Mission Command: in Ancient Rome, 218 BC-AD 100

MAJ Michael J. Rasak

Art of War Scholars Series

111 Pages

Published: January 2024

MAJ Michael J. Rasak used extant literary evidence to effectively argue that Rome’s highly offensive and initiative-oriented way of war influenced its development of a command structure that prioritized battlefield dispersion, subordinate autonomy, information sharing, inherently flexible mission orders, and decentralized operations. In this insightful military history Rasak demonstrates how Roman leaders codified and institutionalized these processes and reveals their reliance on concepts resembling modern principles of mission command.

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Whose Role is it Anyway?

The Inter-Service Race to Develop Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles

MAJ Brennan S. Deveraux

Art of War Scholars Series

107 Pages

Published: 2023

Evaluating emerging technology to capitalize on technological innovation—while avoiding unnecessary effort duplication—is an enduring problem for any military organization. The 1950s DoD management of missile development strained a dwindling defense budget, limited the modernization of conventional capabilities, and fractured an already tenuous relationship among the services. MAJ Brennan S. Deveraux explores the historical lessons offered in his Art of War Scholars examination of missile-development and the responsibilities therein.

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Not Just Lucky

How Patton’s Third Army Adapted to Generate Information Advantage, 1944

Spencer L. French, Major, US Army

138 Pages

Published: 2023

In August 1944, Patton’s Third Army smashed through German defenses in Normandy and broke out in a rapid pursuit across France. Third Army’s success was substantially due to its effectiveness at generating operational level information advantage. Information advantage enabled Third Army to gain and maintain the initiative, anticipate decisions, and extend operational reach. Yet when Third Army activated in England in the Spring of 1944, it possessed neither the information forces nor the staff processes to generate information advantage effectively. This study examines how Patton successfully embedded a unique military culture that encouraged rapid adaptation within Third Army’s information forces. Specifically, it explores how Patton’s visionary leadership created a sense of organizational urgency, reducing change resistance. It also analyzes how Patton’s coalition established robust feedback loops and a culture of self-criticism and experimentation. Finally, it looks at how Patton leveraged diverse expertise to develop devastatingly effective solutions to complex problems. Improvements in Third Army’s ability to generate information advantage resulted not from any technological advance or material factor but from a military culture that encouraged adaptation.

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Lessons in Unit Cohesion

from the United States Army’s COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training) Experiment of 1981 to 1995

Michael R. Kearnes, Major, US Army

153 Pages

Published: 2022

In 1981, The United States Army experimented with its personnel management philosophy to examine the benefits of a unit-based system over an individual system. In this Art of War series contribution, MAJ Michael R. Kearnes examines the historical background of personnel management from WW II to the Vietnam War, leading up to the COHORT experiment of the 1980s and 1990s. COHORT aimed to build cohesion via stability at the company and battalion levels on a three-year life cycle. Kearnes concludes that personnel stability is a prerequisite to cohesion and unit effectiveness and that the personnel system ought to focus on building unit cohesion through personnel stability, and account for individual concerns when possible, in both peace and war.

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Retaining Talent

Lessons from Australia, Norway, and Sister Services

Sarah M. Gerstein, Major, US Army

91 Pages

Published: 2022

Women play a critical role in the defense of the United States as members of the military. As women have joined the workplace in increasing numbers, they do not remain in the US Army at the same rate as their male counterparts. The US Army is unable to capitalize on the full extent of the US population to recruit and retain its most valuable weapon: the American soldier. MAJ Sarah Gerstein uses a qualitative research methodology to analyze four other armed serves to understand what efforts they have made towards retaining diverse populations. Using the US Coast Guard, the US Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, and the Norwegian Armed Forces, she evaluates what policies the US Army could adopt to better retain female officers.

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Art of War Papers: Avoiding the Paris Gun Trap

The Future of America’s Strategic Artillery

Ian P. Grundhauser, Major, US Army.

98 Pages

Published: 2022

In an attempt to end the stalemate on the Western Front during World War I, German scientists and engineers created a supergun capable of firing a 233-pound projectile over 75 miles to bombard the citizens of Paris, France. These weapons, The Paris Guns, possessed the potential to achieve an exponential military advantage for the German Military. The Germans’ folly became clear as they developed a weapon without first considering its ability to achieve the effects they desired. Today, the United States Army seeks to develop superguns capable of exponentially increased range, the strategic long-range cannons. The United States Army has defined a role for these weapons in deterring in competition, and penetrating and dis-integrating anti-access and area denial networks in armed conflict. This study examines the history and effects of The Paris Guns at the strategic level. It then measures the accumulation of these effects across the operational variables. This study concludes that The Paris Guns achieved some strategic effects; these effects did not benefit the Germans. Additionally, this study concludes that the United States Army’s pursuit of strategic long-range cannons is viable, provided the pursuit avoids the same strategic errors of The Paris Guns during World War I.

