

North Korean Collapse or Korean Reunification

The Importance of Preparation over Prediction

Bryan Port

Korea is of tremendous importance to U.S. national security and economic prosperity. Unfortunately, most Americans do not closely follow developments in Korea despite the high stakes involved—stakes that include the safety of over one hundred thousand Americans in South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK), hundreds of thousands of American jobs tied to exports to the ROK, and tens of billions of dollars invested there. Americans likely would lose their lives, jobs, or property in the earliest hours of a conflict in Korea. Further, a conflict would alter the regional balance of power and have strategic implications for the United States. The manner in which the United States participated in a potential conflict, particularly related to Korean reunification, would affect whether the United States was able to sustain the leading role it plays in northeast Asia and to continue reaping the many associated economic and security benefits. The effects of a collapse of the North Korean government or of reunification of the two Koreas would be so profound that they demand strategies, policies, plans, decisions, and actions to prepare the United States and the ROK to

secure their interests and shape the strategic environment that would follow.¹

North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK) presents a severe and growing threat to American interests. It directly threatens the lives of Americans and the citizens of our allies, develops and proliferates weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and commits extensive human rights abuses. Most Americans are aware of the DPRK's efforts to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and they often hear of its "strange" leaders. However, few understand the DPRK's enduring conventional military threat and the destruction it could inflict on the ROK and, to a growing extent, the WMD threat it presents to the United States. It is even more difficult to grasp the consequences of the collapse of the DPRK's government. While the prospects of a large loss of American lives is less in a collapse scenario, a collapse would nonetheless





North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visits the construction site of an orphanage 11 February 2015 in Wonsan, Kangwon Province, North Korea. The quality of the construction shown in the photo is indicative of the problems faced in North Korea. (Photo courtesy of Rodong Sinmun)

alter the strategic landscape of northeast Asia and significantly affect U.S. interests.

Preparing for collapse or reunification is more important than predicting it. However, to be clear, I am not advocating a deliberate effort to overthrow the North Korean regime; rather, my focus is on preparing for a collapse or reunification, assuming that at some point we will face this situation without any direct effort to bring it about. Preparation is critical due to the strategic importance of these potential developments. Without predicting the timing or circumstances of a collapse or reunification, there are many dimensions of these situations that we can identify, enabling efforts now to prepare to resolve an instability crisis.

Although the U.S. and ROK forces maintain a high state of readiness, produce detailed operational plans, and conduct rigorous training, they can do more to plan for and prepare to handle collapse or reunification. With millions of lives, trillions of dollars, and vital national interests at stake, it is imperative that the United States and the ROK continue to develop a common understanding that enables the design and implementation of strategies, policies, and plans for handling collapse that places active preparation at their core. The objectives are clear: enable stabilization of North Korea, enable the Korean people to decide when and how to reunify, and position the United States and a unified Korea to sustain one of history's most successful alliances and, by extension, enable

the United States to continue to contribute to regional stability as well as sustain its influence and interests in northeast Asia.

It is unlikely that, in terms of personnel and quantity of materiel, the ROK and U.S. militaries will have sufficient capabilities on hand and pre-positioned to deal with a North Korean collapse or reunification.² However, based on experience, doctrine, and extant capabilities, the U.S. military can make a potent contribution to a ROK-led preparation-centric strategy. As the *Army Operating Concept* explains, as a member of the joint force, the Army has well-developed capabilities for establishing stable environments in postconflict or failed-state environments, consolidating gains, and achieving sustainable outcomes.³ The U.S. Army's efforts to enhance the performance of its soldiers and civilians in confronting complexity position it well to succeed in preparing for or executing operations in a North Korean collapse. From the foundation of a ROK-led preparation-centric strategy, the U.S. military can play a powerful, albeit supporting, role in stabilizing North Korea.

