

The Staff Ride Handbook for the Red River Campaign, 7 March-19 May 1864



Steven E. Clay



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Cover Image: *The War on the Red River*, Engraving, C.E.H. Bonwill, 1864. Admiral Porter's fleet passing through Col. Bailey's Dam above Alexandria, May 1864, after safely getting over the rapids by its means. From Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, 16 July 1864.

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Lieutenant Colonel (Retired)
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I originally started this handbook while I was still on active duty as the Staff Ride Team Chief here at the Combat Studies Institute back in 2004. When I retired from the US Army in 2006, several members of the staff ride team were subsequently assigned to work on the Red River Campaign Staff Ride. Although the handbook itself languished, all of those individuals who followed me as the managers of the Red River Campaign Staff Ride added greatly to the development of the staff ride and its products such as the walkbook, maps, and read-ahead packets. Much of their work has been incorporated into this handbook and I believe it is only appropriate that I should acknowledge their excellent contributions to this effort. Those individuals are Dr. Richard Herrera and COL (R) William Darley. A number of years ago Rick did yeoman work on preparing a functional walkbook for use by the staff ride team. Bill's work on the staff ride visuals (maps) was instrumental in helping me better understand many of the tactical actions during the campaign.

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Steven E. Clay
Staff Ride Instructor

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Publisher's Note on the use of Civil War Terms

The Army University Press supports the professional military education of Soldiers and leader development. Books are published by our press that describe the historical facts pertaining to the American Civil War and acknowledge that the legacy of that war is still at the forefront of our national conversation. We intend to describe the political and social situation of the Civil War in a neutral manner. For example, the traditional terms to describe the opposing sides, North and South, are only used for grammatical variety, as they ascribe generalities that certainly did not apply to the totality of the "North" or the "South." Many local citizens who resided in states that openly rebelled against the United States government were not in favor of secession, nor did they believe that preserving slavery warranted such a violent act.

Similarly, citizens in states who remained loyal to the United States did not all feel a strong commitment towards dissolving the institution of slavery, nor did they believe Lincoln's views represented their own. Thus, while the historiography has traditionally referred to the "Union" in the American Civil War as "the northern states loyal to the United States government," the fact is that the term "Union" always referred to all the states together, which clearly was not the situation at all. In light of this, the reader will discover that the word "Union" will be largely replaced by the more historically accurate "Federal Government" or "US Government." "Union forces" or "Union army" will largely be replaced by the terms "US Army," "Federals," or "Federal Army."

The Reconstruction policy between the Federal Government and the former rebellious states saw an increased effort to control the narrative of how and why the war was fought, which led to an enduring perpetuation of Lost Cause rhetoric. The Lost Cause promotes an interpretation of the Civil War era that legitimates and excuses the secessionist agenda. This narrative has been wholly rejected by academic scholars who rely upon rigorous research and an honest interpretation of primary source materials. To rely upon bad faith interpretations of history like the Lost Cause in this day and age would be insufficient, inaccurate, and an acknowledgment that the Confederate States of America was a legitimate nation. The fact is that Abraham Lincoln and the US Congress were very careful not to recognize the government of the states in rebellion as a legitimate government. Nonetheless, those states that formed a political and social alliance, even though not recognized by the Lincoln government, called themselves the "Confederacy" or the "Confederate States of America." In our works,

the Army University Press acknowledges that political alliance, albeit an alliance in rebellion, by allowing the use of the terms “Confederate,” “Confederacy,” “Confederate Army,” for ease of reference and flow of the narrative, in addition to the variations of the term “rebel.”

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Introduction

Ad bellum Pace Parati: Prepared in Peace for War. This sentiment was much on the mind of Capt. Arthur L. Wagner as he contemplated the quality of military education at the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, during the 1890s. Wagner believed the school's curricula during the long years of peace had become too far removed from the reality of war, and he cast about for ways to make the study of conflict more real to officers who had no combat experience. Eventually, he arrived at a concept called the staff ride, which consisted of detailed classroom study of an actual campaign followed by a visit to the sites associated with that campaign. Although Wagner never lived to see the Staff Ride added to the Leavenworth curricula, an associate of his, Maj. Eben Swift, implemented the Staff Ride at the General Service and Staff School in 1906. In July of that year, Swift led a contingent of 12 students to Chattanooga, Tennessee, to begin a two-week study of the Atlanta campaign of 1864.

The Staff Ride concept pioneered at Leavenworth in the early years of the twentieth century remains a vital part of officer professional development today. At the US Army Command and General Staff College, the Army War College, ROTC detachments, and units throughout the world, US Army officers study war vicariously through the Staff Ride methodology. That methodology (in-depth preliminary study, rigorous field study, and integration of the two) need not be tied to a formal school-house environment. Units stationed near historic battlefields can experience the intellectual and emotional stimulation provided by standing on the hallowed ground where soldiers once contended for their respective causes. Yet units may find themselves without many of the sources of information on a particular campaign that are readily available in an academic environment. For that reason, the Combat Studies Institute of the Army University Press has prepared a series of handbooks that will provide practical information on conducting Staff Rides to specific campaigns and battles. These handbooks are not intended to be used as a substitute for extensive study by Staff Ride leaders or participants. Instead, they represent an effort to assist officers in locating sources, identifying teaching points, and designing meaningful field study phases. As such, they represent a starting point from which a more rigorous professional development experience may be crafted.

The Red River campaign of 1864 is an effective vehicle for a staff ride. It raises a variety of teaching points, at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, that are relevant to today's officer. A diverse spectrum

of military operations and planning occurred in the course of the campaign. In addition, the campaign featured prominent participation by the US Navy thus providing a joint dimension to the operations. It also offers insights on a wide variety of combat support and combat service support activities, most notably military engineering and logistics.

The Staff Ride Handbook for the Red River Campaign provides a systematic approach to the analysis of this key Civil War campaign. Part I describes the organization of the United States and Confederate armies, detailing their weapons, tactics, and logistical, engineer, communications, and medical support. It also includes a description of the US Navy elements that featured so prominently in the campaign.

Part II consists of a campaign overview that establishes the context for the individual actions to be studied in the field.

Part III consists of a suggested itinerary of sites to visit to obtain a concrete view of the campaign in its several phases. For each site, or “stand,” there is a set of travel directions, a discussion of the action that occurred there, and vignettes by participants in the campaign that further explain the action and which also allow the student to sense the human “face of battle.” Part III also provides a brief analysis of the event or action that occurred at each stand and which can serve as a springboard for further discussion and analysis while visiting the locations.

Part IV provides practical information on conducting a Staff Ride in the Red River campaign area, including sources of assistance and logistical considerations. Appendix A outlines the order of battle for the significant actions in the campaign. Appendix B provides biographical sketches of key participants. Appendix C provides an overview of Medal of Honor conferral in the campaign. An annotated bibliography suggests sources for preliminary study.

In summary, the Red River Campaign is a superb example of two armies contending within a complex joint campaign on the one hand and an under-resourced ground campaign on the other. It provides an excellent study in contrasts between operational and tactical command structures and command decisions, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, and audacity and timidity in thought and action on the part of various commanders. It also provides an excellent opportunity to analyze some of the aspects of the cost of war on the part of both soldiers and civilians and how terrain and weather conditions affect combat operations. Finally, while the study of military history does not necessarily provide answers to future dilemmas encountered on the battlefield, the insights and lessons which can

be gained from the study of this campaign can be of tremendous benefit to the modern military professional when similar situations occur in conflicts yet to come.

Part I

Civil War Armies and Navies

Introduction

Before conducting a staff ride covering a complex campaign such as that which took place in Louisiana in 1864, staff ride leaders and participants need to understand the broader context of how and why the campaign was prosecuted. The following section covers the “how” by describing the organization, weapons, tactics, and support functions of the Civil War’s primary opponents (for the “why” of this campaign, see Section II: Campaign Overview). This account is detailed enough to help readers understand the organization and capabilities of campaign leaders and units involved in the campaign so that various military actions and decisions will be better understood in the context of their time. For uniformity and clarity, this volume follows the outline of previous Combat Studies Institute Staff Ride handbooks—borrowing material and ideas from previous volumes while focusing on Civil War and Red River Campaign command structures, organizations, military strategy, and tactics.

The Armies

The US Army in 1861

The Regular Army of the United States on the eve of the Civil War was essentially a frontier constabulary force which consisted of only 16,000 officers and men. The army was organized into 198 companies scattered across the nation at 79 different posts. At the start of the war, 183 of these companies were either on frontier duty or in transit, while the remaining 15 were mostly coastal artillery companies on the Great Lakes and the coastlines, or detachments guarding one of the 23 arsenals and depots positioned across the country. In 1861, the Army was under the command of Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, the 75 year-old hero of the Mexican-American War. His position as general-in-chief was traditional, not statutory. Each Secretary of War since 1821 had designated a general to be in charge of the US Army’s field forces without seeking formal congressional approval. The commanders of the various geographic departments, who reported directly to the general-in-chief, controlled the army’s field forces. This departmental system, frequently modified, would be used by both sides throughout the Civil War for administering organizations and activities under army control in those regions.

The various War Department bureau chiefs handled army administration at the national level. By 1860, most of these officers were in the twilight of long careers in their technical fields. At the time, six of the ten bureau chiefs were over 70 years old. These bureaus (shown on Table 1.1), modeled after the British system, answered directly to the War Department and were not subject to the orders of the general-in-chief.

War Department Bureaus, 1861	
Quartermaster	Medical
Ordnance	Adjutant General
Subsistence	Paymaster
Engineer	Inspector General
Topographic Engineer*	Judge Advocate General
*merged with the Engineer Bureau in 1863	

Table 1.1. War Department Bureaus as of 1861.

During the war, Congress elevated the Office of the Provost Marshal and the Signal Corps to bureau status and also created a Cavalry Bureau. Note that no operational planning or intelligence staff existed. American commanders before the Civil War apparently did not see a need for such a structure or capabilities.

The bureau system provided suitable civilian control and administrative support to what was a rather small field army prior to 1861. Ultimately, the system would respond effectively, if not always efficiently, to the massive army that was mobilized over the next four years. Indeed, its success during the Civil War ensured it remained essentially intact until the early 20th century. The Confederate government, forced to create its army and support organizations almost from scratch, established a similar bureau system to that of the Federal government. In fact, many important figures in Confederate bureaus had served in one of the US Army pre-war bureaus.

Raising the Armies

With the outbreak of war in April 1861, both sides faced the monumental task of organizing and equipping armies that far exceeded the pre-war army structure in size and complexity. The United States Army largely maintained control of the existing Regular Army (the Confederates initially created a regular army as well, but it existed largely on paper).

Almost immediately, however, the US Army did lose many of its Regular officers to the rebellion, including some of exceptional ability. Of 1,108 Regular officers serving as of 1 January 1861, 270 ultimately resigned to join the Confederate Army. Conversely, only a few hundred of the 15,135 enlisted men left Federal US Army ranks to serve with the rebel forces.

The Federal government had two basic options for the use of the Regular Army. It could be divided into training and leadership cadre for newly-formed volunteer regiments or be retained in units to provide a reliable nucleus for the US Army in coming battles. At the start, Scott envisioned a relatively small force to defeat the rebellion and therefore insisted that the regulars fight as units. Although Regular units fought well at the First Battle of Bull Run and in many later battles, Scott's decision ultimately limited the impact that the Regular Army had on the war. Battle losses and disease eventually thinned the ranks of the Regular Army regiments which could never recruit sufficient replacements in the face of stiff competition from the states that formed volunteer regiments from the same manpower pool. By November 1864, most Regular units (especially the infantry regiments) had been so depleted that various army commanders withdrew them from frontline service. The war, therefore, was fought primarily with volunteer officers and men, the vast majority of whom had no previous military training or experience.

Neither side had difficulty in recruiting the numbers initially required to fill the expanding ranks. In April 1861, President Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 men from the states' militias for a three-month period. This figure probably represented Lincoln's informed guess as to how many troops would be needed to quell the rebellion quickly. Almost 92,000 men responded, as the states recruited their "organized," but untrained, militia companies. At the First Battle of Bull Run in July 1861, these ill-trained and poorly-equipped soldiers generally fought much better than they were led. Later, as the war began to require more manpower, the Federal government set enlisted quotas through various "calls," which local districts struggled to fill. Similarly, the Confederate Congress authorized the acceptance of 100,000 one-year volunteers in March 1861. One-third of these men were under arms within a month. The southern spirit of voluntarism was so strong that possibly twice that number could have been enlisted, but sufficient arms and equipment were not then available.

As the war continued and casualty lists grew, the glory associated with volunteering faded, and both sides ultimately resorted to conscription to help fill the ranks. The Confederates enacted the first conscription law in American history in April 1862, followed a year later by the Federal gov-

ernment's own law in March 1863. Throughout these first experiments in American conscription, both sides administered the programs in less than a fair and efficient way. Conscription laws tended to exempt wealthier citizens, and initially, draftees could hire substitutes or pay commutation fees. As a result, the health, capability and morale of the average conscript were poor. Many eligible men, particularly in the South, enlisted to avoid the onus of being considered a conscript. Still, conscription, or the threat of conscription, ultimately helped both sides obtain a sufficient quantity of enlistees who were hoping to avoid the draft.

Conscription was never a popular program for either side, and the US Government, in particular, tried several approaches to limit conscription requirements. These efforts included offering lucrative bounties, or fees paid to induce volunteers to fill required quotas. In addition, the Federals offered a series of reenlistment bonuses, including money, 30-day furloughs, and the opportunity for veteran regiments to maintain their colors and be designated as "veteran" volunteer infantry regiments. The Federals also created an Invalid Corps (later renamed the Veteran Reserve Corps) of men no longer fit for front line service but who could perform essential rear-area duties. The United States Army also recruited almost 179,000 African-American men, mostly in federally organized volunteer regiments. By February 1864, Black men were being conscripted by the US government as well. In the South, recruiting or conscripting African-Americans, either enslaved or free, was so politically sensitive it was not attempted until March 1865, far too late to influence the war.

Whatever the faults of the manpower mobilization, it was an impressive achievement, particularly as a first effort on that scale. Various enlistment figures exist, but the best estimates are that approximately 1.5 million men enlisted in the United States Army during 1861-1865. Of that number, one million were still under arms at the end of the war. Although Confederate records are incomplete, most likely, between 750,000 and 800,000 men served in the Confederate army during the war, achieving a peak strength that never exceeded 460,000. Perhaps the greatest legacy of the manpower mobilization efforts of both sides was the improved Selective Service system that created the armies of World Wars I and II.

In terms of organization, both armies used a variant of the ten-company structure for newly-formed volunteer regiments. The Federal War Department established a volunteer infantry regimental organization with a strength that could range from 866 to 1,046 (varying in authorized strength by up to 180 infantry privates). The Confederate Congress fixed its ten-company infantry regiment at 1,045 men. Combat strength in bat-

tle, however, was routinely less than half of authorized strength because of casualties, sickness, leaves, details, desertions, and straggling.

The battery remained the basic artillery unit, although battalion and larger formal groupings of artillery emerged later in the war in the eastern theater. A Federal battery usually consisted of six guns and had an authorized strength of 80 to 156 men. A battery of six 12-pounder Napoleons could include 130 horses. If organized as “horse” or flying artillery, cannoneers were provided individual mounts, and more horses than men could be assigned to the battery. Their Confederate counterparts, plagued by limited ordnance and available manpower, usually operated with a four-gun battery, often with guns of mixed types and calibers. Rebel batteries seldom reached their initially-authorized manning level of 80 soldiers.

Originally, cavalry regiments were comprised of ten companies, but congressional legislation in July 1862 officially reorganized the mounted units into standard regiments of 12 “companies or troops” of 79 to 95 men each. Although the term “troop” was officially introduced, most cavalrymen continued to use the more familiar term “company” to describe their units throughout the war. Though there was no official requirement to do so, Federal commanders generally grouped two companies or troops into squadrons, with four to six squadrons making a regiment. Confederate cavalry units, remained organized in the pre-war model which were authorized ten 76-man companies per regiment. Some volunteer cavalry units on both sides also formed into smaller cavalry battalions. Later in the war, both sides began to merge their cavalry regiments and brigades into division and corps organizations.

For both sides, unit structure above regimental level was similar to today’s structure, with a brigade controlling three to five regiments and a division controlling two or more brigades. Federal brigades generally contained regiments from more than one state, while Confederate brigades often possessed several regiments from only one state. In the Confederate Army, a brigadier general usually commanded a brigade, and a major general commanded a division. The United States Army, with no rank higher than major general until 1864, often had colonels commanding brigades and brigadier generals commanding divisions.

The large numbers of organizations formed, as shown in Table 1.2 (page 11), are a reflection of the politics of the time. The War Department in 1861 considered making recruiting a Federal responsibility, but this proposal seemed to be an unnecessary expense for the short war initially envisioned. Therefore, responsibility for recruiting remained with

the states, and on both sides, state governors continually encouraged local constituents to form new volunteer regiments. This practice served to strengthen support for local, state, and national politicians (who appointed, or at least influenced the appointment of, regimental officers) and provided opportunities for glory and high rank for ambitious men. Although localized recruiting created regiments with strong bonds among the men, it also hindered the acquisition of replacements for existing regiments as they were reduced by casualties. As the war progressed, the Confederates attempted to funnel replacements directly into weakened units from their same state or region, but Union states simply continued to create new regiments without regard for those which had been worn down by casualties. Many existing state regiments in the United States Army detailed men to return home to recruit replacements, but these efforts, like those of the Regulars, never successfully competed for men who preferred to join newly formed local regiments. The downside, of course, was that the newly-formed regiments possessed few, if any, seasoned veterans to train the recruits and the battle-seasoned regiments lost men faster than they could recruit replacements. In 1864, many regiments on both sides were reduced to near combat ineffectiveness by spring. Therefore, many seasoned regiments were often disbanded or consolidated with other units for operations for the upcoming campaigns, usually against the wishes of the men assigned.

The Leaders

The respective central governments appointed their army's general officers. At the start of the war, most, but certainly not all, of the more senior officers had West Point or other military school experience. In 1861, Lincoln appointed 126 general officers, of whom 82 were, or had been, professional officers. Jefferson Davis appointed 89 generals, of whom 44 had received previous professional training, mostly at West Point. The remainder on both sides were political appointees and of these 16 Federal and seven Confederate generals possessed no previous military experience.

Of the volunteer officers who composed the bulk of the leadership for both armies, state governors normally appointed colonels, who were generally regimental commanders. State legislatures appointed other field grade officers, although many were initially elected within their units. Company soldiers usually elected their own company-grade officers. This long-established militia tradition, which seldom made military leadership and capability a primary consideration, was largely an extension of the states' adherence to the 10th Amendment and helped sustain political patronage in all regions of the country. By the beginning of 1863, however,

Federal and Confederate Organized Forces, 1861-1865				
Branch	Quantity	Federal	Quantity	Confederate
Infantry	19	regular regiments	642	regiments
	2,125	volunteer regiments	9	legions*
	60	volunteer battalions	163	separate battalions
Artillery	351	separate companies	62	separate companies
	5	regular regiments	16	regiments
	61	volunteer regiments	25	battalions
	17	volunteer battalions	227	batteries
Cavalry	408	separate batteries		
	6	regular regiments	137	regiments
	266	volunteer regiments	1	legion*
	45	battalions	143	separate battalions
	78	separate companies	101	separate companies
<p>*Legions were a type of combined arms unit which possessed artillery, cavalry and infantry. They were approximately the strength of a large regiment. Long before the end of the war, most legions lost control their cavalry and artillery organizations and reverted to a pure infantry organization, although most retained their “legion” title.</p>				

Table 1.2. Federal and Confederate Organized Forces, 1861-1865.

the election of company-grade officers was a thing of the past, and governors and or state legislatures assumed responsibility for the appointment of all officers to state organizations.

Much has been made of the West Point backgrounds of the men who ultimately dominated the senior leadership positions of both armies, but none of the graduates of any military college, West Point or otherwise, were prepared by such institutions to command divisions, corps, or armies. Moreover, though many of these leaders had some combat experience from the Mexican War era, very few had experience above the company or battery level in the peacetime years prior to 1861. As a result, the war was not initially conducted at any level above company by “professional officers” as we would define them today. Simply put, the leaders developed their professionalism through actual experience and often at the cost of

hundreds, if not thousands, of lives. General William T. Sherman himself would later note that the war and its leaders did not enter the “professional stage” until 1863.

Civil War Staffs

In the Civil War, as today, the success of large military organizations often depended on the effectiveness of the commanders’ staffs. The procedures used by modern military staffs evolved only gradually with the increasing complexity of military operations since the age of Napoleon. This evolution was far from advanced in 1861 and, throughout the war, commanders personally handled many vital staff functions, most notably operational planning and intelligence analysis. The nature of American warfare up to the mid-19th century had not yet clearly overwhelmed the capabilities of individual commanders.

Civil War staffs were typically divided into a “general staff” and a “staff corps.” This terminology, defined by Winfield Scott in 1855, differs from modern definitions of the terms. Table 1.3 lists typical staff positions at army level, although key functions are represented down to regimental level. Except for the chief of staff and aides-de-camp, who were considered personal staff and would often depart when a commander was reassigned, staffs mainly contained representatives of the various bureaus, with logistical areas being best represented. Later in the war, some truly effective staffs began to emerge but this was largely due to the increased experience of the staff officers serving in those positions rather than a comprehensive development of standard staff procedures or guidelines.

Major General George B. McClellan, when he appointed his father-in-law as his chief of staff, was the first to use this title officially. Even though many senior commanders appointed an officer to function as a chief of staff, the responsibilities of each varied and seldom did the officer in this role achieve the central coordinating authority which a chief of staff possesses in modern military headquarters. The duties of this position, along with most other staff positions, was determined as a commander saw fit, thus they varied under each commander. The generally inadequate employment of the chief of staff was among the most serious shortcomings of staff operations during the Civil War. Equally important weaknesses were the lack of any formal operations or intelligence staff officers. Liaison procedures were also ill-defined, and various staff officers (usually an *aide-de-camp*), or even enlisted soldiers, performed this function often with little formal guidance. Miscommunication and the lack of knowledge

Typical Staffs	
General Staff	Staff Corps
Aides-de-Camp	Chief of Artillery
Assistant Adjutant General	Engineer Officer
Assistant Inspector General	Ordnance Officer
	Quartermaster
	Subsistence
	Surgeon
	Paymaster
	Signal Officer
	Provost Marshal

Table 1.3. Typical staff positions at the army level.

on the part of the liaison regarding the location and status of friendly units proved to be disastrous on many occasions.

The Opposing Armies in the Red River Campaign

Organizationally, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks' Army of the Gulf consisted of two infantry corps, a cavalry division, and two separate brigades. The corps were Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand's XIII Corps and Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin's XIX Corps. At the time of the campaign, however, McClernand and the XIII Corps, less two divisions, were spread throughout Louisiana and along the Texas coast on occupation duties. The two XIII Corps divisions that were to participate with Banks' campaign (the 3rd and 4th Divisions) were under the command of Brigadier Thomas E. G. Ransom and formed an ad hoc "bobtailed" corps for the duration of the campaign. McClernand would later bring two additional XIII Corps brigades to reinforce Ransom toward the end of the campaign, but those brigades would have no effect on the ultimate outcome. Banks' other corps, the XIX, consisted of three divisions, only two of which moved north with Franklin in March. The third remained in the New Orleans area providing security there and elsewhere in southern Louisiana. The Army of the Gulf's cavalry division consisted of five brigades. One brigade, the 2nd, was also assigned security duties in the Port Hudson area during the campaign. The other four went north under the command of Brig. Gen. Albert L. Lee. About half of Lee's regiments were actually mounted infantry armed with standard infantry weapons (i.e., rifles rather than carbines; no sabers, etc.) and largely equipped with confiscated mules and horses

impressed into military service. The army also possessed two brigades of African-American troops, one infantry brigade and the other engineers.

Attached to the Army of the Gulf from Sherman's Army of the Tennessee were two divisions of the XVI Corps under the command of the irascible Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Smith, and a provisional division from the XVII Corps under Brig. Gen. Thomas Kilby Smith. For this campaign, these divisions operated under A. J. Smith's command which was officially designated as the "Detachment, Army of the Tennessee," but commonly referred to as the XVI Corps. The command came with its own transport vessels and by Sherman's original intent, was to operate separately and with Acting Rear Adm. David D. Porter's Mississippi Squadron.

A final element that was to operate with Banks was the Mississippi Marine Brigade. Despite the title, the Marine Brigade was a US Army unit tailored as a combined arms strike force that possessed its own vessels. It could land anywhere the vessels could go, rapidly deploy with infantry, cavalry, and artillery, conduct its mission and quickly return to its boats to sail away. The concept was a good one, but the poor discipline of the unit made it much less effective than it might have been.

Many of the regiments which composed Franklin's XIX Army Corps were raised in the northeastern states and had come to Louisiana with Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler in 1862. Banks also brought a large contingent of easterners with him in December 1862 as well. Since then, these units had been primarily engaged in occupation and constabulary duties, but most had at least participated in the two Bayou Teche expeditions and the investment and capture of Port Hudson all in 1863. Thus, most of Banks' men were not entirely "green" in terms of experience, though they had clearly seen less hard campaigning than their northeastern counterparts in Virginia. Additionally, the XIX Corps' myriad occupation responsibilities had left its newer units with little practical field experience and the kind of physical conditioning that hard campaigning required.

In contrast, A. J. Smith's XVI and XVII Corps troops were mostly battle-hardened veterans drawn from the Midwestern states. Most of them had participated in the battles of Shiloh, Corinth, Vicksburg, and Sherman's recent campaign to Meridian, Mississippi. While these men were indeed formidable fighters, they could also prove to be somewhat undisciplined, especially regarding the private property of the civilians of western Louisiana. Smith's "Gorillas" (as they were derisively titled by the troops from Franklin's corps) had already developed their destructive skills in Mississippi under Sherman but would hone them to an even sharper edge

in Louisiana under Banks. Though the famous “March to the Sea” was later be known for its destruction of civilian property in Georgia, the troops of the XVI Corps proved just as effective at making enemy civilians “feel the hard hand of war” along the Red River.

Most of Ransom’s XIII Corps units were also composed of veteran soldiers. While not as well-traveled as A. J. Smith’s men (Smith had commanded a division in the corps during the Vicksburg Campaign), a large percentage of them were with McClernand at Arkansas Post and Vicksburg and returned with Sherman to finish the destruction of Jackson, Mississippi, after Vicksburg fell. After Jackson, the corps had been partially reorganized and then sent to the Department of the Gulf to help with the occupation of the Texas coast.

The quality, level of training, and morale of the troops of both armies was a concern for US and Confederate commanders. In Banks’ army, the troops of the XIX Corps had spent much of the war in garrison assignments and routine occupation duties. Some corps units did participate in the actions at Fort Bisland and Irish Bend during the first Bayou Teche expedition in April 1863. The corps was then sent to Port Hudson on the Mississippi River in May where it conducted a successful siege and forced the surrender of that place in July. Two divisions of the corps (along with two from the XIII Corps as well) participated in the follow-on advance up Bayou Teche that fall but only engaged in skirmishing and a small battle at Bayou Bourbeau.

The troops of the XIII Corps were more seasoned. They had participated in Sherman’s failed Chickasaw Bayou expedition in December 1862 and the successful effort to capture Fort Hindman (Arkansas Post) the following month. The corps, now under McClernand, performed well during the Vicksburg Campaign during which it took part in the battles of Port Gibson, Champion Hill, and Big Black River Bridge. It also participated in the 19 and 22 May assaults against the Vicksburg defenses just before the siege. After the fall of Vicksburg, Sherman took the XIII Corps along to help complete the destruction of Jackson. The corps, now under the command of Maj. Gen. E.O.C. Ord, was then transferred to the Department of the Gulf. Banks selected the XIII Corps to conduct several operations along the Texas coast during the fall of 1863. The corps succeeded in capturing Brownsville and a few other small enclaves there. In February 1864, General McClernand returned to command the corps, but Banks opted to take only the 3rd and 4th Divisions with him for the Red River Campaign. McClernand and the 1st and 2nd Divisions remained in Texas.

In early 1864, Brig. Gen. James Tuttle's division of the XV Corps and Gen. A. J. Smith's division of the XIII Corps were both transferred to the XVI Corps as the 1st and 3rd Divisions, respectively. Smith's division had participated in Chickasaw Bayou and Arkansas Post. Both of these commands served in the Vicksburg Campaign and the Meridian Expedition in February 1864. These divisions were next attached to Banks' Army of the Gulf with Smith in overall command. The 1st Division was now commanded by Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower with the 3rd Division attached to Mower's command. An additional division from the XVII Corps, commanded by Brig. Gen. Thomas Kilby Smith, was attached to the Smith's corps.

For the troops of the Army of the Gulf, especially those of the XIX Corps, the impending campaign sparked a sense of adventure in the soldiers and morale rose with the anticipation of a break from the monotony of occupation duties. Once movement started, morale remained fairly high despite the poor weather. After the link up was effected between Banks' eastern soldiers and Smith's seasoned veterans, an air of competition sprang up between the two camps. Smith's troops referred to the eastern men as "paper collar soldiers" as they considered those troops soft and not used to the realities of campaigning. Smith's men especially noted the neat uniforms and the large number of wagons the eastern troops brought along to haul along the creature comforts of camp life. Franklin's men in turn referred to the motley collection of troops from the Army of the Tennessee as "10,000 gorillas," noting their bedraggled appearance and the seemingly careless manner by which they conducted themselves.

In summary, most of the infantry troops in Bank's Army of the Gulf, had at least a moderate level of combat and campaigning experience as they prepared to embark on the Red River Campaign and some units had a great deal of experience. The army was well equipped and supplied and was supported by a very powerful naval force. In general, Union confidence and morale were high during the initial stages of the campaign despite the verbal jabs that the eastern and western contingents frequently directed toward one another. All that would change after the battle of Mansfield.

On the Confederate side, the combat experience of Taylor's assigned forces (i.e., the troops of the District of West Louisiana) was at least as high as that of Banks' men as a whole. Over the past 20 months, his troops had engaged the XIX Corps on several occasions to include the two Bayou Teche expeditions and during Taylor's forays into the Bayou Lafourche region near New Orleans. They were good fighters and were committed to the defense of Louisiana, especially those Louisiana troops of the district.

Walker's Texas Division was a marginally experienced unit in terms of combat, but it boasted a good reputation nonetheless. Known as "Walker's Greyhounds," it was noted for its ability to move fast. The division was initially assigned to Taylor's district in March 1863 to operate against Grant's supply line on the west bank of the Mississippi River. The Greyhounds fought at the Battle of Milliken's Bend and the Battle of Young's Point (both on 7 June 1863) and inflicted heavy casualties on the Union defenders at those places, but failed to capture either location due to the heavy cannon on Federal gunboats supporting the positions. The division then remained largely dormant in the Sub-district of Northern Louisiana until March 1864 when Kirby Smith reassigned it to Taylor's command to help delay Bank's advance up the Red River.

Mouton's Infantry Division was an ad hoc organization that Taylor cobbled together in early 1864 and placed it in the hands of the very capable Brigadier Alfred Mouton. It was composed of two brigades, one each from Texas and Louisiana. The Texas brigade was under the command of Camille Armand Jules Marie, Prince de Polignac, a French nobleman. He was affectionately known as 'polecat' by his roughhewn Texans due to their inability to pronounce his French name correctly. Polignac's brigade was formed in 1862 near Fort Smith, Arkansas, where three Texas cavalry regiments were brigaded with several Indian regiments from the Indian Territory. Since then, the brigade had seen light, but at times difficult and much traveled, service in Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana. During that time it had engaged in numerous small skirmishes and affairs, but no major battles. The Louisiana brigade was commanded by Col. Henry Gray of Coushatta, Louisiana. It consisted primarily of three Louisiana infantry regiments (the 18th, 24th, and 28th) and was originally commanded by Mouton himself. Its units, individually, had seen action at Shiloh and Corinth (18th and 24th), and Bisland, and Irish Bend (28th) and were brigaded together in November 1862 under Mouton's command. When Taylor formed the division in mid-March Gray moved up to assume command of Mouton's brigade.

Churchill's Arkansas Division and Parson's Missouri Division were originally the infantry units in Maj. Gen. Sterling Price's District of Arkansas. Consisting of four brigades, they were organized into two small divisions by Kirby Smith when he ordered them to move to Shreveport in March of 1864. Churchill's division consisted of Tappan's Brigade under Brig. Gen. James C. Tappan and Gause's Brigade under Col. Lucien C. Gause. Each nominally possessed three regiments for a total division strength of about 2,000 troops. Tappan's Brigade consisted regiments

which had seen action at the Battle of Prairie Grove, Arkansas, Milliken's Bend, and the defense of Little Rock. Most of Gause's Brigade had been involved in the fighting at Prairie Grove, at Helena, Arkansas, and the defense of Little Rock, as well.

The Missouri Division, commanded by Mosby Parsons, was also a small, two-brigade organization. The First Brigade was commanded Brig. Gen. John B. Clark, Jr. Like the Arkansas brigades, it had participated in the battles at Prairie Grove and Helena, and in the defense of Little Rock. Colonel Simon P. Burns commanded the Second Brigade. The history of this brigade is vague, but its 11th Missouri Regiment participated in the battles at Prairie Grove and Helena and also the defense of Little Rock. Most likely, the other regiments did as well.

Green's Cavalry Division was considered the best such rebel force in the Trans-Mississippi Department. It was formed in 1863 with Green's Cavalry Brigade as the basis. The units of the brigade had fought for Taylor under Green's command during the 1863 forays into the La Fourche district and during the Federal incursions up Bayou Teche. Soon expanded to a division of two brigades (the second under Brig. Gen. James P. Major), Green's men distinguished themselves as able fighters and horsemen by helping to capture a Union supply depot at Brashear City and defeating three infantry brigades at Kock's Planation in June. In September, the division essentially destroyed a Federal brigade in an action at Stirling's Planation. On 3 November Green led the division in an attack against a brigade of the 4th Division, XIII Corps at Bayou Bourbeau, routed it, and captured almost 600 prisoners. After those actions, Kirby Smith had withdrawn Green's cavalry in early November and sent them back to Texas to man defenses at Galveston Island and keep watch over the Federal enclave at Matagorda Bay. Even though it was apparent by late February 1864 that Banks' Army of the Gulf would make another advance up the Red River, Kirby Smith delayed in ordering Green's Division back to Louisiana. He did not give the order for the division's return until 5 March, thus Green's troops did not reach Taylor in Louisiana until 30 March 1864, too late to help with any meaningful delaying action against Banks short of Grand Ecore. Still, the division did arrive in time to participate in the key battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill and several other later actions in the Red River Campaign.

The final unit of any significance in Taylor's army was a small cavalry brigade from the Sub-District of Northern Louisiana under the command of Brig. Gen. St. John R. Liddell. It was composed of a couple of small cavalry regiments, a cavalry battalion, and a two-gun section of artillery.

Confederate: Taylor's Strength			Federal: Banks'		
Date	Additions or Losses	Total	Date	Additions or Losses	Total
1 April	5,800 Walker's and Mouton's Divisions	5,800	1 March		22,900
6 April	+3,000 Green's Cavalry Div	8,000	12 March	+11,000 XVI Corps and XVII Corps	33,900
8 April	-1,100 casualties at Mansfield	6,900	27 March	-1,000 Marine Brigade departs Alexandria	32,900
8 April	+ 3,200 arrival of Churchill's and Parson's Divisions	10,100	28 March	+2500 1/1/Corps <i>d'Afrique</i> arrives	35,400
9 April	-1,630 casualties at Pleasant Hill	8,470	8 April	-2235 casualties at Mansfield	33,165
14 April	-6,100 departure of Churchill's, Parson's, and Walker's Divisions	2,370	9 April	-1370 casualties at Pleasant Hill	31,795
15-30 April	+2,000 arrival of Bagby's cavalry	4,370	18 April	+2000 1/1/XIII arrives Grand Ecore	33,795
23 April	-150 casualties at Monnett's Ferry	4,220	23 April	-300 casualties at Monnett's Ferry	33,495
30 April		5,000 "present for duty" at or near Alexandria	30 April		33,502 "present for duty" at or near Alexandria

Table 1.4. Confederate and Federal Effective Strengths in the Red River Campaign, March-April 1864.