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Art of War Papers: A Legacy of Ashes

The US Army and the Destruction of San Francisco

Erik C. Alfsen, Chaplain (Major).

137 Pages

Published: 2021

In the hours, days, and weeks following the 1906 earthquake and subsequent fires that all but destroyed San Francisco, the United States Army mobilized to provide security, firefighting, and disaster relief. In this Art of War study, Chaplain Erik C. Alfsen examines the shortcomings and strengths of the military actions, closing the gap between civilian and military scholarship on this event. The book concludes with implications for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions in the modern era.

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Art of War Papers:

An 'Exit Strategy' Not a Winning Strategy? Intelligence Lessons Learned From the British 'Emergency' in South Arabia, 1963-67

Stephen Andrew Campbell, Major, British Army

152 Pages

Published: 2014

The British Army is often praised for a particular skill in small wars or counter-insurgencies (COIN). Some attribute this to the special challenge of maintaining order across a global empire with a relatively small force; others cite the intellectual inheritance of great British military theorists and an inherent flexibility present within a small army used to adaptation. Recent scholarship has challenged this view, suggesting that the UK’s record of success in COIN is inconsistent and ignores many failures.

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Art of War Papers: Army Training, Sir

The Impact of the World War I Experience on the Evolution of Training Doctrine in the US Army

Gregory C. Hope, Major, US Army

131 Pages

Published: 2021

The American Army’s mobilization for World War I was fraught with difficulties, resulting in a number of failings that produced a capable but flawed expeditionary force. The traditional interpretation of army training during that conflict was lackluster as it produced combat units that lacked critical capabilities. The experience of learning how to train and how to write training doctrine produced positive results that historians have largely overlooked. This study examines the status of training in the pre-war army to include both existing doctrine and institutional management organizations. It then chronicles the wartime experience and traces the evolution of training doctrine and practices during the war. It concludes by looking at the immediate post-war years to determine what lasting impacts the wartime experiences had on training doctrine and management. Overall, this study concludes that the training effort during World War I had significant long-term benefits for the army, producing the foundation of the army’s training practices through World War II.

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Art of War Papers:

At the Limit of Complexity: British Military Operations in North Persia and the Caucasus 1918

Roland P. Minez, Major, US Army

154 Pages

Published: 2018

MAJ Roland Minez’s Art of War Paper, At the Limit of Complexity: British Military Operations in North Persia and the Caucasus, 1918 highlights the volatile, complex, and ambiguous operating environment likely to face future military operations in unanticipated and far-flung corners of the globe. As World War I wound down, Commonwealth forces entered the Caucasus to fill a power vacuum left by the collapse of the Russian Empire as well as forestall German and Ottoman influence, protect vulnerable Armenian populations that were already the victims of an ongoing genocide and shield vital petroleum reserves, both in the region and in Persia. Dunsterforce, the polyglot and inadequate ad hoc force given this unenviable mission struggled to balance competing priorities, secure adequate support, and navigate the myriad of interests struggling for control of the region, especially the vital petroleum reserves at Baku. While hardly a story of a successful undertaking, the British actions typify complex operations common in the recent past, including interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo when peacekeepers had to sort out competing factions, all while attempting to train friendly forces capable of assuming the mission, the purpose of the current Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). Thus, MAJ Minez’s historical case study offers a wealth of lessons for future Soldiers attempting to solve complex problems in hostile and remote locales.

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Art of War Papers:

Closing the Security Gap

Michael J. Gunther, MAJ, US Army

144 Pages

Published: 2012

The British and US experience with the use of local, irregular security forces suggest their importance in assisting the host nation government and counterinsurgent forces. Their successful establishment, training, and employment demonstrate the importance of several prerequisites including partnership with an advisory force, consent of the host nation’s government to exist, and that the security force is accountable to the local civil authority. Without these prerequisites, the local, irregular security force could risk illegitimacy in the eyes of the populace, the host nation government, and the counterinsurgent.

