Art of War Papers


Art of War Papers: An 'Exit Strategy' Not a Winning Strategy? Intelligence Lessons Learned From the British 'Emergency' in South Arabia, 1963-67

Art of War Papers:

An 'Exit Strategy' Not a Winning Strategy? Intelligence Lessons Learned From the British 'Emergency' in South Arabia, 1963-67

Stephen Andrew Campbell, Major, British Army

152 Pages

Published: 2014

The British Army is often praised for a particular skill in small wars or counter-insurgencies (COIN). Some attribute this to the special challenge of maintaining order across a global empire with a relatively small force; others cite the intellectual inheritance of great British military theorists and an inherent flexibility present within a small army used to adaptation. Recent scholarship has challenged this view, suggesting that the UK’s record of success in COIN is inconsistent and ignores many failures.

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Art of War Papers: Closing the Security Gap

Art of War Papers:

Closing the Security Gap

Michael J. Gunther, MAJ, US Army

144 Pages

Published: 2012

The British and US experience with the use of local, irregular security forces suggest their importance in assisting the host nation government and counterinsurgent forces. Their successful establishment, training, and employment demonstrate the importance of several prerequisites including partnership with an advisory force, consent of the host nation’s government to exist, and that the security force is accountable to the local civil authority. Without these prerequisites, the local, irregular security force could risk illegitimacy in the eyes of the populace, the host nation government, and the counterinsurgent.

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Art of War Papers: Initiative Within the Philosophy of Auftragstaktik

Art of War Papers:

Initiative Within the Philosophy of Auftragstaktik

Martin Sonnenberger, Lieutenant Colonel (GS) German Army

90 Pages

Published: 2015

The philosophy of Auftragstaktik is aimed at initiative of subordinates within and outside of the scope provided by the commander’s intent. While acting within the intent, in general, does not cause problems, acting in alteration of or opposite to given orders regularly will. Deviating from orders within the philosophy of Auftragstaktik is justified by the grundlegende Lageänderung – fundamental change of situation, or if acting upon a higher responsibility to the unit.

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Art of War Papers: Instilling Aggressiveness

Art of War Papers:

Instilling Aggressiveness

William D Harris, Jr. MAJ, US Army

138 Pages

Published: 2013

In March 1947, the United States established an economic and military assistance program to bolster the nationalist Greek government against a communist insurgency. The Greek government suffered from a collapsed economy, deep social divisions, and an inability to defeat the insurgents in battle. The Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group provided operational advice to the Greek National Army that improved the nationalists’ aggressiveness, tactics, battlefield management, and logistics. The advisors used training, mentorship, directive control, and disciplinary action to affect the nationalists’ combat leadership.

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Art of War Papers: Key Considerations for Irregular Security Forces in Counterinsurgency

Art of War Papers:

Key Considerations for Irregular Security Forces in Counterinsurgency

By Robert L. Green, MAJ, US Army

150 Pages

Published: 2012

Counterinsurgents have raised and employed irregular security forces in many campaigns over the last century. Irregular security forces are indigenous forces, not part of the regular police or military organizations of the host nation, that are recruited locally to provide a basic level of security in a given area. Irregular security forces, when used in conjunction with all other available capabilities, contribute to, but do not in and of themselves, ensure success. While irregular security forces can be effective in conducting local security, intelligence gathering, surveillance and other tasks in their home areas, tasks that may prove more difficult for regular security forces, irregular forces are no silver bullet to achieving success.

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Art of War Papers: Lansdale, Magsaysay, America, and the Philippines

Art of War Papers:

Lansdale, Magsaysay, America, and the Philippines

By Andrew E. Lembke, MAJ, US Army

142 Pages

Published: 2013

Historians tend to agree that Ramon Magsaysay’s leadership and his relationship with Edward Lansdale are two of the most important features of the Philippine governments campaign against the Huks from 1946-1954. Yet the nuances of his leadership and the nature of their relationship deserve greater investigation. This thesis seeks to further illuminate Magsaysay and Lansdale’s relationship by focusing on the role of empathy and sociocultural understanding, in defeating the Huks and restoring the Philippine government’s legitimacy. US policy in the Philippines at the time, bolstered regimes riddled with corruption, graft, and nepotism, reinforcing poor governance, and resulting in a loss of government legitimacy.

