Art of War Papers


The Mattis Way of War: An Examination of Operational Art in Task Force 58 and 1st Marine Division

The Mattis Way of War

An Examination of Operational Art in Task Force 58 and 1st Marine Division

By Major Michael L. Valenti, USMC

84 Pages

Published: 2016

In The Mattis Way of War, US Marine Corps Major Michael Valenti suggests that the thought and practices of General (Ret.) James Mattis offer a new warfighting paradigm. Valenti looks closely at Mattis’ commands in Afghanistan and Iraq, finding that his approach to leadership focused on trust and cohesion. Adding to this philosophy was his deep belief in the practical study and use of military history. Onto this foundation, Mattis introduced innovations in the staff structure and operational tempo which ultimately played a significant role in shaping the campaigns he led in 2001 and 2003.

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How China Wins: A Case Study of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War

How China Wins

A Case Study of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War

By Christopher M. Gin, Major, US Army

85 Pages

Published: 2016

The Army Press is pleased to announce the publishing of “How China Wins: A Case Study of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War”, the latest volume in the Art of War Series. This study examines whether or not China won a strategic victory in its invasion of Vietnam in 1979, and what relevance that victory may have on today’s study of Chinese strategy and military thought. Unlike other studies that have focused on the regional issues that led China and Vietnam to war, this study instead focuses on China’s grand strategic framing of the war and why China may interpret its involvement as a strategic victory.

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Perceptions of Airpower and Implications for the Leavenworth Schools: Interwar Student Papers

Perceptions of Airpower and Implications for the Leavenworth Schools

Interwar Student Papers

By David R. Jones, Major, US Army

85 Pages

Published: 2016

This edition of the Art of War Paper examines papers written by US Army officers on airpower topics while attending the Command and General Staff School during the 1930s. From the thesis of the document: “Examination of the papers written on airpower topics suggests that the interwar CGSS students held relatively conservative views of the role of aviation in warfare.” And: “Rather than viewing aviation as the dominant force in war, they perceived it as part of a combined arms effort to defeat an enemy’s military forces and will to fight.”

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Initiative Within the Philosophy of Auftragstaktik: Determining Factors of the Understanding of Initiative in the German Army, 1806-1955

Initiative Within the Philosophy of Auftragstaktik

Determining Factors of the Understanding of Initiative in the German Army, 1806-1955

By Martin Sonnenberger, Lieutenant Colonel (GS) German Army

90 Pages

Published: 2016

The philosophy of Auftragstaktik is aimed at initiative of subordinates within and outside of the scope provided by the commander’s intent. While acting within the intent, in general, does not cause problems, acting in alteration of or opposite to given orders regularly will. Deviating from orders within the philosophy of Auftragstaktik is justified by the grundlegende Lageänderung – fundamental change of situation, or if acting upon a higher responsibility to the unit.

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