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Forging the 10th Mountain Division for War, 1940–45

How Innovation Created a Highly Adaptive Formation

Justin J. Chabalko, Major, US Army

102 Pages

Published: 2020

In Forging the 10th Mountain Division for War, MAJ Justin Chabalko presents a history of Army adaptability and ingenuity. The latest in AUP's Art of War series offers an examination of how wartime and environmental factors informed Army training, with the exciting history of the development of the 10th Mountain Division and the special cold weather considerations that came with preparing troops for victory in extreme conditions. The successes the 10th Mountain Division earned in the mountains of Italy during World War II highlighted the benefits of adaptive training efforts and specialized force building throughout the US Army. Climb to Glory!

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From Domination to Consolidation

At the Tactical Level in Future Large-Scale Combat Operations

Dominik Josef Schellenberger, Lieutenant Colonel, German Army

140 Pages

Published: 2020

The current operational environment is characterized by the emergence of the information age and peer and near peer adversaries. The 2017 Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations addresses those paradigm shifts by introducing the multi-domain extended battlefield and four Army strategic roles-shape, prevent, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains.

FM 3-0 officially implements consolidation of gains and the related consolidation area for the first time into US Army doctrine. The purpose of consolidation of gains is to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities. An analysis of the historical role the US Army played at the end of World War II for the transition in occupied Germany as well as of current doctrine and future-oriented concepts leads to eighteen suggested doctrinal changes concerning consolidation of gains across US Army operations, leadership, and mission command doctrine.

Four of those suggested doctrinal changes are the introduction of a comprehensive multi-domain consolidation area, the emphasis of intent-guided procedural control, the codification of virtual and cognitive consolidation of gains, and the doctrinal recognition of the possible need for temporary military government.

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Art of War Papers:

How China Wins: A Case Study of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War

Christopher M. Gin, Major, US Army

102 Pages

Published: 2016

This Art of War Paper examines whether or not China won a strategic victory in its invasion of Vietnam in 1979, and what relevance that victory may have on today's study of Chinese strategy and military thought. Other studies have focused on the regional issues that led China and Vietnam to war in February 1979. This study instead focuses on China's grand strategic framing of the war and why China may interpret its involvement as a strategic victory.

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Art of War Papers:

Initiative Within the Philosophy of Auftragstaktik

Martin Sonnenberger, Lieutenant Colonel (GS) German Army

90 Pages

Published: 2015

The philosophy of Auftragstaktik is aimed at initiative of subordinates within and outside of the scope provided by the commander’s intent. While acting within the intent, in general, does not cause problems, acting in alteration of or opposite to given orders regularly will. Deviating from orders within the philosophy of Auftragstaktik is justified by the grundlegende Lageänderung – fundamental change of situation, or if acting upon a higher responsibility to the unit.

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Art of War Papers: Inside the Sea Dragon

The Generations Within the Current People’s Liberation Army Navy Officer Corps

Brian C. Juskiewicz, Lieutenant Commander, US Navy

121 Pages

Published: 2019

The author uses Karl Mannheim's social generation theory to analyze the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and argue that the current generation of rising leaders differs markedly from that of the past. Due to historical events and policy decisions, such as the end of the Cultural Revolution, the one-child policy, an expansionist foreign policy, and a western-style accession of highly educated university students, the new crop of PLAN leaders represents China's hybrid culture of revolutionary fervor mixed with market reforms and provides technically competent leadership for a twenty-first century force.

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Art of War Papers:

Instilling Aggressiveness

William D Harris, Jr. MAJ, US Army

138 Pages

Published: 2013

In March 1947, the United States established an economic and military assistance program to bolster the nationalist Greek government against a communist insurgency. The Greek government suffered from a collapsed economy, deep social divisions, and an inability to defeat the insurgents in battle. The Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group provided operational advice to the Greek National Army that improved the nationalists’ aggressiveness, tactics, battlefield management, and logistics. The advisors used training, mentorship, directive control, and disciplinary action to affect the nationalists’ combat leadership.

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Art of War Papers: Jakarta Knows Best

US Defense Policies and Security Cooperation in 1950s Indonesia

Richard W. B. Hutton, Major, United States Army

100 Pages

Published: 2019

Jakarta Knows Best by Major Richard W. B. Hutton is the latest addition to the Art of War series. This study carefully examines how the US crafted and conducted policy toward Indonesia in the early years of the Cold War. As the author shows, in the engagement of this important country, cultural understanding and personal relationships were as important as military equipment and monetary aid.

