A Long and Obstinate Resistance: Staff Ride Handbook for the Charleston Campaign, 1776–80

Harold "Allen" Skinner Jr.

Combat Studies Institute Press
US Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, KS

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Foreword

A Long and Obstinate Resistance: Staff Ride Handbook for the Charleston Campaign is the latest handbook in the Army University Press Staff Ride Handbook series. This third staff ride book written by Army historian Allen Skinner studies the pivotal struggle between the British Empire and breakaway American colonies for control of South Carolina. Analysis focuses first on the thwarted 1776 British attack on Charleston then follows with a detailed study of the 1780 siege of Charleston, which ended in the largest British victory of the Revolutionary War. Unlike many other staff rides, this handbook focuses principally on the strategic and operational levels of war, analyzing the linkage between operational level plans and tactical actions and providing leader development opportunities for all levels. Designed for a two-day training event, the book is written so a unit can conduct a fulfilling one-day staff ride with insights at all levels of war. In planning a staff ride of the Charleston campaign, unit commanders will find many relevant issues to study, including planning and execution of Joint and Combined operations, civil-military relations, logistics, intelligence, campaign planning, and mission command.

Dr. Donald P. Wright
Director
Army University Press

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Thanks also to Carl Borick, director of the Charleston Museum and author of the superb A *Gallant Defense: The Siege of Charleston 1780*, which served as a major secondary source for this work. He also graciously answered questions on the roads and terrain in the area. Heyward Hutson of the Summerville Preservation Society of South Carolina shared helpful details regarding the roads and terrain around Bacon's Bridge and Dorchester. Retired Lt. Col. Peter G. "Pete" Knight, chief of field programs at the Army's Center of Military History, facilitated a superb update to William Glenn Robertson's *The Staff Ride: Fundamentals, Experiences and Techniques* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2020), which greatly assisted in the writing of analytical questions for the stands.

The author started this writing project in 2018, while employed as a command historian for the Army Reserve, and many of the initial edits were completed while deployed as theater historian for Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve. The manuscript and final edits were completed while working as command historian for the US Army's Soldier Support Institute (SSI) at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Thus, many thanks are owed to SSI commanders Col. Stephen K. Aiton, Col. Jason T. Edwards, and chief of staff Troy Clay for supporting these staff ride projects. Furthermore, many of the concepts and threads of continuity in the narrative were refined during multiple facilitated staff rides with instructors and students from the Adjutant General (AG) and Finance and Comptroller (FC) schools. My deepest appreciation is reserved for my wife, Jackie, and our children and their ongoing tolerance for my endless interest in history books, museums, and battlefields. Despite the many efforts by the editorial team and readers to ensure accuracy, responsibility for errors of fact or interpretation lie solely with the author, who credits his success to Col. 3:23: "and whatsoever ye do, do it heartily, as to the Lord."

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Introduction

During the American Revolution, the British Empire armed forces made two attempts to seize the key American seaport of Charleston, South Carolina. The first in June 1776 failed due to a combination of inept British Army-Navy coordination and the dogged defense of Fort Sullivan by South Carolina state troops. By contrast, the British successfully captured Charleston and its entire garrison during a 1780 amphibious assault, the largest British ground victory of the American Revolution. However, Commander-in-Chief Sir Henry Clinton and his tactical commander, Lt. Gen. Earl Charles Cornwallis, failed to implement and follow a coherent plan to consolidate their gains in South Carolina. British pacification efforts were hamstrung because Clinton demanded oaths of loyalty from all Americans while Cornwallis compounded matters by failing to protect Loyalist supporters. Consequently, the poorly motivated Loyalist units were routinely defeated in battle by the better-motivated Patriots. After the best Loyalist militia units were destroyed at Kings Mountain in October 1780, Cornwallis abandoned pacification efforts in favor of a search and destroy approach against the American regulars. By March 1781, Cornwallis had wrecked his army's offensive potential, which forced the abandonment of his offensive into North Carolina. After regrouping, Cornwallis decided to abandon the Carolinas for an offensive into Virginia. By late 1781, American commander Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene had regained control over all of the Carolinas and Georgia except for small coastal enclaves. Although these events occurred more than 240 years ago, military professionals can discern many modern elements of operational design in the Southern Campaign related to center of gravity, operational approach, lines of operation, intelligence, mission command, and sustainment. This study and analysis of the Southern Campaign of 1780–81 will reveal insights at all levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical.

The importance of the Southern Campaign is best understood within context of the course of the American Revolution. From the first engagements at Lexington and Concord in April 1775, the American rebellion spread across a vast swath of territory from Canada to Florida, involving British, American, French, Spanish, and German military units. With aid from France, the initially contemptible Continental army developed into a dangerous foe, as demonstrated by the humiliating surrender of General John Burgoyne's army at Saratoga in October 1777. By 1778, Lord George Germain, British secretary of state for the colonies, was compelled to re-

formulate British grand strategy to account for the entry of France and Spain into the war. The resumption of war with the French relegated North America to a secondary theater with its own intractable problems. First, the Continental army under General George Washington was too strong to defeat, so Germain dismissed the idea of further offensive operations in the north. Secondly, a peace treaty was out of the question, as King George III refused to willingly grant full independence to the rebellious Americans.

After sifting through intelligence reports and letters from ex-Royal officials, Germaine saw a major offensive in the southern states as the best remaining strategic option. Exiled Americans had promised strong Loyalist support for restoring British sovereignty in the Carolinas. Moreover, regaining control of North and South Carolina and its profitable rice, timber, and indigo would reduce the strain on the British economy. Lastly, seizing the seaport of Charleston, South Carolina, would give the Royal Navy a secure anchorage for protecting the western flank of British holdings in the Caribbean.

As the British already held northern Florida, Germain envisioned a sequential campaign to regain the southern territories. First, the Royal Navy would carry reinforcements to St. Augustine then use it as a staging base to secure Savannah, Georgia. In turn, Savannah's Tybee Roads would serve as an intermediate base for the expedition to seize Charleston. Underpinning the entire southern strategy was a plan to organize Loyalist militia units in the conquered territories, freeing up regular units to continue a sequential advance through the Carolinas. Once the Carolinas were sufficiently pacified, the regular army would subdue Virginia and secure the Chesapeake basin. British units in New York would advance southward, eventually trapping Washington's Continentals between the two armies. To put the new strategy in motion, Sir Henry Clinton was named commander in chief of the British forces in America. [1]

In late 1778, Clinton quietly sent a corps of 3,000 men under Lt. Col. William Campbell southward; the troops quickly seized Savannah. In January 1781, Campbell marched up the Savannah River Valley and easily occupied Augusta, Georgia. The British shift in strategy caught the Americans by surprise, and their response was hobbled by long lines of communication, command friction, and lack of money. After a joint Franco-American expedition failed to retake Savannah in late 1779, Clinton sailed from New York in early 1780 at the head of a joint Army-Navy expedition that landed on the uninhabited barrier islands south of Charleston. After a methodical approach march and siege, Clinton's army took

Charleston and its garrison of 3,000 Continentals and 2,600 militiamen. Clinton's opponent was Continental Army Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln. Although Lincoln was reasonably well supplied and had a fair number of experienced Continental troops, he was burdened with the political leadership of South Carolina watching his every move. Moreover, Lincoln was poorly served by many of his subordinates, particularly Commodore Abraham Whipple of the Continental Navy, who failed to keep the Royal Navy out of Charleston harbor.

After the fall of Charleston, the Continental officers and enlisted men were imprisoned, while the Patriot militiamen were paroled to their homes. The British victory seemed overwhelming, and initial pacification efforts seemed to go well; British officers and cadre were hard at work organizing Loyalist militias to secure vital logistics points. At the time, British control of Georgia and South Carolina seemed assured, but the first harbingers of failure appeared as relationships between Clinton and Cornwallis became increasingly strained. From the high point of May 1780, British fortunes gradually declined, with a string of Loyalist defeats at the hands of vengeful Patriot militiamen. Cornwallis temporarily arrested the decline by smashing a second Continental army under General Horatio Gates at Camden in August 1780. Thereafter, the British cause faced a string of disasters, including defeats at Musgrove's Mills, Kings Mountain, and the Cowpens. Cornwallis's pursuit of General Nathanael Green's American army ended with the Pyrrhic victory of Guilford Courthouse in March 1781. Once Cornwallis's army marched north into Virginia, Greene's army methodically drove the remaining British and Loyalist garrisons from the interior. By September 1781, the British presence in the South had shrunk to a mere foothold in Savannah and Charleston.

Careful analysis of the Charleston Campaign will reveal many valuable insights regarding the operational and strategic levels of war for today's military professionals. Additionally, many tactical level lessons can be learned from analyzing the exercise of small unit leadership in combat. Thirdly, studying how Sir Henry Clinton and Earl Cornwallis failed to consolidate their tactical gains into strategic success will be particularly relevant for Army leaders given the strategically ambiguous end to major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, current operational commanders can learn about strategic civil-military relationships, planning at the strategic and operational levels of war, and command of a combined and joint, multi-component task force from a close study of General Benjamin Lincoln's command situation.

Planning and Organization

The *Staff Ride Guide to the Charleston Campaign* provides a systematic analytical framework to help guide military professionals through a leadership development event. Part I describes how the American and British armies were organized and operated in 1780. Part II provides a campaign-level overview, including details of the major engagements in the 1776 and 1780 campaigns. Part III includes a suggested itinerary of stands (locations), with directions, orientation, and contextual data; detailed descriptions of the action that occurred at each location; historical vignettes; and suggested analysis questions. Part IV outlines the integration phase, where students synthesize their classroom and field-phase learning to (hopefully) glean relevant lessons for their military roles. Part V supports operations and logistics staff planning to help ensure a good training event. Appendix B gives thumbnail biographical sketches of the major participants; Appendix C, a detailed order of battle; and Appendix D, a chronological account of the campaign; and Appendix E, a glossary of terms. Lastly, a selected bibliography shares recommended sources for additional study before the terrain walk. This book is written principally for instructors and facilitators planning a staff ride to Charleston. The facilitator must become thoroughly familiar with the material—best done in conjunction with a terrain walk of the battlefield that will help gain a good understanding of the relationship between the physical terrain features present at the time of the battle, and the historical events as they unfolded on the ground.[2]

Before conducting classroom study and the battlefield terrain walk, the instructor should provide students with a list of recommended reading materials. The selected bibliography in the back of this guide is an excellent starting point. Many of the resources are digital documents easily downloaded at no cost to the student. Many primary sources, generally eyewitness accounts and reports, are suggested to help students understand the human dimensions of the campaign. Individual study is followed by instructor-led classroom study to impart basic historical and operational knowledge. To maximize student involvement and learning, a seminar format is recommended, with students required to give a short oral presentation describing a particular facet of the battle: key leader, warfighting function, branch or functional area, or major events before or during the battle. The terrain walk portion of the staff ride covers extensive terrain in and around Charleston, much of which has been considerably altered since the 1780s. Thus, instructor notes for each stand will contrast the major differences in the terrain between the Revolutionary War and modern times.

The stands in the guide are sequenced to facilitate a logical flow with minimal backtracking; however, the facilitator can easily add, modify, or delete stands as needed to support training objectives. Each stand follows the US Army staff ride logic structure: Orient, Describe, Analyze (ODA).[3] First, orientation to the terrain and physical conditions (time, weather, and lighting) present *at the time of the battle.* Next, the instructor describes a particular action or aspect of the battle, preferably including historical vignettes to illuminate the "face of battle." Particularly useful here are role players describing their decisions and actions during the battle. Lastly, students provide input and insight after they examine the actions of the historic participants, aided by the included analysis questions. Most importantly, the facilitator should guide discussion to help students link their insights and analysis to the contemporary environment. Each stand should conclude with a short discussion summary. The critical point of the entire event will be the integration phase at the end of the terrain walk. If time permits, this should occur as soon as possible to allow students to capture, synthesize, and orally articulate their observations and insights. This portion should not be skipped or rushed: *What did I learn, and how do I apply what I learned today to improve myself and/or my profession?*[4]

Notes

1. Brian W. Neal, *The Southern Campaign of the American Revolution: The American Insurgency 1780–82* (Quantico, VA: The US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, 2009, mss), 2.

2. Curtis King, *The Staff Ride* PowerPoint presentation for Military History Instructor Course (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2013), 1.

3. King, 10 and 13.

4. Matthew Cavanaugh, "The Historical Staff Ride, Version 2.0: Educational and Strategic Frameworks*"* (unpublished thesis, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 2013), 4-6, https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-images/centers_research/center_for_teching_excellence/PDFs/mtp_project_papers/Cavanaugh_14.pdf. Staff ride facilitators are strongly encouraged to read Cavanaugh's paper to help ensure the staff ride will be conducted with sufficient historical rigor.

Part I
The Opposing Forces

For a successful staff ride, participants need to understand the significance of the Charleston campaign within the broader strategic and operational context of the American Revolution. This first chapter provides a concise survey of the organization, weapons, tactics, and support functions of the British and American armies—details that add context to the historical events and leader decisions covered in later chapters. Additionally, the selected biography offers helpful references for a more in-depth study of the subject.

American Ground Forces

Colonial American Militia

Prior to 1775, the American colonial standing militia consisted of able-bodied white males, aged sixteen to sixty, who were required to periodically assemble, or muster, for training with a musket, ammunition, and basic supplies. Militiamen were legally required to serve up to ninety days to protect the colony from hostile forces; in practice, the colonial governor would discharge the militia as soon as the crisis passed. The militia was deemed sufficient to provide both internal and external security, so few British regular troops were stationed in America prior to the Seven Years' War (French and Indian War) of 1754–63. During that conflict, a small number of Americans voluntarily enlisted as Provincial troops. The bulk of the support given to the regular British Army was from ordinary militiamen who served as scouts, guides, and skirmishers. Despite the victorious outcome for the British, the war drove a wedge between American militia and British regulars. American militiamen were treated with disdain and condescension, even after Maj. Gen. Edward Braddock's humiliating 9 July 1755 defeat at the Battle of the Monongahela highlighted British ineptness in frontier combat. In turn, British regulars scorned the lack of discipline in the American militia ranks. Disagreements about sharing wartime costs, particularly the quartering and feeding of the regulars, was a contributing cause of the American Revolution in April 1775.[1]

The Continental Army

After skirmishes at Lexington and Concord in April 1775 precipitated war, New England militia units reinforced Massachusetts regiments besieging the town of Boston. Each state had its own commander in chief,

and problems with unity of command soon became apparent. So on 14 July 1775, the Second Continental Congress mustered state militia regiments into Continental service for a six-month period. To command the new Continental Army, Congress selected George Washington, a Virginia militia colonel with combat experience during the French and Indian War. By March 1776, General Washington commanded a Continental Army with an authorized strength of 13,000 officers and soldiers in twenty-seven infantry regiments. To exercise theater-level operational command within the United States, Congress created three departments—Northern, Middle, and Southern—each commanded by a Continental major general. Significantly, the department commander had no command authority over state militia units, unless explicitly granted by the state governor.[2]

The infantry regiment was the largest permanent tactical unit in the Continental Army. Commanded by a colonel and assisted by a lieutenant colonel and major, the regiment was authorized eight companies, each with one captain as commander, four junior officers, eight noncommissioned officers (NCOs), two musicians, and seventy-six privates, totaling 728 officers and soldiers. Enlisted soldiers were generally drawn from the lower classes of society, and their length of enlistment varied according to the fortunes of war.[3] By contrast, most officers were members of the prewar gentry or mercantile class, usually commissioned for the duration of the war. For field service, regiments were grouped into brigades or wings commanded by a senior colonel or brigadier general; regiments, in turn, were combined into a field army commanded by a major general. Operational, quartermaster, and adjutant staff roles were filled by detailed regimental officers, while most logistics functions—ordnance, quartermaster, and transportation—were handled by skilled civilian contractors.

Because of the high cost of recruiting, training, and sustaining mounted troops, Congress only created four light dragoon regiments, each authorized 280 men. In 1780, Washington reorganized the dragoon regiments into legionary corps by converting two troops to light infantry, thus reducing the logistics requirements while improving the unit's self-defense capabilities. The reorganization proved a step in the right direction, prompting Washington to further rebalance his light units by creating partisan corps, mobile regiments authorized four troops of dragoons and four companies of light infantry.[4]

Despite the militia's relative lack of experience with artillery, the Continental Army succeeded in creating a robust artillery branch under the leadership of Maj. Gen. Henry Knox.[5] In 1776, the Continental Army

organized a twelve-company artillery regiment using captured British cannons and a cadre of ex-Royal artillerymen with combat experience. The regiment was a purely administrative headquarters, with the artillery company as the sole tactical echelon. Each artillery company was authorized six officers, eight NCOs, nine bombardiers, eighteen gunners (ranked as privates but paid extra as specialists), and thirty-two matrosses (artillery privates who rank below gunners).[6]

Providing specialized logistics support to the Continental Army were artificer companies supervised by the Quartermaster General's department. Artificers were skilled craftsmen who provided important logistics support by building and maintaining camp barracks, wagons, and bateaux (flat-bottomed boats); in the field, artificers assisted combat troops with building field fortifications. Artillery artificers employed similar carpenter skills to build artillery carriages and wagons, but also performed armorer tasks like repairing cannons and small arms.[7] Transportation matters also fell under the Wagon Master General of the Quartermaster General's department, overseeing the contracting and employment of horses and oxen teams pulling wagons. The use of contract drivers was intended to relieve valuable soldiers from the drudgery of supply tasks, but the use of civilians in a combat zone often proved problematic.[8]

State Troops

Theoretically, each state organized its militia units along Continental lines, but in practice the units varied in organization, method of recruitment, and length of service. When called into service under Continental command, militiamen were expected to report for duty with basic arms and accoutrements, requiring only daily rations and an occasional resupply from the ordnance stores. In reality, Continental quartermasters had to keep stocks of muskets, uniforms, and accoutrements in their logistics trains to support the needs of the state troops. When around their home districts, Patriot militia provided invaluable intelligence concerning the terrain and loyalty of the population and would often fight harder to defend their homes and townships. A significant number of militia officers and NCOs had prior irregular war experience, and a number previously served with the British or Continental armies. When intelligently led and employed according to their capabilities, militia units were potent force multipliers for the Continental Army—exemplified by the major role that the militia played in Brig. Gen. Daniel Morgan's January 1781 victory at the Cowpens.[9]

At the same time, Patriot militia had significant weaknesses. Even when well-led, militia units would invariably give way under a British bayonet assault, as the militia troops were seldom trained or equipped for bayonet fighting. Additionally, militia unit motivation and effectiveness tended to decline over time, especially when operating away from their home districts. Even with quality leadership, discipline in militia units was seldom good, and a battlefield reverse would often result in widespread desertions. Finally, militia typically brought their own horses, and their demands for fodder further burdened the already strained Continental quartermaster system.[10]

American Naval Forces

Privateers

In comparison to the relationship between British regulars and American militiamen, no such connection existed between American mariners and the Royal Navy. Yet many colonial mariners had served as privateers, privately owned armed merchant vessels that were authorized by letters of marque from the King of Great Britain to attack enemy vessels. The British used this low-cost approach to deny vital goods to the opponent's military and economy; successful privateer officers and crews were paid proportional shares of money gained from the sale of a prize vessel and its cargo. During the French and Indian War, large numbers of New Englanders sailed as British privateers, gaining valuable combat experience while amassing considerable fortunes. The most successful was the *Gamecock*, a privateer commanded by Capt. Abraham Whipple. [11] After the outbreak of the American Revolution, several states commissioned privateers. During the war, significant numbers of British-flagged merchant ships were seized, providing valuable prizes like muskets, gunpowder, and rum to the supply-starved Americans. The Continental Congress eventually sanctioned the practice and issued almost 1,700 letters of marque during the war. American privateers caused significant damage to the British war effort, capturing more than 3,000 prizes worth more than $18 million—a significant drain on the already financially strapped British economy.[12]

State Navies

In eighteenth-century America, water transportation was the cheapest and most efficient method of moving troops and supplies over long distances. However, the eastern seaboard of North America—lined with islands, shoals, and inland waterways—posed a difficult problem for the "blue-water" Royal Navy in supporting land operations away from the

coast. With the outbreak of the Revolution, several states created their own "brown water navy" to gain control of the coastal and inland waterways. At first, gunboats were improvised by mounting cannons and swivel guns on everything from sloops to barges; in time the Americans developed armed galleys. Galleys were small, around 100 tons in displacement, propelled by oars or sails, with narrow hulls and low freeboard—thus suitable for operating on inland waterways like the Chesapeake. Galleys were crewed by thirty to forty men, about half as oarsmen and the remainder as crews and officers. When powered by long oars (sweeps), galleys were easily maneuvered in shallow waters and capable of short sprints to close into engagement range. The firepower of galleys was also considerable, generally two heavy guns (18- to 24-pounders) mounted in the bows, and swivel guns amidships to defend against boarders. Larger galleys might also carry carriage-mounted 6- to 9-pounder guns, mounted amidships or at the stern. The Royal Navy, which had no comparable light warships, was forced to impress captured American galleys to form its own galley fleet.[13]

The Continental Navy

Despite the threat posed by the British Royal Navy, the Continental Congress initially refrained from organizing a Continental navy while political reconciliation was still possible. By October 1775, attitudes hardened and the Rhode Island delegation in Congress issued a proposal to organize a Continental navy for coastal defense and overseas protection of American trade. Arguments over the cost and size of the national navy were made moot when Congress learned on 13 October 1775 that General Washington had issued Continental commissions to the captains of three Massachusetts privateers. The Continental Congress tacitly approved Washington's fait accompli by commissioning two additional armed commerce raiders. When Britain rejected American peace overtures in November 1775, Congress authorized the organization of a Continental navy modeled on the structure and doctrine of the Royal Navy.[14] The first Continental squadron was organized on 18 February 1776, and the navy reached its high point in 1777, with thirty-one warships under the national flag. By the end of the war, a total of fifty Continental ships had been commissioned. Too small to seriously challenge the Royal Navy, the Continental Navy was principally employed in commerce raiding. About 200 British ships were captured by Continental warships during the war. The war's best-remembered naval engagement was the 23 September 1779 victory of Captain John Paul Jones's converted merchantman *Bon Homme Richard* over the frigate HMS *Serapis*. Perhaps the Continental Na-

vy's most important role was providing concrete proof that America was a sovereign nation while carrying diplomats and official correspondence to and from Europe.[15]

Continental Marines

In November 1775, Congress was presented a unique opportunity to annex the major British naval base at Nova Scotia. From the planning for the expedition came a proposal to create two Marine battalions from the existing Continental Army. Each battalion would be structured with ten companies of fifty privates plus officers; each company would be structured to meet Marine requirements for a Continental frigate. On 13 November 1775, Congress issued a resolution approving the proposal to create a separate corps of Marines:

> *Resolved*, That two Battalions of marines be raised, consisting of one Colonel, two Lieutenant Colonels, two Majors and other officers as usual in other regiments; and that they consist of an equal number of privates with other battalions; that particular care be taken that no persons be appointed to office, or inlisted [*sic*] into said Battalions, but such are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea when required; that they be inlisted [*sic*] and commissioned to serve for and during the present war between Great Britain and the colonies, unless dismissed by order of Congress; that they be distinguished by the names of the first and second battalions of American Marines, and that they be considered as part of the number which the continental Army before Boston is ordered to consist of.[16]

General Washington convinced Congress to shelve the plan for Nova Scotia to avoid losing valuable manpower. Instead, Congress on 28 November appointed Samuel Nichols as the first Marine officer responsible for recruiting the new Marine battalions. While Nichols worked to recruit new Marines, Congress passed new Marine-specific regulations addressing issues such as pay, administration of prize money, and the daily rum ration. By January 1776, five Marine companies were enlisted into Continental service and had been assigned to six Continental ships operating from Philadelphia. Marines were used as amphibious infantry for raids against enemy installations, and provided security for watering and resupply details. During naval combat, below-deck Marines helped officers maintain discipline on the gun decks, while others were posted aloft in the masts to engage enemy marines and sailors with musket fire and iron grenades.[17]

The Continental Southern Department, 1779–81

Ground Forces

The Continental Southern Department was first organized under Maj. Gen. Charles Lee to resist the April 1776 British army-navy attack against Charleston. The stubborn American defense was greatly aided by squabbling between British army commander Sir Henry Clinton and navy commodore Sir Peter Parker. Emboldened by the British failure to take Charleston, southern Patriots largely suppressed Loyalist (Tory) militia organization efforts within the region. As a consequence, the Southern Department evolved into a quiet backwater of war, as both sides concentrated their resources in the northern theater. British troops broke the stalemate after Saratoga when they stormed Savannah, Georgia, in December 1778. Congress reacted to the surprise shift in British strategy by appointing Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln as the new department commander. By early 1780, department commander Lincoln had about 5,600 troops—all of the Continental Line infantry regiments from Georgia and the Carolinas, several Virginia regiments, and two squadrons of Virginia dragoons—along with numbers of North and South Carolina militiamen. [18] After an extended campaign and siege, marked in large part by American ineptness, Lieutenant General Clinton's army captured Charleston on 12 May 1780. The

Figure 1.1. Siege of Charleston. From the public domain.

destruction of a retreating Continental detachment at the 29 May 1780 battle of the Waxhaws marked the final elimination of the Continental Line in the Southern Department.[19]

While the Charleston siege was still in progress, the Continental Congress dispatched the Maryland-Delaware Division, under Maj. Gen. Baron Johann De Kalb, as reinforcements. Once De Kalb received word of the fall of Charleston, he camped near Hillsborough, North Carolina, to await further instructions from Congress. Meanwhile, Congress appointed Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates, the hero of the Saratoga campaign, as the department commander—over General Washington's objections. Gates joined De Kalb at Hillsborough and immediately led his army—Continentals as well as North Carolina and Virginia militia—through the pine barrens of central South Carolina to attack the British major logistics base at Camden. Warned of Gates's approach by Loyalist sympathizers, General Lord Charles Cornwallis met and steamrolled Gates's poorly deployed army near Camden, South Carolina, with more than 900 Continentals killed in action, and a further 1,000 taken prisoner. Afterward, Gates withdrew to regroup the fragments of his army at Hillsborough. Unaided by Gates, diehard Patriot militia commanders in the region continued to contest British pacification efforts by interdicting supply lines and destroying isolated enemy detachments. Major British defeats at Musgrove's Mill and Kings Mountain compelled Cornwallis to suspend his offensive plans and go into winter quarters at Winnsboro, South Carolina.[20] In December 1780, Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene quietly relieved Gates and took command of a threadbare and dispirited army of 900 Continentals and 1,500 militia. After performing a reconnaissance of his new department, and pondering his dismal circumstances, Greene seized the initiative by dividing his army. Brig. Gen. Daniel Morgan's light troops marched westward to threaten the key British outpost of Ninety Six, South Carolina. Meanwhile, Greene marched the rest of his army into South Carolina's pro-Patriot Cheraw Hill region, where he could safely subsist his command while threatening Cornwallis's lines of communication to the coast.[21]

Greene's unorthodox strategy triggered a violent reaction from Cornwallis, who attempted to trap and destroy Morgan's light corps. Instead, Morgan set up a well-planned defense and decisively defeated Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton's *British Legion* at the Cowpens on 17 January 1781. Afterward, Greene consolidated his army and withdrew with hundreds of British prisoners into North Carolina. During several weeks in January and February 1781, Greene orchestrated an extended delaying action, avoiding engagements while exhausting Cornwallis's army. After a period

of refitting in southern Virginia, Greene challenged Cornwallis in a game of hare and hounds for control of North Carolina. After weeks of probing and skirmishes, the two armies clashed at Guilford Courthouse on 15 March 1781, producing a Pyrrhic victory for the British. Then Cornwallis withdrew his shattered army to refit at Wilmington, North Carolina, and Greene embarked on a "war of posts" against British interior posts in the Carolinas. Despite never winning a major battle in the Southern Department, General Greene's regular and militia forces successfully drove the British from their interior posts, penning the enemy into their coastal enclaves by the end of 1781.[22]

Naval Forces

In a belated response to the British attack in June 1776, the South Carolina General Assembly authorized the formation of the South Carolina State Navy. Although orders were placed for several purpose-built galleys, only a single vessel, the *Beaufort*, was launched in April 1777. After providing support to American forces operating along the St. Mary's River in Georgia, *Beaufort* was modified as a commerce raider with two 12-pounders in the bow, and eight 4-pounders to her sides. Plans for further raiding craft were abandoned after Prevost's 1778 invasion of Georgia. Instead, work crews modified several flat boats into armed galleys, each mounting two 18-pounder guns, for use in defending the waterways around Charleston. Several other suitable boats were bought from private owners and turned into armed galleys by adding 6-pounder carriage guns and light swivel guns. These galleys were commanded by a captain and authorized two lieutenants, a shipmaster, five specialist rates, and forty seamen to man the guns and oars.[23]

As part of the tardy response to the fall of Savannah, Continental land and naval forces were sent to reinforce the Southern Department. In late 1779, Commodore Abraham Whipple sailed from Boston on the frigate *Providence*, leading the frigates *Boston*, *Queen of France,* and sloop *Ranger* as reinforcements for Charleston. Whipple had been a privateer captain during the French and Indian War so had no scruples in seizing a 12-gun British brigantine as a prize of war before reaching Charleston. After a pause to reprovision and repair storm damage, Whipple's ships scouted north and south of Charleston, capturing three British ships that yielded helpful supplies and intelligence on the southward movement of Royal Navy ships to Tybee Roads near Savannah. On 29 January 1780, the *Providence* and *Ranger* clashed with two British 50-gun ships of the line—thus confirming the nearby presence of a strong Royal Navy squad-

ron. With that intelligence, Whipple withdrew into Charleston harbor to await developments. Besides his four Continental ships, Whipple commanded the converted French transports *Bricole, Truite*, and *L'Adventure* as well as seven auxiliary ships—with a total of 278 guns.[24]

After conferring with General Lincoln, Whipple dedicated his ships to defending the inner harbor. To hinder British efforts to penetrate the harbor, Whipple dispatched two Marine demolition parties to destroy the harbor's navigation aids and lighthouse beacon—and for good measure the walls of Fort Johnson—with charges of gunpowder. For the remainder of the siege, the navy ships laid idle in the Cooper River, despite numerous demands from General Lincoln for Whipple to launch sorties against Royal Navy warships. Initially, the Marines were kept busy with guarding ships and manning observation posts along the Cooper River. Once the American fleet was bottled up in the Cooper River, the Marine detachments (along with some surplus sailors) were sent ashore to serve as gunners in the artillery redoubts on the east side of the city. The Marines were designated as a quick reaction force in the event of a British amphibious assault on the city. When General Lincoln surrendered Charleston in May 1780, four shipboard detachments of 200 Marines and perhaps 750 sailors were among the haul of prisoners.[25] Whipple and his senior commanders were paroled in late May back to Philadelphia, followed by the Continental Marines and sailors in June 1780.[26]

British Ground Forces

Regular Army

As in the Continental Army, the infantry regiment was the largest permanent tactical unit in the British Army—normally paired in temporary brigades that, in turn, were combined in a field army commanded by a major or lieutenant general. British regiments were commanded by a colonel assisted by a lieutenant colonel, a major, and a small specialist staff, and were nominally composed of twelve infantry companies. However, a British regiment organized for combat fielded only 448 muskets, unlike the authorized strength of 544 muskets in a Continental regiment.[27]

The discrepancy was due to the unique British practice of leaving two depot companies at home station to handle recruiting and administrative matters. This left a deployed infantry regiment with eight line companies, one light infantry company, and one grenadier company. Traditionally, the tallest and strongest recruits were assigned to grenadier companies, which were employed as assault troops employing black powder grenades. By

1776, the grenadier role was obsolete, but the name was retained as an infantry mark of honor. When not on detached missions, the grenadier company occupied the regiment's right flank, traditionally the point of decisive action in combat. Light infantry companies were organized and trained in open-order skirmishing tactics; when consolidated with the regiment, the light infantry company anchored the left flank. Grenadier and light infantry companies naturally recruited the fittest and most capable soldiers, so the companies were often grouped into ad hoc assault battalions.[28]

Because of the high cost of shipping horses from England and the work involved with supporting dragoons in the field, the British army deployed only two regular dragoon regiments to North America. Its fire support in North America was provided by the *Royal Artillery Regiment*, which was considered a separate and coequal military service to the army. *Royal Artillery* battalion headquarters performed only administrative functions, leaving the artillery company as the primary tactical echelon. Artillery companies had a base organization that varied according to the availability and type of cannon systems. Cannons had a positive moral effect on the battlefield but were heavy and costly to move, a factor that limited British field artillery employment during the inland operations to 3- and 6-pounder cannons. For siege operations, the army used water transport to move up heavy guns up to 24-pounder in size, along with mortars and howitzers for indirect fire tasks.[29]

The British Army held many tactical advantages over the Continental Army, as it was a well-established professional military force with a long tradition of battlefield victory. Many British officers and NCOs were combat veterans; regardless of combat experience, all leaders were capable of quickly molding new recruits into professional soldiers. Consequently, the Continental Army fought at a decided disadvantage in the early years of the war, and did not demonstrate tactical parity with the British until the June 1778 Battle of Monmouth. However, significant logistics constraints hobbled the British Army's tactical prowess. In addition, recruiting of native British volunteers was difficult, as soldiering was not considered an honorable profession and fears of dying in the wilds of North America dissuaded many volunteers. Even after the depot regiments collected a sufficient number of recruits, many would die from disease or accidents before reaching their regiments in North America. As a result, British infantry regiments in North America were chronically undermanned throughout the war; the British Army was forced to recruit Provincial and militia troops and contract German troops to make up the difference.[30]

Provincials

The practice of enlisting Americans in provincial regiments dated from the French and Indian War, so was naturally employed during the American Revolution. Loyal Americans were enlisted in service to the Crown, but unlike regulars, the provincials were limited to service only for the duration of the war. Provincial regiments enjoyed the same pay and benefits as regulars, but provincial officers were lower in status than regulars; additionally, provincials were not entitled to half pay and permanent retention of rank after demobilization.[31] Many provincial units organized from New York and New Jersey Loyalists served during the Charleston campaign, including Maj. Patrick Ferguson's *American Volunteers* and the *British Legion* under Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton. The second wave of reinforcements to Clinton in April 1780 included the *North Carolina Volunteers* under Lt. Col. John Hamilton, and Col. Alexander Innes's *South Carolina Loyalists*.[32] Interestingly, Hamilton was the only native-born American among the four Provincial commanders in Clinton's expedition. Ferguson and Innes were Scottish-born, while Tarleton was a native Englishman.[33]

As noted earlier, the British army in North America was critically short of dragoons to perform vital intelligence, patrolling, and flank security missions. In July 1778, the *British Legion* was organized with 250 dragoons and 200 light infantry, under the field command of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton. However, during the ship movement from New York to Savannah, the horse transports sank in a winter gale, leaving his men temporarily unhorsed. Once the British army arrived at Savannah, Tarleton's troopers and the light infantry were sent inland to procure horses, which left the *Legion* troopers at a decided disadvantage against the Continentals, who were largely mounted on stronger and specially trained Virginia horses. Despite the initial handicaps, Tarleton performed superbly during the Charleston campaign, defeating the more numerous but poorly led American dragoons at Monck's Corner and Lenud's Ferry—and capturing their better horses and the dragoon equipage. After further victories at the Waxhaws and Camden, the Americans adapted to Tarleton's stereotyped tactics, and Tarleton suffered a major defeat at the January 1781 Battle of Cowpens.[34]

The German Units

Besides recruiting from the loyalist population in North America, Britain negotiated for combat units from several German states, finding that contracting for troops was easier than recruiting additional British regiments. The Landgraviate of Hesse-Kassel was the largest contributor

to the British effort, and so Americans generically called all German units "Hessians," regardless of origin. German soldiers were not really mercenaries, as they did not individually volunteer for overseas duty; instead, the German regiments were raised by landholding elites and organized for conventional European wars. Furthermore, the troops received no additional pay or incentives for being in America; instead, the financial benefits accrued to the German princes who contracted out their regiments. German regiments were organized differently than British or American units, with variations between different German states. Each German regiment was commanded by a colonel and seconded by a lieutenant colonel, major, and staff of eighteen officers and NCOs. A typical German regiment had up to six line infantry companies and a single grenadier company. Each company was led by a captain, up to three lieutenants, ten NCOs, and 114 to 165 enlisted musketeers. Thus, a German regiment could field between 525 and 690 muskets depending on how it was organized—surpassing the firepower of a British regiment and on par, if not surpassing, Continental infantry regiments.[35] Clinton's amphibious corps was considerably strengthened with the addition of four German grenadier regiments, two infantry regiments, and an artillery detachment. Additionally, Clinton's force was supported by a large *jäger* (German for hunter) rifle company of 150 men, commanded by Capt. Johann v. Ewald. *Jägers* were fighters recruited from hunters and gamekeepers and trained and equipped to perform light infantry and sharpshooting missions.[36]

Organizational Structure for Southern Campaign 1778–81

By 1778, Lord George Germain, secretary of state for the American colonies, was in overall control of British grand strategy in North America—divided into two defined geographic commands. Sir Henry Clinton functioned as commander in chief and governor-general of all British-controlled land south of the Saint Lawrence River down to the Gulf of Mexico.[37] When Clinton's expedition left New York in December 1779, the transports carried a corps of light infantry and a corps of grenadiers, five Royal regiments, a corps of Provincial dragoons and light infantry, detachments from the Royal Artillery and pioneers, and five German infantry regiments—about 8,000 troops. A second wave of reinforcements arrived from New York and Savannah in April 1780, consisting of eight regiments of Loyalist Provincials and militia, and the full-strength 71st Foot (Highlanders); their arrival pushed Clinton's troop strength to roughly 12,800 troops, a total that did not include an unknown number of naval personnel manning heavy siege guns.[38]

Royal Naval Forces

Although the 1775 Royal Navy was arguably the world's strongest, Britain did not have uncontested control of the world's oceans. The constant European wars of the early and mid-eighteenth century required a large standing fleet, but the period after the Seven Years' War was marked by fighting on the Continent; thus, Royal budgets were prioritized to the Army. Shipbuilding slowed, and the expansion of shipyards was neglected such that by 1776, many of the Navy's 270 warships were decrepit. When the rebellion broke out in 1775, Britain lost access to American timber, hemp, and turpentine for shipbuilding; American ship bottoms for carrying freight; and American skilled seamen to enlist in the Royal Navy. Because of the low state of readiness and other overseas commitments, the Royal Navy was slow to respond to the war in North America. In 1776, Sir Peter Parker commanded only two fourth-rate ships of the line, and six frigates for the expedition against Charleston. At the time, the number of ships was deemed sufficient for the task at hand because the Americans lacked the naval strength to do more than attack weakly defended convoys and pick off isolated third-rate warships.

The entry of France into the war complicated planning for the 1780 Charleston expedition, as the vulnerable transports would need a substantial naval force for protection. Consequently, Vice Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot commanded a comparatively strong fleet of seven ships of the line, ranging from forty-four to sixty-four guns, supported by eight frigates and small craft, with a total of 496 heavy guns. The fleet carried several armed galleys confiscated from the Americans that were used for close support of the troop-carrying boats and to patrol inland waterways. Each Royal Navy ship carried some marines to maintain its security while in port, and as fighting troops during combat.[39]

Weapons

Muskets

The primary infantry weapon used by the British Army was the Short Land Pattern Brown Bess .75-caliber smoothbore flintlock musket of varying lengths; these muskets weighed about ten pounds, fired a .69-caliber one-and-a-half-ounce lead ball, and mounted a deadly sixteen-inch socket bayonet. Tactics of the time emphasized the shock value of massed volley fire, so the weapons were not equipped with sights, and soldiers seldom received marksmanship training. The British Army fielded the first Short Land Pattern muskets in the 1720s, and many were shipped to the colonial

militia armories; consequently, many Brown Bess muskets saw service in the Patriot militia ranks. At least 48,000 of the .69-caliber French Charleville Model 1763 and 1766 muskets were smuggled into the colonies from France beginning in 1776 and adopted as the primary musket issued to Continental regiments. The M1766 musket was fifty-seven inches long, weighed about ten pounds, and fired a one-ounce .65-caliber ball, which was often supplemented with the addition of lead buckshot in each paper cartridge (buck and ball) that would theoretically create a shotgun-like pattern of projectiles with each volley. Some American militia units carried the Charleville, but more carried Brown Bess muskets or a mix of personal rifles and shotguns. Little information exists as to the weapons carried by German infantry units beyond a bayonet capable musket with a .70- to .75-caliber bore.[40]

Muskets versus Rifles

In terms of accuracy, the smoothbore musket had an effective range that was one-third less than a rifle—less than 100 meters versus 300 meters.[41] Yet despite the obvious disadvantages in range and accuracy, muskets offered more advantages in combat compared to rifles; as a result, muskets were the principal infantry weapon of European armies. First, mass-produced muskets were robustly made, designed for hard usage and ease of maintenance in the field. Second, smoothbores were much less affected by black powder fouling due to the loose fit of the ball in the barrel. When fired at close range, the heavy lead musket ball could cause carnage in the enemy ranks, even more so with buck and ball cartridges. Finally, a bayonet-tipped musket gave a musketeer a decided advantage over a rifleman in close-in combat.[42]

Finely crafted muzzle-loaded flintlock rifles were employed by both sides, but in secondary or specialist roles. A skilled shooter using a personal Pennsylvania rifle could accurately hit a squirrel at 200 meters and an adult-sized target out to 300 meters. In exchange for such accuracy and range, the effective rate of fire was about one round per minute. The rifleman had to measure powder from a horn, nest the ball into a greased patch, and pound the whole into the rifling with a ramrod—a task that increased in difficulty once unburnt powder fouled the bore. Rifles were designed for hunting, not combat; they were not designed to mount bayonets and would break apart if used in hand-to-hand combat. Variations in these handcrafted rifles meant a skilled gunsmith had to repair the weapons, and the shooter had to cast his own bullets.[43] Pennsylvania or Deckard rifled flintlock muskets ranged in caliber from .36 to .48. The Ansbach *jägers*

used a similar .67-caliber hunting rifle (*büchse*); thus, German riflemen were known as *jäger*. Smaller and shorter than a Pennsylvania rifle, the *büchse* has a correspondingly shorter effective range of 175 yards.[44]

Secondary Weapons

In terms of the tactics of the time, the bayonet was the mission-essential secondary weapon for regular infantry soldiers. After reducing the strength of an enemy's formation through firepower, an infantry regiment would march forward and break a shaken enemy line with the press of the bayonet. Bayonets for each army were all similar in basic design: a long spike blade varying between 14 and 18 inches in length and mounted to the muzzle of the weapon by a socket and stud. One common secondary weapon carried by American soldiers was a tomahawk or hatchet; a heavy blow from this lethal close-range weapon could kill or immobilize an opponent.

Officers on both sides carried swords as a badge of rank and for close-range combat; some specialist troops, such as Ansbach *jäger* company soldiers, carried a short sword (*Hirschfänger* or deer catcher) when a bayonet was not practical. General Washington ordered Continental officers to carry a spear-like spontoon, half-pike, as a visible mark of authority on the battlefield. British officers had long rejected the use of spontoons on the battlefield. Some even exchanged their swords for a privately procured fusil (light flintlock musket) and bayonet to make them less obvious to a sharp-eyed Patriot rifleman. The practice was condemned by Lieutenant General Clinton, as he believed a fusil-armed officer was too easily distracted from command duties:

> General Burgoyne and I have often represented the absurdity of officers being armed with fusils, and the still greater impropriety . . . by which they neglected the opportunity of employing their divisions to advantage. . . an inconvenience which I had long apprehended might result from officers carrying fuzees, which was then and had been the general practice on the American service.[45]

Dragoon Weaponry

The Southern Campaign cavalry organizations on both sides were routinely task-organized with light infantry to form robust mobile units suitable for screening, pursuit, and delaying actions in support of the main infantry force. Unlike European cavalry—only trained to fight while mounted—light dragoons were trained to fight on horseback and as dismounted skirmishers with the light infantry. For dismounted work, dra-

goons carried a smoothbore flintlock carbine; the heavy-bladed saber was the weapon of choice when mounted, as mounted shock action with the saber was preferred by commanders on both sides.[46]

Artillery

Nomenclature for artillery guns was based on the weight of the solid shot; a 3-pounder gun fired a solid shot that weighed three pounds, and so on. Guns were made of durable bronze; 6-pounder guns were mounted on a wood and iron two-wheeled carriage that weighed 900 pounds and required two horses to move. Three-pounders were mounted on a wheeled carriage that weighed about 500 pounds, light enough to be moved by a single horse or the gun crew during a battle. Three- and 6-pounders were considered field guns due to their relatively light weight and mobility. The standard crew for a 6-pounder field gun was fifteen soldiers led by a commissioned officer and seconded by a sergeant and a corporal; the 3-pounder crew was a minimum of one officer, two gunners, and eight fighters. Each gun crew had one or more specialist gunners who calculated distance and elevation then rammed, aimed, and sponged the cannon; the bombardier handled the vent and loading of the correct ammunition in the breech. The remaining crew consisted of matrosses and artillery privates, the soldiers who positioned the gun and passed ammunition to the bombardier.[47]

The static nature of the Charleston siege allowed use of much heavier ordnance, ranging from 9- to 24-pound guns. Both British and Americans removed heavy guns from sailing ships and moved them into earthen redoubts via sleds, rollers, and rope tackle. Once in position, the guns were mounted on timber and iron carriages capable of small changes in elevation and depression using screws and wedges.[48] For plunging fire into the American defenses, Clinton's army had several howitzers and mortars. Howitzers resembled field guns, but with trunnions balanced at the midpoint (for ease of elevation) and only six calibers in length. Mortars were short-barrel weapons with trunnions at the base, mounted in wooden beds to fire at a 45-degree angle.[49]

Cannons fired four major types of ammunition: shot, grape, canister, and shell. Solid cast iron round shot was used primarily against massed infantry and cavalry targets and for battering fortifications and engaging in counterbattery fires. Maximum range for a 6-pounder gun firing solid shot was around 1,000 meters; the 3-pounder's range was about 800 meters. Grape shot was a medium-range antipersonnel round consisting of a cluster of golf ball-size metal balls loaded in a wood and canvas container that disintegrated during firing to release a cluster of projectiles toward the

target. Canister, or case shot, consisted of musket balls packed in a tin container that shattered on discharge to release a shotgun-like fan of bullets against enemy formations at ranges of less than 400 meters. Shells were hollow iron spheres filled with explosives, primarily fired at steep angles from howitzers and mortars to explode on or within enemy fortifications and installations.[50]

Tactics

Infantry Tactics

By 1780, conventional linear tactics built around the flintlock musket and bayonet had been in use for more than 100 years. For combat, infantry was deployed in linear formation, usually in two to three ranks to maximize the effect of en masse or volley fire to the front. Infantry regiments were the standard infantry tactical unit, known as heavy infantry or line infantry. Every army's primary tactical goal was synchronized employment of all arms, infantry, dragoons, and artillery to break the enemy line of battle. After breaking the enemy line, the army used a bayonet charge and pursuit by dragoons to seal the victory for the still-intact infantry line. The standard sequence of battle events opened with an approach march in column formation by the attacking army to a suitable battle position. Open ground, with a natural obstacle such as a river or swamp to protect one or both flanks, was considered ideal for an army assuming a defensive role. The attacking army would deploy from its marching columns into battle line, preferably out of range of enemy heavy weapons. Once deployed, the attacking force would advance to within 100 yards of the enemy line, the effective engagement range for muskets. During this approach march, skirmishers, sharpshooters, and artillery on both sides would engage to attrite and demoralize the enemy force.

Once within a suitable killing distance, infantry regiments officers would direct controlled volley fire to shock and break the enemy unit's cohesion. A well-trained regiment could load and fire its smoothbore muskets about three times per minute while under fire; in practice, officers controlled volley fire by company or division to avoid having the entire regiment without loaded muskets. Under ideal combat conditions, about 20 percent of the rounds from a volley would hit an enemy infantry line at fifty yards. Casualties were naturally lower at greater engagement ranges or if there was natural cover or fortifications to shield soldiers. Speed was stressed over accuracy; the shock of repeated volleys was intended to stagger and disorder the enemy line sufficiently for a bayonet charge. Fierce

hand-to-hand fighting could follow if the troops in the weaker line stood and fought; more likely, the disorganized side would break and retreat. Few infantry regiments, even well-trained ones, were disciplined enough to stand and receive a bayonet charge; the poorly equipped Patriot militia and state units typically retreated facing British regulars.[51]

In addition to the line (heavy) infantry, armies had several specialist infantry units. Light infantry companies were trained to advance in an open skirmish line, using available cover and concealment while performing screening and reconnaissance duties well ahead of the parent regiment. Skirmishers operated in fire teams of two to four fighters, with one or more soldiers engaging the enemy with aimed fire while the others reloaded, all well-dispersed to present a reduced target to enemy skirmishers. During the Southern Campaign, the Americans generally used light infantry in their designated role, while the perennially shorthanded British routinely consolidated their light units into a provisional line infantry battalion. British and Hessian grenadiers, for which there was no American equivalent, were also consolidated into battalions for concentrated employment as specialist assault troops. Rifle-armed troops on both sides were similarly employed as light infantry, with tactics modified to account for their slower rates of fire and vulnerability to line infantry. Besides performing skirmishing tasks, riflemen were commonly used to engage enemy commanders and weapon crews, usually from the flanks or elevated terrain overlooking the engagement area, where reach and accuracy of the rifles could be used to maximum effect. In Clinton's army, the Hessian *jägers* were often task-organized with regular bayonet-equipped infantry for close-in security.