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Art of War Papers: Military Professionalism and the Early American Officer Corps 1789-1796

Art of War Papers:

Military Professionalism and the Early American Officer Corps 1789-1796

By Christopher W. Wingate, MAJ, US Army

138 Pages

Published: 2013

In September 2012, the Department of the Army published new capstone doctrine, Army Doctrine Publication 1 (ADP 1), The Army, in which the concept of military professionalism occupies an especially prominent place. Coinciding with the release of The Army, the Chief of Staff declared that 2013 features a focus on professionalism; entitled “America’s Army – Our Profession,” in an effort to better understand the idea of military professionalism.

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Art of War Papers: Operations at the Border

Art of War Papers:

Operations at the Border

By Eric Hunter Haas, MAJ, US Army

134 Pages

Published: 2012

Disrupting an insurgent’s access to sanctuary and safe-haven is a critical aspect of operational planning for counterinsurgent forces. By denying an insurgent’s access to safe-havens early in the conflict, the counterinsurgent will gain a marked advantage over the initially weaker force. Only through a deep understanding of how the insurgent is using international, tribal, or cultural borders to evade the counterinsurgent force can the counterinsurgent disrupt the insurgent operations. In order to accomplish this, the counterinsurgent must understand the physical terrain and cultural demographics, nest border operations into the overarching strategy, and employ security forces to reinforce success.

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Art of War Papers: Orde Wingate And the British Internal Security Strategy During the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936-1939

Art of War Papers:

Orde Wingate And the British Internal Security Strategy During the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936-1939

By Mark Lehenbauer, MAJ, US Army

108 Pages

Published: 2012

The Arab Rebellion and British Counter-rebellion campaign of 1936 to 1939 in Palestine exhibited many features of modern insurgency and counterinsurgency. This thesis traces the British military thought and practice for countering rebellion as influenced by their Small Wars’ experiences, and it then presents the rebellion and counter-rebellion campaign as a case study in their military and political contexts. This study focuses on the evolution of the internal security strategy, and it examines the actions of Captain Orde Wingate both within the campaign and in his attempts to influence it at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

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Art of War Papers: Perciptions of Airpower and Implecations for the Leavenworth Schools: Interwar Student Papers

Art of War Papers:

Perciptions of Airpower and Implecations for the Leavenworth Schools: Interwar Student Papers

By David R. Jones, Major, US Army

153 Pages

Published: 2014

This thesis evaluates interwar period US Army officer perceptions of aviation as expressed in student papers written as part of the Command and General Staff School during the 1930s. The evaluation compares student perceptions to period airpower theory and doctrine and applies that study to weigh-in on the broader debate over the effectiveness of Fort Leavenworth during the interwar period.

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Art of War Papers: Protecting, Isolating, and Controlling Behavior

Art of War Papers:

Protecting, Isolating, and Controlling Behavior

By Mark E. Battjes, MAJ, US Army

292 Pages

Published: 2012

The classical counterinsurgency theorists emphasize that it is necessary for the government to gain and maintain control of the population in order to defeat the insurgency. They describe population and resource control measures as a means of doing so. However, some contemporary writers have questioned the legitimacy of such tactics and doubt that they can be employed effectively in modern campaigns.

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Art of War Papers: Stabilizing the Debate between Population and Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency Success Demands a Balanced Approach

Art of War Papers:

Stabilizing the Debate between Population and Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency Success Demands a Balanced Approach

By Nathan Ray Springer, MAJ, US Army

150 Pages

Published: 2012

This thesis contends the debate on whether to embrace a population-centric or enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan detracts focus from building a balanced approach, customized for the human and political landscape in each area of operation (AO). The debate should be finally resolved since each strategic axis represents a crucial portion of the ideal hybrid approach, which necessarily looks different from one AO to the next.