Contextualizing and Bounding the Problems

The DPRK's problems are many and varied, but most are knowable and will have to be dealt with eventually, whether because of war, regime collapse, or peaceful reunification. Analysts focusing on North Korea can produce a catalog of challenges and opportunities associated with North Korean collapse or reunification.⁴ That catalog, in turn, can provide government agencies with a framework from which to create solutions to challenges and methods to take advantage of opportunities in the pursuit of objectives, including establishing a durable peace on the peninsula, denuclearization, and regional stability.

There is a growing body of work useful for assessing issues associated with the DPRK's instability and potential collapse, as well as references that provide structured approaches to active preparation and, if necessary, a positive response to those events.⁵ U.S. Army doctrine, drawing on extensive stability operations experience, offers a framework against which to apply analysis and preparation, and upon which we can layer area-specific expertise.⁶ U.S. scholarship and unclassified government analysis of the subject matter are a relatively recent development and provide critical country-specific context

to layer onto U.S. Army doctrine and experience.⁷

Collectively, the work referenced above is invaluable in understanding the context of potential regime collapse in the DPRK or reunification of the two Koreas, and correspondingly, for designing and executing a strategy to prepare for these potentialities.

"7P" Strategy

A "7P" strategy—*politics, public (support), prediction (assessment), policy, plans, preparation, and prompting (shaping)*—best positions the U.S.-ROK alliance to stabilize North Korea and set conditions to enable reunification and reintegration.⁸ All seven Ps are critical, but this article focuses on policy and preparation. Collectively, the other Ps can be used to prompt positive, and hopefully stable, change in North Korea.⁹

The 7P strategy does not advocate or require efforts to bring down the Kim family regime. Rather, this strategy is designed primarily to enable rapid, effective, and efficient stabilization, and potentially reunification, in the event of a collapse crisis that originates internally in North Korea. However, perhaps the 7P strategy could encourage, or enable, the Kim family regime to implement changes that reduce the threat they present to their neighbors and enhance the well-being of their own people.

Politics and Public Support

Concerted efforts are required in both the United States and the ROK to build understanding and support for a campaign to stabilize North Korea in the event of collapse. In the ROK, support for reunification is eroding. Other than with Koreans in their fifties and older, there is not significant support in any strata of ROK society to pay the costs required to achieve reunification, let alone to make advance investments through taxes or other material measures to offset reunification costs.¹⁰ Responding to changing perspectives in ROK society, President Park Geun-hye is working to build a consensus on reunification.¹¹ Indications from focus groups are that her administration's efforts have arrested the decline in support for reunification and sparked a broader dialogue on the issue.¹² However, national consensus remains elusive; it is trending toward acceptance of continued division or perhaps a future federation. More is required to sustain, enhance, and ultimately transition a societal dialogue into tangible support for active preparation for collapse or reunification, which, depending on North



Young people from a collective farm in North Korea harvest crops 30 October 2012. Autumn rains had soaked the crops, which may have made them difficult to store. Citizens of North Korea continually face famine, exacerbated by the country's "military first" policy. (Photo by Devrig Velly, European Union)

Korea, may not come about in a manner that offers a choice to the ROK other than direct involvement.¹³

The U.S. public presents a tougher challenge in terms of its willingness to support stabilization of North Korea in the event of regime collapse or to support reunification. Americans would likely be reluctant to support a fight against remnants of the DPRK's military to bring about stability or reunification. In order to draw support, the U.S. government would be well served to provide the American people with a compelling explanation about the U.S. interests at stake in the event of regime collapse or reunification, to include the need to gain control over the DPRK's WMD.

From Prediction to Assessment

We must transcend the tendency to predict the fate of the Kim regime, to assess, instead, the requirements for stabilizing North Korea should its regime collapse, and for setting the conditions for reunification. For more than two decades, since the death of Kim Il-sung, Korea watchers focused on predicting the DPRK's collapse at the expense of a disciplined

consideration of the preparation necessary to respond to North Korean instability, let alone reunification and reintegration. Beginning with the death of Kim Il-sung, the focus on collapse intensified at key inflection points, including the first North Korean nuclear crisis and famine. The result has been a twenty-year analytic wandering; analysts tend to admire the problem and mystery that is North Korea rather than considering how to make progress in pursuing national interests, or, more nobly, how to bring relief to the long-suffering North Korean people.