Dragoon Tactics

In theory, dragoons were organized and equipped to ride to their place of battle, dismount at a distance from the objective, and maneuver into combat fighting with muskets or rifles. These tactics required dragoons to leave the horses under the care of every fourth person in the unit. This practice was seldom used in combat as it would reduce the squadron's firepower. Instead, dragoons fought mounted, attacking the flank or rear of vulnerable infantry units with slashing broadsword attacks, relying on attached infantry to provide a base of fire and protection against a superior force. Other dragoon battlefield tasks were engagement of hostile mounted troops, reconnaissance, and pursuing a defeated enemy. Neither side employed dragoons without infantry support. Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's *British Legion* was permanently organized with an average of 250

mounted dragoons and 200 light infantry, and the *Legion* was often reinforced with attached light infantry and artillery. By contrast, Lt. Col. William Washington's amalgamated 1st and 3rd Continental Light Dragoons lacked organic infantry, and so required task-organizing with infantry for additional security.[52]

Artillery Tactics

In terms of battlefield employment, infantry and dragoon tactics were relatively straightforward. By contrast, the artillery arm was a specialized, technically oriented branch requiring skilled officers and soldiers to function properly on the battlefield. Each type of cannon (gun) had peculiarities and variables impacting the weapon's effectiveness—factors compounded by the effects of wind, temperature, and humidity. Consequently, artillery specialists needed mathematical skills and a great deal of training to gain proficiency as gunners. Because of inevitable combat casualties, each fighter had to be cross-trained to learn the tasks of the others. Once crews gained proficiency, the company commander would train the gun sections to function together. Tactically, sections of two to three guns were commonly assigned in a direct support role to an infantry brigade, although the army commander might elect to keep them in general support for possible counterbattery, harassment, or reinforcement roles. Gunners preferred to emplace their weapons well out of enemy rifle range, positioned on the friendly flank so the guns could enfilade (fire down the long axis) of the enemy infantry as it closed within range. For long-range engagements, gunners calculated the fall of the shot to create a bounce or ricochet effect through the enemy line, thus maximizing casualties. For engagement ranges less than 400 meters, gunners would switch from solid shot to grape or canister and continue the engagement until the enemy line was within 100 meters, too close to safely fire. The guns could revert to a flank protection role, although they were often withdrawn into reserve to avoid casualties from enemy rifle fire. On the attack, guns were unlimbered (detached or unpacked) from their vulnerable draft animals; crews pushed and dragged the guns forward, ready to lend immediate fire support at the quick halt. In improved defensive positions, guns were emplaced on the flank of the principal infantry line, positioned behind an earth redoubt so it could enfilade the enemy infantry with grape or canister rounds before reaching the friendly works—without being engaged by return fire from enemy riflemen or guns. The longer-range 6-pounders were emplaced to perform both antipersonnel and counterbattery tasks against hostile artillery.[53]

Two other light artillery pieces were used during the siege of Charleston. Swivel guns weighted from 20 to 100 pounds, up to 30 inches long, with a 1.5- to 3-inch bore. The gun trunnions were mounted in a yoke like a modern machine gun pedestal; they could be mounted on a wall or similar object heavy enough to absorb the recoil. Served by a gunner and two to three assistants, swivel guns could engage small targets in a wide forward arc with shot and canister. Generally issued only to Hessian units, the amusette was an oversized musket that weighed more than fifty pounds, mounted on a yoke similar to a swivel gun. The amusette could be mounted on a wall for defensive work, or a light carriage for mobile firepower. Some amusettes were rifled for long-range precision fire, although most were smoothbore like a giant shotgun for defensive use.[54]

Defensive Tactics

Deliberate fortifications were commonly used in the Northern Theater during the American Revolution, but seldom in the Southern Campaign. One major exception was the defensive works at Charleston. To create temporary field works, troops and laborers dug a trench then used the piled-up earth to create a sloped curtain. In time, redans, redoubts, and lunettes were added to permit flanking and enfilade fire. The approaches to field works were protected with obstacles like *abatis* (obstacle of felled trees with sharpened branches facing the enemy), *chevaux-de-frise* (a tree trunk with spikes used to slow horses and men), and palisades (stout wood fences that required ladders to scale). The obstacles were designed to slow and canalize enemy assault columns in an open area where the defenses could engage with flanking and enfilade fire from rifles, muskets, and artillery. When properly integrated, field works would protect friendly troops and artillery from enemy fire, while also hindering the enemy's ability to penetrate into the depth of the defenses. When possible, field works incorporated favorable terrain and were laid out for mutual support with interlocking fields of fire. When reinforced with fascines (rough bundle used to strengthen a structure) and gabions (like Hesco barriers), earthen fortifications could absorb considerable bombardment before collapse, allowing the defensive force to inflict disproportionally heavy casualties on an attacking infantry force.[55]

Tactics in the Southern Campaign

A tactical offensive was the preferred form of operations during the American Revolution. Commanders would adopt a defensive posture for economy of force reasons—either an area defense to deny the enemy ac-

cess to terrain, or in a point defense role to protect an installation or town. Tactics were often unconventional, dictated by available units and equipment and logistics support, and further influenced by physical and human terrain in the Carolinas:

- British units abandoned the conventional three-line deployment in favor of a two-line combat deployment used by the Continental Army, which allowed the regiment to cover a greater front.
- Regiments were deployed in looser formations, with more space between individual soldiers to adapt to the denser terrain of the South.
- Due to their chronic shortage of heavy infantry, British light infantry and grenadier companies were often employed as conventional infantry.
- Field guns were generally retained in a general support role under the direct command of the senior commander.
- Riflemen were used to attrite enemy commanders and crew-served weapon systems.
- Riflemen, dragoons, and infantry were routinely task-organized for mutual support.
- Out of necessity, the Americans used militia and state troops in an offensive role.

Logistics

British Logistics

Each side operated with a significant set of logistics constraints that shaped the course of the campaign. At the strategic level, Great Britain had a well-organized system to move supplies and ordnance stores from England to the ports of Beaufort and Savannah. By contrast, the American strategic logistical support was hamstrung by lack of funds and its inability to move reinforcements by sea due to Royal Navy superiority. At the operational and tactical level, frictions and inefficiencies (in the form of poor roads and insurgent attacks) hindered the cross-country movement and cross-country supply and reinforcement distribution. Boats were cheaper and more efficient for moving men and supplies but were vulnerable to ambush from hostile patrols and watercraft. For both sides, logistics shaped campaign planning and execution, and so merit considerable study.

In contrast with its new American enemy, the British strategic logistical system was well-established, roles and responsibilities were delineated, and the whole was backed by a robust financing system. That did not

mean the system was efficient, but by almost any measure the British system was significantly better than the American system. On the plus side, Britain had more than a century of experience mounting expeditionary operations and a well-developed network of arsenals, factories, and depots capable of producing large quantities of supplies and equipment to sustain an expeditionary army in North America. Furthermore, the Royal Navy was powerful enough to ensure that supplies to British Army overseas field forces would at least reach North American seaports without serious interference from enemy vessels.

To manage rations in North America, the Treasury Board commissioned a civilian commissary general of provisions who, assisted by a military deputy, supervised contractors, verified the delivery and condition of foodstuffs, and settled accounts with vendors. Although subject to directives from the Treasury Board, the commissary general received day-to-day orders from the commander in chief, Lieutenant General Clinton.

The logistics process began in the British Isles, where provisions and military stores ordered by the commissary general were collected from factories, depots, and suppliers then loaded on chartered merchant ships at the Irish port of Cork. After a convoy across the Atlantic Ocean, the transports unloaded at regional depots. In 1776, the closest friendly port was at St. Augustine, Florida. As a result, capturing Beaufort, South Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia, were vital preconditions for a successful expedition against Charleston. Every year during the war, some 400 ships moved the necessary supplies and reinforcements from Great Britain. Assuming the supplies shipped from England were not spoiled or destroyed in transit, port quartermasters had to receive, store, and distribute the supplies across a considerable distance on unimproved roads, all while under constant threat of rebel attack. As the British did not have a dedicated quartermaster corps to manage the entire supply chain, civilian agents coordinated the purchase of transportation, storage, and distribution facilities, while accounting and safeguarding thousands of pounds worth of property and supplies.

Ordnance stores, quartermaster supplies, and replacement equipment and uniforms represented a small portion of the cargo shipped from Great Britain. The bulk of the cargo consisted of consumable items for soldiers: principally, pork and beef, wheat flour and hard bread, and butter and salt, as well as other foodstuffs like oatmeal, peas, cheese, bacon, fish, raisins, and molasses. Scurvy, brought on by a lack of Vitamin C, was a perennial problem, especially during the winter months, so soldiers were given large quantities of spruce beer, vinegar, and sauerkraut. When in season, fresh vegetables were shipped for hospital patients; healthy soldiers were ex-

pected to obtain or raise their own produce. Besides consumables for the soldiers, procuring forage for draft animals and cavalry horses was vital, as each animal needed about fifty pounds of green forage (or twenty-five pounds dry) per day. Forage was too bulky to haul from home, so British logisticians had to carefully time the availability of fresh forage from farms in Georgia and Florida to support any major movements.[56]

American Logistics

At the beginning of the war, the Americans were at a severe disadvantage compared with Great Britain. Congress and the state governments had to cobble together a national logistics system from scratch. The Second Continental Congress had notional responsibility for arming, equipping, and supplying Continental forces in the field. In reality, Congress had little financial or political power to dictate logistics priorities to the states; state governments provided most logistics support for American units. Congress took the first step to reform the Continental Army logistics system by creating a commissary general, quartermaster general, and commissary of artillery. Each department head was the equivalent of a colonel in rank, but the deputy and assistant quartermasters were considered civilian experts working on behalf of the department—even if the incumbent already held a line commission.

Primarily concerned with strategic logistics, this embryonic Continental staff also assisted their counterparts in the geographical departments and field armies. In terms of a strategic industrial base in America, most military goods were produced by local, private entrepreneurs. Any controls or priorities were imposed by state governments, which were also principally responsible for raising and equipping their own militia organizations and Continental Army regiments recruited from within the state. Many of the supplies—food, for example—had were purchased directly from the producer by a purchasing agent. Both states and the Continental departmental quartermasters employed purchasing agents to acquire goods and materials to support their respective units, creating competition for scarce goods that inflated prices. Speculation and fraud was rampant, and government officials wasted much time and energy attempting to curb these problems. Adding to these headaches, Continental paper money—not backed by a system of taxation or currency reserves—was rapidly devalued, which made the challenge of acquiring supplies even more problematic. American quartermasters in the south lacked money and specie, and so had to impress provisions and livestock from private owners, in exchange for a receipt for later payment—but only if the owner could prove

their loyalty. Effective in the short term to alleviate supply shortages, such strong-arm tactics carried the risk of damaging civilian support for the Continental war effort.[57]

A particularly acute problem for the rebellious colonies was obtaining weapons and ordnance stores, as America had no large-scale manufacturing capability. Working through a network of secret agents, Congress gained covert support from the French and Spanish governments, which saw the opportunity to hurt the English by extending support to the rebels. The trickle of smuggled aid turned into large shipments of war materiel after the 1777 American victory at Saratoga, which convinced France to declare war on England. By the end of the war, more than 100,000 muskets and bayonets, more than 200 hundred cannon, and many tons of ordnance stores had been delivered to the Americans from French and Spanish arsenals—all purchased on credit extended by the French monarchy.[58]

Procurement of supplies overseas was seen as a stop-gap measure; Americans bent their energies to becoming self-sufficient. In 1776, the first of many ordnance depots (or magazines) were established on a regional basis for collecting and distributing provisions, fodder, ordnance, and quartermaster stores. Besides collecting and distributing classes of supplies, laboratories were organized for manufacturing and maintenance. Artificers (skilled craftsmen) were recruited to build and repair muskets, wagons, and artillery systems as well as make gunpowder and the components for musket and artillery ammunition. When American brigades and corps marched from one location to another, quartermasters calculated and gathered consumables at intervals along the march route. When the tactical situation permitted, the interval of march between brigades was kept at seven days so quartermasters would have time to replenish their magazines.[59]

During the winter, the different supply organs organized logistics for the following campaign season. The collection of consumable supplies was driven in large part by the season, as forage and cereal grains were harvested in the fall. When possible, hogs and cattle were also slaughtered in the late fall at their peak fatness, and the meat was salted or pickled, then sealed in large barrels. Fall was also the ideal time to rotate horses to quiet pastures and farms to rest and restore after campaigning, while quartermaster officers "recruited" fresh horses to replace those lost to death or injury.[60]

American Southern Department Logistics

The quick pace of the 1776 British attack left the Southern Department without an appointed quartermaster general. After Savannah was

threatened, Col. Francis Huger was appointed to fill the role. However, because Huger was in arrears on payments to the South Carolina state government, he was replaced by Col. Stephen Drayton in November 1778.[61] Drayton had significant challenges obtaining supplies as Continental paper dollars were all but valueless. Matters were made worse by large losses of supplies and equipment resulting from the loss of Savannah and the subsequent American abandonment of the Savannah River defenses. A late 1779 assessment of the logistics state of the department revealed shortages of ammunition, clothing, tents, and equipment. To its credit, the Continental Congress dispatched the accumulated stores of the Philadelphia depot to Charleston, including pioneering tools and portable forges for fabricating iron cannon ammunition, but the army still experienced chronic shortages of leather for footwear and accoutrements.[62] Until the city was surrounded, consumables came from the farms and plantations near Charleston, and Americans units operating outside of Charleston obtained their provisions from local sources. As part of preparations for an eventual siege, Lincoln had his quartermasters amass stocks of preserved meat, sugar, coffee, and rice. Once the siege lines were closed to the garrison on 27 April 1780, the matter of distributing supplies was much eased; the Americans had sufficient food for a few days. Back in March, Lincoln had asked the government to evacuate all nonessential civilians so they would not be injured or drain scarce resources. Yet, many civilians were trapped in the city along with the army, and provisions quickly ran short. On 4 May, the meat ration was cut in half after quartermasters discovered much of the preserved meat had spoiled due to improper salting. On 8 May, the meat ration was discontinued; for the rest of the siege, the Americans lived on rice, sugar, and coffee.[63] Ordnance stores in the city also ran short, in part due to the continual cannon firing and skirmishing by the infantry. Matters were not helped when large stores of powder, shot, and shell were captured by the British at the American forts on the eastern side of the harbor.[64]

Engineer Support

Engineer operations during the Southern Campaign differed little in concept from modern mobility and counter-mobility processes. As in most other warfighting functions, the British Army had a distinct advantage with its own formally trained engineer officers. During the 1780 siege of Charleston, Maj. James Moncrief, Royal Engineers, planned and oversaw execution of the sapping operations that penetrated the American defensive works. Much of the defensive works protecting Charleston were based on surveys and plans drawn up in the 1750s by French-born

engineer William Gerard de Brahm. De Brahm's groundbreaking cartography work benefitted both British and Americans, who used his maps and surveying data to navigate South Carolina rivers and coastal areas. When South Carolina declared its independence, De Brahm was employed as the chief engineer for the state, and oversaw the upgrade and expansion of the fortifications protecting Charleston.[65]

When General Charles Lee organized the Continental Southern Department in 1776, he received two engineer officers, both German expatriates: William Baron Massenbaugh and John Stadler.[66] An experienced former British major, Lee understood the value of specialist engineer units. In May 1776, he urged General Washington to pressure Congress to authorize the enlistment of engineers, blacksmiths, and artificers into Continental service.[67] When Lee arrived in Charleston in June 1776, he was accompanied by Engineer Massenbaugh. After Lee found the Sullivan's Island works unsatisfactory, Engineer Massenbaugh advised Colonel Moultrie and Engineer De Braham on improving the existing works, and enclosing the unfortified areas. After the British expedition departed in late 1776, De Brahm remained in Charleston as part of the garrison. In January 1778, he was brevetted major of engineers in the Continental Army in recognition of his earlier service.[68] Major De Braham remained in the city, where he worked as an assistant engineer under General Lincoln during preparations to withstand the 1780 siege.[69]

In February 1779, Col. Jean-Baptiste-Joseph, Comte de Laumoy, was dispatched from Washington's headquarters to serve as the chief engineer of the Southern Department. He remained with Lincoln's command during the battle of the Stono Ferry and the sieges of Charleston.[70] Laumoy was commissioned second lieutenant in 1768 after completing a school of military engineering at Meziéres, France. He served in the French army as an engineer, rising to the rank of major before he was recruited for the Continental Army in 1777.[71] Other officers employed by the Americans to perform engineering planning were not formally trained but had learned engineering skills while in military service. For example, Colonel Laumoy was assisted by French artillery officer Lt. Col. Louis Antoine Jean Baptiste, Chevalier de Cambray-Digny, who had sufficient engineering skills to obtain a commission in Duportail's corps of engineers. Cambray-Digny was sent south in 1778, where he was commended for emergency fortifications that hindered Prevost's May 1779 raid on Charleston.[72] Archibald Gamble served as "manager on the public works" from February 1780 until he was incapacitated "by a contusion from a cannon" in April 1780.

Gamble attested to his "marking General Lincoln's attention to the construction of every work necessary for the defense of the place;" he oversaw the construction of a deep earthen glacis formed by the soil dug from the 12-foot-deep wet ditch connecting the Ashley and Cooper rivers.[73]

Late in the siege, Army Chief of Engineers Louis Duportail inspected the city on orders from General Washington. Duportail quickly grasped deficiencies in the works: "To remain fourty (*sic*) two days in open trenches before a Town of an immense extent fortified by sandy intrenchments raised in two months without covered way, without out works, open in Several places on the water Side, exposed every where to attacks, and defended by a Garrison which was not sufficient by half . . . is nothing very glorious."[74] Both armies lacked permanent engineer units, so necessary engineering tasks were performed by ad-hoc work teams, usually detailed soldiers under the direction of staff engineers. However, South Carolina had a large pool of available laborers that were used by both sides—black slaves. Slave laborers augmented white soldiers in constructing Fort Moultrie and renewing the city defenses in 1776. When the British army approached Charleston, large numbers of slaves (from both Patriot and Loyalist plantations) sought freedom with the British. Clinton's men naturally took advantage of the manpower, and blacks were pressed into service digging earthworks and helping to emplace artillery. General Lincoln's force similarly employed slaves but had a difficult time obtaining sufficient manpower from local slave owners, who were reluctant to risk losing their property. After Clinton's army crossed to the Neck, Lincoln was finally able to impress available slaves in the garrison to repair and improve the defensive works.[75]

Mobility

Mobility operations are engineer activities that mitigate the effects of natural and manmade obstacles to enable freedom of movement and maneuver for a combat force; namely, construction and improvement of roads and bridges and reduction of enemy fortifications by sapping operations. Small boats and bridges were key to mobility in the South Carolina Lowcountry. The British navy provided Clinton's army with some boats to move troops and supplies, with armed galleys as escorts. Bridging operations were necessary when the route of march ran perpendicular to waterways. When the British army moved from James Island to the mainland, British engineers played a key role, building a pontoon bridge that spanned the Wappoo Cut. Cross-country movement of supplies and cannons was done by teams of horses and oxen overseen by civilian contractors. Both

armies employed a mix of civilian and military artisans and craftsmen, including carpenters, blacksmiths, and coopers capable of building and repairing bridges, boats, and wagons.

Countermobility

Countermobility operations on land include the use or improvement of natural and man-made obstacles to deny an adversary freedom of movement and maneuver. Hasty countermobility measures consisted of burning or dismantling bridges and blocking fords with logs. When possible, security detachments overwatched bridges and fords to provide early security and hinder enemy attempts to rebuild bridges or conduct an amphibious assault using boats.

Survivability

Survivability operations are military activities that alter the physical environment to provide or improve cover and concealment—primarily construction of fortifications to protect soldiers from direct fire (bullets and projectiles) and indirect fire (shells and shell fragments). Both sides employed extensive earthworks after the British army crossed the Neck and laid siege to Charleston.

Communications

Strategic Communications

Strategic communications between the Continental Congress, Continental commander in chief, and American field armies tended to be much easier than it was for their British counterparts. Continental armies usually operated on interior lines of communications; face-to-face meetings and courier messages were less risky than sending dispatches via boat. However, given the fractious nature of the Southern Campaign, couriers needed an intimate knowledge of the region to avoid riding into hostile territory. To avoid notice, the couriers usually rode without escort and wore civilian attire—a risky venture, as they could be executed as a spy if caught. For exceptionally important messages, more than one courier was dispatched to ensure that at least one letter (or verbal message) got through. Both sides also employed encoding systems to delay enemy exploitation of captured messages.

A courier message from General Lincoln in the Southern Department could be delivered to the governors of North Carolina or Virginia within

a week, while a courier supplied with relays of fresh horses could reach Philadelphia within two weeks, barring major delays due to weather or enemy action. Due to the long distances involved, Lincoln did not make personal visits to Congress or state governments after his fall 1780 trip south, instead relying on courier messages or liaison officers.

Strategic communications between British Secretary of State Lord George Germain, Cornwallis, and Clinton could only travel as fast as the unpredictable Atlantic weather and currents allowed. Under the best conditions, a journey from London to Savannah could take sixty to ninety days, although the trip was about two to three weeks shorter on the return voyage. Consequently, Germain had to cede effective strategic-level command and control to Clinton in favor of broad grand strategic guidance. Strategic communications between Germain and his commanders were not only slow but ineffective due to poorly thought-out plans and directives. Limited by distance and other factors, Clinton only exercised a limited amount of operational control over his subordinate commanders.[76]

Tactical Communications

The courier system extended down to the tactical level as well, especially when elements were widely separated like Lt. Col. James Webster's reconnaissance of the Wando River valley in April 1780. When possible, commanders gave tactical orders verbally to subordinates while viewing the terrain in question. To help keep track of the orders, the adjutant would record the verbal orders in an order book and, time permitting, forward a copy to the commander in question. In Cornwallis's headquarters, Maj. John Despard of the *Volunteers of Ireland* performed duties as adjutant general. Col. Otho Holland Williams, in addition to his primary role as the commander of the Maryland Continental brigade, served as adjutant general of the Southern Army.

During battle, flags, signal guns, bugles, fifes, whistles, and drums were all used to transmit and receive timely information. Courtesy of Maj. Gen. Friedrich von Steuben, Washington's inspector general, the Continental Army had a standardized system of signals based on drumbeats, flags, and music to coordinate tactical movement and maneuver on the battlefield. Combined operations with German and British units posed challenges due to language barriers. There is some evidence that French was used as a common third language for written communications between British and Hessian officers, although few details are known about exactly how orders were processed between the two.[77]

Intelligence

British Intelligence

Strategic intelligence activities among the European nations began as an extension of diplomacy, with ambassadors and envoys expected to collect information on potential adversaries. Thirteenth century Venice is considered the birthplace of modern diplomacy (and organized intelligence gathering), a practice the British belatedly adopted in the late fifteenth century. Not until the Elizabethan period did the British, under Sir Francis Walsingham, adopt the practice of deliberate intelligence gathering on both foreign and domestic enemies.[78]

Compared to their well-documented methods for combat tactics and military engineering, tactical level military intelligence in eighteenth-century armies was rudimentary. Personal reconnaissance by commanders was the principal means to gather intelligence, supplemented by reports from scouts and spies. In large part, this practice was driven by the constrained nature of warfare on the European continent, as topography limited operations to already well-known regions. Although the British army had developed a staff organization during the 1600s, the role of scout master general was relegated to a lowly major.[79]

Beyond the scout master general appointment, the British declined to develop rational intelligence gathering and processing procedures. Instead, commanders gathered and analyzed their own tactical information through personal battlefield reconnaissance, supplemented with reports from scouts and spies. When British troops deployed to North America for the French and Indian War, operational plans were based on offensive capabilities, without considering French strategy and combat capabilities. The defeat of General Edward Braddock's army at the July 1755 Battle of the Monongahela was in part due to British failure to gather and use tactical and operational intelligence.[80] By the American Revolution, the British had developed a robust national collection apparatus, with intelligence collection organs in the Foreign Ministry, Admiralty, and diplomatic posts around the world. As France was Britain's chief political and military rival, the British routinely recruited spies to monitor activities in Paris, as well as military camps and bases in the country. Within the Army and Navy, commanders were responsible for their own intelligence analysis, although the task of collecting information was often delegated to subordinates.[81]

Sir Henry Clinton was a product of the British class-based commissioning system; although well-read in books of military science, he had no

formal military science education. Consequently, when Clinton assumed command of the Charleston expedition in 1776, he had little practical experience in gathering and analyzing intelligence data. The British expedition against Charleston was badly handicapped as neither Clinton nor Arbuthnot performed a detailed reconnaissance before attempting the assault.[82] To his credit, Clinton learned from his errors. While commanding the northern theater, Clinton developed a robust spy network to gather information on Washington's army; however, Clinton did not delegate the task of processing the received information to his staff. Not until the aftermath of the Saratoga campaign did Clinton appoint his aide-de-camp, Capt. John André, as an intelligence officer. André created an intelligence book to summarize reports and information received from scouts and interrogation of deserters but failed to perform analysis or create intelligence summaries for Clinton's use.[83] Later when André was subsequently assigned as Clinton's adjutant general, a portion of the intelligence gathering was handled by assistant adjutant general Maj. Frederick Mackenzie. Mackenzie performed well in the role, improving the collection of information on Washington's whereabouts through his network of Loyalist spies and scouts.[84]

In 1780, however, no such Loyalist spy network existed in the southern states. Clinton was forced to rely on reports written by Lt. Col. Archibald Campbell and General August Prevost during their operations in the south. Lord Germaine and Clinton were wary about relying on strong support from the American populace, so covert agents were dispatched into the Carolinas to gather intelligence and coordinate Loyalist support. The former royal attorney general for South Carolina, James Simpson, surreptitiously toured Georgia and South Carolina in the summer of 1779. Simpson's report contained favorable news: "We have flattering hopes of assistance from the inhabitants, held forth to us by Mr. Simpson, who ought to be acquainted with the temper of the people." Thus encouraged, Clinton accelerated his preparations for an amphibious operation against Charleston during the winter of 1779–80.[85]

Yet, Clinton did not have tactical intelligence regarding American troop strength, defensive dispositions, the state of their supplies, and morale. Furthermore, according to Lt. Col. Archibald Campbell, the British lacked good maps of the region:

> It was a matter of great concern, that there was not a chart of Georgia in the possession of any officer in the army, nor any information of the roads, swamps, or creeks . . . for directing our operations into the interior parts of the province. . . . The only resource therefore left me . . . was such information as I could

> procure from the people of the country. . corrected from my own observations the day thereafter.[86]

Thus, when Clinton's troops landed on Seabrook Island, they lacked both intelligence on the American defenses and the knowledge of quickest route to Stono Ferry. Until British patrols could capture American troops and dispatches, and interrogate local freemen and slaves, Clinton's army would operate virtually blind. The British intelligence gathering efforts were further hindered by the lack of mounted troops until Tarleton's *Legion* returned from its horse-impressing raid into Georgia.[87]

As the British and Hessian troops finished landing, and regrouped on Seabrook Island, patrols began bringing in runaway slaves and civilians—and later a sizable number of deserters and Loyalist volunteers. By 10 March 1780, Major André had assembled a remarkably accurate assessment of Lincoln's combat strength, and the state of the fortifications guarding Charleston.[88] British intelligence gathering operations were immeasurably boosted when a *Legion* dragoon patrol captured messages between General Huger and General Lincoln—actionable intelligence that led to victory at Biggin Bridge-and the subsequent seizure of additional intelligence on the city's forts left behind in Huger's headquarters at Biggin Church. Aided by the organizational efforts of André and Mackenzie, Clinton enjoyed detailed intelligence of American dispositions, morale, and even the state of their logistics throughout the campaign.[89]

American Intelligence

General Benjamin Lincoln operated under a similar set of intelligence constraints, although he had the advantage of local intelligence sources. Loyalties in Americans were often complex, sometimes overridden by personal motives or connections. In September 1778, Henry Laurens learned of British plans to "detach part of their Squadron, together with 10,000 Troops immediately after the Hurricane season to South Carolina, to land either at or near Charlestown, or at Beaufort Port Royal." The information was passed by a Patriot sympathizer with ties to South Carolina, who gleaned the intelligence from an overheard conversation involving George Johnstone, a British peace commissioner visiting Clinton's headquarters. Though uncertain about the accuracy of the intelligence, Laurens forwarded the information to the governors of North and South Carolina, as well as to George Washington.[90]

Once Lincoln received word that the British fleet had left New York in late 1779, Whipple's ships were sent to sea to locate the fleet. By early February 1780, Whipple's ships had captured enough British ships to

calculate the number of warships and transports with reasonable accuracy. In capturing several British stragglers, Whipple learned the British fleet had been destined for Tybee Roads at Savannah, but had been badly scattered and lost horses and siege artillery during a winter storm. After learning of the British reinforcements, Lincoln belatedly worked to develop a surveillance network oriented southward. Patriot civilians were recruited to maintain watch on the shores and waterways. Col. Daniel Horry, commander of the South Carolina Light Dragoons, was sent southward to screen passages across the Coosawhatchie River in concert with Col. Francis Marion's 2nd South Carolina. From their headquarters near the burnt remains of the Prince William's Parish Church (Sheldon Church), South Carolina dragoon and light infantry patrols probed down toward Savannah to gather intelligence. Interrogation of prisoners revealed much of Clinton's plan, including the reoccupation of the Stono River bridgehead and plans for Arbuthnot's frigates to penetrate the harbor. Crucially, the intelligence indicated an imminent assault on Charleston, prompting Lincoln to write for reinforcements from North Carolina and Virginia and redoubled efforts on the defensive works.[91]

Once the Continental Navy was driven into harbor, Lincoln received intelligence from militia patrols, as well as sympathetic civilians. The Americans also benefitted from observations collected by Peter Timothy, who sat in the steeple of St. Michael's Church and took notes of British movements along the Ashley River.[92] After American dragoons were dispersed from Monck's Corner, the British cordoned off the city, drying up the flow of information from the outside. From that point, observers and prisoner interrogations were the principal intelligence sources for General Lincoln and his subordinate commanders.[93]

In the days before motorization and improved roads, soldiers and sailors had to pay close attention to the weather and assess its impact on military operations. Weather forecasting consisted largely of direct observation, looking for changes in the wind direction and clouds. Sailors had greater experience with the consequences of the weather, and ships carried thermometers and barometers. The latter instrument was vital to predicting a major storm, but in many instances, the information was too late to prevent storm-related losses. Many early Americans, such as Thomas Jefferson and George Washington, kept detailed records of weather data—information that was shared on both sides of the Atlantic. Consequently, both British and Americans were aware of broad weather patterns that would impact military operations.[94] Two major weather-related factors impacted planning and execution of the Charleston campaign: the hurri-

cane season, which ran from June to the end of November, and the torrid summertime heat of the Carolinas. Clinton originally planned to sail at the end of October, when he judged the risk of hurricanes was rapidly waning. Even after delays (and a pause to divine French intentions in the north) pushed the British preparations into December, Clinton compelled Arbuthnot to sail on 29 December 1779, to avoid having the fleet ice-bound for the winter. By mounting the expedition during the winter, Clinton hoped to reduce the risk of heat illnesses among northern European British and German troops, who were unaccustomed to working in torrid summertime heat. The fleet lost only one ship due to icing, but an unanticipated winter storm caused many ships to sink and scattered the remainder of the fleet.[95] In his journal, Clinton raged at the incompetence of Arbuthnot, who compounded the weather-related problems by blundering the fleet into the Gulf Stream: "Who can say I am not liberal with the old Admiral, when 'tis known that owing to his obstinacy we go into the Gulf Stream, and our voyage was delayed, and we met with great losses?"[96] As the fleet sailed from Tybee Roads, the two commanders argued over where to land the army forces. Minimizing risk to the force was paramount to Clinton's decision to land at the mouth of the Edisto River, a sheltered anchorage far from the American defensive works. Instead, Clinton was outraged when he found Arbuthnot unimaginatively planned to land the army at the unsheltered mouth of the Stono River, a point likely guarded by the Americans. Thanks to the efforts of Clinton's naval liaison officer, Capt. George Elphinstone, Arbuthnot was convinced to land at the Edisto River. On 12 February 1780, Clinton's army successfully established a lodgment on Simmons (Seabrook) Island. That night, Clinton's decision to land on Simmons Island was vindicated when his transports rode out a storm inside the shelter of the Edisto River.[97]

As the British army cut its way across the barrier islands, and the American defenders dug in their defenses, both sides were plagued by periodic cloudbursts. While the Lowcountry average high temperature in late March is 65°F, with an average rainfall of 3.3 inches, diary entries indicate that winter was stormy and wetter-than-average. Besides rainfall swelling waterways, rain and high humidity caused steel weapons to rust, and threatened to render flintlock weapons unable to fire due to moisture in the powder and cartridges. By 29 March, the Lowcountry heat was already in evidence, and troops in the entrenchments were tormented by shortages of potable water.[98]

Besides impacting land troops, sailing ships were affected by the winds and tides and the sailors on both sides had to pay close attention

to those factors when planning operations. Ship operations around the Charleston harbor were particularly tricky due to the numerous sandbars and shoals. Consequently, Arbuthnot had to shift his flag to the smaller 44-gun *Roebuck*, as his 64-gun third-rate ships were too large to enter the harbor; they were forced to remain outside the harbor, exposed to repeated Atlantic squalls. Finally on 20 March, Arbuthnot's frigates were able to use a favorable wind and high tides to thread the Ship Channel and enter Five Fathom Hole. The appearance of the enemy warships in the harbor stunned the American defenders as sarcastically described by South Carolina militia officer John Gervais: "It is a little surprising that we should have been in possession of the Country a Century and at this day only know that a Vessel of such a draft of water could come in."[99] Blinded by their assumptions, the American naval officers failed to leverage the canalizing terrain of the Bar to inflict heavy damage on the British fleet.

Despite Clinton's constant prodding, Arbuthnot's flotilla sat in Five Fathom Hole until early April. Certainly, some of the delay was due to Arbuthnot's plodding leadership style. But the delay was also attributable to the time needed for Royal Navy officers to perform a detailed reconnaissance, and produce maps depicting water depths and the location of natural and man-made obstacles. The necessary surveying work was finally completed in early April so that Arbuthnot could attempt to penetrate the inner harbor with a reasonable chance of success. Royal Navy ships would need a strong southeast wind to quickly sail past the enemy guns on Sullivan's Island, while a rising tide was necessary to minimize the risk of grounding on Shute's Folly. At midday on 8 April, the wind and tide were optimum for Arbuthnot's ships, and in ninety minutes, the British ships successfully ran the gauntlet of American cannon fire, sustaining only minor damage to the rigging and hulls. The only loss to Arbuthnot's squadron was a single transport that drifted onto Shute's Folly and was subsequently scuttled.[100]

Medical

In general, the Continental Army employed three kinds of hospitals during the war: general, flying, and regimental. Each Continental department was authorized one or more general hospitals to provide long-term medical care, normally located in permanent buildings far from the combat zone. The first American department hospital was established in 1776 at Charleston, South Carolina, under the direction of local physician David Oliphant. As the war returned to the South in 1778, Oliphant was given responsibility for all of Georgia and South Carolina, while North Carolina

was placed under the authority of Dr. Hugh Williamson. After the capture of Charleston, Oliphant and his hospital staff remained in the city to care for American prisoners held in the city.[101] As the name implies, flying hospitals were mobile and set up in an available civilian structure, or in tents. The facilities had only a few beds and an area set aside for surgery. Regimental hospitals, operated by regimental surgeons, were analogous to modern aid stations—designed to provide immediate medical care near the battlefield. Once the surgeon was finished with treatment, the patient was transferred to a flying hospital for further treatment or to a general hospital for long-term care.[102]

On the British side, the medical corps existed as an adjunct to the Ordnance Department. A physician general and surgeon general, and an inspector of hospitals were part of the Royal establishment but served only in an advisory role to the King. Regimental surgeons and mates were appointed by the regimental commander; candidates were not required to hold a medical degree or have formal training. Nurses were commonly recruited from among female camp followers who were part of the eighteenth-century European way of war, and the nurses were compensated with a daily allowance from regimental rations.[103]

Commander in Chief Clinton was advised by his superintendent of hospitals for North America, Scottish physician John Mervin Nooth. During preparations for the southern campaign, Nooth recommended outfitting several transports as floating hospitals until the army could establish its own general and regimental hospitals. Nooth calculated some 5,000 men would require medical support, so he recommended creating two general hospitals, one for British troops and one for German soldiers. Each hospital was to have a lead physician, three surgeons, and eight surgeon's mates supported by a deputy purveyor and clerks, who were responsible for hospital provisions and supplies. In late 1779, Clinton selected Dr. John Macnamara Hayes as the physician and director of the director of the campaign's expeditionary hospital. Although junior to other surgeons, and lacking a medical degree, Hayes was well-respected and had performed well as director of Burgoyne's general hospital during the 1777 campaign. As the army was short of surgeon's mates, many northern Loyalists were recruited to fill the vacancies. Of the seventy-six medical personnel who sailed with Clinton's expedition, about half were assigned to the expeditionary hospital, and the remainder staffed the regimental hospitals.[104] Failures to properly configure and stock the hospital ships were minimized as the army easily occupied James Island without fighting. Once the army was firmly established onshore, Physician Hayes oversaw the opening of

the main hospital on James Island, where it remained during the siege. Once the city was captured, the expeditionary and regimental hospitals were relocated to Charleston.[105]

Medical support for both armies was generally poor, not through lack of effort but due to basic knowledge and training. Most American surgeons learned their trade by serving an apprenticeship with a surgeon; a handful received formal medical education in Europe. Although Scotland had several world-renowned medical colleges, few physicians and surgeons who served in Clinton's army had formal training; instead, medical training was done on the job under the supervision of an experienced surgeon. Consequently, treatment of battlefield wounds was limited to bandaging wounds, probing for musket balls, and amputating mangled limbs. Surgeons were ignorant of the causes and prevention of diseases, so surgical instruments, towels, and bedding were reused without cleaning. Therefore, many soldiers who survived a battlefield wound and the trauma of surgery died from a secondary infection rather than from the injury.[106]

At the outbreak of the war, American army surgeons relied heavily on a medical textbook of military hygiene compiled by surgeon John Jones. Jones served with the British army during the French and Indian War and during the Revolution as a surgeon's mate and surgeon of the 10th Massachusetts Continental Regiment. At the start of the war, Jones compiled writings on treating wounds and fractures that also contained camp disease observations from British surgeon Sir John Pringle—information routinely used by British army surgeons.[107] In 1777, Jones's work was combined with an English translation of a German book on military diseases. Copies were distributed to army surgeons to help impart military medical knowledge to surgeons. Although much of the advice was wrong, particularly that "bad air" caused most diseases, much was useful. Commanders were admonished to minimize overcrowding, protect soldiers from overexposure to the sun, and issue "garden stuff and fruit" to prevent scurvy. Depression or "nostalgia" was highlighted as a concern; the suggested remedy was to allow soldiers time for recreation and regular church attendance. General Washington, and later General von Steuben, promulgated general orders emphasizing personal hygiene, and camp sanitation, to help prevent disease outbreaks. Washington pointedly invoked the Mosaic sanitary rules outlined in the Pentateuch books of *Numbers* and *Deuteronomy* as a guide to good hygiene and camp sanitation.[108]

Infectious diseases were a particular concern for both armies, as the large numbers of fatigued and malnourished soldiers living in constant

close quarters were especially vulnerable to epidemics. If officers and NCOs did not closely monitor camp discipline, particularly concerning proper disposal of body waste in sinks (field latrines), outbreaks of diarrhea, dysentery, and typhoid fever were bound to occur. Smallpox posed a grave danger to the combat readiness of both armies, as the viral disease could kill one in three infected soldiers. Smallpox was endemic in Britain, so many British soldiers and sailors were already naturally immune; however, fewer Americans had been exposed to the disease. British troops quartered in Boston in 1775 suffered a smallpox outbreak that jumped to the American populace. Smallpox raged in the American ranks and by May 1776, the Northern Army at Quebec was rendered combat-ineffective. Washington initially ordered that smallpox victims be quarantined; he refused to order compulsory inoculations, fearing it would create a major outbreak and harm the army's fighting power. By late 1776, Washington relented and the Continental Army began a program of smallpox inoculation. By spring of 1777, the Continental army in the north was completely inoculated, and states were required to immunize new recruits before they joined the army. For the remainder of the war, the army experienced less than a 1 percent death rate; smallpox provided a minor irritant.[109]

The British army in North America had its own disease epidemic problems. In late August 1779, British troopships landed at New York with 3,800 fresh recruits; many were infected with what Clinton termed "a malignant jail fever"—presumably typhus—that swiftly spread to the rest of the army. By December, one in five men were sick in the hospital, an alarming drain of combat power for an army short of its authorized strength.[110] The greatest disease danger in the southern theater, especially for northern European soldiers with no natural immunity, came from mosquito-borne malaria and yellow fever. As Cornwallis described to Clinton, "This climate (except in Charleston) is so bad within 100 miles of the coast, from the end of June until the middle of October, that troops could not be stationed among them [*sic*] during the period, without a certainty of their being rendered useless for some time, for military service; if not entirely lost."[111] However, when Clinton's army sailed from New York, it was fit and healthy, as the sick were left behind. By 1 March, about 15 percent of the British troops were sick; by the capitulation, 740 men were hospitalized due to illness. By contrast, the British army suffered only fifty-four combat deaths and 102 men wounded during the entire campaign. Eighty-nine American soldiers were killed and 138 wounded in action, but the numbers of sick are imprecise.[112] General Moultrie estimated the sur-

render "between 1,500 and 1,600 continental troops, (leaving five or six hundred sick and wounded in the hospital)" but no firm number was given for the sick among the militia.[113]

Religious Support

As dryly noted by history professor Edward Curtis, "If the physical welfare of the [British] soldier was ill-cared for, his spiritual welfare was practically neglected. . . . There is little else to indicate that commanding officers took more than passing interest in the religious life of the men." Army regulations required the regimental commander to appoint a Church of England (Anglican) chaplain, but in many instances, commanders reallocated the pay for their own priorities. Other times, chaplains used parish duties as an excuse to avoid overseas service, so many British regiments deployed to North American without a chaplain. The army was a reflection of its government and society: "The majority of [Anglican] chaplains had but a poor reputation, and were typical of an age of spiritual torpor," this despite evangelization efforts by John Wesley and other itinerant preachers in England.[114]

By contrast, the American army of the Revolution had a much greater interest in religion, which had been greatly stimulated by the Great Awakening of the 1740s and 50s. Certainly not all Americans were practicing Christians, but prewar American culture had been deeply influenced by religion. During the French and Indian War, a high proportion of colonial militia regiments had clergy in the ranks; some performed services as an additional duty while others were chaplains appointed by the colonial governor legislature. Most chaplains of the era were ordained Anglican, Presbyterian, or Congregationalist clergy and were considered part of the commander's personal staff, without visible rank or authority.[115] When America mobilized for war in 1775, clergymen responded to the call, both as chaplains and unit members. Congress and the embryonic army's leaders were deeply concerned with religious matters, and issued regulations covering "Divine Services" and the sale of liquor on Sundays. On 29 July 1775, Congress authorized the appointment of chaplains who were "persons of good Characters and exemplary lives" to the Army.[116] Initially chaplains were authorized pay of $20 per month, on par with line captains and judge advocates, an amount that was later increased to $33 per month. Besides leading divine services on Sundays, good chaplains ministered to the physical and spiritual needs of their regiment—often performing their duties while in range of enemy weapons.[117]

Notes

1. Richard W. Stewart, ed., *American Military History*, vol. 1, *The United States Army and the Forging of a Nation, 1775–1917*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2009), 30–32.

2. Robert K. Wright Jr., *The Continental Army* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2006), 82–84; and Steven E. Clay, *Staff Ride Handbook for the Saratoga Campaign, 13 June to 8 November 1777* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2018), 3–5. The length of detail varied from ninety days for traditional militia unit up to eighteen months for state line units, such as the Virginia Line units that fought at Guilford Courthouse.

3. Wright, 68–69.

4. Wright, 161–62. A common eighteenth-century alternative spelling of *partisan* was *partizan*, which students may encounter in further readings of contemporary works. See John C. Fitzpatrick, *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745–1799*, vol. 20 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1776), 278. The standard modern spelling is used throughout this book.

5. Clay, *Staff Ride Guide to the Saratoga Campaign*, 6–8.

6. Wright, *The Continental Army*, 53–54.

7. Erna Risch. *Supplying Washington's Army* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1981), 25, 33.

8. James A. Huston, *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775–1953* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1997), 35.

9. Wright, *The Continental Army*, 166.

10. Wright, 67–75.

11. Charles R. Lampson, "Privateers of the Revolution," The Massachusetts Society Sons of the American Revolution (blog), 23 June 2011, https://www.massar.org/2011/06/23/privateers-of-the-revolution/.

12. John Frayler, "Privateers in the American Revolution: A Means to An End," 15 December 2016, https://www.nps.gov/article/privateers-in-the-american-revolution.htm.

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14. "Birth of the U.S. Navy," 19 December 2019, https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/heritage/origins-of-the-navy/birth-of-the-us-navy.html.

15. "The Birth of the Navy of the United States," 13 November 2017, https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/commemorations-toolkits/navy-birthday/OriginsNavy/the-birth-of-the-navy-of-the-united-states.html.

16. Charles R. Smith, *Marines in the Revolution: A History of the Continental Marines in the American Revolution, 1775–1783* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1975), 10.

17. Charles R. Smith, *Marines in the Revolution*, 17–18.

18. Carl Borick, *A Gallant Defense: The Siege of Charleston 1780* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 223 and 251–52.

19. Lawrence Babits and Joshua Howard, *Long, Obstinate, and Bloody: The Battle of Guilford Courthouse* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

20. John W. Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 92–95.

21. Harold Allen Skinner Jr., *A Game of Hare & Hounds: An Operational-level Command Study of the Guilford Courthouse Campaign, 18 January-15 March 1781* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2021), 37.

22. Skinner, 117.

23. Sayen, "Oared Fighting Ships of the South Carolina Navy," 221–22.

24. Sayen, 234.

25. J. D. Lewis, "The American Revolution in South Carolina: The Siege of Charleston," 2021, http://www.carolana.com/SC/Revolution/revolution_siege_of_charleston.html.

26. Smith, *Marines in the Revolution*, 247–50.

27. Wright, *The Continental Army*, 47–49. The actual combat strengths of infantry regiments were generally 40 to 60 percent of authorization due to sickness and details.

28. Wright, 47–49.

29. Clay, *Staff Ride Handbook for the Saratoga Campaign,* 19–22.

30. Clay, 22.

31. William T. Bulger, "The British Expedition to Charleston, 1779–1780"(dissertation, University of Michigan, 1957), 114. Among other points of contention, policies governing regular versus provincial rank had created animosity in the regular ranks; according to Clinton; Cornwallis fanned the animosity to undermine Clinton's authority.

32. "An Introduction to North Carolina Loyalist Units," On-Line Institute for Advanced Loyalist Studies, accessed 7 November 2018, http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/ncindcoy/ncintro.htm.

33. B. D. Bargar, "Charles Town Loyalism in 1775: The Secret Reports of Alexander Innes," *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 63, no. 3 (July 1962): 125–26. Innis arrived in Charleston in 1775 as secretary to the royal governor and apparently as a confidential observer for the earl of Dartmouth, who was the secretary of state at the time. After Innis fled Charleston with Lord William Campbell in August 1775, he obtained a provincial commission and was appointed inspector general of the Provincial forces in 1777. He apparently helped organize the *South Carolina Loyalists* in 1779, and led the unit through the Southern Campaign. E. Alfred Jones, ed., "The Journal of Alexander Chesney: A South Carolina Loyalist in the Revolution and After," Provincial Archives of New Brunswick, CA, 2021, 182, https://archives.gnb.ca/exhibits/forthavoc/html/Chesney.aspx?culture=en-CA#linkIntro. Patrick Ferguson was

born in Scotland in 1744, and commissioned as a British cornet in 1759. He served in Flanders and Germany, and was appointed captain in the 70th Foot. In the early Revolution campaigns, Ferguson organized the *American Volunteers* as a light infantry corps. His unit was transferred south with Clinton's expedition in 1780; after the fall of Charleston, Ferguson was appointed inspector general of militia in South Carolina. He died at the battle of Kings Mountain in October 1780. John Hamilton was a prewar merchant in North Carolina, and personally raised the *Royal North Carolina Regiment* after Savannah was captured in 1779. His regiment fought in several engagements in the south, where he was wounded three times, and accompanied Cornwallis's army to Yorktown. After the war, Hamilton lived in London and was later appointed the British consul at Norfolk Virginia from 1790–1812. Tarleton's biography is in Appendix A.

34. Babits and Howard, *Long, Obstinate, and Bloody*, 80.

35. Clay*, Staff Ride Handbook for the Saratoga Campaign,* 20–22.

36. Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 240.

