
For a technologically savvy generation, what good reason could there be to pick up a classic translation of ancient Roman history? The answer is in understanding the timeless elements of the history of warfare, and of professional study of its master practitioners, such as Hannibal and Scipio Africanus. The War with Hannibal is an account of the Second Punic War (which lasted for 17 years) and of its many battles, sieges, and campaigns in Spain, Sicily, the Italian peninsula, and ultimately in North Africa. The book details Carthage and Rome as states at war more than it studies Hannibal’s generalship, although the elements of his generalship are woven into the narrative. Principally, the book defends the staying power and character of Rome. One is overwhelmed by the length and reach of the conflict, of its total nature, involving politics and economics, and its joint character, with interlocking battles on land and sea. The outcome of the war hinged as much on decisions in Rome itself, and on campaigns in Spain, Sicily, and Greece, where Hannibal was not present, as it did on Hannibal’s actions in Italy.

Livy’s account has become a classic over time, and there are two editions currently in print. This review is based on the Penguin edition, which has been in print for over three decades and thus qualifies as a classic revisited. The newest release of Livy is Hannibal’s War: Books Twenty-one to Thirty, by Livy, John Yardley, and Dexter Hoyos (Oxford University Press, 2009). Again, this review cites the Penguin release.1

The weight of the book is not to battle accounts, though those accounts are vivid enough to give the reader a sense of the magnitude, flow, and catastrophic scale of each battle. Livy tells the story of several events that rank among those most famous in antiquity: Hannibal’s unexpected crossing of the French Alps, his first decisive victory over the Roman Army at Lake Trasimene, and the Carthaginian slaughter of the Romans at Cannae. Cannae, as the serious student of military history will know, represents the classic battle of annihilation. To Livy, the battle demonstrated the failure of Hannibal’s will to overcome the plundering tendencies of his army and to proceed to conquer the city of Rome while he could. Time, the drag of additional years of campaigning in city-by-city conquests in southern Italy, and the desultory effects of winter quarters wore Hannibal’s army down until his soldiers were shadows of their former selves.

The Romans forced a decision after 17 years by invading Carthage itself, where Hannibal, after being recalled from the Italian peninsula, was defeated by Scipio at Zama in 202 BCE.

The book does not recount battles in tactical detail, as a military reader might expect. Each of these major events is treated in just a few pages of text: the crossing of the Alps, Lake Trasimene, Cannae, and Hannibal’s defeat at Zama. Those who look for red and blue arrow diagrams might be disappointed, but what Livy richly recounts is the human impact of a commander in battle, both by example and word. He often includes the orations of commanders prior to major battles. From these we glean a psychological and motivational element to this long war, one that may be instructive given the current circumstances of lengthy international engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Hannibal could not defeat Rome after such decisive battles as Lake Trasimene and Cannae, and psychological will and long-term strategy were the decisive elements.

This book is as much about Roman politics and generalship as it is about Hannibal. To Livy, the war with Hannibal had to account for the evolution and resilience of the Roman state under Hannibal’s onslaught. Livy’s account becomes a character analysis of Roman leadership, both senatorial and military. His portrayal of Quintus Fabius Maximus’ delaying actions against Hannibal after Cannae, where Roman military power was preserved and gradually rejuvenated, is noteworthy. “Fabian strategy” has become an aspect of cultural literacy. The interplay of battle with the decisions of Roman leaders, reinforced by the will of the Roman people in a city-by-city failed conquest, proved decisive in creating Hannibal’s long-term strategic defeat.2

Livy’s character studies captivate. He wrote his histories long after they occurred by using a combination of sources, and he has been criticized for historical inaccuracy. However, the value of Livy is in his flow of writing. His capture of leader orations, whether to soldiers before battle or to motivate a doubting citizenry at home, are a window for Livy to display the character of the men who spoke them. Even more, they illustrate the character of the Roman nation that survived because of such men.

Hannibal learns, too, and reveals the lessons of life and desire for peace, as he said on the eve of his final loss to Scipio at Zama: “As for myself, an old man returning to the homeland I left in boyhood, the years with their burden of success and failure have so taught...
me that I would rather now follow the dictates of reason than hope for what luck may bring.” To Livy, the account of individual and national character was more important than historical accuracy in telling of battles and campaigns.