With Kim Jong-un effectively wielding power, the cottage industry of predicting North Korea's collapse adjusted its business model. Analysis now centers on new areas such as power consolidation and relationships among North Korean elites.¹⁴ Rather than predicting the precise timing and circumstances of the Kim regime's demise, most are content to assess that the Kim regime cannot last forever.¹⁵ This shift has facilitated thought on responding to instability, not just predicting it. This shift in turn is rendering analytically robust frameworks useful for actual preparation.¹⁶



Farmers bring in the maize crop 24 October 2012 in North Hwanghae Province, North Korea. Because of a lack of proper storage facilities, the crop is lying out in the open, which could result in significant losses and contribute to North Korea's continual famine conditions. (Photo by Devrig Velly, European Union)

Fortunately, we do not need to know the exact timing or nature of a North Korean collapse to understand and prepare for the challenges associated with it. We do not need to define every challenge in detail. We have enough knowable objectives, tasks, and problems to facilitate deliberate planning, as well as active preparation. Setting policy against and preparing for the *knowns* will leave us better postured to succeed when *unknowns* inevitably arise. Thus, we must ensure that prediction gives way to assessment, and that planning does not substitute for actual preparation for instability or reunification. We should move to set conditions for whatever may come, as well as to enhance deterrence and shape positive, stable change toward stability in North Korea.

Using Policy and Doctrine to Design Frameworks

U.S. policy and military doctrine provide a framework for preparation. Applying Korea subject-matter expertise to that policy and doctrine will enable the United States and the ROK to sharpen and transcend planning in order to begin preparations. Specific policy and doctrinal references include

Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, *Stability Operations*; Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operational Planning*; and Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07, *Stability*.

DODI 3000.05 establishes stability operations as a core U.S. military mission.¹⁷ It holds that civilians are best suited to perform stability tasks, but when not prepared to do so, the Department of Defense (DOD) leads operations to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance. The DOD leads until it can transition tasks to other U.S. agencies, foreign governments, or international organizations. However, the United States must ensure its policy and doctrine allow for the unique circumstances of a North Korean collapse, particularly the leadership role of the ROK.

U.S. military planning doctrine found in JP 5-0 provides a comprehensive approach to planning for any operations, including intervention in instability crises, ranging from those with limited objectives (resolving a humanitarian crisis) to those with maximal end states (conditions for reunification).¹⁸

ADP 3-07 defines stability tasks as “tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”¹⁹ The primary stability tasks are to establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development.²⁰ These tasks are important elements in a framework that guides preparation for a North Korean collapse or Korean reunification.

Crucial Policy Decisions

U.S. and ROK policy on North Korea is fundamentally sound, but profoundly incomplete. The ROK and the United States have clear positions on North Korean denuclearization, responding to North Korean military aggression, and the need for the DPRK to respect human rights. Unfortunately, more detailed policy decisions are required to enable active preparation to handle collapse or reunification situations.

Policy is also required to set conditions to proactively reduce or eliminate sources of instability in advance of a crisis that would prompt the ROK and United States to intervene, as well as to influence the DPRK to adopt a responsible approach. We must establish policies that allow us to provide a vision for a positive future to the majority of North Koreans. This is not to say, for example, that the ROK needs exhaustively detailed civil and criminal codes for a reunified Korea or analogous bodies of policy in other realms such as education. Rather, we need guidelines that will provide North Koreans, individually and collectively, a sense of their prospects in a changed or reunified Korea, and what they must and must not do to realize those opportunities. Correspondingly, guidelines will provide a sound planning-and-preparation platform to guide the military in how it is to relate to North Koreans in the event of an intervention.