37. Wilson, *The Southern Strategy*, 59–60.

38. Wilson, order of battle for Charleston 1780, 239–41.

39. David Lee Russell, *The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2000), 135.

40. Bill Ahern and Robert Nittolo, *British Military Long Arms in Colonial America* (Pittsburg, PA: Dorrance, 2018), 409.

41. Lawrence E. Babits, *A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 13.

42. Babits, 13.

43. Babits, 14–15.

44. Babits and Howard, *Long, Obstinate, and Bloody*, 81.

45. "British Officer Infantry Weaponry, 1768–1786," His Majesty's 62nd Regiment of Foot, accessed 10 January 2018, https://www.62ndregiment.org/officer_arms.htm.

46. Babits, *A Devil of a Whipping*, 20.

47. Janice E. McKenney, *The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, 1775–2003*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2007), 9–10.

48. Jac Weller, "Revolutionary War Artillery in the South," *The Georgia Historical Quarterly* 46, no. 3 (September 1962): 262.

49. Weller, 255–56.

50. "Artillery," AmericanRevolution.org, accessed 26 June 2019.

51. Henry Lumpkin, *From Savannah to Yorktown* (San Jose, CA: toExcel, 2000), 136–37.

52. Wright, *The Continental Army*, 105–6.

53. McKenney, *The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, 1775–2003*, 11–12.

54. Weller, "Revolutionary War Artillery in the South," 256.

55. Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 110–11.

56. John A. Tokar, "Logistics and the British Defeat in the Revolutionary War," *Army Logistician* 31, no. 5 (September/October 1999): 42–47.

57. Erna Risch, *Supplying Washington's Army* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1981), 15–23.

58. Larrie D. Ferreiro, *Brothers at Arms: American Independence and the Men of France and Spain Who Saved It* (New York: Knopf, 2016), 335.

59. James A. Huston, *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775–1953* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1997), 31–33.

60. Risch, *Supplying Washington's Army,* 24–25.

61. Risch, 32.

62. Wilson, *The Southern Strategy*, 196.

63. Wilson, 231; and Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 201.

64. Borick, 200.

65. "William Gerard De Brahm," *South Carolina Encyclopedia*, 21 July 2022, https://www.scencyclopedia.org/sce/entries/de-brahm-william-gerard/.

66. "To George Washington from John Stadler, 4 May 1778," *Founders Online,* National Archives, accessed 30 April 2021, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-15-02-0037. The footnotes indicate John Stadler had eighteen years of military experience in Europe and North American before the Revolution and had participated in building Fort Pitt during the French and Indian War.

67. "Charles Lee to George Washington, 10 May 1776," in Henry Lee, *Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States* (Washington, DC: Peter Force, 1827), 18.

68. "List of French Officers Who Served in the American Army with Commissions from Congress Prior to the Treaties Between France and the Thirteen United States of America (reprint)," in *The Magazine of American History with Notes & Quotes*, vol. 2 (New York: A. S. Barnes & Company, 1879), 368.

69. Robert Wilson Gibbes, *Documentary History of the American Revolution* (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1857), 124. De Braham was born in 1718, so was perhaps not fit enough for active service in the latter part of the war.

70. "Jean-Baptist-Joseph Comte de Laumoy to George Washington, 14 October 1783," accessed 29 April 2021, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-11937. Laumoy was originally commissioned colonel of engineers on 17 November 1777. He served until 1783, mustering out as a brigadier general.

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76. John Ferling, "Sir Henry Clinton's Generalship," *Journal of the American Revolution* (April 2021): 10.

77. Rebecca Robbins Raines, *Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal Corps* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1996), 3.

78. Maj. Scott E. Conley, *British Intelligence Operations as they Relate to Britain's Defeat at Yorktown* (thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010), 4–5.

79. Brig. Gen. James D. Hittle, *The Military Staff: Its History and Development* (Barakaldo Books, 2020), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/liberty/detail.action?docID=6223786.

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81. Kenneth A. Daigler, *Spies, Patriots and Traitors: American Intelligence in the Revolutionary War* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 197–98.

82. Kaplan, "The Hidden War," 118.

83. Kaplan, 123–24.

84. Benjamin Huggins, "Three Diaries," *Washington Papers,* accessed 19 July 2021, https://washingtonpapers.org/three-diaries/.

85. Alan S. Brown, "James Simpson's Reports on the Carolina Loyalists, 1779–1780," *The Journal of Southern History* 21, no. 4 (November 1955): 514.

86. Matthew H. Spring, *With Zeal and Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775–1783* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 45–46.

87. Spring, 45–46; and Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 56–57.

88. Kristen M. Seielstad, "'Upon Secrecy, Success Depends,' Intelligence Operations during the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution" (thesis, The Graduate School of the College of Charleston and the Citadel, Charleston, SC, 2010), 34–35.

89. Kaplan, "The Hidden War," 127–28.

90. "To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 23 September 1778," *Founders Online*, National Archives, accessed 20 July 2021, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-17-02-0094.

91. Robert D. Bass, *Swamp Fox: The Life and Campaigns of General Francis Marion* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1959), 27; and Seielstad, "'Upon Secrecy, Success Depends,'" 31–32.

92. Seielstad, 33.

93. Seielstad, 38.

94. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), *A History of Observing the Weather*, 21 January 2021, https://celebrating200years.noaa.gov/foundations/weather_obs/welcome.html#earlyyear.

95. Jonathan T. Engel, "The Force of Nature: The Impact of Weather on Armies during the American War of Independence, 1775–1783" (thesis, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, 2011), 53–54.

96. Willcox, *The American Rebellion*, 159.

97. Willcox, 161.

98. See the diary entries of Captain Johann von Evald, 45, and Captain Johann von Hinrichs, 181, in *The Siege of Charleston, with an Account of the Province of South Carolina: Diaries and Letters of Hessian Officers From the von Jungkenn Papers in the William L. Clements Library*, trans. Bernhard A. Uhlendorf (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1938).

99. Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 81–83.

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101. Mary Gillett, *The Army Medical Department, 1775–1818* (Washington, DC: US Army Medical Department, 1981), 118.

102. Lt. Col. (Ret.) Louis C. Duncan, *Medical Men in the American Revolution, 1775–1783* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Medical Field Service School, 1931), 312.

103. Edward E. Curtis, *The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1926), 10–11, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=inu.32000011304294&view=1up&seq=7.

104. Paul E. Kopperman, "The Medical Dimension in Cornwallis' Army, 1780–1781," *The North Carolina Historical Review* 89, no. 4 (October 2012): 369, 379–81.

105. Kopperman, 384.

106. Mary C. Gillette, *The Army Medical Department 1775–1818* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1981), 18.

107. "Sir John Pringle (1707–1782)," London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, accessed 21 July 2021, https://www.lshtm.ac.uk/aboutus/introducing/history/frieze/sir-john-pringle. A Scottish physician, Pringle served as a surgeon in the British army, where he learned first-hand the importance of camp discipline and sanitary procedures to reduce typhus and dysentery. Pringle was appointed Physician General of the British Army in Flanders in 1745, and subsequently published *Observations on the Diseases of the Army* in 1752. As a consequence, Pringle is recognized as the "father of military medicine."

108. Gillett, *The Army Medical Department,* 32–35.

109. Gillett, 75–76.

110. Kopperman, "The Medical Dimension in Cornwallis' Army," 368.

111. Duncan, *Medical Men in the American Revolution, 1775–1783*, 312.

112. Kopperman, "The Medical Dimension in Cornwallis' Army," 369–70.

113. William Moultrie, *Memoirs of the American Revolution*, vol. 2 (New York: D. Longworth, 1802), 108; and Borick, *A Gallant Defense,* 222.

114. Curtis, *The Organization of the British Army in the American* Revolution, 12–13.

115. Parker C. Thompson, *From its European Antecedents to 1791: The United States Chaplaincy*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, 1978), xviii. See also Robert Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 46.

116. Thompson, 110.

117. Thompson, 108, 110–12.

Part II
The Southern Campaign Overview, 1776–83

To fully understand the strategic and operational dynamics of the Southern Campaign, a brief historical review of the American Revolution is necessary. After the 1775 outbreak of the Revolutionary War, the British made plans to reestablish order and loyalty in the rebellious colonies. Believing the New England area was the center of Patriot resistance, Lord Frederick North (principal military advisor to King George III) devised a four-part divide and conquer strategy. First, impose a naval blockade to isolate the Americans. Second, split the northeast from the middle colonies by securing the Hudson River Valley. Third, isolate the grain-producing states of Pennsylvania and Maryland. Lastly, secure the Carolinas by seizing Charleston and Savannah. In sharp contrast, American Commander in Chief George Washington's strategy of attrition was adopted from sheer necessity—fighting only when necessary and minimizing risk to what he saw as the Revolution's center of gravity, the regular or Continental army. Washington hoped to exhaust the British and, at the same time, encourage one of England's traditional enemies—France, Spain, or the Netherlands—to intervene in the war. Initially, British arms achieved several battlefield victories, but British efforts to coordinate strategy and operational plans foundered due to bitter rivalries between senior leaders.

Such leadership dysfunction was evident in the first British attempt to reassert control over the southern colonies. Maj. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton was given command of an expedition that was originally expected to establish a Loyalist enclave in North Carolina in late 1775. The effort was frustrated by bad weather and a failed Loyalist uprising. Clinton's bad luck continued with a failed April 1776 attempt to take Charleston, an expedition plagued by friction between Clinton and his rival counterpart, Sir Peter Parker, as well as faulty intelligence and ultimately stopped by the resolute American defenses. American morale soared at the news of the British defeat right after the Declaration of Independence, and the British recognized that the Americans planned to fight hard for their freedom. Afterward, Clinton withdrew his forces to New York. With the Loyalists firmly suppressed by the Patriot militias, the Southern theater slipped into inactivity.

Strategic dysfunction in the British war effort culminated in 1777, when British commander-in-chief General Sir William Howe failed to support General John Burgoyne's army marching south from Canada via the Hudson River Valley. Because Howe deliberately neglected orders

from London to coordinate operations, Burgoyne's army overextended army was cut off and forced to surrender at Saratoga in October 1777.[1]

British Strategic Reformulation after Saratoga

The American victory at Saratoga led to international recognition of the United States, as well as French and Spanish military intervention—conditions that limited the remaining strategic options open to the British in North America. Following the American victory at Monmouth Court House on 28 June 1778, British officials recognized that stalemate had taken hold in the northern theater. Hoping to regain the initiative in America, Lord North and Britain's new commander in chief of North America, General Sir Henry Clinton, turned their thoughts back to the South. South Carolina loomed large in their strategic calculus for both military and economic reasons. Economically, British control of Carolina rice and indigo crops would help to pay war costs. Militarily, the Royal Navy could use the Charleston harbor's protected anchorage to support operations in the Caribbean, while South Carolina could serve as a springboard for army operations toward the Virginia side of the Chesapeake Bay. Consolidating British sovereignty of the Carolinas would give the British government a strong negotiating position for brokering peace talks with the French and Americans. The plan was influenced by Tory expatriates in London, who promised a strong showing of Loyalist support at the reappearance of British authority. By leveraging support from the Royal Navy, Clinton could quickly project combat power from New York into the South before the Continentals could react. Once Savannah and Charleston were secured, British regulars would establish a strong outpost line across upper South Carolina to block Continental incursions from Virginia. While British light troops mopped up remaining insurgents, trainers drawn from regular units would organize and train an effective Loyalist militia. By all appearances, a campaign in the Carolinas promised an easy win to help the British regain the initiative in the war. The key assumption underpinning the entire British campaign plan was the use of well-trained Loyalist militia to successfully pacify and secure South Carolina. Absent Loyalist support, Sir Henry Clinton simply did not have enough manpower in North America to secure New York and pacify South Carolina.[2]

Besides the rational strategic calculations, Clinton had a personal motivation in seeking revenge for the botched Charleston attack. Despite Parker's key role in the debacle, Clinton received most of the blame, and his reputation was deeply damaged within the Army and Royal establishment.

Figure 2.1. The War in the South: Operations in the Carolinas, 1779–81. Courtesy of the US Military Academy, History Department.

Consequently, Clinton developed a deep-seated mistrust of Royal Navy officers; for the moment, however, Clinton put aside his misgivings and drew up a methodical campaign plan to capture Charleston by an indirect amphibious approach. To minimize frictions that hindered the 1776 operation, Clinton used Capt. George Elphinstone as a liaison officer between Clinton and Vice Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot so the Charleston campaign would resemble a truly joint Army-Navy operation. Clinton's planning was done in secret, enabling the British to seize the strategic initiative from the Americans, who failed to recognize the shift in British strategy.[3]

The shaping phase of Clinton's campaign opened during the winter of 1778–79 when an expeditionary force from St. Augustine, Florida, swiftly captured the vital port of Savannah and most of Georgia. Shocked by the sudden loss of Georgia, Congress dispatched General Benjamin Lincoln and all available North and South Carolina Continentals to organize a Southern army at Charleston. Further disaster befell the Americans when a combined Franco-American assault failed to retake Savannah in October 1779. Afterward, the supporting French fleet withdrew, leaving Charleston's seaward flank vulnerable to an amphibious assault. Clinton learned of the French fleet's departure and ordered the invasion fleet to assault Charleston. Clinton's assault force of some 9,500 men, landed without incident on Seabrook Island, well to the east of Charleston harbor on 11 February 1780. Unlike 1776, Clinton's plans were well thought out, and effective coordination with the Royal Navy was accomplished through Captain Elphinstone's liaison efforts. By contrast, Lincoln's plan of defense and reactions to the British landing were lackluster. Despite instructions from Washington to keep his Army intact and not unduly risk the capture or destruction of the Continentals, Lincoln allowed local political leaders to constrain his freedom of maneuver. As a result, British troops easily cut off all land and river communications with the outside world. After a siege lasting several weeks, Lincoln surrendered the city and his army of approximately 5,600 Continentals and militiamen on 12 May 1780—the largest surrender of American arms during the war. The taking of Charleston was the single greatest feat of British arms during the war. Crucially, Clinton and Lord Germain failed to appoint a civil government to oversee pacification and reconciliation tasks. Instead, Cornwallis was left to handle civil administration, a distasteful task to which he devoted little time or attention.[4]

Cornwallis's army racked up further impressive wins against American Continentals at the Waxhaws on 29 May 1780, and at Camden on 16 August 1780. Despite these smashing victories, diehard Patriot bands in the



Figure 2.2. Investiture of Charleston by the British Army, 1780. Shows position of each corps. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

central and upper Carolinas continued to attack vulnerable Loyalist militias. Concerned with the deteriorating security situation, Cornwallis tried a risky expedient: he sent a corps of the best Loyalist militiamen under Scottish regular Maj. Patrick Ferguson to secure the eastern foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Aroused by the Loyalist threat to their homesteads, Patriot Overmountain men surrounded and annihilated Ferguson's militia corps at Kings Mountain on 15 October 1780. The stunning Patriot victory at Kings Mountain not only reversed the string of tactical successes by the British, but "spirited up the people;" many Americans began to actively support the rebellion. Bereft of his best Loyalist militia units, Cornwallis was compelled to suspend his planned North Carolina offensive and reallocate his regular units to internal security and patrolling missions.

The American Response: Greene Takes Charge

Cornwallis faced added challenges when General Nathanael Greene took command of the Continental Southern army in December 1780. Greene was an inspired choice for command—not only a competent logistician, but a gifted strategist. In short order, Greene gained an impressive grasp of the terrain, human dimensions, and, most importantly, British vulnerabilities. As the Continental force was too weak to face Cornwallis in open combat, Greene adopted a Fabian strategy to minimize American

vulnerabilities while neutralizing Cornwallis's greater combat strength. Central to Greene's strategy was his corps of organized, regular Continental units. Their presence in the Carolinas exposed the hollowness of British power. Although Greene sometimes struggled in his relationships with local Patriot militia leaders and state governors, he employed Whig partisans to harass British forward bases and lines of communication and provide good intelligence of British dispositions. By adopting an indirect operational approach, Greene hoped to weaken Cornwallis enough to prevent consolidation of political gains in South Carolina—ideally enough to force Cornwallis to abandon the Carolinas altogether.

Defying conventional military wisdom, Greene split his army in early January 1781, ordering a corps of light infantry and dragoons commanded by Col. Daniel Morgan into western South Carolina while Greene moved the rest of the army to northeastern South Carolina. Ordering Morgan so far west posed significant risks but accomplished several purposes. First, Morgan could draw his own provisions from the fertile Broad River region, which not only reduced the logistics strain for the main Continental army, but denied the same resources to British and Tory units. Second, the presence of armed Continentals served to "spirit up" the local Patriots, encouraging them to resist British pacification efforts. Most importantly, Greene's dispositions denied Cornwallis freedom to maneuver, as a British advance toward either army would expose vulnerabilities for the other American army to attack. Goaded into action, Cornwallis attempted to trap Morgan's corps between Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton's *British Legion* and the regular infantry regiments. Cornwallis, however, failed to synchronize his movements with Tarleton, and Morgan dealt the unsupported *British Legion* a major defeat at the Cowpens on 15 January 1781.

Morgan's force captured hundreds of British regulars and, as a result, Cornwallis abandoned his pacification mission to pursue Greene's consolidated army. That unsuccessful pursuit ended along the Dan River, some 240 miles from the Cowpens. Greene resupplied and rested his army, carefully keeping Cornwallis at arms-length near the Virginia border. His combat power restored, Greene's army recrossed into North Carolina, where American detachments hindered British resupply and recruiting efforts, further degrading Cornwallis's already waning strength. Desperate to force a decision, Cornwallis attacked Greene's force of militia and Continentals at Guilford Courthouse on 15 March 1781. The battle resulted in a Pyrrhic tactical victory for the British. No longer able to draw supplies and Loyalist recruits from the region, however, Cornwallis abandoned the offensive and withdrew to Wilmington, North Car-

olina, to refit. Greene immediately marched into South Carolina to isolate and attack the now-unsupported British bases. Although Greene's army never won a single major battlefield victory during the remainder of the war, his indirect approach relentlessly drove the British from the interior and ultimately forced the British into coastal enclaves where they were unable to protect Loyalist supporters. After refitting his corps at Wilmington, Cornwallis permanently abandoned his original mission of pacification and protection of Loyalists to pursue the chimera of a decisive battle with Continental forces in Virginia—a decision that ended in disaster at Yorktown in October 1781. By failing to pursue a long-term strategy of pacification and political reconciliation, Clinton and Cornwallis wasted the strategic benefits gained by the seizure of Charleston. Instead, Great Britain negotiated an end to the War of the American Revolution with the complete loss of American territory.[5]

Notes

1. David K. Wilson, *The Southern Strategy: Britain's Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia 1775–80* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2005), 59.

2. Robert S. Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), 79–81.

3. Andrew D. Dauphinee, "Lord Charles Cornwallis and the Loyalists: A Study in British Pacification during the American Revolution, 1775–1781" (master's thesis, Temple University, Philadelphia, 2011), 15–16.

4. John W. Gordon. *South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History* (Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 84–85; and John S. Pancake, *This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780–1782* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2003), 243.

5. Pancake, 233.

Part III
Field Study Phase

The second part of the staff ride is the field study, where an instructor leads students on a historical discussion of a facet of the Charleston campaign, when possible while standing on the actual terrain. The field study phase is designed to help the student better understand the historical events before, during, and after the battle; critically analyze the significance of those events; then distill relevant insights into the profession of arms. As no combat engagement takes place in isolation, considerable attention is paid to the strategic and operational details and placing each engagement within its proper context. The theater of operations is surprisingly compact, as only forty miles lies between Fort Moultrie and Monck's Corner. Yet, considerable driving time between stands is necessary due to the region's numerous waterways. This guide examines the major points of the campaign in a two-day field study phase and includes shorter single events. Although most of the stands (site visits) are in publicly accessible areas, travel by van or bus can be challenging, especially for stands in the Charleston historic district. The recommended starting point for the first day is Fort Moultrie National Monument (FMNM) on Sullivan's Island then ending at Remley's Point on the east side of the Cooper River. With thirty minutes allotted for each stand, and an hour for lunch, the first day should take about ten hours to complete. The day 2 itinerary begins at Marion Square in the heart of old Charleston and ends at The Battery overlooking Charleston Harbor. With a programmed meal break, day 2 should easily fit into an eight-hour day.

Charleston Campaign Staff Ride Stand List

Day 1 Outer Ring Stands

Stand 1: The Road to Charleston (Operational Orientation at Fort Moultrie)

Stand 2: The British and American Operational Plans (base of Fort Moultrie)

Stand 3: The British Land Assault (Thomson Park-Sullivan Island)

Stand 4: The American Defense (Pickett Park)

Stand 5: Campaign Overview 1780 (Ravenel Bridge)

Stand 6: Clinton's Landing (Wide Awake Park-Matthew's Ferry)



1. The Road to Charleston (Operational Orientation Fort Moultrie)
2. The British and America Operational Plans (base of Fort Moultrie)
3. The British Land Assault (Thompson Park-Sullivan Island)
4. The American Defense (Pickett Park)
5. Campaign Overview 1780 (Ravenel Bridge)
6. Clinton's Landing (Wide Awake Park-Matthews Ferry)
7. British Movements up Wappoo Cut Riverland Terrace Boat Ramp)
8. Fenwick's Point/British Artillery Redoubt (California Dreamin')
9. British Crossing to the Neck (Magnolia Plantation)
10. Biggin Church Skirmish (Monck's Corner)
11. Lamprieres Point/Closing of the Encirclement (Remley's Point)

Figure 3.1. Day 1 Outer Ring Stands. Created by Army University Press.

Stand 7: British Movements up Wappoo Cut (Riverland Terrace Boat Ramp)

Stand 8: Fenwick's Point/British Artillery Redoubt (California Dreamin')

Stand 9: British Crossing to the Neck (Magnolia Plantation)

Stand 10: Biggin Church Skirmish (Monck's Corner)

Stand 11: Lemprieres Point/Closing of the Encirclement (Remley's Point)

Day 2 Inner Ring Stands

Stand 1: 1776 Campaign Overview/Clinton's Plan (Fuller House/ Dorchester Road)

Stand 2: Lincoln's Plan/American Defensive System (Wragg Square)

Stand 3: American Redoubts (Hampstead Mall)

Stand 4: The Siege (Marion Square)

Stand 5: Lincoln vs. Privy Council (80 Broad Street-Old State House)

Stand 6: Whipple vs. Arbuthnot, The Naval Fight that Didn't Happen (Waterfront Park)

Stand 7: End of the Siege ("Pineapple Fountain" at Waterfront Park)

Modifications to the Staff Ride Stands

Although the Charleston campaign is best studied over two days, much educational value can be gained with a single-day event. Options include trimming the stands remote to Charleston, or selectively focusing on individual stands for their operational or tactical focus. Option 1 below is structured with an operational focus, while Option 2 focuses principally on tactical actions.

Option 1: Operational Focus Staff Ride

Stand 1: Campaign Overview at Fort Moultrie National Monument (FMNM)

Stand 2: The American and British plans for 1780 (base of Fort Moultrie)

Stand 3: Fenwick's Point/British Landing, deception, and isolation plan (California Dreamin')

Stand 4: British Crossing to the Neck (Magnolia Plantation)

Stand 5: Lincoln's Plan (High Ground/Progressive Academy & Meeting Street)



Figure 3.2. Day 2 Inner Ring Stands. Created by Army University Press.

Stand 6: The Siege (Marion Square)

Stand 7: Whipple vs. Arbuthnot-The Naval Fight (Waterfront Park)

Stand 8: End of the Siege ("Pineapple Fountain" at Waterfront Park)

Option 2: Tactical Focus Staff Ride (Stands 1–3 pertain to 1776, all others to 1780)

Stand 1: Campaign Overview at Fort Moultrie National Monument (FMNM)

Stand 2: Fight at Sullivan's Island-Parker vs. Moultrie (base of Fort Moultrie)

Stand 3: Clinton's Dilemma (Thompson Park-Sullivan Island)

Stand 4: British Movements up Wappoo Cut (Riverland Terrace Boat Ramp)

Stand 5: Fenwick's Point/British artillery (California Dreamin')

Stand 6: British Crossing to the Neck (Drayton Manor/Magnolia Gardens)

Stand 7: Biggin Bridge (Monck's Corner, South Carolina)

Stand 8: Lemprieres Point/Malmédy's Failure (Remley's Point Boat Ramp)

Stand 9: Opening Engagements (Hampstead Mall)

Stand 10: The Siege and Naval Actions (Marion Square)

Stand 11: End of the Siege ("Pineapple Fountain" at Waterfront Park)

Staff Ride Methodology

The field study phase consists of walking to locations (known as stands) on the battlefield, and discussing historical events through the ODA analytical framework: Orientation, Description and Analysis. The structuring and sequence of the stands provide plenty of opportunities for students to analyze all aspects of the battle.

Orientation

Each stand starts with a brief orientation to ensure participants understand the physical characteristics of the location as it was during the battle. The first orientation of the day should be detailed, and tailored to the needs of the students at each subsequent stand. Here the instructor can

gauge student situational awareness by asking simple open-ended questions such as "Which way is north?" Suggested minimums include:

A. Location of the previous stand. If visible, point it out. If beyond line of sight, use a map board and cardinal directions.

B. The current location on the map, with key terrain features.

C. Weather and light data, time of day, and season at the time of the battle.

D. Approximate location of units in relation to the terrain, and each other.

E. Permanent or temporary structures that were present during the battle.

F. Significant changes in terrain, vegetation, or structures from 1780 to present.

Description

The purpose of the description is to ensure students are familiar with the historical events that occurred near the stand location. A suggested technique is to use a chronological review of the following key elements:

A. Unit movements.

B. Combat actions: attacks, maneuvers, defends, withdraws.

C. Leader movements, location, decisions, and actions.

D. Individual soldier acts of bravery or cowardice.

The instructor should minimize lecturing and instead encourage student-led descriptions to maximize student experiential learning. One approach is to assign a specific study area to each student based on a historical figure (Cornwallis or Lincoln as examples); Army Warfighting functions (Movement and Maneuver, Fires, Intelligence, Protection, Sustainment, Mission Command/Leadership); or specific battlefield functions such as Cavalry, Infantry, and Quartermaster. At the stand, students orally describe the historical events and insights gained from their research. Role playing can be particularly helpful to draw out insights. The role player should try to explain the character's possible decision-making process based on the information at hand. The instructor uses open-ended questions to fill in details and tactfully correct errors in student presentations.

Analysis

The heart of the staff ride is the analysis portion of each stand. Open-ended questions are directed at the students to encourage them to consider the how and why behind a particular leader action. Ideally, critical analysis will help students gain insights into the timeless aspects of combat leadership. Analytical questions fall into two categories: historical evaluations and modern relevancies:

A. Historical Evaluations. The instructor guides students through questions regarding the leaders, units, and systems in their historical context. Leadership questions should focus on the factors (facts, assumptions, mental and physical factors) that influenced decision-making, along with mission command, training, and integration of weapons systems in combat.

B. Modern Relevancies. The instructor helps draw out relevant insights for the military professional: "So what and then what?" One method is to view historical factors through the lens of modern doctrine. For example: "Consider hasty versus deliberate mission planning in the context of the historical attack plan; what could they have done differently?" Or "Using current doctrine as a guide, what were some defensive planning shortfalls?" Use open-ended questions such as "Why did a particular action fail or succeed?" or "What were some of the factors leading to the successful friendly attack?"

C. Encourage debate and disagreement among students, and certainly point out that there are multiple points of view regarding an issue. The instructor should respectfully challenge students to logically defend their arguments. Use humility and tact, as students can often reveal fresh insights not readily apparent to seasoned professionals. To ensure a more productive integration session, encourage students to carry a notebook to record their thoughts and observations *as they occur*, rather than waiting for the end of the terrain walk.[1]

The first stand each day is designed to provide a strategic and operational overview to reinforce the preliminary study class, thus ensuring students have a good grasp of the campaign at the start of the staff ride. Because of rivers and large bodies of water, it is difficult to move from one stand to another in strict chronological sequence. Consequently, some stands are sequenced to avoid time-consuming backtracking; the sequence between Biggins Bridge and Lemprieres Point serves as one such exam-

ple. Each stand is scripted in a standardized format to support an orderly flow for the terrain walk. Written directions help the instructor guide students from one stand location to the next. The orientation paragraph depicts the location of the historical actions, in relation to the terrain visible at the stand. The description section provides a narrative guide to historical actions during the battle, tied to the location adjacent to the stand. Primary-source vignettes, along with human interest stories, help illuminate the "face of battle" and give insights into timeless mental factors present in combat. Finally, suggested analysis questions help the instructor stimulate critical thinking and discussion about the "how" and "why" of events discussed at the stand. All azimuths given in the text are magnetic, while times are local to Charleston, South Carolina (Eastern time zone), and given in a twenty-four-hour military time format.

DAY 1 OUTER RING STANDS

Stand 1: The Road to Charleston (Operational Orientation-Fort Moultrie)

Directions: Fort Moultrie is part of the larger Fort Sumter and Fort Moultrie National Historical Park, administered by the National Park Service (NPS). The Fort Moultrie Visitor's Center is located at 1214 Middle St., Sullivan's Island, SC 29482 (32.75951, -79.85770). It is recommended to limit use of the visitor's center to the large wall map and interpretive displays that support the operational overview to the 1776 battle. The center's auditorium shows a twenty-minute film that discusses the entire history of Fort Moultrie; due to time constraints, this is not recommended for staff ride orientation. With advanced coordination, the auditorium is well-suited for the initial orientation, and NPS staffers can be used to discuss additional historical details. Once the inside orientation is complete, walk students south across Middle Street to the main entry point in the masonry fortification. Once inside, carefully climb atop the black painted glacis overlooking Charleston harbor.

Visual Aids: Figure A.2. Principal American Revolution Campaigns, 1775–79 (page 188). Figure A.3. Principal American Revolution Campaigns, 1780–81 (page 189). Figure A.4. Principal American Revolution Campaigns, Timeline (page 190). Figure A.5. Operational Overview, 1776 (page 191). Figure A.6. Day 1 Tactical Stands, Sullivan's Island (page 192).

Orientation: Charleston is in the South Carolina Lowcountry, about 83 miles (133 km) from the seaport town of Savannah, Georgia, and 155 miles (248 km) from Wilmington, North Carolina. The major northern seaport of New York is 638 miles (1,021 km) to the northeast, while the British naval base at Liverpool, England, was more than 3,700 miles (5920 km) to the east.

Once atop the glacis of Fort Moultrie, point out the face of the fort points southward before facing north and orienting students to the cardinal directions of the compass. Across the harbor, 4 miles (6.4 km) to the northwest is the city of Charleston. The distance across the harbor has changed considerably due to hurricanes and dredging; in 1776, the open water between Sullivan and James Islands (to the southwest) was probably 1.5 miles (2.4 km). Then 0.8 miles (1.3 km) to the northeast is Mount Pleasant, an appendix of land jutting into the Charleston harbor. In 1776, the point was called Haddrell's Point, and the mainland was known as Point Pleasant. The instructor should also point out Fort Sumter, the low brick structure sitting atop a large sand shoal at the 7 o'clock position. To the 10

o'clock position is a smaller brick fort, Castle Pinckney, which sits atop the Shute's Folly sandbar. Before May 1776, the only manmade structure on Sullivan's Island was the "Pest House," which was temporarily used to quarantine slaves inbound from Africa.[2]

Description: The 1776 Charleston expedition was a hastily cobbled together branch plan to the British main offensive against New York. The British prime minister, Lord Frederick North, realized a sizeable amount of combat power would sit idle at New York while waiting for troop transports and warships to arrive from Europe. Encouraged by lobbying from the exiled royal governors of the Carolinas, North nominated Maj. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton as army commander of an expedition to regain control of North Carolina. Operating from this secure enclave, British regulars would organize and arm regiments of Loyalists who would deploy inland to pacify the interior districts. Clinton sailed from Boston in January 1776 with a single reinforced infantry regiment en route to a planned rendezvous along the Outer Banks of North Carolina with a Royal naval flotilla and troop transports under Sir Peter Parker. Clinton's flotilla arrived first at Wilmington, North Carolina, on 12 March 1776. After seizing the port from the weak Patriot garrison, Clinton was dismayed to learn the local Loyalist militia regiment had been crushed by Patriot militiamen at Moore's Creek Bridge in February 1776. With no Loyalist recruits and logistic support forthcoming, Clinton was compelled to abandon the planned North Carolina operation.[3]

Sir Peter Parker's storm-scattered fleet did not consolidate at Wilmington until May 1776. With the Loyalist defeat at Moore's Creek Bridge, the two commanders were faced with developing a new course of action. After some heated discussions, Clinton reluctantly endorsed Parker's scheme to raid Charleston, South Carolina—a target which offered the navy a protected anchorage and ample supplies. Clinton hoped to seize a defendable lodgment "where the King's persecuted subjects . . . might find an asylum until the proper season for a southern American campaign returned.[4] With the arrival of troop transports from home, Clinton's corps grew to 2,500 soldiers and marines. In support was Parker's squadron of ten warships which included two 50-gun "fourth-rates," four 28-gun frigates, a 20-gun sloop, and a single "bomb ketch" ship mounted with a large mortar. Both Clinton and Parker had extensive experience with amphibious operations; with the Loyalist support promised by South Carolina's exiled Royal Governor William Campbell, no major difficulties were expected.[5]

However, Campbell's assurances were based on stale information. Beginning back in April 1775, the Charleston (Patriot) Council of Safety

had moved aggressively to counter British attempts to contain the rebellion. Strategic outposts along with powder and ordnance were seized by Patriot militia, while prominent Tories were suppressed. In September, Campbell was forced to flee to the His Britannic Majesty's Ship (HBMS) *Tamar* for safety. Fearing a British counterattack from St. Augustine, Patriot militiamen feverishly collected British ordnance stores into magazines, and refurbished old fortifications, while additional crews constructed a new fort on Sullivan's Island. Throughout 1775, Patriot militias suppressed Loyalists and Cherokees in the western districts; and by December, South Carolina was firmly controlled by the Patriots.[6]

When word of the British southern operation reached the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, Maj. Gen. Charles Lee was dispatched to organize a new Southern Department. Besides organizing new Continental regiments in Virginia, Lee labored to develop intelligence gathering on the enemy. Lee's efforts to divine British intentions were aided when an American privateer captured a British transport carrying dispatches between Lord Germaine and Sir Henry Clinton. Armed with details of Clinton's plans for North Carolina, but unsure of matters in the aftermath of the Moore's Creek victory, General Lee hastily organized the defenses of both Virginia and North Carolina. After the British expedition sailed from Wilmington in mid-May, Lee correctly guessed the British would next target Charleston. Consequently, Lee dispatched available resources and troops southward before riding himself to oversee preparations in Charleston.[7]

Figure 3.3. Maj. Gen. Charles Lee. From the public domain.

Vignettes

A good starting point for understanding the 1776 campaign is to read contem-

porary correspondence about the respective British and American plans. First, Sir Henry Clinton:

> The advanced Season of the Year and the depressed State of the Kings Friends in the two Carolinas, forbade our looking to the Southward; and as I was expecting every moment to receive the Commander in Chiefs Summons to join him, I became apprehensive that I should not have time to put my Chesapeak Scheme into any Sort of Train. I proposed however, as soon as the Fleet could be got in readiness for Sailing, to proceed to Virginia, and there wait Sir Wm Howes ultimate Directions. But Sir Peter Parker having in the mean time procured Intelligence from whence it appeared the Rebel Work on Sullivan's Island (the Key to Rebellion Road & Charles Town) was in so unfinished a State as to be open to a Coup de Main & that it might be afterwards held by a small Force under Cover of a Frigate or two; and [I] having about the same time received a private Letter from Sir Wm Howe, in which he seemed to intimate a Wish I could get possession of Charles Town, without expressing any Hurry for my joining him; I was tempted to accede to the Commodores Proposals for a joint attempt upon that Island.[8]

Secondly, that of the Americans:

> By Order of Congress to Col. William Moultrie, or to the commanding officer, at Fort Johnson. Sir, You are hereby commanded, with the troops under your orders, by every military operation to endeavor to oppose the passage of any British naval armament that may attempt to pass Fort Johnson, until further orders by Congress, or the council of safety. William H. Drayton, President, Charlestown, Nov. 9th, 1775.[9]

Analysis

1. What was the comparative strategic situation in 1776?

2. What were some fundamental assumptions made on both sides?

3. Describe political, military, and economic constraints. Were any changeable? If so, how?

Stand 2: The British Plans

Directions: From the Fort Moultrie glacis, retrace your steps the front of the fort facing Middle Street, the road between the fort and visitor's center. Turn right (east) and follow the sidewalk as it curves around the fort, and position students to gain a clear view of the Charleston harbor, vicinity of (32.75879, -79.85903).

Visual Aids: Figure A.7. British Assault on Fort Moultrie, 28 June 1776 (page 193). Figure A.8. Battlefield Effects: British Assault on Fort Moultrie, 28 June 1776 (page 194).

Orientation: Although long since obliterated by Atlantic storms, a large sand and log fort once stood in this general location. Charleston is to the northwest about 4 miles (6.4 km) across the harbor. To the east-southeast 1.0 mile (0.62 km) is the brick fortress of Castle Pinckney, atop the remnants of Shute's Folly sandbar. Then 1.4 miles (0.8 km) beyond Castle Pinckney is Fort Johnson on James Island. Lastly, Haddrell's Point, the peninsula of land jutting from Mount Pleasant, is 1 mile (1.6 km) to the northeast. The large boulders (riprap) on the shoreline are a modern addition. The shoreline in 1776 was narrow and silty at low tide, and submerged at high tide.

Figure 3.4. Commodore Peter Parker. From the public domain.

Description: The offshore appearance of two British frigates in late May 1776 warned Patriots in Charleston that an enemy amphibious assault was imminent. The British reconnaissance noted not only the strong works at Fort Johnson, but the partially

Figure 3.5. Sir Henry Clinton. From the public domain.

finished Sullivan's Island position. Armed with the patrol reports, Parker decided to use his frigates to suppress the American batteries on Sullivan's Island sufficiently for a landward assault by a battalion of trained marines and sailors. After consultations, Clinton decided to use Long Island (today's Isle of Palms) as a staging base for an assault across Breach Inlet against the unfinished eastern flank of the American fort. Once secured, British regulars based on Sullivan's Island would organize Loyalist militia regiments for pacification of Charleston and the interior districts.

Vignettes

Sir Henry Clinton's comments on the planned assault:

> But, Sir Peter Parker, having in the meantime procured intelligence from when it appeared the rebel work on Sullivan's Island (the key to Rebellion Road and Charleston) was in so unfinished a state as to be open to a *coup de main* and that it might be afterwards held by a small force under cover of a frigate or two, and having . . . received a private letter from Sir William Howe in which he seemed to intimate . . . I could get possession of Charleston without expressing any hurry for my joining him, I was tempted to accede to the Commodore's proposals for a joint attempt upon that island. For though neither the season . . . the orders under which I acted, the short time allowed me, nor the number of troops I had under my command would warrant an expectation of *suddenly* getting hold of Charleston and keeping it afterward . . . yet I thought Sullivan's Island . . . might prove a very important acquisition and greatly facilitate any subsequent move we should be in a condition to make in proper sea-

son against that capital. Preparations were according made for re-embarking the troops, and on the 31st of May the fleet sailed to the southward.[10]

Analysis

1. Analyze Sir Peter Parker's plan: Strengths? Weaknesses? Planning assumptions?

2. What of Sir Henry Clinton's plan: Strengths? Weaknesses? Planning assumptions?

3. How did the army and navy operations and tactical tasks support (or deviate) from strategic goals?

[Teaching points: The functions of planning: Understand situations, develop solutions; task-organization and prioritization; synchronization; anticipation and adaptation. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0 (Washington, DC: 2019), 2-3.]

Stand 3: The British Land Assault (Thomson Park, Sullivan's Island)

Directions: Turn left from the Fort Moultrie parking lot, and drive 2.8 miles (4.5 km) via Middle Street to Thomson Park. Pay close attention to the odometer, as a missed turn will require a lengthy drive to reach a turnaround point on Isle of Palms. Smaller vehicles will fit in the limited parking spaces at Thompson Park; oversized vehicles will need to park at nearby Sunrise Presbyterian Church (after securing permission to use the lot). Park and walk southeast to a point overlooking Breach Inlet, the open water between Sullivan's Island and the Isle of Palms.

Visual Aids: Figure A.7. British Assault on Fort Moultrie, 28 June 1776 (page 193). Figure A.8. Battlefield Effects: British Assault on Fort Moultrie, 28 June 1776 (page 194).

Orientation: In May 1776, Col. William Thomson's reinforced 3rd Regiment of Rangers manned a sand and palmetto log redoubt overlooking the Breach Inlet from this general location. The redoubt was later relocated about 100 yards southwest of this location, near the intersection of Jasper Boulevard and Station 30 Street. The waterway to the north and west of this location, between Sullivan's Island and Mount Pleasant, is part the modern Intracoastal Waterway. In 1776, the shoreline on both sides was banded by an irregular tidal marsh.

Description: Today, Breach Inlet is barely 300 yards from edge to edge; in 1776, the inlet was more than 1 mile wide. The inlet was dotted with constantly shifting sand and muck, and the depth could vary from two feet to seven feet. Thus, crossing the Breach was possible only by small watercraft, and only then during high tide.[11] Although these facts were known to locals, Sir Henry Clinton missed those key details during his two-day reconnaissance of Sullivan's and Long Island. After his troops and guns landed on Long Island on 9 June, Clinton planned to execute an assault across the Breach, ideally timed both at low tide and during Parker's assault on Fort Sullivan. Shortly after the landing, a British reconnaissance patrol brought back the disconcerting news that the Breach was impassible to foot movement even at low tide. As Clinton's corps lacked sufficient boats to bypass the Breach defenses, the only option was to attempt a surprise amphibious assault at high tide when the American defenders were distracted by Parker's bombardment of the main fort.[12]

Meanwhile, Parker's staff completed mapping and marking the portion of the harbor's channels and obstacles that lay outside the engagement range of the American guns. Favorable winds and tides on 7 June allowed

Parker's lighter ships (with the loss of one supply vessel) to pass across the Bar and into Five Fathom Hole. Parker's heavier 50-gun flagship, the HBMS *Bristol* was floated across on 9 June, but only after the removal of heavy cannons and gear. As the ship's crews prepared for combat, Parker and Clinton attempted to coordinate their tactical and communication plans via exchange of letters. While unfavorable tides delayed Parker's sea assault, Clinton pressed Parker to bypass Sullivan's Island and instead attempt a landing on Mount Pleasant. Parker pushed back on the plan, fearing concentrated enemy fire from both Haddrell's Point and Sullivan's Island. Instead, Parker offered to provide fifteen long boats to give Clinton's assault greater lift capability for a simultaneous assault at the Breach. Throughout the back-and-forth letter writing, neither commander fully committed to a cooperative plan. Instead, Clinton only promised "whenever circumstance shall concur to make the attack practicable, I shall do my utmost to cause a diversion and to cooperate with you."[13]

In an amazing example of bungling, Parker planned a naval assault on Charleston without ensuring his task force had at least one naval officer capable of navigating the harbor. Instead, Parker had to entrust the success of his plan to the dubious ability of conscripted black civilian pilots to avoid the hazards of Charleston harbor. With favorable winds and tides, Parker's HBMS *Bristol* led a flotilla of nine frigates into the attack at midmorning on 25 June 1776. Covered by the supporting fire of the bomb ketch, Parker's leading division of five frigates would attack Fort Sullivan's southwest bastion, thereby fixing the defenders in place. Once Parker felt the enemy gunners were sufficiently suppressed, he would order the rear division to enfilade the unfinished northern flank of the enemy fort. By doing so, Parker hoped to pin the enemy gun crews in place and prevent their withdrawal to the mainland—either by gunfire or the landing of a storming party of sailors and marines.[14]

Parker's plan immediately began to unravel as bombs from the mortar ketch appeared to cause no damage to the interior of the fort; in short order, firing from the ketch stopped as the crew had to repair leaks in the ship's hull caused by too-heavy powder charges in the mortar. As American shot begin hitting the lead British ships, the conscripted black pilots refused to take the frigates closer to the American fort, which forced the British crews to anchor at a distance that significantly lessened the terminal impact of their shot. Despite the range disadvantage, the British fire was rapid and accurate, though ineffective as the British solid shot was seen to bounce harmlessly from the palmetto log and sand walls of the American fort. Although slower, the American fire was accurate and

effective, causing cumulative damage to British hulls and rigging during the battle.[15]

About midday, British observers saw the blue South Carolina liberty flag disappear from view, giving the impression the fort was trying to surrender. After several minutes of tense watching, a salvo of American shot and the reappearance of the blue liberty flag showed the garrison was still in the fight. Around noon, Parker signaled for the flank attack by the third division, which quickly failed as three frigates ran aground on Shute's Folly. Despite the setbacks, Parker stubbornly kept his frigates in the fight throughout day.[16]

A second lull in the firing came in the afternoon, causing Parker to hope Clinton's corps was launching an assault on the landward face of Fort Sullivan. After a thirty-minute silence, the Americans resumed firing and the battle continued until Parker grudgingly withdrew his ships to Five Fathom Hole at nautical twilight. Of the three grounded frigates, two were floated off at high tide, but the HBMS *Actaeon* was scuttled by fire after its crew failed to pull the ship free. Besides the loss of the *Actaeon*, every frigate had been battered by American fire. Parker's flagship *Bristol* was the worst damaged: mizzenmast destroyed, mainmast damaged, more than seventy holes and significant burn damage to the hull from heated shot. British casualties were severe, with sixty-four killed and 141 wounded, including Parker, who narrowly missed death when a splinter shredded the backside of his trousers. To add insult to injury, the British watched helplessly as an American boarding party boldly fired cannon shots from the smoldering *Actaeon* at Parker's flagship before safely escaping with the ship's bell. Parker's frustration at his defeat was made worse by Clinton's failure to make a lodgment on the east side of the island.[17]

On the other side of Sullivan's Island, Clinton's troops had struggled throughout 25 June with their own set of misfortunes. While performing a final reconnaissance of the Breach, Clinton discovered the American defenders had covertly thrown up a second redoubt, with good fields of fire and none of the vulnerabilities of the original shoreline redoubt. Because of the delays in the naval attack, the British artillery crews had to drag their guns higher on the beach to avoid the rising tides from the Breach. The sight of the British troops milling about in the open provided plenty of warning for the American defenders, who promptly opened fire when the British light boats cautiously edged into the Breach. After getting hit by 18-pounder shot and grapeshot, and briefly running aground, the escorting Royal Navy schooner and sloop withdrew out of range—forcing the assault force under General Earl Charles Cornwallis to withdraw to

safety. That night, Clinton sent a letter to Parker asking for additional fire support for a second attack the next day. Yet, at dawn the next morning, Clinton was dismayed to watch Parker's flotilla withdraw down to Five Fathom Hole, clear evidence that Parker had conceded defeat to the American defenders.[18]

After making emergency repairs and provisioning, the British task force began sailing for Boston in July 1776. Afterward, mutual recriminations were exchanged between the two commanders. Parker's report pilloried Clinton for his timidity and unwillingness to risk a landing at the Breach or Haddrell's Point—a point hotly contested by Clinton, who pointed to Parker's failure to provide sufficient boats and proper fire support to the army troops. Moreover, Clinton blasted Parker's incompetence in forgetting qualified pilots and the consequent grounding of an entire division's worth of firepower. Although he was not officially reprimanded, Clinton received most of the blame for the botched attack, thus permanently damaging his reputation within the British establishment.[19]

Vignettes

A Loyalist crewmember on the schooner *Lady William* watched the British repulse at the Breach:

> It was impossible for any set of men to sustain so destructive a fire as the Americans poured in upon them on this occasion; that it was the destructive fire from Colonel Thomson's fort which prevented the flotilla from advancing, and not the shoals and sand bars as was alleged; that it was the repulse of the flotilla which prevented General Clinton from fording the inlet, and not the depth of water.[20]

The editor of Sir Henry Clinton's papers noted the Sullivan's Island expedition was flawed from the start, with a vague mission, ill-defined command authorities, and based on faulty assumptions. Secondly, the entire expedition was unrealistically constrained by the need to attain a quick victory before rejoining the main army at New York. These factors were compounded by Clinton's character flaws, and inability to admit to his own errors—as is evident in an excerpt from Clinton's campaign report:

> The long menaced attack took place . . . on the 28th of June. About eleven o'clock we saw [Parker's first division] moving toward the fort . . . but no signal whatsoever as agreed upon to prepare the troops. Everything was, however, got in readiness. . . . as events should suggest. Every demonstration was according-

ly made of an intention to land on the island, and every diversion by cannonade. . . . Small armed vessels were at the same time ordered to proceed near the shore as if to cover a descent (which, however all got aground); the boats were drawn up and the troops so disposed that in an instant they could attempt a landing either on the island or the main, as the circumstances . . . should direct. But, soon after the landing ships had taken their stations, we had the mortification to discover that the three frigates (which were intended to favor the attack by the troops on the battery at Heddral's Point) were stuck fast . . . and that the ships engaged with the battery at Sullivan's Island had brought up at too great a distance (800 yards at least to avail themselves of the fire. . . . From hence we grew apprehensive that no serious impression could be made. . . . To our great surprise, the cannonade still continued (without any favorable appearance that we saw) until night, while the troops remained all the time on the sands . . . held in readiness. And the best dispositions possible was made of all our light ordnance to enable them at the proper . . . tide to risk one effort should necessity require it—which I must, however, confess, would have been a step not justified but in case of the success or distress of the King's ships, to take advantage of the one or to relieve the other. Break of day discovered to us . . . the squadron had given up the contest and retired. . . . Nothing, therefore was now left to do but lament that the blood of brave and gallant men had been so fruitlessly spilt and prepare for re-embarking as soon as possible.[21]

Analysis

1. Given the limits of eighteenth-century technology, what were some ways that Clinton and Parker could have better synchronized their efforts? [Teaching points: Concept of operations, tenets of unified land operations, and preparation activities. ADP 5-0, 2-20 to 2-22 and 3-1 to 3-8.]