Livy is valuable for focusing the student of war on the political, economic, and cultural considerations of conflict. Hannibal lost the Second Punic War not because he failed on the battlefield, but because he failed at strategy. He stayed so long in Italy after having failed to immediately capitalize on his enormous battlefield success at Cannae that the war fell apart around him. His allies did not provide needed resources or manpower, the peripheral theaters of Sicily and Rome became decisive, and Hannibal was ultimately recalled home to fight—and lose—to Scipio. Livy teaches the importance of strategy through his character analysis of the Second Punic War’s strategists.

Notes

1. One can learn of the importance of Livy’s War with Hannibal from the repetitive release of translations of the Latin over time. Each edition carries an introduction, which reveals how Livy stands in that time and generation. A 19th century edition is available from Google Books Online. This Google book is Livy, Books XXI-XXV, The Second Punic War, translated into English with Notes by Alfred John Church and William Jackson Brodribb (London: Macmillan and Co, 1883). Also available in print is a reprint of Livy: The War with Hannibal, edited by Edward Ambrose Beach (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1905), which is the original Latin text with an English introduction.


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A TACTICAL ETHIC: 
Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace

Navy Captain (Retired) Dick Couch is especially well qualified to write a book on military ethics, not from a lawyer’s perspective, but from the point of view of a leader and ethicist who has experienced combat first-hand. As a SEAL Team Platoon Commander in the Vietnam War, he led one of that conflict’s few successful prisoner of war rescues. In 1997, he retired from the senior SEAL command billet in the Naval Reserves. Since then, he has served as the adjunct professor of ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy and as the ethics advisor to the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

It is no wonder then that, in A Tactical Ethic: Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace, Couch has succeeded in writing an extraordinarily insightful study of tactical military ethics. This is the guidebook on ethics that U.S. combat leaders, eager to keep their troops on the moral high ground, have been waiting for.

A Tactical Ethic begins powerfully, relating the story of a trainee who, in 2004, approached Couch at the Special Forces Qualification Course. This trainee, like the ancient mariner of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s rhyme, had a shameful tale to tell. In Afghanistan, this captain revealed, he had witnessed a special operations team beat to death an enemy prisoner of war. The captain said that he had tried to stop the assault, but soon gave up, feeling that if he pressed the issue, the incensed team might actually kill him, too.

Couch uses this story to introduce the question: how much serious misconduct has gone unreported during the Global War on Terrorism? Couch’s troubling answer is that, while the vast majority of U.S. troops behave honorably downrange, most incidents of misconduct are never reported.

Couch’s conjecture is a scary thought, considering the number of tragic incidents that have been publicized. Thanks largely to the Internet and digital technology, such incidents gained the status of major military defeats. Historically, we have worried about setbacks on conventional battlefields, such as mass casualties at the Hurtgen Forest in World War II or the sudden appearance of Chinese divisions at the Yalu River in the Korean War. Of greater concern today, however, are lurid events at such places as Gitmo, Abu Ghraib, Bagram, Haditha, Kunduz, Mahmudiyah, and Al Qaim. To think that even more stories of recent U.S. military misconduct may be forthcoming is distressing, to say the least. Couch is almost certainly right, though, since small units operate more independently and with less oversight on asymmetric battlefields.

Also sobering is Couch’s idea that the problem of battlefield misconduct is not something that can be corrected via top-down directives. As Couch indicates, U.S. military doctrine, regulations, and policy now largely address this problem. Still, battlefield misconduct—sometimes extremely serious misconduct—persists. Couch argues that amoral subcultures reside in some small units within our operational military.
According to Couch, these subcultures usually exist due to one or two influential moral “pirates” within a small unit. Such pirates commandeer a unit, using the strong ties of loyalty which bind members to one another to either convert other members to their cause or keep them quiet.

Why do moral pirates plague our operational military, despite the robust ethics-related education they received at initial military training? The answer to this question, Couch says, has a lot to do with an American pop culture that increasingly glorifies violence, which promotes a “win at any cost” mentality via “reality” programming, and which makes heroes of thugs like Jack Bauer. New recruits bring harmful values with them into military service, and without frequent and effective reinforcement training, the thin veneer of military values they acquire in initial training wears off.

Amplifying the challenge for our military, Couch observes, is the tendency among so-called “millenials,” the current generation of recruits, to try harder to “fit in” than the members of previous generations. Any American who has volunteered for military service has done so in part because he wants to be a valued member of a team. But millennials need to fit in even more than previous volunteers, increasing the likelihood that they will go along with an amoral small unit culture.