This unit was of dubious value as it was composed of men of doubtful character. Liddell himself described his arrival at his new command in January 1864:

I found certainly demoralization on every side, but went to work patiently and increased my little cavalry concern to about seven hundred men. They were chiefly deserters from the armies of Virginia and Tennessee, now dodging conscription by entering the cavalry. They regarded lightly the honor of serving in our great armies in the East where danger added to reputation. Now these men were desirous of legalized plunder, with the smallest possible amount of service or danger to themselves.

With this unit, he was required to secure 120 miles of the Red River, from the north bank to the Arkansas border.

In short, Taylor's command would be outnumbered during the entire campaign, most of the time vastly. The units, while not green, had not seen heavy campaigning and few had experienced heavy combat. Taylor's "army" was largely ad hoc with most divisions being organized for operations shortly before, or in some cases, after the commencement of the United States army's advance toward Alexandria. Still, these forces would fight against great odds and their efforts, Taylor's leadership, and Union bumbling, would ultimately yield impressive results for the Trans-Mississippi Department. Though always outnumbered by their opponents, the soldiers of Taylor's command marched and fought under difficult conditions and constraints but still succeeded in driving a much larger and better equipped force from central Louisiana. Their efforts arguably helped to increase the length of the war, but of course, they would not change the inevitable end result.

Weapons

Infantry

During the 1850s, in a military technological revolution of major proportions, the rifle-musket began to replace the relatively inaccurate smoothbore musket in ever-increasing numbers, both in Europe and America. This process, accelerated by the Civil War, ensured that the rifled shoulder weapon became the basic weapon used by infantrymen in both the Federal and Confederate armies.

The standard and most common shoulder weapon used in the American Civil War was the Springfield .58-caliber rifle-musket, models 1855, 1861, and 1863. In 1855, the US Army adopted this weapon to replace

the .69-caliber smoothbore musket and the .54-caliber rifle. In appearance and function, the rifle-musket was similar to the smoothbore. Both were single-shot muzzle-loaders, typically fired *en masse* by a regiment formed in two lines. The rifled bore of the new weapon, however, substantially increased the potential range and accuracy of the firing line. The rifling system chosen by the United States was designed by Claude Minié, a French Army officer. Whereas earlier rifles fired a round, non-expanding ball that was difficult to ram down the barrel, the Minié system used a hollow-based cylindro-conoidal projectile slightly smaller than the bore that could be easily rodded into the base of the barrel. When the powder charge was ignited by a fulminate of mercury percussion cap, the released propellant gases forced the base of the bullet to expand and engage the rifled grooves, giving the projectile a ballistic spin. This gave the rifle a potential accurate range of out to 500 yards as opposed to the smoothbore which could dependably strike a target at about 100 yards at best. Realistically, however, the actual effective range was closer due to the lack of extensive marksmanship training and the fact that most engagements (less those performed by skirmishers, etc.) tended to be conducted by units formed in ranks and weapons fired *en masse* toward an enemy battle line. Typically, engagements began out as far as 200-300 yards versus the 50-100 yards with muskets. Of course, the engagement distance would close (and casualties increase) as one line or the other advanced. Terrain also influenced the effectiveness and use of the rifle-musket at times in that wooded locations such as those in the Wilderness in Virginia and undulations in the ground such as those at Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg prevented heavier casualties until the formations came close enough for the weapons to be more effectively employed.

The Model 1855 Springfield rifle-musket was the first regulation arm of the US Army to use the hollow-base .58-caliber Minié bullet. The slightly modified Model 1861 was the principal infantry weapon of the Civil War, although two subsequent models were produced in about equal quantities. The Model 1861 was 56 inches long overall, had a 40-inch barrel, and weighed 8.75 pounds. It could be fitted with a 21-inch socket bayonet and had a rear sight graduated to 500 yards. The maximum effective range of the Springfield rifle-musket was approximately 500 yards, although it had killing power at 1,000 yards. The round could penetrate 11 inches of white-pine board at 200 yards and 3 ¼ inches at 1,000 yards. A well-trained soldier could possibly load and fire four times per minute, but in the confusion of battle, the typical rate of fire was probably slower at two to three rounds per minute.

In addition to the Springfield rifle-musket, over 100 other types of muskets, rifles, rifle-muskets, and rifled muskets—manufactured in various calibers—were used during the American Civil War. The numerous American-made weapons were supplemented early in the conflict by a wide variety of imported models. The best, most popular, and most numerous of the foreign weapons was the British .577-caliber Enfield rifle, Model 1853, which was 54 inches long (with a 39-inch barrel), weighed 8.7 pounds (9.2 with the bayonet), could be fitted with a socket bayonet with an 18-inch blade, and had a rear sight graduated to a range of 800 yards. The United States purchased over 436,000 Enfield pattern weapons during the war. Statistics on Confederate purchases are more difficult to ascertain, but a report dated February 1863 indicates that 70,980 long Enfields and 9,715 short Enfields had been delivered by that time, with another 23,000 awaiting delivery.

While the quality of imported weapons varied, experts considered the Enfields and the Austrian Lorenz rifle-muskets very good. Some foreign governments and manufacturers took advantage of the huge initial demand for weapons by dumping their obsolete weapons on the American market. This practice was especially prevalent with some of the older smoothbore muskets and converted flintlocks. The greatest challenge, however, lay in maintaining these weapons and supplying ammunition and replacement parts for calibers ranging from .44 to .79. The quality of the imported weapons eventually improved as the procedures, standards, astuteness, and experience of the purchasing agents increased. For the most part, the European suppliers provided the needed number of weapons, and the newer foreign-designed weapons were generally well-regarded.

All told, the United States purchased about 1,165,000 European rifles and muskets during the war, nearly all within the first two years. Of these, 110,853 were smoothbores. Besides the Enfields, the remainder were primarily the French Minié rifles (44,250), Austrian Model 1854s (266,294), Prussian rifles (59,918), Austrian Jagers (29,850) and Austrian Bokers (187,533). Estimates of total Confederate purchases range from 340,000 to 400,000. In addition to the roughly 100,000 Enfields delivered to the Confederacy, 27,000 Austrian rifles, 21,040 British muskets, and 2,020 Brunswick rifles were also purchased by the end of the war, with another 30,000 Austrian rifles awaiting shipment.

Breech-loaders and repeating rifles were available by 1861 and were initially privately purchased in limited quantities, often by individual soldiers. In general, however, they were not issued to troops in large numbers because of technical problems such as poor breech seals, faulty and ammu-

dition. In addition, there was a fear among Ordnance Department officers who procured and produced such weapons that troops would waste ammunition with such rapid fire weapons and the cost of their production would be too high. The most famous of the breechloaders was the single-shot Sharps weapon which was produced in both carbine and rifle models. The Model 1859 rifle was .52 caliber, 47 1/8 inches long, and weighed 8 3/4 pounds, while the carbine was .52 caliber, 39 1/8 inches long, and weighed 7 3/4 pounds. Both weapons used a linen cartridge and a pellet primer feed mechanism. Most Sharps carbines were issued to Federal cavalry units.

The best known of the repeaters was probably the seven-shot Spencer, .52 caliber, which also came in both rifle and carbine models. The rifle was 47 inches long and weighed 10 pounds, while the carbine was 39 inches long and weighed 8 1/4 pounds. The first mounted infantry unit to use Spencer repeating rifles in combat was Col. John T. Wilder's "Lighting Brigade" on 24 June 1863 at Hoover's Gap, Tennessee. The Spencer was also the first weapon adopted by the US Army that fired a metallic rim-fire, self-contained cartridge. Soldiers loaded rounds through an opening in the butt of the stock, which fed into the chamber through a tubular magazine by the action of the trigger guard. The hammer still had to be cocked manually before each shot.

Cavalry

Initially armed with sabers and pistols (and in one case, lances), Federal cavalry troopers quickly added the breech-loading carbine to their inventory of weapons. However, one Federal regiment, the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, carried lances until 1863. Troopers preferred the easier-handling carbines to rifles, and the breechloaders to awkward muzzle loaders. In 1861, the Hall .52-caliber carbine accounted for approximately 20,000 of the single-shot breech-loading carbines which saw extensive use during the Civil War. The Hall, however, was quickly replaced by a variety of better carbines including the Merrill .54 caliber (14,495 produced), Maynard .52 caliber (20,002 produced), Gallagher .53 caliber (22,728 produced), Smith .52 caliber (30,062 produced), Burnside .56 caliber (55,567 produced), and the popular Sharps .54 caliber (80,512 produced). The next step in the evolutionary process was the repeating carbine, the favorite by 1865 being the Spencer .52 caliber seven-shot repeater (94,194). Because of the South's limited industrial capacity, Confederate cavalymen had a more difficult time arming themselves with suitable weapons. Nevertheless, they too embraced the firepower revolution, choosing shotguns, muzzle-loading carbines and multiple shot pistols as their primary weapons. In addition, rebel cavalymen made extensive use of battlefield salvage

by pressing lost and captured Federal weapons into service. However, the South's difficulties in producing the metallic-rimmed cartridges used by many of these recovered weapons often limited their usefulness.

Artillery

Artillery in the era leading up to the Civil War consisted of four general weapon types—guns, howitzers, mortars, and columbiads. Guns were long-barreled cannon that delivered high-velocity, flat-trajectory, long-range fire. Howitzers were lighter and shorter than guns, and used a smaller powder charge to fire explosive projectiles at shorter distances. Mortars, the shortest pieces, used a small powder charge to lob a large projectile at a very high angle. Columbiads combined characteristics of all three. They were generally of large caliber, possessed relatively long barrels, and used a large powder charge to fire a heavy projectile great distances.

Artillery was also categorized as to method of employment—field, siege (officially classified as “siege and garrison”), and seacoast. Field artillery, the lightest and most mobile, operated with infantry and cavalry tactical units as part of a standard combined arms team. Siege and seacoast artillery operated more or less independently of the other combat arms. Siege artillery units were normally formed into siege trains that were called to the front only under special circumstances. The circumstances usually entailed the necessity of battering down enemy fortifications before a final massed attack by infantry. Seacoast artillery, the heaviest Civil War ordnance, was typically emplaced in fixed coastal defense positions. Its mission was to trade heavy blows with enemy vessels to prevent them from entering a friendly harbor. These weapons could also be emplaced in fortified positions along rivers and streams, as in the Vicksburg and Red River Campaigns, to prevent enemy vessels from using those avenues as invasion routes or lines of communications.

Field Artillery

In 1841, the US Army selected bronze as the standard material for fieldpieces and at the same time adopted a new system of field artillery. The 1841 field artillery system consisted entirely of smoothbore muzzle-loaders: 6- and 12-pounder guns; 12-, 24-, and 32-pounder howitzers; and 12-pounder mountain howitzers. A pre-Civil War battery usually consisted of six fieldpieces—four guns and two howitzers. A 6-pounder battery contained four 6-pounder guns and two 12-pounder howitzers, while a 12-pounder battery had four 12-pounder guns and two 24-pounder howitzers. The guns fired solid shot, shell, spherical case, grapeshot, and

canister rounds, while howitzers fired shell, spherical case, grapeshot, and canister rounds.

The 6-pounder gun (effective range 1,523 yards) was the primary field piece used from the time of Mexican War until the Civil War. By 1861, however, the 1841 system based on the 6-pounder was obsolete. Shortly before the war, a new and more versatile fieldpiece, the 12-pounder gun-howitzer (Napoleon), Model 1857, appeared on the scene. Designed as a multipurpose piece to replace existing guns and howitzers, the Napoleon fired canister and shell, like the 12-pounder howitzer, and solid shot at ranges comparable to the 12-pounder gun. The Napoleon was a bronze, muzzle-loading smoothbore with an effective range of 1,619 yards using solid shot (see Table 1.5 on page 28) for a comparison of artillery data). Served by a nine-man crew, the piece could fire at a sustained rate of two aimed shots per minute. With less than 50 Napoleons initially available in 1861, however, the obsolete 6-pounders remained in the inventories of both armies for some time, especially in the western theater.

Another new development in field artillery was the introduction of rifling. Although rifled guns provided greater range and accuracy, they were somewhat less reliable and slower to load than smoothbores (rifled ammunition was semi-fixed, so the charge and the projectile had to be loaded separately). Moreover, it was soon determined that the canister load of the rifled gun did not perform as well as that of the smoothbore. Initially, some smoothbores were rifled on the James pattern (a rifling system developed by Charles T. James and the Ames Manufacturing Company of Chicopee, Massachusetts) but they soon proved unsatisfactory because the bronze rifling eroded too quickly. Therefore, most rifled artillery was either wrought iron or cast iron reinforced with a wrought iron reinforcing band.

The most common rifled guns were the 10-pounder Parrott and the Rodman, or 3-inch ordnance rifle. The Parrott rifle was a cast-iron piece, easily identified by the wrought-iron band reinforcing the breech. The 10-pounder Parrott was made in two models: the Model 1861 had a 2.9-inch rifled bore with three lands and grooves and a slight muzzle swell, while the Model 1863 had a 3-inch bore and no muzzle swell. The Rodman or Ordnance rifle was a long-tubed, wrought-iron piece that had a 3-inch bore with seven lands and grooves. Ordnance rifles were sturdier than the 10-pounder Parrott, and displayed superior accuracy and reliability.

By 1860, the ammunition for field artillery consisted of four general types for both smoothbores and rifles: solid shot, shell, case, and canister.

Solid shot for smoothbores was a round cast-iron projectile; for rifled guns it took the form of an elongated projectile known as a “bolt.” Solid shot, with its smashing or battering effect, was used in a counterbattery role or against buildings and massed troop formations. The rifle’s conical-shaped bolt lacked the effectiveness of the smoothbore’s cannonball because it tended to bury itself on impact instead of bounding along the ground like round shot.

Shell, also known as common shell or explosive shell, whether spherical or conical, was a hollow projectile filled with an explosive charge of black powder detonated by a fuse. Shell was designed to break into jagged pieces, producing an antipersonnel effect, but the low-order detonation seldom produced more than three to five fragments. In addition to its casualty-producing effects, shell had a psychological impact when it exploded over the heads of troops. It could also be used against field fortifications and in a counterbattery role. Case or case shot for both smoothbore and rifled guns was a hollow projectile with thinner walls than shell. The projectile was filled with round lead or iron balls set in a matrix of sulphur that surrounded a small bursting charge. Case was primarily used in an antipersonnel role. This type of round had been invented by Henry Shrapnel, a British artillery officer, hence the term “shrapnel” which originally came into use to refer to the small lead or iron balls.

Lastly, there was the canister round, which was the most effective artillery ammunition, and the round of choice, used at close range (i.e., 400 yards or less) against massed troops. Canister was essentially a tin can filled with iron balls packed in sawdust with no internal bursting charge. When fired, the can disintegrated, and the balls followed their own paths to the target. The canister round for the 12-pounder Napoleon consisted of 27 1-1/2 inch iron balls packed inside an elongated tin cylinder. At extremely close ranges, artillerymen often loaded double charges of canister.

Heavy Artillery—Siege and Seacoast

The 1841 artillery system listed eight types of siege artillery and another six types as seacoast artillery. The 1861 *Ordnance Manual* included eleven different kinds of siege ordnance. The principal siege weapons in 1861 were the 4.5-inch rifle; 18-, and 24-pounder guns; a 24-pounder howitzer and two types of 8-inch howitzer; and several types of 8- and 10-inch mortars. The normal rate of fire for siege guns and mortars was about twelve rounds per hour, but with a well-drilled crew this could be increased to about twenty rounds per hour. The rate of fire for siege howitzers was somewhat lower, being about 8 shots per hour.

The carriages for siege guns and howitzers were longer and heavier than field artillery carriages, but were similar in construction. The 24-pounder model 1839 was the heaviest piece that could be moved over the typical roads of that day. Alternate means of transport, such as railroad or watercraft, were required to move larger pieces any great distance.

The rounds fired by siege artillery were generally the same as those fired by field artillery, except that siege artillery continued to use grapeshot after it was discontinued in the field artillery (1841). A “stand of grape” consisted of nine iron balls ranging from two to about 3 ½ inches, depending on gun caliber and was similar in design to the smaller canister round.

The largest and heaviest artillery pieces in the Civil War era belonged to the seacoast artillery. These large weapons were normally mounted in fixed positions. The 1861 system included five types of columbiads, ranging from 8- to 15-inch; 32- and 42-pounder guns; 8- and 10-inch howitzers; and mortars of 10 and 13 inches.

Wartime additions to the Federal seacoast artillery inventory included Parrott rifles ranging from 6.4-inch to 10-inch (300-pounder). New columbiads, developed by Ordnance Lieutenant Thomas J. Rodman, included 8-inch, 10-inch, and 15-inch models. The Confederates produced some new seacoast artillery of their own—Brooke rifles in 6.4- and 7-inch versions. They also imported weapons from England, including 7- and 8-inch Armstrong rifles, 6.3- to 12.5-inch Blakely rifles, and 5-inch Whitworth rifles.

Seacoast artillery fired the same projectiles as siege artillery, but with one addition—hot shot. As its name implies, hot shot was solid shot heated in special ovens until red-hot, then *carefully* loaded and fired as an incendiary round against wood and canvas vessels.

In short, while the technical advancements of weapons contributed to the evolution of tactics and resulted in various advances, and limitations, on the employment of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, they also transformed the two armies into the most deadly, and accurate, fighting forces ever engaged on American soil.

Weapons in the Red River Campaign

The variety of infantry weapons available to Civil War armies is evident in the Red River Campaign. A review of the *Quarterly Returns of Ordnance* for January-March 1864, reveals that of 76 infantry regiments in Banks’ Army of the Gulf, all but six carried first class shoulder weapons, the most numerous of which were British 1853 Enfield rifle-muskets

Type	Model	Bore Diameter (inches)	Tube Length Overall (inches)	Tube Weight (pounds)	Carriage Weight (pounds)	Range (yards)/degrees elevation
Field Artillery						
Smoothbore						
6-pounder	Gun	3.67	65.6	884	900	1,523/5°
12-pounder "Napoleon"	Gun-Howitzer	4.62	72.15	1,227	1,128	1,680/5°
12-pounder	Howitzer	4.62	58.6	788	900	1,072/5°
24-pounder	Howitzer	5.82	71.2	1,318	1,128	1,322/5°
Rifle						
10-pounder	Parrott	3.0	78	890	900	2,970/10°
3-inch	Ordnance	3.0	73.3	820	900	2,788/10°
20-pounder	Parrott	3.67	89.5	1,750	Unk	4,400/15°
Siege and Garrison						
Smoothbore						
8-inch	Howitzer	8.0	61.5	2,614	50.5 shell	2,280/12°30'
10-inch	Mortar	10.0	28.0	1,852	87.5 shell	2,028/45°
12-pounder	Gun	4.62	116.0	3,590	12.3 shot	
24-pounder	Gun	5.82	124.0	5,790	24.4 shot	1,901/5°
Rifle						
30-pounder	Parrott	4.2	132.5	4,200	29.0 shell	6,700/25°
Seacoast						
Smoothbore						
8-inch	Columbiad	8.0	124	9,240	65.0 shot	4,812/27°30'
10-inch	Columbiad	10.0	126	15,400	128.0 shot	5,654/39°15'
11-inch	Dahlgren	11.0	161	15,700		3,650/20°
32-pounder	Gun	6.4	125.7	7,200	32.6 shot	1,922/5°
42-pounder	Gun	7.0	129	8,465	42.7 shot	1,955/5°
Rifle						
6.4-inch	Brooke	6.4	144	9,120	Unk	Unk
7-inch	Brooke	7.0	147.5	14,800	Unk	Unk
100-pounder	Parrott	6.4	155	9,700	100 shot	2,247/5°

Table 1.5. Types of Artillery Available in the Red River Campaign.

(.577 caliber). No less than 45 regiments carried the Enfield. The other first class infantry weapon used in the Red River Campaign was the American-made Springfield rifle-musket used by at least 16 regiments. Another seven regiments carried a mixture of both weapons, each company carrying entirely one type or the other. The one exception to this was the 19th Kentucky Infantry, which had the weapons mixed with no respect toward type-weapon integrity in each company. Six Federal units, five of which were US Colored Troops (USCT) regiments, were armed primarily with second class weapons, such as Austrian rifle-muskets in .54, .577 and .58 calibers, US Model 1841 rifled muskets (.69 caliber), Belgian and French rifled muskets (.69 and .71 calibers), Belgian or Vincennes rifles (.70 and .71 calibers). Only one 'white' Federal regiment, the 16th Ohio Infantry, was armed with second class weapons, which was the Austrian rifle-muskets, probably the .577 caliber version. Only one USCT regiment, the 73rd, possessed a first class weapon which in their case was the Enfield.

Although the records are incomplete, it seems that most of the weapons carried by rebel infantry soldiers were the British-made Enfields. Other weapons included a mix of various .58 caliber "minié" rifles (Springfield, Richmond, Mississippi and Fayetteville models), Austrian and French rifle-muskets in .577 and .58 calibers, Mississippi rifles, Austrian rifle-muskets (.54 caliber), various .69-caliber rifled-muskets altered to percussion, Belgian .70-caliber rifles, and British smoothbore muskets in .75 caliber. The diversity of weapons (and calibers of ammunition) obviously created significant sustainment problems for both sides, but certainly more so for Taylor's men.

Whereas there was little to differentiate Federal from Confederate effectiveness so far as small-arms were concerned, the forces in Banks' army enjoyed a clear superiority in terms of artillery. When the Army of the Gulf marched from Alexandria, it included about 96 cannon organized into nineteen batteries. Seven of the Federal batteries contained six guns each; the remaining 13 were four-gun batteries. At least 50 guns were rifled artillery; about 46 were smoothbores. Of particular note was the presence of the Singer, Nimick & Co. 3-inch Model 1861 steel rifle-guns. Steel making in the 1860s was still a very expensive process and due to the expense associated with the manufacturing of these weapons, only six were ever made. All six of the guns participated in the Red River Campaign—four with the 1st Vermont Light Artillery Battery and two with the 1st Indiana Light Artillery Battery.

The Confederate forces in Louisiana possessed a much smaller artillery capability and could not hope to match Federal firepower. At the

height of their strength under Taylor, the Confederate forces in this campaign possessed a total of about 13 batteries of artillery, numbering some 54 tubes. However, many of the rebel guns were short ranged and obsolete. Taylor's batteries possessed few of what could have been considered modern guns and no rifled artillery. Fort DeRussy's armament included ten cannon—six large pieces located in the water battery and four smaller weapons located in the fort itself. The water battery held two 9-inch Dahlgrens and four 32-pounders—two Army smoothbores, one Navy smoothbore, and one rifled gun. The main position mounted two 24-pounders and two 6-pounder field pieces for anti-personnel defense (See Appendix B for additional details on Fort DeRussy's defenses and manning).

In most of the engagements during the Red River Campaign, the Federal artillery demonstrated its superiority to that of the Confederates. A notable exception to this was the several instances where rebel field artillery batteries engaged the more heavily armed tinclads and other boats on the river but still succeeded in defeating them.

Tactics

Tactical Doctrine in 1861

The Napoleonic Wars and the Mexican-American War were the major influences on American military thought at the beginning of the Civil War. The campaigns of Napoleon and Wellington provided ample lessons in battle strategy, weapons employment, and logistics, while American tactical doctrine also reflected the lessons learned during the conflict with Mexico (1846-1848). However, these tactical lessons were misleading because in Mexico two relatively small armies fought only seven pitched battles. Because these battles were so small, almost all the tactical lessons learned during the war focused at the regimental, battery, and squadron levels. Future Civil War leaders had learned very little about brigade, division, and corps maneuvers in Mexico, yet these units were the basic fighting elements of both armies in 1861-1865. Additionally, the lessons were derived from tactics based on the use of smoothbore infantry weapons which possessed much shorter ranges than the rifle-muskets of the Civil War.

The US Army's experience in Mexico validated Napoleonic principles—particularly that of the offensive. In Mexico, tactics did not differ greatly from those of the early nineteenth century. Infantry marched in column and deployed into line to engage. Once deployed, an infantry regiment might send one or two companies forward as skirmishers as security against surprise or to soften the enemy's line. After identifying the enemy's position, a regiment advanced in closely ordered lines to within 100

yards or less. There, it delivered a devastating volley, followed by a charge with bayonets. Both sides tried to use this basic tactic in the first battles of the Civil War with generally poor results.

In Mexico, American armies employed artillery and cavalry in both offensive and defensive battle situations. In the offense, artillery moved as near to the enemy lines as possible—normally just outside musket range—in order to blow gaps in the enemy’s line that the infantry might exploit with a determined charge. In the defense, artillery blasted advancing enemy lines with canister and withdrew if the enemy attack got within musket range. Cavalry guarded the army’s flanks and rear but held itself ready to charge if enemy infantry became disorganized or began to withdraw.

These tactics worked perfectly well with the weapons technology of the Napoleonic and Mexican wars. The infantry musket was generally accurate up to 100 yards but largely ineffective against even massed targets much beyond that range. Rifles were specialized weapons with excellent accuracy and range but slow to load and therefore not usually issued to line troops. Smoothbore cannon had a range up to 1 mile with solid shot but were most effective against infantry when firing canister at ranges under 400 yards. Artillerists worked their guns without much fear of infantry muskets, which had a limited range. Cavalry continued to use sabers and lances as shock weapons.

American troops took the tactical offensive in most Mexican-American War battles with great success, and they suffered fairly light losses. Unfortunately, similar tactics proved to be obsolete in the Civil War because of a major technological innovation fielded in the 1850s—the rifle-musket. This new weapon increased the infantry’s range and accuracy and loaded as fast as a musket. The US Army adopted a version of the rifle-musket in 1855, and by the beginning of the Civil War, rifle-muskets were available in moderate numbers. It was the weapon of choice in both the United States and Confederate Armies during the war, and by 1862, large numbers of troops on both sides had rifle-muskets of good quality.

Official tactical doctrine prior to the beginning of the Civil War did not clearly recognize the potential of the new rifle-musket. Prior to 1855, the most influential tactical guide was Gen. Winfield Scott’s three-volume work, *Infantry Tactics* (1835), based on French tactical models of the Napoleonic Wars. It stressed close-order, linear formations in two or three ranks advancing at “quick time” of 110 steps (86 yards) per minute. In 1855, to accompany the introduction of the new rifle-musket, Maj. William J. Hardee published a two-volume drill manual, *Rifle and Light*

Infantry Tactics (commonly referred to as “*Hardee’s Tactics*”) which became the standard infantry manual used by both sides at the outbreak of war in 1861. Hardee’s work contained few significant revisions of Scott’s manual. His major innovation was to increase the speed of the advance to a “double-quick time” of 165 steps (151 yards) per minute. If, as suggested, Hardee introduced his manual as a response to the rifle-musket, then he failed to fully appreciate the weapon’s impact on combined arms tactics and the essential shift the rifle-musket made in favor of the defense.

If Scott’s and Hardee’s works lagged behind technological innovations, at least the infantry had manuals to establish a doctrinal basis for training. Cavalry and artillery fell even further behind in recognizing the potential tactical shift in favor of rifle-armed infantry. The cavalry’s manual, published in 1841, was based on French sources that focused on close-order offensive tactics. It favored the traditional cavalry attack in two ranks of horsemen armed with sabers or lances. The manual took no notice of the rifle-musket’s potential, nor did it give much attention to dismounted operations. Even worse, the artillery had a basic drill book delineating individual crew actions, but it possessed no manual which explained battery, or higher, tactical operations. Like cavalrymen, artillerymen showed little concern for the potential changes that the rifle-musket was about to enforce on tactical operations.

Prior to the Civil War, Regular Army infantry, cavalry, and artillery units continued to practice and become proficient in the tactics that brought success in Mexico. As the first volunteers drilled and readied themselves for the battles of 1861, officers and noncommissioned officers in the units also taught the lessons learned from the Napoleonic Wars and validated in Mexico. Thus, the leaders and men of the opposing armies entered the Civil War with a good understanding of the tactics that had worked in the Mexican War but with little understanding of how the rifle-musket might upset their carefully practiced lessons.

Early War Tactics

In the battles of 1861 and 1862, both sides employed the tactics proven in Mexico and found that the tactical offensive could still be successful—but only at a great cost in casualties. Men wielding rifled weapons in the defense generally ripped frontal assaults to shreds, and if the attackers paused to exchange fire, the slaughter was even greater. Rifles also increased the relative numbers of defenders, since flanking units could engage assaulting troops with a murderous enfilading fire. Defenders usually crippled the first assault line before a second line of attackers could come

forward in support. This caused successive attacking lines to intermingle with survivors to their front, thereby destroying formations, command, and control. Although both sides sought to use the bayonet during the war, they quickly discovered that rifle-musket fire made successful bayonet attacks almost impossible.

Just as the infantry found the bayonet charge to be of little value against an enemy equipped with rifle-muskets, cavalry and artillery made troubling discoveries of their own. Similarly, cavalry leaders soon learned that the old-style saber charge did not work against trained infantry armed with rifle-muskets. The cavalry did retain, however, its traditional intelligence gathering and screening roles whenever commanders chose to make the horsemen the “eyes and ears” of the army. Artillery leaders, for their part, found that they could no longer maneuver their guns close to enemy lines to fire canister as had been done in Mexico, because the rifle-musket was accurate well beyond that distance. Worse yet, at ranges where gunners were safe from rifle fire, artillery rounds, to include shot, shell, and case, were far less effective than close-range canister. Ironically, rifled cannon did not give the equivalent boost to artillery effectiveness that the rifle-musket gave to the infantry. The increased range of cannons was limited and proved no real advantage in the broken and wooded terrain over which so many Civil War battles were fought. It did, however, give defenders an increased advantage. As an attacking force closed the gap between the lines, the guns of the defending force increased in effectiveness while those of the attacking force decreased since they did not generally move forward and due to the need to avoid firing into the friendly troops as they advanced.

There are several possible reasons why Civil War commanders continued to employ the tactical offensive long after it was evident that the defensive was superior. Most commanders believed, rightly, the offensive was the decisive form of battle. This lesson came straight from the Napoleonic Wars and the Mexican-American War. Commanders who chose the tactical offensive usually retained the initiative over defenders. Similarly, the tactical defensive depended heavily on the enemy choosing to attack at a point convenient to the defender and continuing to attack until badly defeated. Although this situation occurred often in the Civil War, a prudent commander could hardly count on it for victory. Consequently, few commanders chose to exploit the defensive form of battle if they had the option to attack.

The offensive may have been the decisive form of battle, but it was very hard to coordinate and even harder to control. The better generals of-

ten tried to attack the enemy's flanks and rear but seldom achieved success because of the myriad difficulties involved in attacking at those locations. Not only did the commander have to identify the enemy's flank or rear correctly, he also had to move his force into position fast enough to attack. Moreover, he had to do so in conjunction with attacks made by other friendly units (for the procedure involved in moving a regiment into line of battle from march column, see Figure 1.6.) Command and control of the type required to conduct these attacks was generally beyond the ability of most Civil War commanders. Therefore, Civil War armies repeatedly attacked each other frontally, with correspondingly high casualties, because that was the easiest way to conduct offensive operations. When attacking frontally, a commander had to choose between attacking on a broad front or a narrow front. Attacking on a broad front rarely succeeded except against weak and scattered defenders. Attacking on a narrow front promised greater success but required immediate reinforcement and continuing the attack to achieve decisive results. It also increased the density of troops through which shot and shell would pass. As the war dragged on, attacking on narrow fronts against specific objectives became more common but continued to increase the ever-growing casualty lists.

Later Tactics

Poor training may have contributed to high casualty rates early in the war, but casualties remained high among infantry units and even increased long after the armies became experienced. Continued high casualty rates resulted because tactical developments failed to adapt to the capabilities of the new weapons technologies. Few infantry commanders (or of the other branches as well) truly understood how the rifle-musket strengthened the tactical defensive. However, some commanders developed offensive innovations that met with varying success. When an increase in the *speed* of the advance did not overcome defending firepower (as Hardee suggested it would), some units tried advancing in more open order to reduce casualties. But this sort of formation lacked the appropriate mass to assault and carry prepared positions and created command and control problems beyond the ability of Civil War leaders to resolve. This tactical change also tended to lead to attrition-based, siege-like tactics that appear in the later phases of the war.

Late in the war, when the difficulty of attacking field fortifications under heavy fire became apparent, other tactical expedients were employed. Attacking solidly entrenched defenders often required whole brigades and divisions moving in dense masses to cover intervening ground rapidly, seize the objective, and prepare for the inevitable counterattack. Seldom




Figure 1.6. Regimental line of battle from march column.

successful against alert and prepared defenses, these attacks were generally accompanied by tremendous casualties and foreshadowed the massed infantry assaults of World War I.

As the war dragged on, tactical maneuver focused more on larger formations—brigade, division, and corps. However, the increased size of formations larger than brigade and the often broken or forested nature of the terrain on many battlefields, made effective tactical command and control of divisions and corps very problematic. Therefore, in most of the major battles fought after 1861, brigades were employed as the primary maneuver formations. But brigade maneuver was at the upper limit of direct command and control for most Civil War commanders and then, only when the terrain was relatively open. Brigades might be able to retain coherent formations if the terrain were suitably open, but brigade attacks frequently degenerated into a series of poorly coordinated regimental lunges through the broken and wooded terrain. Thus, brigade commanders were often on the main battle line trying to influence regimental fights.

Typically, defending brigades stood in line of battle and blazed away at attackers as rapidly as possible. Volley fire usually did not continue beyond the first round. Most of the time, soldiers fired as soon as they were ready, and it was common for two soldiers to work together, one loading for the other to fire. Brigades were generally invulnerable to attacks on

their front and flanks if units to the left and right held their ground or if reinforcements came up to defeat the threat.

Two or more brigades constituted a division. When a division attacked, its brigades often advanced in sequence, from left to right or vice versa—depending on terrain, suspected enemy location, and number of brigades available to attack. At times, divisions attacked with two or more brigades leading, followed by one or more brigades ready to reinforce or ‘support’ the lead brigades or maneuver to the flanks. Two or more divisions constituted a corps that might conduct an attack as part of a larger plan controlled by the army commander. More often, groups of divisions attacked under the control of a corps-level commander. Division and corps commanders generally took a position to the rear of the main line to control the flow of reinforcements into the battle, but they often rode forward into the battle lines to influence the action personally.

While the infantry made some advances, arguably the cavalry branch made the greatest adaptation during the war. Cavalry commanders learned to use their horses for mobility, then usually dismounted their troopers to fight on foot like infantry. Cavalry regained a useful battlefield role by employing this tactic especially after repeating and breech-loading rifles gave it the firepower to contend with enemy infantry albeit at closer ranges. Cavalry also found a role off the battlefield in long-range, behind-the-lines, raids that interdicted enemy supply lines, damaged or destroyed railroads and other militarily significant infrastructure, and diverted enemy troops in a manner that foreshadowed exploitation and air interdiction missions in the twentieth century. The Grierson Raid in the Vicksburg Campaign, the Wilson-Kautz raid in Virginia, and Wilson’s raid through Alabama provide excellent examples of this function.

In contrast to the cavalry, which during the war reasserted itself as an offensive arm, artillery found that it could best add its firepower to the rifle-musket and tip the balance even more in favor of the tactical defensive; artillery never regained the offensive importance that it held in Mexico. If artillery had developed an indirect firing system, as it did prior to World War I, it might have been able to contribute more to offensive tactics. Still, both sides employed artillery decisively in defensive situations throughout the war.