2. The British appear to have violated the principle of objective—directing a military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and achievable goal. What are some ways Clinton and Parker could have closed the gaps in their plan? [Teaching points: Shared understanding of purpose, written operational approach, and concept of operations. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: 2019), 2-1 to 2-2.]

Stand 4: The American Defense (Pickett Park-Pitt Street Bridge)

Directions: From Thompson Point, turn left (southwest) on Middle Street (SC 703). Drive about 1.5 miles (2.4 km) and turn right (north) to follow SC-703/W Ben Sawyer Boulevard over the Intracoastal Waterway. Drive about 2 miles (3.2km) and turn left (west) on Center Street. After 1.2 miles (1.9 km), turn left (south) and drive about 0.4 miles (0.6 km) to the end of the drivable portion of Pitt Street. Park on the side of the road and walk southeast about 0.5 mile (0.8 km) to stop on the wooden walkway of Pitt Street Bridge (32.76975, -79.86207). *Note: Use of buses for this stand is strongly discouraged due to steep road shoulders and lack of a suitable turnaround point at the end of Pitt Street.*

Visual Aids: Figure A.7. British Assault on Fort Moultrie, 28 June 1776 (page 193).

Orientation: On contemporary British maps, this appendix of land was labeled Hetheral Point. In May 1776, the Americans built a causeway spanning the Narrows between the Sullivan's Island and Hetheral Point. After orienting to the north, point southeast to Fort Moultrie about 0.8 mile (1.3 km) from Hetheral Point. To the northwest 1.8 miles (3.0 km) is Haddrell's Point, which in 1780 housed an American redoubt adjacent to Shem Creek, a water avenue of approach into Mount Pleasant. From 1898 to 1945, a trolley bridge spanned Pitt Street to Sullivan Island; this was closed following the construction of the Ben Sawyer steel drawbridge currently in use. Today, the Sullivan Island Narrows are 0.3 mile (0.5 km) in width, but in 1776, the inlet was probably 0.5 mile (0.8 km) wide, lined with marsh, and navigable only by small boats.[22]

Description: Since its inception in 1670, British officials fortified and garrisoned Charles Towne to prevent raids by French and Spanish forces. Around 1750, the South Carolina governor hired German-born military engineer William de Brahm to upgrade fortifications for the rapidly growing city.[23] The peace after the Seven Year's War (1756–63) brought a halt to military preparations until 1775, when the British governor was driven from the colony, and the Patriots girded for an expected British invasion. Militiamen and slaves borrowed from nearby plantations repaired the decrepit Fort Johnson on James Island, and added new redoubts to guard Mount Pleasant.[24] The linchpin of the city defenses was a new fort on Sullivan's Island, sited to control the main channel leading from Rebellion Road to the Charleston Harbor docks. Appointed to man the Sullivan's Island works was the newly mustered 2nd South Carolina Continental infantry regiment under Col. William Moultrie.[25]

In May 1776, Southern Department commander General Charles Lee and his staff engineer, Lt. Felix Baron von Massenbach, arrived to coordinate the defense of Charleston. Lee found Colonel Moultrie overseeing work parties of slaves and soldiers laboring to fortify Sullivan's Island before the expected battle. When complete, the fort (later named Fort Moultrie) would shelter thirty-one guns, crews, and the supporting infantry garrison behind a ten-foot-high double wall, 500 feet (152 meters) long by 16 feet (5 meters) deep, made of layered palmetto logs and wood planks, with the open spaces filled by sand. The fort was positioned so the heavy guns could easily engage any British ships in the Ship Channel; in turn, enemy frigates would have a hard time engaging with all of their guns due to the narrowness of the Ship Channel.[26]

Figure 3.6. Maj. Gen. William Moultrie. From the public domain.

Despite the fort's many advantages, Lee and Massenbach recognized that it did not provide overhead cover or bombproof shelters for the crews; additionally, the powder magazine was vulnerable to enemy enfilade fire through the unfinished northwest wall. Lastly, the garrison lacked a secure line of retreat in the event of a British land assault. Lee concluded that Fort Moultrie's flaws outweighed its tactical advantage, so Colonel Moultrie was given orders to move his garrison and stores to Hetheral Point. By virtue of his Continental brigadier's commission, Lee was officially the senior commander on the ground. Yet, Moultrie circumvented Lee with an urgent message to President Rutledge, who quietly remanded the order. To avoid a public crisis of command, Rutledge publicly affirmed Lee as the

supreme American commander in South Carolina. Lee privately seethed at the rebuke to his authority and took his frustration out by badgering Moultrie with demands for constant improvements. With the commitment to defend from Fort Moultrie, Engineer Massenbach was detailed to advise Moultrie on how best to rectify the lack of overhead cover, and improve secondary positions overlooking the Narrows. To solve the problem of a secure line of retreat across the Narrows, Moultrie ordered his chief engineer, Capt. Ferdinand de Brahm, to fabricate a causeway to Hetheral Point. Under de Brahm's supervision, work crews built a pontoon bridge of boards and empty hogsheads (barrels), which proved sufficient only for individual foot traffic.[27]

Lee and his staff engineers also devoted attention to improving the other defensive works protecting the city. Haddrell's Point was reinforced, and its guns repositioned to enfilade any British ships trying to move inland via Shem Creek. Lee prodded Col. William Thomson of the 3rd South Carolina to relocate the Breach Inlet redoubt to improve its fields of fire, while better earthworks lessened the risk of British counterbattery fire. To protect the vulnerable commercial district along Bay Street, work details threw up new redoubts and fletches. Finally, Lee passed on knowledge gained during his years of experience as a British army major by teaching the green South Carolina militia leaders the basics of infantry drill and maneuver.[28]

Yet, Lee remained deeply dissatisfied with Colonel Moultrie's lack of urgency in executing orders. On 28 June, Lee prepared to confront President Rutledge and demand that Moultrie be relieved. Parker's assault that same day interrupted Lee's visits, fortuitously leaving Moultrie in command. Ignorant of his near-firing by Lee, Moultrie had ridden that morning to visit Thomson's redoubt at the Breach. After seeing Clinton's redcoats clustered near the Breach, Moultrie realized an attack was imminent, and the garrison was ordered to full alert. Directing the fire of the thirty-one Fort Moultrie heavy guns were but twenty trained gunners of the 4th South Carolina Artillery, so gun crews were formed from hastily trained 2nd South Carolina infantrymen. Fort Moultrie was manned by a total of 344 officers and men in a fort designed for 1,000, while Colonel Thomson commanded about 700 men, with two cannons, to guard the Breach. Although well-armed, the Sullivan's Island garrison had but two tons of gunpowder, as General Lee had ordered an additional five tons removed to Haddrell's Point, thus reducing the amount that could be captured by the British. By Moultrie's estimation, the powder supply would allow only twenty-eight shots from each gun. Besides the gunpowder and unfinished

defensive works, the garrison was also short of drinking water due to a lack of rainfall to refill the cisterns.[29]

Around 1100, bombs from the British bomb ketch and shot from the lead British frigates began hitting the fort as Parker's lead division moved into firing position. General Lee described the incoming fire as "one of the most furious and incessant fires I ever saw or heard."[30] Yet, for all the noise and shock, the incoming fire caused little damage to Fort Moultrie. The mortar rounds were muffled by the sandy floor of the fort, while long-ranged British shot was absorbed by the flexible log and sand walls. Small-arms fire from British marines in the topmasts was equally ineffective against the American crews sheltered behind tall merlons. The principal risk to the garrison was from occasional shot or fragment that flew through an embrasure to strike down a gunner. Outside the main fort was a different matter, as the 12-pounder gun crews along the incomplete west curtain were driven from the guns by the storm of fire from the British frigates.[31]

After an hour of continuous shelling, the Americans spotted three British frigates gliding toward the Cove to enfilade the western end of the fort. In an incredible stroke of luck for the Americans, the British warships ran aground well out of engagement range of the fort. A lull in the firing followed when a British shot dropped the blue and white South Carolina colors inside the fort, leading the Navy crews to assume the fort had capitulated. Sgt. William Jasper, a gun commander within the fort, braved the gunfire to climb the parapet and rig a temporary flagpole in full view of the British flotilla. Inside the fort, Moultrie admonished his gunners to conserve powder by firing fire slowly and only at clear enemy targets. Despite their lack of training, the South Carolina gun crews fired accurately, causing great damage to the hulls and rigging of the British frigates. One salvo cut the *Bristol's* anchor cable, which swung the frigate's vulnerable side toward the American fort. By the time the *Bristol* crew could rig a new anchor cable and pull the ship back into firing position, its stern had been smashed and most of the gun deck crews were dead or wounded.[32]

Around 1500, Colonel Moultrie received a report that British troops had bypassed the Breach defenses and landed on Sullivan Island. Moultrie ordered the infantry to man the fort's interior defenses, while staffers rode to verify the information. Shortly after sending a report and request for reinforcements and fresh gunpowder to President Rutledge, Moultrie received word that Colonel Thomson's rangers had repulsed a British landing attempt at the Breach. Relieved, Moultrie ordered the reengagement of the British frigates, which had obligingly waited in position. Around

1700, General Lee arrived at the fort with a boatload of fresh powder. A quick inspection of the battlements made plain that Moultrie had control of the situation, so Lee departed to gather additional powder and reinforcements. Their morale bolstered by Lee's visit, and buckets of rum issued in lieu of water, the reinvigorated South Carolinian garrison fought on until the enemy frigates withdrew at dusk. Despite the estimated 7,000 British cannon balls shot at Fort Sullivan, the fort suffered only seventeen dead and twenty wounded, and lost but a single 18-pounder, split apart by a too-heavy powder charge. Moultrie's concern for his powder supplies proved justified, as the garrison expended the original stockpile of 4,766 pounds of powder during the fight and would have run out of powder without Lee's timely resupply.[33]

Dawn revealed the British frigates still sitting at anchor, and one frigate (the *Acteon*) still grounded just out of range of the fort's guns. Repair parties swarmed over the ships to repair the damage inflicted by the American gunners. Around midmorning, American observers saw a longboat rowing away from the frigate still grounded in the harbor, and soon smoke rising from its hull gave clear evidence of a scuttling attempt. Racing against time, a party of South Carolinians recovered a load of valuable sails and the ship's bell as a trophy shortly before the burning *Acteon* exploded. Throughout the day, British ships limped one-by-one out of range to anchor at the far end of Five Fathom Hole. As the American troops policed up the detritus of battle and repaired the damage to their forts, Lee tried to divine the next British move. The evident damage inflicted on the Royal Navy ships was confirmed by interrogation of British deserters. Yet, British troops remained camped on Long Island, and on 11 July, an American patrol fought a short skirmish with a Royal Marine watering detail. Early on 12 July, American lookouts observed the weighing of anchors and trimming of sails on the ships in the harbor. By midday, a steady stream of British ships glided across the Bar into the open waters of the Atlantic Ocean. By 2 August, the British expeditionary force was gone, clear evidence that the South Carolinians had inflicted a major defeat on the world's dominant superpower.[34] Complacency soon set in, and work on the Charleston defenses slowed to a crawl as the focus of operations shifted northward. Of greater significance to subsequent operations in the south, the seeds of discord had been sown by Rutledge's interference with Lee's command authority. The unresolved dispute between civilian and military authorities would produce bitter fruit during subsequent 1779 and 1780 British assaults on Charleston.[35]

Maj. Gen. Charles Lee's account of the 28 June 1776 action at Charleston:

> On Friday, about eleven o'clock the Commodore [Parker], with his whole squadron, consisting of two lines of battle-ships and six frigates . . . anchored at less than half musket shot from the fort; and commenced one of the most furious and incessant fires I ever saw or heard. It was manifestly their plan to land at the same time their whole regulars at the east end of the island and . . . invest the fort by land and sea. As the garrison was composed entirely of raw troops, . . . as I knew their ammunition was short; and as the bridge by which we could reinforce, or call off the troops from the island, was unfinished, you may easily conceive my anxiety. It was so great, that I was in suspence whether I should evacuate it or no. Fortunately . . . some ammunition arrived from the town, and my aid de camp, Mr. Byrd, returning from the island with a flattering report of the garrison's spirit, I determined to support it at all hazards. On this principle I thought it my duty to cross over to the island, to encourage the garrison by my presence; but I might have saved myself that trouble; for I found, on my arrival, they had no occasion for any sort of encouragement: I found them determined and cool to the last degree: their behaviour would, in fact, have done honour to the oldest troops. I beg leave, Sir, therefore, to recommend, in the strongest terms, to the Congress, the commanding officer, Colonel Moultrie, and his whole garrison, as brave soldiers and excellent citizens; nor must I omit . . . Colonel Thompson, who, with the South-Carolina rangers and a detachment of the North-Carolina regulars, repulsed the enemy in two several attempts to make a lodgment at the other extremity of the island. Our loss, considering the heat and duration of the fire, was inconsiderable: we had only ten men killed . . . twenty-two wounded; seven of whom lost their limbs, but with their limbs they did not lose their spirits; for they enthusiastically encouraged their comrades never to abandon the standard of liberty and their country.[36]

An excerpt from Col. William Moultrie's memoirs, giving his recollection of the battle:

> On the morning of the 28th of June, I paid a visit to our advanced-guard . . . saw a number of the enemy's boats in motion

. . . as if they intended a descent upon our advanced post. . . . I immediately ordered the long roll to beat, and officers and men to their posts. We had scarcely manned our guns, when the following ships of war came sailing up, as if in confidence of victory . . . we began to fire; they were soon abreast of the fort, let go their anchors, with springs upon their cables, and begun their attack most furiously. . . . The Thunder-Bomb . . . threw her shells in a very good direction; most of them fell within the fort, but we had a morass in the middle that swallowed them up instantly…so that very few of them bursted amongst us. At one time, the Commodore's ship swung round with her stern to the fort, which drew the fire of all the guns that could bear upon her. . . . General Lee paid us a visit through a heavy line of fire, and pointed two or three guns himself; then said to me, 'Colonel, I see you are doing very well here, you have no occasion for me, I will go up to town again,' and then left us. Never did men fight more bravely, and never were more cool; their only distress was the want of powder . . . there cannot be a doubt, but that if we had had as much powder as we could have expended in the time, the men-of-war must have struck their colors, or . . . have been sunk, because they could not retreat. . . . They could not make any impression on our fort, built of palmetto logs and filled in with earth. . . . During the action, three of the men-of-war . . . got entangled together . . . had these three ships effected their purpose, they would have enfiladed us in such a manner to have driven us from our guns. It being a very hot day, we were served along the platform with grog in fire buckets, which we partook of very heartily. . . . After some time our flag was shot away. . . . Sergeant Jasper perceiving the flag . . . had fallen without the fort, jumped from one of the embrasures, and brought it up through a heavy fire, fixed it upon a spunge-staff, and planted it upon the ramparts again; Our flag once more waving in the air, revived the drooping spirits of our friends . . . till night had closed the scene.[37]

Analysis

1. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and integration of governmental and nongovernmental actions with military operation to achieve unity of effort. What are some ways President Rutledge, General Lee, and Colonel Moultrie could have attained unified action in defending

Charleston? [Teaching points: Clear commander's intent and concept of operations, shared understanding of operational goals. ADP 3-0, 3-13.]

2. In Army doctrine, what is the difference between a *risk* and a *gamble*? What risks did Colonel Moultrie's assume by remaining in place on Sullivan's Island? How did he mitigate his risks? In return, what advantages did the Americans gain by Moultrie's decision? [Teaching points: Risk analysis, mitigation, and acceptance. ADP 5-0, 2-15.]

Stand 5: Campaign Overview, 1780 (Ravenel Bridge)

Directions: From Haddrell's Point, drive northwest on Pitt Street about 0.7 mile (1.1 km), and turn right (east) on McCants Drive. After driving three blocks, turn left (northwest) on Simmons Street. Drive about 0.5 mile (0.8 km) and turn left on SC 703, Coleman Boulevard. Drive about 1.5 miles (2.4 km) to turn left (southwest) on Patriot's Point Road. After 0.4 mile (0.64 km), turn right on Harry J. Hallman Jr. Road, and follow the road about 0.3 mile (0.5 km) through a traffic circle, and park in one of the paved parking lots under the overhanging Arthur Ravenel Bridge. Oversized vehicle parking is available near the Mount Pleasant Visitor's Center, at 99 Harry M. Hallman Jr. Blvd., Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464 (32.802156, -79.90214). Once parked, walk about 250 feet (75 m) toward the southeast side of the Ravenel Bridge, to a paved foot path (Wonder's Way) running parallel to the bridge. Walk east about 200 meters, and continue on Wonder's Way as it doubles back westward to parallel the bridge. Continue to climb the bridge to a widening of the deck adjacent to the first major pier. From parking lot to pier is a strenuous 1.5 mile (2.4 km) uphill walk; no toilets or water fountains are available on the bridge, so a water and latrine stop at the Mt. Pleasant Visitor's Center is suggested before starting the walk. An alternate, albeit lower vantage point, of the Charleston harbor is the flight deck of the decommissioned USS *Yorktown* at the Patriot's Point Naval & Maritime Museum, 40 Patriots Point Rd, Mt Pleasant, SC 29464 (32.790919, -79.904219). From the parking lot, follow signs through the visitor's center to the USS *Yorktown.* Once inside, follow directions to the open flight deck before positioning students along the west edge facing the Cooper River. Modify the orientation directions to account for the modified location. *Note: The Patriots Point visitor's center normally charges an entrance fee, but active-duty military* in uniform *can obtain free passes to access the USS* Yorktown.[38]

Visual Aids: Figure A.2. Principal American Revolution Campaigns, 1775–79 (page 188). Figure A.3. Principal American Revolution Campaigns, 1780–81 (page 189). Figure A.4. Principal American Revolution Campaigns, Timeline (page 190). Figure A.9. Operational Overview, 1777–79 (page 195). Figure A.10. The Charleston Campaign: Initial Disposition and Movements, 1 February–12 May 1780 (page 196). Figure A.14. Battlefield Effects: The Siege of Charleston, 29 March–12 May 1780 (page 199).

Orientation: The concrete-and-steel Ravenel Bridge connecting Charleston and Mount Pleasant presents a unique birds-eye view of the Charleston harbor. A convenient start point for the orientation is Daniel Is-

land, due north of the bridge. The Cooper River (at 20°) flows on the west side of Daniel Island, while the mouth of the Wando River is at 30°. At 35°, about 0.8 mile (1.3 km) from the bridge, is Remley's Point. Formerly known as Lemprieres Point, a small American redoubt there guarded the upper reaches of the Wando River.[39] At 110°, 2 miles (3.2 km) to the east-southeast is Haddrell's Point, the location of an American redoubt guarding the mouth of Shem Creek. At 125° is Hog Island, which in 1780 was separated from the mainland by a deep channel of the Cooper River. Beyond Hog Island, about 4.3 miles (6.9 km) from the bridge, is Sullivan's Island—identifiable on a clear day by its black rectangular tower. At the viewer's 150° position is the low brick structure of Fort Sumter, built atop a remnant of the Middle Ground sandbars. The open water between Fort Sumter and James Island is Rebellion Road, once the deepest natural part of the Charleston harbor. James Island, the western edge of the harbor is at 170°. Jutting from James Island is Fort Johnson, the gateway to the Ashley River, which is barely visible beyond the city of Charleston, around 190°. Back at the 175° azimuth, is the low brickwork Castle Pinckney, built on the remnants of Shute's Folly. In 1780, the Americans built a water obstacle from Shute's Folly to the commercial docks of Charleston to prevent a British thrust directly at the city.

Between 230–240°, the city skyline is dominated by two prominent church steeples. The tan one to the viewer's left is St. Philip's Church; the white steeple to the viewer's right is St. Michael's. In 1780, the Americans used the St. Michael's steeple as an observation platform. Although not clearly visible from this vantage point, the mouth of the Wappoo Cut is about 3.2 miles (5.2 km) to the viewer's 240° position. Drayton Hall, the British crossing point to the Charleston Neck, is about 10.5 miles (17 km) around the 300° position. Biggin Bridge, the key Cooper River crossing point near Monck's Corner, is 29 miles (46 km) to the 350° (north northwest). Lastly, Christ Church Parish was the stretch of land between the Wando River and Sullivan's Island, running northeast from the harbor about 26 miles (35km) to Awendaw Creek. As the topography of Charleston is a bit difficult for some students to envision, best to use a detailed map and compass when performing the orientation. *Note: The Ravenel Bridge is a popular recreation spot, so some cautions are in order. The pedestrian walkways are marked with separate lanes for foot and bike traffic; facilitators must ensure students use the correct walkway to avoid injury from overly aggressive bike riders. Atop the bridge, additional instructors are recommended as road guards to ensure student safety. Secondly, wind*

and road traffic can prove distracting; a good alternative location for this stand (in addition to the USS *Yorktown) is at the base of the bridge*.

Description: The October 1777 defeat of General John Burgoyne's army at Saratoga, and France's subsequent declaration of war, placed Britain on the horns of a strategic dilemma. First, France's powerful fleet limited Britain's freedom of navigation, and posed a grave threat to Britain's lucrative Caribbean colonies. Still saddled with heavy debt from the Seven Year's War, Britain's seemingly never-ending operations in North American placed increasingly intolerable pressure on the King and Parliament for a resolution. Not until early 1778, however, was King George III willing to offer any degree of political autonomy to the Americans; by then, the Americans had already signed a treaty of alliance with France. As a consequence, the Continental Congress rejected British offers via the June 1778 Carlisle Peace Commission.[40]

While the politicians dithered, Lord George Germain, American secretary of state, outlined a new strategic approach to Commander in Chief Sir Henry Clinton. Priority of resources went to the defense of Britain's Caribbean holdings and home islands. Thus, Clinton had to adopt a defensive economy-of-force posture to reduce risk and conserve manpower and ship bottoms. In early June, the British army abandoned Philadelphia and withdrew across New Jersey toward New York. Washington's army attempted to destroy Clinton's rearguard at Monmouth Court House on 28 June 1778. Although an operational failure, Baron Frederich von Steuben's reform efforts were evident as the Continental regiments performed on par against the British regulars. After the British abandoned Philadelphia, Clinton's forces held enclaves only around New York and Providence, Rhode Island; with France's entry into the war, the northern campaign was at a strategic impasse. Consequently, Germain gave Clinton the latitude to shift forces southward to conduct a southern campaign, albeit without reinforcements from home.[41]

To divert Washington's attention from the change in strategic direction, Clinton's army openly improved its defensive works around New York and Providence, while raiding parties struck American coastal towns. With Washington's attention diverted, Clinton would use the Royal Navy's strategic mobility to project combat power in a surprise campaign to reconquer the southern colonies. Because a secure base in southern waters would be vital, Clinton planned to first seize Savannah by a surprise amphibious assault, then establish an outpost line on the Savannah River to firmly control Georgia. Clinton would use Savannah to stage an amphibious expedition against Charleston, which he saw as the American political

and economic center of gravity in the South.[42] While British regular forces commanded by Earl Charles Cornwallis mopped up pockets of resistance, provincial troops commanded by Maj. Patrick Ferguson, inspector of militia, organized the Loyalist militia to consolidate gains in South Carolina. Cornwallis would repeat the invasion and pacification process northward, while Clinton led his remaining forces southward from New York to pin Washington's army against the Chesapeake Bay. Success of the southern campaign was predicated on the active support—recruits, supplies, and intelligence—of Loyalists in the Carolinas.[43]

To accomplish the seizure of Savannah, Clinton dispatched Lt. Col. Archibald Campbell and 3,000 men to reinforce Brig. Gen. Augustine Prevost, commander of British Florida. In a lightning amphibious campaign, Campbell rapidly outmaneuvered Continental commander Maj. Gen. Robert Howe, and captured Savannah on 29 December 1778. Caught off guard by Clinton's southward gambit, the Continental Congress and Commander in Chief George Washington rushed Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln and the available southern Continental Line regiments southward as reinforcements. At Purrysburg, South Carolina, Lincoln took command of a threadbare army of 1,700 partially trained men in January 1779. While Lincoln struggled to feed, equip, and train his army, General Prevost led an expedition upriver from Savannah toward Augusta, Georgia. British patrols soon fixed Lincoln's army at Purrysburg, allowing Campbell's division to flank the American defenders and seize Augusta on 29 January 1779. The euphoria of the victory soon wore off as Campbell discovered the local Loyalists so cowed by their Patriot neighbors that few Georgians enlisted in the Loyalist service. The threat posed by Georgia Patriots was graphically brought home when Patriot militiamen ambushed and defeated a column of North Carolina Loyalist reinforcements at Kettle Creek on 14 February 1779. With no forthcoming Loyalist reinforcements, Campbell abandoned Augusta before a stronger American column, under General John Ashe, could attack the town.[44]

Shortly afterward, Lt. Col. Jacques Marcus Prevost, younger brother to General Prevost, took command from the ailing Lieutenant Colonel Campbell. Mark Prevost was an aggressive commander; on 3 March 1779, he routed General Ashe's carelessly deployed corps at Briar Creek. American personnel and material losses were grievous, with the loss of an entire Continental regiment, hundreds of abandoned weapons, and the army's loaded logistics trains. Lincoln regrouped his scattered forces and imprudently decided to march on Augusta, leaving Colonel Moultrie with but 1,000 militia and 220 Continentals to defend the Purrysburg bridgehead. After learn-

ing of Lincoln's advance toward Augusta, Prevost daringly bypassed the Purrysburg redoubt to launch a foraging raid into South Carolina. With his flank turned, Moultrie withdrew toward Charleston while attempting a delaying defense. Prevost's men moved faster, seizing the bridge across the Coosawhatchie River before the Americans could destroy the structure. With the loss of the defensive terrain along the Coosawhatchie, Moultrie was compelled to withdraw into the main Charleston fortifications.[45]

Figure 3.7. General Benjamin Lincoln. From the public domain.

Although he lacked the manpower and equipment for a siege, Prevost tried to bluff the Charleston defenders into surrendering their city. Prevost's threat so unnerved the South Carolina Privy Council that only a last-minute intervention by General Moultrie prevented the city's surrender. After learning of the tardy approach of Lincoln's army, Prevost withdrew toward the Stono Ferry bridgehead, while shepherding a slow wagon train full of forage and provisions. On 20 June 1779, Prevost's rear guard defeated a probe by Lincoln's army at Stono Ferry, inflicting 300 American casualties in exchange for only 119 British injuries. Afterward, Prevost successfully consolidated his army and purloined supplies at Beaufort, South Carolina, to await the return of cooler weather before resuming the offense.[46]

In his after-action report, Prevost marveled at Lincoln's botched response: "It was not till some days after our progress into South Carolina that General Lincoln could be persuaded to retreat and come to the assistance of Charleston."[47] Lincoln's failure to effectively counter Prevost's

raid was only the latest blunder that called into question Lincoln's competence as department commander. After suffering defeats at Brier Creek and Purrysburg, Lincoln left Charleston virtually unprotected while pursuing a strategically meaningless offensive toward Augusta. Lastly, the Stono Ferry failure was due in part to poor pre-battle reconnaissance that resulted in costly American frontal assaults on the British redoubts. Lincoln's reputation was so damaged by the Stono Ferry repulse that he wrote to Congress requesting relief from command; a request that was surprisingly blocked by Rutledge and Moultrie.[48]

Prevost's (and Campbell's) post-battle reports were read with great interest by Sir Henry Clinton and Lord North. The American political and military structure in South Carolina was self-evidently weak, while the plentiful provisions and forage in the region promised adequate logistics support to an extended siege operation against Charleston. However, both Clinton and North overlooked information about widespread resentment against British foraging operations in South Carolina. Taking cattle and provisions from local civilians was a convention of eighteenth-century warfare. However, Prevost's men often went beyond justifiable foraging, and pillaged private property and slaves from Patriots and Loyalists alike. Not only did British officers fail to stop the plundering, but General Prevost refused to issue receipts to Loyalist supporters for later reimbursement. Americans were further angered by Prevost's use of Creek Indian auxiliaries, who had a bad habit of looting and murdering both Tory and Whig. Lastly, the hapless Loyalists were left exposed to Patriot reprisals when Prevost's army withdrew from the area. Consequently, neither Campbell nor Prevost were able to enlist enough Loyalists to effectively pacify Georgia.[49]

Meanwhile, American morale in the South dropped further when a joint Franco-American expedition against Savannah was soundly defeated by Prevost's troops in October 1779. News of Prevost's success, and the subsequent withdrawal of the French fleet from southern waters, gave Sir Henry Clinton a window of opportunity to launch the assault against Charleston. By December 1779, Clinton's expeditionary corps of 8,700 fighting men, supported by eighty-eight transport and supply ships, was assembled near Tybee Island off Savannah, Georgia. Fire support for the expedition was provided by a squadron of thirty Royal Navy warships under Vice Adm. Mariot Arbuthnot. After reviewing reconnaissance reports, and recommendations from Lord Germaine and General Prevost, Clinton selected the mouth of the Stono River as a suitable landing point. From there, the dense vegetation of Simmons Island offered a concealed path

for Clinton's light infantry to secure Stono Ferry. With access to the Wappoo Cut via the Stono River, Clinton could launch an amphibious assault across the upper Ashley River to reach the Charleston Neck. Once the army cut the Great Charleston Road (King Street), Admiral Arbuthnot's squadron would only have to blockade the Ashley and Cooper rivers from within the harbor to complete the encirclement.[50]

Vignettes

In March 1778, Lord Germaine laid out new strategic priorities and guidance to newly appointed Commander in Chief Sir Henry Clinton:

> His Majesty is nevertheless of opinion that the War must be prosecuted upon a different plan, from that upon which it has hitherto been carried on. . . . It is therefore recommended to you, if you should find it impracticable to bring Mr. Washington to a general and decisive Action early in the Campaign, to relinquish the idea of carrying on offensive Operations against the Rebels within Land, and, as soon as the Season will permit, to embark such a Body of Troops as can be spared from the Defense of the Posts you may think necessary to maintain, onboard of transports under the Conduct of a proper number of the King's Ships.[51]

While amphibious raids around New York kept General Washington distracted, Clinton was to launch a major amphibious operation against the Southern states:

> When these [diversionary] Operations . . . are concluded. . . . It is the King's Intention than an Attack should be made upon the Southern Colonies with a view to the conquest and Possession of Georgia & South Carolina. The various accounts we receive from those Provinces . . . representing the distress of the Inhabitants, and their general Dispositions to return to their Allegiance, a large Supply of Arms will therefore be sent out for the purpose of arming such of them as shall join the King's Troops, and indeed it is the King's Wish that every means were employed to raise and embody the well affected Inhabitants in all the Provinces where any Posts are maintained or Operations carried on. It cannot be expected that Farmers, or Men of Property . . . will engage in the Military Service for an indefinite time. . . . They would readily enough take up arms as an embodied Militia, officered by their own countrymen, and act with the

King's Troops throughout a Campaign, or defend a Post in the Absence of the Army. Such appear to be the methods taken by the Rebels for strengthening their Army, and I am commanded to recommend the Experiment to your consideration. . . . Especial encouragement should be held out to [slaves and indentured servants] to desert. . . . The ideas entertained here of the most effectual mode of making an attack upon the Southern Provinces, lead to the taking of possession of Georgia, as soon as reinforcements arrive. . . . A corps of 2,000 men it is supposed would be fully sufficient to take and keep possession of Savannah. . . . Communications being opened with Georgia to join the King's Troops there, such a Force might be collected as when the troops destined for the attack of Charles Town should arrive, would be capable of penetrating into South Carolina . . . thereby dividing the Province in the Middle, and opening an easy communication with the loyal inhabitants in North Carolina, and by cutting off the . . . planters on the Sea Coast, reduce them to . . . submitting to the King's Authority. The number of Troops that is supposed would be sufficient to reduce Charles Town is about Five Thousand. . . . It is imagined by landing on James' Island, which is accessible to ships of a small Draught of Water, by Stono Inlet, Fort Johnson might be reduced, and a Passage secured through Wappoo Creek, for the flat bottomed Boats to get into Ashley River without danger, or that the harbor would be so far opened…that the ships…might pass the Fort on Sullivan's Island . . . and land the troops behind the Works, where the Town is entirely open. . . . Could a small Corps be detached at this country, and the Rebels deprived of a principle resource for the support of their foreign credit . . . as the Products of those Provinces make a considerable part of their Remittances to Europe.[52]

Next, a brief except from Sir Henry Clinton's long-winded discussion of his campaign plans:

I had long determined . . . on an expedition against Charleston . . . to save [Georgia] from falling into the hands of the rebels . . . the universal dejection occasioned in the rebel country by the late miscarriage of the French . . . before Savannah . . . strongly at this time invited me to it. My intention had been to put the Chesapeake and Carolina expeditions in motion together early in October [1779] that we might have the whole winter and fol-

> lowing spring before us to carry our operations to their proper extent. And I was not without hopes . . . that the spirit of rebellion might be thoroughly subdued in the two Carolinas, and such a hold afterwards taken of the Chesapeake as should prove at least a barrier between them and the northern states. But the visit of a superior French fleet to the American coast . . . obliged the Admiral and me to confine our thoughts…to the security of . . . His Majesty's American possessions.[53]

After discussing his inability to decisively engage Washington's Continentals, and his estimate for the combat force needed to protect New York, Clinton continued his plan for Charleston:

> But, as Admiral Arbuthnot seemed now to enter cordially into the execution of [the Charleston campaign] I had little doubt that if we should have a prosperous voyage and retained our superiority at sea . . . but these [his corps of 7,000 men] would prove sufficient not only to achieve the conquest of Charleston but to recover the chief part of South Carolina. And I proposed . . . to draw 2,000 more troops from New York to occupy a commodious post in Virginia, for the purpose of cooperating with the southern army in the reduction of North Carolina, should circumstances at the time encourage such and effort.[54]

Analysis

1. Was Lincoln's planned offensive toward Augusta suitable and feasible? Why not? How could he have mitigated risk? [Teaching point: Task-organize the force and prioritize efforts. "When developing their concept of operations, commanders first visualize the decisive operation that directly accomplishes the mission. They then visualize how shaping and sustaining operations support the decisive operation [which] prioritizes effort and is the focal point around which the plan is developed." ADP 5-0, 2-3.

2. Critically analyze Lord Germaine's guidance to Sir Henry Clinton. What were the pros and cons of Germaine offering operational advice to Clinton? What are the major planning assumptions held by Germaine? Identify ways, means, and ends from Germaine's letter. Any critical gaps, or major flaws?

3. Compare Clinton's campaign plan to the guidance given by Germain. Does Clinton's plan "nest" within the higher-level guidance? Does Clinton identify ways and means to the end? [Teaching point: The nature

of operations: To achieve or contribute to national policy objectives. ADP 5-0, 1-2.]

4. Consider General Prevost's leadership. How did his tactical victories influence follow on operations by both sides? What of his inability or unwillingness to control looting? How does the behavior of the British and Loyalist troops affect the local population? What modern parallels can you draw? [Teaching point: Principles of joint operations: maintain legitimacy. ADP 3-0, 2-1.]

Stand 6: Clinton's Landing (Wide Awake Park/Matthew's Ferry)

Directions: After boarding vehicles for movement, turn north (right) from the parking lot on Harry M. Hallman Jr. Boulevard and merge via Wingo Way on to US-17S toward Charleston. Remain on US-17S as it crosses the Ravenel Bridge, and transitions from Spring Street to Savannah Highway and across the Ashley River. In total, you should travel about 15 miles (24 km) on US-17S to the town of Hollywood, South Carolina. Once there, turn left (southwest) on SC-162 W and drive about 2.5 miles (4 km). Near St. Paul's Church of Hollywood, turn left (southeast) and follow Trexler Avenue roughly 0.5 mile (0.8 km) to the parking lot of Old Wide Awake Park at 5035 Trexler Ave, Hollywood, SC 29449 (32.748588, -80.165395). Once parked, walk southeast about 330 feet (100 meters) to the wooden boat dock overlooking the Stono River. *Note: Old Wide Awake Park is a popular wedding destination, so advanced coordination with the town of Hollywood is recommended to avoid conflicts.*

Visual Aids: Figure A.10. The Charleston Campaign: Initial Disposition and Movements, 1 February–12 May 1780 (page 196). Figure A.11. Day 1 Tactical Stands, Charleston Vicinity (page 197).

Orientation: This spot overlooks the historical location of Stono Ferry, a critical crossing point for travelers between James Island and the mainland. After orienting to the north, direct student attention upriver (northeast) about 800 feet (248 meters) to the second dock. In 1779, A British redoubt stood there, oriented northward to guard the ferry from American ground attacks, while a right flanking redoubt was located 0.2 mile (0.3 km) farther upstream overlooking the river. A third redoubt, securing the left flank of the ferry, stood in the approximate location of Old Wide Awake Park (this stand). The Stono River flows south and west into the Wadmalaw River, which in turn flows westward into the Edisto River and on to the Atlantic Ocean between Edisto and Simmons (Seabrook) Islands—about 18 miles (30 km) from this spot.

Description: The British armada bound for South Carolina set sail from New York in late December 1779. Severe winter storms scattered the fleet, which did not consolidate at Tybee Roads (vicinity Savannah, Georgia) until late January 1780. Although few soldiers were lost on the voyage, Clinton's planned siege operations were hampered by the loss of vital transports carrying horses and the army's siege artillery and ordnance stores.[55] While ship crews repaired the ships and landing parties loaded

fresh water and provisions, Clinton finalized his own plans. Initially, Clinton had planned to land his entire force at the mouth of the North Edisto River on the remote (and presumably undefended) Simmons Island, and cross to the mainland via Stono Ferry. Instead, Clinton decided to detach a flying column of light infantry and dismounted dragoons, under Lt. Gen. Earl Charles Cornwallis, to march toward Augusta while the remainder landed at Simmons Island. Ostensibly, the raid would divert General Lincoln's attention from the landing on Simmons, while gathering horses to remount Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton's *British Legion*. The expedition also gave Clinton a convenient excuse to sideline the increasingly troublesome Cornwallis. During the previous winter, Clinton had suffered such a crisis of confidence that he submitted a letter of resignation to King George III. Cornwallis held a dormant commission as replacement commander in chief, so both men assumed Cornwallis would receive appointment as the new commander in chief. The matter lingered on until mid-March 1780 when Clinton learned his request had been denied, placing both men in an awkward situation. An embittered Cornwallis became increasingly aloof from Clinton to avoid blame for any campaign setbacks. Cornwallis's standoffishness fueled Clinton's suspicions that his ambitious subordinate was secretly corresponding with friendly officials in London to undermine Clinton's authority.[56]

Tensions grew between the army and navy commanders as well. Commodore Arbuthnot wanted to land the army troops on James Island at the mouth of the Stono River—an option that Clinton rejected for being too close to the Charleston defenses. Aided by his naval liaison officer, Capt. George Elphinstone, Clinton eventually won Arbuthnot's cooperation. On 11 February 1780, Clinton's light infantry rowed up the Edisto River and secured a lodgment on Simmons Island. The British lacked good maps of the barrier islands, so relied on intelligence from reconnaissance patrols and friendly slaves to navigate across Simmons Island to Stono Ferry. On 28 February, Clinton's advanced guard, supported by armed gallies on the Stono River, took possession of the abandoned earthworks overlooking the Stono Ferry.[57]

Back in 1779, American troops had contested British control of Stono Ferry, even after Lincoln's repulse; American galleys and raids were used to probe the British redoubts. Yet, in 1780, the American seemed content to surveil the British advance with light dragoon patrols and made no effort to defend the Stono River bridgehead. Instead, the American defenders withdrew after burning Wallace's Bridge on the main road leading to Charleston. With the bloodless seizure of the Stono crossing, and the

puzzling lack of American resistance, the Ashley River was the only major obstacle facing Clinton's army before it could open the siege of Charleston.[58]

Figure 3.8. Vice Adm. Mariot Arbuthnot. From the public domain.

Vignettes

Capt. Johann Ewald of the Hessian *Jägerkorps* left a detailed diary of his experiences during the Southern Campaign that included this description of the campaign opening:

> Early on the morning of the 11th [of February] the fleet set sail. The wind was so favorable that about noon we reached the mouth of the North Edisto, and toward evening, the harbor which forms a circular basin in which over one hundred ships can ride at anchor. Although the mouth of the harbor is so narrow that only two ships can wind through the sandbars, Captain Elphinstone guided the entire fleet through safely. We dropped anchor near Simmons Island. . . . Toward evening a signal was given to lower the flatboats in the water, and to provide the troops with provisions for four days.[59]

Figure 3.9. Capt. George Keith Elphinstone. From the public domain.

After describing a meeting with Sir Henry Clinton, Captain Ewald resumes his narrative:

> On the same evening, about ten o'clock, the beginning of the disembarkation was carried out in a strong wind. But since the

weather constantly grew worse, no more than the first disembarkation and a part of the Hessian grenadiers could be put ashore. On the 12th at daybreak, all the troops disembarked without the guns (except the four amusettes of the light infantry, which the men themselves had to remove) or any of the baggage, not even a horse for the commander in chief. He informed all the officers, in the most polite manner, to look after their own most necessary equipment as soon as possible. Hence, no officer had any more with him than what his servant could carry in his hands. Toward ten o'clock, the troops set out through a pathless and marshy wood, which continued with the greatest difficulty until five o'clock in the evening. A path often had to be cut through the bushes with axes and bayonets in water up to the waist. By this time, we reached a prepared road . . . the Leslie and Webster brigades . . . crossed a second creek which separates this island from John's Island and took post. The *jäger* detachment and the 33rd Regiment…occupied a road leading to Stono Ferry. . . . The remaining troops encamped on Simmons Island. . . . By this maneuver of the admiral, the enemy had been deceived in such a manner that we did not find a single man of the American army. . . . For no one . . . had believed that any person would think of landing in this area and marching toward Charlestown from this side.[60]

Sir Henry Clinton's account of the initial landing and movements across the barrier islands toward Charleston:

> The Admiral at first proposed to land us . . . on John's Island by Stono Inlet. But he was luckily persuaded [to land at the Edisto]. The transports having got into North Edisto harbor without accident the day after we left Tybee, fortunately escaped a violent tempest that arose . . . which would have been the case had the Admiral persisted in his first design. For this piece of good fortune we were indebted to Captain Elphinstone's zealous exertions . . . [and] perfect acquaintance with all the island navigation…A considerable part of the flank corps, which Lord Cornwallis and I had accompanied, were put on shore that evening on Simmons Island, and the rest of the army followed the next day. The want of wagon horses might have now rendered it difficult to get forward the necessary supplies . . . especially as the galleys which had been sent from Savannah through the

> island navigation did not make [the] progress we expected. But through Captain Elphinstone's . . . judicious arrangements every impediment was soon surmounted. And, some victualers, ordnance vessels and gunboats being passed between the islands into Stono, possession was taken of John's Island and a proper force advanced over Stono Ferry to the main.[61]

Analysis

1. Consider the pros and cons of Clinton's decision to land on Seabrook Island, as compared to Arbuthnot's desired landing on John's Island? [Teaching point: Protection: "Commanders anticipate how enemy actions and environmental factors might disrupt operations and then determine the protection capabilities required to maintain sufficient reach." ADP 3-0, 2-10.]

2. Put yourself in the shoes of Captain Elphinstone. Consider how a modern-day liaison officer (LNO) might handle similar disagreements in operational approach and design between co-equal commanders? [Teaching point: Role of Liaison officers, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: 2019), 4-6 to 4-7.]

3. Consider the causes and consequences of the personal differences between Clinton and Cornwallis. What are some modern parallels and implications? What are some possible solutions, or mitigation measures? [Teaching point: Interpersonal tact, leads others. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession* (Washington, DC: 2019), 4-2 to 4-3, 5-1 to 5-4.]

Stand 7: The British Movements up the Wappoo Cut (Riverland Terrace)

Directions: From Old Wide Awake Park, drive northwest on Trexler Avenue to SC-162 E. Turn right (east) and follow SC-162 on to US-17 N. Drive 4.4 miles (7 km) before taking a slight right on Old Charleston Road (State Road S-10-1024). Continue 0.8 mile (1.3 km) to the T-intersection and turn right (south) on Main Road (SR S-10-91), which crosses the Stono River. Drive about 1.7 miles (2.7 km) to turn right (east) on River Road (S-10-91). Drive an additional 4.8 miles (7.8 km), before turning left (northeast) at the T-intersection with SC-700 (Mayback Highway). Drive 3.16 miles (5.1 km) to recross the Stono River, before turning left (north) on Plymouth Avenue. Drive 0.5 mile (0.8 km) then park at the Riverland Terrace Public Boat Landing, 19-35 Plymouth Ave, Charleston, SC 29412 (32.76791, -79.99224).

Visual Aids: Figure A.10. The Charleston Campaign: Initial Disposition and Movements, 1 February–12 May 1780 (page 196). Figure A.11. Day 1 Tactical Stands, Charleston Vicinity (page 197).

Orientation: This location is on James Island overlooking the Wappoo Cut, a tidal creek connecting the Stono and Ashley rivers. In 1780, the British army installed a pontoon bridge over the Cut to reach the mainland from James Island. Facing north, point west to indicate the general direction of the Stono River Ferry, which is 1.6 miles (2.6 km) to the southwest. Charleston is to the east about 3.7 miles (5.9 km). The approximate route taken by the British army from this point, up to Drayton's Manor, across the Ashley River, and down to the defensive works guarding Charleston, is roughly 23 miles (37 km). Assuming Clinton had tried to march on the city via Bacon's Bridge Road on the upper Ashley River, the road distance between this location and the city would be 45 miles (72 km). The Wappoo Cut flows east for 2.5 miles (4.1 km) to connect with the Ashley River at Fenwick's Point. Although not visible from this location, Fort Johnson on James Island is to the southeast about 6 miles (9.6 km).

Description: Today, the Wappoo Cut is a maintained portion of the Intracoastal Waterway, but in 1780 it was a shallow and meandering tidal creek. When passing through the area in 1779, Lieutenant Colonel Prevost had calculated the creek could be used to pass light-draft galleys between the Stono and Ashley rivers. Based on Prevost's reports, Clinton decided to build an intermediate staging base on James Island overlooking the Wappoo Cut. Once Stono Ferry was secured, Captain Elphinstone oversaw the relocation of British troop transports to the mouth of the

Stono River. From there, cargo galleys moved equipment, supplies, and reinforcements via the Stono River into the Wappoo Cut. On 7 March 1780, British Royal Engineers led by Maj. James Moncrief completed a pontoon bridge over the Cut, allowing the light infantry to expand a bridgehead northward on the mainland. To secure the Cut against American armed galleys from the Ashley River, naval gun crews manned heavy gun batteries at Fenwick's Point (covered in greater detail in the next stand). With matters for the amphibious phase of the operation well in hand, Clinton and his staff focused on rectifying shortages of siege guns and ordnances stores. Besides incessantly badgering Arbuthnot for heavy guns, powder, and shot from warships that were idle in the Atlantic, Clinton wrote to British army commanders in Florida and the Caribbean seeking additional ordnance stores from their magazines. Enough munitions arrived by early March to form an initial stockpile for the siege, but the process of obtaining the cannons and materials further strained tense relationships between army and navy commanders.[62]

Vignettes

Sir Henry Clinton continues his narrative of the advance toward Charleston:

> The occupying Fort Johnson and the rest of James Island followed . . . and the banks of the Ashley being thence attained by a bridge over the Wappoo Cut, the entrance of that river was secured by batteries of heavy guns. But more serious operation could not go on against the body of the place, until our depots were formed and the Admiral could pass a naval force into the harbor to assist us with heavy artillery and ammunition for the operations of the siege, and seaman and boats for the transportation of the troops to Charleston Neck.[63]

Capt. Peter Russell, an officer of the *64th Regiment of Foot* lends another perspective:

> Feb 28: Capt. Elphinstone came down from the army. The Grenadiers and light Infantry with the commander in Chief took possession of James Island yesterday without opposition, . . . 100 men left on the Main in 2 Redoubts, remainder of 71st landed on Johns Island, and joined Col Webster.
>
> March 2: Wind N.W. fair day. Captain Elphinstone went round to Stono in the *Breton* having with him a number of Vessels of

light draft loaded with the Engineers and Q.M. (Quartermaster) Generals Stores.