Couch presents two training models to assist us in defeating our moral pirates. The first is that of the U.S. Marine Corps. Couch builds a convincing case that new Marines receive a stronger ethical imprint at boot camp than do other military service members during their initial training. Couch also points out that the U.S. Marine Corps does a better job of reinforcing ethics training than other services, largely powering down this responsibility to the small unit leaders who should own it.

Despite Couch’s assertions, there exists little published empirical evidence, such as psychological surveys or comparative studies of service misconduct, to support the idea that the U.S. Marine Corps has performed more ethically than other military services during the Global War on Terrorism. This may be due to counterbalancing weaknesses of the Marine Corps in other areas, such as a culture which can promote loyalty to fellow Marines at an excessive price (witness the revenge-motivated misconduct of Marines at Haditha and Shinwar). Still, certain strengths of the Marines’ system may be worth emulating.

The second model, Couch says, is the Close Quarters Defense® System, a business that has been training special operators for two decades. The company excels at incorporating practical ethical decision making in its individual and team battle drills. Moreover, it takes the “train as you fight” idea one step further by preaching the virtue of the “complete warrior.” Trainees are taught that living a balanced, moral life at home makes them far more effective warriors. If they love their country and their families, the company believes, they will fight at least as hard as their enemies on today’s battlefields.

Whatever the ethics training model, Couch says, there are key rules this model will need to implement. These rules, which Couch calls his “Rules of Ethics,” deserve to be read and digested by all military leaders. One especially important rule is “The Loyalty Rule”—loyalty before all else, except honor. “Small unit leaders,” Couch says, “must make it unmistakably clear to their men that wrong action on the battlefield is a form of disloyalty—to their nation, to their service, to their team brothers, and to those fallen warriors whose honor they stain.”

In the final analysis, A Tactical Ethic is not just an insightful study, it is a brave book. Pointing out that our military is not adequately addressing its deep cultural issues will not win Couch friends in certain quarters. Couch, who has written several popular works of history and fiction, clearly would not have written this book if he were not troubled by the current ethical state of our military. Thus, like the captain who told him the story of the murdered detainee, Couch has related a tale of which he, too, must unburden himself—the sad story of the inadequate state of ethics training today for most U.S. military service members.

Couch is right. We must do better. And reading A Tactical Ethic is a superb place for us to begin.


In Shakespeare’s Henry V, soldiers remark on the eve of Agincourt that “if the cause be not good, the king himself hath a heavy reckoning to make.” Craig White’s recent book asks that timeless question of the 2003 Iraq War decision. Though a veteran of diplomatic circles, White writes as a private citizen, seeking to answer the question by impartially applying the six traditional just war criteria. As part of his approach, he outlines the limits of his work. It is not a narrative of the politics and personalities who shaped the decision for the war; nor is it a discussion of jus in bello. White limits his evaluation to the Western just war framework (as developed in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas) and uses only the analysis and information available at the beginning of the war (with minimal exceptions). White sets out the six criteria as sovereign authority, just cause, right intention, proportionality of ends, last resort, and reasonable chance of success. In White’s estimation, the Bush administration failed to meet five out of these six principles.

White argues that President Bush’s 2003 decision was the valid exercise of sovereign authority, meeting the first criterion. The author spends more time on just
cause, since he believes it forms the moral core of just war theory. He contends that the administration failed this standard because it inflated the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and terrorist threats, misinterpreted UN Resolutions 678 and 687, and usurped the Security Council’s prerogative for enforcing UN policy. On the criterion of right intention, White follows the Thomistic argument that an intention can be seen by the means used to achieve that end. Improper or inadequate means (i.e., low troop numbers, poor contingency planning, and a naïve belief in the power of democracy) show an ultimately unjust intention. This led the United States to commit the unjust act of destroying a government without adequate or realistic plans to deal with the powerful social, religious, and ethnic forces unleashed by that action.

Therefore, he believes the administration did not carefully weigh the question of proportionality in debating the merits of a stable dictatorship against the problems of a nascent democracy torn by internal and regional power struggles. The United States also did not use force as a last resort, since UN inspections had made progress, the United States had aggressively provoked Saddam at times, and there was no imminent threat. The failure to account for the challenges of replacing Saddam’s regime violated the final criterion, reasonable chance of success.