One of the most significant tactical developments later in the Civil War was the widespread use of field fortifications once the campaign season began in May 1864. This was particularly true for Meade’s Army of the Potomac in the east and Sherman’s armies in the Military

Division of the Mississippi in the west. These campaigns differed from previous Civil War efforts in the sense that the federal armies involved were conducting continuous operations rather than fighting a battle then backing away from the enemy such as had occurred previously. The constant close proximity of the opposing armies and likelihood of action at any time frequently prompted soldiers to dig entrenchments immediately before and after contact with the enemy, even without orders from their officers. The soldier's actions were also due in part to their perceived tactical situation and the heavy casualties inflicted by the firepower of the rifle-musket. Eventually, troops dug complete trench lines within an hour of halting in a position. Within twenty-four hours, an army could create defensive works that were nearly impregnable to frontal assaults. This was particularly noticeable during the Army of the Potomac's Overland Campaign from the Wilderness until its arrival before Petersburg. In this respect, this development during the American Civil War was a clear forerunner of the kind of warfare that came to dominate World War I.

Summary

In the Civil War, the tactical defense dominated the tactical offense because the tactics and firepower of assault formations proved inferior to the defender's own firepower. The rifle-musket, in its many forms, provided most of this firepower and caused the following specific alterations in tactics during the war:

- It required the attacker, in his initial dispositions, to deploy farther away from the defender, thereby increasing the time and distance over which the attacker had to expose himself while closing the gap.
- It increased the number of defenders who could engage attackers (with the addition of effective enfilading fire).
- It influenced a shift of emphasis in infantry battles toward firefights rather than shock attacks depending on the terrain.
- It caused battles to last longer, because units could not close with each other for decisive shock action.
- It encouraged the widespread use of field fortifications. The habitual use of field fortifications by armies was a major American innovation in nineteenth-century warfare.
- It forced cavalry to the battlefield's fringes until cavalymen acquired equivalent weapons and tactics.

- It forced artillery to abandon its basic offensive maneuver; that of moving forward to within canister range of defending infantry.

Tactics in the Red River Campaign

The basic higher-level unit of maneuver for federal forces in the Red River Campaign was the corps. For the Confederates, it was the division (there being no corps echelon in Taylor's order of battle). On the battlefield, the brigade was the basic tactical unit for both sides.

United States forces held the initiative during the first half of the campaign. Throughout the campaign, Banks possessed significantly superior numbers and not surprisingly, in the initial tactical encounters US forces were on the offensive. Unlike most Civil War commanders, the US commanders advancing into the Red River Valley did not rely heavily on frontal attacks. At both Fort DeRussy and again at Henderson's Hill, both Federal commanders maneuvered to get behind the enemy rather than assault into their guns. Frontal assaults in the Civil War were generally costly, but they sometimes worked, as the rebel attack at Mansfield demonstrates. At the battle of Pleasant Hill, however, the Federals enjoyed a heavy numerical advantage over the Confederates and were more prepared to meet Taylor's men in an open field fight. Rugged terrain and jungle-like vegetation greatly facilitated the Federal defense and helped ensure a Confederate defeat. Despite their tactical loss, Taylor's meager numbers still forced Banks' retreat back to Grand Ecore, but Pleasant Hill does not stand out as an example of effective offensive tactics.

Undoubtedly the most successful frontal attack of the campaign occurred during the battle of Mansfield on 8 April 1864. Taylor had initially deployed his forces in an "L"-shaped defense across the Mansfield Road in anticipation that the federal force advancing on Shreveport would attack him there. After skirmishing and sniping at maximum range for some four hours before the attack, Taylor perceived his time was growing short to decisively engage and defeat a weaker piece of Banks' army. He decided to attack instead of defend and sent his brigades forward in what devolved to an essentially echeloned assault from left to right. The initial engagements on the left resulted in significant casualties to Mouton's two brigades. However, the fighting there was enough of a distraction for the Federals that Taylor then launched Walker's Texas Division with three brigades on line straight down the road. The massive assault of howling Texans stormed into and over a Federal cavalry brigadecavalry brigade, two infantry regiments, and Nims' battery attempting to hold that part of the

field. Walker's troops had effectively used the terrain and limited natural cover to move in close to the enemy and when the attack was launched it was vigorous and impetuous. The unsteady Federal regiments facing Walker held for a short time, then broke when this assault force reached their light breastworks.

Unlike the tactical level, the Napoleonic influence on the operational level of war is not as noticeable in the Red River Campaign as can be seen in other campaigns. In the Vicksburg and Overland Campaigns, for example, Grant deployed his corps on separate routes to facilitate movement, but close enough to support each other should the Confederate army be encountered in force. Napoleon often used this technique, termed the *bataillon carré*, which can best be summarized by the adage, "march dispersed, fight massed."

Though there were several corps (or parts thereof) which composed the Army of the Gulf during the Federal march from Alexandria to Grand Ecore, and then to Mansfield, Banks chose to march over a single route. In part this was logical due to the few roads available to him between Grand Ecore and Shreveport (although there were at least three, none were improved roads) and, in part, due to the few lateral roads available to assist in the concentration of the army in the event of contact with the enemy's main force. Additionally, neither Banks, nor his subordinate commanders, anticipated fighting a pitched battle until they reached Shreveport, therefore, he might have believed that it was not necessary to use converging columns. Finally, Banks' own lack of military training may have been a factor. There is no evidence to indicate that he knew about such operational maneuvers. It is also doubtful that he would have used such a technique had he known anyway unless his corps commanders insisted on it, which they did not.

Though the tactical ability of US commanders in the Army of the Gulf was mediocre on average, that of their Confederate counterparts was generally higher despite their units' lack of experience in large unit operations. The rebel forces defending western Louisiana constituted a district, and never were formally designated as an 'army.' Prior to the campaign, Taylor's units were dispersed having spent the winter in garrison and in fortified positions. Additionally, Taylor's regiments had little recent experience operating together as brigades and divisions. Not until A. J. Smith's troops arrived at Simmesport and moved to take Fort DeRussy did a major portion of the district's troops assemble and organize as a field force. Even so, unit esprit and the generally good tactical leadership of Taylor's subordinates (though there were exceptions) gave the Confederate forces an

edge that manifested itself in aggressiveness on the battlefield and a desire to overcome the odds. The rebel troops' familiarity with the terrain and their belief that they were defending hearth and home from invasion gave them further actual and psychological advantages.

At the lower echelons, most of the more imaginative and daring tactics of the Red River Campaign were executed, or at least attempted, by the Confederates. Taylor's decision to attack at Mansfield and his efforts to swing Churchill wide to the south to flank Federal forces rather than attack frontally at Pleasant Hill are good examples. Likewise, Taylor's aggressiveness and his troops' *esprit de corps* prompted them to pursue, fight, and even 'surround' the Army of the Gulf at Alexandria, despite the fact that the rebel command was significantly outnumbered. On several occasions, Confederate artillery, aided by small infantry forces, moved rapidly and engaged Union shipping on the Red River and succeeded in sinking, burning, or capturing a number of Federal vessels, even though the rebels' batteries were often outgunned by Navy tinclads.

When the Federal advance ended and the Army of the Gulf was "besieged" at Alexandria, an entirely new set of tactics came into play. Whereas there was a modicum of formal doctrine for battlefield tactics in the Civil War (and none at all for operational maneuver), the sciences of fortification and siegecraft were well-established and understood by any West Point-trained military engineer. In keeping with the principles of fortification, the Federals erected strong earthwork fortifications that afforded interlocking fields of fire and commanded the approaches into the city and along the river. Trenches or rifle pits connected the major fortifications. Taylor's force, which had dwindled to some 5,000 men by this time due to Kirby Smith's redirection of troops to Arkansas, had no hope of ever making a successful assault against Banks' works. There were no saps or mines dug by the rebels, nor any other tactics traditionally associated with besieging fortifications. There were certainly no assaults. The 'siege' simply ended when the Army of the Gulf marched away.

Finally, unlike the armies in the Vicksburg, Overland, and Atlanta campaigns, those troops participating in the Red River Campaign did not employ the kind of automatic reversion to tactical defense preparations when they halted movement which one observed elsewhere by that time of the war. Although there were a number of locations during the Red River Campaign where soldiers prepared defensive positions, such as at Alexandria and Grand Ecore, in most actual battles neither side was dug in and combat generally took place in stand up fights between two battle lines. There were no significant entrenchments dug at Mansfield, Pleasant Hill,

Monett's Ferry, Mansura, or Yellow Bayou. Most of the fighting at those locations were more reminiscent of 1862 than of 1864.

Logistics Support

Victory on Civil War battlefields seldom hinged on the quality or quantity of tactical logistics. On the operational and strategic level, however, logistical capabilities and concerns always shaped the plans and sometimes the outcomes of campaigns. And as the war lengthened, the logistical advantage shifted inexorably to the North. The Federals controlled the vast majority of financial and industrial resources of the nation and with their ability to import any needed materials, the Federals ultimately created the best-supplied army the world had yet seen. Despite suffering from shortages of raw materials, the Confederates generated adequate ordnance, but they faltered gradually in their ability to acquire other war matériel. The food supply for Southern armies was often on the verge of collapse, largely because limitations of the transportation network were compounded by civil-military mismanagement. Still, the state of supply within field armies on both sides depended more on the caliber of the people managing resources than on the constraints of available matériel.

One of the most pressing needs at the start of the war was for sufficient infantry and artillery weapons. Large quantities of outmoded muskets were on hand for both sides, either in arsenals or private hands, but the Federals initially had only 35,000 modern rifle-muskets, while the Confederates had seized about 10,000. Purchasing agents rushed to Europe to buy existing stocks or contract for future production. This led to an influx of outmoded weapons, which resulted in many soldiers going into battle with Mexican-American War-era smoothbore muskets. As late as the fall of 1863, soldiers on both sides in the western theater were armed with muskets, though by March of 1864, few of Banks men still possessed what were considered second- or third-class firearms. Modern artillery pieces were generally available in adequate quantities, though the Confederates usually were outgunned. Although breech-loading technology was available and the Confederates had imported some Whitworths from England, muzzle-loading smoothbore or rifled cannon were the standard pieces used by both armies.

With most of the government arsenals and private manufacturing capability located in the North, the Federals ultimately produced sufficient modern firearms for their armies, but the Confederates also accumulated adequate quantities—either from battlefield captures or through the blockade. In addition, exceptional management within the Confederate Ord-

nance Bureau led to the creation of a series of arsenals throughout the South that produced large quantities of munitions and weapons.

The Northern manufacturing capability permitted the Federals eventually to produce and outfit their cavalry forces with repeating arms, the best of which had been patented before 1861. Initially, however, the North's conservative Ordnance Bureau would not risk switching to a new, unproved standard weapon that could lead to soldiers wasting huge quantities of ammunition in the midst of an expanding war. By 1864, after the retirement of Chief of Ordnance James Ripley and with President Lincoln's urging, Federal cavalry received seven-shot Spencer repeating carbines, which greatly increased battle capabilities.

Both sides initially relied on the states and local districts to provide some equipment, supplies, animals, and foodstuffs. As the war progressed, more centralized control over production and purchasing emerged under both governments. Still, embezzlement and fraud were common problems for both sides throughout the war. The North, with its preponderance of railroads and developed waterways, had ample supply and adequate distribution systems. The South's major supply problem was subsistence. Arguably, Confederate states produced enough food during the war to provide for both military and civilian needs, but mismanagement, parochial local interests, and the relatively underdeveloped transportation network often created havoc with distribution.

In both armies, the Quartermaster, Ordnance, Subsistence, and Medical Bureaus procured and distributed equipment, food, and supplies. The items for which these bureaus were responsible are not dissimilar to the classes of supply used today. Some needs overlapped, such as the Quartermaster Bureau's procurement of wagons for medical ambulances, but conflicts of interest usually were manageable. Department and army commanders requested needed resources directly from the bureaus, and bureau chiefs wielded considerable power as they parceled out occasionally limited resources.

Typically, matériel flowed from the factory to base depots as directed by the responsible bureaus. Supplies were then shipped to advanced depots, generally a city on a major transportation artery safely within the rear area of a department. During campaigns, the armies established temporary advance depots served by rail or river transportation. From these points, wagons carried the supplies forward to the field units. This principle is somewhat similar to the modern theater sustainment organization.

The management of this logistical system was complex and crucial. A corps wagon train, if drawn by standard six-mule teams, would be spread

Item	Packing	Weight (lbs.)
Bulk ammunition:		
.58 caliber, expanding ball (500-grain bullet)	1,000 rounds per box	98
12-pounder Napoleon canister (14.8 lbs. per round)	8 rounds per box	161
“Marching” ration (per man per day):		
1 lb. hard bread (hardtack)		2
¾ lb. salt pork or ¼ lb. fresh meat		
1 oz. coffee		
3 oz. sugar and salt		
Forage (per horse per day):		
14 lbs. hay and 12 lbs. grain		26
Personal equipment:		
Includes rifle, bayonet, 60 rounds of ammunition, haversack, 3 days’ rations, blanket, shelter half, canteen, personal items		50-60

Table 1.7. Selected Samples of Federal Logistical Data.

out from five to eight miles, based on the difficulty of terrain, weather, and road conditions. The wagons, which were capable of hauling 4,000 pounds in optimal conditions, could carry only half that load in difficult terrain. Sustenance for the animals was a major restriction, because each animal required up to 26 pounds of hay and grain a day to stay healthy and productive. Bulky and hard to handle, this forage was a major consideration in campaign planning. Wagons delivering supplies more than one day’s distance from the depot could be forced to carry excessive amounts of animal forage. If full animal forage was to be carried, the required numbers of wagons to support a corps increased dramatically with each subsequent day’s distance from the forward depot. Another problem was created by herds of beef that often accompanied the trains or were appropriated en route. This provided fresh (though tough) meat for the troops but slowed and complicated movement.

The bulk-supply problems were alleviated somewhat by the practice of foraging, which, in the proper season, supplied much of the food for animals and men of both sides. Foraging was practiced with and without

command sanction wherever an army went. It was particularly prevalent in those units raised in the western theaters.

Logistics in the Red River Campaign

The Federal logistics system in the Red River Campaign was, by and large, adequate to support the Army of the Gulf. New Orleans was a port city, and thus, a major depot for supplies. Banks' forces experienced few problems getting the necessities required of an army for field operations. Rifles, artillery, wagons, limbers, tentage, food, ammunition, tools, and a multitude of other supplies needed to support the Army of the Gulf sailed into the port in the bottoms of merchant ships, unhampered by the Confederate Navy. As a result, Banks' army was well-equipped and supplied when it embarked on the campaign.

In his report to the Quartermaster General after the campaign, Lt. Col. John G. Chandler, acting quartermaster for Banks' army reported that at the beginning of the campaign:

The material of the quartermaster's department with this command was put in perfect condition for any orders or exigencies that could obtain; wagons completely repaired, mules and horses nursed and fatted, harness and repair material liberally supplied and renewed, the troops thoroughly equipped with all necessary articles of clothing, camp and garrison equipage, and, indeed, every preparation made by me, under orders from General Franklin, that could be anticipated to place the department in good working order. Just before the command was ordered to march, two divisions of the XIII Corps, hastily but quite thoroughly equipped, joined our command for the march. The transportation of the entire command at this time numbered 307 teams [wagons] in the aggregate.

Of course, at this point Chandler was referring to his own command, the XIX Corps, and the detachment of the XIII Corps. In regard to Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith's detachment of the XVI Corps, Chandler went on to remark:

General Smith's troops, transports, and supplies had come from points above the mouth of the Red River and had accompanied the gun-boat fleet up Red River, and were organized almost solely with the view of moving by water alone. The command was scantily provided with land transportation or quartermaster's supplies, clothing, camp and garrison equipage. Its quartermaster's department appeared without much system, General Smith attending personally to all the wants of his command; the

division quartermasters had been left behind. General Smith, although reporting to General Banks, seemed prepared to move only on his transports and with the admiral.

Once the various commands were concentrated around Grand Ecore, the line of communication for supply ran north from New Orleans up the Mississippi River to Turnbull's Island, where it turned west into the Atchafalaya River a short ways to the mouth of the Red River. From thence, it wended its way northwestward up the Red River through Alexandria to Grand Ecore. From Grand Ecore, supplies would have to travel by wagon to the front, at least until the river was up and cleared of obstacles and Shreveport had been captured. In short, the planned supply line was a viable one, and the Army of the Gulf could easily be resupplied by army transports as long as the Red River maintained its depth. Indeed, Brig Gen. Charles P. Stone reported that 300,000 rations had arrived at Alexandria via steamboat on 23 March, a clear indicator of how feasible it was to resupply the army by way of the river.

Moving from Grand Ecore on 6 April, the Army of the Gulf's supply train consisted of some 900 wagons (including those few wagons from A. J. Smith's command, Albert Lee's cavalry division, and T. Kilby Smith's brigade) all under the nominal control of Lt. Col. Chandler. This massive train occupied about nine miles of road space as it moved on the single lane forest track on which Banks chose to base his advance on Shreveport. Closed up tight at the halt it would have occupied about seven miles of road space if it were consolidated in one long column.

The rough dirt road between Grand Ecore and Mansfield was lightly used by local traffic and not intended to support such a large multitude of wagons, horses, and people. It was closed in by a thick pine and hardwood forest on both sides throughout almost the entire route. Occasionally, small subsistence farms built in the wilderness provided brief, but small, clearings that afforded sunlight and some space in which soldiers could leave the road to rest or allow wagons to turn around. Mills, inns, or other structures which indicated some form of human presence also caused the road to widen occasionally and provide some turn-around space. Beyond those few opportunities, it was generally impossible to find enough space to turn wagons around without great difficulty.

Adding to the problems of advancing on such a narrow road was the bickering between Franklin and Lee regarding the placement and protection of the cavalry division's trains. Lee, on several occasions requested Franklin to allow him to move his trains behind the infantry column.

Franklin consistently refused to allow Lee to do so, stating that it was the cavalry's responsibility to guard their own trains. This would have dire consequences on 8 April at the Battle of Mansfield when the cavalry's wagons not only hindered Federal reinforcements from getting to the front, but also delayed the retreat after the main fighting. Franklin's decision not only resulted in the loss of the cavalry division's entire train, but also of several artillery pieces that could not get past the traffic jam, as well as numerous teamsters and soldiers.

After the battles at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, the army retreated back to Grand Ecore. On his arrival on 11 April, Banks discovered that Porter, along with the army's quartermaster boats (which carried the army's resupply of food and ammunition), was still upriver. After a harrowing, fighting retreat, Porter and some of the boats arrived on 13 April. The rest of the boats, at least those not sunk or captured by the Confederates, arrived two days later.

At Grand Ecore, the command was resupplied with food, forage, and ammunition from the transports. On 20 April, the command moved to Alexandria where the command continued to be resupplied by the Army's Quartermaster boats until the Confederates closed off the Red River below the city. This move caused some shortages in Banks' supplies, but the only category that appears to have seriously suffered was forage for the horses. Banks and his subordinate leaders partially offset this by sending heavy forces out on forays into rebel-held areas outside the city. Taylor responded by ordering his troops to take or burn anything the Federals could possibly use within miles of Alexandria. Eventually, however, Porter's gunboats reopened the river and forage arrived in enough quantities for the horses to pull their loads southward. Soon after, Banks ordered the surplus stores, tools, and equipment loaded on army transports and sent down river. On 12 May, the army started its return trip back to Simmesport. The train was now up to 976 wagons, 105 ambulances, and 12,000 horses and mules. Few supply problems were encountered en route. Indeed, in actions which presaged Sherman's forthcoming Savannah Campaign, many soldiers, especially A. J. Smith's men, helped themselves to whatever foodstuffs (and other things) they wanted from the homes and farms along the way.

In summation of the US logistics operations during the campaign, Lt. Col. Chandler wrote: "During the entire campaign the public property of the department was nourished and no abandonment or useless destruction, so usual on retreats, occurred under my notice, and no serious loss other than the accidents of the march, save the capture at Sabine Cross-Roads,

are recorded against the expedition.” In short, while the campaign itself was a failure, the Federal logistics system operated quite successfully.

The Confederate logistics experience during the campaign was far different. The Department of the Trans-Mississippi was at the far end of the supply line for arms and equipment and largely isolated by Porter’s control of the Mississippi River. Some items, such as rifles, pistols, ammunition, gunpowder, uniforms, and accoutrements, could be, and were, manufactured locally. Most of the facilities manufacturing war materiel for the Trans-Mississippi were located in east Texas. For example, in Marshall, Texas, there was an arsenal, a foundry, and a powder mill with a magazine. In Jefferson, there was also a powder mill and supply warehouses. Tyler boasted a productive arsenal that turned out rifles and pistols and was the site of an ammunition factory as well. In Louisiana, Shreveport was home to a foundry, a powder mill, an arsenal, and several other establishments that directly supported the war effort.

But as one might expect, the items manufactured in these facilities were not of the best quality, nor produced in enough quantities to make them plentiful. Of course, larger items, such as artillery pieces, limbers, and carriages, had to be acquired from the east, or from overseas, neither of which were viable sources of supply for the Trans-Mississippi by 1864. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the Confederates troops were largely operating in their own home regions, their supply situation was uniformly worse than that of the Federals, even for such items such as certain kinds of food and virtually all medicines. Dr. Chris Gabel, in his *Staff Ride Handbook for The Vicksburg Campaign*, relates part of the reason why this was so: “the invading Federals could take what they needed, whereas the defending Confederates could not so easily requisition from their own people [without risking severe alienation and thereby losing local support].” In other words, the hard hand of war visited upon civilians by their own army would likely cause them to sue for peace, rather than encourage them to help the war effort.

Unlike Banks, Taylor did not possess a huge supply train of wagons. His haul capacity was exceedingly small (although this would change with the capture of hundreds of Federal wagons at Mansfield). Therefore, before the campaign began, Taylor determined the possible routes on which Banks’ army could advance toward Shreveport. He then established a series of “supply depots” or caches where he hid his supplies mostly near, but not on, the anticipated route. He placed these depots at various locations to include the Carroll Jones’ plantation, Beasley’s plantation, Fort Jesup, Pleasant Hill, Mansfield, and Keachi. Each depot contained food,

ammunition, gunpowder, and other necessities and was guarded by a small detail of troops. In addition, Taylor established a forage depot at Blair's Landing for supporting the horses and mules of his army. As the Army of the Gulf moved up river, Taylor would fall back to the vicinity of the next depot to replenish the needs of his troops. He kept his few wagons well to the north of his army and used them only for emergency resupply. If the wagons were called forward, they would be offloaded and quickly sent north again out of harm's way to the next depot to restock with ammunition and food. This was an excellent work-around for a command with few wagons and which had to conduct a fighting retreat.

Taylor also had a few small riverboats that he could use as supply vessels. These appeared to have been used to load up supplies and other government property at Fort DeRussy and Alexandria and evacuate the materiel northward as the Federals approached. They were also used to shuttle supplies to Taylor's troops at Carroll Jones' plantation and forage to Blair's Landing and occasionally to move artillery pieces. Taylor does not appear to have ever used them to move large bodies of troops during the campaign.

Despite his efforts to stockpile supplies (and even with over 150 wagons and over 1,000 mostly mules and horses captured from Banks at Mansfield), Taylor still experienced major supply shortages, especially in the latter half of the campaign. Having fought two major battles after he fell back on his depots, he soon found that he had difficulty in resupplying his troops as they headed back south chasing Banks' column. This was for two key reasons. First, his troops had used a fair amount of rifle and artillery ammunition in the skirmishing and fighting as the Federals advanced up the Red River and to Mansfield. Exacerbating the problem was the arrival of 4,000 troops from Sterling Price's command at Shreveport on 24 March. Virtually all of their ammunition was bad and had to be replaced from the depot there. The battles at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, as well as the constant skirmishing around Grand Ecore and Alexandria, added to the depletion. By 4 May, Taylor's men soon became critically short of ammunition for Enfield rifles, as well as rounds of any kind for 12-pounder and 3-inch artillery pieces. This was true even though Smith had stripped Taylor of three infantry divisions back on 14 April to meet Steele's advance in Arkansas. Time and again Taylor pleaded with Smith in his daily reports that he needed more ammunition. Finally, on 7 May Taylor sent most of his artillery to the rear as he no longer had ammunition to fire.

As early as 23 March, Taylor also petitioned Kirby Smith for horses. On that date he needed at least 100. It would only get worse. By the third

week in April, Taylor issued orders to subordinates to go to Shreveport and begin forced impressment of horses for his command. This order, however, was countermanded (most likely by Kirby Smith or one of his staff) and Taylor received no relief. Additionally, by this time his food stocks were almost gone. In a message to Smith's adjutant general, Col. Samuel S. Anderson, Taylor remarked, "Some subsistence must be sent this army from above or we will have to eat our boots." Some relief in the form of food and forage finally arrived at Cotile on 2 May via steamboat.

As Banks retreated south from Alexandria on 13 May, Taylor's logistics problem increased. He now was in dire need of fresh horses to pull the few artillery pieces that still remained with the army. To compound the problem, he needed even more horses and mules to replace those that broke down pulling wagons on the ever-increasing round trips back to his rapidly diminishing supply depots to bring supplies forward as he advanced.

By 23 May, at the conclusion of the campaign, Taylor related his supply situation to Smith's headquarters:

The usual refrain of want of clothing and shoes is being sung. I hope the Clothing Bureau will be able at once to put a stop to it. My batteries are rendered inefficient for want of artillery horses. Unless the most stringent measures are adopted and their wants supplied, it will be impossible to act upon the defensive, much less upon the offensive . . . I cannot too urgently impress upon department headquarters the vital importance of immediate action which will supply my wants in the respect. I have not received a horse for my batteries from department headquarters since I have been in command of this district, notwithstanding my constant appeals and the urgent wants of my artillery.

Despite the dire logistics situation, however, Taylor's command continued operations until the end of the campaign though with difficulty and minimal supplies.

Engineer Support

Engineers on both sides performed many tasks essential to any campaign. Engineers trained at West Point were at a premium; thus, many civil engineers, commissioned as volunteers, supplemented the work being done by engineer officers. The Confederates, in particular, relied on civilian expertise because many of their trained engineer officers sought

line duties. State or even local civil engineers frequently planned and supervised much of the work done on local fortifications.

In the prewar US Army, the Corps of Engineers contained a handful of staff officers and one company of trained engineer troops. This cadre was later expanded to a four-company engineer battalion. Congress also created a single company of topographic engineers, which joined the Regular battalion when the engineer bureaus merged in 1863. In addition, several volunteer pioneer regiments, some containing up to 2,000 men, supported the various field armies. The Corps of Engineers also initially controlled the fledgling Balloon Corps, which provided aerial reconnaissance. The Confederate Corps of Engineers, formed as a small staff and one company of sappers, miners, and pontoniers in 1861, grew more slowly and generally relied on details and contract labor rather than established units with trained engineers and craftsmen.

Engineer missions for both sides included construction of fortifications; repair and construction of roads, bridges, and, in some cases, railroads; demolition; limited construction of obstacles; and construction or reduction of siege works. The Federal Topographic Engineers, a separate prewar bureau, performed reconnaissance and produced maps. The Confederates, however, never separated these functions in creating their Corps of Engineers. Experience during the first year of the war convinced the Federals that all engineer functions should be merged under a single corps, because qualified engineer officers tended to perform all related functions. As a result, the Federals also merged the Topographic Engineers into their Corps of Engineers in March 1863.

One of the most important engineer missions of the war was the employment of pontoon bridges, especially in the eastern theater. Bridging assets included wagon-mounted pontoon trains that carried either wooden, canvas-covered, or inflatable rubber pontoon boats. Using this equipment, trained engineer troops could bridge even large rivers in a matter of hours. The most remarkable pontoon bridge of the war was the 2,200-foot bridge built by Army of the Potomac engineers in 1864 over the James River. The bridge consisted of over three dozen pontoon bridges built in support of campaigns in the east that year. The Federals were not the only side to employ pontoon bridges, of course. In 1862, the Confederates began developing pontoon trains after they had observed their effective use by US engineers. In fact, during the Atlanta campaign of 1864, Gen. Joseph Johnston had four pontoon trains available to support his army.

Both armies in every campaign of the war traveled over roads and bridges built or repaired by their engineers. Federal engineers also helped clear waterways by dredging, removing trees, or digging canals. Fixed fortifications laid out under engineer supervision played critical roles in the Vicksburg Campaign and in actions around Richmond and Petersburg. Engineers also supervised the siege works designed to reduce those fortifications.

While the Federal engineer effort expanded in both men and materiel as the war progressed, the Confederate efforts continued to be hampered by major problems. The relatively small number of organized engineer units available forced Confederate engineers to rely heavily on details from infantry units, contractors, and the labor of enslaved persons. Despite congressional authorization to conscript 20,000 enslaved people as a labor force, state and local opposition continually hindered such efforts. Local enslavers were reluctant to provide labor details when labor was crucial to their economic survival. Finding adequate manpower, therefore, was often difficult because of competing demands for it.

Another related problem concerned the value of Confederate currency. Engineer efforts required huge sums for men and materiel, yet initial authorizations were small, and although congressional appropriations grew later in the war, inflation greatly reduced effective purchasing power.

In 1861, maps for both sides were also in short supply; for many areas in the interior areas of the country, they were essentially non-existent. As the war progressed, the Federals developed a highly sophisticated mapping capability. Federal topographic engineers performed personal reconnaissance to develop base maps, reproduced them by several processes, and distributed them to field commanders. Photography, lithographic presses, and eventually photochemical processes gave the Federals the ability to reproduce maps quickly. Western armies, which usually operated far from base cities, carried equipment to reproduce maps on campaigns with their army headquarters. By 1864, annual map production exceeded 21,000 copies.

Confederate topographic work never approached the Federal effort in either quantity or quality. Once they produced a base map, topographers initially used tracing paper to reproduce maps in their efforts to get copies into the hands of subordinate commanders. It wasn't until 1864 that the Confederate Topographical Department was able to use photographic methods to create maps. Though these maps were rudimentary compared to military maps of today, they were quite practical, generally accurate, and in enough detail to conduct more complex military operations. The

maps were frequently mounted on cloth so that an officer could easily fold it and carry it in a saddle bag. Though the lack of printing presses and paper ensured that these maps remained in short supply they were equal in quality to the more numerous maps produced by Federal topographers.

Engineers in the Red River Campaign

The engineering operations conducted in support of the Red River Campaign were about as varied and complex as any during the war. For much of the campaign, Federal engineers focused on mobility operations, while Confederate engineers emphasized counter-mobility, particularly in denying the Federals the use of the Red River as a reliable means of transportation and mobility north of Alexandria.

Like most of the larger US field armies, the Army of the Gulf possessed trained engineer troops. Unlike the other armies, which typically enjoyed the availability of a single regiment, Banks' engineer unit was a brigade consisting of two African-American regiments, the 3rd and 5th Engineer Regiments, *Corps D' Afrique*. Though Banks would primarily use this brigade for engineer work, the exigencies of the campaign would press many of his infantry regiments into various construction projects as well.

During the march of the XIII and XIX Corps from Franklin to Alexandria, the engineer brigade was kept busy with road and bridge repair. On 16 March, for example, the brigade reconstructed a destroyed bridge at Vermillion Bayou over which the entire army moved. The brigade then proceeded to repair several other bridges between Washington and Alexandria and corduroy roads made almost impassable by the heavy rains and large volumes of traffic.

At Alexandria, the brigade's pontoon train arrived on 27 March. Four days later, the pontonniers, along with details from the engineer brigade and the XIX Corps, built a 200-foot pontoon bridge across the Cane River over which most of the army passed en route to Grand Ecore. After the battles at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, the pontoon bridge was sent back to Alexandria. There it was emplaced across the Red River to allow scouting parties to sweep the north side of the river for food and forage. Unfortunately, the *Black Hawk* accidentally rammed through the bridge on 16 April, but it was repaired and kept in service until April 21 when it was taken up.

The engineers were sent back to Cane River on 23 April and re-laid the bridge near Monett's Ferry by about 1900. All that night, the army retreated over the river and completed the crossing by noon the following day. The pontoon bridge was laid twice more during the retreat of the

Army of the Gulf toward Simmesport. The first time was on 15 May at Bayou Choctaw and the second time was at Yellow Bayou two days later, just before the army's arrival at Simmesport. In short, the pontoon bridge gave the Army of the Gulf a significant mobility capacity that enabled it to easily cross what might otherwise have been major impediments to the movement of the force.

The most notable engineering feat of the campaign, at least on the Union side, was the construction of Bailey's Dam at Alexandria. By the time that Banks' army, and that portion of Porter's fleet that had steamed up the Red River to Loggy Bayou, had arrived back at Alexandria in the third week of April, the Red River had fallen so low that the fleet could not get back over the falls. The depth of the river was only between three and four feet; it took seven feet of water to get the gunboats over the rocky bottom at the rapids. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Bailey, the chief engineer on Franklin's staff, proposed to Banks and Porter to build a series of dams and sink several stone-laden barges to block the passage of water and cause the river to pool up behind them. There would be three narrow chutes constructed in the middle to allow passage of the largest gunboats. Then when the depth was sufficient, the boats would steam over the rocks, through the passageways, and into safe and deep waters below the dam.

Using the brigade of African-American engineer troops and several white infantry regiments, Bailey successfully built the dams between 30 April and 8 May. Suddenly, on the morning of 9 May, the river pushed one of the barges out of place and the river began to pour through. Four of the gunboats took a chance and steamed through the openings and all made it to safe water, one with slight damage to her hull. Bailey quickly settled on building two wing dams to repair the problem and by 13 May, the remaining boats made it to safe waters.

Lieutenant Colonel Bailey was also responsible for building an impressive makeshift bridge at Simmesport that allowed the safe passage of the Army of the Gulf to the east side of the Atchafalaya Bayou. By anchoring twenty-two transports and riverboats side-by-side across the stream, then planking over the boats, he built a sort of pontoon bridge, completing the work by 19 May. By that means, the army's artillery, wagons, cavalry, and some infantry units were able to move to safety. Taylor had no means to cross such a large river to continue the pursuit of Banks and this event effectively ended the campaign.

Even before Bailey built his dams and the Simmesport bridge, there was a great deal of engineering effort on defensive positions undertaken

by the engineers and other Federal troops at Grand Ecore. On 11 April, two days after the battle at Pleasant Hill, Banks' engineer officers supervised the layout and construction of a three-mile, semicircular line of entrenchments around the little hamlet. The works were substantial and utilized, in part, existing works previously prepared by Taylor's men. The infantry troops felled large trees to build breastworks and reinforce the earthworks. The engineers constructed abatis and other obstacles, while the artillerymen built battery positions along likely avenues of approach. Each location was chosen to take advantage of the high ground and maximize kill zones. Though there was some skirmishing around Grand Ecore and later at Alexandria, the works were never seriously challenged by Taylor's forces. The Confederate commander simply did not have enough men to make costly frontal assaults against entrenched troops.

On the Confederate side, engineering endeavors were not as evident. Most of their efforts went into building defensive works, most notably Fort DeRussy and Forts Humbug 1 and 2. Taylor himself was against the construction of defensive works. He was an offensive-minded commander who did not want to tie his troops to fixed positions. Rather, he wanted to maneuver and look for opportunities to attack the enemy. Despite his protests, Taylor was forced by Kirby Smith to assist in building defensive works in the District of West Louisiana. West Point-trained engineer Brig. Gen. William R. Boggs, the department chief of staff, and Major H. T. Douglas, the department engineer, were Smith's men to plan and build the defenses.

Under Boggs' supervision, Taylor's troops built minor fortifications at several key locations along the Red River including Alexandria and Grand Ecore and extensive works at Shreveport. The defenses at Shreveport consisted of several miles of trenches around the south side of the city (the north was protected by the river) and included at least five named forts and five named batteries. These defenses, as it turned out, would ultimately see almost no combat.

Perhaps the most impressive Confederate engineering effort before and during this campaign, however, was the diversion of water from the Red River through Tone's Bayou and into Bayou Pierre beginning on 18 March. That feat may have contributed to the failure of the Red River to not only rise in depth that spring, but to actually drop. If true, the diversion may have been responsible for many of the problems experienced by Porter's fleet during the campaign north of Alexandria. The lack of water in the river contributed to the loss of and damage to several federal gunboats,

to include the USS *Eastport*, the largest and most powerful ironclad of Porter's fleet.