The policy decisions in play are at levels above the military’s purview, but the issues at hand have a crucial impact on the planning and conduct of military operations. Some of the issues include transitional justice, salaries and pensions for former government officials and military personnel, property rights, macroeconomic issues (e.g., disposition of the North Korean currency, the *won*), educational policy (to include curriculum

development and professional credentialing), and more. Decisions in areas such as these will enable the military to plan, train, and allocate resources well in advance of a crisis. The military is responsible for providing its best military advice to civilian leaders, and for gaining a clearer sense of how the political leadership intends to proceed. Collectively clear communication between military and civil authorities on matters of policy will enable the military to optimize operations to facilitate a smooth transition from a military- to a civilian-led operation.

Policies on these types of issues can be used to decrease the scope, intensity, and duration of violence and resistance during stability operations. Better still, they can increase the prospects for gaining popular support—in North Korea, as well as in the ROK, the United States, and the international community. Policy guidelines in each of these areas will enable the military to co-opt, or at least nonmilitarily neutralize, significant elements of the DPRK’s military and security services. This, in turn, can lower the resource requirements and the strategic risk associated with stabilizing North Korea.

These types of decisions will need to be made at some point regardless of how change comes about in North Korea. If made sooner, these decisions can prove useful in deterrence, response to aggression, strategic shaping, and international consensus building. The key is to avoid losing opportunities to prepare for and handle sudden change for want of policy decisions and guidance.

From Policy to Planning

With policy guidance in hand, the military can better conduct deliberate planning for responding to North Korean collapse. Deliberate planning will bring into relief issues that are currently obscured, but that if handled poorly could fuel sustained resistance in North Korea or exacerbate an already severe humanitarian crisis. For example, some of the earliest areas likely to come under control of the ROK or a U.S.-ROK alliance include North Korea’s Hwanghae Province—its breadbasket. Failure to rapidly rehabilitate agriculture in the event of a North Korean collapse could cost the ROK and U.S.-ROK alliance legitimacy and place an already vulnerable population at further risk of malnutrition or starvation. Successful economic and infrastructure development efforts at the outset of a crisis in the areas earliest under the control of the ROK or the U.S.-ROK alliance would encourage North Koreans in other areas of the country

to be more pliant, if not cooperative.

With greater fidelity on challenges and opportunities, and knowing most boots on the ground will be ROK troops, the United States can better identify and prepare to contribute unique combat multipliers, or stability multipliers. Specific areas for consideration include, but are not limited to, command, control, communications, and computers; imagery intelligence; mobility; logistics; military medicine; military law enforcement and justice; and military engineering. We train our forces to meet the requirements of our plans. Therefore, shifts in planning will have significant implications on training and readiness, as well as on resources. As training begets readiness, shifts in our plans will lead to greater preparedness.

From Planning to Preparation

The U.S. military can do much to prepare for the challenges of stability operations in North Korea. However, doing so requires vision, leadership, resources, and the acceptance of risk. It is no easy task to convince either the American or the South Korean people to invest resources now for an event that some believe may never come and that cannot be predicted with precision. This is acutely so when factoring in the other priorities and challenges each nation currently faces. Complicating matters, active preparation initiatives could prompt a North Korean backlash,

Astronauts on the International Space Station took this night image of the Korean Peninsula on 30 January 2014. Unlike daylight images, city lights at night illustrate dramatically the relative economic importance of cities, as gauged by relative size. In this north-looking view, it is immediately obvious that greater Seoul is a major city and that the port of Gunsan (south of Seoul) is minor by comparison. There are 25.6 million people in the Seoul metropolitan area—more than half of South Korea's citizens—while Gunsan's population is 280,000. North Korea is almost completely dark compared to neighboring South Korea and China. The darkened land appears as if it were a patch of water joining the Yellow Sea to the Sea of Japan. Its capital city, Pyongyang, appears like a small island, despite a population of 3.26 million (as of 2008). The light emission from Pyongyang is equivalent to the smaller towns in South Korea. Coastlines are often very apparent in night imagery, as shown by South Korea's eastern shoreline. But the coast of North Korea is difficult to detect. These differences are illustrated in per capita power consumption in the two countries, with South Korea at 10,162 kilowatt hours and North Korea at 739 kilowatt hours. (Photo courtesy of NASA)



even when explicitly communicated and executed as being done without the intent of bringing about the end of the Kim regime. Further, much of what can be done now is not within the military's purview.²¹ Still, despite the limitations and constraints, there are preparations the U.S. military can make.