White handles this extremely controversial topic in a fair, thorough, and nonpartisan manner, reaching logical conclusions. While many will disagree with the author, he takes the courageous step of calling for a serious debate on the application of just war theory to U.S. policy. He also raises issues that deserve serious dialogue, such as the place of preemption in just war theory and how policymakers can integrate a more apolitical understanding of just war theory into their decision-making processes. Military and civilian leaders, clergy, political theorists, and concerned citizens will all gain a deeper moral understanding of conflict by engaging the questions that White raises and refining their own ethical framework for determining justified force.

While well-written, the book would benefit from cleaner formatting and the correction of some noticeable proofreading errors. However, these errors do not detract from the overall importance of the concerns raised by White’s analysis and the moral implications about the Iraqi conflict.

1LT Jonathan E. Newell, USAR, Amherst, New Hampshire


With the exception of Desert Storm and the initial stage of Operation Iraqi Freedom, war since 1990 has not followed the Western model of understanding armed conflict. This is the claim made by Richard H. Schultz, Jr., and Andrea J. Dew, who provide some superb insights into why and how nonstate actors fight. If you are interested in either irregular warfare or counterinsurgency, you should add this book to your reading list.

Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat focuses on anthropological study and analysis. One of the first points it makes is that, unlike the West, many cultures view conflict positively. Rather than seeing it as immoral or abnormal, they view warfare as a normal state of affairs, one that is often desirable. To fully understand why this is the case and the ramifications that follow from this state of affairs, one must study the foe’s history, culture, norms, and values. The study of culture is just as important as intelligence work focused on enemy numbers, location, and capabilities. Unless we focus on the cultural aspects, we run the risk of misunderstanding our enemy’s motivations and methods, and of losing despite our advantages in technology and conventional capability.

As part of their anthropological analysis, the authors focus on tribes and clans. Until the recent past, both of these terms have been viewed by the West as anachronistic. While much of the world has long focused on the primacy of states as the key actors on the international stage, large numbers of the world’s population identify far more with their clan and tribe than they do with the state they live in. Loyalty is first and foremost to the clan and blood line. Decentralization and autonomy are the norm, and, partially because of this, conflicts with outside groups are likely to occur. Additionally, the relatively small size of clans and tribes necessitates that all male members take on the role of warriors to protect their clan and tribe’s interests. In such a system, martial ability is prized.

The authors focus on four case studies: Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Each of these sections is well written and researched and provides a succinct account of the history of these areas. After the historical account, each case study is examined using the following format: concept of warfare, organization and command and control, area of operation, targeting and constraints on the use of force, and role of outside actors.

The book ends with a short chapter on lessons learned, which can be summed up in Schultz and Dew’s exhortation to remember Sun Tzu’s advice to “know your enemy.” Their book offers an excellent model for doing this.

LTC Brian Imiola, West Point, New York


America does not listen, so America cannot win. Middle East expert Mark Perry’s Talking to Terrorists: Why America Must Engage With Its Enemies provides a critical view
of American foreign policy in the Middle East. More than that, the book offers a lesson about how gaining an Islamic perspective on American policies and understanding the real nature of one’s opposition are the keys to achieving stability in the Middle East.

Perry reveals the real problems America must address in order to achieve a long-term peaceful resolution to ongoing conflicts in the Muslim world. The book has implications for achieving acceptable conflict termination in Afghanistan and discusses what transformations are necessary for the United States to prevent future hostile engagements in the Middle East.

Talking to Terrorists highlights a number of issues relevant to military leaders and policymakers. Following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, civil-military relations were further complicated by the rivalry between the Department of State and Department of Defense over who would lead the effort in Iraq. The argument between use of hard power (fixing the problem with bullets) and soft power (providing opportunities for economic development) illuminated the major disconnect between how America viewed its Iraqi enemy and how Iraqi insurgents saw themselves.

The United States does not distinguish between terrorists and national resistance movements. Members of the Muslim community view insurgents participating in national resistance movements as political, legitimate, and constituent-based organizations. Terrorists are interested in the radical transformation of society. In that light, Muslims may perceive U.S. actions in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan as terrorist activities. Perry debunks Western concerns about talking to terrorists and provides the bottom line: “Not talking to them will not end a conflict.” He suggests America should begin by talking to political Islamic organizations that already have constituent support and have agreed to participate in democratic processes, like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.