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Art of War Papers:

Key Considerations for Irregular Security Forces in Counterinsurgency

By Robert L. Green, MAJ, US Army

150 Pages

Published: 2012

Counterinsurgents have raised and employed irregular security forces in many campaigns over the last century. Irregular security forces are indigenous forces, not part of the regular police or military organizations of the host nation, that are recruited locally to provide a basic level of security in a given area. Irregular security forces, when used in conjunction with all other available capabilities, contribute to, but do not in and of themselves, ensure success. While irregular security forces can be effective in conducting local security, intelligence gathering, surveillance and other tasks in their home areas, tasks that may prove more difficult for regular security forces, irregular forces are no silver bullet to achieving success.

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Art of War Papers:

Lansdale, Magsaysay, America, and the Philippines

By Andrew E. Lembke, MAJ, US Army

142 Pages

Published: 2013

Historians tend to agree that Ramon Magsaysay’s leadership and his relationship with Edward Lansdale are two of the most important features of the Philippine governments campaign against the Huks from 1946-1954. Yet the nuances of his leadership and the nature of their relationship deserve greater investigation. This thesis seeks to further illuminate Magsaysay and Lansdale’s relationship by focusing on the role of empathy and sociocultural understanding, in defeating the Huks and restoring the Philippine government’s legitimacy. US policy in the Philippines at the time, bolstered regimes riddled with corruption, graft, and nepotism, reinforcing poor governance, and resulting in a loss of government legitimacy.

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Art of War Papers:

Learning from Our Military History

The United States Army, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the Potential for Operational Art and Thinking

By Aaron J. Kaufman, Major, US Army

171 Pages

Published: 2017

The Army University Press is pleased to publish "Learning From Our Military History: The United States Army, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the Potential for Operational Art and Thinking", another book in The Art of War Series. LTC Aaron Kaufman examines how the US Army was successful in Operation Iraqi Freedom. He notes that some tactical organizations, companies included, learned and adapted, whereas others accomplished little and made the environment worse. The interviews conducted and personal reflections confirmed that a deeper and more historical understanding is required. He concludes that OIF demonstrated the need for operational art and thinking, particularly in commanders of relatively junior rank. This work offers an explanation on how we learned and adapted in OIF, not for the purposes of a definitive military history, but only as an intellectual way point that may lead us to useful military history for the future of the Army.

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Art of War Papers:

Military Professionalism and the Early American Officer Corps 1789-1796

By Christopher W. Wingate, MAJ, US Army

138 Pages

Published: 2013

In September 2012, the Department of the Army published new capstone doctrine, Army Doctrine Publication 1 (ADP 1), The Army, in which the concept of military professionalism occupies an especially prominent place. Coinciding with the release of The Army, the Chief of Staff declared that 2013 features a focus on professionalism; entitled “America’s Army – Our Profession,” in an effort to better understand the idea of military professionalism.

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Art of War Papers:

Operations at the Border

By Eric Hunter Haas, MAJ, US Army

134 Pages

Published: 2012

Disrupting an insurgent’s access to sanctuary and safe-haven is a critical aspect of operational planning for counterinsurgent forces. By denying an insurgent’s access to safe-havens early in the conflict, the counterinsurgent will gain a marked advantage over the initially weaker force. Only through a deep understanding of how the insurgent is using international, tribal, or cultural borders to evade the counterinsurgent force can the counterinsurgent disrupt the insurgent operations. In order to accomplish this, the counterinsurgent must understand the physical terrain and cultural demographics, nest border operations into the overarching strategy, and employ security forces to reinforce success.

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Art of War Papers:

Orde Wingate And the British Internal Security Strategy During the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936-1939

By Mark Lehenbauer, MAJ, US Army

108 Pages

Published: 2012

The Arab Rebellion and British Counter-rebellion campaign of 1936 to 1939 in Palestine exhibited many features of modern insurgency and counterinsurgency. This thesis traces the British military thought and practice for countering rebellion as influenced by their Small Wars’ experiences, and it then presents the rebellion and counter-rebellion campaign as a case study in their military and political contexts. This study focuses on the evolution of the internal security strategy, and it examines the actions of Captain Orde Wingate both within the campaign and in his attempts to influence it at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

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Art of War Papers:

Perceptions of Airpower and Implications for the Leavenworth Schools: Interwar Student Papers

By David R. Jones, Major, US Army

153 Pages

Published: 2014

This thesis evaluates interwar period US Army officer perceptions of aviation as expressed in student papers written as part of the Command and General Staff School during the 1930s. The evaluation compares student perceptions to period airpower theory and doctrine and applies that study to weigh-in on the broader debate over the effectiveness of Fort Leavenworth during the interwar period.