March 6th: Little Wind, rained heavily great part of the Night and most of the Morn. 7th Regt crossed from Johns Island and landed on Coles Island. These last five days the Army employed in landing heavy artillery &c. This Night 2 Battalions of Light Infantry crossed the Wappoo Bridge on Intelligence some light Cavalry lay at Church Bridge. The blow was prevented by an officer's Servant falling in with the enemy and making a Discovery.[64]

Analysis

1. Critically analyze Clinton's cautious operational approach to this point. Strengths and weaknesses? How would such an approach fare against a more aggressive American opponent? [Teaching point: Seize, retain, and exploit initiative, operational tempo. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP 3-90), *Offense and Defense* (Washington, DC: 2019), 1-4 to 1-5.]

2. Decisive action is defined as the continuous, simultaneous execution of offensive, defense, and stability operations; higher echelons generally have a broader focus than lower echelons. Analyze Lincoln's operational approach to this point through the elements of decisive action. Are there gaps in Lincoln's approach? [Teaching point: Lincoln's approach is best described as an Area Defense operational approach to retain key terrain, gain time, and protect populations and critical assets. Stability tasks: civil security and control and support to governance. However, there are no American attacks to dislocate/disrupt enemy forces. ADP 3-0, Table 3-1, 3-2.]

Stand 8: Fenwick's Point/British Artillery Redoubt (California Dreamin')

Directions: From the Riverland Terrace landing, drive south 0.5 mile (0.8 km) on Plymouth Avenue. Turn left (east) on SC-700 (Maybank Highway) 0.75 mile (1.2 km) then turn left (north) on SC 171 (Folly Road Boulevard). After driving 3.5 miles (5.6 km), turn right (southeast) on Albemarle Road. Drive 0.2 mile (0.3 km), turn left (east), then immediately turn right (south) on Fielding Connector. Drive about 0.2 mile (0.3 km) then turn left (east) on Ashley Point Drive. Drive eastward 0.3 mile (0.5 km) across a large parking lot and stop near the multistory brick restaurant to your front at 1 Ashley Point Dr., Charleston, SC 29407 (32.77814, -79.95967). After dismounting, walk around the right side of the building to gain a good vantage point over the Ashley River. *Note: The stand is adjacent to a restaurant, so advanced coordination with the property management is essential to avoid encroachment problems. An alternate location for the stand is in the open parking lot area facing to the southeast.*

Orientation: This location on Fenwick's Point marks the approximate position of British batteries emplaced to close the Ashley River to American river traffic. After facing students north, indicate the flow of the Ashley River to the north and east. The British staging area on the Wappoo Cut is 2 miles (3.2 km) to the southwest, while the creek empties into the Ashley River just south of the large concrete bridge to the east. Marking the downtown area of old Charleston is the white spire of St. Michael's Church, which is 1.7 miles (2.7 km) southeast across the Ashley River. Drayton Manor (Magnolia Plantation) is 11 miles (18 km) to the northwest.

Visual Aids: Figure A.10. The Charleston Campaign: Initial Disposition and Movements 1 February–12 May 1781 (page 196). Figure A.11. Day 1 Tactical Stands, Charleston Vicinity (page 197).

Description: On 11 March 1780, Cornwallis's light troops marched from the pontoon bridge at the Wappoo Cut to Fenwick's Point. After burning houses and clearing the debris, engineers under Major Moncrief's direction surveyed a large earthen redoubt. Soldiers, sailors, and impressed slaves worked throughout the night of 11–12 March, to throw up a large earthen redoubt, in which were emplaced three 32-pounders, two 24-pounders, and a howitzer. At daybreak, the redoubt announced its presence to the Americans when a volley fired at an encroaching American galley overshot its target and landed in Charleston. British work crews

soon finished a second redoubt with additional 32-pounder guns on the north side of the Wappoo Cut—thereby closing off the Ashley River and forging another portion of the Charleston envelopment.[65]

Vignettes

British Capt. Peter Russell's diary describes the Fenwick's Point operation:

> March 11th. Weighed at Seven in the morning and ran up [the Stono River] with the tide to Head Qtrs. at Hudson's or Perino's near the Entrance of Wappoo. Immediately went on shore to the Commander in Chief. Lord Cornwallis and General Leslie advanced with the British Flank Corps and 7th and 23d Regiments to the Main, four miles beyond Wappoo Bridge. Schooners pushed thro' the Bridge to receive some heavy ordnance and stores for a Battery to be built to Night at the mouth of the Creek next Charles Town. . . . This night a Battery was begun on the Pt near Wappoo Cut at Fenwicks Barn. 2 32 Pdrs and an 8in. Howitzer mounted before day break. Some Rebel Gallies and armed Brigs cannonaded the Battery, but obliged to sheer off. Battery finished next day and 3 more 32pdr. Mounted.
>
> March 12th. The Battery on the Main Side of Wappoo finished last Night and one 32 Pounder mounted, with which the mouth of the Creek was effectually cleared of Gallies and other armed Vessels. You have a fine View from the Generals door of Charles Town, from the Steeples of which everything transacted at Head Quarters may with a good Telescope be distinctly seen. 64th took post near Head Qtrs.[66]

Lt. Col. John Laurens, a confidante of General George Washington, shared the American viewpoint of the enemy movements west of the Ashley River in mid-March:

> The Enemy's present disposition of his force and all his late operations indicate a design to attack Charles Town by a siege in form. To complete the investiture he must introduce his Ships of war into the harbor-that it is his intention appears from his fixing buoys on the bar, barricading his Ships wastes—and anchoring them in a station where they may embrace the first favorable spring-tides to enter. His Transports and Store ships have removed from Edisto Up Stono River where they lie contiguous to

> Wappoo Cut, which is the water communication from thence to Ashley River-At a point of the Main-Land formed by the issuing of the former into the latter, he raised in the course of a night, the 11th inst., a battery of six embrasures-This Situation naturally very advantageous he will probably render very strong, and establish in it his deposit of military Stores and provisions-He then may either force a passage over Ashley River, or turn it by a circuitous march-fortify a camp on the neck and open his trenches. The best communications between his magazines and Camp will be across the Ashley River.[67]

Analysis

1. William T. Bulger's article, "The British Expedition to Charleston, 1779–1780," notes Lincoln was unsure of British intentions, and feared having isolated detachments cut-off by British amphibious landings. By ceding the initiative to Clinton, what advantages does Lincoln give up? What, if anything, does Lincoln gain in exchange?[68] [Teaching point: Characteristics of the Defense: "The defender does not wait passively to be attacked . . . aggressively seeks ways of attriting and weakening attacking enemy forces before the initiation of close combat." ADP 3-90, 4-1.]

2. Lieutenant Colonel Laurens's letter indicates General Lincoln had some awareness of British intentions. What were possible American responses to the enemy threat west of the Ashley River? [Teaching point: Special Purpose Attacks. Field Manual (FM) 3-90-1, *Offense and Defense* vol. 1 (Washington, DC: 2013): Ambush, 3-23; Demonstration, 3-29; Raid 3-29 to 3-30; Spoiling Attack, 3-30 to 3-31.]

Stand 9: British Crossing to the Neck (Magnolia Plantation)

Directions: Drive west from the parking lot and turn right (north) to follow Fielding Connector about 0.6 mile (0.9 km) as it curves west to merge with SC-61 S (St. Andrews Boulevard). Drive about 2.25 miles (3.6 km) before the road curves left into a Y-intersection with Ashley River Road (SC-61 S). Continue northwest on Ashley River Road 7.4 miles (11.8 km) then turn right (east) at the entrance to Magnolia Gardens at 3550 Ashley River Rd., Summerville, SC 29485. After parking, follow the paved main road to the gift shop, and walk eastward to locate a black-and-silver South Carolina historical marker "British Attack 1780" on the banks of the Ashley River. *Note: The latitude/longitude location for the historical marker is 32.87684, -80.08211. Online mapping software may not give accurate directions to the historical marker, and the trail system at Magnolia Gardens is poorly marked. Thus, the facilitator should perform a personal reconnaissance before conducting this stand to avoid embarrassing delays. Magnolia Gardens charges an entrance fee, so the facilitator must coordinate in advance with the visitor's center to minimize delays at the stand site.*

Orientation: The metal historical marker marks the general location where British troops crossed the Ashley River on the night of 28–29 March 1780. To the east across the river is the approximate location of the Fuller Plantation, the British landing point and temporary location of Clinton's advanced headquarters. From the historical marker, the straight-line distance to the main Charleston defensive works is 12 miles (19.4 km) to the southeast. The British intermediate staging base at Lining's Creek (modern Oldtown Creek) is 8 miles (13 km) the southeast, the location of the British pontoon bridge spanning the Wappoo Cut is 10.2 miles (16.4 km) to the southeast, and the redoubt at Fenwick's Point is 11 miles (18 km) to the east-southeast. The main west bank crossing of the Ashley River at Bacon's Bridge is 9 miles (14 kilometers) northeast. Even at this point, the Ashley River is a considerable water obstacle, about 364 feet (111 meters) in width. The Ashley is a tidal river, so its levels and flows cycle about every twelve hours from six feet at low tide to around twelve feet at high tide.[69]

Visual Aids: Figure A.10. The Charleston Campaign: Initial Disposition and Movements, 1 February–12 May 1780 (page 196). Figure A.11. Day 1 Tactical Stands, Charleston Vicinity (page 197).

Description: While scouting the west bank of the Ashley River for a suitable crossing point, British patrols found a robust American redoubt guarding Bacon's Bridge. The bridge was the main crossing point from the

west bank of the Ashley River to the Charleston Neck. The reconnaissance confirmed Clinton's assumption that a surprise amphibious landing on the Neck offered the greatest chance of success with the fewest casualties. The same reconnaissance patrol located a suitably undefended crossing point at John Drayton's rice plantation. The plantation was within easy marching distance of Lining's Creek, which offered a suitable staging point for boats preparing for the river crossing. While Captain Elphinstone's naval crews worked to stage galleys and rowboats at Lining's Creek, Major Moncrief's pioneers threw up a redoubt for protection from American raids debouching from the Gibbes' Landing fortifications. Clinton had no intention of launching an unimaginative amphibious assault directly at the closest landing to the American defenses. Instead, the staging of boats and building of the redoubt at Lining's Creek were intended to distract American attention from the actual crossing point at Drayton's plantation. By 28 March 1780, the Lining's Creek position was finished, and Cornwallis's corps was openly bivouacked to convince the Americans that the British would assault the city via Gibbes' Landing. After nightfall on 28 March, Cornwallis's troops quietly broke camp and marched upriver to rendezvous with Elphinstone's flotilla, which had rowed upriver with no lights and muffled oars to Drayton's plantation. By daybreak on 29 March, Cornwallis's light infantry crossed the Ashley and seized a bridgehead at Fuller's House, allowing the rest of the army to finish crossing under the cover of a providential morning fog. The Americans did not learn of the landing until late in the day, when British skirmishers made contact with American pickets screening the Broad Road (today's Dorchester Road). The Americans seemed off-balance, with only desultory skirmishing between the light infantry of both sides until nightfall.[70]

After passing a quiet night in bivouac, Clinton's troops marched south to camp near the Quarter House Tavern, only 4 miles (6.4 km) from Charleston. On the morning of 30 March, Cornwallis's light infantry were engaged by Lt. Col. Henry Laurens's light infantry battalion, which fought a delaying action to their redoubt across the road. Laurens's orders from Lincoln were to fight a delaying action; after a brisk skirmish, Laurens ordered his men to abandon the redoubt and withdraw southward. Shortly afterward, Laurens's men encountered friendly reinforcements dispatched by General Lincoln from the city. With the additional support of a few light field guns, Laurens's skirmishers quickly flushed a patrol of surprised *jägers* from the redoubt. In turn, General Cornwallis deployed his line infantry regiments to envelop the American redoubt, prompting Laurens to break contact and withdraw to the Hornwork once again. With the Ameri-

can defenders gone, Cornwallis's corps enlarged the earthworks to protect their encampment at Gibbes' plantation. With the plantation secure, Captain Elphinstone shifted the army's line of communication to pass through the Wappoo Cut to the fleet of transports in the Stono River. The seizure of Gibbes' landing capped the initial success of Sir Henry Clinton's army in overcoming the last major obstacle guarding Charleston. Pleased with his progress, Clinton looked expectantly at Arbuthnot's squadron to complete the encirclement of Charleston.[71]

Vignettes

Lt. Col. John Laurens's 9 April 1780 letter to General Washington conveyed the grim news of the British landing on the Charleston Neck:

> When I last had the honor of writing to your Excellency, the Enemy had not extended their operations beyond their place of arms on Wappoo Neck. On the 29th Ulto, they crossed Ashley River in force one mile above the ferry; the next day they advanced to Gibbe's, a convenient Landing about two miles from town; having previously collected a number of boats at the opposite shore [Lining's Creek], for the purpose of crossing their heavy artillery and stores. My battalion of light infantry posted there to prevent a surprise or two sudden approaches of the enemy, was ordered not to engage seriously, but skirmish with advanced parties, retiring slowly and orderly toward Town; as there was no object in maintaining any advanced post, and the advantages of a serious affair were all on the side of the Enemy.[72]

British Maj., and Royal Engineer, Archibald Robinson, recorded pertinent details of the British operation across the Ashley:

> 22nd. [March 1780] In the evening the Yagers, Light Infantry and 33d moved to Church creek Bridge, to repair it.
>
> 23rd. Went with Sir Henry and the corps [light infantry] from Church Creek to reconnoiter the Landings, also to make a Diversion in favor of General [James] Patterson's Corps on their march from Georgia. Found the landing at Drayton's preferable in many respects to any Other. This Corps remain' d there. . . to make a Demonstration toward Dorchester, Bacon's Bridge, etc.
>
> 26th. This day Captain Evans of the *Reasonable* arrived at Perrineau's with the Flat Boats and Seamen from the Fleet to man them.

27th. Captain Elphinstone with all the Boats went thro' Wappoo Creek up Ashley River into Linning's Creek without any Accidents.

28th. in the evening the Army march'd from Their Positions near Fenwick's to Drayton's. In the night Captain Elphinstone went up the Ashley with all the Boats and got to Drayton about 3 in the morning of the 29th near 20 miles without any Accident.

29th. ½ past 9 Morning the 1st Embarkment consisting of the British Light Infantry and Grenadiers Landed on Charles Town Neck without opposition. Before 12 the Whole were landed. . . . We Encamped near to Ashley Ferry, where all the Boats Assembled and cross'd over the Baggage of the Army, covered on the other side [by light troops] where General Patterson had the command to keep up communications with the shipping on Stono.

30th. The Army march'd toward Charles Town. No firing until we came within 1 ½ miles of the Rebel lines, when a small Party opposed our Advanced Yagers. Lord Caithness and one Yager Wounded. The Rebels quitted a small unfurnished Redoubt they had upon the main Road at a Narrow Pass between two creeks, was taken Possession off by the Yagers, but in an hour or two after a Party from the Town, of the Silk Stocking Companys retook it. The Yagers lost one man. By the Rebel Accounts they had this Day three officers and forty men killed and Wounded. They quited this work in a short time Afterwards.[73]

Lastly, a portion of Sir Henry Clinton's report detailed the crossing of the Ashley River at Drayton's plantation:

I caused the elite of the army to advance to Drayton's Hall (fifteen miles above Charleston) from whence they passed over the Ashley the next morning without any attempt from the rebels to obstruct them. For the enemy—as they did not perceive the boats coming up, which passed their batteries in the night with muffled oars—expected the landing would have taken place five miles lower down and had thrown up a treble breastwork across the causeway leading from the ferry to obstruct it. And this being now being abandoned when they found we had effected a landing higher up, an uninterrupted, commodious passage was opened thereby for the transportation of the stores and

> remaining troops. The following day the army moved toward Charleston without any other resistance from the enemy than an ineffectual scattering fire on the head of the column. And in the night of the 1st of April we broke ground within 800 yards of the rebel works.[74]

Analysis

1. According to ADP 3-0, 3-11: "Deception is a critical supporting enabler for creating multiple [tactical] dilemmas, achieving operational surprise and maintaining the initiative. . . . Deception inhibits effective enemy action by increasing the time, space, and resources necessary. . . . Deception is a force multiplier when properly resourced and executed." What are some ways the British could have enhanced tactical deception operations during this phase of the operation? [Teaching point: Creating multiple tactical dilemmas through simultaneous operations.]

2. How could Lincoln have anticipated and penetrated enemy deception operations? [Teaching points: Security operations, Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), protection of Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI). ADP 6-0, 3-6 to 3-7.]

3. For the Americans, what were advantages and disadvantages of conducting a mobile or area defense? [Teaching point: Mobile defense concentrates on destruction or defeat of enemy through decisive counterattack. Area defense denies the enemy access to key terrain. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-90, *Offense and Defense* (Washington, DC: 2019), 4-3.]

Stand 10: Monck's Corner/Biggin Bridge Skirmish

Directions: From Magnolia Plantation, turn right (northwest) on Ashley River Road (SC-61) and drive 8.15 miles (14 km). Turn right (north) on SC 165 (Bacon's Bridge Road) and drive 6.4 mile (10.4 km) to merge on US 17 (Alt). *Note: In 1780, an American redoubt guarded Bacon's Bridge, which carried the Broad Road across the Ashley River to the Charleston peninsula.* Once on US 17 (Alt) drive 16.6 miles (26.6 km) to the merge of US 17 (Alt) with US-52. Continue driving north 1.6 miles (2.6 km), then turn right (southeast) on SC-402 soon after crossing the Cooper River. Drive slowly on the curving road for about a mile (1.6 km) to turn right (west) on Biggin Road. *Note: The road to the left (east) is SR-S-8-376 (Old Cherry Hill Road); make sure to turn on Biggin Road.* Drive 0.5 mile (0.8 km) to stop in the William Dennis Boat Landing parking area, 1037 Carswell Lane, Moncks Corner, SC 29461 (33.211958, -79.97348).

Orientation: Facing westward, the Cooper River flows south (to the viewer's left) and east about thirty miles (48 km) to empty into Charleston Harbor. This location is near where Biggin Bridge once spanned the Cooper River. Back at the corner of Biggin Road and Old Cherry Hill Road is the brick ruins of Biggin Church, and its adjacent graveyard. *Note: Although the church building has long been abandoned, the graveyard is still in active use, so exercise suitable discretion during the visit.*

Visual Aids: Figure A.11. Day 1 Tactical Stands, Charleston Vicinity (page 197). Figure A.12. Day Tactical Stands, Monck's Corner (page 197).

Description: As is apparent at this site, Lowcountry rivers hinder east-west movement of troops and logistics trains; thus, control of crossing points was critical to facilitating, or hindering, operational movements. In 1780, Biggin Bridge was a strategically important chokepoint at the headwaters of the Cooper River. Below the bridge, boats could easily move up and down river according to the tides, but above the bridge roads were necessary for movement of soldiers and logistics trains. Four major roads converged at the bridge, including the important road that ran northeastward from Charleston though Berkeley Parish and on to Georgetown. Each road was surrounded by swampy ground, thus canalizing military movements to the roads.[75] Nearby Biggin Church was organized in 1711 as the St. John's Berkeley Parish Church, one of ten such Anglican churches in South Carolina. Built in 1761, the brick church was used during the Revolution by both British and American troops as a convenient strongpoint and magazine. The structure was burned in 1781 when the British abandoned the region.[76]

Possession of Biggin Bridge was a matter of strategic importance in controlling the region. American control of the bridge assured the arrival of supplies and reinforcements and offered a secure northward line of retreat for Lincoln to withdraw from Charleston. Conversely, British possession of the bridge blocked American lines of communication running eastward from the city. Clinton first learned of the importance of Biggin Bridge from a Loyalist scout's report describing the movement of Continental reinforcements. At that point, Clinton's army was already astride the Charleston Neck; yet American boats could still safely shuttle men and supplies arriving via Biggin Bridge. Unless Admiral Arbuthnot would push armed galleys past Lemprieres Point, the only way to sever American lines of communication east of the Cooper was for army forces to seize key terrain. Yet, until reinforcements arrived from Britain, Clinton felt he lacked the combat power to invest the city and clear the American redoubts along the Cooper River. So, Clinton focused his efforts on at least compelling Arbuthnot to cross the Bar and blockade the Ashley River, which would allow redeployment of combat power to patrol the east bank of the Cooper River basin.[77]

On 7 April, an American flotilla of light ships bearing Continental reinforcements reached the city via the Cooper River, underscoring the urgency of stopping American freedom of movement along the rivers. The next day, a period of favorable wind and tides allowed Arbuthnot to run his frigates safely past Fort Moultrie's guns. Anchored in Five Fathom Hole, the Royal Navy frigates barred American galleys from approaching the mouth of the Ashley River. In response, Clinton pulled manpower from the Stono and Ashley River redoubts. Lt. Col. James Webster's *33rd Regiment of Foot* was reinforced with the *64th Foot*, Maj. Patrick Ferguson's *American Volunteers*, *North Carolina Loyalists*, and Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton's *British Legion*, thus creating a robust 1,400 man-combined arms task force. Webster's command departed Goose Creek to march northward toward Monck's Corner on 12 April 1781. En route, a *British Legion* patrol scooped up a black slave carrying a message from General Isaac Huger to General Lincoln. The letter described how Huger had deployed his forces to secure Biggin Bridge: Lt. Col. William Washington's *3rd Regiment of Continental Light Dragoons* guarded the west approaches, while Pulaski's *Legion* was bivouacked east of the bridge. Additionally, Continental and North Carolina infantrymen were camped close to Huger's command post at the Biggin Church for security and to support the dragoons. In total, Huger had about 500 dragoons and infantrymen, although several militiamen lacked muskets and bayonets.[78]

Based on the intelligence, Webster ordered a 14 April predawn attack by Tarleton's dragoons, supported by the *Legion* and *American Volunteers* light infantry. Tarleton's troopers easily overran the weak American picket line on the west bank and bowled over Washington's dragoons before they could organize an effective defense.[79] Several Americans were cut down while trying to fight; the remainder, including Huger and Washington, scattered into nearby swamps. Cloaked by darkness, a few more American dragoons managed to run eastward to escape between Tarleton's troopers and the trailing British infantry. Once the fighting was over, Tarleton's dragoons gladly remounted themselves with the better-quality horses, tack, and equipment abandoned by the enemy dragoons. Besides taking sixty-three American prisoners, and hundreds of abandoned firearms, Webster's attack netted a convoy of forty-two wagons carrying supplies and ordnance stores intended for Charleston. Even more valuable was the seizure of Huger's papers from his command post inside Biggin Church, including a copy of Lincoln's defensive plan. Webster established his own command post at Biggin Church, and sent patrols to gather up enemy stragglers and establish control of the upper Cooper region. Thus, in one short but violent action—which incurred but three wounded men and five injured horses—Webster's brigade not only wiped out the American advantage in mobile troops, but also cut Lincoln's primary land line of communications to the outside world.[80]

Although a brilliant tactical success, the battle produced the first of many incidents that tainted Tarleton's reputation and hindered British pacification efforts. As Maj. Pierre-Francois Vernier of Pulaski's *Legion* tried to surrender, he was brutally sabered and left to die without medical aid by some of Tarleton's Loyalist dragoons. Other *British Legion* troopers entered the homes of suspected Patriots, where plundering soon turned to the abuse of defenseless women. When Lieutenant Colonel Webster learned of the indiscipline, which by some accounts included sexual assault, Ferguson's men were used to restore order in the village. The troopers in question were arrested and sent to Clinton's headquarters; he ordered them "tried and whipped."[81] Regardless of the disciplinary action, word of the Tory abuses (Tarleton's men were mostly Loyalists from New York) quickly spread across the region.[82]

Vignettes

Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton's account of the action at Biggin Bridge:

> The Americans had joined a body of militia to three regiments of continental cavalry, and the command of the whole

entrusted to Brigadier-general Huger. This corps held possession of the forks and passes of Cooper river, and maintained a communication with Charles town; by which supplies . . . might be conveyed to the garrison during the siege, and by which, the continental troops might escape after the defenses were destroyed. . . . On the 12th of April, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, being reinforced . . . by Major Ferguson's corps of marksmen . . . moved out in the evening . . . to surprise the Americans: An attack in the night was judged most advisable, as it would render the superiority of the enemy's cavalry useless, and would, perhaps, present a favorable opportunity of getting possession of Biggin bridge. . . . At some distance from the creek, a negro was secured . . . a letter was taken from his pocket, written [in Huger's camp] the afternoon of the day. . . . It was evident, that the American cavalry had posted themselves in front of the Cooper river, and that the militia were placed in a meeting house, which commanded the bridge, and were distributed on the opposite bank. At three o'clock in the morning, the advanced guard . . . [was ordered] to charge the enemy grand guard on the main road . . . and to pursue them into their camp. . . . The Americans were completely surprised. Major Vernier of Pulaski's legion, and some other officers . . . who attempted to defend themselves, were killed or wounded; General Huger, Colonels Washington and Jamieson . . . fled on foot to the swamps . . . where they effected their escapes. Four hundred horses belonging to officers and dragoons, with their arms and appointments, (a valuable acquisition for the British cavalry in their present state) fell into the hands of the victors. . . . Major [Charles] Cochrane was ordered to force the bridge and the meeting house with the infantry of the British legion: He charged with fixed bayonets . . . and dispersed everything that opposed him. . . . This final instance of military advantage, may be partly attributed to the judgment and address with which the expedition was planned and executed, and partly to the injudicious conduct of [Huger]; who besides making a false disposition of his corps, by placing his cavalry in the front of the bridge . . . his infantry in the rear, neglected sending patrols in front of his videttes [mounted sentinels]; which omission, equally enabled the British to make a surprise, and prevented the Americans recovering from the confusion attending an unexpected attack.[83]

General Nathanael Greene provided a cogent description of the terrain at Biggin Bridge:

> At thirty miles from the coast [the] Cooper River is supplied by a variety of branches, all respectable streams, bordered by impassable swamps, and only to be crossed in a very few places by ferries, or causeways and bridges. . . . From Biggin Bridge, the only road westwardly to Charleston, crosses at Goose Creek Bridge. The church near Biggin Bridge, a strong brick building, is about a mile from Monk's Corner, and the post consisted of a redoubt at the corner . . . and the fortified church at Biggin, which covered the bridge, and secured the retreat at that point, by way of Monk's Corner. But could Watboo [Biggin] Bridge be destroyed, the retreat by the eastern route became impracticable, and this bridge became of course, an important object with the two parties.[84]

Analysis

1. Using the vignettes, analyze Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's leadership performance at Biggin Bridge. What leadership principles does he most prominently display? [Teaching point: Army Leader Dimensions: Character, Presence, Intellect. ADP 6-22, 2-1 to 4-3.]

2. Compare and contrast the behavior of Tarleton's men toward Major Vernier, and the civilians at Monck's Corner, with some modern examples? How can a commander prevent or mitigate such problems? What type of operational and strategic problems can such behavior create? [Teaching point: The influence of operations on enemies and populations. ADP 3-0, 1-4 to 1-5. Also, adherence to the Law of War and the Soldier's Rules. ADP 3-0, 3-10 to 3-11.]

3. Critically analyze Brig. Gen. Isaac Huger's performance before and during the Biggin Bridge skirmish. What did he do well? How did he fail? Provide similar analysis regarding Lieutenant Colonel Washington and the other subordinate American commanders. [Teaching point: Defensive planning considerations, Security, Ensure Mutual Support, and Countermobility, FM 3-90, 6-3 to 6-9.]

Stand 11: Lemprieres Point: The Closing of the Encirclement

Directions: Leave the Biggin Bridge site via SC-402 to turn left (southwest) on to US-17/52. Drive on US-52 for approximately 21 miles (34 km), following signs to merge onto I-26 South. Drive about 12 miles (19 km) then take Exit 220 (US-17 North) toward Mount Pleasant. After driving 3.3 mile (5.3km) across the Ravenel Bridge, turn left (north) on Houston Northcutt Boulevard. Drive 0.3 mile (0.4 km) then turn left (west) on 7th Avenue. Make an immediate right (north) turn on 5th Street, then turn left (west) on 5th Avenue. Go about 0.7 mile (1.1 km), then turn left (south) to follow 2nd Street/5th Avenue to the publicly accessible Remley's Point parking lot at 112 2nd Street, Mt Pleasant, SC 29464 (32.81367, -79.90750). Park and walk to a vantage point overlooking the Cooper River. *Note: A pre-visit reconnaissance is strongly recommended before using large vehicles in this area, as Mount Pleasant has many narrow streets with low-hanging power lines and trees.*

Orientation: Known in 1780 as Lemprieres Point, Remley's Point is a small promontory of mainland jutting into the Cooper River. To the left (south) downstream about 2 miles (3.2 km) was a second major redoubt at Haddrell's Point, while Fort Moultrie on Sullivan's Island is an additional 4.8 miles (7.7 km) farther southwest. The skyline of Charlestown, with its easily discernable church steeples, lies 3 miles (4.8 km) southwest across the Cooper River. Biggin Bridge, the major crossing on the upper Cooper River, is 40 miles (64 km) to the north-northwest.

Visual Aids: Figure A.11. Day 1 Tactical Stands, Charleston Vicinity (page 197). Figure A.13. The Siege of Charleston, March–May 1780 (page 198).

Description: In 1780, the Lemprieres Point redoubt controlled waterborne access to the upper Cooper River and secured the western terminus of the 40-mile (64 km) Charleston-Georgetown segment of the Kings Highway. From the Kings Highway, a branch road ran northward through Cainhoy on the Wando River, crossed the Santee River (via Lenud's Ferry), and continued on to Salisbury, North Carolina. The Lemprieres Point redoubt housed four 18-pounder and two 4-pounder guns overlooking the water, with five swivel guns and infantry fighting positions commanding the land approaches. Manning the redoubt were 100 South Carolina Continentals, and 200 local militiamen, under command of Col. François de Malmédy. Malmédy, a former French cavalry *sous lieutenant* (sub lieutenant), had obtained a brevet major's commission in the Continental Army in 1776. After serving as the chief engineer of the Rhode Island militia, Malmédy was

exiled southward by General Washington, who was irritated by the Frenchman's nonstop demands for a Continental colonel's commission. Malmédy competently commanded troops at Stono Ferry in June 1779, and in 1780 was one of few officers who advocated for an active defense. Yet, it is a bit of a mystery why Malmédy was given command at Lemprieres Point instead of one of Lincoln's Continental general officers.[85]

Lincoln and his subordinates waited until Clinton's army was in control of the Neck before they tardily reacted to shore up the vulnerable Cooper River line of communications. Malmédy was sent to erect redoubts at both Lemprieres Point, and Cainhoy on the upper Wando River. Malmédy believed his battalion of 300 men too weak to handle both tasks, so his initial efforts were focused on the Lemprieres Point redoubt.[86] As noted in Stand 11, Lt. Col. James Webster's brigade had defeated American mobile forces at Biggin Bridge and Lenud's Ferry, thus securing the upper Cooper and Santee River valleys. The arrival of 2,500 fresh men on 18 April allowed Clinton to dispatch Cornwallis to clear the Cooper River southward from Biggin Bridge to Sullivan's Island. Cognizant of the American penchant for surprise withdrawals, Clinton was anxious to forestall such an event by cordoning off the city. In keeping with his methodical approach, Clinton cautioned Cornwallis to perform only a reconnaissance in force, and avoid a costly assault on the American redoubts.[87]

Meanwhile, General Lincoln reacted to the Biggin Bridge debacle by reinforcing Malmédy's garrison with Lieutenant Colonel Laurens's light infantry battalion, and additional slave laborers to deepen the earthworks. Meanwhile, Cornwallis's corps began to cautiously probe from Monck's Corner southward toward Mount Pleasant. Cornwallis was impressed by the thick earthen walls, deep ditch and wooden abates, and well-emplaced swivel guns at Lemprieres Point—all backed by the nearby firepower of American frigates on the Cooper River. In his report to Clinton, Cornwallis stated "the works as they appeared to me, assisted by their shipping & galleys, would subject an attempt to storm them to considerable loss."[88]

Following Clinton's instructions, Cornwallis bypassed Lemprieres Point, isolating the enemy redoubt by setting up company-sized "posts of intelligence" overlooking likely crossing points along the lower Cooper River. In coordination with Webster, dragoon and light infantry detachments patrolled possible crossing points on the upper Cooper and Wando rivers. Lastly, Cornwallis centrally positioned his reserves and artillery along Wappetaw Creek, the lower branch of the Wando River, to engage American reinforcements marching southward from either Cainhoy, or from Georgetown via the King's Highway.[89]

With those measures complete on 26 April, Cornwallis probed down to Haddrell's Point. The British advance panicked the American defenders, who abandoned the fort and its three guns and ordnance stores without firing a shot. Some of the Haddrell's Point defenders fled to Lemprieres Point, unnerving Malmédy such that he ordered the redoubt abandoned, and his men to withdraw to Sullivan's Island. Several of Malmédy's men lost their bearings in the dark and were scooped up by a British ship in the Hog Island channel. The next day, after noticing the Lemprieres Point redoubt was empty, a Royal Marines boarding party took possession of the enemy fort and its valuable cannons and ammunition stores. Lincoln was deeply angered as he learned of the loss of the Mount Pleasant redoubts only by observing British flags flying over the earthworks. After Malmédy tardily appeared at headquarters, Lincoln threatened to court-martial the French officer, before Malmédy "was advised to quit the town while there was a probability of a passage."[90] That night, Malmédy crossed the Cooper River along with other Americans fleeing the doomed city. A British dragoon patrol scattered the escapees, and Malmédy had to hide in the marshy swamps to avoid capture. Malmédy's ordeal underlined a stark reality for the American defenders of Charleston; the British army had effectively isolated the city from the rest of the world.[91]

Vignette

General George Washington's 26 April 1780 letter to Lt. Col. John Laurens reveals deep anxiety over General Lincoln's decision to continue defending Charleston:

> I have received [your earlier letters] and am much obliged to you for the Military details they contain. I sincerely lament that your prospects are not better than they are. The impracticability of defending the bar, I fear, amounts to the loss of the town & garrison. At this distance it is difficult to judge for you, and I have the greatest confidence in General Lincoln's prudence; but it really appears to me that the propriety of attempting to defend the Town depended on the probability of defending the bar, and that when this ceased the attempt ought to have been relinquished. In this however I suspend a definitive judgment & wish you to consider what I say confidential. Since you last [wrote] to me I have received one from General Lincoln . . . in which he informs me that the enemy had gotten a 64-gun ship with a number of other Vessels over the bar & that it had been

> determined to abandon the project of disputing the passage by Sullivan's Island—and to draw up the Frigates to the Town and take out their Cannon. This brings your affairs nearer to a dangerous crisis & increases my apprehensions.[92]

Analysis

1. Malmédy's moral failure at Lemprieres Point underscores General Lincoln's inability to select competent leaders capable of following orders. What could Lincoln have done beforehand to better prepare Malmédy? What are some modern parallels, and potential courses of action? [Teaching point: Counterproductive (incompetent) leadership. ADP 6-22, 8-8.]

2. Consider General George Washington's comments to Lieutenant Colonel Laurens. If Laurens had shared Washington's comments with Lincoln, would he have changed his course of action? Why or why not? What are some reasons why Washington did not give Lincoln clearer guidance? Also, why was Laurens told to not share Washington's revised opinions? [Teaching point: Strategic leadership. ADP 6-22 10-2 to 10-6.]

DAY 2 INNER RING STANDS

Planning Note: *As a reminder, all day 2 stands (except Stand 1-The Fuller House) are in the downtown Charleston area. Charleston roads are narrow and congested, and the city has extremely restrictive parking ordnances. Because paid on-street parking is time-limited, the suggested approach is to park in municipal parking lots near Marion Square or Bay Street and walk between stands. Groups employing commercial buses are encouraged to contact the city of Charleston to coordinate suitable driving routes, parking, and rendezvous points.*

Stand 1: Campaign Overview/Clinton's Plan (Fuller House-Charleston Visitor's Center)

Directions: The first stand for day 2 begins roughly where the British forces crossed from Drayton's Plantation to the Charleston Neck. From your starting point for the day, navigate to the North Charleston Fire Department Station #5 at 6265 Dorchester Road (SC Highway 625), North Charleston, SC (32.87254, -80.05779). To save time, a good alternate location for the campaign overview is the Charleston Visitor's Center at 375 Meeting Street, Charleston, SC 29403 (32.789926, -79.937012). Besides featuring a large-scale map of the city, the Visitor's Center has publicly accessible restrooms and water fountains.

Orientation: Walk west from the fire department parking lot via a dirt trail about 0.33 mile (0.5km) to the east bank of the Ashley River. This stand gives students a good picture of how the Ashley River tidal flats and rice fields would have looked in 1780. The exact location for the Fuller House is unknown, but was probably at the river bend north of this location.[93] Drayton Hall is about 1 mile (1.6 km) to the northwest across the river, while General Benjamin Lincoln's tactical headquarters at the Hornwork (modern-day Marion Square) is 9.5 miles (15.3 km) to the southeast. Using Figure A.10 (The Charleston Campaign) for orientation, remind students that the actions here tie back to the British crossing of the Ashley River near Drayton Hall (Stand 9-Day 1). The Figure A.14 Battlefield Effects chart (page 199) can help remind students of the physical conditions of the battlespace in 1780.

Visual Aids: Figure A.10. The Charleston Campaign: Initial Disposition and Movements, 1 February–12 May 1780 (page 196). Figure A.14. Battlefield Effects: The Siege of Charleston, 29 March–12 May 1780 (page 199). Figure A.15. Day 2 Tactical Stands, Dorchester Road (page 200). Figure C.1. Order of Battle: American Coalition Forces (page 217). Figure C.2. Order of Battle: British Coalition Forces (page 218).

Description: To recap from stand 9, Clinton's army made an unopposed landing at the Fuller House on 29 March 1780. Then, Cornwallis's light infantry patrols brushed aside American opposition, and the British army occupied Gibbes' Plantation as an advanced staging base. Notwithstanding their commanding position astride the Great Road, Clinton's army faced many obstacles to victory. Charleston's multilayered defenses were made from tabby—an eighteenth-century version of concrete made from a mix of lime, crushed oyster shells, and sand mixed with water—and earthen fortifications behind a dense obstacle belt, behind which were dozens of heavy guns sited for direct and enfilade fire. The American garrison was set for an extended siege with plentiful water, and ordnance and quartermaster stores. With unrestricted access to the Cooper River, the Americans could still obtain supplies and reinforcements, and American warships and raiding parties could attack Clinton's unsecured left flank. Consequently, Clinton badgered Sir Mariot Arbuthnot to run his frigates into the Charleston harbor to complete a close blockade of the city. Yet, Arbuthnot stubbornly refused to risk his frigates against the American guns at Haddrell's and Lemprieres Points, which left the Americans free to move along the Cooper River.[94]

Meanwhile, the British established a strong picket line across the Neck to protect the growing stockpile of pioneering tools (confiscated from the Americans, as the originals were lost at sea), supplies, and ordnance stores at Gibbes' Landing. Of greatest importance to a successful siege were heavy guns and ordnance stores borrowed from the Royal Navy to replace the Army ordnance lost at sea during the movement from New York. Although Clinton had hoped the army's presence on the Neck would be enough to compel Lincoln to surrender, his army continued preparations for a deliberate siege using Vauban tactics.[95] Protected by darkness and strong infantry patrols, work parties of black slaves, under the supervision of Royal Engineer Major Moncrief, dug approach trenches toward the American obstacle belts. The pioneers then dug a perpendicular "parallel" trench sufficient to protect an infantry platoon. The infantry soldiers continued to deepen and improve the parallel by throwing soil on top of fascines to form a projectile-resistant parapet. Meanwhile, fresh parties of black laborers laterally expanded the parallels and constructed larger artillery redoubts using soil-filled wicker gabions—an eighteenth-century version of Hesco barriers—to absorb the effect of American shot and shell. Lastly, the sappers used the parallel as a covered start point to cut a new approach trench in a zig-zag pattern to minimize risk from enfilade fires while closing with the American defenses. When done properly, Vauban

engineering methods provided a slow but low-risk method to move within assault range of the enemy works.[96]

The British sapping operations began on 2 April and, despite constant cannon fire from American shore and ship guns, the first parallel was opened on 6 April. But shortages of draft animals and rainy weather significantly delayed the installation of heavy guns and ammunition caches in the first parallel. Despite the delays, Clinton and Arbuthnot decided to issue to obligatory formal demand for surrender on 10 April, which was quickly rejected by General Lincoln:

> Sir Henry Clinton . . . and Vice Admiral Arbuthnot . . . regretting the effusion of Blood and distress which must now commence, deem it conformant to humanity to warn the Town and Garrison of Charlestown of the havock and devastation with which they are threatened from the formidable force surrounding them by Sea and Land. . . . Should the place in a fallacious Security . . . delay a Surrender or should the public Stores or Shipping be destroyed, the resentment of an exasperated Soldier may intervene; but the same mild and compassionate Offer can never be renewed.[97]

By 13 April, the British first parallel was complete with nineteen heavy guns, three howitzers and nine mortars, and ample ordnance stores.[98]

Vignette

Sir Henry Clinton's letters reveal a commander deeply obsessed with tactical minutiae, and ready to blame others for any delays or shortfalls:

> We had no entrenching tools; those from Savannah detained by the accident of the *Defiance* . . . and if we had had them, we could not have done anything till the Admiral [Arbuthnot] got over the bar. . . . The delays since have been his own. Till he returned the 71st I could not advance; till he gave me officers and sailors from the Navy, I could not nor ought not to land where great opposition was expected. Till he gave me the gallies we had not the Ashley, without which we must have been disgraced. Since we have had all this, nothing more could be more solid than our advances. We broke ground 800 [yards] from the town, complete a parallel of 2 miles in 3 days, the two flanks of which approach those of the town within 500 yards, and, if there are delays, let them be imputed to the admiral. I told him at our

first meeting, the place could not be invested properly without he came to Fort Johnson; he said he could not lay there in safety from fireships.[99]

After complaining about Cornwallis's perceived insubordination, Clinton's entry for 6 April 1780 revealed his frustration with friction between the engineers and the army and navy artillery crews:

> Great disputes between the chiefs of [artillery] and [engineers]; I must settle it by an *accordez-vous supérieur* [grant yourself superior]. I foresee something likewise arising between the [navy] and [artillery], owing to an order . . . that the sailors must be commanded by their own officers only. I shall settle it by giving the sailors a battery . . . commanded by their own captains, and if they will not receive orders from us, they shall be requested. If the service is done, I care not how, and I shall write nearly the same to the Admiral respecting what he is to do for us.[100]

Later, Clinton's description of the American defenses:

> The fortifications of the place we had now sat down before were by no means contemptible. . . . The defenses on the land side of the town extended in a chain of redoubts, lines, and batteries from Ashley to Cooper Rivers, into which oozed two deep morasses that lay in front of each of the flanks and were joined together by a broad canal. Betwixt this latter and the works of the place were two rows of abates, all the other various obstructions usual before fortified towns, and a double-picketed ditch. The center of the line, where the natural defenses seemed to be weakest, was strengthened by an enclosed Hornwork of masonry, which was converted into a kind of citadel during the siege. And through the extent of these works were mounted eighty pieces of cannon and mortars of various calibers, from which a well-served fire was unremittingly kept up. On the sea side a number of ships was sunk in the mouth of the Cooper; and the batteries which guarded the entrance of each river and commanded the navigation up to the town, appeared to be equally formidably numerous with to the land, and furnished with heavy guns.[101]

Maj. Ferdinand de Brahm, the chief engineer of Charleston, comments on the state of the city's defenses on 30 March 1780:

> The advanced guard of the enemy came within two miles of Charlestown, when a party of two hundred men, under Colonel

> John Laurens (and a little while after two-field pieces), went out against them, who, after a skirmish of some hours, returned toward sun-set. The fortifications of Charlestown were, even at this time, very incomplete. All the Negroes in town were impressed, who together with the parties detailed from the garrison, were henceforth employed upon the works.[102]

Analysis

1. Consider Clinton's inability to compel Admiral Arbuthnot to risk his ships: How does one influence a peer commander to risk damage to major combat systems in a shaping operation?

2. Using Clinton's comments about joint army-navy cooperation, what are some modern Joint considerations in conducting amphibious operations? [Teaching point: Organizational leadership, extending influence beyond the chain of command and using persuasion to build teams and consensus. ADP 6-22, 9-1 to 9-3.]

3. Compare Clinton's and de Brahm's comments about the American defensive works. Perception versus reality? Is the value of fortifications more for physical protection or for psychological effect? Both? How and why?

4. Compare and contrast eighteenth-and twenty-first-century protection tasks. [Teaching points: Protection: Area Security, Survivability, and Force Health Protection. FM 3-90-1, 6-17 to 6-20.]

Stand 2: General Lincoln's Plan (Wragg Square-342 Meeting Street)

Directions: From the North Charleston Fire Station, turn right (south) on Dorchester Road (SC-642). Take an immediate left (east) on Michaux Parkway and drive roughly 1 mile (1.6 km), then take a slight right to follow International Boulevard about 1 mile (1.6km). Past the I-526E overpass, take the ramp to the left to I-526E. Stay to the right to take exit 17 for I-26 East. Drive about 8 miles (13 km) then take the left exit (221 B) for Meeting Street. Turn right (south) on Meeting Street and drive 0.7 mile (1.1 km) to the intersection of Meeting and Charlotte streets. The stand is at Wragg Square, a large open area surrounded by a low brick wall and wrought iron fence adjacent to 342 Meeting Street, Charleston, SC 29403 (32.790547, -79.93640). *Note: Because on-street parking is extremely limited in this location, the author's recommendation is to park at the nearby Marion Square Garage, 399 King Street (32.7864199, -79.936510) and conduct the staff ride on foot.*

Orientation: In 1780, this location overlooked the eastern section of a large water-filled moat which connected the Cooper River, to the east 0.62 mile (1 km), and the Ashley River, 1.2 miles (1.8 km) to the west. Archaeology studies indicate a triangle redoubt stood on the western edge of Wragg Square. Toward the end of the siege, the British third parallel ran through this general area, with a redoubt built on the high ground at the northeast corner of the park. The moat itself was about 200 feet south of the park. After orienting to the north, point southwest toward Marion Square, 1,300 feet (400 m) on the other side of Meeting Street. In 1780, the Hornwork, the key defensive work guarding the north side of the city, stood in that location.[103]

Visual Aids: Figure 2.2. The Investiture of Charleston by the British Army, 1780 (page 59). Figure A.13. The Siege of Charleston, March–May 1780 (page 198). Figure A.14. Battlefield Effects: The Siege of Charleston, 29 March–12 May 1780 (page 199). Figure A.16. Day 2 Tactical Stands, Charleston (page 200).