The United States must take the time to listen to these groups and allow them to define themselves in order to better understand how they see themselves and how they see us and our allies, especially Israel.

While Perry’s book is relevant in light of continued U.S. military presence and national interests in the region, his presentation lacks cohesion. The book’s major ideas are more implicit than explicit and often buried in narrative accounts of the author’s encounters in the Middle East. Perry devotes four chapters of his book to the transformation in Al-Anbar, Iraq, between 2004 and 2006. He then transitions to chapters on his experiences with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Israel that are less about talking to terrorists and more a way to show the “other side” of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. His final chapter is a collection of Perry’s personal experiences that makes no explicit point related to his topic.

Despite the organization of the book, Talking to Terrorists is interesting, insightful, easy to read, and offers some critical lessons for military and civilian leadership looking for a way ahead in resolving conflict with the Muslim world.

MAJ Patricia E. McPhillips, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Since the end of the Cold War, changes in the world order have strained America’s traditional resource assumptions. These have been accompanied by the development of new overseas military bases and base closures or realignments under the Base Realignment and Closure Commission and the Global Defense Posturing Review. In the same time frame, base-related crime and accidents have fueled anti-American or anti-base demonstrations outside bases in Okinawa, Korea, and other areas.

What factors do host governments consider when statesmen try to negotiate short-term access into conflict areas through adjacent countries (i.e., through Turkey to Iraq or through Pakistan to Afghanistan)? What influence do traditional power politics, economic and business interests, domestic political infighting, and local politics play in the decisions of host governments to allow or sustain U.S. bases within their borders?

Through comparative political analysis on case studies of ten countries’ U.S.-base experiences, Alexander Cooley provides a model to examine and explain “base politics” historically and to predict these politics in future basing decisions. His research is valuable to policymakers, diplomats, lawyers, political scientists, and military planners involved in negotiations regarding bases, status of forces agreements, and regional stability issues.

Cooley examines the political history of American military bases in Spain, the Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, Okinawa and mainland Japan, the Azores, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. He also mentions bases in several other countries through a series of comparisons and contrasts with the bases and domestic politics in each country above. Such a large coverage might suggest that the book spreads itself too thin, but this is not the case. Cooley’s research includes a series of balanced interviews worldwide, searches of local and international newspapers, and consultations with an eclectic mix of sources.

The most important contribution is Cooley’s modeling of authoritarian regimes, those transitioning between authoritarian and democratic governments (either way), and those of mature democracies. He examines these governmental forms as predictors of the credibility of base contracts and their basis in jurisdictional stability. Cooley notes that the establishment of American bases can serve to support authoritarian regimes, both domestically and internationally (i.e. Franco in Spain in 1953), and that geopolitical realities may
pit the necessity of prime base locations against other U.S. government interests, namely promoting diplomatic institutions. In Central Asia, Cooley shows that rather than stabilizing domestic political situations, U.S. bases instead became pawns in regime survival politics.

While Cooley’s model may be predictive of the long-term success of base stability, its greater service may be as a tool to consider the pressures on governments with bases on another sovereign nation’s soil. One nation’s strategic geopolitical goals may not be another nation’s priority, although this may not be obvious without considering the international and domestic equities of the parties involved.

Base Politics is the first latitudinal study to focus on local host politics of foreign bases across the world. It is useful as a history of U.S. bases throughout the world (for example, France, Great Britain, and Russia), as a guide for policymakers and diplomats involved in base negotiations, and as a guide in understanding sovereignty issues for lawyers and military administrators involved in status of forces law and precedence.

John Dyson, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The title of Seth G. Jones book suggests a warning. Empires as powerful as Alexander’s Greece, Victoria’s Great Britain, and Brezhnev’s Soviet Union came to grief in Afghanistan. Today we ask, “Will 30,000 additional U.S. troops be enough to salvage a war many now see as unwinnable?” Seth Jones, a political scientist and adjunct faculty member at Georgetown and the Naval Postgraduate School, believes that between 2002 and 2005, the United States had an opportunity to achieve a better outcome than those who invaded Afghanistan in the past.