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Art of War Papers:

Protecting, Isolating, and Controlling Behavior

By Mark E. Battjes, MAJ, US Army

292 Pages

Published: 2012

The classical counterinsurgency theorists emphasize that it is necessary for the government to gain and maintain control of the population in order to defeat the insurgency. They describe population and resource control measures as a means of doing so. However, some contemporary writers have questioned the legitimacy of such tactics and doubt that they can be employed effectively in modern campaigns.

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Art of War Papers:

Stabilizing the Debate between Population and Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency Success Demands a Balanced Approach

By Nathan Ray Springer, MAJ, US Army

150 Pages

Published: 2012

This thesis contends the debate on whether to embrace a population-centric or enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan detracts focus from building a balanced approach, customized for the human and political landscape in each area of operation (AO). The debate should be finally resolved since each strategic axis represents a crucial portion of the ideal hybrid approach, which necessarily looks different from one AO to the next.

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Art of War Papers:

Survival Through Adaptation - The Chinese Red Army and the Extermination Campaigns, 1927-1936

By Wilbur W. Hsu, MAJ, US Army

196 Pages

Published: 2012

This study analyzes the Chinese Red Army from 1927 to 1936 to determine how the Red Army survived attacks from external military forces and also successfully overcame the threats to its existence posed by changing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies. During this period, the CCP attempted to develop, expand, and professionalize the Chinese Red Army as a way to defend Communist base areas from a series of Kuomingtang (KMT) Extermination Campaigns.

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Art of War Papers:

The Biggest Stick - The Employment of Artillery Units in Counterinsurgency

By Richard B. Johnson, MAJ, US Army

229 Pages

Published: 2012

This study uses a comparative analysis of the Malayan Emergency, the American experience in Vietnam, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to examine the role and effectiveness of artillery units in complex counterinsurgency environments. Through this analysis, four factors emerge which impact the employment of artillery units: the counterinsurgency effort’s requirement for indirect fires; constraints and limitations on indirect fires; the counterinsurgency effort’s force organization; and the conversion cost of nonstandard roles for artillery units.

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Art of War Papers:

The Proximity Principle: Army Chaplains on the Fighting Line in Doctrine and History

By Chaplain Philip A. Kramer, Major, US Army

130 Pages

Published: 2015

The first official US Army chaplain doctrine appeared in 1926 and contained this guidance: “The duty of the chaplain lies with the men of his command who are on the fighting line.” This guidance reflected a principle of proximity — that is, chaplains minister wherever their soldiers are found, up to and including during direct ground combat. The primary argument of this thesis is that this proximity principle — both in chaplain history and chaplain doctrine — has been a dominant theme of the Army chaplain’s ministry.

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Art of War Papers:

The Rhodesian African Rifles

By MAJ Michael P. Stewart

138 Pages

Published: 2012

The Rhodesian African Rifles overcame profoundly divisive racial and tribal differences among its members because a transcendent “regimental culture” superseded the disparate cultures of its individual soldiers and officers. The RAR’s culture grew around the traditions of the British regimental system, after which the RAR was patterned. The soldiers of the RAR, regardless of racial or tribal background, identified themselves first as soldiers and members of the regiment, before their individual race and tribe. Regimental history and traditions, as well as shared hardships on deployments and training were mechanisms that forced officers and soldiers to see past differences.

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Art of War Papers:

The United States and the British Commonwealth in Korea, 1950-1953: A Critical Study of the Origins of Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations

By Matthew D. Marfongelli, Major, US Army

164 Pages

Published: 2015

Future American military operations, be they high-intensity combat, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counter-insurgency, or otherwise, are likely to require multinational contributions. This requirement is due to several possible considerations, to include limited American military resources or the need to demonstrate legitimacy for an operation through international participation. America’s first opportunity to lead a coalition as a superpower occurred during the 1950-1953 Korean War.

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Art of War Papers:

United States’ Grand Strategy Through the Lens of Lebanon in 1983 and Iraq in 2003

By Charles P. Bris-Bois III, MAJ, US Air Force

103 Pages

Published: 2013

The United States failed in both Lebanon in 1982-1984 and Iraq in 2003, to achieve its political objectives. While there are many reasons for this, perhaps the greatest is that the government failed to coordinate and direct all of its resources in a unified manner to achieve its goals. This book outlines four key indicators, present in both Lebanon and Iraq, that suggest the United States did not have a grand strategy. Further, this book reveals that Lebanon and Iraq are not anomalies; there are both historical and structural reasons why the United States struggles to implement grand strategies.

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