The one area in engineer support that the Confederate forces seemed to have parity with Banks was in the possession of a pontoon train that was based out of Shreveport. However, there was a mix up on the priority of its use. Taylor requested the train on 23 March, but unfortunately for Taylor's troops, the train did not get to him until 18 April. It is not clear from the record what Taylor did, if anything, with the train, but Kirby Smith and Sterling Price would have great need for such an asset after Steele's evacuation of Camden and after the battle of Jenkins Ferry in Arkansas. The rebel forces at Jenkins Ferry did not lose the battle from the lack of a train, but they were unable to rapidly pursue Steele's Federal forces across the Saline River, thus allowing the command to escape without further damage after the battle. Taylor mentions that he still had possession of the bridge at Alexandria on 2 May, but nothing more about its role in the campaign.

One area of engineering support exclusive to the Confederates in this campaign was in the realm of underwater mine warfare. As the Federals approached Alexandria, Kirby Smith ordered the captain of the CSS *Missouri* to load 30 "torpedoes" (i.e., mines) and to proceed to Cotile or Grand Ecore. The ship's crew, along with an army detail commanded by a staff officer from Smith's staff, installed them in the river to stop, or at least slow, the movement of the US fleet toward Shreveport. Taylor reported that at least six were actually emplaced in the river during the campaign. On 15 April, as the USS *Eastport* made its way south from Grand Ecore, it struck a torpedo near the town of Montgomery which blew a hole in her bow. After a desperate struggle by her crew, the gunboat settled to the shallow bottom. Though the mine damage was not permanently disabling, the subsequent delay in refloating the boat contributed to the ultimate destruction of the *Eastport* when, as the river continued to fall, she permanently grounded on some submerged logs. Porter was forced to order the boat's destruction to prevent her capture.

Communications Support

Communications systems used during the Civil War consisted of telegraphic systems, line-of-sight signaling, and various forms of time-honored courier methods. The telegraph mainly offered viable strategic and operational communications, line-of-sight-signaling provided operational and limited tactical possibilities, and couriers were most heavily used for tactical communications.

The Federal Signal Corps was in its infancy during the Civil War, Maj. Albert C. Myer having been appointed the first signal chief in 1860. His organization grew slowly and became officially recognized as the Signal Corps in March 1863 and achieved bureau status by November of that year. Throughout the war, the Federal Signal Corps remained small. By the end of the war, its maximum strength reached just over 1,500 officers and men, most of whom were on detached service with the corps.

Unwittingly, Myer indirectly influenced the formation of the Confederate Signal Service with the development of the 'wig-wag' signaling system with flags. Among the men who assisted Myer in the prewar testing of the system was Lieut. Edward P. Alexander of Georgia. At the First Battle of Bull Run in 1861, Alexander would be credited with being the first person to use signal flags to transmit a message over a long distance in battle. He later organized the Confederate Signal Corps which was officially established in April 1862. Unlike the Federal corps which became a separate branch, the signal service remained attached as a sub-component of the Adjutant and Inspector General Department. Nevertheless, the corps attained the same size as its Federal counterpart with nearly 1,500 men ultimately being detailed for service by the end of the war.

Myer also endeavored to develop a Federal viable field telegraph service. The central feature of this system was a piece of equipment known as the Beardslee device. This was a magnet-powered machine operated by turning a wheel to a specific point on a dial which then sent an electrical impulse that keyed the machine at the other end to the same letter. Although less reliable than the standard Morse code telegraph key, the Beardslee could be used by an operator with only several hours' training and did not require bulky batteries for a power source. Myer's field telegraph units carried equipment on wagons that enabled its operators to establish lines between field headquarters. The insulated wire used could also be hooked into existing trunk lines, thus offering the potential to extend the reach of the civilian telegraph network. Control over the existing fixed telegraph system, however, remained with the US Military Telegraph Service. Myer lost his struggle to keep the field telegraph service under the Signal Corps when Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton relieved Myer as the signal chief in November 1863 and placed all telegraph activity under the Military Telegraph Service.

Although the Confederate Signal Corps' visual communications capabilities were roughly equal to those of the Federals, Confederate field telegraph operations remained too limited to be of operational significance. The existing telegraph lines provided strategic communications capabili-

ties similar to those of the Federals, but lack of resources and factories in the South for producing wire precluded their extending the prewar telegraph networks down to the operational level.

The courier system, using mounted staff officers or detailed soldiers to deliver orders and messages, remained the most viable tactical communications option, short of commanders meeting face to face. Although often effective, this system was fraught with difficulties, as couriers often were often captured, killed, or delayed in route. Commanders sometimes misinterpreted or ignored messages and circumstances were often changed by the time messages were delivered. The weaknesses of the courier system, though not always critical in themselves, did tend to compound commanders' errors or misjudgments during campaigns and battles.

Communications in the Red River Campaign

Banks' strategic line of communication was by way of courier boat down the Red and Mississippi Rivers to New Orleans. From there, ocean-going ships took messages directly to Washington, DC, or to another port which had telegraphic communications with the capital. It was usually about a month-long process under the best of conditions. Thus, Lincoln, Halleck, and Grant were forced to provide suggestions, instructions, and orders that were broad in nature and allowed Banks to manage the details.

At the tactical level, Banks and his subordinates typically communicated by horse-mounted courier, both up and down the chain of command and laterally. Though Banks possessed trained signal teams in his army, the nature of the terrain precluded effective use of flag and light signals. The only time the Signal Corps was able to function in battle with flag teams was briefly at the battle of Monett's Ferry and at Alexandria, after the retreat from Grand Ecore. At Alexandria, Capt. Frank W. Marston, Chief Signal Officer for the department, was later able to set up a line of signal stations to facilitate communications between Banks' headquarters with the outlying headquarters of the army's major commands and Porter's gunboats.

Additionally, the Army of the Gulf possessed a tactical telegraph capability during the Red River Campaign. It consisted of a telegraph train of five wagons, three of which carried large reels of wire. There were four civilian telegraph operators and several other teamsters and support personnel, all under the command of Capt. Charles S. Bulkley. Bulkley, however, did not go on the campaign. Therefore, the train was under the nominal control of Capt. Marston, and under the direct control of Mr. Edward Conway, the Manager of Lines for the Department of the Gulf. The train pulled out of New Iberia on 15 March with Franklin's XIX Corps. As

it did so, the Chief Operator, Mr. Sidney B. Fairchild, sent the final telegraph message to Capt. Bulkley before severing the lines:

To CAPTAIN BULKLEY, New Orleans:

Head-quarters in the saddle for the last two days. Hind-quarters sore.

(Signed) S. B. F.

The campaign for the members of the telegraph train was to be adventuresome. Early one morning, the train was left behind by the troops of the XIX Corps as they started their day's march. The telegraphers suddenly found themselves alone, and worse, under attack by a few civilian irregulars. Fortunately, someone in the corps discovered the unit's absence and elements of the 2nd New York Cavalry arrived to rescue the train. In another incident, poor driving by one of the teamsters caused two of the telegraphers and a wagonload of wire reels to be spilled headlong down a hill, much to the delight of the other teamsters.

The telegraph unit's participation in the campaign, however, was to be relatively uneventful in terms of supporting the army's operations. About the only thing of note in terms of the use of the telegraph equipment came after the battles at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill. At Grand Ecore on 20 April, Conway boarded the gunboat USS *Cricket* which was temporarily serving as Porter's flagship. Conway took with him batteries, wire, and other electrical equipment, but not for sending messages. He was going along with Porter to use the items in sending electrical charges to set off explosives. In the event that any of Porter's boats grounded beyond recovery before he could get them over the falls at Alexandria, the admiral intended to destroy the grounded vessels. Conway was to help blow them up to prevent capture. As it turned out, Conway was employed to help destroy the USS *Eastport* after her final grounding, but the battery failed to ignite the powder. The sailors then poured a powder train and the boat's captain struck a match. The old fashioned way worked fine.

There seems to have been little opportunity to use the telegraph during the campaign. It is not clear why, but it may be that the equipment was somehow lost or damaged, or perhaps the equipment that was taken along was simply faulty. That may explain part of Capt. Marston's post-battle report. In it he explained:

During this campaign I have had constant cause for regret that the instrument formerly known as the "signal telegraph" was no longer in our hands or in operation in the field. Many op-

portunities arose where its services would have been invaluable. I have laid these facts before the major-general commanding the department, with the request that if the American Telegraph Company did not intend to use the instruments they might be turned over temporarily to the signal corps.

Unfortunately, Marston did not go on to explain why the equipment that was taken saw no use or why he was no longer in possession of it, nor did he elaborate on Banks' response to his request.

Like Banks, Taylor was forced to operate with a predominantly horse-mounted courier system, but he used it for both tactical and operational communications. Under Capt. T. B. Gray, the Confederates set up a courier line between Taylor's headquarters and department headquarters at Shreveport. Apparently the courier service operated somewhat like the Pony Express with riders taking the message along a specific route and distance before handing it off to the next rider. In any event, Taylor's communications with Smith appear to have been very efficient and, in most cases where it was desired, timely.

Medical Support

Federal and Confederate medical systems followed a similar pattern. Surgeons general and medical directors for both sides had served many years in the prewar Medical Department but were hindered by an initial lack of administrative experience in handling large numbers of casualties as well as by the state of medical science in the mid-19th Century. Administrative procedures improved with experience, but throughout the war, the simple lack of knowledge about the true causes of disease and infection led to many more deaths than direct battlefield action.

After the disaster at the Battle of First Bull Run, the Federal Medical Department established an evacuation and treatment system developed by Surgeon Jonathan Letterman. At the heart of the system were three precepts: consolidation of field hospitals at division level, decentralization of medical supplies down to regimental level, and centralization of medical control of ambulances at all levels. A battle casualty evacuated from the front line normally received treatment at a regimental holding area immediately to the rear. From this point, wagons or ambulances carried wounded men to a division field hospital, normally within a mile of the battle lines. Once stabilized, seriously wounded men could then be further evacuated by wagon, rail, or watercraft to general hospitals located usually in towns along lines of communication in the armies' rear areas.

Although the Confederate system followed the same general principles, field hospitals were often consolidated at brigade rather than division level. A second difference lay in the established span of control of medical activities. Unlike their Federal counterparts who had control over all medical activities within an army area, a Confederate army medical director had no control of activities beyond his own brigade or division field hospitals. A separate medical director for large hospitals was responsible for evacuation and control. In practice, both sets of medical directors resolved potential problems through close cooperation. By 1863, the Confederacy had also introduced rear area “wayside hospitals,” which were intended to handle convalescents en route home on furloughs.

Procedures, medical techniques, and medical problems for both sides were virtually identical. Commanders discouraged soldiers from leaving the battle lines to escort wounded back to the rear, but such practice was common, especially in less-disciplined units. The established technique for casualty evacuation was to detail men for litter and ambulance duty. Both armies used bandsmen, among others, for this task. Casualties would move or be assisted back from the battle line to litter bearers who evacuated them to ambulances or supply wagons. The ambulances were specially designed two- or four-wheel carts with springs to limit jolts, but rough roads often made even short trips agonizing for wounded men. The ambulances, in turn, would take the casualties to a division field hospital. There, regimental, brigade, and division surgeons staffed these consolidated hospitals. Hospital sites were generally chosen based on the availability of water, potential buildings to supplement the hospital tents, and safe distances from enemy cannon and rifle fire.

The majority of operations performed at field hospitals in the aftermath of battle were amputations. Approximately 70 per cent of Civil War wounds occurred in the extremities, and the soft minié ball tended to shatter any bones that it hit. Amputation was the best technique available at the time to limit the chance of serious infection and gangrene. The Federals were generally well supplied with chloroform, morphine, and other drugs to combat such infections though shortages did occur on the battlefield. Conversely, Confederate surgeons often lacked these critical drugs and medical supplies.

Medical Support in the Red River Campaign

Like all United States armies, by March 1864 the Army of the Gulf had adopted Letterman’s system of evacuation and hospitalization. Thus, field hospitals were consolidated at the division echelon and medical supplies were distributed down to regimental level. Ambulances were under

positive centralized medical control. Commissioned or noncommissioned officers were in charge of ambulance details at division and brigade levels with ambulance drivers and assistant drivers assigned to support each regiment. In all, Banks' army possessed some 200 ambulances to support its evacuation needs.

Once a Federal soldier was wounded during this campaign, ideally he was evacuated to a division field hospital. From there, he was evacuated by ambulance initially to Grand Ecore and later to Alexandria. There, he was placed on board a steamer and sent downriver to a general hospital at New Orleans or Baton Rouge, or perhaps up river to Vicksburg or Memphis for A.J. Smith's men. New Orleans, the main hospital center for the Department of the Gulf, boasted seven general hospitals, one of which was the *Corps d'Afrique* General Hospital specifically designated for African-American troops. The hospitals in New Orleans had a total capacity of some 5,058 beds. Baton Rouge was the site of an additional general hospital. At, or near, Vicksburg, the federal forces had established an additional three general hospitals and seven more at Memphis. The wounded of the XVI and XVII Corps most likely ended up at one of the latter two locations while those of the XIII and XIX Corps were sent to New Orleans or Baton Rouge.

During the campaign, surgeons were forced, by the nature of the operations, to carry sick and wounded soldiers along with the marching columns, or leave them behind to be captured. Initially, this was not a major problem as the Federals suffered few casualties up until 8 April. Most of those men were not actually wounded, but ill from dysentery, malaria, and other diseases associated with that part of Louisiana. Indeed, surgeons in the Army of the Gulf reported that 24 percent of the troops in the command were ill from sickness or disease at some point during the campaign.

During the major battles at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, the Army of the Gulf suffered about 1,600 casualties due to wounds. Of these, about 500 men were captured by rebels on the field of battle (at the battle of Mansfield, the one hospital established by the XIX Corps Surgeon was overrun within minutes of its establishment) or subsequently abandoned by Banks when he retreated to Grand Ecore. Additionally, nine doctors and seventy of Banks' 200 ambulances were captured. Another four doctors volunteered to remain behind to care for the men left at Pleasant Hill after the battle of 9 April. These doctors would be kept busy over the next several weeks caring not only for Union wounded, but for the rebel injured as well.

On 12 April, Surgeon Eugene F. Sanger, Acting Medical Director for the Army of the Gulf, gained permission to take two wagon loads of medical supplies under a flag of truce into the Confederate lines and on to the Federal wounded at Pleasant Hill. Of the experience, Sanger later recorded:

I found them [the Union wounded] very kindly treated, but suffering for medicines, bedding and hospital stores; all of which I was able to supply. I found Surgeon Yandell, medical director of the trans-Mississippi Department, disposed to do everything in his power, he also promised that all the medical officers should be allowed to return within our lines as soon as I conscientiously thought they could be spared. General Taylor in his communication to General Banks, expressed a willingness to parole all our wounded as soon as they could travel.

Two days later, Sanger was able to send another four wagon loads of medical supplies and clothing to the Federal wounded.

Relatively little specific information is available concerning Confederate medical efforts during the campaign. However, it is safe to assume that problems with sickness and disease were of similar magnitude to those encountered by US troops. It is also clear that the Confederate army in Louisiana suffered from shortages of medical supplies and equipment and from an inadequate number of trained surgeons.

What is known is that Taylor directed specific medical preparations before the battle at Mansfield. He ordered his medical director to set up field hospitals in the private residences in the town. However, the subsequent Confederate casualties at the battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, coupled with the capture of sizable numbers of Federal wounded, overwhelmed Taylor's meager medical capabilities. The number of casualties, both Confederate and Union, also swamped the two villages. Virtually every building in each town, to include churches, public buildings, and outbuildings were commandeered to serve as hospitals after the fighting. One woman, who volunteered her services as a nurse's assistant, described the scene: "Oh, what a dreadful sight. Our poor men just lying on the floor in cotton. And such an odor . . . There are more than a thousand wounded . . . every house is full.

Vessel Name	Type	Dimensions Length/breadth/ draft/ tons	Armament	Armor (max)	Speed (knots)
<i>Benefit</i>	Naval Transport	Unk / Unk / Unk / 213	2 guns	n/a	Unk
<i>Benton</i>	Ironclad (conversion)	202' / 72' / 9' / 633	16 guns	2.5" iron	5.5
<i>Black Hawk</i>	Large Tinclad	260' / 45' / 6' / 902	16 guns	½" iron	Unk
<i>Carondelet</i>	Ironclad (City Class)	175' / 51' / 6' / 512	11 guns	2.5" iron	5.5
<i>Champion No. 3</i>	Transport/ Tug/ Pump Boat	Unk / Unk / Unk / 195	n/a	n/a	Unk
<i>Champion No. 5</i>	Transport/ Tug/ Pump Boat	Unk / Unk / Unk / 185	n/a	n/a	Unk
<i>Chillicothe</i>	Ironclad	162' / 50' / 4' / 203	3 guns	3" iron	7
<i>Choctaw</i>	Ironclad (conversion)	260' / 45' / 8' / 1,004	8 guns	1" iron + 1" rubber	5
<i>Covington</i>	Tinclad	126' / 37' / 6' / 224	8 guns	Unk	Unk
<i>Cricket</i>	Tinclad	154' / 28' / 4' / 178	6 guns	½" iron	6
<i>Dahlia</i>	Tug	Unk / Unk / 6' / 50	n/a	n/a	8.8
<i>Eastport</i>	Ironclad	280' / 43' / 6' / 570	8 guns	Unk	5
<i>Essex</i>	Ironclad	159' / 47' / 6' / 355	12 guns	3" iron	5.5
<i>Forest Rose</i>	Tinclad	155' / 32' / 5' / 260	8 guns	Unk	5.3
<i>Fort Hindman</i>	Tinclad	150' / 37' / 2.5' / 280	6 guns	Unk	Unk
<i>Gazelle</i>	Tinclad	135' / 23' / 5' / 117	6 guns	Unk	3.5
<i>General Price</i>	Ram	182' / 30' / 13' / 483	4 guns	n/a	10
<i>Hastings</i>	Tinclad	173' / 34' / 5' / 293	8 guns	Unk	Unk
<i>Juliet</i>	Tinclad	155' / 30' / 5' / 157	6 guns	Unk	Unk

Table 1.8. US Navy Mississippi River Squadron Vessels in the Red River Campaign.

Vessel Name	Type	Dimensions Length/breadth/ draft/ tons	Armament	Armor (max)	Speed (knots)
<i>Lafayette</i>	Ironclad (conversion)	280' / 45' / 8' / 1,193	10 guns	2.5" iron + 2" rubber	4
<i>Lexington</i>	Timberclad	177' / 37' / 6' / 448	7 guns		7
<i>Louisville</i>	Ironclad (City Class)	175' / 51' / 6' / 512	13 guns	2.5" iron	5.5
<i>Mound City</i>	Ironclad (City Class)	175' / 51' / 6' / 512	14 guns	2.5" iron	5.5
<i>Neosho</i>	Monitor	180' / 45' / 5' / 523	4 guns	2.5" iron	10
<i>Osage</i>	Monitor	180' / 45' / 5' / 523	3 guns	2.5" iron	10
<i>Ouachita</i>	Tinclad	227' / 38' / 7' / 572	36 guns		7
<i>Ozark</i>	Monitor	180' / 50' / 5' / 578	7 guns	2.5" iron	
<i>Pittsburg</i>	Ironclad (City Class)	175' / 51' / 6' / 512	14 guns	2.5" iron	5.5
<i>Signal</i>	Tinclad	157' / 30' / 2' / 190	8 guns	Unk	Unk
<i>St. Clair</i>	Tinclad	156' / 32' / 3' / 203	8 guns	Unk	Unk
<i>Tallahatchee</i>	Tinclad	Unk / Unk / Unk / 171	6 guns	Unk	Unk
<i>William H. Brown</i>	Dispatch & Transport	230' / 26' / Unk / 200	2 guns	n/a	Unk

Table 1.8 (continued). US Navy Mississippi River Squadron Vessels in the Red River Campaign.

The Navies

Civil War Joint Operations

The Red River Campaign was, at least for the Federal forces involved, a joint operation involving both Army and Navy components. At the time of the Civil War, however, there was no joint command structure for the US military. The president himself was the first common leader in the formal chain of command between US Army field commanders and supporting US Navy commanders and vice-versa. There was no requirement for either service commander to cooperate, but when they did, it was essen-

tially a gentlemen's agreement which could be ended at a moment's notice. During the Vicksburg Campaign in 1862-63, Grant, then commander of the Army of Tennessee, and Porter, commander of the Mississippi River Squadron, developed an informal methodology for joint cooperation. Really more of an understanding of capabilities and limitations which developed between the two over the months, the two commanders built an effective and efficient joint relationship. Their success was due to several reasons: both were professional military officers; each possessed an understanding of the capabilities of each other's service; each respected each other's judgement; and they both understood that they needed each other to accomplish the mission. They also communicated frequently and frankly to avoid misunderstandings or misconceptions. Although Banks and Porter had never reached that same level of trust, nevertheless, the Army's and Navy's joint efforts during the campaign were generally effective.

Military Significance of the Rivers

Naval power was a decisive element in the western campaigns of the Civil War. Given the enormous size of the western theater of operations (680 miles in a straight line from Cairo, Illinois to New Orleans) and the relative austerity of the road and rail nets, navigable waterways were the preferred method of movement for both commercial and military enterprises. In a situation somewhat analogous to 20th Century "air superiority," control of the western rivers conferred significant military advantages from "naval superiority," particularly with regard to mobility and firepower.

It is important to understand that navigable rivers and streams were not barriers to the Union ground forces involved in the campaign. Rather, they could be considered "superhighways," using current terminology. The free movement by river of both men and material was an essential precondition for Banks' campaign to seize Shreveport. Conversely, since the Confederates possessed only marginal capabilities to use the Red River, their ability to adequately oppose Banks suffered.

Union Naval Power

The Mississippi River Squadron

At the beginning of the Civil War, the US Navy possessed 90 warships. Of these, only 42 were in commission; the remainder were 'laid up' (i.e., out of commission) with only a few men aboard to maintain and repair them. Due to the Lincoln administration's blockade of southern ports as part of its overall war strategy, the number of vessel built or purchased

and placed into commission expanding rapidly. During that process, it soon became clear to the War Department that vessels would be needed to operate inland as well, especially on the western rivers and tributaries. Thus, the US naval force that played such a large role in the Red River Campaign began its existence as an Army organization known as the Western Flotilla. In 1861, the War Department began to procure vessels for operations on the western rivers. The effort included both the conversion of commercial boats into armored combat vessels and by contracting for the new construction of purpose-built ironclads. The US Navy, which at first wanted little to do with the river war, provided officers and some of the crews, but the Army owned the boats. The first three commanders of the Western Flotilla, though Navy officers, took their orders from the Army department commander.

On 1 October 1862, the flotilla was transferred from Army to Navy control, although the Army retained possession of its unarmed riverboats that it used as transports. Later that month the flotilla was redesignated as the Mississippi River Squadron and received a new commander, David D. Porter. Porter held the rank of Flag Officer, which (at that time) was equivalent to a major general. Later, Porter was promoted to the rank of Acting Rear Admiral which theoretically made him the highest-ranking Union officer in the theater—Banks was still a two-star general.

Neither Porter's rank nor the separation of the squadron from army control altered the fact that the operation in the Red River Valley would be primarily an army show. In practice, the ground force commander initiated the majority of joint operations and always for the purpose of prosecuting the ground war. However, it was a wise general who kept his naval counterpart intimately involved in the planning process for any impending joint operations. Since Porter was not required to take orders from the army, he could effectively veto any plan that he considered unfeasible. Therefore, Banks' best interests were served when he avoided surprising Porter with a scheme that had not received any navy input. Under the circumstances, the Red River Campaign would proceed under a "gentleman's agreement" between Banks and Porter and only a mutual trust and respect between army and navy commanders (as in Grant's relationship with Porter during the Vicksburg Campaign) would prevent disagreements from escalating into deadlock. As will be seen, however, the relationship between Banks and Porter throughout the campaign remained cautious at best.

At the time of the Red River Campaign, Porter's Mississippi River Squadron numbered approximately 98 vessels of all types. Of these, only

Vessel Name	Type	Tonnage	Armament
<i>Adriatic</i>	Transport	369 tons	n/a
<i>Alf Cutting</i>	Tug	95 tons	n/a
<i>Alice Vivian</i>	Transport	369 tons	n/a
<i>Anyone</i>	Transport	Unk	n/a
<i>Arizona</i>	Transport	450 tons	n/a
<i>Autocrat</i>	Transport	862 tons	n/a
<i>Baltic</i>	Transport	113 tons	n/a
<i>Beauregard</i>	Transport	275 tons	n/a
<i>Bella Donna</i>	Transport	Unk	n/a
<i>Belle Creole</i>	Transport	Unk	n/a
<i>Belle Darlington</i>	Tug	84 tons	n/a
<i>Belvidere</i>	Transport	816 tons	n/a
<i>Ben J. Adams</i>	Transport	687 tons	n/a
<i>Black Hawk</i>	Transport	450 tons	n/a
<i>Henry Chouteau</i>	Transport	623 tons	n/a
<i>City Belle</i>	Transport	400 tons	n/a
<i>Clara Belle</i>	Transport	350 tons	n/a
<i>Cleveland</i>	Tug	37 tons	n/a
<i>Colonel Cowles</i>	Transport	331 tons	n/a
<i>Des Moines</i>	Transport	500 tons	n/a
<i>Diadem</i>	Transport	400 tons	n/a
<i>Diana</i>	Transport	564 tons	n/a
<i>Emerald</i>	Transport	1000 tons	n/a
<i>Emma</i>	Transport	452 tons	n/a
<i>Gillum</i>	Transport	70 tons	n/a
<i>Hastings</i>	Transport	375 tons	n/a
<i>Iberville</i>	Transport	505 tons	n/a
<i>Illinois</i>	Transport	682	n/a
<i>Hamilton</i>	Transport	Unk	n/a
<i>J. C. Lacy</i>	Transport	500 tons	n/a
<i>James Battle</i>	Transport	621 tons	n/a
<i>Jennie Rogers</i>	Transport	346 tons	n/a

Table 1.9. US Army Quartermaster and Mississippi Marine Brigade Boats.

Vessel Name	Type	Tonnage	Armament
<i>John H. Groesbeck</i>	Transport	359 tons	n/a
<i>John Raine</i>	Transport	620 tons	n/a
<i>John Warner</i>	Transport	391 tons	n/a
<i>Kate Dale</i>	Transport	428 tons	n/a
<i>La Crosse</i>	Transport	350 tons	n/a
<i>Laurel Hill</i>	Transport	783 tons	n/a
<i>Liberty</i>	Transport	400 tons	n/a
<i>Lioness</i>	Ram	233 tons	n/a
<i>Louisiana Belle</i>	Transport	89 tons	n/a
<i>Luminary</i>	Transport	1,300 tons	n/a
<i>Mars</i>	Transport	245 tons	n/a
<i>Meteor</i>	Transport	800 tons	n/a
<i>Mittie Stevens</i>	Transport	Unk	n/a
<i>Pauline</i>	Transport	Unk	n/a
<i>Polar Star</i>	Transport	Unk	n/a
<i>Thomas E. Tutt</i>	Transport	600 tons	n/a
<i>Red Chief</i>	Transport	Unk	n/a
<i>Rob Roy</i>	Gunboat	200 tons	4 guns
<i>Sallie Robinson</i>	Transport	Unk	n/a
<i>Shreveport</i>	Transport	Unk	n/a
<i>Silver Wave</i>	Transport	500 tons	n/a
<i>Sioux City</i>	Transport	800 tons	n/a
<i>South Wester</i>	Transport	685 tons	n/a
<i>Starlight</i>	Transport	351 tons	n/a
<i>Superior</i>	Transport	420 tons	n/a
<i>T. D. Horner</i>	Ram	130 tons	n/a
<i>Texas</i>	Transport	Unk	n/a
<i>Thomas E. Tutt</i>	Transport	600 tons	n/a
<i>Universe</i>	Transport	464 tons	n/a
<i>William L. Ewing</i>	Transport	600 tons	n/a
<i>Woodford</i>	Hospital boat	487 tons	n/a

Table 1.9. (continued) US Army Quartermaster and Mississippi Marine Brigade Boats.

about 30 were directly involved in supporting the Army of the Gulf at any given point in time. The remainder could typically be found interdicting rebel trade along the Mississippi River, conducting routine patrol missions, or undergoing repairs. Approximately 27 US Navy combat vessels participated in the Red River Campaign at one time or another. These included 10 ironclads, 12 “tinclads,” 1 “timberclad,” 1 ram, and 3 monitors. Additionally, Porter possessed four auxiliary craft of various types that participated in the campaign as well.

US Army Quartermaster Boats

During the winter and spring, the roads in Louisiana were too poor to move and supply the army rapidly by ground transport only. Thus, the transport of some US ground forces and supplies by water was critical to a swift and successful completion of Banks’ mission in the Red River Campaign. After the capture of Shreveport, Banks had to return A. J. Smith’s contingent of the XVI Corps to Sherman in time for the beginning of the Atlanta Campaign in early May. To accomplish this, he had to be able to quickly move many assets on the Red River and use the same water transport to return Smith’s troops to Vicksburg in a timely manner. The mission of transporting the troops and supplies of the Army of the Gulf fell to the vessels of the US Army Quartermaster Corps. Although these vessels were army-owned or chartered, they, as well as those of the Mississippi Marine Brigade discussed below, generally operated under Porter’s direction for ease of command and control during the campaign.

The Quartermaster Corps assembled about 50 boats to function as transports for the Red River Campaign. In appearance, the craft were a motley collection of riverboats that ranged in size from the 37-ton *Cleveland* to the *Luminary* which weighed in at 1,300 tons. Unlike Porter’s vessels, these boats possessed no armor protection and no guns. Their only protective armament was that which could be provided by Porter’s fleet or perhaps the small arms of the soldiers on board. Not surprisingly then, these craft suffered the lion’s share of losses from enemy action during the campaign. In addition to the transports, the Quartermaster Corps also possessed a few specialized vessels which included Banks’ headquarters ship, the *Black Hawk* (not to be confused with the USS *Black Hawk*, Porter’s own flagship), two tugs, and a small gunboat, the *Rob Roy*.

Mississippi Marine Brigade

One other collection of boats that operated for a short time on the Red River during the mission was the eleven boats of Brig. Gen. Alfred W. Ellet’s

Mississippi Marine Brigade. These Quartermaster vessels were assigned to specifically support the operations of that brigade only. Several of them had been originally been modified to be used as rams against Confederate boats. Most were large, deep-draft vessels when compared to the army transport boats since they were primarily intended to move the Marine Brigade as a mobile strike and raiding force along the Mississippi River. As a result, few of them could make it over the falls at Alexandria. Indeed, the brigade's hospital boat, the *Woodford*, was wrecked beyond recovery at Alexandria when it attempted to cross the shoals there. For that reason, and because Maj. Gen. James McPherson was calling for its return to Vicksburg, Ellet's brigade departed on 27 March and contributed little to the campaign.

Naval Tactics

The ironclads' primary mission during the Red River Campaign was to engage and destroy, or at least silence, Confederate fortified fixed and mobile batteries along the river as portions of Bank's army was moved up upstream. The key actions of these types occurred at Fort DeRussy against fixed batteries and at Blair's Landing against mobile artillery. The ironclads did not subdue Fort DeRussy (it was captured by land assault), but the fact that the rebels deemed it necessary to build major fortifications to try and block the US Navy's advances up the river is itself testimony to the power and mobility of the Mississippi River Squadron.

The approved naval tactic for subduing a fort was to bombard it head-on from the downstream side of the fort head-on to take advantage of the ironclad's heaviest armor (located on the forward surfaces); and from the downstream direction because the boats handled better and remained a more stable firing platform with their bows facing the current. Also, by approaching the fort from downstream, any vessel that might be disabled by enemy fire would drift to safety, away from the enemy guns. The range of engagement could be quite short—the ironclads might close to within 100 yards of the fortification. The gunners used grape shot to sweep the crews off opposing guns and exploding shell and solid shot in an attempt to break down the earthen parapet (front wall) of the fort and disable or dismount its guns.

Vessels

The variety of vessel types reflects the diversity of missions with which the Mississippi River Squadron was faced. For heavy combat the squadron relied on its ironclads. Their firepower and armor protection allowed them to trade blows with any Confederate force whether ashore or afloat. Four of the squadron's ironclads were built to a common design created for the War Department in 1861 by a US Navy "constructor" named Samuel

M. Pook. The James B. Eads Company of St. Louis, Missouri, won the contract to build seven of Pook's "City" class ironclads, so called because each was named after a Midwestern river town. Of these, the USS *Carondelet*, *Louisville*, *Mound City*, and *Pittsburg* operated on the Red River.

Only one of the City class boats is still in existence. The USS *Cairo* (pronounced Kay-row) was sunk by a Confederate mine in December 1862 on the Yazoo River and later raised from the mud in 1964-1965. Today, the vessel is on display at the Vicksburg National Military Park. Its basic description is typical of its sisters. Visitors are often surprised by how large the *Cairo* is—175 feet long and 51 feet wide—and yet her draft was only six feet (meaning that she could float in as little as six feet of water). Two steam engines, which drove a center-mounted paddlewheel, propelled the vessel to a top speed of approximately six knots. Armament varied somewhat between the City Class boats, but the *Cairo* mounted three 7-inch rifles, three 8-inch smoothbores, six 32-pounder smoothbores, and one 30-pounder Parrot rifle. The guns were located in a slope-sided casemate with three ports facing forward, four to each side, and two to the stern. Thus, unlike seagoing vessels of the day, which could fire half their guns at one time with each broadside, the ironclad could train roughly one-fourth of its armament on a given target. The casemate was protected by 2 ½ inches of iron armor fixed over timbers two feet thick. Railroad rails provided additional protection on the rounded corners of the casemate. The octagonal pilothouse carried 1 ¼ inch of iron over timbers. Armor was thickest on the forward surfaces. The rear of the vessel was essentially unarmored, as were the underwater surfaces.

Other than some variations in armament, the City class gunboats were virtually identical. The boats were so similar that a system of colored bands was used so that each could be more readily identified in combat and from a distance. Each boat had an approximately three-foot wide colored band, painted in a different color for every vessel, on the two stacks. The *Cairo*'s color was grey.

Built by Joseph Brown of Cincinnati, the *Chillicothe*, like the City class boats, was specially designed and constructed to be an ironclad gunboat. Unlike the Eads vessels, the *Chillicothe* was poorly constructed, lightly armed, and imperfectly armored. Moreover, the *Chillicothe* carried only three guns and thus proved to have only limited utility for operations.

Another three ironclads in Porter's armada, *Choctaw*, *Lafayette*, and *Benton*, had been converted from commercial rivercraft. All of these were stronger, safer, and more powerful than Brown's or Ead's vessels. More-

over, they were significantly larger than either of the for-purpose built series of ironclads. The *Choctaw* and *Lafayette* carried a layer of rubber, in addition to their iron armor, to help deflect projectiles though the crew discovered that the arrangement did not really improve her protection. The *Benton*, which sometimes served as Porter's flagship, was the Mississippi River Squadron's most powerful vessel. She measured 202 feet long by 72 feet wide, and carried 16 guns.

In addition to the heavy ironclads, Porter possessed a number of lighter, more nimble gunboats. Typically, these lightdraughts, or "tin-clads," were converted riverboats. Tinclads provided the naval presence that kept waterways under Union control even when the riverbanks belonged to the Confederates. The tinclads got their name from the thin iron plating, only $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{3}{4}$ inch thick, that primarily protected the power plant and pilot house from small-arms fire so these vessels were not particularly well-armored. In terms of armament, however, the typical tinclad mounted an impressive six 24-pounder howitzers which were usually placed to fire broadside and were more than enough firepower to cope with most threats on shore, unless it was a fixed battery. Tinclads could also double as troop transports in joint operations, each one carrying up to 200 troops. Their shallow draft enabled them to prowl waterways inaccessible to heavier war vessels. Some tinclads could float on as little as 18 inches of water when lightly loaded.

'Timberclad' vessels, which were also converted riverboats, were similar to tinclads in armament and size. The primary difference in the two designs was that timberclads were protected by wooden bulwarks rather than iron. The timber 'armor' was intended to protect the crew from small arms fire but was only nominally effective against the small artillery pieces used by ground troops. Like the tinclads, the timberclads were also often used as troop transports.