Jones believes the opportunity was lost in 2006 as U.S. efforts to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan faced resistance in five areas: insurgent groups like the Taliban and the Hezb-i-Islami, criminal groups, tribes allied with the insurgents, warlord militias, and corrupt elements of the government. The Taliban, in particular, made good use of sanctuaries inside Pakistan and the support they received from senior members of the Pakistani intelligence service as they rebuilt their strength. The resurgence of the Taliban was also built on weak governance from Kabul and an enduring religious ideology that enabled the “true believers” among the insurgents to weather the hard times that followed the U.S. invasion. Yet, Jones argues that even when the situation became critical (the author calls it a “perfect storm”), the United States kept its focus on the war in Iraq.

Along with an assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan, the book offers five chapters of historical background, thumbnail sketches of key insurgent leaders, and a structural analysis of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their allies. He recommends attacking government corruption, denying sanctuary to the insurgents, and providing effective governance and security to the Afghan population.

The book’s tone and focus are more journalistic than scholarly and, in two or three years, it is likely to seem dated. If a reader opens the “Early Bird” news service every morning and pays attention to the news coming out of Afghanistan, that reader would already be aware of much of what Jones has to say. The war in Iraq has dominated our attention and drained our resources in time, blood, energy, and treasure. Now, Afghanistan demands our attention, and Jones’ In the Graveyard of Empires offers a readable and reasonably concise account of how it came to be the seemingly intractable problem it is today.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE WAR FOR KOREA, 1950-1951: They Came from the North, Allan R. Millett, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2010, 644 pages, $45.00

When most Americans think of the Korean War (that is, when they remember the so-called “forgotten war”), they think of June 1950 to July 1951 (the North Korean invasion to the allied restoration of the 38th parallel), which make up the two years of battlefield stalemate that lasted until 1953. This is the focus of Allan Millett’s second volume in a projected trilogy on the Korean conflict.

Volume One, published in 2005, is about the almost completely forgotten part of the forgotten war, the Korean civil war pitting pro-versus anti-communist factions headquartered, respectively, in Pyongyang and Seoul. Volume Three, scheduled for publication in late 2012, will cover the conclusion of the conflict: deadly small unit “king of the mountain” combat (the communists take Pork Chop Hill at night; the United States/United Nations/South Korean coalition takes it back in the morning) and prolonged negotiations, primarily over the voluntary repatriation of POWs. If the third volume matches the first two, Millett will produce for the Korean War something equivalent to Rick Atkinson’s trilogy on the U.S. Army in World War II Europe and Douglas Southall Freeman’s trilogy on the Army of Northern Virginia in the U.S. Civil War.

Most books about the Korean War fall into one of two broad categories. On the one hand, there are stories of personal courage, cowardice, insight, and arrogance. Among the best are Joseph Gouden’s Korea: The Untold Story (1982), Clay Blair’s The Forgotten War (1987), Max Hasting’s The Korean War (1987), John Toland’s In Mortal Combat (1991), and David Halberstam’s The Coldest Winter (2007). On the other hand, there are the workman-like studies coming out of the military service history offices: Roy Appleman’s...
Moye’s research covers more than the “experiment” that created the Tuskegee Airmen; his research spans more than 70 years, from the days following the end of the First World War to contemporary times. It is this comprehensive assessment that provides the book’s greatest drawback, namely that the title implies a scope much less broad than the content therein. Scant details are given about the actual combat experiences of the “Red Tails” and the difficulties they faced in a wartime environment. Most of the manuscript focuses on the national policies, infrastructure, and organization in the United States that simultaneously sought to liberate and constrain the nascent attempt to train African-Americans to fly.

Many of the personal recollections of events are decidedly one-sided. By Moye’s account, there appears to be little that any senior Army Air Corps leader did that was not portrayed as a thinly veiled attempt to induce failure of the Tuskegee Airmen at every turn; Tuskegee Airmen are likewise portrayed as innocent yet valiant protagonists. This is likely because much of Moye’s research is garnered from first-hand interviews conducted during the National Park Service’s Tuskegee Airmen Oral History Project and few, if any, of the white officers mentioned in the book were interviewed, or even still alive. For their side of the story, we are forced to rely on writings from the day, inferring intent and evaluating character based on what was undoubtedly the product of collaborative thought via the staffing process. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that these battles waged on the home front were every bit as important as the battles that raged over the skies of North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and Germany.

Despite this, Freedom Flyers provides detailed insight into the strategic mindset of a nation on the cusp of war, executive-level decision making, and the attempt to fundamentally change the pervasive, discriminatory culture of the day, both in the military and in the civilian populace. The author successfully brings to life the idea that many Tuskegee Airmen waged battle against a tough and determined foe in an inhospitable environment, without ever leaving the United States.