Description: Known today as Wragg Square, this area in 1780 was part of a larger rise in the ground which was incorporated into the American defensive works. In the colonial era, city officials concerned about the threat of Spanish raids from nearby St. Augustine, Florida, fortified Charles Town. The valuable mercantile district along East Bay Street (the original trace of the city harbor) was protected by a Half-Moon battery embedded in a brick curtain wall anchored by bastions. The swampy and

less-populated south and west sides of the town were protected by earthwork walls. Astride Charles Town Road (now King Street), a Hornwork and revetments were constructed with tabby walls atop a brick foundation. Neglected in the aftermath of the French and Indian War, the city defenses needed considerable repair by 1776. While skilled workers refurbished the brick and tabby construction, work parties of slaves and militiamen enclosed open spaces with sand and palmetto log breastworks, similar to those built at Fort Sullivan. A redoubt was positioned for enfilade fire on British troops approaching the Hornwork via the Broad Road.[104]

Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln commanded the American forces. A Massachusetts farmer and prewar militia commander, Lincoln effectively organized American militia units, gaining General Washington's trust. During the Saratoga campaign, Lincoln skillfully employed militia units to interdict the British lines of communications, thus starving Burgoyne's army of supplies. Following the loss of Georgia, Lincoln was appointed commander of the Southern Department. Before Lincoln's departure, General Washington gave Lincoln no specific instructions on how best to conduct operations, other than emphasizing the importance of avoiding the surrender or destruction of the Continental Line regiments. After Lincoln assumed command, his plans were often frustrated by lack of command authority over the state militia units, and the level of logistics support from the governors in his department. In organizing the defenses of Charleston, Lincoln was caught on the horns of a dilemma. First, Governor Rutledge and the state's Privy Council routinely interfered in command decisions, and the politicians made clear the withdrawal of the Continentals was politically unacceptable.[105] Contrary to Washington's guidance, Lincoln placed his Continental units at risk for capture by planning for a deliberate defense of the city. Lincoln believed the Continental Congress expected such as defense, as evidenced by extensive Continental army and navy reinforcements sent southward.[106] Consequently, Lincoln and his staff focused their efforts on hardening the city's defenses and preparing for a lengthy siege. Firepower was not a major concern, as the Continental infantry and artillery units were already well-equipped, and the garrison was strengthened with guns and ordnance stores taken from the surplus navy ships. American quartermasters labored to gather tons of rice, meat, flour, and rum in the city. Water for the garrison was obtained from shallow wells, and rainwater collected in cisterns. As long as American defenders could retain control of the Cooper River, Lincoln was confident enough supplies and reinforcements could reach the city to sustain an extended defense.[107]

Lincoln's greatest weakness was the lack of sufficient manpower to man the defenses and maintain sufficient reserves to repel a British assault. Lincoln took command with promises of strong Continental and militia reinforcements from Virginia and the Carolinas. General George Washington had ordered additional reinforcements south in early April, but with the long distances and supply difficulties, only two understrength Continental regiments reached the city before the closing of the British encirclement.[108] The militia situation was equally dismal, as more than 1,000 North Carolina militiamen had left the city when their enlistments expired in March 1780.[109] Demands and threats from Governor Rutledge convinced few South Carolina militiamen to report for duty. Many militiamen cited the risk of contracting smallpox; in reality, many wanted to stay home to protect their homesteads from Cherokee or Tory marauders. Other factors included lingering resentment of the wealthier Lowcountry dwellers, and the risk of death or imprisonment in what appeared to be a doomed cause.[110]

Consequently, General Lincoln commanded a force of 3,000 Continentals and around 2,600 militiamen. With this small army, Lincoln had to garrison Forts Johnson and Moultrie, Bacon's Bridge, Lemprieres Point, and Haddrell's Point redoubts; man the Charleston defensive works; and maintain a mobile reserve. To ease the manpower shortage, slaves borrowed from nearby plantations were put to work as laborers and sappers. Despite the assumed disparity in numbers, Lincoln was confident he could withstand the British assault, as long as the Cooper River line of communications remained open for additional reinforcements.[111]

Although the British ration strength eventually reached 12,600 men, the actual combat strength was around 8,500 troops. Large numbers of soldiers were committed to rear security and line of communication duty, and many more were needed for sapping and stevedore work in support of the infantrymen in the siege lines. As a result, Clinton had but a 1:5-to-1 manpower advantage, insufficient force to conduct a frontal assault on the city with a reasonable chance of success. Instead, Clinton felt it necessary to employ Vauban siege tactics to wear down the defenders while minimizing the risk of heavy combat losses. However, Clinton's methodical tactics left Arbuthnot's heavy warships unprotected outside the harbor until the conclusion of the siege. The frigates and smaller ships could at least shelter in Five Fathom Hole—but only after Commodore Arbuthnot's frigates ran the gauntlet of American guns at Sullivan's Island.[112]

In a 27 March council of war, the feasibility of holding Fort Moultrie was discussed:

> Council of War held at Charles-Town & consisting of the following members [Lincoln, Brigadier Generals Moultrie, McIntosh, and Hogun, and seventeen regimental commanders]. The General [Lincoln] laid before the Council the state of fort Moultrie and requested their opinion whether it was advisable under the present state of that fort & of the town now to evacuate the fort. . . . [The vote was] Passed in the Negative. The General then requested the opinion of the Council whether the Garrison [of Moultrie] ought to be reinforced from this town. Passed in the Negative.[113]

Lt. Col. John Lauren recounted details of the defense to General Washington:

> On the night of the 1st inst. [1 April] the Enemy broke ground, and have been working slowly ever since; I scarcely know how to denominate what they have executed hitherto—it consists of several redoubts with a covered communications from right to left which is still unfinished; their nearest work is an inclosed [sic] battery on their left, at about the distance of six hundred yards, which induces me to believe that they intend to the line in question for a first parallel, altho' some parts of it are rather too remote. Our Shot and Shells have disquieted them and interrupted their operations, but Genl Lincoln sensible of these articles in a siege economises them as much as possible. Fatigue parties are constantly employed in improving our works; the whole front of our line within the abatis is armed with wolf traps. All this afford an excellent defense against storm but must finally yield to a perseverance in regular approaches which appears to be Clinton's present plan—unless we can work under his fire as fast as he can, and afford time for the arrival of Your Excellency. Our obstructions in Cooper River are completed which gives a prospect of maintaining a communication with the Country, and hitherto prevents the accomplishment of the investiture. Since the arrival of Genl Woodford [Virginia Continentals], Genl Lincoln will have it in his power to execute his plan of establishing

the necessary posts for this purpose on the eastern shore of the River. Col. Malmédy is to take command of the Troops destined for this service.[114]

Analysis

1. Using the readings, analyze General Lincoln's understanding of his operational environment. Visualize and describe his operational approach. What does he do well? What details did he miss? [Teaching point: The Elements of Operational Art. ADP 3-0, 2-3 to 2-12.]

2. What are some other possible courses of action Lincoln could have adopted to avoid the loss of his entire Continental force? [Teaching Point: Types of Defensive Operations: Mobile Defense, Retrograde: Delay, withdrawal, or retirement. FM 3-90, 4-2 to 4-3.]

3. What risks and benefits accrue to Lincoln's participative style of leadership, and habit of making decisions through a council of war? [Teaching points: Leading, Developing, and Achieving. ADP 6-22, 9-1 to 9-6.]

Stand 3: American Redoubts (Hampstead Mall)

Directions: From Wragg Square, walk north on Meeting Street about 0.5 mile (0.8 km) and turn right (east) on Columbus Street. Walk 0.2 mile (0.3 km) to Hampstead Mall Playground, 68 Columbus St., Charleston, SC 29403 (32.79667, -79.93664).

Orientation: Before the Revolution, Hampstead Village—a partially developed suburb north of the city limits—stood atop Hampstead Hill, the highest point on the peninsula.[115] The Hornwork, the lynchpin of the main American defenses, was 0.6 mile (1.0 km) to the southwest (Marion Square), athwart the main Charles Town Road (King Street). Today, the Cooper River lies about 0.5 mile (0.8 km) from the mall, but in 1780, the waterline was only 1,000 feet (314 meters) to the east, along what is now Bay Street. The British first parallel ran east to west through this general area.

Visual Aids: Figure 2.2. The Investiture of Charleston by the British Army, 1780 (page 59). Figure A.13. The Siege of Charleston, March–May 1780 (page 198). Figure A.16. Day 2 Tactical Stands, Charleston (page 200).

Description: This stand will be used to describe American and British dispositions at the beginning of the siege of Charleston. As described in greater detail at Stand 5 (Marion Square), the main American defensive line was about 0.7 mile (1.1 km) south of this position. Other than the rise of ground at Hampstead Hill and Wragg Square, the terrain on the Neck was generally flat and cut with numerous tidal creeks. To deny the British cover, the American defenders cut down trees and burned the houses north of the Hornwork. In his first survey of the American defenses, Clinton's trained eye noticed the commanding presence of Hampstead Hill; consequently, Major Moncrief was ordered to prioritize Hampstead Hill as the initial objective. By daybreak on 2 April, a shallow parallel had been dug opposite the hill, and British pioneers used prefabricated frames to start emplacing three redoubts. At daybreak, the American defenders began a sustained harassing fire at the unfinished redoubts, forcing the British troops to grimly shelter in place until dark. Under cover of darkness, the British gun crews fabricated wood frames to support heavy guns in the redoubts, while other work details dug embrasures (narrow gun ports), deepened the entrenchments, and dug toward the hill. By daybreak on 3 April, a partially finished British redoubt stood on Hampstead Hill, which was part of the first parallel spanning the entire peninsula. Work slowed at

daylight under a barrage of American retaliatory fire, which included salvoes from the twenty-gun sloop *Ranger* on the Ashley River. In response, Major Moncrief ordered a 24-pounder gun and a howitzer repositioned to engage the *Ranger*, but the effort failed to damage the enemy sloop. The American fire, and the heavy work of moving guns and ordnance stores into the works delayed the completion of the first-line redoubts, upsetting Clinton's timetable for advancing the siege.[116]

While British and Hessian artillery and patrols probed the American defenses on the Neck, Clinton redoubled efforts to interdict the American lines of communications along the Cooper River. First, Captain Elphinstone organized a large work detail to lift and drag an armed galley from the Ashley River to the Cooper River using a series of logs as rollers. Next, Clinton ordered the repositioning of several heavy guns in the easternmost redoubt to interdict the Cooper River. Despite such efforts "eleven American schooners and sloops loaded with troops sailed down the Cooper River right before our eyes" on 8 April, which triggered an enthusiastic American barrage of the British works.[117] Yet, American morale was deflated the next day as Arbuthnot's frigates successfully bypassed Fort Moultrie and anchored safely in Rebellion Road. The failure of the American defenses to keep the British fleet out of the harbor was a disquieting sign that the Royal Navy had learned from its mistakes in 1776.[118]

Vignettes

Sir Henry Clinton's account of the opening of the siege of Charleston:

> I went to the left on the island, saw rising ground near the town [which] appeared not above 800 yards from it. It may cost to get it but when in possession of it we take the town. I showed it to Moncrieff who agreed. . . . Moncrieff proposed to throw up redoubts; three he intended, but having tools for one redoubt, it was thought better to defer till next day. . . . At 8 o'clock we broke ground within 800 yards of the place, and in one night completed 3 redoubts and a communications [trench] without a single shot. . . . It was intended to run the parallel to my hill this night, but 'tis thought better to extend the right first.

After a diatribe about his thwarted attempts to resign, Clinton continued his narrative regarding the situation on 4 April 1780:

> [Maj. John] Andre, who had been with Gen. [Heinrich von] Kospoth, the whole night, reported that a battery having two

faces, one to the river, the other to the town was finished on my hill within 500 yards [of Charleston]; early in the morning some ships came down to the mouth of Town Creek and fired at it; some guns at Island Point removed them. Moncrieff proposes to finish the right redoubt this night and if necessary to run a communications [trench] with the left battery. I wish that it was a close work with fascines [not] an open work [with] supposed impracticable flanks.[119]

Maj. Ferdinand De Braham's diary entries of the April 1780 Hampstead Hill engagements:

31 March—At day-break we observed that the enemy had opened his trenches in three places.

1 and 2 April—The enemy's works were a little extended, and ours augmented.

3 April—This morning the battery was discovered upon a height, at Hampstead. A battery of four pieces was constructed on our right to oppose that of the enemy, which, as from all the others, a continued firing of shot and bombs was kept up the following night along the lines.

5 April—Last night's fight of our batteries was kept up as heretofore. The enemy's galley approached the town and fired upon it all night. We began to dig wells in our front, and to close up the gorge of the horn work.

6 April—The fire of the batteries and the works continued as before. To-day the reinforcement under General Woodford arrived.

8 April—Last night the enemy commenced a battery of six pieces. All our workmen employed building traverses. A quarter of an hour before sun-set, the English fleet passed Fort Moultrie, under a heavy fire on both sides, and anchored in a line near Fort Johnson. Nobody wounded or killed in Fort Moultrie. The fleet consisted of the following vessels: One of fifty guns, two of forty, four frigates, two vessels armed *en flute* [armed cargo ships], and two other smaller ones; one of these armed *en flute* grounded on a bank called "The Green."[120]

Analysis

1. Discuss the pros and cons of fighting to control the high ground: is control of the high ground always necessary? Why or why not? [Teach-

ing point: "*Key terrain* is any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant. *Decisive terrain*, when present, is key terrain whose seizure and retention is mandatory for successful mission accomplishment." FM 3-90-1, 1-25.]

2. Is Clinton's operational plan terrain-focused, or enemy-focused? What are the strengths and weaknesses to each approach?

3. Analyze and discuss Protection and Engineering tasks as described in the vignettes. What modern parallels can we draw?

Stand 4: The Siege (Marion Square)

Directions: From Hampstead Mall, cross to the west side of Meeting Street and turn left (south). Walk about 0.6 mile (904 m), passing the pinkish, turreted hotel that was once the South Carolina State Arsenal, and turn southwest into the open greenspace of Marion Square, 329 Meeting St., Charleston, SC 29403 (32.78691, -79.93585).

Orientation: The Square is bisected by two walking paths forming an "X." Move northwest (9 o'clock position) toward what appears to be an irregular hunk of concrete surrounded by a low iron picket fence. The "concrete" is a preserved piece of tabby material from the Hornwork, a remnant of the defensive line that stood here in 1780. Then, orient the students to the north, before pointing to the 10 o'clock position (northwest), and pan left to indicate the path of King Street, which in 1780 was named Charles Town Street. From contemporary maps, the Hornwork straddled Charles Town Street in both directions.

Visual Aids: Figure 2.2. The Investiture of Charleston by the British Army, 1780 (page 59). Figure A.13. The Siege of Charleston, March–May 1780 (page 198). Figure A.16. Day 2 Tactical Stands, Charleston (page 200).

Description: Designed in 1757 by Ferdinand de Braham, the tabby Hornwork was part of a much larger system of fortifications built during the French and Indian War. Shaped like an inverted pentagon, with a lunette and bastions for enfilade fire from its eighteen cannons, the thirty-foot-tall Hornwork straddled ten acres along Charles Town Street and was intended as a final defensive work.[121] In 1776, a continuous log and sand parapet was built to anchor the flanks of the Hornwork to each river. Redoubts were added on each side of the Hornwork, with the easternmost, half-moon redoubt positioned to pour enfilade fire across the front of the parapet. In front of the parapet was a six-foot-deep, twelve-foot-wide trench, protected by a palisade, three rows of wood poles driven into the soil with sharpened points aimed at the enemy. Beyond the palisade was a series of "wolf-traps (deep pits), then an eighteen-foot-wide wet ditch fed by sluices on a tidal creek from the Cooper River. Fields of fire were created by demolishing houses and trees north of the ditch, and the resulting materials were used in the defensive works. In total, British pioneer and assault troops would have to penetrate a deeply echeloned defensive belt before reaching the main defensive works, with all covered by enemy fire. After crossing the wet ditch and bypassing the wolf-traps, British sappers

would have to breach the palisade wall sufficiently to allow assault squads to negotiate the dry trench with ladders. Then, the assault would have to cross the open ground through direct and enfilade small arms and crew-served (cannon) fire before reaching the main defensive line. Lastly, while enduring constant fire from the American defenders, the assault squads would have to surmount the eighteen-foot-high parapet walls or attempt to breach the tabby walls of the Hornwork.[122]

By 10 April 1781, Clinton felt all was ready to open the siege, but the rules of eighteenth-century warfare required the issuance of a formal surrender demand to the Americans. Lincoln rebuffed Clinton's demand, despite his concerns over the lack of militia reinforcements. Eventually, Lincoln convinced Governor Rutledge and several Privy Council members to escape the city to rally militia reinforcements. On 13 April, General Lincoln oversaw a stormy council of war where several of his Continental officers argued to abandon the city before the British could complete the encirclement. Lincoln rejected the proposals, as he still believed his orders from Congress prevented an evacuation. As the Americans bickered, British heavy guns opened long-range fire on the Hornwork using heated shot; several of the inaccurate rounds fell in the city, setting fires in the process. Clinton angrily ordered a halt to the use of heated shot, reasoning it was "absurd . . . to burn a town you mean to occupy."[123]

Shortly after the third parallel was started, General William Moultrie organized a 20 April raid to upset the British sapping operations. The raiding party, led by Lt. Col. William Henderson of the 3rd South Carolina Continentals, charged across a temporary bridge into the third parallel just as the British sappers were withdrawing under cover at daybreak. The Continental assault troops bayonetted several British and Hessian men, and drove the remaining defenders from the third parallel. With the raid completed, Henderson's detachment withdrew to safety with several prisoners. The next night, a stampede was triggered in the British third parallel by a brief skirmish with American pickets. Several panicked British soldiers ran to the rear and were shot by jittery pickets guarding the second parallel.[124]

Despite heavy cannonading and rifle fire from the Americans, and periodic heavy rains, the British sappers methodically worked their way southward. Morale in the British ranks was greatly boosted by the 27 April fall of Lemprieres Point, and the inability of the American defenders to arrest the progress on the siege works. On 6 May, the British sappers drove the American defenders away from the lock and dam holding water in the

wet ditch. After taking two days to drain the water, the British sapping teams—closely covered by light infantry and *jäger* skirmishers—began working their way across the muck. By 8 May, a partial parallel with redoubts was completed, providing sufficient cover for sapping operations to breach the obstacle belt and the palisade.[125]

Vignettes

Sir Henry Clinton's 10 April 1780 demand for surrender:

> Sir Henry Clinton K. B. [Knight of the Bath] General and Commander in Chief of His Majesty's forces in the Colonies lying on the Atlantic from Nova Scotia . . . and Vice Admiral Arbuthnot, Commander in Chief of his Majesty's Ships in North America, regretting the effusion of Blood and distress which must now commence, deem it conformant to humanity to warn the Town and Garrison of Charlestown of the havock and devastation with which they are threatened from the formidable force surrounding them by Sea and Land. An alternative is offered at this hour of saving their Lives and Property contained in the Town or of abiding by the fatal consequences of a cannonade and Storm.
>
> Should they place in a fallacious Security or its Commander in a wanton indifference to the fate of its Inhabitants delay a Surrender or should the public Stores or Shipping be destroyed, the resentment of an exasperated Soldier may intervene, but the same mild and compassionate Offer can never be renewed. The respective Commanders who hereby summon the Town do not apprehend so rash a path as farther resistance will be taken, but rather that the Gates will be opened and themselves received with a degree of Confidence which will forebode further reconciliations.[126]

Major de Brahm described the siege operations:

> 13 April—Very little firing last night. This morning one of the batteries of the enemy was finished, the other not quite; the trenches extended. This morning at 9 o'clock, the enemy opened his batteries, firing bombs, carcasses [incendiary shell] and hot balls, which were returned with all our force from the batteries. This lasted about two hours, when the firing was abated on both sides, till about 5 o'clock, when all the fire was on the side of the enemy. We had one 18-pounder dismounted, and two houses burnt in town.

15 April—Fire from the batteries and works as before. The enemy has a bomb battery. His second parallel commenced . . . who kept up a continued fire upon our lines.

16 April—In addition to his usual fire, the enemy opened his new battery. Last night we extended from our redoubt a counter-mine with a small parallel whence we could return the fire of the enemy's musketry. This evening one of our Gallies ascended Cooper River to a place whence she enfiladed the English camp for several hours, which was briskly answered by field pieces from the camp.

17 April—The enemy enfiladed the town on all sides last night and threw a great quantity of bombs-sometimes from fifteen to twenty at once. We worked upon our counter mine. We received intelligence from our detachment at Lemprieres, that one thousand or fifteen hundred of the enemy under General Lord Cornwallis had passed Monk's Corner . . . and actually arrived [at Lemprieres Point]. This morning the enemy's second parallel was prolonged toward our left, supplied with bags of earth and full of Chasseurs [*jägers*].

20 April—Fire from the batteries as ordinary. This morning at daybreak, a party of two hundred men under Col. Henderson made a sortie on the enemies' works which caused a general fire of musketry on both sides. The party returned . . . with twelve prisoners. Our loss was one Captain and one soldier killed.

28 April—As ordinary. Last night our Fort at Lemprieres was evacuated and taken possession of by the enemy to-day. It was not until this moment that Charlestown was completely invested; the enemy having possession of James Island, Wappoo, Charlestown Neck, Hobcaw Point, Lemprieres, and Haddrell's Point; and his fleet anchored in the Road-stead before the town.[127]

Analysis

1. During this phase of the operation, General Lincoln authorized only one American spoiling attack to disrupt the enemy sappers. Why no additional trench raids? [Teaching Point: Characteristics of the defense are disruption, deprive enemy of the initiative, attrition. FM 3-90, 6-1.]

2. The British lost several soldiers in the 20 April fratricide incident. What are some factors that contribute to fratricide? Also, what were some

measures the British force could have employed to prevent such friendly fire incidents? [Teaching point: Control Measures and Planning for Area Defense. FM 3-90-1, 7-4 to 7-9.]

3. Consider how the British employed a combined arms approach to their sapping operations. What modern parallels can we draw? [Teaching point: Employment of combined arms. ADP 3-0, 3-9 to 3-10.]

Stand 5: Lincoln versus the Privy Council (Old State House)

Directions: From Marion Square, walk south on Meeting Street 0.8 miles (1.3 km). Turn right (west) and stop at 84 Broad Street (32.77673, -79.93130), an imposing two-story white building at the northwest corner of the intersection. In the event of crowded streets or a hot sunny day, a good alternative is to conduct the stand at Washington Park, 80 Broad Street (32.777032, -79.930524).

Orientation: Today this building houses the Charleston County Probate Court; in 1780, the South Carolina revolutionary legislature met in a two-story brick and stucco building that once stood at this location. During the siege, General Lincoln would have visited here to confer with South Carolina political authorities. In modern times, this intersection is known as the "Four Corners of Law" for the four buildings representing local, county, federal, and God's law.[128] *Note: The County Courthouse offers one of the few available public restroom locations in the city. A restroom stop here is recommended.*

Visual Aids: Figure 2.2. The Investiture of Charleston by the British Army, 1780 (page 59). Figure A.13. The Siege of Charleston, March–May 1780 (page 198). Figure A.16. Day 2 Tactical Stands, Charleston (page 200).

Description: This stand is used to discuss behind-the-scenes maneuvers between General Lincoln, Lincoln's subordinate officers, and the remaining Privy Council members. As noted in the earlier stands, Lincoln rebuffed the often-contradictory advice from his subordinates to either withdraw the Continental army from Charleston, or to accept Clinton's offer of the honors of war through a quick surrender. By mid-April, the American officers knew their situation was desperate: Royal Navy frigates sat in Five Fathom Hole, while the American defenders seemed unable to prevent the British sappers from reaching the Hornwork. Led by Chief Engineer Laumoy, a cabal of Continental officers renewed pressure on Lincoln to evacuate or seek honorable terms before the British were in position for an assault. Incredibly, Lincoln invited Lieutenant Governor Christopher Gadsden to attend those meetings with a view of informing the Privy Council. Gadsden took word of the proposals to the Privy Council, which not only rejected the idea of evacuation, but radical members even threatened to forestall a withdrawal attempt by opening the city gates to the British. The next day, the Privy Council did an about-face, sending Gadsden with a list of unrealistic surrender terms to submit to General Clinton. General Lincoln dutifully presented the council demands to Clinton on 21 April: Departure of the garrison with their arms and ammuni-

tion; no plundering of the city, and no suppression of Patriot sympathizers. Clinton angrily rejected the outrageous American proposal with a demand for unconditional surrender of the entire city. Lincoln returned to his headquarters, and both sides resumed their nocturnal digging and shelling. While the sappers burrowed their way through the American defensive belts and Arbuthnot's squadron remained idle in the harbor, Clinton sent Cornwallis with fresh reinforcements to clear the American redoubts guarding the upper Cooper River.[129]

On 25 April, Brig. Gen. Louis Duportail, chief engineer of the Continental Army, arrived in the city to assist Lincoln. After assessing the depth of the British penetration, and the state of the remaining defensive works, Duportail urged Lincoln to evacuate the Continentals while the route east was still open. Yet when Lincoln held another council of war on 26 April, those Continental officers who had earlier advocated for escape reversed themselves by arguing to remain in the city. The officers cited the risk of an engagement with British dragoon patrols east of the Cooper River. While the American leadership vacillated over the question of evacuation, a courier arrived in the city with the shocking news of the 6 May skirmish at Lenud's Ferry. With Tarleton's dispersal of the remaining American mobile forces, the northern escape route was no longer available.[130]

Unaware of the behind-the-scenes maneuvering, rank-and-file American defenders stoutly resisted the sapping and probes of their British and Hessian opponents. After General Lincoln refused to give permission to leave Charleston, Duportail threw his energies into organizing the construction of an additional wood and sand palisade to slow enemy sapping operations in front of the Hornwork. The unremitting bombardment and shortages of provisions, especially meat, began to take a toll on the American defenders. On 7 May, American morale slumped when word of the Fort Moultrie surrender was followed by a harsh demand for capitulation from Sir Henry Clinton. Lincoln replied with a cease fire request, which was followed on 9 May by a second proposal to surrender: parole for the militia and civilians, guarantees of private property, and the surrender of Continental forces with full honors of war. Clinton rejected protection for property, and the honors of war, but agreed to give parole to the civilians and militia. Ultimately, the negotiations broke down over the question of the honors of war for the Continentals; after the talks dissolved, an angered Clinton allowed British gunners to fire heated shot and explosive shell in a "a most furious cannonade & bombardment which continued throughout the night."[131] Many wood structures were set on fire, causing extensive damage to both houses and military installations.

Sir Henry Clinton continues his narrative of the siege:

> The Admiral with his squadron having passed Sullivan's Island on the 8th (fortunately without much injury to the King's ships, although they were above an hour under a very heavy fire from Fort Moultrie or Sullivan at 600 yards' distance), and the first parallel being now completed and the guns mounted, we jointly summoned the place. But Mr. Lincoln, the rebel General, having thought proper to reject our proposals, the batteries were opened of course the next day and ground broke for a second parallel. The attack had been planned with so much judgment by . . . Captain Moncrieff . . . that I had not the smallest doubt of my becoming the master of the town without much loss. This consideration alone would have been a sufficient incitement for me to prefer the mode of regular approaches to any other, less certain though more expeditious, which might have sacrificed a greater number of lives on both sides. Other important motives also influenced me on this occasion . . . *to secure the capture of all the rebel corps in Charleston* . . . as I saw the reduction of the rest of the province in great measure depended upon it.[132]

Writing to General George Washington after his parole from Charleston, General Lincoln detailed the reasons why he kept his army in Charleston:

> Some questions on this subject, I think, will naturally arise in your Excellency's mind and, in order that I may write more intelligibly, I shall suppose and endeavour to answer such as follow. First why the defence of Charlestown was under taken. Though I pretend not to plead an express order of Congress directing the defence of that place. Yet I can say from the following resolutions and the line of conduct pursued by Congress it appeared to me to be their intentions that the measure should be adopted and that circumstanced as we were it was right in itself. As early as January 1st 1776 when Congress were informed that an attack was intended upon Charlestown, they immediately recommended that a vigorous defence should be made—In the beginning of the year 1779 when it appeared that the subjugation of South Carolina was an object which claimed the attention of the enemy—Congress sent Lieutenant Colonel Cambray, an Engineer, to South Carolina for the express pur-

pose of fortifying the town of Charlestown (in which business he was employed until its surrender).

On the tenth of November following when the designs of the enemy no longer remained a doubt, they ordered three of their continental frigates to Charlestown, for the defence of its harbour and on my frequent representations to them that succours were necessary for defending the town they Ordered them accordingly—and at no time intimated to me that my ideas of attempting the defence of it were improper.

That the measure was right in itself, circumstanced as we were, will I hope appear when it is considered that Charlestown is the only mart in south Carolina, and the magazine of the State—That its natural strength promised a longer delay to the enemy's operations than any other post in the country—In abandoning it we must have given up the continental ships of war, and all our stores, while there was yet a prospect of succour—for the harbour had been blocked up by a superior naval force previous to the debarkation of the troops—the stores could not have been removed by water and the waggons we had, or could have procured, would have been unequal to the transportation of our baggage and our field artillery—The place, abandoned, would have been garrisoned by an inconsiderable force, while the enemy's army would have operated unchecked by our handful of troops, unable to oppose them in the field, or impede their progress through the country and, had our expected succours arrived, we could only have ultimately submitted to the inconveniences of an evacuation without our stores, when further opposition no longer availed.[133]

An excerpt from Brig. Gen. Louis Duportail's report to General Washington:

I arrived there the 25th of April . . . after having past during the night in the middle of the Ennemies, through the Woods, with the assistance of good Guides. I found the Town in a desperate State, almost intirely invested by the British Army & Fleet, which had passed the Bar and fort Moultrie; they had Surmounted difficulties which were generally looked upon as insurmountable without experiencing Scarce any resistance. The Enemy had brought their Trenches upon the Necks within . . . 130 Yards from the fortifications; in a word, the fall of the Town

was unavoidable unless an Army came to her assistance, which then did not appear likely. After having examined the Situation of things, I thought an evacuation highly advisable . . . but the Council found an impractibility in the measure, although for my own part it only appeared to me difficult & hazardous and Such as we ought to risque in our present Situation. That plan being rejected, the only object was to protract the terms of our Capitulation: I have done on my part everything that was in my power to fulfil that object . . . but time brought us to lose sight of the term of our resistance; the Ennemy Succeeded in draining part of our ditch that was in front of our entrenchments and raised new Batteries in their third Parrallel. The day they opened them they sent a Flag with a Letter to summon General Lincoln to Surrender, upon this a Counsil of General & field officers were called, and after having asked whether terms ought to be proposed to the Enemy—it was carried in the affirmative by the great majority. I myself was of that number. The First proposals were from the Ennemy; we might expect Advantageous Conditions, I had even Some hope that we might have Saved the Garrison, besides a positive refusal to treat with an Ennemy who within a few days could have been in a condition of giving us the Law appeared imprudent and unseasonable. It was then determined in Council that propositions Should be made, but afterwards, by an extraordinary oversight they left the General officers the care of determining what was to be proposed. This is the Moment where I left off taking any part in what had been done, being of a contrary opinion to that of the [other] General Officers. They agreed to propose that the Continental Troops Should be prisonners of war. I opposed that Measure with all my might, I represented that if even our Situation required it, it was not our business to propose it, and that Show'd an ignorance of what is practiced in those Cases which would make us appear in a Ridicule light. I Represented . . . to propose terms to the Enemy . . . honorable terms both advantageous to the Army and Continent . . . that if the army must be a prisoner of war it was more eligible to hold out in order to justify Such unfavorable conditions by a longer resistance and a more distressing Situation. My representation had not the desired effect…Fortunately, Such as they were the Ennemy would not grant them and proposed others less advantageous, which General Lincoln did not

> however think proper to accept. The Truce was broke and the operations of the Siege vigorously continued. But the Second day after the Militia refused to do duty, General Lincoln thought from this that the Capitulation was absolutely necessary, and called the Council who countenanced the measure. For my own part, I thought that we ought to try before to bring the Militia to their Duty by all possible means, by acts of authority, and if necessary by exemplary punishments. This was likely deemed impracticable and the Capitulation took place to my great regret; not that I think we could have held out longer than three or four days, but that time would have put the Ennemy in such a Situation as to render a further resistance on our part blameable to everybody; then our defense would have done us much more honor. . . . I was for Sacrificing that advantage to a little more glory—Fortunately in all this the honor of the American arms is Secure and the Ennemy have not yet great Subject to triumph.[134]

Analysis

1. Using the modern Army Ethical framework, analyze the Continental officer's demands for a negotiated surrender. How could Lincoln have responded? [Teaching points: Trust and honorable service. ADP 6-22, 1-6 to 1-7.]

2. What guidance could the Continental Congress have given General Lincoln to better guide the civil and political conversations with Lieutenant Governor Gadsden? What could Lincoln have done to improve his standing with the local politicians? [Teaching points: Strategic leadership, extends influence, prepares self, strategic planning, and execution. ADP 6-22, 10-1 to 10-8.]

3. Analyze Clinton's operational design as expressed in the vignette using the Principles of Joint operations. [Teaching points: Objective, offensive, mass, maneuver, economy of force, unity of command, security, surprise, simplicity, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. ADP 3-0, 2-1.] Strengths and weaknesses? What assumptions underpin his operational design?

4. Compare Lincoln's and Duportail's assessments of the Charleston defenses. What realistic options did Lincoln have in early April?

Stand 6: Whipple vs. Arbuthnot—The Naval Fight That Didn't Happen (Waterfront Park)

Directions: Walk east on Broad Street about 1,200 feet to the T-intersection with East Bay Street. Turn right (south) followed by an immediate left (east) on Exchange Street, to walk about 600 feet. Once across Concord Street, walk through Joe Riley Waterfront Park to a vantage point overlooking Charleston Harbor (32.776845, -79.925363).

Orientation: Although not part of this stand, the facilitator should point out the Exchange building at the intersection of Broad and Bay streets. Before the war, the Exchange performed currency exchanges, and assessed customs duties on imports into the city. During the British occupation, Patriot political prisoners and common criminals were held in the squalid conditions of the basement. Remind students that in 1780, the Exchange sat on the city waterfront, alongside commercial warehouses, docks, and wharves.

This stand overlooks the eastern portion of the Charleston harbor, a superb location for discussing naval operations. Before starting the stand, the instructor should contrast the 1780 harbor layout and the extensive modern urbanization on both sides of the river. After orienting students to the north, point southeast toward Castle Pinckney, a War of 1812-era brick auxiliary fort built atop Shute's Folly. During the French and Indian War, an artillery redoubt was maintained on Shute's Folly, but the installation was unused during the Revolutionary War. Due to erosion and harbor dredging operations, Shute's Folly appears around half the size it was in 1780. To the northeast, stretching from the base of the Ravenel Bridge down to Shem Creek (roughly 1 to 2 o'clock) is Hog Island. During the war, a narrow and shallow channel of the Cooper River ran between Shute's Folly and Hog Island, which was a seventeen-acre patch of high ground fringed by salt marsh. [135] In 1780, the Americans constructed a barrier of cables and sunken ships that stretched from the city docks to Shute's Folly to block a British amphibious thrust west of Hog Island. To the southeast (about 4 o'clock) beyond Shute's Folly is Rebellion Road, the deep part of the harbor where Arbuthnot's frigates anchored in the latter stages of the siege. Farther southeast beyond Rebellion Road is Sullivan's Island, identifiable in clear weather by a tall black-and-white lighthouse. In the open water of the harbor at the four-thirty position is a larger brick building, Fort Sumter, which sits atop the string of shoals at the entrance to the harbor, the "Infernal Bar." Lastly, the tip of James Island is at the five o'clock position. Fort Johnston was on James Island at the five-thirty position and was occupied by British and Hessian troops early in the siege.

Visual Aids: Figure 2.2. The Investiture of Charleston by the British Army, 1780 (page 59). Figure A.13. The Siege of Charleston March-May 1780 (page 198). Figure A.16. Day 2 Tactical Stands, Charleston (page 200).

Description: In late 1779, Congress responded to the growing British threat in the south by sending Continental Navy Commodore Abraham Whipple's frigates *Providence*, *Boston*, and *Queen of France,* and the sloop *Ranger*, as reinforcements to Charleston. After departing Nantucket, Rhode Island, Whipple's flotilla raided British sea lines of communication near Bermuda before reaching Charleston in late 1779. Whipple's arrival was welcomed with so much enthusiasm that fortification work on the Cooper River temporarily slowed.[136] On the surface, Commodore Abraham Whipple seemed an excellent pick to command the Continental naval forces in the south. Born in 1733 to a Rhode Island seafaring family, Abraham Whipple rose from seaman apprentice to captain a merchant ship sailing the West Indies trade routes. During the French and Indian War, Whipple converted his ship to a privateer and took thirty-three French ships, prizes valued at more than a million dollars in colonial currency. In 1772, Whipple was a key participant in the burning of the British schooner HBMS (His Britannic Majesty's Ship) *Gaspee*, an incident often cited as the first engagement of the American Revolution.[137] In 1775, Whipple was commissioned commodore of the Rhode Island Navy, and later into the Continental Navy as the captain for the 28-gun converted merchantman *Columbus*. Whipple es-

Figure 3.10. Commodore Abraham Whipple. From the public domain.

tablished a reputation for aggressiveness and daring in several engagements before he was ordered to South Carolina.[138]

After a brief provisioning stop at Charleston, the *Providence* and *Ranger* sailed in late January 1780 to scout near British-held Savannah and St. Augustine. The patrol proved lucrative, capturing several transports and light warships as prizes. Besides yielding useful supplies, information gleaned from prisoners and official correspondence provided intelligence that Tybee Roads, near Savannah, was the planned rendezvous point for the British invasion fleet. Whipple's ships did a fast run past Tybee Roads, and brought back word that a British assault on Charleston was imminent. Word of the British fleet at Tybee Roads galvanized defensive preparations back in Charleston.[139] When he arrived in Charleston, Whipple was given command authority of French warships in the harbor: the *Bricole* (44 guns), *Truite* (26 guns), *L'Adventure* (26 guns), and the 18-gun *Zephyr*—a total of eight warships with 180 heavy guns—enough firepower to challenge the Royal Navy frigates.[140]

Governor Rutledge also delegated command of the South Carolina state navy, several sloops converted to light warships, and five armed galleys, to Whipple. The galleys were nimble shallow-draft vessels, generally armed with one or two 18- to 24-pounder bow guns, up to six 18-pounders mounted amidship, and several antipersonnel swivel guns on deck railings. Consequently, the maneuverable American galleys posed a great threat to British galleys and boats performing inshore troop and supply movements.[141]

Lincoln's appointment from Congress also conferred mission command authority over all Continental forces in the Southern Department—including Continental Navy elements. With his diverse mix of warships, Lincoln felt Whipple could defeat not only British frigates attempting to enter the harbor, but also stop enemy amphibious operations in the coastal waterways. To Lincoln, Whipple's principal mission was to defend the Bar, thereby keeping British frigates out of the harbor. Local harbor pilots scoffed at Lincoln's orders for Whipple to attempt a close defense of the Bar, arguing that a flood tide could push anchored frigates into the Morris Island shoals. Whipple also rejected the idea, believing the British could simply bypass any attempt to defend the Ship Channel by using good wind and tides to run past Fort Moultrie via the North or Five Foot Channels. Instead, Whipple wanted to position his frigates within supporting distance of Fort Moultrie's guns—a location where he felt his heavy guns could rake enemy frigates in the North Channel or sailing up from the Five Fathom Hole. Distrustful of his naval officers' assertions, Lincoln challenged

Whipple to conduct his own survey and identify a suitable location for the Continental frigates and shore batteries to cover the Ship Channel. Instead, Whipple and his captains offered only excuses; consequently, the Ship Channel remained uncovered by either ship or shore batteries.[142]

Meanwhile, Sir Henry Clinton faced his own problems with synchronizing land and naval operations. After safely landing Clinton's army on Simmons Island, Arbuthnot's anchored his fleet so it could interdict inbound reinforcements, and prevent the Continental navy from attempting a breakout through the Bar. On paper, Arbuthnot commanded a powerful fleet capable of smashing Whipple's light flotilla: six ships of the line (44 to 64 guns), four frigates (28 to 32 guns), four brigs (20 to 22 guns), and four armed escort galleys. Despite the impressive numbers, Arbuthnot faced many tactical dilemmas. Foremost, he was not able to bring the deep draft ships of the line across the Bar. Instead, Arbuthnot's strongest warships were left exposed to destruction by French warships and Atlantic storms. Secondly, many of the frigates, including Arbuthnot's temporary flagship, the 44-gun HBMS *Roebuck*, were so heavy that heavy guns and stores had to be removed before they could cross the Bar; without protection, the frigates would be temporarily helpless against Continental Navy counterattack. After days of squalls and contrary winds, 20 March 1780 opened with a flood tide and wind blowing into the harbor—perfect conditions that permitted six frigates and supporting auxiliary craft to cross the Bar at the Ship Channel. The sight of the enemy frigates alarmed Whipple and his commanders so much that the American ships remained at anchor under the guns of Fort Moultrie. Untroubled by the Continental Navy, the British squadron anchored in Five Fathom Hole, where work crews reloaded the cannons and heavy stores from transports back onto the frigates.[143]

The sight of Arbuthnot's frigates crossing the Bar without a single shot fired from the Continental Navy infuriated Lincoln, who demanded Whipple launch a sortie to attack the vulnerable British frigates. Instead, Whipple argued his ships were outgunned by the British frigates. After remaining passively at anchor for several days, Whipple withdrew his ships into the Cooper River, leaving Fort Moultrie unsupported against the Royal Navy. While the Royal Navy ship crews were left undisturbed to complete their attack preparations, the Americans scuttled their smaller, and now useless, ships and sank them in the channel between Shute's Folly and the waterfront. Crews then linked the wrecks together with chains and cables to form a water barrier. The now-surplus marine and gun crew detachments were used to reinforce shore defenses. Despite persistent demands

from Lincoln, Whipple's remaining frigates remained passively at anchor, and made no attempt to attack isolated British ships in the harbor.[144]

Despite Clinton's hectoring, Arbuthnot's frigates remained in Five Fathom Hole until 8 April, another day of good wind and tides that allowed for movement into the harbor. Unlike in 1776, Arbuthnot had good pilots and maps this time, and made no attempt at a drawn-out fight with Fort Moultrie. Instead, British crews suppressed the Americans gunners while their frigates sailed into the harbor to anchor near British-held Fort Johnson. For the loss of twenty-seven men, and one grounded (and subsequently burned) transport, Arbuthnot had successfully bypassed the strongest American defensive works in the harbor. From there, Arbuthnot positioned shallow-draft schooners to protect the Wappoo Cut and Lining's Creek positions from Continental naval interference. Clinton was naturally pleased and urged Arbuthnot to finish the encirclement by pushing combat power past Hog Island to close the Cooper River line of communications. Arbuthnot balked at the idea, insisting Clinton's ground troops would have to clear the heavy American batteries on the east side of the Cooper. Throughout the remainder of the siege, Arbuthnot kept his frigates anchored at Fort Johnson despite a barrage of demands from Clinton for action. Arbuthnot's unwillingness to challenge the enemy defenses was reinforced when the HBMS *Comet* ran aground on Hog Island and was sunk by American guns. Not until 12 May, well after the capture of Lemprieres Point, did Arbuthnot send a British galley patrol into the Cooper River. Despite great expectations and demands from Generals Lincoln and Clinton, neither naval commander made more than a minor contribution to the course of the campaign. Instead, the outcome of the Charleston campaign hinged on the generalship of Sir Henry Clinton and General Benjamin Lincoln.[145]

Vignettes

General Lincoln's January 1780 instructions to Commodore Whipple:

> Dear Sir—By your instructions you will observe that you were sent with frigates under your command as a protection to this part of the United States and I have no doubt of your zeal and that of your officers in the Common Cause or of your utmost exertions for the defense of this state. Your duty will be if possible to prevent the enemy from entering the harbor; if that should be impracticable, you will in the next place [oppose] them at Fort Moultrie. I have lately been informed that with an easterly wind and flood tide it will be impossible for a ship to lye

with her broad side to the entrance of the bar. To ascertain this matter is of importance; you will therefore as early as possible have the internal part of the bar and the adjacent shoals sounded and buoyed. . . . After that you will please in company with the Captains of the several ships to reconnoiter the entrance of this harbor and see whether there is a possibility of ships lying in such a manner as to command the passage.[146]

Sir Henry Clinton's dismissive summary of Admiral Arbuthnot's contributions to the campaign:

> But I was still very desirous of having an armed force in [the Cooper River] to remove every possibility of such an event [escape of the Americans] and to facilitate the transportation of supplies to our troops in that quarter, which were liable to be constantly intercepted by the galleys and armed boats from the town. I therefore made use of every argument I could think of . . . but I could only obtain from [Arbuthnot] reiterated promised that he would shortly comply with my desire—notwithstanding which I had the mortification to be disappointed, as no attempt was *ever* made by him to send ships into the Cooper to the end of the siege. I do not, however, mean to insinuate. . . Arbuthnot had not very sufficient reasons for declining it. I am ready to admit the possibility of it being so; and I have therefore thought it right to insert in the appendix all the necessary extracts from our correspondence . . . that the reader may be capable of judging them as I was.[147]

General William Moultrie's assessment of the navy's lackluster contributions; the poor showing by the Sullivan's Island batteries certainly galled the victor of the 1776 engagement:

> We have altered our plan greatly; all our ships and gallies are ordered up to town, and their guns taken out and placed in the batteries, and manned by the sailors. . . . We are to sink some ships, to stop the channel from the exchange over to the marsh. . . . The reasons for altering the plan fixed upon them to dispose of our fleet, was, that Commodore Whipple did not choose to risk an engagement with the British fleet. I think he was right in the first instance, when stationed just within the bar to prevent the British fleet from coming over, as that was a dangerous place, but his second position . . . above Fort Moultrie within point blank shot of the fort, with his ships across, to rake the

> channel . . . it would have been impossible for them to pass without losing some of their ships. . . . The [British] fleet was of little service to the besiegers in blocking up our port, as all the reinforcements that we go . . . came in by land: it is true, Admiral Arbuthnot had the honor of having Fort Moultrie tamely given up to him without firing a single gun. . . . After the British fleet had passed Fort Moultrie, it was no longer of use to us, but rather a dead weight.[148]

Analysis

1. Both Whipple and Arbuthnot seemed more concerned with the risk to their warships, than supporting the ground commander. What are some reasons why commanders might develop such a mindset? How can contemporary commanders recognize and mitigate such problems? [Teaching point: Identify, mitigate, and accept risk. ADP 6-0, 2-6 to 2-7.]

2. The contentious relationship between the navy and army commanders highlights the need for clear lines of mission command, and authority in exercising senior command responsibilities. What modern measures can be taken to ensure good Joint cooperation? [Teaching points: Unified Action and Joint Operations. ADP 3-0, 1-6 to 1-9.]

3. Despite having clear authority over Whipple granted by orders from the Continental Congress, Lincoln proved unable or unwilling to exert his authority over Whipple. What are some methods a commander can use to exert his will over a balky subordinate? What are the possible legal/moral/ethical consequences of action or inaction? [Teaching points: Leads others: Compliance and commitment; providing purpose, direction, and motivation. ADP 6-0, 5-1 to 5-6. Elements of Command: Authority and responsibility. ADP 6-0, 2-1 to 2-3.]

Stand 7: End of the Siege ("Pineapple" Fountain at Joe Riley Waterfront Park)

Directions: From the edge of the water at Joe Riley Waterfront Park, turn north and walk about 480 feet (147 m) to the vicinity of the prominent Pineapple Fountain at 1 Vendue Range, Charleston, SC 29401 (32.77820, -79.92521).

Orientation: There is no particular historical significance attached to this location. The fountain area provides shade and outdoor seating for a quick break before starting the last stand covering the end of the siege. The location also is excellent for a class or group photo.

Visual Aids: Figure 2.2. The Investiture of Charleston by the British Army, 1780 (page 59). Figure A.10. The Charleston Campaign: Siege of Charleston March–May 1780 (page 196). Figure A.16. Day 2 Tactical Stands, Charleston (page 200).