Naval Ordnance

Like the Army, the US Navy in the Civil War possessed an artillery establishment that spanned the spectrum from light to heavy. A series of light boat guns and howitzers corresponded to the Army's field artillery. Designed for service on small boats and launches, this class of weapons included 12- and 24-pounder pieces, both smoothbore and rifled. The most successful boat gun was a 12-pounder smoothbore howitzer (4.62-inch bore) designed by John A. Dahlgren, the Navy's premier ordnance expert and wartime Chief of Ordnance. Typically mounted in the bow of a small craft, the Dahlgren 12-pounder could be transferred, in a matter of min-

Type	Model	Bore Diameter (inches)	Tube Length Overall (inches)	Tube Weight (pounds)	Projectile Weight (pounds)	Range (yards)/degrees elevation
Smoothbore						
8-inch	Dahlgren	8	115.5	6,500	51 shell	1,657/5°
9-inch	Dahlgren	9	131.5	9,000	72.5 shell	1,710/5°
11-inch	Dahlgren	11	161	15,700	136 shell	1,712/5°
12-pounder	Howitzer	4.62	63.5	760	10 shell	1,085/5°
24-pounder	Howitzer	5.82	67	1,310	20 shell	1,270/5°
32-pounder	Gun	6.4	108	4,704	32 shot	1,756/5°
64-pounder	Gun	8	140.95	11,872	Unk	Unk
Rifle						
30-pounder	Parrott	4.2	112	3,550	29 shell	2,200/5°
42-pounder**	Gun (rifled)	7	121	7,870	42 shot	Unk
50-pounder	Dahlgren	5.1	107	6,000	50 shot	Unk
100-pounder	Parrott	6.4	155	9,700	100 shot	2,200/5°
Mortar						
13-inch	Mortar	13	54.5	17,120	200 shell	4,200/45°

Table 1.10. Naval Armaments.*

*Many guns mounted on the boats of the Mississippi River Squadron were in fact Army field artillery and siege guns.

**Converted smoothbore.

utes, to an iron field carriage for use on shore. This versatile little weapon fired shell and case rounds.

Naturally, most naval artillery was designed for ship-killing. A variety of 32-pounder guns (6.4-inch bore), produced from the 1820s through the 1840s, remained in service during the Civil War. These venerable smooth-bores, direct descendants of the broadside guns used in the Napoleonic Wars, fired solid shot and were effective not only in ship-to-ship combat but also in the shore-bombardment role.

John Dahlgren's design came to typify the "shellgun" class of weapons. All of his shellguns shared an unmistakable "beer-bottle" shape. The most successful Dahlgren shellguns were a 9-inch model (72.5-pound shell or 90-pound solid shot), an 11-inch (136-pound shell or 170-pound solid shot), and a 15-inch gun, which fired an awesome 330-pound shell or 440-pound solid shot. A pivot-mounted 11-inch Dahlgren shellgun proved to be the decisive weapon in the USS *Kearsarge's* 1864 victory over the CSS *Alabama*. The famous US Navy ironclad USS *Monitor* mounted two 11-inch Dahlgrens in its rotating turret and later monitors carried 15-inch shellguns.

The US Navy also made wide use of rifled artillery. These high-velocity weapons became increasingly important with the advent of ironclad warships. Some Navy rifles were essentially identical to Army models. For instance, the Navy procured Parrott rifles in 4.2-inch, 6.4-inch, 8-inch, and 10-inch versions, each of which had a counterpart in the Army as either siege or seacoast artillery. Other rifled weapons, conceived specifically for naval use, included two Dahlgren designs. The 50-pounder (with approximately 5-inch bore) was the better of the two Dahlgren rifles. An 80-pounder model (6-inch bore) was less popular, due to its tendency to burst.

The Confederacy relied heavily on British imports for its naval armament. Naval variants of Armstrong, Whitworth, and Blakely weapons all saw service. In addition, the Confederate navy used Brooke rifles manufactured in Alabama, as well as a 9-inch version of the Dahlgren shellgun which apparently found use both afloat and ashore.

Logistics Support

In an age when most of an army's tactical transportation moved by horse power, the steamboat was a logistician's dream come true. Cargo capacity ranged from 250 tons for the smaller boats up to 1,700 for the largest. By contrast, a horse-drawn military wagon could move about one ton, depending on road conditions, and a Civil War-era freight train of ten cars could carry only up to 100 tons of goods. Moreover, in the western theaters, especially in the Trans-Mississippi, rail lines were limited, difficult to maintain, and rare-

ly ran in the direction convenient to an army's route of advance. However, if camped on the banks of a navigable stream, a field army of 40,000 men and 18,000 horses could subsist handily on the daily deliveries of one large (500 ton) steamboat which traveled on a river that was not vulnerable to sabotage and was rarely 'out of order.' Additionally, riverboats could move the army itself. One riverboat could transport a regiment; ten could move an entire infantry division. Such troop movements might be operational in nature, such as the flow of reinforcements that came to Banks' army from other departments before the beginning of the campaign; or tactical, as demonstrated during the Chickasaw Bayou battle in 1862 when Sherman used riverboats to move troops from one part of the battlefield to another.

Naval Power in the Red River Campaign

Union Naval Operations

By mid-1863, after Vicksburg's fall, Porter's Mississippi River Squadron controlled the Mississippi from St. Louis to the sea. There were few navigable areas in the southern Mississippi drainage area where his boats could not go except for those tributaries, such as the Red River, where Confederate fortifications still blocked the waterway. With the army's help, the Red River would soon be open to US river traffic as well.

On 11 March 1864, 21 transports, packed with XVI Corps and XVII Corps troops, under the command of A. J. Smith, departed Natchez, Mississippi, and wound their way toward Turnbull's Island. By evening, the transports had linked up at Old River with the large detachment of Mississippi River Squadron vessels that Porter had selected to participate in the Red River Campaign. Porter had with him almost every ironclad he commanded and the majority of his other combatant vessels. Before escorting A. J. Smith's troops from Vicksburg to the Red River, Porter had promised Sherman that he would ascend the river with "every ironclad vessel in the fleet," perhaps because of the persistent rumors of the construction of Confederate ironclads and submarines at Shreveport. The squadron's firepower lay in some 210 pieces of ordnance ranging from 12-pounder cannon to 100-pounder Parrot rifles. He would also have to deal with the imposing batteries at Fort DeRussy. Thus, he chose to lead the fleet into the Red River with his largest, and one of the most powerful, ironclads the USS *Eastport*.

The following morning, 12 March, the fleet's movement up the Red River began with an inauspicious start. The *Eastport* grounded on a sandbar at the mouth of the Red River, but its captain quickly freed her and gingerly guided his boat over the bar. Soon, the remainder of Porter's fleet was past the obstacle and he sent some vessels up the Ouachita River to

neutralize a Confederate position to the north, while the remainder the squadron proceeded up the Red River toward Fort DeRussy.

Meanwhile, Smith debarked his troops at Simmesport (known as Simsport in 1864) and prepared to begin his movement toward Fort DeRussy as well. The plan agreed to by Porter and Smith was for the army to proceed by land to gain the rear of the fort, while the navy kept the defenders' attention by pounding the position's water batteries and main fortification with the powerful guns of their ironclads.

The following day, 13 March, as Smith made for Fort DeRussy via the village of Marksville, Porter's boats were temporarily delayed by a timber 'raft' obstacle blocking the river. After ramming and pulling the obstacle apart, the fleet continued toward the fort, and the lead vessels arrived there on the afternoon of the 14th just as Smith's troops formed to charge the main position. After only two rounds of gunfire support, however, the *Eastport's* captain ordered a cease-fire for fear of causing friendly casualties. The Federal land assault captured the fort just before dusk and the campaign's first success was registered.

On the morning of the 14th, Smith re-embarked one division under Mower and sent it with the fleet to seize and occupy Alexandria. The monitor USS *Osage*, however, arrived there first on 15 March and captured the town alone. Mower's troops and portions of the fleet arrived soon thereafter. Porter and his fleet would sit at Alexandria for the next ten days waiting for Banks and the Army of the Gulf to arrive.

Though his vessels were tied up along the piers and wharves at Alexandria, Porter's men were not idle, however. Due to the naval prize law that was on still on the books from the days of the American Revolution and the War of 1812, naval crews were allowed to seize enemy property and sell it for reward. Porter and his sailors, in other words, could enrich themselves on the cotton of enemy civilians. Under Porter's orders, the jack-tars busied themselves by fanning out into the countryside to seize all the cotton they could find and load it aboard the boats. Thus, Porter's crewmen secured some 3,000 bales of cotton while waiting for Banks.

Unlike the navy, the army did not have the benefit prize laws. Smith's soldiers employed on cotton gathering duty were required to turn over the cotton they seized to US Treasury agents and the money from the sale of that cotton would go to the government. This state of affairs caused friction between the two component commanders which, in turn, trickled down to the lowest subordinates.

Banks himself finally arrived at Alexandria on 24 March and the bulk of the Army of the Gulf arrived the next day. Despite the need for a speedy capture of Shreveport and the return of Smith's command to Sherman, Banks decided to linger in Alexandria. Instead of continuing the advance upriver, Banks, ever the politician, busied himself with arranging elections for local officials loyal to the Union, but the elections were not scheduled to take place until 1 April. Time was ticking, but the Gulf Army commander seemed unconcerned.

Porter on the other hand was worried. Since entering the Red, he had been monitoring the level of the river daily and sometimes on an hourly basis. Under normal conditions, there should have been plenty of winter and spring rain to ensure the navigability of the Red River all the way to Shreveport during this time of year. For the first time since 1855, however, the rainfall in Louisiana had been insufficient to ensure the annual spring rise in water levels. Indeed, instead of a rise in the river, Porter knew it was falling.

Porter realized that time was of the essence. As he waited for Banks to begin the movement on Shreveport, he also prepared to move a major portion of his squadron upstream. He engaged the services of a local river pilot with the unlikely moniker, Wellington W. Withenbury. Withenbury (whose loyalties are suspect by some modern scholars) was a competent and experienced pilot and he advised Porter to take only his light draft tinclads upstream. Porter refused that course of action, probably due to his concern about the reports of Confederate ironclads located, or at least being built at, Shreveport. For whatever reason, Porter insisted that his heavyweights go along. Therefore, on 26 March the admiral ordered Withenbury to pilot the fleet's biggest ironclad, the *Eastport*, over the rocky falls at Alexandria. After a mild protest, Withenbury attempted the passage, but as predicted by the pilot, the *Eastport* became stuck in the chute. It took three days of effort and a small rise in the river level to get the *Eastport* through. By 3 April, most of Porter's fleet and thirty army transports were through the falls and concentrated at Grand Ecore. The Army of the Gulf, meanwhile, finally departed Alexandria on 26 March, and arrived at Grand Ecore on the 3rd as well.

On arrival at Grand Ecore, Banks had a decision to make which was what route the army should take towards Shreveport. There were two roads known to Banks and Porter: one followed the river on the north bank of the river; the other, a single lane dirt track that passed through a wilderness of pine trees through Mansfield and Keachi, thence to Shreveport. Banks did not like the river road as it would place him on the wrong side of the river in the event he had to assault Shreveport. Porter suggested to Banks

to allow him to conduct a reconnaissance to try and detect any rebel defenses or ambushes farther north before moving further. Banks, now in a rush to conclude the campaign so that he could release A. J. Smith's troops in accordance with Grant's instructions, told Porter that there wasn't the time to waste. Neither Banks nor Porter had maps which showed a third road which existed and ran along the river on the south side. It was an ideal route as it allowed both foraging and direct support between the land and naval forces. Banks, ignorant of the best option, decided to head inland on the road through Mansfield.

On 6 April Banks' army departed Grand Ecore moving on the inland on the inland track. The following day, Porter steamed up the Red River en route to his initial destination, Loggy Bayou, some 100 miles upstream. Loggy Bayou was the point chosen for a resupply link-up between Banks' ground force and Porter's fleet. With him, Porter took two monitors, one gunboat, two tinclads, one timberclad, two tugs, one naval transport, two dozen army transports and T. Kilby Smith's 1,600-man division of the XVII Corps, while A. J. Smith's troops trailed the rest of the Army of the Gulf.

For the next four days the fleet steamed up the treacherously low waters of the Red River to reach the destination of Loggy Bayou on the 10th. On arrival, however, Porter found an ingenious impediment to his further movement toward Shreveport. The Confederates had placed a large, old steamer, the *New Falls City*, across the breadth of the bayou, broken its keel and filled it with rocks to make a rather impressive obstacle. To add insult to injury, the rebels had placed a large banner on the boat with an invite to the Union men to attend a ball in Shreveport. Before Porter's men even get started on removing the *New Falls City*, a courier from Banks' army arrived to inform the admiral of Banks' defeat at Mansfield, the battle at Pleasant Hill, and Banks' decision to return to Grand Ecore. Porter and Kilby Smith discussed the situation and agreed to turn back to link up with Banks at Grand Ecore.

The descent down the Red River was even more difficult than the ascent. The ever-receding water made sandbars and rocks more prominent and navigable stretches of the river narrower. Additionally, the army was already far to the south of Porter's ships and not in a position to provide any help if the vessels were attacked. The Confederates, flushed with success, now sensed an opportunity and moved to intercept the fleet, trap it, and destroy or capture it if possible.

On 12 April, the fleet approached Blair's Landing some 45 miles above Grand Ecore. There, Porter found Brig. Gen. Thomas "Tom" Green's

2,500-man Texas cavalry division lying in wait. The fight lasted just over an hour and, despite the heavy fire between the two forces, there were surprisingly few casualties. One of the casualties, however, was Green himself who had his head taken off by a cannon shot while well forward leading his troops. Several of Porter's boats, to include his flagship the *Black Hawk*, were severely peppered with small arms and cannon fire. Over the next three days, the fleet was fired upon here and there, but all boats finally arrived safely back at Grand Ecore by the 15th and were reunited with the army.

The following day, the fleet began making its way back to Alexandria, but had proceeded only three miles before the lead gunboat, the huge *Eastport*, struck a "torpedo" (i.e. a mine). The damage was not heavy and the boat slowly settled to the shallow bottom after five hours of trying to keep her afloat. Her position in the river now created a significant obstacle for the fleet. After six days of effort, the *Eastport* was refloated on the 21st, but then stuck fast on some underwater snags on the 26th. The boat once again bottled up the fleet and the river was falling fast. Therefore, Porter was forced to order the destruction of the *Eastport*. The Federal sailors blew it to pieces with gunpowder which cleared the way for the rest of the fleet.

The *Eastport's* five escort vessels continued south and as they neared the Cane River, another ambush was sprung by some 200 Confederate riflemen and a field artillery battery. The rebel force sank the *Champion No. 3* and heavily damaged the other four ships including the *Cricket* on which Porter was sailing. Here Porter once again demonstrated his great courage and coolness under fire. After the boat's gun crews were incapacitated, the admiral quickly trained some previously-enslaved refugees who had been had taken aboard the *Cricket* how to load, aim, and fire the guns. He then went to the engine room find out why the steam had fallen, only to discover that the engineer was dead. The admiral swiftly put the assistant engineer in charge and helped him raise the steam in the boilers. On his return to the pilot house, Porter next found the ship's pilot had been killed and he personally took charge of the ship to get it past the deadly Confederate battery. When the fleet limped into Alexandria, the admiral now found the water too low for his boats to cross back over the falls. His fleet was indeed trapped.

Over the next two and a half weeks, Banks' army was besieged at Alexandria by Taylor's small force, while Porter and others struggled with the problem of how to save the stranded vessels of the Mississippi River Squadron. Meanwhile, routine boat traffic still plied the Red River from Alexandria to the Mississippi carrying messages, troops, and supplies, but

the voyage was now extremely dangerous as single boats and small groups of vessels were subject to attack by small but deadly Confederate forces. On 1 May, for example, a battery of Confederate artillery engaged and sunk the transport *Emma*. Two days later, this same battery attacked and seized the steamer *City Belle* and killed or wounded about 350 men of the 120th Ohio Infantry and captured the rest of the regiment with the surrender of the vessel. The following day, 4 May, a small convoy consisting of the *John Warner*, *Covington*, and *Signal*, departed Alexandria. The boats were under small arms fire intermittently all day. In the dark of the following morning, the convoy approached Dunn's Bayou and was immediately brought under fire by a battery of Confederate artillery supported by infantry. At the end of the fight all three vessels were destroyed or captured along with the 56th Ohio Infantry which had lost about 125 killed and wounded.

The enemy activity on the Red River, along with the seemingly impossible obstacle of the falls at Alexandria, gave Porter much to worry about. Fortunately, a young engineer officer from Franklin's staff came to the fore with an idea. Lt. Col. Joseph Bailey, a former logging industry executive from Wisconsin, offered to build a set of 'wing' dams, one each protruding from the banks of the river, that would force a rise in the river's level. The rise in the water level would then allow sufficient depth for Porter's vessels to float over the falls. Many of the Federal commanders, including Porter, were dubious, but in the end Bailey's efforts were successful. By 13 May, all of the boats were safely past the falls and ready to continue the journey back to the wide, deep Mississippi. The entire fleet was safely on the Mississippi two days later and at that point, the Red River Campaign was finally over for Porter and the Mississippi River Squadron.

After war's end, Porter's western fleet soon vanished virtually without a trace. Whereas ocean-going sailing vessels served on in the US Navy for years, even decades, the postwar navy had no requirement for, or interest in, maintaining a riverine force of any size. Most of the gunboats were converted (or reconverted, in many cases) into commercial transports and steamed off into oblivion. Only the USS *Cairo* and a few lesser relics once encased in the protective muck of Southern rivers for over a century remain to illuminate a unique and fascinating chapter in American naval history.

Confederate Naval Operations

Unable to utilize water transport to any great degree, the Confederates were forced to rely almost exclusively on the sub-standard roads of north-west and central Louisiana. Moreover, with few vessels, and none which

Vessel Name	Type	Tonnage	Armament	Remarks
<i>Anna Perrette</i>	Steamer	173 tons	n/a	used as a supply vessel
<i>Beauregard</i>	Steamer	Unk	n/a	used as an ammunition supply vessel
<i>Countess</i>	Steamer	198 tons	n/a	used as a supply vessel; grounded on the falls at Alexandria 15 Mar 64 and burned by crew
<i>Dixie</i>	Steamer	Unk	n/a	used as a supply vessel
<i>Frolic</i>	Steamer	296 tons	n/a	used as a supply vessel; evacuated Taylor from Natchitoches
<i>Missouri</i>	Armored Steamer	183 tons	4 guns	used to move 30 torpedoes to the vicinity of Grand Ecore; low water later prevented this boat from leaving Shreveport
<i>New Falls City</i>	Steamer	880 tons	n/a	sunk near Coushatta Chute (Loggy Bayou) to block the US Naval fleet from approaching Shreveport
<i>Osceola</i>	Steamer	157 tons	n/a	
<i>Pauline</i>	Steamer	Unk	n/a	used as a commissary supply vessel
<i>Texas</i>	Steamer	1,152 tons	n/a	used as a supply vessel

Table 1.11. Confederate Vessels in the Red River Campaign.

could oppose Porter's ironclads, the rebel navy could only cede the river to the Mississippi River Squadron.

By 1863, the US Navy was able to exercise such pervasive control over the western rivers only because the Confederates lacked the means of challenging US naval superiority. Such had not always been the case. In 1861, the Confederate War Department had established a "River Defense Fleet" in New Orleans consisting of 14 commercial riverboats which had been converted into rams by strengthening their bows and stacking cotton bales around their vitals as a form of armor (giving birth to the nickname, "cottonclad"). Elsewhere on the Mississippi River and its tributaries the Confederates had mounted artillery on the decks of about 25 other riverboats, turning them into gunboats.

This imposing river force, however, met with disaster in 1862. Two full-scale naval battles, one fought downriver from New Orleans, and the other upstream from Memphis, rapidly broke the back of Confederate naval power on the Mississippi. Every one of the 14 rams of the River Defense Fleet was either destroyed in battle, captured, or burned to prevent capture. Of the seven Confederate river ironclads under construction, only one, the *Arkansas*, ever saw action. The *Arkansas*' combat career lasted only three weeks, and her own crew scuttled her on 5 August 1862 to prevent her capture after her steam engines failed.

The Mississippi was not the only river on which the Confederates attempted to build and maintain a brown water navy. In Shreveport, the Confederate naval station there, working with civilian contractors, converted a paddle-wheel steamer into the ironclad CSS *Missouri*. In the winter of 1864, however, the *Missouri* faced the same dilemma as Porter's gunboats—the waters of the Red River were too low due to lack of rain to allow the vessel to foray south to meet the Federal vessels. The Shreveport yard also conducted the repair work on the ram CSS *William S. Webb* after she captured the ironclad USS *Indianola* on the Mississippi in February 1863. Finally, the Shreveport navy yard was also the site to which the builders of the submarine CSS H.L. Hunley moved when the siege of Charleston in South Carolina made it impractical to continue work there. By the time of the Red River Campaign, the naval yard in Shreveport may have had four or five Hunley-type submarines under construction.

Thus, during the Red River Campaign, there was only one viable Confederate gunboat remaining on the western rivers and it ultimately stayed in port. In fact, the greatest threat to the US Navy during this campaign was that of low water which could lead to its vessels falling into enemy

hands. Given the sparsity of rain to fill the Red River in the winter of 1864, added to Confederate diversion efforts, this indeed became a great concern and would almost spell disaster for Porter's flotilla during the campaign.

Summary

In summary, throughout the Red River Campaign, the scale of combat power and combat multipliers clearly tilted in the favor of the Army of the Gulf. In any area one wishes to analyze, one will find that Banks had all the advantages. In infantry, cavalry, artillery, boats, transportation, supplies, food, ammunition, animals, medical capabilities and virtually any other category, the Army of the Gulf held the best hand. It was only in the areas of generalship and an understanding of the operational environment that Taylor appears to have had an advantage, and in the end he made the most of this advantage and won.

Endnotes

1. This section was adapted from Dr. Chris Gable, *Staff Ride Handbook for the Vicksburg Campaign, December 1862-July 1863*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2001), *passim*.
2. William T. Sherman, *Sherman's Civil War: Selected Correspondence of William T. Sherman, 1860-1865*, eds. Jean V. Berlin and Brooks D. Simpson (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 775-777.
3. Liddell, St. John R., *Liddell's Record*, ed. Nathaniel C. Hughes, Jr. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 173.
4. Figures adapted from Ludwell H. Johnson, *Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War*, (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1993), *passim*.
5. US War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, DC: USGPO) Vol. 34 (Part 1), 236. Hereafter referred to as "OR."
6. *OR*, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 237.
7. *OR*, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 178.
8. *OR*, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 239.
9. *OR*, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 239-240.
10. Dr. Christopher R. Gabel, *Staff Ride Handbook for the Vicksburg Campaign, December 1862-July 1863*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2001), 51.
11. *OR*, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 561-62.
12. *OR*, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 513, 587-89.
13. *OR*, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 506, 580, 582, 586.
14. *OR*, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 595.
15. *OR*, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 248-52, *passim*.
16. Johnson, *Red River Campaign*, 262-66.
17. Forsyth, *The Red River Campaign of 1864*, 115.
18. Gary D. Joiner, *One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End: The Red River Campaign of 1864* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2003)
67. The efficacy of the diversion project at Tone's Bayou is debated by various historians. Joiner provides a very good explanation of the project and argues that the effort was successful in lowering the level of the Red River that spring. Other historians disagree due in part to the fact that the water would have flowed back into the Red River at Grand Ecore and therefore the water levels at Alexandria would have been affected only briefly.
19. *OR*, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 506, 586; Johnson, *Red River Campaign*, 195.
20. *OR*, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 499.
21. Myer's wigwag system, patented in 1858, used five separate numbered movements of a single flag. Four number groups represented letters of the alphabet and a few simple words and phrases. The system could also be employed at night by using kerosene torches.

22. William R. Plum, *The Military Telegraph During the Civil War in the United States*, (New York: Arno Press, 1974), II, 45-46.
23. Plum, 46-47.
24. *OR*, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 242.
25. Joseph K. Barnes, *Medical and Surgical History of the Civil War*, (Wilmington, DE: Broadfoot Publishing Co., 1992), VI, 962-963.
26. Frank R. Freeman, *Gangrene and Glory: Medical Care in the American Civil War*, (University of Illinois Press: Chicago, 2001), 2002.
27. Barnes, *Medical and Surgical History*, II, 336.
28. Barnes, 336.
29. John D. Winters, *The Civil War in Louisiana* (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1963), 357.
30. Data drawn from Paul H. Silverstone, *Civil War Navies*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001). This list is not comprehensive.
31. Data drawn from Charles D. Gibson and E. Kay Gibson, *The Army's Navy Series; Dictionary of Transports and Combatant Vessels, Steam and Sail, Employed by the U. S. Army, 1861-68*, (Camden, ME: Ensign Press, 1995). This list is not comprehensive.
32. Data drawn from Gibson, *The Army's Navy Series* and Silverstone, *Civil War Navies*. This list is not comprehensive.
33. Data drawn from Charles D. Gibson and E. Kay Gibson, *The Army's Navy Series; Dictionary of Transports and Combatant Vessels, Steam and Sail, Employed by the U. S. Army, 1861-68*, (Camden, ME: Ensign Press, 1995). This list is not comprehensive.
34. Data drawn from Gibson, *The Army's Navy Series* and Silverstone, *Civil War Navies*. This list is not comprehensive.

Part II

Red River Campaign Overview

Introduction

Similar to the Vicksburg Campaign, where the Mississippi River provided both the greatest assistance and the most daunting geographical challenge to Federal forces, the dominating geographical feature of the Red River Campaign was the Red River itself. This waterway shaped, facilitated, and constrained operations throughout the campaign at every level—strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategically, occupying the Red River Valley, invading Texas, and restoring Old Glory to the Lone Star State were key objectives for the Lincoln administration. Militarily, achievement of those objectives would send a clear signal to the Confederacy—and a warning to France and Emperor Maximilian in Mexico—of the Federal government’s intent to reassert control of *all* areas under its sovereignty of the United States. Economically, success in attaining these objectives also created the potential for reestablishing the cotton trade between producers in Louisiana and the cotton mills in the northeast. Politically, it would concurrently satisfy two of those two constituencies and arguably improve the chances for a peaceful reconciliation with the people of central Louisiana by economic incentives.

Operationally, the river was the axis of advance and main line of communications for US forces penetrating the rebel-controlled regions of central Louisiana from southeast to northwest. Tactically, the river was the only feasible route to resupply large forces marching to seize Shreveport (the Confederate capital of Louisiana and the headquarters of the Trans-Mississippi Department). As such, the river ensured that an invading Union army would never completely sever its ties to it. Subsequently, all fighting during the campaign occurred less than a one- or two-day march from its banks.

The Red River is purported to be one of the largest silt bearing streams in the United States. Thus its name comes from the red hue created from the large quantities of red soil it carries toward the Mississippi River during flood periods. The rapid and unpredictable shifting and build-up of sandbars made it (as it can to this day) a difficult and perfidious stream for boat pilots to negotiate, even during periods of high water. Historically, the Red River drains to low levels in late spring or early summer and remains so until winter. During the intervening months, only the smallest of riverboats with the shallowest of drafts could adequately navigate the river

between the shoals of Alexandria and Shreveport. South of Alexandria, downstream to the mouth of the river, larger boats could ply their way up and down, but only with extreme caution in low water periods. Additionally, at the lowest water levels, it was impossible for boats, except perhaps rowboats and small flatboats, to cross the falls at Alexandria. Therefore, Banks' window for operations up the Red River valley to capture Shreveport, under normal circumstances, was roughly late February to late May. Banks and Porter understood that fact, as did Taylor and Smith.

The Red River began its annual rise in water level generally in December or January. Typically, by late February or early March, the river was deep enough that even the largest of the vessels used in the campaign could easily sail their way up to Shreveport, if they encountered no military opposition. In the winter of 1864, however, the river failed to rise as normal for the first time since 1855. This was due to two reasons. First, the winter rains, which normally fill the tributaries that drain into the Red River, were lighter than average. The second reason was, unknown to Banks and Porter, the diversion by Confederate engineers of water out of the Red River and into Bayou Tone (which subsequently dumped it into Bayou Pierre).¹ This effort arguably ensured the navy's gunboats and the army's transports would see a great deal of trouble before the end of the campaign.

In 1864, the Red River averaged about 800 feet in width and was typically about 12 to 20 feet deep during periods of high water. There were numerous hairpin turns along the route, however, where the river narrowed and thus ran deeper and faster. Water velocity at these constricted points made for more difficult navigation.

Defending the river was not an easy task. The best locations were those that either provided high ground that allowed artillery to direct plunging fire onto the lightly armored tops of gunboats, or hairpin turns that provided ground nearby on which could be sited a battery of heavy artillery that could engage the gunboats as they slowed and maneuvered to negotiate the difficult waters of the bend. Of the former, there were really only three places along the river that afforded bluffs that could be reasonably defended: Alexandria, Grand Ecore, and Shreveport. The Confederate commanders in the Trans-Mississippi had incompletely fortified all three locations by 1864. Of the latter, of which there were several possibilities, only at the 'Bend of the Rapides' near Marksville did the rebels build any substantial fortifications, namely Fort DeRussy. As it turned out, however, none of these locations proved to be decisive terrain during the campaign. That honor would go to a decidedly land-locked approach.

For US land forces driving on Shreveport, there were initially three feasible avenues of approach, all of which converged on the city of Alexandria. The first was purely a land route. It essentially followed the Bayou Teche drainage northwestward from the Union encampments around Berwick and Franklin, Louisiana. The route was essentially a narrow strip of dry ground about one to seven miles wide, sandwiched between the swamplands of the Atchafalaya Basin on the east and coastal swamps on the west until it reached the vicinity of New Iberia. From there it broadened, at least to the west, into farmland prairies and piney woods crisscrossed by numerous winding bayous and dotted with smaller swamps. North of Opelousas, as the route extended beyond the northern reaches of the Atchafalaya Basin, the ground opened up on the east as well. From Opelousas north, the terrain imposed few natural obstacles and provided few defensible pieces of ground until one reached Alexandria. Along this route was a single dirt road that followed essentially the same track as Louisiana Highway 182 does today, at least until reaching the little hamlet of Milburn. From there the route went through Cheneyville and on to Alexandria. This was the route that the XIX and XIII Corps troops marched to get to Alexandria.

The second avenue extended from Baton Rouge west to Rosedale, then followed the Bayou Grosse Tete and the Atchafalaya River to Simmesport. This was militarily less inviting due to the very constricted maneuver space (it was swampier and more wooded than the XIX Corps' route), and the Atchafalaya River was a significant obstacle which could be easily defended by a relatively small enemy force. The Federals did not use this route.

The third avenue was primarily a water route initially. It followed the Mississippi River to an entrance into the Atchafalaya, then a short distance to the town of Simmesport. From there, a land force could follow the main road through Marksville to Alexandria. This route was also largely farmland and provided few obstacles to movement, though there were small bayous and swamps across the route that made it less than problem free. For the most part, it also provided ample maneuver room for a large land force. For a defender, it was better ground than the first avenue, but still not ideal unless the defending force was at least approaching the same strength in troops and firepower as that of an advancing force.

Moving northwest out of Alexandria toward Shreveport, a land force was largely restricted to movement up the Red River valley until reaching Natchitoches and Grand Ecore. From there, a commander really had three choices. First, he could cross the Red River and move north on the road to Campti. This route was not ideal because the line of march had to bypass

Lake Bisteneau. Therefore, a column would be required to move due north to Minden, then turn and drive another thirty miles westward to reach Shreveport. The extra distance added two to three days marching time to the movement and drew the army away from the support of the gunboats and supply boats on the river. It would also put the army on the wrong side of the river for an attack on the city.

The second option was a river road on the west side of the Red River. Porter noticed this road as his fleet made its way north toward Loggy Bayou. He later wrote to Gen. Sherman, describing his impressions of the route:

It struck me very forcibly that this would have been the route for the army, where they could have traveled without all that immense train, the country supporting them as they proceeded along. The roads are good, wide fields on all sides, a river protecting the right flank of the army, and gunboats in company. An army would have no difficulty in marching to Shreveport in this way.²

The problem was, however, that Porter did not notice this fine approach until after the army had already departed for Shreveport via Mansfield (the third possible route) and Banks apparently never knew of its existence until after the army's retreat to Grand Ecore.

The third route followed a path that has been often been colorfully referred to in many books and articles as a 'howling wilderness' and in others more accurately portrayed as 'pine barrens.' It was a single lane track that threaded its way west out of Grand Ecore, out of the Red River Valley onto almost imperceptibly higher ground, and then north through forests and several small villages, the largest of which were Pleasant Hill and Mansfield. This route would also require the army to move away from its naval support on the river, but it possessed the advantages of getting the army to Shreveport at least two days earlier than the Campti—Minden route. It also placed the army on the correct side of the river for an attack on the city. Ultimately, this would be the route that Banks would choose.

Preliminary Moves

Banks' counterpart in Louisiana, Lt. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, assumed command of the Trans-Mississippi Department on 7 March 1863 and set up his headquarters initially at Alexandria, Louisiana. His command was responsible for the security of the largest military department in the Confederacy but it also possessed by far the smallest military force per square mile of ground to protect its assigned area of operation. Smith's initial year in command was spent supervising operations which attempted

to defend central Louisiana and the coastal areas of Texas from invasion by Banks, as well as to try and relieve some pressure on Vicksburg. For the first three months, Smith's efforts largely focused on skirmishing against Federal troops of the XIX Corps in south Louisiana and to a lesser degree, making half-hearted attempts to assist Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton as he defended Vicksburg against the incursions of Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. Then, the situation began to change.

The fall of the Confederate enclaves of Vicksburg and Port Hudson on the Mississippi River in July 1863 presented a new set of problems for Smith and his command. These Federal victories now released Banks' command to begin efforts on a new line of operations. Though Banks (as did Grant and Adm. David G. Farragut, commander of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron) believed that his next objective should be the seizure of Mobile, Alabama (to help relieve pressure off Gen. George H. Thomas in Tennessee), Lincoln and Halleck thought otherwise. Both Lincoln and Halleck wanted to plant a meaningful Federal presence in Texas to clearly signal France that the United States had every intention of reuniting the country and reasserting control over all of its territory. Thus, Halleck in a somewhat convoluted manner to protect himself from any blame in the case of failure, urged Banks to undertake operations that would successfully achieve that objective. To achieve that end, Banks had the choice of two routes: by sea or by land. Either route would cause Kirby Smith significant challenges in his efforts to defend the Trans-Mississippi. Banks chose first to try by sea.

In September 1863, Banks sent Franklin with about 4,000 men of the XIX Corps to land in Texas somewhere in the vicinity of the Sabine River. On September 8, Franklin's flotilla of 16 steamers and four gunboats arrived off the mouth of the river. There to oppose him, the Trans-Mississippi Department had a single artillery battery, Company F, 1st Texas Heavy Artillery, under Lieutenant Dick Dowling. Nicknamed the 'Davis Guards,' Dowling's battery consisted of forty men manning two 24-pounder and four 32-pounder guns. In about 45 minutes of action that afternoon, Dowling's men disabled and captured two of the gunboats and drove off the other two. In addition to the vessels, the US naval contingent also lost 13 heavy cannon, over 50 men killed, wounded, or missing and 315 sailors captured. Dowling's battery suffered no casualties. Franklin and the naval commander decided not to try to land and sailed back to New Orleans.

Banks was mortified and embarrassed by the outcome of Franklin's lackluster sortie. He almost immediately ordered Franklin to move on Texas via an overland route. The route chosen was up the Bayou Teche

through Opelousas to Alexandria, then turn northwest to head for Texas. But once again, success was to elude Franklin. He proceeded from New Iberia on 3 October and moved as far as Washington, just north of Opelousas, arriving there on 23 October. The XIX Corps skirmished with Taylor's troops along the whole route but fought no major battles. The Federals remained at Opelousas until 4 November, then withdrew back to New Iberia where they arrived on 17 November.