The military could use a preparedness platform to enhance interagency collaboration. Drawing on the previous example regarding North Korea's Hwanghae Province, the ROK and U.S. militaries could engage with



agriculture experts to gain insight into the initial actions required to rehabilitate North Korea's agricultural sector, to include identifying a cadre of agriculture experts that would be willing to move forward early in a stability operation. This cadre would assess, organize, and manage resources and operations to ensure that North Korea does not lose a growing season due to conflict, and that it has a productive yield within one year.

The United States and the ROK could also better leverage defectors. Much is made of the number of

North Korean defectors now in the ROK, with an inclination on the part of some to dismiss their intelligence value, let alone consider their value in an effort to bring stability to the north. While unable to pinpoint North Korean nuclear weapons or give us insight into the inner thoughts and monologue of Kim Jong-un, defectors from areas and professions in question can be an invaluable resource for understanding the needs that the ROK, the United States, and the international community will face in the wake of a North Korean collapse.



The U.S. military can advise on, and advocate for, military and nonmilitary preparations that involve the international community, particularly the United Nations Command (UNC) sending states. Even if advice and advocacy only result in a shared understanding and more fidelity in planning, we will be better prepared to respond to an instability crisis. Many of the UNC sending states are likely to desire to contribute to efforts to bring stability and an enduring peace to the Korean peninsula. The United States can assist

in outreach and organizing these efforts in a manner that is agreeable to the ROK.

Also, the United States has underutilized our professional military education and civilian education systems. Within our defense educational institutions, we can program instruction generally and directly applicable to North Korean contingencies to enhance the ability of our military professionals to thrive in the complex and uncertain conditions sure to characterize a North Korean instability crisis.²²



Republic of Korea soldiers stand guard 24 June 2008 in the Joint Security Area (JSA) between North and South Korea. Located in the now unoccupied village of Panmunjom, North Hwanghae Province, North Korea, in the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the JSA is used by both countries for diplomatic engagements. The JSA is the only portion of the DMZ where North and South Korean forces stand face-to-face. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

The U.S. Army is well suited in this regard, with deep and recent experience in stability challenges codified in doctrine and applied in training.²³ It has the capacity to do the conceptual work required to succeed in

handling a North Korean instability crisis. As one key component of the military education system, the Army University represents a powerful step in ensuring that the U.S. Army not only retains but also enhances its competitive advantage in creativity and innovation, as operationalized through mission command.²⁴

Building and engaging networks, partnerships, and coalitions are another strength of the U.S. military. The Army should place more focus on developing professionals in key areas related to Korean issues, particularly North Korean instability. This includes foreign area officers, international relations officers, civil affairs soldiers, and military information support operations soldiers. The development of our human capital and efforts to foster networks using our talented professionals will pay dividends on adapting to the complex and shifting conditions that we will encounter in a North Korean collapse.

Prompting Positive, Stable Change

There is a fine line between preparing for and prompting change. While our intent may be to bring about positive, stable change, those on the receiving end may not see it as such. The accumulation of preparatory actions over time could be perceived not as efforts to position for a possible future, but as a deliberate attempt to bring about regime change. Strategic communication and robust international partnerships are required to increase the chances that preparatory efforts do not lead to a situation in which North Korea lashes out.

There is also the potential to transcend preparation to use preparation actions in a deterrent-and-shaping mode. Many of the measures discussed above can be used in this manner, to include policy decisions that provide clear and positive alternative futures for the majority of North Koreans while refraining from concerted efforts to apply those decisions prior to crisis. We also can engage the North Korean people with practical information they can use to improve their daily lives and be better prepared to weather sudden change. For example, we can provide information on preventive medicine or civil engineering. Doing so would also enhance the credibility of the channels that we use to communicate information. Investments made in shaping have the potential to lead North Korea to make changes

internally in a stable manner, lessen the burdens encountered should collapse occur, and solidify the prospects for an alliance between the United States and a unified Korea.