Description: With the loss of Lemprieres Point and the closing of lines of communication to the east, the Americans immediately began experiencing shortages of fresh provisions. Shortly afterward, Continental quartermasters reduced the daily fresh meat ration to four ounces after finding most of the preserved meat had spoiled due to improper salting. Only some 400 tons of rice, and smaller amounts of sugar and coffee, remained to feed the thousands of soldiers and civilians in the city. Although in command of the approaches to the enemy city, Clinton's army of northern European men suffered greatly from enervating heat and bouts of malaria. Clinton's worries about the state of his army were heightened by a 10 May warning that a French convoy was departing home waters for North America. Faced with the need to close the siege as quickly as possible, Clinton ordered his gunners to shell the city with heated shot and exploding shells to batter the stubborn Americans into submission. Morale in the city fell so much that many of the militia refused to man their posts; meanwhile, Lincoln received a written petition for surrender from the civilians trapped inside Charleston. Early on 11 May, the Americans signaled for a cease fire, but British fire "was so violent that we did not see them coming, they were compelled to withdraw. At two o'clock in the afternoon the enemy hoisted a white flag on the Hornwork, and dispatched a second flag, offering the capitulation of the city."[149] Accompanying the white flag was a written message from Lincoln which acknowledged acceptance of Clinton's earlier surrender terms: Continentals as prisoners of war; militia paroled; no honors of war; and no guarantees of private prop-

erty. On the morning of 12 May, roughly 1,800 able-bodied Continental officers and soldiers, with their colors cased and accompanied by a band playing a Turkish marching song, led a column of militia and government officials from the Hornwork to surrender to Clinton.[150]

The numbers of American militiamen at the surrender seemed suspiciously low, so Clinton threatened to imprison Lincoln unless the remaining militiamen were surrendered. Hundreds more militiamen appeared at a second muster on 15 May, prompting General Moultrie to bitterly remark: "This threat brought out the aged, the timid, the disaffected, and the infirm, many of whom had never appeared during the whole siege, which swelled the number of militia prisoners to at least three times the number of men we ever had upon duty."[151] Despite the constant bombardment and skirmishing, casualties were remarkably low, with only eighty-nine dead and 140 wounded American soldiers and an additional twenty civilians dead and an unknown number injured. In exchange for seventy-six battlefield deaths and 189 wounded, the British coalition and joint task force had inflicted a stunning defeat on the American forces—capturing 5,618 American prisoners and their personal weapons, three hundred cannons, four serviceable frigates, and tons of ordnance stores. With the surrender of twenty-three Continental infantry regiments—the 1st through 4th Georgia; 1st through 4th South Carolina; 1st through 5th North Carolina; and ten regiments of the Virginia Continental line—the Continental Line of four states had been permanently stricken from the American order of battle.[152]

Per the surrender terms, the disarmed American militiamen were paroled to their homes. The Continental officers and soldiers were temporarily housed in barracks and houses near the Hornwork while Clinton fruitlessly negotiated their exchange for the officers of Burgoyne's army. British supervision of the Continental prisoners was initially lax, and an unknown number of American troops escaped to return to friendly lines. The American officers were eventually paroled, and most returned to active service after being exchanged. The Continental enlisted men were offered freedom in exchange for enlisting in the King's army, but most spurned the offer and were sent to the living hell of prison ships in the harbor. When the Continental prisoners were exchanged in late 1781, General Moultrie estimated that only 1,400 men remained; the rest presumably escaped or died while in prison.[153]

General Lincoln and Commodore Whipple were among the first parolees; after reaching Philadelphia in late June 1780, Lincoln requested a

Congressional court of inquiry to restore his reputation. The request disappeared in the maze of Congressional bureaucracy; as a result, Lincoln was never officially reprimanded for surrendering his army. He returned to his home in Hingham, Massachusetts, and wrote his official report of the campaign while awaiting exchange. Lincoln's report downplayed his own contributions to the disaster; instead, he placed blame for the defeat on the lack of manpower and reinforcements. Lincoln was exchanged in October 1780, and served for the remainder of the war as General Washington's second-in-command. When the British army surrendered at Yorktown in October 1781, Washington ordered General Charles O'Hara (standing in for the allegedly ill Cornwallis) to surrender his sword to Lincoln. Lincoln also had the satisfaction of seeing Cornwallis denied the honors of war, sweet revenge for Lincoln's humiliating surrender of Charleston.[154]

The surrender of Charleston proved the greatest feat of arms by the British army during the war in North America. Learning from the 1776 mistakes, Clinton refined his processes for gathering intelligence, developed a clear and flexible operational design, and maintained unity of command and effort toward a clearly defined goal. Clinton's deliberate pace of land operations minimized the combat risk to soldiers and animals at the expense of greater environmental risk from malaria and heat injuries. Clinton benefitted from several instances of good fortune as well as the mediocrity of opposing American commanders. Moreover, Clinton was universally well served by his subordinate army commanders, and Capt. Keith Elphinstone's actions as liaison officer ensured a successful joint campaign despite the lack of an overall commander. However, the slow tempo of land operations lengthened the exposure of Arbuthnot's warships and transports to storms and French naval attack. Moreover, Arbuthnot felt the risk of penetrating the harbor was too great until Clinton's army captured Fort Johnson, giving the Royal Navy a protected anchorage inside the harbor.[155]

London celebrated the capture of Charleston with a victory parade, and Clinton and Arbuthnot received joint commendations from both Houses of Parliament. Had Sir Henry Clinton sailed for England after taking Charleston, he would be remembered in history as a great captain of war. However, having won the military operation, the British failed to set the conditions for reestablishing Royal sovereignty. The root cause of the problem stemmed from London. First, Lord Germain blocked Loyalists from taking part in any political decisions. Secondly, Clinton and Arbuthnot were appointed as peace commissioners but lacked the author-

ity to make substantive political agreements without consulting London. Consequently, the senior British field commander (first Clinton then later Cornwallis) was saddled with civil administrative tasks in addition to pacifying the region.[156]

Under the original terms of surrender, American militiamen were "permitted to return to their respective homes as prisoners on parole, which parole as long as they observe, shall secure them from being molested in their property by the British."[157] These generous terms of surrender were resented by Carolina Loyalists, who wanted revenge for earlier mistreatment by Patriots. To placate the Loyalists, Clinton threatened punishment and confiscation of property to Patriots charged with attacking Loyalists. Just before departing for New York, Clinton issued a final proclamation that commuted paroles for Americans not captured at Charleston and ordered all Americans to take an oath of loyalty to the Crown and enroll in the Loyalist militia. Those who refused the oath, whether actively or passively, were considered rebels, and subject to punishment and confiscation of property. By doing so, Clinton hoped to placate London and stimulate Loyalist militia recruiting; instead, the proclamation blurred the distinction between committed Patriots, and a significant number of Americans hoping to remain neutral. Clinton's proclamations opened the door for British and Loyalist troops to abuse Americans who refused to swear allegiance to the Crown.[158] Clinton later defended his proclamation, describing it as a means to clearly identify those with rebel sympathies; pacification efforts were severely damaged, as many neutrals were driven to support the Patriot cause. Noted Lt. Col. Francis Lord Rawdon to Cornwallis: "That unfortunate Proclamation of the 3rd of June has had very unfavorable consequences. The majority of the inhabitants in the Frontier Districts, tho' ill-disposed to us . . . were not actually in arms against us; they were therefore freed from the Paroles imposed by Lt. Colonel Turnbull and myself; and nine out of ten of them are now embodied on the part of the Rebels."[159]

Having thus stirred up both Whig and Tory with his clumsy policies, Clinton decamped for New York, leaving Cornwallis with about 8,000 regulars and provincials to pacify the region. As the shock of the Charleston defeat wore off, Patriot partisan attacks grew in bloody intensity over the summer of 1780. Additional British victories at the Waxhaws in June and Camden in August 1780 did little to calm the restive population. In October 1780, Cornwallis's offensive into North Carolina was derailed by the destruction of Maj. Patrick Ferguson's Loyalist militia corps at Kings

Mountain. In December 1780, while Cornwallis's army was in winter quarters, General Nathanael Greene assumed command of the Southern Department. In a brilliantly executed campaign, which began in January 1781, Greene methodically weakened Cornwallis's army in a series of engagements beginning at the Cowpens and ending at Guilford Courthouse in March 1781. Cornwallis subsequently abandoned pacification in South Carolina, allowing Greene to methodically isolate and reduce British bases across South Carolina. Following the September 1781 battle of Eutaw Springs, the British were penned into small enclaves around Charleston and Savannah. In December 1782, the British forces, many of their Loyalist supporters, and liberated slaves sailed from Charleston—leaving Greene's Continental army in full possession of the state. As the commander in chief in North America, Clinton received most of the blame for the ultimate failure of the southern campaign.[160]

From the beginning of his command of the Southern Department, General Lincoln labored under a significant number of constraints and limitations. First, Lincoln was hamstrung by conflicting orders and guidance from General George Washington, the Continental Congress, and South Carolina political leadership. Consequently, General Lincoln was unable to articulate a clear commander's mission and intent, and maintain unity of command and effort in defending the region. Only a fraction of the promised Continental and militia reinforcements arrived in Charleston before the closing of the siege—forcing Lincoln to perform minor miracles to reorganize the army after the disastrous 1779 campaign season. Unlike Clinton, General Lincoln was poorly served at critical points during the siege by several of his subordinate commanders: Whipple failed to protect the bar; Huger bungled defensive measures at Monck's Corner; Malmédy experienced a failure of nerves at Lemprieres Point; and General Moultrie provided lackluster leadership for the Continental infantry. From his exile in the interior, Governor Rutledge castigated Lincoln's decision to not evacuate the army—while conveniently overlooking the Privy Council's meddling in Lincoln's command decisions. Yet, as the commander of the Southern Department, Benjamin Lincoln bears the ultimate responsibility for the failed defense of Charleston.[161]

So why did Lincoln fail as an independent commander? Historian Wayne E. Lee concluded that Lincoln was a well-meaning, honest, but intellectually mediocre commander who lacked the "vision of Nathanael Greene to invent an alternative style of mobile defense that would still convey Congress' commitment to the South."[162] Lincoln biographer David

Mattern attributes the failure to the New England habit of deference to civil authorities:

> However understandable his reasoning, however unrelenting the pressures placed upon him, the fact remained that Lincoln had sacrificed his better judgment to the threats and entreaties of South Carolina's civil authorities. Unable to imagine a military effort without the support of the civil authorities. Lincoln bowed at critical moments to the desires of the civilian leaders. Imbued with the idea of military subordination to civil authority, he allowed himself to be trapped in a siege he had neither the experience, the resources, nor the ruthlessness to win.[163]

This is an opportunity to compare Lincoln to Generals George Washington and Nathanael Greene. Despite intense political pressure and criticism, Washington abandoned Philadelphia in 1777; he chose not to risk the destruction of what he saw as the strategic center of gravity for the Revolution, the Continental Army. Unlike Lincoln, Greene grasped the strategic and political importance of safeguarding his cadre of Continentals from destruction or capture. As long as the Americans maintained a viable regular army presence in South Carolina, Britain could not claim undisputed sovereignty of the region under the doctrine of *uti possidetis*, territory held at the start of peace negotiations.[164] Despite his long relationship as a trusted subordinate to General Washington, Lincoln unaccountably failed to grasp this salient fact. By surrendering hundreds of irreplaceable Continental soldiers, Lincoln gave the British a priceless opportunity to reclaim Georgia and South Carolina sovereignty—an opportunity squandered by inept British grand strategy.[165] Mattern also highlighted a major flaw in Lincoln's character, the inability to impose his will on subordinates and civil authorities. By comparison, when General Nathanael Greene took command of the Southern Department in December 1780, one of his first acts as commander was to reestablish discipline in the ranks through a public court-martial and execution of a deserter. Greene did not hesitate to discipline his own officers for their battlefield failures. After the April 1781 battle of Hobkirk's Hill, Greene court-martialed Col. John Gunby for his role in the American defeat. General Lincoln failed to take comparable disciplinary action against any of his subordinates related to the siege of Charleston.[166]

Vignettes

Sir Henry Clinton describes the start of the surrender negotiations:

> Mr. Lincoln had on the 21st proposed to me *to enter into the consideration of terms of capitulation.* His letter being addressed to

me singly without noticing the Admiral, I pointed out to him the impropriety of the neglect, and desired that one of my aides-de-camp might be permitted to pass with a letter to the ships to request a conference with him. The articles proposed by the rebel General were however so much beyond what we thought he had a right to expect that we immediately rejected them, and hostilities renewed.[167]

After recounting the Lenud's Ferry and Fort Moultrie victories, Clinton resumes his surrender narrative:

> Judging by these two events, as they removed every hope of either escape or succor, might probably dispose the garrison of Charleston to surrender, and the guns being now mounted in the batteries of the third parallel near the edge of the canal (which was drain almost dry), I sent an aide-de-camp to General Lincoln with a renewal of the offers we had made him on the 21st of April. The enemy was, however, not sufficiently humbled to accept them; and as we were equally averse from agreeing to those he proposed, I ordered the batteries to open . . . and under cover of the fire from our *Jägers*, light infantry and grenadiers (who shot down every head the instant any appeared above the works) our troops gained the counterscarp of the outwork that flanked the canal, then passed the canal itself, and carried a sap close to the very ditch of the place. Matters were now arrived at that extremity that the assault was prepared for.[168]

Clinton then analyzed correspondence with Arbuthnot, highlighting supposed promises of close cooperation and support from the navy:

> The reader, therefore, will of course be as much surprised as I was at reading the following answer from [Arbuthnot]: "Unless it is intended to land a body of troops under the fire of the ships' guns, I confess it would be against my judgment to place the ships against the enemy's batteries, circumstanced as they are, merely for a diversion. However when the moment arrives, the ships will at least by their movements indicate such a design to the enemy, which will answer the purpose you propose, that of keeping the men at the batteries at this side from opposing you." Fortunately, however, we had no occasion to put the efficiency of the Admiral's *indicatory* movements to the prop, as General Lincoln judged it most prudent not to abide the assault, and now

> acquiesced in the terms he had two days before rejected—and which many important considerations at the present moment rendered it advisable for us still to grant . . . the articles of capitulation, too, were framed in the mildest spirit of moderation throughout, with a view of convincing those misguided people that Great Britain was more inclined to reconciliation than to punishment, as by it the Continentals troops and sailors alone were required to remain prisoners of war until exchanged, the militia being permitted to return to their respective homes as prisoners on parole. The like terms were also granted to the civil officers and other citizens of every denomination, whether they bore arms or not, whereby the persons and property of all who surrendered were alike secured from molestation as long as they continued peaceable and observed the paroles they had given.[169]

Writing with the benefit of postwar hindsight, Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton offered an insightful analysis of General Lincoln's failed strategy:

> The body of regular troops detailed [to defend Charleston], though assisted by the militia and inhabitants, was scarcely adequate to the defense of such extensive fortifications, and could have been more usefully employed in the field; where, judicious operations, assisted by the resources to be found in the country, and by the approaching heat of the season, would have protected the greatest part of the fertile province of South Carolina, would have soon overbalanced the present superiority of the British forces, and would effectually have prevented the co-operation of the royal navy and army. General Washington adopted this line of action, when he abandoned New York Island for the Jersies, where he yielded Philadelphia to the English arms, and in many other instances, where a contrary conduct, to all human appearances, would have unavoidably established the sovereignty of Great Britain.[170]

Following his parole, General Lincoln wrote a letter to General Washington, providing a lengthy recital of his decisions and actions while directing the American defense:

> This I laid before a Council of General & field officers & the Captains of the Continental ships—It was the view of the Council, that terms of capitulation ought to be proposed—Terms were accordingly sent out but as so many of them were rejected others

so mutilated and a quallification of them utterly denied us, hostilities again commenced in the evening of the Ninth [May] with a more incessant and heavy fire than ever, which continued until the 11th when having prior thereto received an address from the principal inhabitants of the town, and a number of the country militia signifying that the terms acceded to by General Clinton, as they related to them, were satisfactory and desired that I would propose my acceptance of them, and a request from the Lieutenant Governor and Council that the negotiations might be renewed—the militia of the Town having thrown down their arms—our provisions, saving a little rice, being exhausted—The troops on the lines being worn down with fatigue, having for a number of days been obliged to lay upon the banket—Our harbour closely blocked up—compleatly invested by land by nine thousand men at least the flower of the British army in America, besides the large force which, at all times, they could draw from their marine, and aided by a great number of blacks, in all their laborious employments—The garrison at this time, exclusive of the sailors, but little exceeding twenty five hundred men, part of whom had thrown down their arms—The citizens in general discontented and clamorous—The enemy being within twenty yards, of our lines, and preparing to make a general assault by sea and land—many of our cannon dismounted and others silenced from the want of shot—A retreat being judged impracticable, and every hope of timely succour cut off, we were induced to offer and accede to the terms executed on the 12th. A copy of them, the several letters and propositions that passed between Sr Hy Clinton & myself from the 10th of April to the 12th of May, I do my self the honor to inclose.

Thus, sir, in as concise a manner as possible, and perhaps too much so in justice to myself, I have given to your Excellency a state of matters, relative to the defence and loss of Charles town, & the measures pursued by me for its safety.[171]

Analysis

1. Perform a critical analysis of General Benjamin Lincoln's performance as an operational commander. Strengths and weaknesses? How could Lincoln have compensated? [Teaching points: Guides to Effective Command. ADP 6-0, 2-16 to 2-24.]

2. Using ADP 6-0 Guides to Effective Command, analyze Clinton's operational performance.

3. How could General Washington and the Continental Congress have better articulated guidance to Lincoln? In return, how could Lincoln have obtained clear specified tasks? [Teaching point: Unified Action. ADP 3-0, 1-6 to 1-9.]

4. Using the DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) model, analyze both British and American grand strategy: What DIME implications did the fall of Charleston create for each side? What opportunities were created, or vulnerabilities exposed?

5. General Lincoln seemed particularly burdened with poor leaders. What are some things he could have done to improve leadership importance? What are some modern parallels we can draw in developing subordinates, and improving substandard performers? [Teaching points: Organizational Leadership: Leads Others, Develops Others. ADP 6-22, 9-3 to 9-5.]

This marks the end of the battlefield terrain walk. The suggested location for the Part IV Integration event is beneath the shade trees near the Pineapple Fountain.

Notes

1. Much of the information for this section is from Charles D. Collins, *Staff Ride Handbook and Atlas: Battle of White Bird Canyon 17 June 1877 (*Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2014), 8–13 *passim*. See also Peter G. Knight and William G. Robertson, *The Staff Ride: Fundamentals, Experiences, Techniques* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2021), 5, and 25–40.

2. John C. Parker, *Parker's Guide to the Revolutionary War in South Carolina*, 2nd ed. (West Conshohocken, PA: Infinity Publishing, 2013), 124.

3. David Lee Russell, *The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2000), 85.

4. William Willcox, ed., *The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of his Campaigns, 1775–1782 with an Appendix of Original Documents* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1954), 27.

5. Don Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763–1789* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1971), 135–36.

6. John W. Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History* (Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina, 2003), 33. David Lee Russell, *The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies* 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2009), 59–60.

7. Donald B. Chidsey, *The War in the South: An On-the-Scene Account of the Carolinas and Georgia in the American Revolution* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1969), 38–39.

8. Willcox, *The American Rebellion*, 29. *Note: All vignettes in this staff ride handbook were edited for clarity and to remove extraneous passages. Spelling, syntax, and grammar are from the original text.*

9. William Moultrie, *Memoirs of the American Revolution* (New York: David Longworth, 1802), 101.

10. Willcox, *The American Rebellion*, 29.

11. Parker, *Parker's Guide to the Revolutionary War*, 124.

12. Edward Bearss, *The Battle of Sullivan's Island June 28, 1776: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps* (Washington, DC: US Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Division of History, Office of Archaeology and Historic Preservation, 30 June 1968), 64–65.

13. Bearss, 70.

14. Bearss, 71.

15. Bearss, 76–80.

16. John W. Gordon, *South Carolina and the American* Revolution, 43. The lull in American firing was due to a false report of a British assault on Fort Moultrie. Colonel Moultrie ordered his infantry to the landward defenses to face the expected assault. Instead, the British assault was at the Breach, and was driven off without significant loss. One word of Clinton's repulse reached

Moultrie; the infantry was ordered back to their guns to continue firing at the Royal Navy ships.

17. Bearss, *The Battle of Sullivan's Island,* 87–89.

18. Bearss, 91–92.

19. David K. Wilson, *The Southern Strategy: Britain's Conquest of South Carolina & Georgia* (Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press, 2005), 45, 48–54; Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution*, 44; and Bearss, 107–10.

20. Bearss, 92.

21. Willcox, *The American Rebellion*, *xxi–xxii*, 34–35.

22. "Pitt Street Bridge," 2022, https://www.scpictureproject.org/charleston-county/pitt-street-bridge.html.

23."William de Brahm," 14 September 2006, http://www.scencyclopedia.org/sce/entries/de-brahm-william-gerard/.

24. Moultrie, *Memoirs of the American Revolution*, 115–16; and Bearss, *The Battle of Sullivan's Island,* 32.

25. Wilson, *The Southern Strategy*, 56–57. Moultrie was a leading member of the landed gentry and had commanded a South Carolina militia unit during the 1761 Anglo-Cherokee War.

26. Rebellion Road, sometimes referred to as Rebellion Roads, was an anchorage inside the Charleston Bar, so named as it was used by rebellious pirates to avoid interference of local officials. See Suzannah Smith-Miles, "Rebellion Roads—A Pirate's Refuge," 19 August 2020, https://www.postandcourier.com/moultrie-news/opinion/rebellion-roads-a-pirates-refuge/article_34ea6c9d-0a3f-5ed5-9397-9c64eb02b615.html for additional details. Paul K. Walker, *Engineers of Independence: A Documentary History of the American Engineers in the American Revolution, 1775–1783* (Washington, DC: Office of History, US Army Corps of Engineers, 1981), 254. Felix Lewis, Baron von Massenbach, was commissioned a 2nd lieutenant of artillery on 20 February 1776 by the state of Maryland. Massenbach was subsequently appointed engineer in the Continental Army in the Southern Department. *Archives of Maryland: Muster Rolls and Other Records of Service of the Maryland Troops in the American Revolution, 1775–1783* (Baltimore, MD: Maryland Historical Society, 1900), 570.

27. "Gadsden Bridge Redoubt," accessed 15 January 2019, http://scbattlegroundtrust.org/rwmountpleasant/gadsden-bridge-redoubt-(circa-1780).html.

28. Bearss, *The Battle of Sullivan's* Island, 41–43.

29. Bearss, 28, 60–61.

30. Letter from Charles Lee to John Hancock, 2 July 1776, in *Memoirs of the Life of the late Charles Lee, Esq. lieutenant colonel of the forty-fourth regiment; colonel in the Portuguese service; major-general and aid de camp to the King of Poland, and second in command in the service of the United States during the Revolution*, ed. Edward Langworthy (New York: T. Allen, 1792), 250, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N18813.0001.001/1:15.16.33?rgn=div3;view=fulltext.

31. Bearss, *The Battle of Sullivan's* Island, 76–77.

32. Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution*, 42–44.

33. Bearss, *The Battle of Sullivan's Island,* 81–87. Based on modern light data, nautical twilight for this day was approximately 2135.

34. Bearss, 95.

35. Wilson, *The Southern Strategy*, 45.

36. Lee, *Memoirs of the Life of the late Charles Lee*, 250–51.

37. Moultrie, *Memoirs of the American Revolution*, 174–80.

38. Patriots Point Naval & Maritime Museum, accessed 16 March 2022, https://www.patriotspoint.org/.

39. Carl P. Borick, *A Gallant Defense: The Siege of Charleston 1780* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2012), 285. In 1780, the spelling of Lemprieres Point was varied. For consistency, this book uses Borick's naming convention.

40. Martin Simner, "A Further Evaluation of the Carlisle Peace Commission's Initiative," *Journal of the American Revolution,* 30 September 2021, https://allthingsliberty.com/2021/09/a-further-evaluation-of-the-carlisle-peace-commissions-initiative/.

41. Higginbotham, *The American War for Independence*, 250–51.

42. According to the 1986 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, "The center of gravity of an armed force refers to those sources of strength or balance. It is that characteristic, capability, or locality from which the force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Clausewitz defined it as 'the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.'" Strategist Dale Eikmeier offers a simpler definition: "The center of gravity is the primary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve the objective." Dale Eikmeier, "A Logical Method for Center-of-Gravity Analysis," *Military Review* (September–October 2007), 63.

43. Wilson, *The Southern Strategy*, 60–62.

44. Russell, *The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies,* 2nd ed., 105.

45. Parker, *Parker's Guide to the Revolutionary War*, 265.

46. Parker, 120.

47. Maj. Gen. Augustine Prevost to Lord George Germaine, 10 June 1779, in K. G. Davies, ed., *Documents of the American Revolution 1770–1783*, vol. 17 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1977), 142–43.

48. Wilson, *The Southern Strategy,* 102,112, 119–21.

49. Wilson, 176.

50. Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence*, 356–57.

51. "Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton, 8 March 1778," in B. F. Stevens, ed., *Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to America 1773–1783* (London: Malby & Sons, 1889–95).

52. "Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton."

53. Willcox, *The American Rebellion*, 151.

54. Willcox, 153.

55. The artillery and horses were concentrated in only a few ships, instead of being distributed throughout the fleet, a military version of "putting all your eggs in one basket." Maj. Patrick Ferguson saw the danger but was ignored by Clin-

ton's quartermasters: "His proposal went unheeded, but his predictions came true. The British army before Charleston was much hampered by a scarcity of ordnance and ammunition." William T. Bulger, "The British Expedition to Charleston, 1779–1780" (diss., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 1957), 66.

56. Wilson, *The Southern Strategy*, 199–200; and Bulger, 129, 132.

57. Russell, *The American Revolution in South Carolina,* 132.

58. Moultrie, *Memoirs of the American Revolution*, 48–50. Clinton originally intended to cross his army to the mainland via Stono Ferry, but later opted to cross via the Wappoo Cut. The garrisons at Stono Ferry were withdrawn after the troop transports were moved to the mouth of the Stono. Bulger, "The British Expedition to Charleston," 99.

59. Joseph P. Tustin, ed., *Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979), 196. An *amusette* or "wall gun" was a large rifled musket ranging from .90 to 2 inches in caliber. *Amusettes* weighed between 30 to 50 pounds, so required a light wheeled carriage for movement. When in defensive works, the weapon was generally mounted such to absorb recoil and provide a stable base of fire. John W. Wright, "Some Notes on the Continental Army," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 11, no. 3 (April 1931): 93.

60. Tustin, 196.

61. Willcox, *The American Rebellion*, 160–61.

62. Bulger, "The British Expedition to Charleston," 92–98.

63. Willcox, *The American Rebellion*, 161.

64. James Bain, ed., "The Siege of Charleston: Journal of Captain Peter Russell, December 25, 1779 to May 2, 1780," *The American Historical Review* 4, no. 3 (April 1899): 488–89. The term "&c" is an archaic version of etc. or etcetera.

65. Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 65–67.

66. Bain, "The Siege of Charleston," 489–90.

67. "Lt. Col. John Laurens to George Washington, 14 March 1780," *Founders Online*, National Archives, accessed 15 June 2021, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-25-02-0033.

68. Bulger, "The British Expedition to Charleston," 89.

69. "Ashley River below Summerville," 13 June 2022, https://water.weather.gov/ahps2/hydrograph.php?gage=ards1&wfo=chs.

70. Bulger, "The British Expedition to Charleston," 114. Once the British army was firmly established at Gibbes' Landing, Clinton ordered the abandonment of the posts west of the Ashley, except for the redoubts at Wappoo Cut and Lining's Creek, in a move to free up manpower for the siege. Richard K. Murdoch, "A French Account of the Siege of Charleston, 1780," *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 67, no. 3 (July 1966): 143.

71. Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 104–7.

72. "Lt. Col. John Laurens to George Washington, 9 April 1780," *Founders Online*, National Archives, accessed 6 November 2020, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-25-02-0237."On the 29th Ulto" refers to the British landing on 29 March.

73. Harry M. Lydenberg, ed., *Archibald Robertson, Lieutenant-General Royal Engineers: His Diaries and Sketches in America 1762–1780* (New York: The New York Public Library, 1930), 217–19.

74. Willcox, *The American Rebellion*, 160–63.

75. Carl Borick, email to author, 6 June 2021; and C. Leon Harris and Charles B. Baxley, "Tarleton Tightens the Noose around Charlestown Neck: Biggin Bridge, April 14, 1780," *The Journal of the Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution* 18, no. 2 (29 November 2021): 12–14.

76. "Biggin Church Ruins, Berkeley County (S.C. Hwy 402, Moncks Corner Vicinity), National Register Properties in South Carolina," accessed 16 March 2022, http://www.nationalregister.sc.gov/berkeley/S10817708001/index.htm. Although the rebuilt structure survived the Civil War, an 1886 fire forced the congregation to abandon the site.

77. Charles Stedman, T*he History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War*, vol. 2 (London: J. Murray, 1794), 182.

78. Russell, *The American Revolution in South Carolina*, 141–43.

79. Wilson, *The Southern Strategy*, 246. Lieutenant Allaire intimates that the American dragoons were in marching order, while Tarleton asserts Huger's troops were caught by surprise. Some other evidence shows Washington's unit was in the middle of breaking camp, awake but not ready to receive an attack.

80. Russell, *The American Revolution in South Carolina*, 141–42.

81. Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution*, 82.

82. Stedman, *The History of the Origin*, 183.

83. Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton, *A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America* (London: T. Cadell, 1787), 17–18.

84. William Johnson, *Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene, Major General*, vol. 2 (Charleston, SC: 1822), 169. General Greene's assessment was written in mid-1781, during the American campaign to eject the British from the interior of South Carolina.

85. See Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 189–90, for an excellent analysis of the leadership dynamics about Lemprieres Point.

86. Borick, 145.

87. John S. Pancake, *This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780–1782* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2003), 64.

88. Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 183.

89. Borick, 184. The description of the blockhouse at Miller's Bridge is from Parker, *Parker's Guide to the Revolutionary War*, 130.

90. Borick, 189–90. Lachlan McIntosh, "Journal of the Siege of Charleston," in *Lachlan McIntosh Papers in the University of Georgia Libraries Miscellanea Publications*, no. 7, ed. Lilla Milles Hawes (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1968), 119.

91. Borick, 189–90; and McIntosh, 119.

92. "George Washington to Lt Col Henry Laurens, 26 April 1780," *Founders Online*, accessed 3 December 2020, https://founders.archive.gov/documents/Washington/03-25-02-0345.

93. Parker, *Parker's Guide to the Revolutionary War*, 89, shows the approximate location for Fuller's House 700 feet (215 meters) north of Ryan's Bluff Road, roughly west of the nearby Dorchester Road Senior Center. "Fuller Plantation," https://south-carolina-plantations.com/charleston/fuller.html, shows Fuller Plantation north of the William Pringle Runnymede Plantation located at 6518 Dorchester Road. This book uses Parker's interpretation.

94. John J. Sayen Jr., "Oared Fighting Ships of the South Carolina Navy, 1776–1780," *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 87, no. 4 (October 1986): 234.

95. Bulger, "The British Expedition to Charleston," 115. European siege warfare of the era was based on tactics and techniques devised in the 1670s by French military engineer Sebastien de Vauban.

96. Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 109–110; Walker, *Engineers of Independence*, 6–7; and Benjamin Quarles, *The Negro in the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 137.

97. Borick, 136–37.

98. Russell, *The American Revolution in South Carolina, 142*.

99. Henry Clinton, "Journal of the Siege of Charleston, 1780," ed. William Bulger, *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 66, no. 3 (July 1965): 153–54.

100. Clinton, 153–54.

101. Willcox, *The American Rebellion*, 163–64.

102. "Diary of Major Ferdinand de Brahm," in *Documentary History of the American Revolution*, ed. R. W. Gibbes (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1857), 125.

103. Lisa M. Gardiner, "Defending a Nation: Synthesizing Geographic Information Systems Analysis and Ground Penetrating Radar to Locate Battlefield Features Associated with the 1780 Siege of Charleston" (thesis, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, May 2021), 101, 111.

104. "Rediscovering Charleston's Colonial Fortifications FAQs," accessed 26 December 2018, https://walledcitytaskforce.org/faqs/.

105. James Haw, "Review of Carl Borick, *A Gallant Defense: The Siege of Charleston*," *The Georgia Historical Quarterly* 87, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 306, notes that the South Carolina legislature had previously issued a public resolve to defend the city.

106. David B. Mattern, *Benjamin Lincoln and the American Revolution* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), 93–94. Bulger, "The British Expedition to Charleston," 143, also notes Lincoln felt the idea of abandoning the city while reinforcements were enroute was especially dishonorable.

107. Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 129; and "The Search for a Suitable Water Supply: The Early Years," Charleston Water System, accessed 25 May 2022, https://www.charlestonwater.com/164/The-Search-for-a-Suitable-Water-Supply.

108. Russell, *The American Revolution*, 139. Among the reinforcements ordered south were the Maryland Line and the Delaware Regiment under command of Maj. Gen. Johann De Kalb. Difficulties in procuring supplies and

transport delayed De Kalb's corps from reaching Virginia until early June, well after the surrender of Charleston.

109. Bulger, "The British Expedition to Charleston," 121. Governor Rutledge managed to reenlist about 100 men with a $300 bounty plus a "free suit of clothes and $50 per month." The remaining 700 North Carolina militiamen refused Rutledge's offers and marched for home.

110. Borick, *A Gallant Defense,* 57–58; and Robert S. Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 1987), 95–97.

111. Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 63–64.

112. Wilson, *The Southern Strategy*, 210–11.

113. Benjamin Lincoln, *Original Papers Relating to the Siege of Charleston 1780*, (Charleston, SC: Press of Walker, Evans & Cogswell Co., 1898), 9–10.

114. "John Laurens to George Washington, 9 April 1780," *Founders Online*, National Archives, accessed 6 November 2020, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-25-02-0237.

115. Susan Millar Williams, "East Side History Series: Hampstead," 6 October 2016, http://ttcpalmernews.blogspot.com/2016/10/east-side-history-series-hampstead.html. Hampstead Hill originally covered four city blocks, but after the war was leveled for new house construction.

116. Borick, *A Gallant Defense,* 122–24; and Gardiner, "Defending a Nation," 72.

117. John Buchanan, T*he Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1997), 57.

118. Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 129–30.

119. Clinton, "Journal of the Siege of Charleston," 149–50.

120. "Diary of Major Ferdinand de Brahm," *Documentary History of the American Revolution*, 125.

121. Nic Butler, "Uncovering History: Locating the Horn Work under Marion Square," 2020, https://www.ccpl.org/news/uncovering-history-locating-horn-work-under-marion-square.

122. Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 116–18.

123. Clinton, "Journal of the Siege of Charleston," 160.

124. Moultrie, *Memoirs of the American Revolution*, 64.

125. Russell, *The American Revolution in South Carolina,* 48.

126. Reproduced in Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 136–37.

127. "Diary of Major Ferdinand de Brahm," *Documentary History of the American Revolution*, 274–75.

128. Jenny Gesley, "Four Corners of Law, Charleston, SC—Pic of the Week," 6 October 2017, Law Librarians of Congress, https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2017/10/four-corners-of-law-charleston-sc-pic-of-the-week/.

129. Henry Lumpkin, *From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South* (San Jose, CA: toExcel, 2000), 48.

130. Russell, *The American Revolution in South Carolina,* 143–44.

131. Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 210–14. Russell, *The American Revolution*, 145–6.

132. Willcox, *The American* Rebellion, 164.

133. "To George Washington from Benjamin Lincoln, 11 August 1780," *Founders Online*, National Archives, accessed 30 June 2021, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-02900.

134. "To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 17 May 1780," *Founders Online*, National Archives, accessed 22 June 2021, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-26-02-0044.

135. Henry A. M. Smith, "Hog Island and Shute's Folly," *The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Society*, 19, no. 2 (April 1918): 89.

136. Gardner W. Allen, *A Naval History of the American Revolution*, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918), 67.

137. "The 1772 Gaspee Affair, Rhode Island's Own Tea Party (But the Ship Burned), part 2," 2022, New England Historical Society, accessed 22 June 2021, https://www.newenglandhistoricalsociety.com/1772-gaspee-affair-rhode-islands-tea-party-ship-burned-2/.

138. Sally D. Wilson, "Who Was Commodore Whipple?" Gaspee Virtual Archives, November 2004, http://gaspee.org/AbrahamWhipple.html.

139. Gardner W. Allen, *A Naval History of the American Revolution,* 491–93.

140. As defined by the British Admiralty, a frigate was a warship with at least twenty-eight guns, all mounted on a single deck. By contrast, a ship of the line carried two or more gun decks. See https://revolutionarywar.us/continental-navy/ (accessed 22 May 2022) for additional information.

141. Sayen, "Oared Fighting Ships of the South Carolina Navy," 225.

142. Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 72–75; and George F. Sproule, "A Sketch of the Environs of Charlestown in South Carolina, 1780," Library of Congress, accessed 28 May 2022, https://www.loc.gov/item/gm71000637/.

143. Lumpkin, *From Savannah to Yorktown*, 43–44.

144. Lumpkin, 46–47; and Murdoch, "A French Account of the Siege of Charleston," 143.

145. Bulger, "The British Expedition to Charleston," 157.

146. Benjamin Lincoln, *Original Papers*, 37.

147. Willcox, *The American Rebellion*, 167.

148. Moultrie, *Memoirs of the American Revolution*, 60–61. Fort Moultrie surrendered to a naval landing party on 6 May.

149. Russell, *The American Revolution*, 146.

150. Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy, *The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 230–31.

151. Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 223–24.

152. Robert K. Wright, *The Continental Army* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1983), 283–314.

153. Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 223–24.

154. O'Shaughnessy, *The Men Who Lost America*, 281.

155. Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence*, 356–57.

156. O'Shaughnessy, *The Men Who Lost America*, 231; and Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 68.

157. Article 4 of the Articles of Capitulation, reproduced in Borick, *A Gallant Defense*, 248.

158. C. L. Bragg, *Martyr of the American Revolution: The Execution of Isaac Hayne, South Carolinian* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2016), 9.

159. Russell, *The American Revolution*, 149.

160. See O'Shaughnessy, *The Men Who Lost America*, 230–33 and 243–46, for extended discussion of Clinton's leadership and character flaws, and 255–86 for an enlightening discussion of the subsequent course of the Southern Campaign. O'Shaughnessy equally apportions blame among the army and navy commanders.

161. Bulger, "The British Expedition to Charleston," 179.

162. Wayne E. Lee, "Review of Carl P. Borick, *A Gallant Defense: The Siege of Charleston, 1780*," *The Register of Kentucky Historical Society* 101, no. 1/2 (Winter/Spring 2003) 129–30. Lincoln's lack of operational and strategic intellect is also noted in Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton's vignette of the campaign, 170–71.

163.Mattern, *Benjamin Lincoln and the American Revolution*, 108.

164. Richard K. Showman et al., ed., *The Papers of Nathanael Greene*, vol. 8 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1976), *xii*. Like many other military concepts or the era, *uti possidetis* was adopted from the Romans.

165. Mattern, *Benjamin Lincoln and the American Revolution*, 108. See "Nathanael Greene to George Washington, 31 May 1779," in *The Papers of Nathanael Greene*, vol. 4, ed. Richard K. Showman et al. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 107–8. In his May 1779 letter, Greene articulates a remarkable grasp of the importance of the Continentals as the center of gravity for the American cause. Lincoln was apparently unaware of the concept despite working directly for General Washington. Lincoln's decisions in the South reveal his lack of strategic acumen, particularly the importance of the Continental forces to the Revolutionary cause.

166. Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 130.

167. Willcox, *The American Rebellion*, 168.

168. Willcox, 168–69.

169. Willcox, 169–70.

170. Tarleton, *A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781*, 15

171. "To George Washington from Benjamin Lincoln, 11 August 1780," *Founders Online*, National Archives, accessed 30 June 2021, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-02900.

Part IV
Integration

This chapter provides a suggested framework for conducting the all-important integration phase of the staff ride. As outlined in the introduction, integration should occur as soon as possible after the field study phase (terrain walk) to allow students to capture, synthesize, and articulate their observations and insights. To omit or rush this portion is to miss the entire point of the staff ride: *What did I learn, and how do I apply what I learned today to improve myself and/or my profession?*[1] Before starting the previous field study phase, the facilitator should have ensured the training audience clearly understood the staff ride is a training event, and not just an interesting terrain walk. Additionally, the facilitator should have ensured that the unit commander clearly articulated training objectives and goals for the event. During the terrain walk, it's important to periodically remind students there will "be a test at the end;" this will help motivate active participation in sharing insights as they form. The facilitator should encourage note-taking to capture fleeting thoughts and impressions for later sharing. A helpful technique is for individual students to use a dedicated recorder to take notes, or even record the event with a digital device, and provide a summary of notes at the end.

In planning and preparing for the Integration phase, the facilitator must balance some competing factors. Ideally, the integration session should be held in a location with minimal environmental and noise distractions. To ensure that sufficient time is provided for the integration, the facilitator should coordinate in advance with the unit commander to block out adequate time on the training schedule. When possible, students should have some time for personal reflection and thought before the integration phase. Optimum timing is to hold the integration session the day after the field study phase ends. However, few units will afford the staff ride leader the luxury of extra time, so the leader may need to conduct the integration phase immediately following the field study. First, consider the physical needs of the students and facilitators. After a couple of hours walking the battlefield, physical requirements (food, water, and restroom relief) will impact student ability to perform critical thinking. The staff ride facilitator should organize the integration phase based on the type of unit (the focus of a brigade will likely differ from a division- or corps-level formation), time available, and the unit commander's training objectives and goals. Address the commander's expectations for the integration event beforehand, as a formal event may require coordinating auditorium space

and audiovisual support. Conversely, an informal integration event can be done in conjunction with a post-staff ride meal. At a minimum, the integration event should take place at a location other than the last stand, in a setting that allows open discussion among all participants. The staff ride leader can employ a structured or unstructured format; whatever method is used, the staff ride leader should facilitate the event and let the students do most of the talking. By using this approach, the students will ideally integrate their preliminary study with insights gained on the terrain walk to gain relevant insights into their current assignment as well as subsequent career. The integration phase does not include an after-action review (AAR) of the staff ride. Although important, AAR comments fall outside the scope of the integration event, and should be done separately.

This section provides some techniques along with sample questions that the facilitator can use to cap off a quality training event. Figures 4.1 through 4.2 on page 180 and 181 provide additional analysis points using Army doctrine as a structuring framework. The questions should help students link their experiences and observations to the commander's stated training objectives. At the beginning of the integration event, the facilitator should remind students of the training event goals and objectives and the purpose of the integration phase. Then the facilitator should use open-ended questions to stimulate a robust question-and-comment session. Depending on the audience and motivation level, the facilitator may only need to ask the question and let the conversation run its course. For more reserved participants, the facilitator may have to ask focused follow-up questions to "draw out" good insights such as:

1. **What initial impressions of the campaign did you develop in the preliminary study phase that were either changed or strengthened by the terrain walk?**

This question gets to the heart of a staff ride: the study of the terrain in relation to the course of the battle. Discussion could include the struggle to control river crossing points, and the contest to control access to the inner harbor of Charleston as well as the vast distances of the operational maneuver leading to the battle and the rugged terrain's impact on operational and tactical maneuvers. A good follow up question: *Did seeing the terrain alter your opinion of any of the leaders' decisions or actions? If so, how?*

2. **Which aspects of warfare have changed since 1780? Which have remained the same?**

The obvious "changed" aspects will generally revolve around technology, weapons, mechanization and motorization, communications, and

support equipment. More subtle, but discoverable with a bit of encouragement from the facilitator, are the timeless aspects of warfare—the role of personalities, relationships, commander's intent and guidance, logistics, and the presence or absence of assertive leadership on the battlefield.

3. **What relevant insights can a military professional glean from studying the Charleston Campaign?**

This question can easily open a myriad of discussion threads, limited only by time and student interest. Here, the facilitator can help frame the discussion by the type of unit. For example, a logistics unit might compare and contrast how the British and Americans organized their logistics systems. Although this staff ride incorporates much in the way of tactical level analysis, it also supports operational-level considerations, including:

a. End-state/military conditions.

b. Center of gravity.

c. Decisive points and objectives.

d. Lines of operation.

e. Culmination point.

f. Operational reach/approach/pause.

g. Simultaneous and sequential operations.

h. Tempo.

For tactical-level analysis, the Army's Warfighting Functions (WFF) can serve as a good launch point for questions:

a. Movement and Maneuver.

b. Intelligence.

c. Fires.

d. Sustainment.

e. Protection.

f. Mission Command/Leadership.

These suggested questions and focus areas are to help stimulate a robust integration phase. This handbook provides examples of possible answers to the questions but does not provide "the right answer" to operational and tactical problems. In preparation for the event, the staff ride leader should pre-record answers or thoughts to the questions to develop potential ideas to "kick-start" the discussion if needed. Ideally, students will

engage in a spirited discussion that will require minimal instructor input. In the event the students are less motivated, the instructor must engage in more direct Socratic question-and-answer techniques to fully engage them.

Charleston Campaign Analysis		
	United States	**Great Britain**
Strategic Goals	• Establish undisputed sovereignty • Gain independence	• Establish undisputed sovereignty of southern colonies • Use North America as base to protect Caribbean
Operational Goals	• Exhaust and attrit the British will • Not losing is winning	• Regain sovereignty in the Carolinas • Sequentially regain southern colonies
Tactical Objectives	• Retain control of Charleston	• Destroy Continental forces • Exploit Charleston as a secure base of operations • Organize Loyalists
Centers of Gravity	• Continental Army • French support • Popular support	• Legitimacy • Loyalist support
Lines of Operation	• Interior	• Exterior • Operate along water corridors of movement
Decisive Points	• Leadership • Motivation • Neutralize Loyalists	• Discipline • Volley fire and bayonet charge • Secure Loyalists
Culminating Points	• Destruction or neutralization of Continentals • Loss of popular support	• Loss of Loyalist support • Loss of supplies from interior

Figure 4.1. Charleston Campaign Analysis. Created by the author.

Siege of Charleston Tactical Analysis		
	Lincoln/ United States	**Clinton/ Great Britain**
Movement and Maneuver	• Lincoln loses ability to maneuver once inside fortifications. • Water used for rapid movement of troops and supplies	• Movement is methodical and done with support from naval units • Indirect approach minimizes losses • Use of liaison officer (LNO) to coordinate operations with Navy
Intelligence	• Fails to effectively employ mobile troops and scouts	• Good use of scouts and local guides • Engineer surveys and detailed maps to guide operations
Fires	• Integrated fire plan for all systems • Precision fires using riflemen	• Integrated fire plan for all systems • Precision fires using *jägers*
Sustainment	• Fails to protect vulnerable lines of communication • Failure to preserve meat rations • No evacuation of non-combatants to reduce logistics burden	• Transports used as seaborne logistics base • Water lines of communication facilitate movement of supplies • Provisions and forage drawn from local sources
Protection	• Extensive obstacles and earthworks to protect troops and city	• Good use of scouts and local guides • Engineer surveys and detailed maps to guide operations
Mission Command/ Leadership	• Lincoln fails to resolve conflicting orders—loses sight of center of gravity • Unclear commander's intent • Lincoln unable to impose his will on subordinates	• Clinton develops clear and flexible operational design • Maintains unity of command effort toward the goal of taking Charleston

Figure 4.2. Siege of Charleston Tactical Analysis. Created by the author.

Notes

1. Matthew Cavanaugh, "The Historical Staff Ride, Version 2.0: Educational and Strategic Frameworks" (unpublished thesis, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 2013, https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-images/centers_research/center_for_teching_excellence/PDFs/mtp_project_papers/Cavanaugh_14.pdf, 4–6. Cavanaugh provides excellent pointers on how to ensure the staff ride is conducted with sufficient historical rigor. See also Peter G. Knight and William Glenn Robertson, *The Staff Ride: Fundamentals, Experiences, Techniques* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2020), 37–38.

Part V
Support

Information and Assistance

a. The Army University Press (AUP) Staff Ride Team, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, can assist and advise on planning and executing a professional staff ride. Visit the AUP website for details and resources:

Army University Press
Truesdale Hall, 290 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2348
(913) 684-2131/2082/2080
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Staff-Rides/

b. Fort Moultrie National Historic Park is located on Sullivan's Island, South Carolina. The closest major airport is Charleston International Airport (CHS), about twenty miles from Fort Moultrie. The best amenities for before or after a staff ride (gas, lodging and restaurants) are in nearby Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. Fort Moultrie, which is administered by the National Park Service, features a full-service visitor's center with museum displays, bookstore, and a roomy theater well-suited for pre-and post-visit use. The park visitor's center is open daily except for Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year's Day, from 0900 to 1600; the grounds and parking area are accessible from 0900 to 1700. The entrance fee is waivable for "educational groups with an approved academic fee waiver." Advanced reservations are required for group visits, and you will need to coordinate theater use. For more information, contact the park staff:

Fort Moultrie National Historic Park
1214 Middle St.
Sullivan's Island, SC 29482
(843) 577-0242
https://www.nps.gov/fosu/learn/historyculture/fort_moultrie.htm

c. The Command Historian at the United States Army Soldier Support Institute can provide limited support and assistance to Army units planning a Charleston staff ride:

United States Army Soldier Support Institute (SSI)
ATTN: ATSG-CH (Command Historian)
10000 Hampton Pkwy.
Fort Jackson, SC 29207
(803) 751-8013

d. The US Army Center of Military History (CMH) staff ride webpage offers additional information on planning and executing staff rides: https://history.army.mil/staffRides/.

Logistics for the Campaign-Level Staff Ride

a. Meals and Services. Most stands in or close to Charleston are near food, fuel, and restroom services; however, this is not true for the first-day stands west of the Ashley River, or east of the Cooper River. Planners are strongly encouraged to do personal reconnaissance of these remote stops to locate required services.

b. Lodging. For military or Federal civilians traveling on government orders, lodging in downtown Charleston will generally exceed the authorized Federal per diem rate. For lodging within the government per diem rate, consider facilities near the Charleston International Airport, or along I-26 at North Charleston or at Goose Creek. Another option for military or Federal employees is lodging at nearby Joint Base Charleston (http://af.dodlodging.net/propertys/JB---Charleston-AFB).

c. Traveling. Ground transportation to Charleston is best via I-26—driving from Columbia, South Carolina, or connecting to I-26 via I-95 North from Savannah, Georgia, or I-95 South coming from Fayetteville, North Carolina. Charleston International Airport (CHS) is the preferred gateway for groups flying from an extended distance. Joint Base Charleston may also be a good transportation hub for units with access to military air travel options.

Other Considerations

a. As with any other training event, direct coordination with the park staff, and personal reconnaissance of the selected stands is essential. With advanced notice, the Fort Moultrie Park staff can support a staff ride with assistant instructors and a firing demonstration.

b. Lowcountry South Carolina tends to be warm and humid most of the year. To limit ill effects from warm weather, plan appropriate hydration and personal relief stops for students throughout the day.

c. All participants should wear comfortable outdoor footwear and long pants, and carry rain gear and insect repellent— especially for the stands outside the metro Charleston area.

d. Road and parking conditions vary by stand, so facilitators should do their own reconnaissance to confirm routes and suitable parking for

large vehicles. As a general rule, the roads in and around the city are narrow and congested. Because buses are limited to certain routes within the old part of the city, additional research and coordination will be required to use buses for transportation.

e. Parking is limited and expensive, so those traveling on government travel orders should program parking fees into their travel authorization. Reconnaissance of parking spots and costs also should be part of the planning process.

f. To best replicate weather, light, and vegetation conditions during the campaign, plan this staff ride in April–May; otherwise, the recommended time is during milder fall and spring months.

Appendix A
Stand Maps



Figure A.1. Map Key – Legend. Created by the author.





1 R. Howe, Summer 1776
2 W. Howe, Summer 1778
3 Clinton, Summer 1778
4 Campbell, Winter 1778–1779

Revolutionary War Battles 1775–1779

A Bennington
B Brandywine
C Bunker Hill
D Concord
E Crown Point/Ticonderoga
F Germantown
G Kaskaski
H Lexington
I Long Island
J Monmouth
K Montreal
L Moore's Creek Bridge
M Newton
N Oriskany
O Princeton
P Saratoga
Q Savannah
R Stony Point
S Ticonderoga
T Trenton
U Valcour Island
V Valley Forge
W Vincennes
X White Plains
Y Wyoming

Source: US Military Academy, Department of History

Figure A.2. Principal American Revolution Campaigns, 1775–79. Recreated by Army University Press.



Source: US Military Academy, Department of History

Figure A.3. Principal American Revolution Campaigns, 1780–81. Recreated by Army University Press.