On this excursion, Franklin determined that an army could not be feasibly sustained overland along this route due to the long hauling distances for supply wagons, an abundance of "bushwhackers," and a shortage of water. In short, Banks would have to supply his army by some other way if he wanted to get to Texas through central Louisiana. The logical way was up the Red River, but it would not be in flood stage to support steamers large enough to supply a major force until February or March. Operations to use the overland route to Texas were postponed for the time being.

While Franklin was moving up the Teche, Banks was not idle. He assembled other forces, mostly Maj. Gen. Napoleon J. T. Dana's XIII Corps, to invade Texas via the Gulf of Mexico. On 2 November 1863, the 2nd Division, XIII Corps, directly under Dana, successfully landed troops at Brownsville, Texas. Two weeks later, Corpus Christi fell to the Federals on November 16 and Port Aransas was captured the next day. On 27 November, another XIII Corps division under Maj. Gen. Cadwallader C. Washburn landed at Fort Esperanza to close down Matagorda Bay. In late December, Port Lavaca was seized as well. By the beginning of 1864, the only port remaining in Confederate hands along the coast of Texas was Galveston, and Banks had plans to capture that city as well.

A Change of Mission and a New Plan

Banks was well-satisfied with his progress in isolating Texas up to this point. By January he had succeeded in satisfying the administration's desires to begin the process of reasserting control over the Lone Star state (at least that is what he believed), so he now began to look back toward finalizing his earlier plans to capture Mobile. But Henry Halleck intervened once again. Upset with Banks' actions on the Texas coast (Banks had not informed him of his intentions to abandon the overland route and adopt a line of attack from the sea) Halleck wrote to Banks on 7 December 1863 to reiterate his opinion that the proper route to Texas was still along the Red River to Shreveport. Though Banks was supported by Grant in his belief that the next point of attack for the US forces in the Department of the

Gulf in 1864 should be Mobile, by late January 1864 both generals finally acceded to Halleck's wishes in launching an offensive toward Shreveport.

Once decided upon, Halleck's initial concept to seize Shreveport was a two-pronged offensive. Banks, of course, was to move up the Red River from the southwest with 20,000 men of the XIX Corps and other attached units. The second prong was to consist of an 8,500-man column under Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele which would advance from Little Rock, Arkansas, to approach Shreveport from the north. For his part, Steele was not supportive of the operation from the beginning and his inept actions in Arkansas would ultimately have only a marginal impact on the impending campaign. To compound the problem, there was no overall commander designated for the operation. Grant, soon to be appointed General-in-Chief, was now nominally the next higher commander for both columns but could not realistically exercise command due to his need to be in Washington to prepare for the upcoming spring campaigns for all Union-defending armies. Even if one of the three participating generals was appointed to command, neither had effective means to communicate to coordinate their actions. The major positive aspect to the Federal's two-pronged attack plan was that Kirby Smith would be unable to tell which thrust was the primary threat between Banks and Steele. He therefore had to split his forces to defend against both avenues of approach.

An additional problem arose for Banks once he agreed to move on Shreveport. He had dispersed of half of the XIII Corps in his operations along the Texas coast. Additionally, he had to leave parts of the XIX Corps in southern Louisiana to protect key Federal installations in New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and other localities. Therefore, he believed he had too few troops to get to Shreveport. Fortunately, Sherman's troops in Mississippi were more or less idle at this point and, though he would need them for the upcoming spring campaigns, Sherman agreed to temporarily loan Banks three divisions. Grant, who still did not like the idea of the Red River Campaign, agreed to allow Sherman to send the troops with the proviso that they be returned to Sherman by mid-April. That decision solved Banks' troop shortage. The date for movement of the XIX Corps was set for 1 March. Sherman's troops, under Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson "A. J." Smith (affectionately referred to as "Whiskey Smith" by his men), were to link up with Banks' men in Alexandria on 17 March. However, unknown to Banks, Steele, who was still lukewarm about the whole idea, would not even begin moving south until the 23rd.

Banks' objectives for this campaign were never stated in a clear and concise mission statement, and even today remain somewhat cloudy. Judg-

ing from contemporary documents, it appears, however, that the objectives of Banks' campaign can be safely stated as follows. First, to advance up the Red River to capture Shreveport and destroy its military production facilities. Ideally this would also include the destruction of Confederate military forces that opposed the advance. Second, to permanently occupy Shreveport and deny the use of the Red River for moving military supplies from Texas to active theaters east of the Mississippi. Third, to establish a pro-Union state government in Alexandria in time for the fall national elections and thereby, at least in theory, strengthen the Republicans' chances of retaining or increasing power. And lastly, to capture as much cotton as possible belonging to pro-Confederate farmers and concurrently pay for cotton belonging to pro-Union farmers. The cotton would then be shipped to the idle mills in the north, particularly those in Massachusetts (Banks' home state), in order to get their employees back to work. Of course, the last two objectives were primarily political and economic considerations and normally of secondary concern to a military commander—that is unless that commander happens to be a potential presidential candidate, as was Banks. Thus, the latter objectives would ultimately take on greater importance than they might have if the Federal commander had been a professional soldier.

To accomplish his goals, Banks' possessed eight divisions organized into three corps with which to conduct the campaign. Throughout the operation, the army's effective strength averaged about 25,250 infantrymen and artillerymen and 3,900 cavalrymen. Additionally, the army possessed approximately 96 cannon organized into sixteen batteries. Under normal circumstances, this would be provide the US commander with an almost overwhelming advantages when compared to his opponent. It would remain to be seen if Banks could use this advantage to good effect.

Confederate Situation and Plans

As Banks made preparations for the campaign, the Confederate outlook in the Trans-Mississippi was gloomy, but not entirely bad. Kirby Smith's troops had driven off Franklin at Sabine Pass and stopped him again at Opelousas. Though the Army of the Gulf had gained footholds on the Texas coast, Smith knew these were largely symbolic and not particularly threatening to the department. On the other hand, the number of troops available to the department had not increased significantly, and those that were available were still poorly equipped and largely undisciplined. Additionally, Smith and his staff had considered the possibility of a Federal pincer movement up the Red River and south from Little Rock.

His problem was that he hardly had enough troops to face one of these two columns, much less both at the same time.

Smith's overall operational plan to defend the Trans-Mississippi was militarily sound given his situation. He would defend against the two primary approaches from Little Rock and from New Orleans. If only one Federal advance materialized, he could concentrate his forces by reinforcing the threatened district with the troops of the non-threatened districts. If he could identify a main effort, he could hold with minimal forces against the Federal's supporting effort, while the bulk of his command concentrated to defeat the Union's main force. Once that force was defeated, Smith would then turn his entire command on the remaining US forces and defeat them in detail. What this strategy demanded, however, was trading space for time, a concept that most of his subordinates were decidedly against, especially Taylor. This disagreement on strategy would play itself out in ever increasing acrimony between Smith and Taylor as the campaign progressed. Nonetheless, Smith positioned his units to address both eventualities.

In Arkansas, Sterling Price deployed his forces to defend his district against the expected thrust from Steele out of Little Rock. Price had two infantry and two small cavalry divisions to face the Federal advance. The two infantry divisions were situated about Camden, Arkansas, through which Price thought Steele would advance if he struck for Shreveport. These two divisions, the Arkansas Division under Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Churchill and the Missouri Division under Brig. Gen. Mosby M. Parsons, would later play important roles in the fighting in the Red River valley. Smith had also alerted Brig. Gen. Samuel Maxey in the Indian Territory to be prepared to move a small division of Texas and Indian troops to reinforce Price if necessary. Price's two cavalry divisions were deployed with one northwest and one northeast of Camden along possible routes of advance. Additionally, Smith had ordered the construction of numerous small supply "depots" (which were probably more on the order of caches) each placed strategically at sites between Camden and Shreveport. These caches would be the means to resupply an army, which was almost devoid of wagons for proper supply trains, by allowing it to fall back on them as the Federals advanced.

In the District of West Louisiana, Taylor had spread his meager forces to cover Louisiana as best as he could. Smith had given command of the Sub-District of Northern Louisiana to Brig. Gen. St. John R. Liddell, recently arrived from the Army of Tennessee. The sub-district essentially encompassed that part of the state north of the Red River. For command

purposes Liddell was subordinated to Taylor. Taylor, in turn, provided Liddell one small cavalry regiment under Col. Isaac F. Harrison and two cavalry battalions, then in the process of organization, to defend his area of responsibility. This force operated along the Washita (Ouachita) River near Monroe.

Taylor also tentatively assigned to Liddell an infantry brigade under the command of Louisiana's governor, Col. Henry W. Allen (command would pass to Brig. Gen. Allen Thomas on 17 February 1864). The regiments of that brigade, however, had been captured and paroled at Vicksburg and were currently awaiting exchange. Thus the brigade was not yet reorganized and Taylor advised Liddell not to expect any use of the unit in the near future (indeed, it would not be fully exchanged until June). There were also two other infantry brigades initially in Liddell's area—those of Brig. Gen. Alfred J. Mouton, camped northeast of Alexandria, and Brig. Gen. Camille J. de Polignac, located at Trinity on the Washita. These two brigades, however, were exempted from any control by Liddell and remained under Taylor's direct command. All told, Liddell had only about 700 men and two six-pounder cannon under his control.

South of the Red River in the District of West Louisiana, Taylor had deployed his "elite" force, Walker's Texas Division, in the area between Opelousas and Marksville, Louisiana, enabling it to defend against a Federal advance either from the vicinity of Baton Rouge to the east or from Opelousas to the south. Taylor considered Walker's unit to be his most reliable and Walker his best subordinate. Praising both, Taylor later wrote of them: "Seconded by good brigade and regimental officers, [Walker] had thoroughly disciplined his men, and made them in every sense soldiers; and their efficiency in action was soon established."³

Portions of Walker's command, reinforced by other detachments from Taylor's forces, defended Fort DeRussy near Marksville on the Red River. This command consisted of some 320 officers and men, mostly from the Texas Division. Also attached to Walker, and stationed on the east side of the Atchafalaya River, were three companies of cavalry from Col. William G. Vincent's 2nd Louisiana Cavalry providing Walker early warning of any Federal approach on the river. The balance of Vincent's regiment remained under Taylor's direct control and was operating along Bayou Teche near Opelousas. All told, Taylor possessed somewhere between 6,000 and 7,000 men at the beginning of the campaign. Also short on wagons, like Price Taylor had constructed small supply caches from the vicinity of Marksville north to Shreveport along the likely routes of Federal advance to resupply his forces as they retreated toward Shreveport.

The Federals Advance

On 7 March, one week late, Lee's cavalry division, eyes and ears of the Army of the Gulf, departed Brashear City in the middle of a rain storm. Lee was headed west to join Franklin's XIX Corps and Ransom's XIII Corps assembling at the town of Franklin, Louisiana, and arrived there on the 11th. The long columns of blue-clad troops slowly slogged through the now mud-choked quagmires that in drier periods passed for roads. The plan called for Banks, Franklin, and A. J. Smith to link up in Alexandria on 17 March, but the weather, and other distractions would force the delay of that event.

On 10 March, about 10,000 men of A. J. Smith's command boarded some twenty army quartermaster transports at Vicksburg and set sail down the Mississippi bound for the Red River. The transport flotilla arrived at Simmesport escorted by twenty boats of Porter's Mississippi Squadron on the evening of 11 March. Smith ordered some troops ashore who quickly garnered as much grain and livestock from the local inhabitants as they could 'liberate' in the time allowed. The remainder of the XVI Corps and a division of the XVII Corps landed on the following day. Smith and Porter agreed to push up the Red River to capture Fort DeRussy in a joint effort. On 13 March, the XVI Corps, led by Brig. Gen. Joseph Mower's 1st Division, set off for Marksville, quickly brushing away the rebel pickets before it. Though Walker had troops deployed to delay the advance, Mower's fast pace and several flanking movements forced the Confederates to rapidly retreat. Totally outmaneuvered, Walker fell back leaving Fort DeRussy to its fate. Mower's division arrived at Fort DeRussy on the afternoon of 14 March.

While several of Porter's gunboats, led by the USS *Eastport*, struggled to remove a pile obstacle driven in the river east of the fort, Mower's men took up their assault positions. Because of the way Fort DeRussy was constructed and due to its intended purpose, the defenders could not train their large cannon on the Federal line. The rebel commander, Lt. Col. William A. Byrd, commanding a scratch force of infantry and artillery, could only direct his men to take up positions facing to the fortification's rear, positions from which they never expected to fight. As a result, the battle was quickly decided. The troops of the 1st Division lunged forward, and in spite of a brief period of heavy firing from the defenders, the US troops were up and over the parapets within minutes. The navy's contribution to the effort was two shots fired at the water battery as the *Eastport* hove into range during the assault.

While Smith's men were preparing to destroy Fort DeRussy, Franklin's men continued the slow, messy march through the mud toward Alexandria. Meanwhile, the overall commander for the expedition, Banks, had remained in New Orleans focusing his attention on planning the inauguration of Louisiana's new Unionist governor, Michael Hahn. Earlier on 2 March, Sherman had arrived in New Orleans on a coordination visit and found Banks worrying over how to electronically fire a 100-gun salute to honor the governor on the big day. Disgusted, Sherman left the following day. Later he wrote, "I regarded all such ceremonies as out of place at a time when it seemed to me every hour and minute were due to the war."⁴

On 15 March, A. J. Smith sent Mower's division on transports up the Red River to capture Alexandria and, hopefully, seize any rebel steamboats and supplies of military significance (including cotton). Concurrently, Smith also directed Brig. Gen. T. Kilby Smith's XVII Corps division to destroy Fort DeRussy. Meanwhile, Taylor now realized that the loss of the fort made the possibility of holding Alexandria unlikely and he quickly ordered the evacuation of all troops and supplies from the town. He was largely successful in this effort by the time the USS *Osage* arrived on 15 March to take possession of the town. Porter's vessels and A. J. Smith's transports arrived at the town later the same day.

Since they were two days ahead of the appointed rendezvous date, both Smith and Porter directed their respective commands to begin gathering cotton and foraging for food. The navy proved much more adept at securing cotton than the army primarily because of the US government's prize law. This law allowed for naval personnel to receive prize money for items seized from the enemy. Normally these items were enemy ships, but it applied equally to rebel cotton, a valuable commodity. Soldiers, of course, received no such bounty and as a result, some of Smith's men became more interested in stealing what they could from the local inhabitants than they were in collecting cotton. Once soldiers discovered the navy's motive in collecting cotton, the prize law issue came to be a source of friction between the army and navy throughout the rest of the campaign.

After departing Alexandria, Taylor moved his force to Carroll Jones' plantation where he had established one of his supply points. There, while he continued to send messages to Kirby Smith pleading for more cavalry and infantry, he pondered his next move. First, however, he needed intelligence on Federal intentions so he sent Vincent's 2nd Louisiana Cavalry to gather information on enemy movements. On 19 March Vincent selected Henderson's Hill, just west northwest of Alexandria, as the position from which he would watch the Federals' movements. On the rainy night of 21

March, however, Mower's division detected the 2nd Louisiana and was successful in surrounding and capturing most of the regiment. Now, Taylor was almost devoid of any reconnaissance capability.

On 20 March, Lee's cavalry rode into Alexandria. The lead elements of Franklin's XIX Corps and Ransom's XIII Corps finally arrived on the 25th, eight days later than the planned rendezvous with Smith. The remainder of the corps straggled into the town over the next three days. Banks himself finally arrived on 25 March as well, and within twenty-four hours, the general commanding of the Army of the Gulf was beset by two highly disturbing pieces of information.

On the day following his arrival, Banks received a message from Grant urging him to seize Shreveport as quickly as possible. Grant then went on to forcefully remind him that he wanted A. J. Smith's troops back at Memphis by 15 April, "even if it leads to the abandonment of the main object of your expedition."⁵⁵ This ultimatum meant that Banks had about twenty days to capture Shreveport—less if one included the travel time for Smith's troops back to Vicksburg. Banks then went to see Porter to discuss the next phase of the operation. There he received the second piece of bad news. Porter told Banks that the river level was rapidly falling and that it was questionable whether he could even get his boats over the falls at Alexandria. Banks, realizing that he could not resupply his army without the aid and protection of Porter's boats, pleaded with the admiral to continue the operation. After some more discussion and prodding, Porter agreed to attempt to get some of his boats over the falls and keep his pledge to go "wherever the sand is damp" to support the Army.

Banks Moves North

Banks soon after issued orders for the advance, and Lee's cavalry departed that day headed for Grand Ecore. On 27 March, Smith's XVI Corps marched out of Alexandria, followed the next day by the XIII and XIX Corps. Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover's 2nd Division from the XIX Corps remained in Alexandria guarding the supply base which Banks had established there. While the army marched north, Banks once again remained behind for political reasons, this time to supervise the election of delegates to the state's constitutional convention. Meanwhile, Porter struggled to get his boats over the falls. After getting the *Eastport* stuck on the shoals for three days, Porter was finally able to get twelve more light draft gunboats and several Army transports over and on their way to Grand Ecore. Banks brought up the rear of this movement and arrived at Grand Ecore on 2 April.

At Grand Ecore, Banks was faced with a potential choice of three routes, but was only aware of two of them. He ultimately chose the inland route through Pleasant Hill and Mansfield and he issued orders to begin the march on 6 April. As usual, Lee's cavalry led out, but immediately behind the cavalry column was Lee's wagon train. Under normal circumstances, one would expect the cavalry's 200 wagons to move behind the main body of infantry with the rest of the army's trains. However, Franklin, who was in command of the column at this point (Banks had remained behind in Grand Ecore), insisted that Lee keep his trains forward of the XIX Corps. The column was now strung out for miles along the single lane track so if the head of the cavalry division struck a determined enemy force, it would be difficult to get large bodies of infantry past the wagons and forward to support the cavalry. By messenger, Lee recommended to Franklin that the infantry move forward of his wagons to be within supporting distance, or to at least send a brigade forward to support the cavalry. Franklin, who like Banks did not believe that the rebels would make a stand before reaching Shreveport, testily responded that the protection of the cavalry's train was Lee's responsibility and that infantry support would be there if, and when, needed. Thus Lee pressed on, and Franklin's obstinacy would later have disastrous repercussions.

Taylor, still at Jones' plantation, soon received the information that the Army of the Gulf was on the move away from the river and headed for Pleasant Hill. He passed this information on to Kirby Smith and soon after met with Smith at Mansfield to decide on a course of action. At the meeting Taylor expressed a desire to turn and attack. Smith, on the other hand, wanted to either defend at Shreveport or retreat to Texas. Taylor, of course, disagreed with both suggestions so no decision was made. Smith did, however, agree to move Churchill's and Mosby's Divisions, recently arrived from Arkansas, to the hamlet of Keachi and place them under Taylor's control with the proviso that they only be used in an emergency. Smith then left for Shreveport. The lack of a decision, at least in Taylor's opinion, forced him to plan for resisting the Federal advance, and he chose a piece of ground, the Moss Plantation south of the village of Mansfield, as the battleground.

As Taylor and Smith haggled over operational plans, the Union column continued its push to the northwest. On 7 April, Lee's command departed its bivouac at Crump's Corner and advanced up the road towards Mansfield. In the early afternoon, the cavalry fought a small engagement with rebel cavalry at Wilson's Farm (these were troops from Brig. Gen. Tom Green's cavalry division which had just arrived from Texas). Lee sent

word back to Franklin that he had encountered an aggressive rebel cavalry force and again requested infantry support. Franklin refused and ordered Lee to move as far forward as he could until nightfall.

Lee pushed on and encountered another Confederate force at Carroll's Mills, this time reinforced with a battery of artillery. Once again Lee requested reinforcements from Franklin and once again was denied. All this served to make Lee cautious and convinced him that the rebels would in fact stand and fight before being forced back to Shreveport.

Banks finally linked up with Franklin camped at Pleasant Hill that evening. As soon as he heard that Franklin had denied Lee any infantry support, Banks countermanded the XIX Corps commander and directed him to send a brigade forward first thing in the morning. Franklin complied by sending a brigade from Ransom's division of the XIII Corps.

The Battle of Mansfield

On the morning of 8 April, Taylor busied himself with deploying his command into what was essentially a large L-shaped ambush. His force now numbered about 9,000 men not including the 4,500 troops of Churchill's and Mosby's Divisions. Taylor considered the imminent battle an 'emergency' and sent word to Churchill to move both divisions at Keachi to Mansfield. By mid-morning all of Taylor's forces, less Churchill's two divisions, were in place.

Lee's troops advanced early that morning and immediately encountered the cavalry of Brig. Gen. Hamilton Bee with which they skirmished until reaching an open field four miles south of Mansfield just before noon. There Lee found Taylor's infantry in line of battle and immediately deployed his men along Honeycutt Hill to skirmish with the Confederates. Lee and the attached infantry brigade commander agreed that an attack on the rebel line called for a much larger force than they possessed and so held their positions on the hill.

Banks arrived on the scene at about 1500 hours to inquire about the firing and why the lead elements were stalled. To his surprise, he realized that Taylor did indeed intend to fight before Shreveport. Before Banks could get any sizable body of infantry forward, however, Taylor launched his attack. In relatively short order the Federal line on Honeycutt Hill folded and was driven rapidly back on the infantry now trying to move forward of the cavalry wagon train blocking the way. Franklin, who had also come forward, was wounded in the assault and was soon out of the fight. Another XIII Corps brigade, under Brig. Gen. Robert A. Cameron, attempted to stem the Confederate tide a short distance to the south. Af-

ter a brief, but unsuccessful stand, Cameron's troops were also forced to yield, but their efforts gave the lead division of the XIX Corps time to set up a defense along Chapman's Bayou in the gathering twilight. This division, under Brig. Gen. William H. Emory, was finally able to stop Taylor's advance for the day, but not before Banks had lost a large number of men and much of the Lee's wagon train.

During the night Banks ordered a retreat to Pleasant Hill where he had directed A. J. Smith's troops to meet him. Banks selected Pleasant Hill because it was the closest location under Federal control which possessed a water source. As the XIII Corps and XIX Corps units filtered into the village, Smith's command was already there busy setting up their initial defenses.

The Battle of Pleasant Hill

Throughout the next day, Banks' men moved into and set up nominal defensive positions in and near the village of Pleasant Hill. The lack of significant contact with any pursuing Confederates lulled many into the belief that there would be no follow-on battle, at least for that day. However, at around 1700 hours, Taylor, now reinforced with Churchill's and Mosby's two fresh divisions, launched an attack on the Federal left. Fortunately for the unsuspecting Yankees, faulty navigation by a local guide brought the attacking rebel line into the flank of a forward-deployed US brigade rather than on the left flank of, or behind, the main Federal line manned by A. J. Smith's troops. Such an outcome would have rolled up the entire Union force. Though off course, Churchill's attack scattered the Federal brigade and drove into the village itself as the sun glimmered on the western horizon.

After hearing the initial firing from the Confederate right, Green's cavalry attacked with a mounted brigade down the Union center and dismounted troopers on the Federal right. Taylor then launched an attack on the enemy center with Walker's Division. This attack also crushed a forward deployed US brigade and successfully advanced about halfway toward the village. All looked bleak for Banks' command until A. J. Smith ordered his men into action. Two XVI Corps divisions plowed into the right flank of Churchill's units, now disorganized by their own attack. The Missourians were unable to meet the counterattack and were soon themselves on the run to the rear. Back over on the Federal right, Emory was able to quickly plug holes in the forward lines. Emory's actions, coupled with Walker's wounding, caused the rebel left to stall, then fall back as Churchill's men retreated to the rear pressed by A. J. Smith's onslaught. Within an hour, the rebel lines were back to where they started and the battle was over.

Banks now had a fresh victory under his belt and was initially eager to resume the advance. However, a council of war, with several of his generals whom he called together that evening, instead resulted in his decision to retreat to Grand Ecore. The Army of the Gulf started for that place on the morning of 10 April.

That same evening Kirby Smith arrived at Taylor's location near Pleasant Hill. The two generals discussed the situation. Smith believed Taylor would be attacked by Banks in the morning. Taylor, not surprisingly, disagreed and expressed the desire to attack the Federals again. Predictably, the meeting resulted in no decision except that the two Confederate commanders would meet again at Mansfield later after daylight. At that meeting Smith decided to take Churchill's, Mosby's, and Walker's Divisions with him to Arkansas in order to counter Steele's advance which he now considered the greater danger to Shreveport since Banks was now retreating. Disgruntled, discouraged, and angered by Kirby Smith's decision, Taylor resolutely ordered his remaining force of about 5,000 men to follow and harass Banks' army which still possessed 25,000 troops despite recent casualties.

The Retreat to Grand Ecore

While the battles at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill were being fought, Porter had been busy trying to make his way north on the river. He had found his way blocked by a sunken steamboat near Loggy Bayou, and while there, he heard the rumor that Banks had met disaster. Porter and Brig. Gen. T. Kilby Smith, whose division had been tasked by A. J. Smith to operate with Porter, agreed that they should abort the mission and head for Grand Ecore. The following day Kilby Smith was met at Coushatta by one of Banks' couriers whose message confirmed the Army of the Gulf's defeat and retreat. Porter continued his move back to Grand Ecore, but had to fight several engagements with Confederate ground units *en route*, most notably that at Blair's Landing with Tom Green's troops.

The Army of the Gulf arrived at Grand Ecore on 11 April and immediately began entrenching. A. J. Smith, realizing that Porter and Kilby Smith may yet be in trouble, sent two brigades northwest along the north bank of the river. This movement served to temporarily chase away Liddell's ill-disciplined cavalry and protect the navy as it struggled in the low water. Porter's flotilla finally arrived at Grand Ecore on 16 April. Banks and Porter now settled down to be besieged by an army of only 5,000 troops.

Banks pondered what to do next. Initially, he retained the hope that he might yet take Shreveport, but A. J. Smith's command was due back in

Memphis in four days. Messages from Grant and Sherman reminding him of returning Smith's troops, combined with Porter's reluctance to continue operations on the ever-lowering river, once again caused Banks to change his mind. He issued orders to move the army to Alexandria and on the evening of 20 April, the Federals set out for that place.

The Retreat Continues

Taylor, desiring to do as much damage to the Army of the Gulf as possible, developed a plan to try and block Banks' retreat at Monett's Ferry on the Cane River just northwest of Alexandria. Taylor sent Bee and one brigade to block the entire Federal army at the ferry. With the remainder of his force Taylor would attack the rear. Bee, however, lost his nerve at the sight of the whole XIX Corps in line of battle drawn up before him on the morning of 23 April. After a lackluster holding action, Bee withdrew, and the Army of the Gulf continued its retreat to Alexandria. It arrived there the following day.

Meanwhile Porter's gunboats once again had to gingerly pick their way through the sandbars, shoals, and sharpshooters *en route* to Alexandria. Several boats grounded in the low water but each time they were pulled free by some means or other. The day after the army reached Alexandria, Porter's acting flagship, the powerful *Eastport* stuck fast and could not be freed. Porter reluctantly blew up the boat to keep it from falling into Confederate hands. The navy finally arrived at the falls on 26 April.

The "Siege" of Alexandria and Bailey's Dam

At Alexandria, the river had receded so much that Porter could not get the boats back over the falls. Porter feared that Banks might leave with the army and he would lose a good part of his fleet. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Bailey, the XIX Corps staff engineer, came to the rescue, however. Bailey proposed a plan to build wing dams that would cause the river to rise and allow the boats to float over the falls. Despite doubts expressed by many officers in the navy and army, Bailey succeeded, and the gunboats were safe by 13 May.

During the army's stay in Alexandria, the Federal troops were harassed by Taylor's troops south of the river and Liddell's men on the north. At no time, however, was there a real threat to the Army of the Gulf. Between the initial reoccupation of Alexandria on 24 April and the rescue of the fleet on 13 May, Banks busied himself and his troops by evacuating the wounded and unneeded supplies down the river and preparing the plans for the final leg of the retreat to Simmesport. On the day the last boat was rescued from

the falls, the first elements of the Army of the Gulf marched southeast out of town. As the army's rear guard, A. J. Smith's men took it upon themselves to set fire to the town. This was an act that was to be repeated by Smith's men (and no doubt troops from other commands as well) again and again as it moved south through central Louisiana.

The Army of the Gulf "Escapes"

Though Taylor's troops skirmished with the Army of the Gulf along the entire route to Simmesport, there would only be two more actions of any size and none of any real importance. Taylor attempted to block Banks again at Mansura on 16 May. Both sides deployed on an open plain and engaged in what was essentially an artillery duel. There was a lot of bang and smoke, but little in the way of real fighting. Once the Federals decided to advance, Taylor pulled away to prevent what would obviously have been heavy losses, which he could not afford. There was another engagement at Yellow Bayou just west of Simmesport two days later. A Confederate force under Maj. Gen. John A. Wharton (who replaced Green after his death at Blair's Landing) attempted once again to block the US military retreat. This time, however, Wharton's attack was repulsed by Mower's division with heavy losses.

At Simmesport, Bailey's engineering skills came into play once again. Using 22 army transports as pontoons, he built a bridge across the Atchafalaya over which the army 'escaped' on 19 May. By this time, Porter's boats, relatively safe after getting over the falls, were back in the expansive Mississippi River escorting Smith's troops to Memphis. The campaign thus came to its inglorious end for both sides.

Campaign Summary

Militarily, the Red River Campaign has been regarded as having little significance to the outcome of the war and, generally, that is true. Few historians, if any, would likely claim that a thoroughly successful ending for either side in this struggle would have been decisive to the war's ending. At best, one could say that success for either side would have shortened or lengthened the war by a few months, depending on which side won the campaign.

However, the campaign did have some effect on the war. Banks' setback resulted in both a military defeat for US arms and a symbolic political defeat for the Lincoln administration that it could ill-afford before the elections that coming November (though for other reasons, Lincoln would go on to handily win reelection). Conversely, it provided a much needed

victory for the Confederacy at it time when it was under attack by United States armies advancing on several other fronts. The defeat of Steele's column in Arkansas added to the positive moral impact as well.

For the Confederates, the campaign was indeed successful, but the victory was much less militarily significant than it might have been, as Taylor knew and Kirby Smith would come to understand. Had Smith heeded Taylor's counsel and concentrated to destroy the Army of the Gulf, it is probable that Banks' command would have suffered a great deal more damage. It is not inconceivable that Smith and Taylor may have even been successful in largely destroying the Federal forces or perhaps even capturing the army (and navy) at Alexandria by preventing its movement until it ran out of supplies. As Taylor had predicted to Smith, when Steele heard that Banks had been defeated he turned around and headed for Little Rock. With reinforcements from Arkansas, Texas, and the Indian Territory, Smith could have reached close to parity with Banks' command. With such a force he could have entrenched the bulk of it between Banks and the Federal route to Simmesport thereby blocking movement in that direction. At the least, this would have forced Banks to make bloody frontal attacks to break through and thereby furthering damaging the Army of the Gulf. Even severely damaging the XIX Corps could have prevented its use later in the eastern theater campaigns of 1864.

Additionally, a combined rebel force could well have prevented the escape of Porter's boats over the falls. The admiral would have been forced to either destroy his vessels, or surrender them. Should the boats be captured, the Confederates would have then been in a position to seriously counter the US Navy's superiority on the Mississippi River. They then could have reopened large stretches of the Mississippi to cross-river supply traffic and harass or, more ominously, once again stop the vital trade traffic coming down from the politically sensitive Midwestern states. Shutting off the Mississippi a second time may have been the leverage that the Confederates needed to ensure a Democrat victory and Lincoln's defeat in the fall elections, thereby increasing their chance for a favorable political solution to the war.

Of course, this is all speculation. The personality conflict that developed between Smith and Taylor prevented such cooperation. This rift developed into an unharmonious Confederate command climate that became so bad that Smith refused to even take Taylor along to Arkansas for the fighting against Steele. Eventually, Taylor became so embittered over what he believed was incompetence on Smith's part that he tried to resign his commission. Instead he was promoted to lieutenant general and reassigned

by Jefferson Davis to command the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, a command he held until the end of the war.

On the plus side of the ledger for the Confederates in this campaign was that Taylor's men had prevented the capture of Shreveport and its production facilities. They had destroyed or captured a number of US gunboats and transports and inflicted numerous casualties on both Banks' and Porter's commands. They had also captured a great deal of military supplies, wagons, and weapons that were sorely needed in the Trans-Mississippi Department. Probably most important, the Confederates had prevented Banks from returning early enough to start his scheduled Mobile campaign, as well as delaying the return of A. J. Smith's troops to Sherman in Chattanooga. Both of these accomplishments had a detrimental, though not decisive, impact on Sherman's Atlanta Campaign. Preventing Banks from moving on Mobile allowed Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk to move his corps from Alabama to reinforce Gen. Joseph Johnston's Army of Tennessee which was opposing Sherman's advance. Also, the delay of A. J. Smith's command meant that Sherman initially faced Johnston with fewer troops than he might otherwise have had.

For their part, the Federals had little to show for this campaign. Already discussed was the loss of men and materiel to various Federal commands, as well as the impact of the campaign on other theaters. Indeed, even much of the cotton that was captured in the initial stages was later used to help build Bailey's dam. Although Banks and Porter held virtually all the cards, they still lost the game. Like the rebels, they could largely blame a dysfunctional command system. For all intents and purposes the Federals were acting as three independent commands—Banks, Porter, and Steele—all supposedly operating toward a common purpose with no head to coordinate their efforts. As a result, two of these commanders largely focused on priorities different from what was ostensibly the primary objective—that of capturing Shreveport—and one, Steele, gave it a half-hearted, poorly planned, effort. Thus, one could say that the likelihood of defeat was made significant “by design.”

Additionally, the Federals also suffered from a poor command climate. Though Banks and Porter got along better than Smith and Taylor, it was still not a good relationship and one that was fraught with mistrust on the part of both parties. Banks' principal subordinates, Franklin and A. J. Smith, were both professional soldiers but neither trusted, nor privately respected, the politically appointed Banks. Their attitudes toward Banks (and other non-professional soldiers such as Albert Lee) manifested itself in ways that contributed much to the Federal failures.

On a personal level, the campaign was also a disaster for many US Army leaders. When Banks arrived at Simmesport at the end of the campaign, he found Maj. Gen. Edward R. S. Canby there waiting for him. Though Banks was not technically relieved as department commander, Canby, in effect, took over as the new army commander. Banks would never again command in the field and his aspirations to run for president were dashed. Franklin, already exiled to the west after his failures at Fredericksburg, fell further into disfavor with the army's high command. He also never held another field command after the campaign and resigned from the service altogether at the end of the war. Other generals, most notably Banks' chief of staff, Charles P. Stone, and his cavalry chief, Albert Lee, were relieved before the end of the campaign. Both would later receive field commands once again, but only briefly.

Most of the Federal field commands would go on to retrieve their reputations on other fields of battle. The XIII Corps would help capture Atlanta in September. Part of the XIII Corps and the XIX Corps were later ordered to Virginia as reinforcements after Grant's heavy losses in the spring and summer fighting against the Army of Northern Virginia. The troops of the XIX Corps helped prevent Maj. Gen. Jubal Early's raid from reaching Washington in July 1864 and later participated in Sheridan's Shenandoah Valley campaign later that fall. Had Taylor and Smith been successful in destroying this corps, Grant would have had precious little in the way of troops to block Early from reaching Washington. The victories achieved by the Federal armies in the spring, summer, and fall of 1864, incomplete as some were at the time, largely negated the losses of the Red River Campaign and helped to ensure the reelection of Lincoln. Confederate hopes for a political settlement after the president's reelection were essentially gone.

What was, in reality, a relatively impressive victory by a small force ably led by an aggressive commander against a much larger and better equipped force has been largely ignored by professional soldiers (and only lightly addressed by military historians). Few professional soldiers are familiar with the campaign and fewer still have made a detailed study of it. Yet, like any major campaign, the Red River expedition offers a great number of insights to be gained and lessons to be learned. This is true at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Perhaps it is the perception of the campaign's irrelevance to the outcome of the war that keeps the Red River Campaign from getting its share of serious study and analysis, but there is certainly a great deal that can still be learned from

it by military professionals—and that, indeed, is the very purpose of both this handbook and the staff ride methodology it recommends.