Winning the Peace: A U.S.-Unified Korea Alliance

As noted, our efforts to prepare for instability in North Korea are insufficient, placing at risk millions of lives, trillions of dollars, and vital interests. Further, how the United States responds to a crisis will have a tremendous impact on its future position in the region and elsewhere. Should Koreans see the United States as having failed to live up to

commitments, or should the manner in which it acts cause others to question its will or capacity for action elsewhere, America's ability to influence and shape the strategic environment would take huge hit. A 7P strategy that places preparation at its core and sets the stage for more deliberate shaping efforts holds the best prospects for ensuring we acquit ourselves well in an instability crisis and, by extension, preserve the U.S.-ROK alliance and American options and leadership in the region. ■

The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not represent the official position or views of the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the U.S. government.

Biography

Bryan Port is the director of strategy at U.S. Forces Korea, Combined Forces Command, and United Nations Command, in Seoul, Korea. He has served in leadership and staff positions as a soldier and as an Army civilian in South Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the United States. He holds an MA in national security studies from Georgetown University. His professional training includes Korean language studies at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, and Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea.

Notes

1. Many have spent considerable time discussing these issues with the author. For their advice and counsel, I express my gratitude to Bruce Bennett of the RAND Corporation and many currently serving military officers and government officials from the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK), including Ken Gause, Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum, Dan Pinkston, and Peter Beck.

2. I credit this idea—not having seen a major war on the territory of an advanced industrialized nation since World War II—to Kwon Go-Hoon of Goldman Sachs, who made this point to me during a conversation in Seoul in 2013. Despite the capabilities of the ROK military, the severity and scope of a collapse make it likely the ROK would want and need assistance. Although stability tasks are labor intensive, the ROK would be able to devote few resources to stability tasks should its forces be depleted, or otherwise tied down, against large-scale North Korean resistance. Moreover, force reductions are planned in the ROK military.

3. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 31 October 2014).

4. Bruce W. Bennett, *Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), accessed 4 April 2016, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR331.html; materials associated with the University of Southern California (USC)–Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Korean Unification Project 2010 Working Paper Series, principal investigators Victor Cha (CSIS) and David

Kang (USC), accessed 4 April 2016, <http://csis.org/program/korean-unification>.

5. ROK open source literature, governmental and nongovernmental, often comes under criticism on one or more bases, including overly optimistic assessments of the challenges or ROK capabilities to handle them. Another significant criticism is a lack of fidelity or detail.

6. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], June 2014); Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07, *Stability* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 31 August 2012); Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-07, *Stability* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, August 2012). U.S. doctrine regarding stability operations is based heavily on lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, many Koreans react negatively when Americans, or others, draw on experiences in Iraq or Afghanistan, asserting that Korea is not Iraq or Afghanistan. Those with responsibilities for preparing for crisis on the peninsula would do well to honor the differences, and critics would do well to draw from lessons learned due to the many similarities, even if only using Iraq- or Afghanistan-based lessons as common points of departure.

7. Bennett, *North Korean Collapse*; USC-CSIS, Korean Unification.

8. I draw a clear distinction between shaping and changing the regime. Shaping aims to alter the way the regime thinks, decides, and acts, as opposed to changing the regime, which

centers on replacing all the key leaders and fundamentally altering the political structure of North Korea.

9. I credit colleagues at U.S. Pacific Command for work they have done on a concept for “stable change.”

10. In 2010, then President Lee Myung-bak called for a tax to raise funds to pay for reunification. See Brett Cole, “South Korea President Calls for Reunification Tax,” Reuters online, 15 August 2010, accessed 14 July 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-tax-idUSTRE67E08K20100815>.