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Art Of War Papers: Survival Through Adaptation - The Chinese Red Army and the Extermination Campaigns, 1927-1936

Art of War Papers:

Survival Through Adaptation - The Chinese Red Army and the Extermination Campaigns, 1927-1936

By Wilbur W. Hsu, MAJ, US Army

196 Pages

Published: 2012

This study analyzes the Chinese Red Army from 1927 to 1936 to determine how the Red Army survived attacks from external military forces and also successfully overcame the threats to its existence posed by changing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies. During this period, the CCP attempted to develop, expand, and professionalize the Chinese Red Army as a way to defend Communist base areas from a series of Kuomingtang (KMT) Extermination Campaigns.

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Art of War Papers: The Biggest Stick - The Employment of Artillery Units in Counterinsurgency

Art of War Papers:

The Biggest Stick - The Employment of Artillery Units in Counterinsurgency

By Richard B. Johnson, MAJ, US Army

229 Pages

Published: 2012

This study uses a comparative analysis of the Malayan Emergency, the American experience in Vietnam, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to examine the role and effectiveness of artillery units in complex counterinsurgency environments. Through this analysis, four factors emerge which impact the employment of artillery units: the counterinsurgency effort’s requirement for indirect fires; constraints and limitations on indirect fires; the counterinsurgency effort’s force organization; and the conversion cost of nonstandard roles for artillery units.

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Art of War Papers: The Proximity Primciple: Army Chaplains on the Fighting Line in Doctrine and History

Art of War Papers:

The Proximity Primciple: Army Chaplains on the Fighting Line in Doctrine and History

By Chaplain Philip A. Kramer, Major, US Army

130 Pages

Published: 2015

The first official US Army chaplain doctrine appeared in 1926 and contained this guidance: “The duty of the chaplain lies with the men of his command who are on the fighting line.” This guidance reflected a principle of proximity — that is, chaplains minister wherever their soldiers are found, up to and including during direct ground combat. The primary argument of this thesis is that this proximity principle — both in chaplain history and chaplain doctrine — has been a dominant theme of the Army chaplain’s ministry.

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Art Of War Papers: The Rhodesian African Rifles

Art of War Papers:

The Rhodesian African Rifles

By MAJ Michael P. Stewart

138 Pages

Published: 2012

The Rhodesian African Rifles overcame profoundly divisive racial and tribal differences among its members because a transcendent “regimental culture” superseded the disparate cultures of its individual soldiers and officers. The RAR’s culture grew around the traditions of the British regimental system, after which the RAR was patterned. The soldiers of the RAR, regardless of racial or tribal background, identified themselves first as soldiers and members of the regiment, before their individual race and tribe. Regimental history and traditions, as well as shared hardships on deployments and training were mechanisms that forced officers and soldiers to see past differences.

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Art of War Papers: The United States and the British Commonwealth in Korea, 1950-1953: A Critical Study of the Origins of Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations

Art of War Papers:

The United States and the British Commonwealth in Korea, 1950-1953: A Critical Study of the Origins of Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations

By Matthew D. Marfongelli, Major, US Army

164 Pages

Published: 2015

Future American military operations, be they high-intensity combat, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counter-insurgency, or otherwise, are likely to require multinational contributions. This requirement is due to several possible considerations, to include limited American military resources or the need to demonstrate legitimacy for an operation through international participation. America’s first opportunity to lead a coalition as a superpower occurred during the 1950-1953 Korean War.

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Art of War Papers: United States’ Grand Strategy Through the Lens of Lebanon in 1983 and Iraq in 2003

Art of War Papers:

United States’ Grand Strategy Through the Lens of Lebanon in 1983 and Iraq in 2003

By Charles P. Bris-Bois III, MAJ, US Air Force

103 Pages

Published: 2013

The United States failed in both Lebanon in 1982-1984 and Iraq in 2003, to achieve its political objectives. While there are many reasons for this, perhaps the greatest is that the government failed to coordinate and direct all of its resources in a unified manner to achieve its goals. This book outlines four key indicators, present in both Lebanon and Iraq, that suggest the United States did not have a grand strategy. Further, this book reveals that Lebanon and Iraq are not anomalies; there are both historical and structural reasons why the United States struggles to implement grand strategies.

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