Endnotes

1. The best published accounts of this engineering feat is detailed in Dr. Gary Joiner's books *One Damned Blunder from Beginning to End* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2003) and *Through the Howling Wilderness: The 1864 Red River Campaign and Union Failure in the West* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2014).
2. Secretary of the Navy, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion* (Washington, DC: USGPO), Series I, Vol. 26, 60.
3. Richard Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955), 179.
4. Michael J. Forsyth, *The Red River Campaign of 1864 and the loss of the Confederacy of the Civil War*, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2002), 57.
5. United States War Department. *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*, (Washington, DC: USGPO), Series I, Vol. 34, part 1, 1921, 513-14.

Part III

Suggested Routes and Stands

Introduction

Compared to most Civil War campaigns, the Red River campaign covered a much larger area of operations. For all practical purposes, the area of operations for the Red River campaign spanned a region that stretched from Vicksburg, Mississippi, down to Morgan City, Louisiana, up to Alexandria, over to Shreveport and back to Vicksburg and that does not include the area encompassing Steele's actions in Arkansas. If one limits a staff ride or battlefield tour just to the areas between modern day Simmesport and Mansfield, as does this handbook, it still takes three days to thoroughly cover the campaign due to the time-distance factors involved. Because of the wide chronological and geographical span of the campaign, it has been necessary for the Combat Studies Institute to exercise selectivity in packaging a staff ride that can be executed within a reasonable amount of time. Events at outlying places, such as the actions at Dunn's Bayou, Campti, and Loggy Bayou (as well as Steele's expedition in its entirety) have been omitted to limit travel and time, even though each was an important event in the overall campaign. As such, those events are covered as "offsite" actions at various points during the staff ride.

The resulting itinerary involves considerable driving time. As provided here, the full staff ride itinerary, with discussions at each stand, will take approximately two and a half days to complete. Individual groups can tailor this schedule to accommodate the time available to them or to focus on aspects of the campaign that are of particular interest. Also included are recommendations for conducting one- or two-day staff rides.

In following this itinerary, be aware that not all of the stands (a "stand" is the location where the next orientation, description, and analysis will take place) contain signs or monuments to identify their location. For this reason, the directions provided are as specific as possible in terms of mileages, road names, and landmarks in order to guide staff ride groups to the correct locations. The distance to the first stand will be dictated by the location from where the participants start that day. Consider that roads and landmarks may change over time and mileage estimates are no more accurate than the odometer of the vehicle used. A set of topographic maps, checking road conditions on the internet, and route advice from staff personnel at local historical parks will help pre-

vent unintentional detours or delays. If available, a Global Positioning System (GPS) would be of great value.

As a final note to instructors conducting this staff ride, the handbook is designed to be a guide for you to tailor your staff ride to fit the audience and the learning objectives for your group. Not every stand must be visited, descriptions can be modified, and different analysis questions can be developed. In fact, the analysis questions for each stand in this handbook are intentionally too numerous; the instructor should pick one or two (maybe three at the most) from the choices provided depending on the group's focus, and the instructor can choose to use a question of their own in lieu of those in the handbook.

Red River Campaign Staff Ride Stands for a Three-Day Staff Ride

Day 1

- Stand 1, Simmesport Landing (Campaign overview)
- Stand 2, Fort DeRussy
- Stand 3, Capture and Occupation of Alexandria
- Stand 4, Henderson's Hill
- Stand 5, Decision at Grand Ecore
- Stand 6, Engagement at Wilson's Farm

Day 2

- Stand 1, Battle of Mansfield—Confederate Plan
- Stand 2, Battle of Mansfield—Federal Deployment
- Stand 3, Battle of Mansfield—Initial Attack
- Stand 4, Battle of Mansfield—The Federal Center and Right Crumble
- Stand 5, Battle of Mansfield—Attack on the Federal Left
- Stand 6, Battle of Mansfield—Sabine Crossroads
- Stand 7, Battle of Mansfield—Chapman's Bayou
- Stand 8, Battle of Pleasant Hill—Federal Deployment
- Stand 9, Battle of Pleasant Hill—Confederate Plan and Initial Attack
- Stand 10, Battle of Pleasant Hill—Federal Actions and Confederate Repulse

Stand 11, Engagement at Blair’s Landing

Stand 12, Grand Ecore—Arkansas Campaign and the Decision to Retreat

Stand 13, Engagement at Monett’s Ferry

Day 3

Stand 1, Alexandria Interlude: Union Strategic Situation and Bailey’s Dam

Stand 2, Engagement at Mansura

Stand 3, Engagement at Yellow Bayou

Stand 4, Simmesport, “One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End”

Modified One- and Two-Day Staff Rides

Although the Red River Campaign Staff Ride is best conducted over three days, time constraints may preclude some organizations from conducting the ride over such a long period. Modified one – and two-day staff rides are offered here as a possible option for those groups that cannot afford more time on the ground. For these options, Alexandria is the location for your base (hotel) as these staff rides begin and end at that location. Keep in mind that some information will have to be eliminated at compressed stands. The staff ride facilitator should look closely at what topics should be eliminated and to determine which topics best cover the learning objectives for the ride.

Recommended One-Day Staff Ride

Stand 1, Campaign Overview, Fort DeRussy, and Capture of Alexandria (Day 1, Stands 1-3). This stand should be conducted in Alexandria. It can be conducted at the hotel on the evening before departure on the staff ride to save more time.

Stand 2, Henderson’s Hill and Decision at Grand Ecore (Day 1, Stands 4 and 5). This should be conducted at Grand Ecore, but may be conducted at Mansfield.

Stand 3, Battle of Mansfield—Confederate Plan (include Skirmish at Wilson’s Farm) (Day 1, Stand 6 and Day 2, Stand 1).

Stand 4, Battle of Mansfield—Federal Deployment (includes Initial Attack) (Day 2, Stands 2 and 3).

Stand 5, Battle of Mansfield—The Federal Center and Right Crumble (includes Attack on the Federal Left) (Day 2, Stands 4 and 5).

Stand 6, Battle of Mansfield—Sabine Crossroads (includes Chapman’s Bayou) (Day 2, Stands 6 and 7).

Stand 7, Battle of Pleasant Hill—Federal Defenses (Day 2, Stand 8).

Stand 8, Battle of Pleasant Hill—Confederate Plan and Initial Attack (includes Federal Actions and Confederate Repulse) (Day 2, Stands 9 and 10).

Stand 9, Grand Ecore—Arkansas and Naval Expeditions (includes Blair’s Landing and Monett’s Ferry) (Day 2, Stands 11, 12, and 13). This stand may be further compressed by eliminating coverage of the Arkansas Expedition, Naval Expeditions and Blair’s Landing and covering Monett’s Ferry at the Bailey’s Dam stand.

Stand 10, Bailey’s Dam (includes Mansura, Yellow Bayou, and Campaign wrap-up) (Day 3, Stands 1, 2, 3, and 4).

Recommended Two-Day Staff Ride

Day 1

Stand 1, Simmesport Landing (Campaign overview).

Stand 2, Fort DeRussy.

Stand 3, Capture and Occupation of Alexandria.

Stand 4, Henderson’s Hill.

Stand 5, Decision at Grand Ecore.

Stand 6, Battle at Wilson’s Farm.

Day 2

Stand 1, Battle of Mansfield—Confederate Plan.

Stand 2, Battle of Mansfield—Federal Deployment.

Stand 3, Battle of Mansfield—Initial Attack.

Stand 4, Battle of Mansfield—The Federal Center and Right Crumble.

Stand 5, Battle of Mansfield—Attack on the Federal Left.

Stand 6, Battle of Mansfield—Sabine Crossroads.

Stand 7, Battle of Mansfield—Chapman’s Bayou.

Stand 8, Battle of Pleasant Hill—Federal Defenses.

Stand 9, Battle of Pleasant Hill—Confederate Plan and Initial Attack.

Stand 10, Battle of Pleasant Hill—Federal Actions and Confederate Repulse.

Stand 11, Grand Ecore—Arkansas and Naval Expeditions (includes Blair’s Landing) (Day 2, Stands 11 and 12).

Stand 12, Battle at Monett’s Ferry.

Stand 13, Bailey’s Dam (includes Mansura, Yellow Bayou, and campaign wrap-up) (Day 3, Stands 1, 2, 3, and 4).

The following pages describe, in detail, the stands for the three-day Red River Campaign staff ride. Each stand contains directions to the stand, an orientation, description, vignettes, and analysis questions for discussion.




Figure 3.1. Map legend. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Day 1: Simmesport Landing to Wilson’s Farm (12 March–7 April 1864)

Stand 1, Simmesport Landing (Campaign overview) (Events up to 12 March)

Stand 2, Fort DeRussy (12-13 March 1864)

Stand 3, The Capture and Occupation of Alexandria (15 March-2 April 1864)

Stand 3, The Capture and Occupation of Alexandria (15 March-2 April 1864)

Stand 4, Henderson’s Hill (21-22 March 1864)

Stand 5, Decision at Grand Ecore (26 March-6 April 1864)

Stand 5, Decision at Grand Ecore (26 March-6 April 1864)

Stand 6, Engagement at Wilson’s Farm (6-7 April 1864)




Figure 3.2. Day 1 Route Map, 1 of 3. Graphic by Robin Kern.




Figure 3.3. Day 1 route map, 2 of 3. Graphic by Robin Kern.




Figure 3.4. Day 1 route map, 3 of 3. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Stand 1

Simmesport Landing—Campaign Overview




Figure 3.5. Simmesport Landing. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: To reach Simmesport from Alexandria, proceed south on Louisiana Highway 1 for about 50 miles. In Simmesport look for the traffic light on Louisiana Highway 1 before the Atchafalaya Bridge. Turn left (north) at the stoplight onto North Martin Luther King Drive. At the second street, turn right (east) onto Riverside Drive. Follow Riverside Drive east to the bluff on the river. Stop at the gravel parking lot on the left. The Atchafalaya River highway bridge should be visible on your right. Walk down to the boat ramp to the water's edge.

Orientation: On 11 March 1864, Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Smith's XVI Corps contingent from the Army of the Tennessee began debarking here at Simmesport Landing to begin the Red River Campaign. To the east is the Atchafalaya River. Farther to the east about seven miles is the Mississippi River. About four miles upstream (to the north) is Old River, the entrance into the Atchafalaya from the Mississippi. To the northwest about 24 miles upstream is Fort DeRussy.

Simmesport was developed as a fishing port in the early 1800s and was named after Capt. Bennett B. Simms of Virginia who built a dock and warehouse here next to the river. Captain Simms' home, *Whitehall*, built about 1857, still stands across the river opposite the entrance to Bayou

des Glaises. The old Atchafalaya Iron Bridge to the northeast, dedicated in 1928, was originally a highway bridge, but now serves only as a railroad bridge. Water levels on the Red River today are generally lower than what would have been seen in 1864 due to the Corps of Engineer efforts to control water flow. The water level at the time Smith landed here was relatively high due to the winter rains, however, a generally dryer spring than usual and Confederate damming efforts near Shreveport contributed to falling water levels as the Army of the Gulf moved farther up the river.

Description: This stand is conducted in four parts: Confederate Situation, Union Situation, Taylor's Plan, and Smith's Plan (For reference, see Appendix L, Maps L-1 through L-7.).

Confederate Situation, July 1863-February 1864. In the winter of 1864, the situation was bleak for the armies of the Confederacy. The defeat of Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg the previous July had sent that force reeling back to Virginia, more-or-less reestablishing the status quo existing before the battle of Chancellorsville. The Federals' success in lifting of the siege of Chattanooga by the combined efforts of the US Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio that fall very nearly destroyed Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee. Bragg's army retreated to establish defensive positions designed to block a Federal thrust toward Atlanta by William T. Sherman's Military Division of the Mississippi. Farther west, the fall of Vicksburg on 4 July 1863 and Port Hudson five days later had closed the Mississippi River to Confederate traffic on that river and also prevented the movement of vital supplies from Texas, Louisiana, Missouri and Arkansas to support rebel forces east of the river.

For administrative, command, and control purposes Lt. Gen. E. Kirby Smith's Department of the Trans-Mississippi was composed of four districts (see Appendix L, Map L-2). The districts were: the District of Arkansas, commanded by Maj. Gen. Theophilus Holmes (who would be replaced by Maj. Gen. Sterling Price on 16 March 1864); the District of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona, commanded by Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder; the District of West Louisiana (which included the sub-district of North Louisiana), commanded by Maj. Gen. Richard Taylor; and the Indian Territory (Oklahoma) commanded by Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Maxey. Maxey's command would have almost no impact on the campaign. All told, Smith's command in the first three districts, those involved in the Red River Campaign, consisted of about 21,000 soldiers with which to oppose any Federal incursions. Of course, due to the need to defend all areas of his large department, Smith could not concentrate all of those forces at one

place, so the actual number he could throw against a single Union invasion force was generally no more than 12,000 troops at any one location.

For the conduct of the Red River Campaign, the primary ground force facing Banks' army would be those forces in Taylor's district, although the other two district commanders would in time contribute large numbers of troops to support Taylor's efforts (see Appendix L, Map L-3). At the start of the campaign, Taylor's command was scattered in various locations in north and central Louisiana. Brigadier General St. John R. Liddell's Sub-district of North Louisiana, which encompassed everything in the state north of the Red River, possessed only one small brigade of cavalry under Col. Isaac F. Harrison supported by an artillery section. These units were concentrated in an area near Monroe. Brigadier General Alfred Mouton's Louisiana brigade of infantry was positioned in and near Alexandria. Brig. Gen. Camille J. de Polignac's (pronounced "po-len-nac") brigade, composed mostly of Texas dismounted cavalry regiments, was at Trinity about 50 miles northeast of Alexandria. Down around Marksville, Maj. Gen. John G. Walker's Texas Division was posted at various positions along the Bayou de Glaize and the Avoyelles (pronounced "a-voy-ull") Prairie. Walker also had forces defending Fort DeRussy (pronounced "dee-roo-see") just north of Marksville, and three companies of the 2nd Louisiana Cavalry patrolling on the east side of the Atchafalaya River. The rest of the 2nd Louisiana (Taylor's only mounted reconnaissance force south of the river), commanded by Col. William G. Vincent, was watching the approaches along Bayou Teche near Opelousas.

In late February and early March, Taylor received intelligence about increased Union activities around Berwick Bay and the fact that Sherman had visited Banks in New Orleans. He therefore concluded that he would be facing forces both from Banks' Army of the Gulf and Sherman's Army of the Tennessee and that the strike would come up the Red River Valley as it had the year before.

Union Situation. In March 1864, President Abraham Lincoln named Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant as the General-in-Chief of all Federal armies and then promoted to the rank of lieutenant general by Congress. Grant immediately set out to develop a comprehensive strategy to defeat the rebellion (See Appendix L, Map L-4). His plan was relatively simple—he would have all of the US armies in the field advance simultaneously against key Confederate objectives. As the main effort, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade's Army of the Potomac was ordered to destroy Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, then advance to take Richmond. Grant ordered Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler's Army of the James to advance up the James Riv-

er, land at Bermuda Hundred between Richmond and Petersburg and also advance against the Confederate capital. Major General Franz Sigel was directed to advance his forces from the Department of West Virginia up the Shenandoah River valley to defeat or, at least hold, rebel forces operating there. If successful, Sigel would also deny the use of that route for a rebel advance on Washington. Farther west, Sherman's new command, the Military Division of the Mississippi consisting of the combined forces of the Army of the Tennessee, the Army of the Cumberland, and the Army of the Ohio, was to defeat Maj. Gen. Joseph Johnston (now commanding the Army of Tennessee) and take Atlanta. Finally, the new general-in-chief ordered Banks and his Army of the Gulf to move on Mobile, Alabama, to permanently close that port and to hold Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk's corps in that area to prevent those forces from going to Johnston's aid against Sherman. The simultaneous advance of all US armies that spring would also have the added benefit of tying down Confederate forces where they were and prevent them from reinforcing elsewhere.

Notably missing from this list of objectives is Shreveport, Louisiana, and operations against the rebel forces in the Trans-Mississippi. This omission was in the process of changing even as Grant developed his plan. Both Lincoln and Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, former commanding general of the US armies and now functioning as Lincoln's chief of staff, had for some time been desirous of re-planting the US flag in Texas to signal to France (and Mexico) that the United States was serious about reasserting its sovereignty over all of the Southern states (see Appendix L, Map L-5). Banks believed he had satisfied this requirement after he had closed all but one of Texas' ports by landing Federal troops at various points on the coast in the fall of 1863. Halleck, however, was not satisfied with those efforts (although Lincoln apparently was) and continued to push Banks to advance up the Red River to capture Shreveport. Once there, Banks could then use the city as a springboard for further advances into east Texas to destroy a number of manufacturing centers there.

Initially both Banks and Grant were against Halleck's plan. Banks agreed with Grant that the next objective for the Army of the Gulf ought to be Mobile. Additionally, based on the less than favorable results of the XIX Corps' expedition up Bayou Teche to Alexandria in the fall of 1863, Banks objected because he believed that it was too difficult to supply such an expedition overland and he didn't have enough troops to both seize Shreveport and protect his lines of supply. Banks' thinking began to change when it became apparent that Flag Officer David D. Porter's fleet was going to support his movement by transporting troops and supplies up

the Red River for the campaign. Moreover, Halleck had convinced Grant to allow a portion of Sherman's Army of the Tennessee, then idle on occupation duties in Mississippi, to reinforce Banks with about 10,000 men. Finally, Halleck had cajoled a very reluctant Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele, commander of the Union Department of Arkansas, to lead a 10,000-man column from Little Rock toward Shreveport in a cooperative effort to take the city.

As these assets became available, Banks' began to perceive a political opportunity and changed his plans accordingly. Banks was a major general in the army due to his political connections in the Republican party, not to his military experience (he had none prior to 1861). As a politician, Banks perhaps saw himself as a potential presidential candidate more than as a military commander. He began to sense the political prospects in carrying out Halleck's wishes. Banks' own state of Massachusetts was home to numerous mills that relied on cotton for manufacturing, as were several other states in the northeast. Many of those mills now sat idle and their workers largely unemployed due to the lack of cotton which was virtually all under rebel control. Banks realized that achieving a major victory against a rebel army, destroying Shreveport and its factories and mills, and sending 'liberated' cotton back to the northeast to get the mills on line and unemployed men back to work, would bode well for him in a national election. Therefore, Banks eventually acceded to Halleck's wishes. The decision to conduct a campaign along the Red River approach to Texas was clinched when Grant reluctantly agreed to the idea, but he only did so with two caveats. First, Banks must complete the campaign in time to move against Mobile by the beginning of May to support Grant's grand offensive. Second, Banks must also return A. J. Smith's troops, on loan from the Army of the Tennessee, to Memphis, Tennessee, by 15 April so that those troops could be back with Sherman in time for the upcoming Atlanta Campaign.

Kirby Smith's Plan

Unlike Taylor, Kirby Smith, as commanding general of the Department of the Trans-Mississippi, had to contend with more than a single Federal advance. A pincer movement from Steele moving south from Little Rock and Banks moving northwest from New Orleans was a real possibility. Smith knew he did not have enough troops to effectively defend both avenues of approach without giving up large amounts of territory to one approach or the other. Thus, Smith's basic plan was to conduct delaying operations in both directions, should Federal columns approach from both, until he could determine which arm of the pincer was the greatest threat. He would then delay the supporting attack with as few troops as possible,

giving up territory where necessary, and combine as many troops as he could gather to concentrate to defeat the main attack. This plan called for taking a great deal of risk in terms of both maneuver and the potential loss of support of the civilian populace due to the relinquishment of territory to the enemy.

Banks' Plan

Banks' plan called for the movement of the Army of the Gulf to begin on 3 March 1864 (see Appendix L, Map L-5). Major General William B. Franklin's XIX Corps and Brig. Gen. Thomas E.G. Ransom's detachment from the XIII Corps would move from camps in the vicinity of Franklin, and New Iberia, Louisiana, north along the Bayou Teche to Alexandria. On 7 March, A. J. Smith's detachment from the Army of the Tennessee (which included a provisional division from the XVII Corps and Brig. Gen. Alfred W. Ellet's Mississippi Marine Brigade) was to sail down the Mississippi on transports escorted by Porter's Mississippi Squadron, land at Simmesport, and capture Fort DeRussy near Marksville. Then Smith and Porter would move via the Red River to link up with the Army of the Gulf at Alexandria on the 14th. From Alexandria the combined force would advance on Shreveport via the Red River on a land route, yet to be determined, and together with Steele's column moving south from Arkansas, capture the city. After the capture of Shreveport, Banks would then send Smith's troops back to Vicksburg to join Sherman for his campaign against Atlanta.

Instead of 3 March, however, due to delays from heavy spring rains which made the country roads impassable, the Army of the Gulf did not begin to depart its camps until 7 March when Brig. Gen. Albert L. Lee's Cavalry Division, Army of the Gulf, began the trek north from its camp at Iberia. Franklin, who commanded the army on its march, did not start the XIII and XIX Corps on their way from the camps at Franklin until 8 March, almost a week late. As for A. J. Smith's XVI Corps his troops departed Vicksburg on 10 March, three days later than intended. Two days later, 12 March, the bulk of Smith's command landed here at Simmesport. After a one-day delay to unload supplies and ammunition, Smith's command started off toward Marksville on 13 March to capture Fort DeRussy in what was supposed to be a joint operation with Porter's gunboats providing the close-in fire support against the fortification.

Analysis

1. Evaluate Grant's 1864 strategic plan.

- a. Evaluate the overall strategy and the roles of the other US armies (Sherman, Meade, Sigel, etc.)
- b. Grant inherited some awkward command arrangements for the 1864 campaign. What changes do you think he should have considered before beginning the campaign? What are some of the potential downsides of making those changes just before the campaign begins? (Remember Grant wasn't appointed general-in-chief until March 1864).
- c. Should Grant have allowed Banks to go ahead and conduct the Red River Campaign?
- d. Did Halleck have legitimate reasons for the campaign? If so, what were they?
- e. How do you balance the value/ need for political/ economic objectives (cotton and factories) versus military objectives (such as closing down Mobile harbor and tying down Confederate forces)?

2. Using some of the operational variables of PMESII-PT, evaluate the way in which these variables could have an impact on the campaign. You can look from a US perspective or Confederate (or both). In particular, you might want to look at some—but not all—of these (at later stands you can choose to bring in variables not discussed here):

a. Military variables include the military capabilities of all armed forces in a given operational environment:

- Equipment
- Manpower
- Doctrine
- Training Levels
- Resource Constraints
- Leadership
- Organizational Culture

b. Economic variables encompass individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources.

- Industries
- Trade
- Development

- Finance and Monetary Policy
 - Institutional Capabilities
 - Legal Constraints
 - Price Fluctuations
- c. Social variables describe societies within an operational environment
- Demographics
 - Religion
 - Migration Trends
 - Urbanization (or lack thereof)
3. Evaluate Bank's plan.
- a. What was (were) the strategic/ operational objective(s) of the campaign?
 - b. What were the advantages of Banks' plan? The disadvantages?
4. Evaluate Kirby Smith's plan.
- a. Assess Kirby Smith's and Taylor's positioning of forces to adequately oppose the Federal offensive(s)?
 - b. What were the advantages of Smith's plan? The disadvantages?
 - c. Was the level of risk that Smith was taking by adopting his plan within acceptable bounds? What could he have done to mitigate risk?

Stand 2

Fort DeRussy




Figure 3.6. Route to Fort DeRussy. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time from Simmesport to Fort DeRussy is about 30 minutes) From Simmesport Landing, return to Louisiana Highway 1. Turn right (north) on LA 1 and proceed 21 miles to Marksville, LA. Proceed through Marksville until reaching LA115 (South Main Street). Turn right (northeast) and proceed on LA 115 for about 2 miles until arrival at Louisiana 1192 at the Marksville Hospital. Turn right (northeast) on LA 1192 and proceed 2 miles until reaching a “Y” intersection. Bear right (northeast) and proceed 1/2 mile. Turn right onto Fort DeRussy Road. Look for the Fort DeRussy sign on the left and go about 30 yards past it. Turn left into the Fort DeRussy parking area and park.




Figure 3.7. Fort DeRussy. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Orientation: Fort DeRussy was named for Col. Louis G. DeRussy, the engineer appointed by Taylor in November 1862 to develop the original design of the fort. The small stone obelisk marks the location where DeRussy is buried and serves as his headstone. DeRussy was the oldest West Point graduate to serve in the Confederate Army. He was a veteran of the War of 1812 as well as a veteran of the Mexican War. After the war with Mexico, DeRussy served as a Louisiana state senator, state representative, and as a major general in the State Militia. He was involved in at least two duels and two shipwrecks. After the conclusion of the Red River Campaign, DeRussy returned to his home at Grand Ecore which had been occupied by the United States Army when the Army of the Gulf was there. Although DeRussy was gone during the campaign, his wife was there and did receive visitors from officers who had known him in the Regular Army and who occasionally came by to pay their respects to the old man. As a result, his house was not burned when the Federals left and stood until 1888. DeRussy died not long after and was buried in Grand Ecore. By the late 20th century, the cemetery in which he had been buried was overgrown and almost lost to memory. When the Friends of Fort DeRussy began efforts to restore the fort, they contacted his family and requested that DeRussy's remains be removed and buried at the fort. The family readily agreed and he was reinterred here in September 1999 with military honors.

DeRussy began construction of the position soon after his appointment. Federal troops occupied the position for the first time in May 1863 before it was complete and attempted to destroy it, but did not have enough

explosives to complete the work. The Confederates soon reoccupied the fort and continued to improve the position until A. J. Smith's command landed at Simmesport on 13 March 1864. To the north is the old bed of the Red River that ran along what are now Sugar Point and Fort DeRussy Roads (the current channel is about 1 mile north of the 1864 river bed). The water battery was located across the footbridge to the north of this position, down near the bend of the river. Extending north from Barbins Bayou at the footbridge is a long row of trees marking the route of the covered way to the water battery. The Water Battery was just to the left of the house you can see in the distance. The Federal assault lines were located to the south and southwest of this position. Note that the vegetation in the campaign area in 1864 would have clearer in some areas and heavier in others. For example, here at Fort DeRussy the trees would have been cleared for at least 500 yards all around and at least 1000 yards to the north and south. In general, the Red River and Cane River Valleys and the area around Mansura would have been largely cleared of trees for plantation agriculture (mostly sugar cane). Areas that were forested in the valleys would have large trees but with far less underbrush due to the forging of farm and grazing wild animals. Thus, one could often see up to 100 yards or more through the forest. Some of the fighting in this campaign would take place under such conditions. Once out of the valley and into the "pine barrens" west of the river, the terrain was thickly forested with white pine and hardwood trees with a great deal of underbrush. Only the occasional yeoman farm that dotted the forests here and there along the way provided much open space, and then rarely larger in size than two or three football fields.

Description: (For reference, see Appendix L, Maps L-7 and L-8.) Taylor gave Walker's Texas Division the responsibility for the defense of the southeastern areas of the District of West Louisiana between Simmesport and Alexandria. As with virtually all of the Trans-Mississippi Department's defense commands, Walker's 3,800 troops and twelve guns were woefully inadequate to defend the large area of responsibility he was given. As intelligence reports arrived and Taylor and Kirby Smith deduced that Banks would indeed send a column up the Red River that spring, Taylor sent Walker's division to the Avoyelles Prairie area to secure the regions around the mouth of the Red River. Walker's mission included the completion and defense of Fort DeRussy, located about three miles north of Marksville, and Fort Scurry on Yellow Bayou.

Walker assigned the defense of Fort Scurry to its namesake, Brig. Gen. William R. Scurry. Scurry's brigade of five Texas infantry regiments and a battery of artillery occupied the fort (which the soldiers derisively called

“Fort Humbug” due to its incompleteness and unimpressive appearance), as well as occupied Simmesport and posted the surrounding area with pickets. The fort itself was located astride the road from Simmesport to Marksville, thus, at least in theory, it blocked the route to an invading force headed northwestward toward Alexandria. The problem was that the region north of the Bayou de Glaize which led to Marksville itself was so compartmented by bayous, streams and swamps, that the area was a veritable trap for Walker’s command if he moved north of the bayou to help defend Fort DeRussy.

When A. J. Smith landed at Simmesport, the pickets there from Scurry’s brigade were surprised by the Federal landing. Some pickets were captured, but others were able to make their way back to report to Walker the size and composition of Smith’s forces. They reported (inaccurately) to Walker that at least 17,000 Federal soldiers and 30 to 40 cannon were now present at Simmesport. Once Walker received the report of the size and strength of A. J. Smith’s command, he sent a message to Taylor. He also decided that he had to evacuate Fort Scurry. The position was supposed to be partially protected by the swamps and Yellow Bayou but those bodies of water were fast drying up due to the lack of the usual winter rains. Therefore, Walker withdrew out of the area and stayed south of Bayou de Glaize. He also remained close enough, so that he could watch the movements of the Federal forces. If the opportunity presented itself to fall upon and destroy an isolated fragment of Smith’s troops, Walker was ready to do so. As for Fort DeRussy, it would have to fend for itself.

Fort DeRussy was located on a bend of the Red River and its mission was to prevent the use of the river by Federal vessels (see Appendix L, Map L-8). The fort was commanded by Lt. Col. William A. Byrd of the 14th Texas Infantry. Byrd possessed a garrison of 25 officers and 292 soldiers. The command was ad hoc and consisted of detachments of men from at least 15 different units. The troops were mostly from Walker’s Texas Division, but there were also small number of men from Louisiana units which provided the majority of the artillerymen. The fortifications were equipped with eight large pieces of artillery and two small 6-pounder field pieces. The eight larger guns consisted of two 9-inch Dahlgrens, two 24-pounders, three 32-pounder smoothbores, and one 32-pounder rifled gun all of which were mounted in the water battery close to the river. The 6-pounders were placed in the main fort to protect against ground assault from the rear as were most of the Texas infantrymen. The defenders had also constructed a large raft of logs and pilings on the Red River at a place called the Bend of the Rappiones east of the fort to further prevent, or at least delay, the movement of US gunboats and other vessels farther north.

Having encountered no significant forces as his troops pushed out from Simmesport, A. J. Smith set his entire command in motion overland toward Marksville on 14 March. During his movement, Smith became aware of Walker's division to his west and south, but gave it little attention. His goal was to reduce Fort DeRussy so that Federal shipping could support the move up the river. The only real impediment to Smith's movement was at Mansura. There, the Confederates had burned the bridge across the Bayou Avoyelles to slow Smith's march, but Smith's troops simply disassembled a nearby cotton gin and used the wood to construct a new bridge. After a several hour delay, the column continued its movement. Passing through Marksville in the afternoon, the lead elements of Smith's small corps encountered Fort DeRussy about 3 miles north of the town. Once he viewed the ground, Smith decided to proceed with an attack on the fort even though Porter's gunboats had not yet arrived to suppress the rebel water battery.

Smith ordered Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower's 3rd Division, XVI Corps, to make the attack and kept Brig. Gen. T. Kilby Smith's Provisional Division, XVII Army Corps, in reserve towards the southwest to protect against a move against Smith's rear by Walker's division. Mower formed his 1st Brigade to the left (west) of the Marksville Road, and the 2nd Brigade to the right. He positioned the 3rd Battery, Indiana Light Artillery between the two brigades, straddling the road. The Federal and Confederate artillery opened a brief cannonade as Mower's troops moved forward to make their assault. As the sun began to set, Mower ordered the charge and led it in person. The return fire from the fort was ragged and largely ineffective, and the action was over within 20 minutes. Mower's troops swarmed over the parapets and the fort's defenders quickly threw down their arms and surrendered. Further resistance was clearly useless.

Meanwhile, as the Federal troops formed for the attack, four of Porter's vessels, the *Eastport*, *Osage*, *Fort Hindman*, and *Cricket*, finally arrived. The flotilla had been delayed in their movement by the large raft of logs and pilings that the rebel defenders had constructed to block the river. It took the sailors only two hours to clear the way enough to get the boats through the obstacle. Once through, Porter led with the *Eastport* which, on arrival, fired two rounds at the water battery from its massive 100-pounder Parrot rifles. The shots burst over the heads of the battery and those two were enough. Having those massive explosions overhead caused the gun crews there to take to their heels and make for the woods and swamps.

Casualties in the action were relatively light on both sides, at least in terms of men killed and wounded. Smith's command suffered a total of 3 men killed and 38 wounded. The rebel number killed and wounded was 5

and 4 respectively, but at least 250 officers and men were captured (Taylor later claimed that only 185 men were taken as prisoners).

The following day, Smith boarded Mower's division on transports to follow Porter's gunboats up river to seize Alexandria. Meanwhile Kilby Smith's division remained behind to destroy Fort DeRussy, collect the rebel cannon and arms, process the prisoners, and remove or destroy remaining enemy supplies and ammunition. The effort to level Fort DeRussy took several days and was personally supervised by A. J. Smith. The climax was the detonation of the fort's two magazines. Inexplicably, someone (probably Smith) ordered the firing of the fuse to take place in the middle of the night rather than waiting until the following morning. The massive explosions threw earth, timbers, and metal fragments over a huge area to include spots where men were sleeping. The detonations resulted in two men being killed and several others wounded. The incident cast a pall over Kilby Smith's men who blamed A. J. Smith for the debacle.

Vignette: General Walker offers his explanation as to why he decided not to defend Fort DeRussy directly:

The position I had chosen offered some advantages against an enemy not so unequal in numbers, and if the swamps had been covered with water, as they usually are at this season of the year, even against a largely superior force; but the unusual dryness of the season had rendered the swampy grounds above and below Bout De Bayou bridge passable for artillery and trains, and rendered my position extremely hazardous, inasmuch as I was on [an] island formed by Red River, Bayous De Glaize, Du Lac, and Choctaw, the only outlet to which was Bayou Du Lac bridge, 8 miles to the south. In the event of the enemy turning my right, which he could easily have done, my march to Bayou Du Lac would have been intercepted and the destruction of my command inevitable. To have fallen back toward Marksville in order to cover Fort De Russy would equally have insured the disaster. By falling back, however, toward Bayou Du Lac and watching the movements of the enemy I was in hopes of finding an opportunity of attacking him should he march upon Fort DeRussy with less than his entire strength.¹

Vignette: A. J. Smith described the fight for Fort DeRussy:

On arriving near the fort I found that it was occupied by a garrison of about 350 men. I therefore halted my column 1 miles

from the fort, and, after covering my left flank and rear from any attack that Walker could possibly make, directed General Mower to advance with the First and Second Brigades of the Third Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, in line of battle, with skirmishers thrown well to the front, followed by the Third Brigade within supporting distance. As soon as the line came within sight of the fort the enemy opened upon it with five pieces of artillery from the fort, doing, however, but little execution. Their guns on the land side all being en barbette, the skirmishers of the Second Brigade soon silenced them. At about 1830 the order to charge was given, and the First and Second Brigades advanced under a scattering fire from the enemy, whose infantry were kept down by my skirmishers, and scaled the parapet within twenty minutes from the time the order to charge was given. The enemy then surrendered.²

Report of Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Smith, US Army, Commanding detachments of Sixteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps, 26 September 1865.

Analysis

1. How did the terrain impact General Walker's decisions to oppose A. J. Smith's advance?
2. How did the terrain influence A. J. Smith's decisions and course of action to march on Fort DeRussy?
3. What is your assessment of how the defenses of Fort DeRussy were developed and organized?
4. What is your assessment of the joint coordination between A. J. Smith and Porter for this mission?

Stand 3

The Capture and Occupation of Alexandria




Figure 3.8. Route Map to Levee Park. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time to Alexandria is about 45 minutes) From Fort DeRussy, proceed back through Marksville and return to Louisiana 1. Turn right (west) and proceed 30 miles to Alexandria, Louisiana. In Alexandria, LA 1 will turn into 2nd Street. Follow 2nd Street through the Alexandria Riverfront Center. As 2nd Street exits the Riverfront Center it will veer left into Elliot Street and merge into 4th Street. Turn left at Medical Center Drive and proceed to 6th Street. Turn right onto 6th Street and proceed to Monroe Street. Turn right onto Monroe Street and proceed to North 3rd Street. Turn left onto North 3rd Street Monroe Street and proceed 0.4 mile to the city boat ramp turn off (**Note:** since the road is unnamed, look for the boat launch sign on right). Turn right and proceed into Levee Park to the road junction and turn right. The road




Figure 3.9. Route Map through Alexandria. Graphic by Robin Kern.

will proceed up onto the levee. Proceed to the Levee Park parking area. Park near the boat launch.