Robert A. Leonard, Ed.D., Fort Gordon, Georgia


After occupying Belgium for nearly four and one-half years, the German Army quickly evaporated in August 1944, leaving behind stores of fuel, equipment, and food. In the twilight zone before the Allies’ arrival, chaos ensued. Widespread looting, similar to what we saw in Baghdad in April 2003, broke out as underfed civilians descended upon German facilities in acts of necessity and revenge. The marquis began rounding up collaborators. For days, the population navigated this lawless “Wild West” while waiting for their liberators.

Then, the longed-for moment occurred. Cautiously, Allied columns entered the towns and villages of Belgium. Pictures slapped across the pages of newspapers worldwide captured the breathtaking Allied rush across France and the push into Belgium—crowds surrounded vehicles and piled on, soldiers swigged wine from the bottle and were kissed by adoring women, gaggles of children tugged at G.I. fatigues in hope of a reward of candy or gum. The four-and-a-half-year brutal occupation was at an end—it was finally over! Yet lurking behind the jubilation was the grim reality of the future. The war still remained to be won, the country to be rebuilt, and a shattered society reconstructed.

After liberation, Belgians continued to celebrate. But, the Allies’ struggle to provide adequate amounts of food and coal was exacerbated by the unexpected German attack in the Ardennes. Resentment began to set in. Stealing from the Allies became
Belgian rations were less under the Allies than they had been under the Germans. That the German POWs were better fed than the Belgian civilians was a bitter pill. On top of all of this, V-weapons rained down on cities, especially Antwerp, until March 1945 when 6,500 lives were lost.

Resentment bubbled to the surface in the spring of 1945 over the large number of Belgian women who seemed so easily seduced by Allied soldiers and by the resultant epidemic of venereal disease and the increase of illegitimate children. Many Belgians, their pride wounded by defeat and occupation, now feared economic and cultural domination by their liberators. The end of the war in May touched off another round of celebrations, but by the summer hundreds of thousands of Allied soldiers were temporarily billeted in Belgium. Discipline deteriorated and the crime rate—including everything from drunken brawls to big-time theft, racketeering, and rape—increased dramatically. Many Belgians now asked “who would liberate them from their liberators.” War’s end restored the Belgian’s gratitude to the Allies. Belgium, despite some trepidation, had been transformed and was on the road to becoming a modern consumer society built on the American model.

In a long epilogue, Schrijvers reviews much of the literature and the various historical interpretations of this traumatic time in Belgian history. His argument is based on extensive research in French, Flemish, German, and English documents as well as a large number of secondary sources. *Liberators* is highly recommended for general readers as an important and little understood aspect of the end of the war in Europe. It will also provide insight for those participating in the societal transformations being undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Hal Elliott Wert, Kansas City, Missouri**

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Andrew Wheatcroft’s *The Enemy at the Gate* encapsulates the centuries-long struggle between the Habsburgs and Ottomans, which symbolized physically and spiritually the conflict between Christendom and Islam between the 15th and 18th centuries. As Wheatcroft aptly illustrates, the Siege of Vienna went into the collective consciousness of the West as a decisive victory over the Turks, and Islam in general.

For the political reader who would like to grasp the enduring negative image of the Turk and the modern European resistance to Turkish membership in the European Union, the author demonstrates how the image of the cruel and barbarous Turk propagated by the media of the 17th century still lingers in the collective perceptions of Europe.

For the military historian and officer, the book provides an excellent insight into the Ottoman Army of the period and its high degree of field organization, sanitation, and logistical excellence. This contrasts greatly with the often fragmented and slovenly armies assembled by the Holy Roman Emperor and his allies. Nevertheless, the advent of drill and training among the European soldiery of the era began the ascendancy of the West over the warrior armies of the East, of which the Ottoman military was paramount. The European soldiers served as part of an integrated team on the battlefield, while the Ottoman janissary continued to fight as a highly trained, but individual warrior.

Wheatcroft’s research is impeccable, and his vibrant style takes the reader into the era—its politics, society, and media. The only significant flaw to the book is the lack of detailed maps depicting the campaigns and battles surrounding the Siege of Vienna. The three diagrams provided were insufficient for the task and text. I strongly recommend this book for all military and foreign service officers dealing with the Middle East, Turkey, and the Balkans.

**Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., Zurich, Switzerland**
Unit of Action

LTC Jason A. Carrico, Harker Heights, Texas—I just read “Unit of Action: Organizing a Brigade Combat Team for Future Wars” by Colonel Scott Efflandt (July-August 2010, *Military Review*). I have heard the same counterarguments in reference to fires discussed in logistics circles. Some think a brigade support battalion (BSB) is not truly needed in a BCT and that the Army would be better served falling back on the Divisional concept of sustainment without the FSB/BSB. This would force us to rely solely on forward support companies (FSCs) with sustainment brigades giving reinforcing and in some cases direct support to BCTs. There is no way that structure would remain flexible and responsive enough to support a BCT during full spectrum operations. Also, I argue that the degradation of logistics skills (particularly low density) is due to OPTEMPO and theater specific adaptations and requirements. It is not an inherent flaw in the BCT design as some logisticians argue and will be self-correcting as the OPTEMPO changes and the current operating environment evolves.

The Revolution in Military Affairs


What are these challenges? Restoration of balance between military intellectual theory and the practical experience of warfare. The realization that human, scientific, and technological progress needs to have a systems view that can reveal natural patterns that can provide answers as well as logic and wisdom.

Our strategic or futuristic thinking patterns can be acquired through experience, observation, and study as well as speculative forecasting or prediction because change is the one constant that we must deal with in human affairs. And despite any gulf between visionary rhetoric and practical reality, we shouldn’t feel sorry for ourselves when we don’t get everything we want, fulfill the need to get on with life, work reasonably hard, and make do with what we have. Sometimes we have to pull back and regroup before any meaningful forward or persevering progress can be established and maintained in government and military affairs.

From his teens until his death, the maps George Washington drew and purchased were always central to his work. . . .

Inspired by these remarkable maps, historian Barnet Schecter has crafted a unique portrait of our first Founding Father, placing the reader at the scenes of his early career as a surveyor, his dramatic exploits in the French and Indian War (his altercation with the French is credited as the war’s spark), his struggles through the American Revolution as he outmaneuvered the far more powerful British army, his diplomacy as president, and his shaping of the new republic. Beautifully illustrated in color, with twenty-four of the full atlas maps, dozens more detail views, and numerous additional maps (some drawn by Washington himself), portraits, and other images—and produced in an elegant large format—George Washington’s America allows readers to visualize history through Washington’s eyes, and sheds fresh light on the man and his times.

From the Publisher.


Outnumbered chronicles fourteen momentous occasions on which a smaller, ostensibly weaker force prevailed in an epochal confrontation. Thus, Alexander, undaunted, devised a brilliant and daring plan that disoriented and destroyed the Persian force and, consequently, its empire. Likewise, during the U.S. Civil War, Confederate General Robert E. Lee, despite being outpositioned and outnumbered more than two to one by Union forces at Chancellorsville, Virginia, hatched an audacious and surprise strategy that caught his enemy completely unawares. Other equally unexpected, era-defining victories are shown to have derived from the devastating deployment of unusual weaponry, sheer good fortune, or even the gullibility of an enemy, as when Yamashita Tomoyuki, commander of 35,000 ill-supplied Japanese troops, convinced the 85,000-strong British Commonwealth army to surrender Singapore in 1942.

From the Publisher.


Almost seventy years since Spitfires, Merlins and Hurricanes fought to protect Britain’s skies, it is surprising how little is publicly known about the Battle of Britain. Many people may not even be aware that the RAF’s triumph in this battle was integral in saving Great Britain from German invasion in the Second World War. What collective memory exists at all undoubtedly features a soaring Spitfire as the hero of this epic battle, with little more detail than the faint sound of air-raid sirens. However, in the 1980s and 90s, scholars began to counter this image, publishing works which devalued Churchill’s leadership and the quality of the Spitfire’s engineering. Not sure who to believe, Stephen Bungay set out to discover the truth behind these myths. The result was The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain, a tome described as “the most exhaustive and detailed account of the Battle of Britain.”

From the Publisher.
IED

Improvised explosive device. How curious and technical, this description of death. A simple acronym, mentioning the words, an instant depiction of death. Mental images stirred and conjured horrors realized. Such a curious and strange term, resonant with such graphic, crystal-clear depiction, of the desert affliction. IED, the horror, the signature weapon, of the desert war.

— Major Edward Lee Bryan, U.S. Army, 2010