Revolutionary War Timeline

	1775
19 Apr	Lexington and Concord
15 Jun	Washington named Commander in Chief of Continental Army
17 Jun	Battle of Bunker Hill
	1776
27 Feb	Battle Moore's Creek Bridge
4 Jul	Declaration of Independence
27 Aug	Battle of Long Island
15 Sep	British occupation of New York City
26 Dec	Battle of Trenton
	1777
6 Aug	Indecisive action at Oriskany
16 Aug	Battle of Bennington
11 Sep	Battle of Brandywine
26 Sep	British occupy Philadelphia
4 Oct	Battle of Germantown
17 Oct	Burgoyne surrenders at Saratoga
19 Dec	Washington retires to Valley Forge
	1778
6 Feb	US and France sign alliance
28 Jun	Battle of Monmouth
29 Dec	Battle of Savannah
	1779
25 Feb	Battle of Vincennes
21 Jun	Spain declares war on Britain
	1780
12 May	British take Charleston
16 Aug	Battle of Camden
23 Sep	Bonhomme Richard captures British *Serapis*
7 Oct	Battle of King's Mountain
	1781
17 Jan	Battle of Cowpens
15 Mar	Battle of Guilford Courthouse
5 Sep	French defeat British on Chesapeake Bay
19 Oct	Cornwallis surrenders at Yorktown
	1782
	US and Britain sign preliminary peace treaty
	1783
13 Sep	Final peace treaty signed in Paris

Figure A.4. Principal American Revolution Campaigns, Timeline. Courtesy of the US Military Academy, Department of History.



Figure A.5. Operational Overview, 1776. Created by the author.



Figure A.6. Day 1 Tactical Stands, Sullivan's Island. Created by the author.



Figure A.7. British Assault on Fort Moultrie, 28 June 1776. Created by the author.

Battlefield Effects
British Assault on Fort Moultrie
28 June 1776

Weather
- Atlantic storms pose risk to orderly task force movement on open water
- Oppressive spring heat for European troops
- High humidity and periodic coast rains
- 4 June 1776 (British arrival):
  – Average High: 82°F
  – Average Low: 72°F
  – Average Precipitation: 4.2 inches/month
- 28 June 1776 (Day of battle):
  – Average High: 86°F
  – Average Low: 76°F
  – Southerly wind to move British frigates into position at Sullivan's Island
  – Rising tide from 0800–1200
  – Ebb tide from 1200–1800

Light
- 4 June:
  – Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight (BMNT): 0616
  – End Morning Nautical Twilight (EMNT): 0711
  – Beginning Evening Nautical Twilight (BENT): 1938
  – End Evening Nautical Twilight (EENT): 2031
- 28 June:
  – Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight (BMNT): 0545
  – End Morning Nautical Twilight (EMNT): 0613
  – Beginning Evening Nautical Twilight (BENT): 2033
  – End Evening Nautical Twilight (EENT): 2100

Observation
- Observation very good across water
- Island vegetation obstructs line of sight (LOS)

Avenues of Approach
- The Ship Channel (21' deep at high tide)
- Breach Inlet

Key Terrain
- The "Infernal Bar"
- Breach Inlet

Obstacles and Movement
- No use of obstacles by Americans
- Movement along barrier islands requires boats
- The Bar hinders ship movement into harbor
- Shoals limit ship maneuver inside harbor

Cover & Concealments
- Limited concealment from sand dunes
- Cover man-made
  – Sand/log/earth redoubts
  – Wooden ship hulls

Figure A.8. Battlefield Effects: British Assault on Fort Moultrie, 28 June 1776. Created by the author.



Figure A.9. Operational Overview, 1777–79. Created by the author.



1	Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln (5,600).
1	Lt. Gen. Henry Clinton (12,800).
2	26 March 1780, General James Patterson arrives from Georgia.
3	28–29 March, British crossing.
A	3 February, British land on Simmons Island.
B	16 February, British occupy Stono Ferry.
C	7 March, British complete the pontoon bridge across the Wappoo Cut.
D	11 March, British occupy Fort Johnson and Cummins Point.
E	12 March, Fenwick's Point redoubt fully operational.
F	20 March, British fleet enters Five Fathom Hole, covered by guns at Cummins Point.
G	1 April, British open siegeworks (see Figure A.14 for more detail).
H	7 April, Woodford's Virginia brigade arrives via Cooper River.
I	8 April, British fleet passes Fort Moultrie and enters harbor.
J	12 April, American cavalry defeated at Monck's Corner.
K	14 April–6 May, British seize American outlying posts and Fort Moultrie.
L	11 May, General Lincoln surrenders; 12 May, garrison lays down arms.

Source: US Military Academy, Department of History

Figure A.10. The Charleston Campaign: Initial Disposition and Movements, 1 February–12 May 1780. Courtesy of the US Military Academy, History Department.



Figure A.11. Day 1 Tactical Stands, Charleston Vicinity. Created by the author.



Figure A.12. Day 1 Tactical Stands, Monck's Corner. Created by the author.



Source: US Military Academy, Department of History

Figure A.13. The Siege of Charleston, March–May 1780. Created by the author.

Battlefield Effects
Siege of Charleston
29 March–12 May 1780

Weather
- Oppressive spring heat for European troops
- High humidity and periodic coast rains
- 29 March:
  - Average High: 65°F
  - Average Low: 51°F
  - Average Precipitation: 3.3 inches/month
- 12 May:
  - Average High: 78°F
  - Average Low: 67°F
  - Average Precipitation: 2 inches/month

Light
- 29 March:
  - Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight (BMNT): 0616
  - End Morning Nautical Twilight (EMNT): 0711
  - Beginning Evening Nautical Twilight (BENT): 1938
  - End Evening Nautical Twilight (EENT): 2031
- 12 May:
  - Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight (BMNT): 0523
  - End Morning Nautical Twilight (EMNT): 0622
  - Beginning Evening Nautical Twilight (BENT): 2036
  - End Evening Nautical Twilight (EENT): 2109

Observation
- Very flat, observation very good across water
- Thick vegetation on barrier islands blocks line of sight (LOS)

Avenues of Approach
- Roads: King's Highway and Colonial Road
- Ashley and Cooper rivers

Key Terrain
- River crossings (ferries/fords/bridges)
- Hampstead Hill

Obstacles and Movement
- Extensive use of obstacles in siege lines
- Rivers, streams, and swamps hinder cross-country movement

Cover & Concealments
- Very little concealment
- Cover largely man-made
  - Sand/log/earth redoubts
  - American masonry/tabby forts

Figure A.14. Battlefield Effects: Siege of Charleston, 29 March–12 May 1780. Created by the author.



Figure A.15. Day 2 Tactical Stands, Dorchester Road. Created by the author.



Figure A.16. Day 2 Tactical Stands, Charleston. Created by the author.

Appendix B
Biographical Sketches of Major Participants

Assigning selected students to study of one of the key participants can accomplish several goals for the staff ride. First, assigning a read-ahead assignment will help ensure the student will research the character enough to avoid embarrassment on the day of the event. Ideally, the student will do in-depth analysis of the historical character to be able to discuss why the character acted in a particular way, and how those actions impacted the outcome of the battle. Secondly, role playing nests well within the adult learning pedagogical model; students learn best when they form a personal interest or attachment to the subject. Studying historical participants can create an intellectual and emotional connection, stimulating a student's interest in the past and ideally fostering a career-long desire for additional self-study and reflection on the profession of arms. Lastly, role playing can inject some levity into an otherwise-serious and often-grim subject, helping to "lighten the mood" and maintain participant interest and motivation. For consistency, all ranks shown here are as of May 1780.

Americans

Brig. Gen. Isaac Huger. Isaac Huger (pronounced YOU-gee) was born in March 1742 to a wealthy Huguenot merchant and plantation owner on South Carolina's Cooper River. In his youth, Huger was sent abroad to Europe for a formal education. Huger joined the Provincial South Carolina Regiment as a company-grade officer and fought his first combat at age eighteen against a band of Cherokee. At the start of the Revolution, Huger was commissioned lieutenant colonel of the 1st South Carolina Regiment then was commissioned colonel of the 5th South Carolina Continental Regiment in September 1776. By 1779, Huger was a Continental brigadier general in the Southern Department. After he was wounded at Stono Ferry in June 1779, Huger recovered to take command of the department's dragoons. In April 1780, Huger's task force was beaten by Tarleton's Legion at Monck's Corner and dispersed. He was evacuated to the interior due to illness so missed the May 1780 surrender of Charleston. Huger later led a brigade of Virginia Continental and State Line troops in General Greene's army until being severely wounded at Guilford Courthouse. After the war, Huger served in the South Carolina General Assembly then was appointed the first US marshal of South Carolina in September 1789. Poor health and personal matters led to Huger's retirement in 1793, and he died in October 1797.[1]

Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln. Born in January 1733 to one of the leading Puritan families of Hingham, Massachusetts, Benjamin Lincoln completed a common school education before following in his father's footsteps as town magistrate and clerk, farmer, church deacon, and malt shop proprietor. Lincoln was elected as the adjutant of the 2nd Suffolk militia regiment but because of personal and professional duties did not actively serve during the French and Indian Wars. By 1775, Lincoln was a leading member of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, overseeing the raising and equipping of "minutemen" militia companies within the county. After Lexington and Concord, Major Lincoln oversaw the mobilization of militia for the siege of Boston. Because of his organizational skills, Lincoln was commissioned as brigadier general of the Suffolk County militia in January 1776. Soon thereafter he was given a Massachusetts major general commission, in charge of positioning the artillery batteries that drove Royal Navy ships from Boston harbor on 13 June 1776. Afterward, General Lincoln led a brigade of state militia during the New York campaign of late 1776. Due to his good performance in covering General George Washington's retreat, Lincoln received a Continental major general's commission in February 1777. During the Saratoga campaign, General Lincoln organized a militia corps that supported General Horatio Gates's Continental corps defending upstate New York from Burgoyne's expedition. Shortly after the battle of Bemis Heights, Lincoln was wounded during a reconnaissance patrol and so missed the remainder of the Saratoga campaign. After recovering at home, General Lincoln was given command of the Southern Department in August 1778. During 1778–79, Lincoln led Continentals in the failed Franco-American siege of Charleston. After Savannah, he was surprised by a spring 1779 British raid by Augustine Prevost that nearly captured Charleston. Hamstrung by interference from the South Carolina political leadership and the intransigence of Commodore Abraham Whipple, Lincoln was compelled to surrender Charleston to Sir Henry Clinton in May 1780. Lincoln was subsequently paroled and requested a board of inquiry from General Washington, who denied the request citing lack of witnesses and information. General Lincoln was exchanged in November 1780 and returned to duty in charge of recruiting fresh Continental soldiers for the 1781 campaign season. In the spring of 1781, he successfully led a reconnaissance-in-force against British-held New York before leading a corps of 2,500 Continental reinforcements to help defend Virginia from Cornwallis. Lincoln's corps arrived intact and ready to besiege Cornwallis's army near Yorktown—a testament to his planning and logistics skills. General Washington granted

Lincoln the post of honor in opening the formal siege of Yorktown in early October 1781. On 19 October 1781, Cornwallis's army marched out of their works with cased colors, humiliated by the same terms imposed on Lincoln at Charleston. When General Charles O'Hara offered his sword as a token of surrender, Washington rebuffed the offer, instead ordering O'Hara to present the weapon to Lincoln. Despite his loss of Charleston, Benjamin Lincoln was viewed as an honest and trustworthy man; he was later appointed as the first secretary of war and represented Massachusetts at the Confederation Congress. In later years, Lincoln served a term as lieutenant governor of the state of Massachusetts and served as collector for the port of Boston. Lincoln died at his home in Hingham, Massachusetts, on 9 May 1810.[2]

Sgt. Johann Wilhelm (John William) Jasper. Although his story is shrouded in some mystery, Johann Wilhelm Jasper was born in the German Palatinate around 1750. In 1767, Jasper secured passage to Philadelphia via an indenture contract; he subsequently broke the contract and migrated south to Halifax (modern Burke) County in Georgia. On 7 June 1775, Jasper enlisted in the South Carolina militia. Despite being illiterate, he proved a good soldier and by June 1776 was a sergeant in Moultrie's 2nd South Carolina. During the 28 June 1776 battle of Sullivan's Island, Jasper demonstrated his courage by retrieving and raising the South Carolina flag that had been knocked from its flag pole by a British shot; his actions helped rally the American garrison to continue fighting the Royal Navy. Sergeant Jasper survived the battle without wounding, and was presented a sword by Governor Rutledge to recognize his valor in combat. He was also recommended for a lieutenant's commission, an honor which Jasper self-consciously refused due to his illiteracy. General Benjamin Lincoln described Jasper as a superb patrol leader based on his actions during 1779 battle skirmishes:

> At the commencement of the war, William Jasper entered into my regiment, (the second) and was made sergeant; he was a brave, active, stout, strong, enterprising man, and a very great partizan. I had such confidence in him, that when I was in the field, I gave him a roving commission, and liberty to pick out his men from my brigade, he seldom would take more than six; he went often out, and returned with prisoners before I knew he was gone, I have known of his catching a party that was looking for him. He has told me that he could have killed single men several times, but he would not, he would rather let them get

> off. He went into the British lines at Savannah, and delivered himself up as a deserter, complaining at the same time, of our ill usage to him; he was gladly received (they having heard of his character) and caressed by them. He staid eight days, and after informing himself well of their strength, situation, and intentions, he returned to us again; but that game he could not play a second time. With his little party he was always hovering about the enemy's camp, and was frequently bringing in prisoners.

Sergeant Jasper took part in the 9 October 1780 Franco-American assault on British-held Savannah. In the fighting around the Spring Hill redoubt, the color sergeant bearing the South Carolina flag was shot down. Sergeant Jasper scooped up the colors, but his earlier luck at Sullivan's Island failed; Jasper was mortally wounded in front of the Spring Hill fortifications.[3]

Brig. Gen. William Moultrie. William Moultrie was born at Charleston on 23 November 1730. With the financial backing of his physician father, young William became one of the leading rice planters in South Carolina. By 1752, he was prominent enough in Charleston to win election to the Common House of Assembly, representing the St. Helena parish. His first military experience was as a South Carolina militia captain during the Anglo-Cherokee War of 1761. In 1776, Moultrie was appointed colonel of the 2nd South Carolina militia regiment. When activated for war, his regiment manned the partially built fort on Sullivan's Island, successfully blocking the first British attack in May 1776. Moultrie personally designed a dark blue regimental flag with the white crescent of liberty and a palmetto tree, features later incorporated in South Carolina's official state flag. His success at Sullivan's Island earned a brigadier general's commission in the Southern Department of the Continental Army. Moultrie led Continental and state troops at the battles of Port Royal and Stono Ferry and was General Lincoln's second-in-command during the siege of Charleston. After the city's surrender, Moultrie was paroled to Philadelphia, and subsequently exchanged then promoted to major general by the Continental Congress in 1782. After the war, he returned to his rice plantation and the South Carolina General Assembly. Moultrie's popularity led to two terms as South Carolina governor that were marked by the successful relocation of the state government to Columbia and large-scale adoption of cotton as a cash crop. Moultrie's reputation later suffered when he publicly supported the French Revolution, particularly French attempts to recruit privateers and volunteers from South Carolina. Moultrie retired from public life in 1794 to devote time to the Society of the Cincinnati, a

fraternal organization of American and French officers who served during the American Revolution. In 1802, he published his *Memoirs of the American Revolution*, and died at Charleston in September 1805. His remains were later reinterred at Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's Island, near the brick and masonry fortress bearing his name.[4]

Gov. John Rutledge. John Rutledge, the sole civilian in this list of participants, warrants inclusion due to his prominent role in defending South Carolina. Born 17 September 1739 in Charleston, the eldest son of an Irish immigrant physician, Rutledge showed much promise and began reading law at age 17; he studied law in England then established his practice in Charleston. Before the American Revolution, Rutledge advocated for political and economic freedom from England. He served on the committee protesting the Stamp Act of 1765, and represented South Carolina at the 1774 First Continental Congress and 1776 Second Continental Congress. Rutledge was elected president of South Carolina under the provisional state constitution of 26 March 1776. One of his first acts was to organize civilian and military support for the defense of Charleston and resolve the crisis of command between Continental General Charles Lee and Col. William Moultrie. Rutledge resigned as president in 1778 following a dispute with the state legislature over a proposed new constitution. On 9 January 1779, he was elected South Carolina's first governor under its new constitution. Rutledge orchestrated South Carolina responses to British incursions into Georgia and South Carolina; he was strongly criticized for his part in offering to surrender Charleston during General Mark Prevost's raid. When the British returned to Charleston in early 1780, the panicked legislature voted Rutledge extraordinary executive powers during the crisis. Urged by General Lincoln, Rutledge left Charleston to raise militia reinforcements from the interior, and so missed the city's surrender in May 1780. He avoided British capture, and formed a sort of government-in-exile in support of Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene's campaign to retake the state. After Rutledge's appointment as governor expired in December 1782, he represented South Carolina in the Continental Congress through 1783. During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Rutledge exerted a moderating influence on the final Constitution. He later served as a US Supreme Court associate justice and was chief justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court from 1790–95. In June 1795, President George Washington used a recess appointment to seat Rutledge as the chief justice of the US Supreme Court. However, the Senate rejected a permanent confirmation in December 1795 due to Rutledge's public condemnation of

the Jay Treaty with Great Britain. The humiliation from the episode led to a failed suicide attempt and subsequent withdrawal from public life until Rutledge's death in June 1800. He is interred at St. Michael's Church at the Four Corners of the Law (Broad and King Streets) in Charleston, under a large stone denoting his status as a "Jurist, Patriot, Statesman."[5]

Col. William Washington. A distant relative of George Washington, William Washington was born in Stafford County, Virginia, in February 1752. At the outbreak of the war, Washington abandoned his theological studies to obtain a captain's commission in the 3rd Virginia Continentals on 25 February 1776. Washington served with honor during the New Jersey and New York campaigns, suffering wounds at the battles of Long Island and Trenton. In December 1776, he transferred to the dragoons, and was soon promoted to major and interim commander of the 4th Continental Dragoons. On 20 November 1778, Washington was promoted to lieutenant colonel and appointed commander of the 3rd Continental Dragoons, which was ordered into the Southern Department. His squadron was badly beaten by Tarleton's Legion at Monck's Corner, and virtually destroyed at Lenud's Ferry. After that, Washington withdrew the remnants of his unit to North Carolina to replace its losses. In December 1780, Washington's still-depleted 3rd Dragoons was attached to Morgan's Flying Army and augmented with mounted South Carolina militiamen. Washington's performance was much-improved, and his dragoons won victories at Rugeley's Mill and Hammond's Store. Even though his squadron was outnumbered by Tarleton's Legion at the Battle of Cowpens, Washington skillfully used his massed troopers to envelop the British line and seal the American victory. Congress awarded Lieutenant Colonel Washington a silver medal to recognize his accomplishments at Cowpens. During the Race for the Dan, Washington's dragoon squadron helped screen the main body of Continentals by fighting numerous delaying actions against Tarleton's troops. At Guilford Courthouse, Washington's corps of observation screened the American right flank, and effectively fought to delay the movement of Webster's and O'Hara's brigades on the main Continental line. At the height of the battle, Washington led a well-timed sortie that disrupted the British *2nd Guards* battalion and allowed sufficient time for General Greene to withdraw his Continental regiments. Washington ran into trouble at the Battle of Eutaw Springs, where he was bayonetted and captured on 8 September 1781 after leading a charge against alert British troops. Despite several battlefield reverses due to sloppy security measures, Washington was viewed as a gifted battlefield commander by

both peers and opponents.[6] After the war, Washington settled on the Sandy Hill plantation near Charleston, served in the South Carolina state assembly, and was appointed a brigadier general in the state militia. He died in Charleston in March 1810.[7]

Commodore Abraham Whipple. Abraham Whipple was born in Providence, Rhode Island, on 26 September 1733 to a local farming family. He went to sea at an early age and by his early adult years had been appointed as a merchant ship captain sailing the West Indies trade routes. During the Seven Years' War, Whipple engaged in privateering against French ships. European navies used privateers, fitted out by private owners, to attack enemy shipping under a letter of "marque and reprisal." Captured enemy vessels were condemned at auction, with a percentage returned to the Crown and the rest to the ship's owner, captain, and crew. Whipple apparently was good at that game, in one year capturing thirty-three French vessels. He is best remembered for his role in the June 1772 burning of the British schooner *Gaspee*, regarded by some historians as the first skirmish in the American Revolution. In 1775, Whipple was commissioned in the Rhode Island Navy, and later commissioned a captain in the Continental Navy. In addition to his earlier success against French ships, he proved successful as a privateer against British ships. In June 1778, Whipple led a small flotilla that captured several enemy ships and cargo that yielded $1 million in prize money. In 1780, Commodore Whipple was given command of almost half the Continental navy—three frigates and a war sloop—and sent south to reinforce Charleston. Perhaps he was intimidated by the size of Vice Adm. Mariot Arbuthnot's squadron of fourteen warships; regardless of the reason, Whipple contributed little to the defense of Charleston, other than sending guns and crews ashore to fight alongside the Continental Army, and some minor ship-to-shore action against Clinton's troops. After the surrender, Whipple was paroled and returned to Rhode Island. Saddled by significant debts due to the collapse of the Continental dollar, Whipple had to sell off much of his prewar properties. In later years, Commodore Whipple settled in Ohio and helped pioneer sea trade between Ohio and Cuba. He eventually received some reimbursement for his wartime debts, including the granting of a captain's half-pay as a pension. Whipple died in Marietta Ohio in 1819.[8]

British

Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton. Henry Clinton was born in 1730 to Adm. George Clinton of the Royal Navy, then stationed in Newfoundland.

George Clinton was later posted to New York City, so Henry spent the balance of his childhood in America. After a brief stint as a New York militia ensign, Henry Clinton obtained a regular captain's commission in the Coldstream Guards through his father's connections. He was subsequently promoted to lieutenant colonel of the 1st Foot Guards (Grenadier Guards). During the Seven Years' (French and Indian) War, Lieutenant Colonel Clinton's career was boosted due to his service as aide-de-camp to Prince Ferdinand. By 1772, he had secured a major general's commission along with a seat in Parliament. In 1775, Major General Clinton went to North America as second-in-command to Sir William Howe. At the Battle of Bunker Hill, Clinton helped turn the tide of the battle by organizing reserve forces to outflank the American positions. After his reputation was soiled by the failure to capture Charleston in 1776, Clinton was instrumental in the successful New York and Long Island campaigns. Although Clinton was promoted to lieutenant general for his successes, he was passed over for the commander in chief role in North America in favor of General John Burgoyne. Clinton was irritated by the perceived snub, but his attempts to resign were mollified when King George III awarded him a knighthood as a consolation prize. Clinton later inherited the commander in chief role after General William Howe was recalled in the aftermath of General Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga. Clinton resented the appointment, as he felt he had been given a great task with fewer resources than allotted to Howe. After adopting a new strategy at the urging of Lord Germaine, Clinton pulled his limited resources together to reconquer the southern colonies. Clinton's initial plan worked brilliantly; by May 1780, his army had retaken Georgia and seized the key seaport city of Charleston, South Carolina. Strategic missteps by Clinton and his operational commander in the South, Earl Charles Cornwallis, frittered away their initial success. After the pyrrhic victory of Guilford Courthouse, Cornwallis abandoned the Carolinas, and its Loyalist population, to aggressively pursue Continental forces in Yorktown. Despite his efforts to control the campaign from a distance, Clinton failed to prevent the entrapment of Cornwallis's army at Yorktown. As Britain's last commander in chief in America, Clinton received the greatest blame for the loss of the American colonies, despite the major failings of other general officers. Postwar, Clinton and Cornwallis engaged in a series of written broadsides criticizing each other's shortcomings, with Clinton coming off the worse in the exchange. Clinton served in Parliament from 1790–94 and, although semi-retired, was advanced to full general. He was appointed governor of Gibraltar, but died in December 1795 before assuming his duties.[9]

Lt. Gen. Lord Charles Cornwallis. The central British figure in the latter part of the Southern Campaign, Lieutenant General Cornwallis—First Marquess and second Earl Cornwallis—was among the best battlefield commanders that the British Army fielded during the war. Cornwallis was born into the aristocracy in 1738, attending Eton College and Cambridge University in his youth. In 1756, his father purchased Charles an ensign's commission in the elite 1st Foot Guards. In 1757, Cornwallis took a leave of absence to tour European battlefields with a military tutor, and study military science at Italy's Turin military academy. At the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, Cornwallis missed deploying to Europe with the 1st Guards; instead, he wrangled a staff officer appointment with the British commander in chief. Cornwallis first saw combat at Minden in 1759, and soon after purchased a captaincy in the 85th Regiment of Foot. In 1761, he was commissioned in the 12th Foot, and subsequently brevetted to lieutenant colonel for his excellent combat leadership. While he was still leading troops in combat, Cornwallis was selected for the House of Commons in 1760 and elevated to the House of Lords when his father died in 1762. Favorable court connections led to his appointment as the colonel of the 33rd Regiment of Foot in 1766; however, Cornwallis was busy with political matters and saw no combat service for the intervening decade. In 1776, Cornwallis was promoted to major general, and assigned as a corps commander in General William Howe's army during the New York campaign. He performed superbly during the campaign, badly battering the inept Continentals and driving them from New York, but unexpectedly fumbled the pursuit of Washington's army after its surprising victory at Trenton, New Jersey. Cornwallis shrugged off a sharp rebuke from General Howe, and performed well in the capture of Philadelphia, and in the battles of Brandywine, Germantown, and Fort Mercer. However, his half-hearted engagement of the enemy at Monmouth in June 1778 drew criticism from commander in chief Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton. Rancor festered between the two going forward, particularly affecting their future relationships during the later stages of the war. During the siege of Charleston, Cornwallis led a corps of infantry that helped close the cordon around the city. Afterward, Clinton returned to New York as commander in chief, leaving Cornwallis in independent command of all British forces in the South. With Clinton gone, Cornwallis felt free to run the war the way he saw fit. At first, Cornwallis seemed successful as his regular troops won several engagements against Whig insurgents, and crushed Gates's army of Continentals and militia at Camden in August 1780. He pursued an ag-

gressive strategy against the American guerillas, even employing his newly formed Tory militia in an offensive capacity-—an experiment that ended in disaster at Kings Mountain in October 1780. Bereft of his rear and flank security, Cornwallis was forced to suspend an invasion of North Carolina to handle the growing American threat. He split his army in an attempt to trap and destroy the Continental light forces under Col. Daniel Morgan. Instead, Morgan cannily turned the tables on Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton at the battle of Cowpens; the bulk of Cornwallis's light infantry were killed or taken prisoner. Fixated on running Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene to ground, Cornwallis stripped down his heavy infantry to engage in an ultimately futile pursuit of the Continental Army into Virginia-—the Race for the Dan River. Cornwallis subsequently wrecked what remained of his offensive potential in the campaign, which culminated with the March 1781 Guilford Courthouse battle. After rehabilitating his command at Wilmington, North Carolina, Cornwallis ignored his stated mission to pacify the Carolinas in favor of his own pet scheme to invade Virginia and eliminate the Continental bases supporting the American insurgents. After some indecisive sparring with the smaller Franco-American army, Cornwallis fortified himself on the Williamsburg Neck to wait for reinforcements. Instead, the supporting Royal Navy squadron was driven off by the French Navy, leaving Cornwallis to surrender his besieged army on 19 October 1781. After his parole and return home, Cornwallis was publicly welcomed by King George and, despite a bitter postwar exchange with Clinton over blame for the lost war, Cornwallis remained popular. After a short stint as ambassador to the Prussian court, he was made a knight companion and appointed governor-general and commander in chief of India in 1786. During his tenure, Cornwallis reformed the British East India Company, as well as the civil service and justice systems. After successfully concluding the Third Anglo-Mysore War, he returned home to serve as the British master of the ordnance from 1794–98. Later, Cornwallis was lord lieutenant of Ireland, and represented the crown at the treaty ending the War of the Second Coalition. Reappointed governor-general of India, Cornwallis served only a brief time before dying of a fever on 5 October 1805 at Gauspur, Ghazipur.[10]

Capt. George Keith Elphinstone. One of the less-memorable figures of the Charleston campaign, Capt. George Keith Elphinstone contributed much to the successful cooperation of the Royal Navy with Sir Henry Clinton's maneuver scheme. George Keith Elphinstone was born in Stirling, Scotland, on 7 January 1746, the fifth son of the tenth Lord Elphinstone. Family connections ensured his formal education at Glasgow, fol-

lowed by service as a midshipman beginning in 1762. After several years of service on frigates, Elphinstone sailed as part of a China and East Indies voyage under the auspices of the British East India Company, commanded by his elder brother. Commissioned lieutenant in 1769, Elphinstone was appointed to the flagship of the commander in chief of the Mediterranean fleet. He advanced to commander in 1772 with command of the 14-gun *Scorpion*. Elphinstone was promoted to post-captain of the Marlborough in 1775, later commanding the *Perseus*. When the *Perseus* was detached to North America, Captain Elphinstone served under Adm. Lord Howe, and later Adm. Mariot Arbuthnot. During his service in America, Elphinstone gained the confidence of Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton. Thus, during the 1780 Charleston campaign, Elphinstone commanded a land detachment of sailors, and served as liaison officer between Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot—service for which he received an honorable mention in Clinton's official report. Elphinstone subsequently received command of the 50-gun *Warwick* and captured a Dutch 50-gun frigate, a French 38-gun frigate, and several smaller ships, before the 1783 signing of the Treaty of Paris. Elphinstone entered politics, serving in Parliament and dabbling in science as a Royal Society fellow. In 1793, he was recalled for war with the French, taking command of *Robust*, a 74-gun third-rate ship of the line. He commanded the *Robust* with distinction in the Mediterranean, particularly in his command of a naval brigade that seized the French port of Toulon. Elphinstone was promoted to rear admiral in 1794, then led a 1795 expedition that seized Dutch colonies on the Cape of Good Hope and captured a Dutch squadron in the process. After a stint as the Mediterranean fleet deputy commander, he was named commander in chief in the Mediterranean. Elphinstone's fleet fought several actions against the French Navy, and he was elevated to Baron Keith in 1797. In 1803, Elphinstone was appointed commander in chief of the North Seas Fleet, responsible for protecting the home islands from French invasion. He ended his career as Royal escort and liaison to Napoleon after his surrender to the Allies in 1815. Lord Keith retired to his Scottish holdings, where he died in 1823.[11]

Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton. Born in 1754 to a middle-class Liverpool family, Banastre Tarleton enrolled at the University College, where he spent more time engaged in athletics and gambling than studying law. After running out of money, he obtained a cornet's commission in the 1st Regiment of Dragoon Guards using money borrowed from his mother. In 1775, Tarleton volunteered for service in America, and quickly earned a reputation as a daring battlefield commander. His performance during the 1777

and 1778 campaigns, particularly his capture of American General Charles Lee in a bold nighttime raid, earned promotion to lieutenant colonel. Tarleton was also given command of the *British Legion*, a combined-arms regiment of infantry and dragoons raised under the Provincial system. In 1780, Tarleton's Legion was deployed as part of Clinton's expedition to South Carolina, although his men were temporarily unhorsed when the transport carrying their horses foundered in an Atlantic gale. Once in the South, Tarleton's men had to march overland from Savannah to Charleston, confiscating mounts along the way. On 12 April 1780, Tarleton led a force of provincials and regulars in a surprise nighttime attack that captured the key Continental position at Monck's Corner, which guarded the main road into Charleston. With that audacious win, Tarleton cemented his reputation as a bold and exceedingly dangerous battlefield commander. At the Battle of Waxhaws, Tarleton's Legion destroyed a larger Virginia infantry regiment, giving rise to stories that the Tories ignored a white flag and killed defenseless Continentals. Regardless of the truth, Tarleton was branded as a brutal butcher of helpless prisoners. During the pacification phase of Cornwallis's operation in South Carolina, Tarleton repeatedly bested Patriot guerilla bands under Thomas Sumter's command; however, he was never able to defeat Francis Marion's much-better-disciplined partisan force. His troopers also gained a reputation (whether deserved or not) for brutality and abusing helpless Patriot sympathizers. On 17 January 1781, Tarleton's light infantry was largely wiped out at the Cowpens by Daniel Morgan's light infantry corps, although Tarleton succeeded in escaping with most of his mounted troops. Afterward, Tarleton was criticized by other British officers, particularly his subordinate commanders, who believed the defeat at the Cowpens was due to his lack of maturity and experience. Surprisingly, Cornwallis never lost his trust in Tarleton, who was not officially censured for the Cowpens disaster. Tarleton remained in command of the much-smaller *Legion* during the remainder of the Guilford Courthouse campaign, where his hand was maimed by a rifle ball in the closing stages of the battle. During Cornwallis's march through Virginia, Tarleton came within minutes of capturing Gov. Thomas Jefferson and the legislative body of Virginia; instead, he had to settle for destroying abandoned ordnance stores. After surrendering his command at Yorktown, Tarleton suffered humiliation when he was pointedly excluded from an invitation for Cornwallis's officers to dine with the American and French officers. Paroled to England, Tarleton indulged in excesses such as gambling, drinking, and a series of mistresses that landed him deeply in debt. Politically ostracized by the Tory-dominated Parliament, Tarleton caused

further controversy when he published his *A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America*—downplaying his own errors and pinning much blame on Cornwallis's poor generalship. Bad publicity from Tarleton's book prompted Roderick Mackenzie, a former 71st Regiment of Foot lieutenant who was captured at Cowpens, to publish a detailed rebuttal, *Strictures on Lt. Col. Tarleton's History*. Tarleton served in Parliament from 1790–1812, during which he retained his Army commission but saw no major service during the Peninsular War or War of 1812. Despite his lack of later war service, Tarleton was promoted to major general before dying in January 1833.[12]

Lt. Col. James Webster. James Webster was born in 1743 to a prominent minister's family in Edinburgh, Scotland. Commissioned a lieutenant in the 33rd Regiment of Foot in 1760, he was the lieutenant colonel in command when the unit deployed to America in 1776. The regimental colonel was Cornwallis, and the two men developed a close professional relationship, with Webster as a trusted subordinate. Webster performed with distinction at Monmouth in 1778 and was given command of an ad hoc brigade, with the 23rd and 33rd Foot, for the Southern Campaign. He continued to excel in the South, supporting Tarleton's April 1780 attack at Monck's Corner and forming the main effort of Cornwallis's August 1780 attack at Camden. During the Race for the Dan, Webster skillfully adapted his troops to their new role as light infantry. At the 6 March 1780 Whitesell's Mill skirmish, Webster came within minutes of cutting off the withdrawal of the American light infantry force, even riding his horse into Reedy Fork Creek at the head of his troops while under American rifle fire. At Guilford Courthouse, he led his brigade from the front, continually risking enemy fire to motivate his troops to break both Eaton's North Carolina brigade and Lawson's Virginia Line brigade. Webster's luck ran out when the 33rd Foot was devastated by volleys from Maryland Continentals, and he was seriously wounded by a Continental musket ball to the knee. He lived after the battle for two weeks, dying probably from gangrene or secondary infection, and was interred near Elizabethtown, North Carolina. Sgt. Roger Lamb recorded Cornwallis's reaction at the news of Webster's death: "It was reported in the army that when Cornwallis received the news of Webster's death, his lordship was struck with a pungent sorrow, then turning himself, he looked upon his sword, and emphatically exclaimed, 'I have lost my scabbard.'"[13]

Capt. Johann von Ewald. Johann von Ewald was born into a minor merchant family in Kassel, capitol city of the Landgraviate of Hesse-Kas-

sel, in 1744. At sixteen, he enlisted in a Brunswick army infantry regiment; wounded in combat, he was commissioned ensign in 1761 for battlefield valor during the Seven Years' War. After the war, von Ewald was commissioned second lieutenant in a Guards regiment, but subsequently transferred out because he lacked a noble title. In February 1770, he lost sight in his right eye due to a drunken duel and was required to wear a glass eye for the rest of his life. Despite issues with alcohol abuse, Von Ewald proved an apt student of military engineering and economics and gained notice for publishing a manual on military tactics. In 1776, von Ewald was promoted to captain of the *Leibjäger* (personal bodyguard or hunters) of the Landgrave.[14] Captain von Ewald sailed for North America in mid-1776 in command of the Second Company of *Jägers*, which supported the British army during the New Jersey and Philadelphia campaigns. Von Ewald led his company with great skill and was honored by both the Landgrave and Sir William Howe for his accomplishments at the Battle of Brandywine. During the 1780 siege of Charleston, Von Ewald's *jägers* performed valuable service as snipers and skirmishers, providing overwatch to the sappers and engineers. After returning to New York in June 1780, von Ewald's company accompanied General Benedict Arnold's corps during its invasion of Virginia in late 1780. Captain von Ewald was shot in the knee during a skirmish with hostile militia then hospitalized in Norfolk; meanwhile, his *jägers* continued their light infantry role as part of Cornwallis's combined army. After Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown, von Ewald and his men were paroled and returned to New York. Von Ewald lingered on parole until the Hessian *jager* corps was recalled for Kessel in late 1783. After the war, von Ewald joined the Regiment von Dittfurth and wrote a treatise on partisan warfare based on his experiences in North America.[15] Von Ewald's lack of noble credentials stalled further promotion; with help from Prince Charles of Hesse-Kassel, however, he obtained a lieutenant colonel's commission in the Danish army and earned entry into the Danish nobility due to his success with organizing a corps of *jägers*. By 1802, von Ewald had risen to major general in command of a corps in the Duchy of Holstein, commanding several major battles of the Napoleonic Wars. After the Battle of Lubeck in 1806, General von Ewald massed his corps in a show of strength that halted invasion by one of Napoleon's corps, temporarily preserving Danish neutrality in the Napoleonic Wars. His last combat was in May 1809, when his corps successfully suppressed a Prussian revolt at the Battle of Stralsund; von Ewald was promoted to lieutenant general and decorated with the Dutch Order of the Union and the French Legion of Honor.[16] After Napoleon annexed

Denmark, von Ewald was forcibly retired, and his corps drafted into the French Grande Armée for the failed invasion of Russia in 1812. Lieutenant General von Ewald died in June 1813. Besides his several books on military tactics, von Ewald wrote a detailed journal of his service in North America, described as one of the best accounts of the Revolutionary War written by a German soldier.[17]

Notes

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Appendix C
Orders of Battle



Source: Land component order of battle is derived from Carl P. Borick, *A Gallant Defense: The Siege of Charleston 1780* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2012), Appendix B 251–52. The naval structure was derived from John Sayen, "Oared Fighting Ships of the South Carolina Navy, 1776–1780," *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 87, no. 4 (October 1986): 213–37.

Figure C.1. Order of Battle, American Coalition Forces. Created by Army University Press.



Source: Land component order of battle is derived from Carl P. Borick, *A Gallant Defense: The Siege of Charleston 1780* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2012), Appendix B 251–52. The naval structure was derived from John Sayen, "Oared Fighting Ships of the South Carolina Navy, 1776–1780," *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 87, no. 4 (October 1986): 213–37.

Figure C.2. Order of Battle, British Coalition Forces. Created by Army University Press.

Appendix D
Chronology of Major Events

1775

19 April	Skirmishes at Lexington and Concord
	Start of the American Revolution
12 June	1st Provincial Congress authorizes raising of three regiments of South Carolina Provincials and twelve of state militia
10–21 November	First siege of Ninety Six (indecisive end)
November–December	"Snow" Campaign to suppress Backcountry Tories (Patriot victory)

1776

1–26 June	First British campaign to capture Charleston
26 June	Battle of Fort Moultrie (American victory)

1777

20 May	Treaty of Dewitt's Corner—ends Cherokee aid to Loyalists
17 October	End of Saratoga Campaign (American victory)

1778

6 February	France declares war on Great Britain
8 March	Sir Henry Clinton given change in strategic focus to the South
28 June	Monmouth Courthouse Battle (indecisive—marks clear stalemate in north)
August	Sir Henry Clinton begins planning for campaign in the southern states
September	General Benjamin Lincoln assumes command of Southern Department
23–29 December	British seizure of Savannah

1779

11–13 May	Prevost's Raid on Charleston (British withdrawal)
20 June	Battle of Stono River (indecisive battle)
9 October	Franco-American assault on Savannah (British defensive victory)
October	Clinton orders Charleston operations after successful defense of Savannah and withdrawal of French fleet from American waters
26 December	Vice Admiral Arbuthnot's invasion flotilla departs New York for Savannah

1780

9 February	Arbuthnot's invasion fleet departs Tybee Roads, Savannah
11–12 February	Clinton's troops land on Seabrook Island via Edisto River
15 February	Lincoln orders removal of boats and provisions from from territory west of the Ashley River
28 February	Clinton's advanced guard reaches Stono Ferry
7 March	Royal Engineers complete pontoon bridge across the Wappoo Cut
12 March	Fenwick's Point redoubt fully operational; first shells land in Charleston
20 March	Whipple's ships fail to stop Arbuthnot from crossing the Charleston Bar
	Lincoln orders Commodore Whipple to block the Cooper River
27 March	Lincoln's council of war rejects consideration of withdrawal from city
28–29 March	British assault crossing of the Ashley River at Drayton's landing
30 March	Cornwallis's advanced guard skirmishes with Lieutenant Colonel Laurens's light infantry
	Gibbes' Landing is secured as the British advanced logistics base

1–2 April	British commence siege operations
7 April	Virginia Continental reinforcement arrives in Charleston
8 April	Arbuthnot runs his frigates past Sullivan's Island into Rebellion Road
10 April	Clinton sends his first demand for surrender—refused by Lincoln
12 April	Second council of war; Lincoln rejects Continental demands to evacuate
	First coordinated British shelling of American defenses
13–14 April	Skirmish at Monck's Corner (decisive British victory)
13 April	Governor Rutledge escapes city to the interior
	British first parallel is completed
17 April	British sappers finish second parallel
18 April	Clinton receives reinforcements to begin clearing east of the Cooper River
20 April	Lieutenant Colonel Henderson's trench raid against British first line
	Council of war; Gadsden/Privy Council squash idea of withdrawal
21 April	Lincoln requests truce to present American demands—rejected by Clinton
26 April	Brigadier General Duportail recommends evacuation of city after surveying defenses
27 April	American defenders abandon Lamprieres Point, closing land lines of communication to the outside world
	Council of war again rejects proposal to withdraw from city
6 May	Skirmish at Lenud's Ferry (decisive British victory)
6 May	British sappers seize lock and dam on wet ditch

7 May	Garrison at Fort Moultrie surrenders
8 May	British third parallel is completed, threatening American main line of defense
	Continental quartermaster discovers meat supply is largely spoiled
	Clinton issues demand for surrender
9 May	Lincoln proposes surrender with full honors of war, and parole of the militia.
10 May	After rejecting honors of war, Clinton orders bombardment with heated shot
11 May	Lincoln sends message to Clinton accepting surrender terms offered in 8 May letter

Appendix E
Glossary

This glossary briefly defines selected military-specific or archaic terms used in the body of the text.

Abatis – A field obstacle made of sharpened tree branches oriented toward the enemy. Usually employed in a belt of obstacles designed to slow an enemy advance and prolong exposure to defensive fires.

Area Defense – A defensive task where a unit focuses on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific period of time, instead of trying to destroy the enemy.

Artificer – A skilled craftsman employed to make or repair military equipment and weapons.

Bateau – A small flat-bottomed wood boat, double-ended and of shallow draft, used to carry heavy cargo and supplies.

Bayonet – A long stabbing blade affixed, usually by a metal socket, to the muzzle of a military musket.

Case Shot – An antipersonnel munition consisting of musket-ball-sized projectiles packed in a tin canister; when fired, it would fragment at the muzzle to produce a shotgun-like blast.

Chevaux-de-Frise – An anti-cavalry obstacle made of a wooden log with projecting wood spikes.

Commissary – A military officer in charge of the procurement, delivery, and distribution of provisions, rations for soldiers, fodder, and forage for animals.

Corps – Derived from the Latin *corpus*, denotes a subordinate field army of several regiments.

Delay – A type of defense where a unit under pressure trades terrain for time, slowing the advance of an enemy force to inflict maximum damage while avoiding a decisive engagement.

Doctrine – Fundamental principles, including tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and a common language by which a military force guides its actions in support of national objectives.

Dragoon – Unlike cavalry, which were trained to fight from horseback, dragoons were originally mounted infantry who used horses for

movement but dismounted to fight. By the Revolution, dragoons fought as conventional cavalry, employing the saber as primary weapon.

Fascines – A bundle of sticks or branches tied together and used to fill in swampy ground or reinforce the side of an entrenchment.

Flintlock – A firearm (smoothbore or rifle) ignited by a spark from a lock-mounted flint.

Forage – 1. Bulk food for horses and cattle, usually grass or hay. 2. The act of searching for food.

Grapeshot – An antipersonnel munition consisting of baseball-sized iron balls enclosed in a canvas bag held together by rope, metal bands, or wood. When fired, the balls would scatter in a shotgun-like spread, capable of causing great carnage in massed enemy ranks.

Guard – A security task where a unit protects the main force by fighting to gain time, reporting observed information while preventing the enemy from direct observation or engagement of the main body.

Hessian – German auxiliary units contracted for military service by the British. Commonly named for the German states of Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Hanau but recruited from other German states.

Jäger – Literally a hunter, *jäger* were German light infantrymen recruited from gamekeepers and huntsmen who worked for noble landholders. The *jäger* were armed with light muzzle-loading rifles and trained to fight as individual skirmishers.

Legion – A regiment-sized mixed unit, usually of dragoons and infantry, possibly including artillery.

Logistics – The art and science of moving, feeding, clothing, housing, and resupplying military units.

Loyalist – An American loyal to the British Crown. A derogatory alternate was "Tory."

Lunette – A minor fortification with two faces forming a projecting angle, and two flanks adjoining the faces. Sheltered behind the angled and flank walls, defenders could engage an enemy force with both frontal and flank fires.

Magazine – A building or structure designed to segregate gunpowder and cartridges in isolation from other military stores, lessening collateral damage from an explosion. During the American Revolution, a magazine denoted an intermediate logistics node, a location where bulk commod-

ities and ordnance stores were gathered (often via water transport) then distributed to tactical units by wagon or cart.

Militia – A military force raised from a civilian population for short-term service. In the British establishment, militia officers were of lower standing than regular and provincial officers.

Musket – A muzzle-loaded smoothbore firearm. During the American Revolution, muskets were ignited by a flintlock firing system.

Operation – The operational level of war involves planning and execution of major operations using operational art to achieve strategic military objectives.

Ordnance – Military-specific equipment and materials, including weapons, cannons, and munitions.

Patriot (Whig) – A derogatory name for Americans allied against the Crown of England.

Provincials – A practice dating back to the French and Indian Wars, British governors and department commanders organized short-service militia regiments to augment regular British units. Officers and soldiers were mustered only for the duration of the conflict then discharged, usually without pension or veteran's benefits. In the hierarchy of the British army, provincial officers ranked lower than regulars, but higher than militia leaders.

Pursuit – A military task in which a rapid offensive force overtakes and encircles a fleeing enemy force, with the intent of total destruction of the enemy.

Quartermaster – A military officer, or appointed civilian, responsible for rations, clothing, and quarters for soldiers, plus forage and fodder for animals.

Reconnaissance – A mission to obtain information about the activities and state of an enemy force. Done by visual means, interrogation of civilians or enemy prisoners, and analysis of information.

Redan – A v-shaped salient-angled earthwork pointed toward the expected enemy approach. Similar to a lunette, the redan instead had two angled fronts and three angles. Used to allow defenders to enfilade an enemy attacker with fire.

Redoubt – A square or rectangular-shaped fortification with four earthwork fronts and angles. Redoubts were often attached to a larger wall,

with one corner pointed toward the enemy to permit enfilade fire from within the works.

Regiment – The highest permanent tactical unit employed during the Revolution. Led by a colonel, assisted by a lieutenant colonel and major, a regiment could have five to ten subordinate companies. Regiments were normally of a single combat arms branch, usually infantry or dragoons.

Saber – A heavy sword with a curved blade and single cutting edge, usually used by mounted troops.

Strategy – High-level planning, coordination, and direction of military operations to meet national objectives.

Tactics – The employment and deliberate arrangement of combat forces in relation to each other to accomplish a military objective.

Tory – A derogatory name used by Patriot Americans to describe a Loyal American, or Loyalist.

Withdrawal – A force in combat breaks contact and moves out of range of the enemy force.

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Harold "Allen" Skinner Jr. has thirteen years of experience as an Army historian—five in uniform and eight as an Army civilian historian. He is currently the command historian for the United States Army Soldier Support Institute (SSI), located at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. From August 2019 to January 2020, Skinner was deployed as the theater historian for Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), for which he received the Joint Civilian Service Commendation Award. He is a retired Army major with twenty-five years of service, including deployments in support of Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. Skinner has a master of military art and science in military history from the US Army Command and General Staff College. A PhD student at Liberty University, he is engaged in dissertation research on the 81st Division (National Army) of World War I. His previous work, *A Game of Hare & Hounds: An Operational-level Command Study of the Guilford Courthouse Campaign,* was released by the Marine Corps University Press in March 2021. His 2020 *Staff Ride Guide for the Battle of Kings Mountain* was a finalist for the Army Historical Foundation's 2020 Distinguished Writing Award. Besides writing staff ride books, Skinner has published military history articles in other venues, including the *Journal of the American Revolution*, *Journal of Army History,* and *1914–1918 Online: The International Encyclopedia of the First World* War. He is currently writing an operational-level study on the 1780 Battle of Camden, and working on a book-length history of the Army's Finance branch.

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