11. The Park administration has codified key concepts regarding North Korea in the ROK’s *A New Era of Hope: National Security Strategy*, in late 2014. See Park Geun-Hye, “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust between Seoul and Pyongyang,” *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2011); Blue House, *A New Era of Hope: National Security Strategy* (Republic of Korea: Blue House, October 2014).

12. The statement that support for reunification is no longer declining is based in part on the results from more than three-dozen confidential youth focus groups conducted from 2010 through 2015. The groups normally included six-to-ten South Korean university students in their late teens and early twenties. The vast majority of participating students acknowledged that the president’s initiatives had increased discussion of unification on a broad basis, even if discussion had not led to increased support. However, President Park’s initiatives seemed to have stopped the decline in support for reunification, and possibly to have set a basis for renewed support in the future. The rationale for support is shifting from historical imperative and ethnic-nationalistic bonds with the north to one of strategic considerations.

13. Han Wool Jeong, *The Public’s Appraisal of the Park Geun-hye Administration’s Unification Policy: The Deterioration of Support for the Unification as a “Bonanza” Idea and a Way to Reignite Momentum*, trans. Benjamin A. Engel (Seoul: East Asia Institute, August 2015), accessed 21 June 2016, http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng_report/201509071627572.pdf.

14. Ken E. Gause, *North Korean House of Cards: Leadership Dynamics Under Kim Jong-un* (Washington, DC: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2015), accessed 21 July 2016, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_Gause_NKHOC_FINAL.pdf.

15. A Google search on 22 May 2016 of “Preparing for North Korean Collapse” yielded six discrete articles on the first page by reputable sources (e.g., RAND Corporation, Council on Foreign Relations Asian Institute, and the National Interest website) on preparing for North Korean collapse. Other sources show the trend away from specific predictions on the timing of North Korean collapse to general assessments that the regime will not be able to sustain itself, including Julian Ryall, “Is North Korea Finally Close to Collapse?” Deutsche Welle website, 13 April 2016,

accessed 21 June 2016, <http://www.dw.com/en/is-north-korea-finally-close-to-collapse/a-19183141>; Armin Rosen, “The Long History of (Wrongly) Predicting North Korea’s Collapse,” *The Atlantic* website, 6 August 2012, accessed 21 June 2016, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/the-long-history-of-wrongly-predicting-north-koreas-collapse/260769/>; Andrei Lankov, “When May North Korea Collapse?” *Fortuna’s Corner* website, 4 March 2014, accessed 21 June 2016, <http://fortunascorner.com/2014/03/04/when-may-north-korea-collapse-by-andrei-lankov/> (Lankov is one of the most-renowned experts on North Korea. He was consulted frequently by the author, and he is frequently consulted by the most senior officials of the U.S. government); Kim Sung-han, “The Future of North Korea,” Center for Strategic and International Studies website, 4 November 2014, accessed 21 June 2016, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/141031_The_Future_of_north_korea.pdf (Kim served as the ROK’s vice minister of foreign affairs from 2012 to 2013).

16. Bennett, *North Korean Collapse*; USC-CSIS, Korean Unification.

17. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 16 September 2009), accessed 14 July 2016, login required, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf>.

18. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operational Planning* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 11 August 2011). In addition, I would like to highlight an important turn of phrase expressed here—the distinction between actual reunification and the conditions for it. Actual reunification involves political decisions that are not for the military to make. Rather, the military is intended to set conditions so political decisions can be made in the most secure environment possible.

19. ADP 3-07, *Stability*, GL-2.

20. *Ibid.*, 11.

21. The military is not well positioned to stockpile humanitarian assistance materials for use in stability operations. Nor is the military best suited to lead in the design and execution of broad informational initiatives to change North Korean perspectives and prepare the populace to be better able to weather sudden change.

22. ADRP 1, *The Army Profession* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 14 June 2015); TP 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept*.

23. FM 3.07, *Stability*; ADP 3.07, *Stability*; ADRP 3.07, *Stability*; TP 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept*.

24. Robert B. Brown, “The Army University: Educating Leaders to Win in a Complex World,” *Military Review* 95, no. 4 (July-August 2015): 18.