Orientation: You are currently located just northwest of the port landing area of Alexandria. Looking south down the river, just beyond the mouth of Bayou Rapides on the west side of the river was where the wharves and docks of Alexandria were located. There, steamboats hauling cotton, sugarcane, and other agricultural products and commodities, as well as passengers (enslaved and free) and freight up and down the river, docked on a routine basis to load and unload. This port area made Alexandria the commerce center of central Louisiana and second only to Shreveport as a population center in the Red River Valley. As a result, it would briefly serve as the headquarters of Kirby Smith’s Trans-Mississippi Department, and for Taylor’s District of Western Louisiana. Once the Army of the Gulf arrived Alexandria would also serve as that army’s base of logistics due to its river line of communication all the way back to New Orleans. Located between here and the gazebo across the river were the lower falls of Alexandria. These falls would soon come into play for Porter and his vessels as the river level continued to fall while the army was preparing to march north.

Description: (See Appendix L, Map L-7 for an overview of the first phase of the campaign.) On 15 March, a convoy of gunboats and transports departed the vicinity of Fort DeRussy for the 50-mile voyage up the winding Red River to Alexandria. The flotilla was comprised of Por-

ter's gunboats and army transports carrying Mower's division of the XVI Corps. The lead ship was the gunboat USS *Osage*, commanded by Lt. Com Thomas O. Selfridge, which pushed well ahead of the rest of Porter's vessels. Selfridge was hoping to catch Confederate vessels tied up along the wharves of the city, but found the waterfront empty on his arrival there. The lieutenant commander quickly accepted the city's surrender, but sent word back to Porter to hurry up as he was afraid that the citizens might soon figure out that they far outnumbered Selfridge's crew and might try to capture the vessel. The rest of Porter's boats along with Mower's 5,000 infantrymen arrived at about 1700 that afternoon.

Banks' original plan was for the Army of the Gulf to march up from the areas of Berwick Bay and the town of Franklin and meet Porter and A. J. Smith's column in Alexandria on 14 March. Porter's ships and Smith's troops arrived there on 15 March, one day late. Neither Banks, nor the Army of the Gulf, however, were anywhere in sight. Porter, never one to waste time, directed his sailors to begin fanning out to find and impound any cotton that they could locate. Within days, the naval commander's men had gathered in several thousand bales of cotton and moved them to the wharves at Alexandria. Due to the naval prize laws on the books at that time, both Porter and his sailors could legally confiscate materials from the enemy could be used to make, or support the acquisition of, military supplies. The sailors could then sell the materials, or turn them over to the US Treasury at the going market rate. The cash from the spoils would then be paid out to the Navy men in various amounts according to rank. Needless to say, the sailors had an incentive for gathering the cotton that did not exist for soldiers.

The reason for the Army of the Gulf's delay in reaching Alexandria was due to the heavy rains which began on 7 March. Banks himself, however, was not delayed due to precipitation. Instead of leading his army up the muddy track from the town of Franklin to Alexandria in the rain, a chore he left to his senior subordinate (Franklin), Banks opted to remain behind in New Orleans to personally manage the inaugural celebrations of the new Republican governor of Louisiana which took place on 5 March. Even so, it would still take Banks until 21 March to actually reach Alexandria by steamboat. On his arrival, he was shocked to find that the vast majority of the cotton he had hoped to seize for northern textile mills was already under Navy control. At this point, Banks saw one of his great opportunities to score political points for future election prospects largely disappear. The fact that the sailors were boasting to their Army counterparts that they were going to prosper financially from their efforts caused much ill-will between the two services as well.

The day before Banks' arrival, the army's mud-splattered cavalry division arrived at Alexandria after an eight-day, 175-mile journey. Franklin's XIX Corps and Ransom's XIII Corps troops arrived five days later on 25 March. Unlike Lee's muddy cavalymen and A. J. Smith's ragged XVI Corps troops, Franklin's men marched into town looking as if they were on parade. Apparently Banks and Franklin had agreed beforehand to spruce up their soldiers' appearance for the entry into Alexandria in order to make them appear more professional and soldierly than Smith's men. The XVI Corps troops, all from western states, had just spent the previous winter, spring, and summer struggling through numerous battles and skirmishes to capture Vicksburg and on Sherman's recent expedition to Meridian, Mississippi. Smith's men looked dirty, bedraggled, and torn, but they were clearly rugged fighters. In contrast, the XIX Corps troops, all derived from eastern states, looked like they had never even got their shoes dirty. The effect was almost the opposite of what Banks expected. Smith's men derisively began calling the XIX Corps troops "band box" soldiers and "paper collar" men due to the fresh, white paper collars they had worn into town. The immediate effect of the cat calls was for the eastern men to retaliate by referring to the western troops as "gorillas" due to their wild appearance and untamed conduct. The consequence of all this was to drive a small wedge between two groups of soldiers who would soon be required to depend on each other in the heat of combat.

On the effective attachment of Smith's command to the Army of the Gulf, Banks now had about 32,500 troops concentrated at Alexandria which soon included 2,500 men of the *Corps d'Afrique* (soon to be known as US Colored Troops) who arrived via transports on 26 March. The army also possessed 90 cannon organized into 17 batteries of artillery while the navy mounted 210 large caliber guns. Moreover, on 23 March, the northern arm of the pincer movement on Shreveport, the 8,500-man column under Frederick Steele had begun its movement south toward the city. It was an overwhelming amount of combat power which would almost certainly lead to a successful operation. Now it was just a matter of moving Banks' forces another 125 miles to capture Shreveport to conclude the campaign. In theory, it was easy.

On 26 March, however, Banks received a pointed letter from Grant (now Lieutenant General), commanding general of all US Armies. Grant, who was never enamored of the Red River expedition, now sought to move things along in order to achieve his vision of operations for 1864. That vision included the capture of Mobile, Alabama, not of Shreveport.

As the Red River Campaign was already in motion, Grant did not cancel it, but he told Banks to effect the capture of Shreveport as soon as possible so that the Army of the Gulf could then proceed to take Mobile. He also told Banks that he had to finish the operation by the end of April and that under no circumstances would he delay the return of A. J. Smith's troops beyond 15 April, "even if it leads to the abandonment of the main object of your expedition." This was no vacillating or cloudy suggestion like Banks was used to receiving from Halleck. This was a clear, specific directive from a man who knew what he wanted and was not afraid to spell it out. Banks now knew he could not dally. He also knew that he now had less than three weeks to accomplish the mission of taking Shreveport before he lost at least a third of the forces under his direct command. Additionally, he also knew that Grant still expected him to move on Mobile that spring as well.

Note: At this point, if desired, the staff ride instructor can move the group north along the fence line to an alternate stand location (see stand map 8 above) north of the picnic shelters. Find a location where the participants can see the Curtis-Coleman Bridge to the north. Just to the north of the bridge between it and the Bayou Rigolette is where the upper falls of Alexandria were once located and are now gone due to their removal by the Corps of Engineers. It was there where the USS *Eastport* was lodged in the chute as it attempted to negotiate the falls in late March 1864 (an event covered in more detail later).

Description: (See Appendix L, Maps L-5 and L-7.) In addition to the letter from Grant, Banks now received bad news from Porter. The depth of the Red River was receding daily, sometimes at a rate that was usually fast. Under normal spring conditions the river should at least have been maintaining its depth, perhaps even increasing given the large amounts of rain in early March. In discussions with General Sherman, who had lived in Pineville across the river from Alexandria before the war, Porter learned that the river rose every spring which enabled deeper draft vessels to travel to Shreveport. Yet, here, at the beginning of spring, the river was waning. Fearing the possible loss of some, or even all of his vessels north of the falls above Alexandria, Porter was becoming impatient with the lack of urgency with which he perceived Banks was conducting the army's affairs.

Unbeknownst to either Banks or Porter, at least some of the reduction in the flow of the river was due to the fact that rebel Brig. Gen. William R. Boggs had developed a plan to create just such an effect. Boggs was a West Point-trained engineer officer who had been appointed as the Chief of Staff for the Trans-Mississippi Department under Kirby Smith. Boggs

had learned that in the early 1850s a local man had cut a shunt from the Red River over to Bayou Pierre. The waterway worked so well that it became known as Tone's Bayou. Over the years people noticed that under certain conditions much of the flow of the Red River could be diverted into the shunt which would significantly lower the level of the Red River. The level of the river between Tone's Bayou and where the water reentered the river near Grand Ecore was greatly affected. As an engineer, Boggs devised a system that would ostensibly divert even more of the flow from the Red River into Bayou Pierre in order to keep Federal shipping from reaching Shreveport. It was this system going into operation about mid-March that may have helped cause the Red River to decrease in flow rather than rise.³

Porter had bragged on several occasions that his squadron would go, "wherever the sand was damp."⁴ In order to ascertain that dampness, he sent light-draft vessels upriver to sound the channel above Alexandria. Porter had seen the river fall for several days and then rise briefly. Apparently, the rise was only a small portion of the flow exiting Bayou Pierre and coming back into the river at Grand Ecore, but it was enough that it encouraged him to decide to send a part of his squadron up the Red River in late March.

Despite the low level of the river, Porter readied his gunboats to move over the falls. He hired the services of a local river pilot by the name of Wellington W. Withinbury to guide the boats over the rocks. Withinbury recommended that Porter leave his larger gunboats behind but the admiral demurred and selected his largest vessel, the *Eastport*, to go over first. After protesting the order, the pilot proceeded to guide the boat over and it grounded in the chute as he predicted. After two days of tugging and pulling, along with a slight rise in the river, the *Eastport* was finally freed and floated over. Three days later, twelve other gunboats and thirty transports made it over without incident.

Not counted among the vessels were those of the Mississippi Marine Brigade. The brigade was under the command of Brig. Gen. Alfred W. Ellet and despite the unit's name, it was actually a US Army organization equipped with its own vessels. The boats were mostly fast transports equipped with rams, but included a gunboat and a hospital boat, the *Woodford*. The brigade's mission was to support short-term operations, such as raids, along rivers and streams where the mobility of their vessels would give them a significant ability to strike fast and leave. The brigade, unfortunately, was also considered the most ill-disciplined organization with the army. On 26 March, as the brigade's vessels prepared to move over

the falls (the *Woodford* actually was lost in the process), Banks received a message from Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson, newly appointed commander of the Army of the Tennessee, to return Ellet's brigade so it could be used to help patrol the Mississippi River now that most of Porter's squadron was up the Red River. Banks was happy to release Ellet and his troublesome troops and the brigade and its boats departed the following day. According to one historian, en route back to Vicksburg, the Mississippi Marine Brigade, "wreaked havoc at every village and plantation" on its journey to the mouth of the Red River.⁵

As Porter was having his trials at the falls, Banks, meanwhile, once again put on his politician's hat and continued to coordinate local elections to bring in pro-Union delegates for the upcoming constitutional convention that would replace the state's antebellum document. The elections here and that back in New Orleans were not Banks' whim. They were actions in line with the Lincoln administration's Reconstruction policies to bring reoccupied areas of rebellion back under Federal control with loyal citizens forming the new local and state governments. Despite the warning from Grant to get on with the campaign, Banks remained at Alexandria until 1 April focusing most of his attention on the election. Still, the campaign continued without his presence. On 26 March, the same day he received Grant's message, Banks ordered Franklin to begin the Army of the Gulf's march toward Natchitoches and Grand Ecore. Banks himself left Alexandria on 2 April. Before departing, he wrote Halleck a very optimistic letter. He informed Halleck that he wasn't concerned about the fact that Kirby Smith appeared to be concentrating his forces at Shreveport. In fact, he said he was more worried that Smith would not give battle there and if he didn't, the Army commander proclaimed he would have the city by 10 April. Finally, Banks boldly stated that he would then, "pursue the enemy into the interior of Texas for the sole purpose of dispersing or destroying" the enemy's forces.⁶ When Halleck showed Lincoln Banks' message, the president presciently remarked, "I am sorry to see this tone of confidence: the next news we shall hear from there will be of a defeat."⁷

Vignette: Porter recalled that the day after Banks' arrival in Alexandria, A. J. Smith held a review of his troops for the army commander. Porter described the origins of the ill will between Smith's western soldiers and Banks' eastern troops:

The general [Banks] and staff were all mounted and well mounted at that and bore themselves bravely on horseback as they rode up and down the lines, witnessed the manoeuvres, then bowed with military grace and rode off. "Those are

ragged guerrillas,” said Banks, “those are not soldiers. If a general can’t dress his troops better than that he should disband them.” “Walls have ears,” [Porter rejoined] “and so have trees.” This was overheard, or repeated, and reached General Smith’s ears. The result was the growth of a feud which lasted through the campaign, and extended to the men of Smith’s corps, who held Banks’s army responsible for that remark.⁸

Vignette: Porter also took time to describe the entrance of the Army of the Gulf into Alexandria:

The next day it was announced that Banks’ army was only twenty miles distant and would make a forced march into the town, and everyone was out to see the troops enter. They came along at the appointed time, not with the long, swinging stride I had been accustomed to in Sherman’s men or those of the Army of the Tennessee, but with very steady step, like veterans, shoulder to shoulder, arms at “right shoulder shift,” and keeping time with martial music. Really it was a beautiful sight, and I never saw a finer-looking set of troops than those. If Banks could not get to Shreveport with that army, I thought, he never could get there at all.⁹

Analysis

1. Was rain a feasible excuse for Franklin to delay in moving the army northward toward Alexandria? Why or why not?
2. What are a leader’s responsibilities regarding smooth and effective integration of attachments into his command?
3. Banks’ claim to “pursue the enemy into the interior of Texas for the sole purpose of dispersing or destroying” the enemy’s forces after 10 April seems to conflict with Grant’s directives to be done with the campaign and preparing to go to Mobile by 30 April. Do you think Banks is violating Grant’s intent or exercising disciplined initiative as part of what we would call “mission command” today?
4. What is your assessment of Confederate efforts to block the passage of Porter’s squadron? How could such an effort effect the success of the campaign? Consider the value of having Porter’s vessels at Shreveport once Bank’s army arrived there.

5. Where is the point of diminishing returns between a major commander's need to focus attention on military operations versus those of a political nature? Which has priority?

Stand 4 Henderson's Hill




Figure 3.10. Henderson Hill. Graphic by Robin Kern.




Figure 3.11. Route to Henderson Hill. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel to Henderson's Hill is about 30 minutes) From Levee Park to North 3rd Street. Turn right and Proceed to US 71/US 165 (MacArthur Drive). Turn left (south) onto US 71 and proceed to Louisiana 496 (Bayou Rapides Road). Turn right onto LA 496 (west) and proceed 11 miles to McNutt, Louisiana. At McNutt, LA 496 will end. Continue heading west on LA 121. Proceed 6 miles thru Hot Wells, LA, and continue on LA 121. The road will curve right (north) after leaving Hot Wells. From Hot Wells, proceed 2.4 miles to Red Store Hill Road. Turn left on Red Store Hill Road. At the intersection at the top of the hill, turn right and immediately turn right again into the Dark-Neal Cemetery parking area.

Orientation: Alexandria is 19 miles due east of this location. The Red River is 5 miles due north. Just below the bottom of the hill to the east is Jean de Jean Bayou. The route you drove follows Mower's approach march to Henderson's Hill. LA 496/121 is the Bayou Rapides Road, which follows the nineteenth-century road trace. The Dark-Neal Cemetery and vicinity was the location of Edgar's Battery (which faced southeast) and the camp of the 2nd Louisiana Cavalry. Mower's forces swung wide to the south, west, and north of this position to get behind Vincent's forces.

Description: (See Appendix L, Map L-7 for an overview of the first phase of the campaign.) Once he received word that Fort DeRussy had fallen, Taylor knew that it would only be a matter of a day or less before Federal troops were approaching Alexandria. He immediately ordered the evacuation of all troops and military stores from the city to keep them from falling into Union hands. Once that task was accomplished, he set out on 15 March to join the main body of his troops, composed of Mouton's and Polignac's brigades, located 25 miles south of Alexandria on the Bayou Boeuf. There he sent word to Walker at Bayou du Lac to let him know that he was moving all troops back to Carroll Jones' plantation and ordered Walker to join him there. On 16 March, Taylor started his command northward in search of good ground on which to give battle to Banks.

Carroll Jones was a wealthy "free man of color" and enslaver. As such, Jones was an unusual figure in American history. Originally the son of an enslaver and an African-American enslaved woman, it is not clear how he came to be a freeman. Originally from Tennessee, he apparently came to Louisiana to breed and race horses but actually became rich through his operation of two large plantations. Ostensibly, he was supportive of the rebellion and he willingly provided the use of his property to Taylor for a supply cache point. After the war, Jones applied for a claim for damages to the US government for over \$7000. In the claims process several former

Confederate soldiers testified that Jones helped raise a company of Confederate troops and ran for office as a Democrat. Several people, all formerly enslaved, testified that he was a loyal Union man and had run for office as a Republican. Eventually the claim was denied due to Jones' inability to provide sufficient proof that he had been loyal to the United States. As one historian later pondered, given the social conditions of the time, Jones likely "was compelled to be all things to all people," in order to prosper.¹⁰ The decision did not stop him however, and he went on to purchase his second plantation in the Cane River valley near Natchitoches after the war. That farm was even more productive for him than his first one in the pine barrens.

Jones' original plantation was located at a strategic crossroad where the route from Burr's Ferry on the Sabine River and the road to Natchitoches, to the northeast, separated. It was about 27 miles northwest of Alexandria and 11 miles west of Henderson's Hill. Taylor selected the site, along with a number of others, for the establishment of a series of supply depots placed at strategic points throughout the 'pine barrens' area between the Sabine and Red Rivers (see Appendix L, Maps L-7 and L-11). Since his army possessed only a few wagons, Taylor was forced to use these supply depots to fall back on to resupply his troops as Banks advanced. The system was to work very well during the retreat, but was going to be next to useless if Taylor had to advance, but he would have to worry about that problem later, if he had the chance.

By 19 March, almost all available troops in Taylor's command were assembled at Carroll Jones' plantation to include Walker's Division, Mouton's Brigade, Polignac's Brigade, and most of Vincent's 2nd Louisiana Cavalry. Only Liddell's diminutive cavalry brigade from his Sub-District of Northern Louisiana was not present. Taylor would keep it north of the Red River to protect those areas and harass US movements on the river. At Jones' plantation, Taylor organized a new division with Mouton's and Polignac's brigades and appointed Mouton as the commander. Colonel Henry Gray assumed command of Mouton's brigade. Taylor now had about 6,500 troops under his direct control; close to 7,000 if one included Liddell's command. There would soon be more on the way. On 20 March, Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Churchill's Arkansas Division and Brig. Gen. Mosby M. Parsons' Missouri Division, both of Maj. Gen. Sterling Price's District of Arkansas, began their march from Arkansas to join Kirby Smith in Shreveport. Also *en route* was Brig. Gen. Thomas Green's cavalry division from the District of Texas. Once Green arrived, these units would double the strength of Taylor's command to about 14,000, but there was little he could do before they arrived. In fact, there was no guarantee that

the two infantry divisions would even be released by Kirby Smith to Taylor's control once they arrived in Shreveport. For the time being, Taylor had to make do with what he had.

Most of Vincent's 2nd Louisiana Cavalry had arrived at Carroll Jones' on 17 March (the three companies briefly trapped on the east side of the Atchafalaya River re-crossed the Atchafalaya at Morgan's Ferry, rejoined Walker, and arrived with his division). The regiment had marched and skirmished northward nearly 190 miles in six days and were worn-out. Still, this unit, which was to serve as the eyes and ears of Taylor's army, was the only serviceable horse-mounted cavalry that he currently possessed south of the Red River. He was anxiously waiting for word regarding the arrival of the cavalry division from Texas, but because he did not have the ciphers to decode General Magruder's dispatches, Taylor remained in the dark as to when Green's cavalry would arrive. Taylor needed to know what the Federals intended in terms of routes of advance on Shreveport so he decided to send Vincent's tired troops forward after less than two day's rest.

On 19 March, Vincent's cavalry moved south to set up a screen line to watch for Federal movement in the Bayou Rapides valley south of James Store. Vincent selected a place called Henderson's Hill from which to conduct his observations since that location commanded the junction of Bayou Rapides and Bayou Cotile. Soon, Vincent was sending back reports on Federal activities. During the day on the 20th, some of Vincent's men skirmished with Federal troops near McNutt's Hill six miles southeast of Henderson's Hill and captured six prisoners who were sent back to Taylor.

The activities of the 2nd Louisiana Cavalry did not go unnoticed. Those activities, and reports that Taylor had a large camp of infantry troops camped near Fort Jesup (Carroll's Plantation) prompted A. J. Smith to push out a reconnaissance in force to reconnoiter the road toward Natchitoches on the morning of the 21st (see Appendix L, Map L-7). He chose Mower's division to lead the expedition. Also with Mower was Albert Lee's 1st Cavalry Brigade (which had just arrived at Alexandria) and two batteries of artillery. Mower selected several of his regiments, elements of Lee's cavalry and the two batteries, about 1,000 men in all, to perform the reconnaissance. Mower's ad hoc force covered about 25 miles in seven and one-half hours despite the fact that during the day the weather turned to pouring rain and sleet.

Colonel Thomas J. Lucas, commanding the 1st Cavalry Brigade, led the advance in the cold driving rain. About 13 miles out of Alexandria on

the Bayou Rapides Road (now LA 121) Lucas encountered elements of Vincent's 2nd Louisiana. Lucas's brigade drove the Louisianans westward about seven miles. Vincent reported to Taylor that he was being pushed back. Taylor responded by reinforcing Vincent with Capt. William Edgar's 1st Field Battery, Texas Light Artillery. Edgar's four-gun battery (two 6-pounder field guns and two 12-pounder howitzers) initially took position here on Henderson's Hill above the Bayou Jean de Jean where it commanded the Bayou Rapides valley below.

Once Lucas encountered Vincent's main position on Henderson's Hill, he held in place in the valley to keep an eye on the enemy and wait for Mower's infantry to arrive (see Appendix L, Map L-9). Around 1300, however, Edgar's battery open fired on Lucas' men and sent the Federal cavalry running for cover. Once Mower arrived later that afternoon, he surveyed the position and then ordered Lucas to demonstrate in the rebels' front with three of his regiments to hold their attention. A fourth regiment, accompanied by two guns and Mower's infantry, would move west, then north, and east to fall on the enemy's rear. That evening, led by a local guide (described by some as a deserter or jayhawker), Mower along, with the 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, the 16th Indiana Mounted Infantry, and a section of Battery G, 5th US Artillery, started off into the dark on a five-mile turning movement of the rebel position (see Appendix L, Map L-10). It was to be a wet, cold, and fatiguing march.

Meanwhile, as reports came in Taylor developed a sense that perhaps that Vincent's position was too exposed. He dispatched Maj. Joseph L. Brent, his chief of artillery, to determine if Vincent needed more assistance. Brent later returned and reported that Vincent did need reinforcement and was expecting a major attack the following morning. Despite the strength of the ground Taylor feared that the Federals might succeed in taking the position and destroy his limited reconnaissance assets. Thus, he sent an aide, Capt. Charles Elgee (who hailed from Rapides Parish and knew the ground) with orders for Captain Edgar to withdraw his battery. Elgee was supposed to also emphasize to Vincent to be especially vigilant.

After struggling through thick woods, swamps, and mud, around 2230 Mower's lead element, the 35th Iowa, began to encounter some of Vincent's drowsy pickets in the rain. Mower's troops captured eight separate posts, three couriers (including Captain Elgee before he could deliver his message), one guidon, and an ambulance with horses without raising any alarm. One of the couriers was on his way from Vincent back to Taylor when he mistook Mower's column for Confederate reinforcements since they were now in the rear of the rebel position. Mower passed himself off

as General Taylor and was able to get the courier to lead him and the 'reinforcements' to Vincent's camp.

After a brief rest, the column approached Vincent's camp around midnight. Mower left the 16th Indiana Mounted Infantry and the artillery to block the roads leading north out of the camp to catch any leakers. He then donned a rebel greatcoat and led his force into the camp with fixed bayonets as the rain continued to fall. The surprise was total. The miserable Confederate troopers were huddled around fires and utterly distracted by the weather and their weariness. Edgar's battery appeared as though it was prepared for a rapid withdrawal: horses hitched to caissons, guns in position, and two guns charged with canister. During the brief skirmish, there were only a few stray shots, and only one Federal soldier was wounded. Colonel Vincent himself reportedly, "escaped in his slippers" and hid in a henhouse to avoid capture.¹¹ In addition to Edgar's four-gun battery, Mower's men captured four caissons filled with ammunition, 32 artillery horses; 222 soldiers including 16 officers, 126 cavalry horses, and 92 stand of small-arms.

When Taylor learned of the capture of the 2nd Louisiana Cavalry the following day he immediately understood what it meant in terms of his ability to oppose any move by Banks. "This disaster, he wrote, "leaves me with little or no means of obtaining information in front of a very large force of the enemy's cavalry."¹² Without cavalry, Taylor was now forced to rely on reports from a few scouts, spies, and volunteers who could only operate on the Federal flanks. Because of their small numbers, and the large number of Federal cavalry, they would also be forced to report by circuitous routes, thereby delaying the information perhaps to the point of making it useless.

On morning of the disaster, Taylor feared that Union cavalry was now advancing on his location at Carroll Jones's plantation. The Federals, however, apparently satisfied with depriving the rebels of almost all of their entire cavalry force, instead returned to Alexandria to await the arrival of General Banks. Even without an attack, Taylor thought it best to continue the retreat north where he had additional depots to supply his men.

Taylor first ordered his meager trains to head for Beasley's Plantation, another forage depot located twelve miles northwest near the crossroads to Fort Jesup and Natchitoches. "Without cavalry," he explained to Kirby Smith at the time, "this (Beasley's) is the most favorable position for my infantry to await the arrival of General Green."¹³ Before the main body moved from Carroll Jones' Plantation, however, Taylor's pickets reported

an approaching column of the enemy on the morning of 23 March and he quickly formed his small force into line of battle. Fortunately, the “enemy” turned out to be the remnants of the 2nd Louisiana Cavalry. After about an hour, Taylor and his men marched on to Beasley’s.

Vignette: A “Private Soldier” who served in Walker’s Division wrote:

During the day we heard heavy firing in the direction of McNutt’s Hill, distant from our camp about twelve miles. We learned afterwards that the 2nd Louisiana Cavalry was falling back before the enemy. Edgar’s Battery of Light Artillery, that was attached to Scurry’s Brigade, was ordered to the front. Notwithstanding the gloomy weather, a violent storm of rain and sleet having fallen while we were encamped here, everything betokened the greatest activity. General Dick Taylor had taken the field in person, and had immediate command of the army. The foe, encouraged by our continued retrograde movements, was becoming bolder, and even more daring every day.¹⁴

Analysis

1. Evaluate Taylor’s decision to send the 2nd Louisiana Cavalry on another mission after having marched and fought as long as it had. Were there any alternatives?
2. Compare and critique the performances of Colonel Vincent and General Mower.
3. How do unit leaders ensure maintenance of security and readiness under trying or severe conditions?
4. How did the terrain affect the outcome of this action?
5. What is your assessment of Taylor’s plan for logistical support for his army?
6. According to the Army’s FM 2-0, there are nine characteristics of effective intelligence:
 - Accuracy
 - Timeliness
 - Usability
 - Completeness
 - Precision
 - Reliability

- Relevant
 - Predictive
 - Tailored
7. With Taylor's cavalry force greatly reduced after losing much of the 2nd Louisiana, which of the above intelligence characteristics do you believe was most affected and why?

Stand 5

Decision at Grand Ecore




Figure 3.12. Route map to Grand Ecore. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel to Grand Ecore is about 50 minutes) From Henderson’s Hill return to Louisiana 121. Turn left (north) on LA 121 and proceed 8 miles to Louisiana 1. Turn left (west) on LA 1 North and proceed 1.9 miles to Louisiana 8. Turn left (south) on LA 8 and proceed to the Interstate Highway 49 North ramp. Turn right onto I-49 N. Proceed 35 miles north to Louisiana 6 East at Exit 138 at Natchitoches. Merge right onto Louisiana 6 and proceed to Louisiana 6 Loop. Turn left (north) onto LA 6 (Note: LA 6 and LA 1 will merge here). Proceed 1.5 miles to Louisiana 3175 Bypass. Turn right (east) onto LA 6/LA 3175 Bypass (Note: LA 1 will continue north here). Proceed 3.5 miles to Grand Ecore on LA 6. Before crossing the Red River Bridge, turn left onto Tauzin Island Road (Parish Road 429), and then an immediate right turn into the Corps of Engineers Visitors’ Center.

Alternate Stand Location: If access to the Grand Ecore Corps of Engineers Visitors’ Center is not available, staff ride facilitators can opt to use an alternate stand across the Red River where the bluffs may be viewed. **Directions (for alternate stand location):** Proceed across the Red River Bridge. After you cross the bridge, turn left at the first dirt road turn about 100 yards past the end of the bridge ramp. Turn left again until proceeding down the dirt road toward the river. Park at the empty lot next to the struc-




Figure 3.13. Decision at Grand Ecore. Graphic by Robin Kern.

tural fire training facility. Proceed on foot next to the bridge until reaching a point where the bluffs can be viewed.

Orientation (use for both stand locations): Grand Ecore, which is the French phrase for “big bluff,” received its name from the imposing 100-foot cliff overlooking Red River on which the Corps of Engineers Visitor’s Center sits (See Appendix L, Map L-11). In 1826, Dr. Samuel Russel built a trading post and home here which started the village. Grand Ecore itself was situated on the bluffs overlooking the river. The town served as the port of Natchitoches when the Red River’s flow began to shift from the Cane River to its present course in 1833. To your front is the channel of the Red River as it was in 1864. Bayou Pierre, through which some of the Red River’s flow was diverted in 1864 by Confederate engineers, reenters the Red River about one and a half miles just north of here. To the east of the highway bridge a small rounded inlet marks the anchorage site of the Porter’s fleet while it was here before and after the battle of Mansfield. The bluff to the west has eroded somewhat since 1864. At that time, the edge of the bluff as you see it today would

have extended about 50-60 yards further towards the middle of the river. The stand is about 58 miles northwest of Alexandria, 76 miles southeast of Shreveport, and about 4 miles north of Natchitoches.

Description: (See Appendix L, Map L-11) In 1833, Capt. Henry Shreve (for whom Shreveport is named) began the removal of the “Great Raft,” a 160-mile natural logjam which choked the main channel of the Red River for two centuries between Natchitoches and Shreveport (See Appendix L, Map L-11). The backflow from the raft caused the Red River to change course and flow through the main channel of the Cane River which runs through Natchitoches. Although the project was not fully completed until 1873, the removal of the raft was sufficient enough by the 1840s that river boat traffic to Shreveport was a common occurrence by 1860. As the raft was removed, the river slowly returned its primary flow to the route of the current Red River, its natural course.

The bluffs around Grand Ecore were originally fortified during the period of Spanish possession of Louisiana. During the Mexican War, Lieut. Ulysses S. Grant was stationed here for a short time. After that conflict, the position and its defenses fell into disuse. Once the Civil War began, the Confederates began to improve and expand the fortifications and General Banks’ federal forces greatly increased their size and complexity immediately following the retreat from Pleasant Hill.

Boggs, the Trans-Mississippi Department engineer, supervised the initial construction and renovation of the rebel fortifications here. At first, Kirby Smith supported Boggs’ plan and efforts. On 5 October 1863, however, Smith ordered Boggs to remove the two 9-inch guns that had been placed on the bluffs, and move them to Shreveport for the city’s defenses. He also ordered Boggs to cease any further fortification work on the river below that city.

Union Activities at Grand Ecore

On 26 and 27 March A. J. Smith’s veterans set off from Alexandria for Cotile (pronounced “Cotee”) Landing (modern day Boyce, LA), 22 miles upriver. There, Smith met Porter’s fleet on 29 March and boarded transports for the journey to Grand Ecore. Since the *Eastport* grounded again after she made it over the falls, Porter transferred his flag to the USS *Cricket* on 2 April and the flotilla reached Grand Ecore the following day. *Louisville*, *Pittsburgh*, *Mound City*, *Carondelet*, and 28 transports lay in the anchorage while tug, *Alf Cutting*, worked on retrieving the grounded *Eastport* and *Ozark*. Once again, while the admiral waited for Banks to arrive, Porter’s sailors spread out to hunt for more cotton over the next three days.

The same day A. J. Smith's troops departed Alexandria, Lee's cavalry set out for Grand Ecore and entered Natchitoches on 30 March. Two days later, on 1 April, Franklin's XIX Corps column marched into Grand Ecore after having covered eighty miles in four days. Brigadier General Cuvier Grover's 2nd Division, XIX Army Corps remained behind in Alexandria to secure that location as a depot and prepare defenses which reduced Banks' available field force by 3,600 troops.

On 1 April, the day after his cavalry division entered Natchitoches, Lee sent Lucas' 1st Brigade 12 miles west on a reconnaissance to White's Store (modern Robeline, LA). The following day Lee brought up his 3rd and 4th Brigades, and with the 1st Brigade moved six west miles to Crump's Hill (near modern Marthaville, LA) where he encountered a rebel force that he estimated at 2,000 strong with six guns. The force was Brig. Gen. Arthur P. Bagby's brigade of Green's Cavalry Division, as well as a portion of Brig. Gen. Xavier B. Debray's brigade of the same command. The Confederate troops were en route from Texas to join Taylor at Pleasant Hill. After a several-hour running fight in which Lee's troopers initially gained the upper hand, Bagby's force finally made a determined stand at Crump's Hill and Lee opted to break off the action and return to Natchitoches.

On the evening of 3 April, Lee ordered Col. Oliver P. Gooding's 5th Cavalry Brigade to cross a recently constructed pontoon bridge on the Red River and report to A. J. Smith on the northeastern side of the river. The following morning, Smith ordered Gooding to make a reconnaissance along the river road toward Campti about six miles away and drive away any enemy forces might be there. Smith further told Gooding that he could expect support from an infantry brigade posted along a bayou about three miles downriver from Campti. Gooding's brigade moved north escorted by the gunboat *Lexington* covering their left flank along the river.

The rebel forces in Campti were under Liddell's command. They consisted of Harrison's small 500-man brigade of cavalry who were mostly armed with shotguns, muskets, and rifles. Liddell also possessed a battery of 6-pounder field guns and pair of 12-pounder howitzers. Liddell posted 120 soldiers of Col. A. J. McNeill's 4th Louisiana Cavalry and a company of the 8th Missouri Cavalry under Lt. Col. Samuel J. Ward along the river road (now LA 480). The remainder of the brigade took post along the interior road (now US 71) paralleling the river road.

When Gooding arrived at the location of the infantry brigade, the commander, Col. Lucius F. Hubbard, although junior to Gooding by six

months, refused to accompany Gooding. He claimed he had orders from A. J. Smith that said otherwise and that he would have to send back to Smith for clarification. Gooding left Hubbard's troops behind to guard the road and pressed on to face the enemy alone.

As Gooding's cavalry approached Campti, the Confederates positioned there opened fire on the troopers from buildings within the town. Soon after the initial contact, Gooding sent Maj. George R. Davis and the 3rd Rhode Island Cavalry to set fire to Campti and try to cut off the Confederate retreat. The supporting gunfire from the *Lexington*, however, prevented the action as the vessel's fire was across Davis' front. After being pressed by Gooding's troopers, Liddell's troops began to withdraw across a small bridge toward the high ground north of the town. Tearing up the bridge after crossing, the Confederates posted themselves on the hill while the Federals continued to press forward. The Confederates fought on there for two hours, but ran out of ammunition, and were again forced to retreat. Toward the end of the fight Hubbard finally brought up his infantry, but he was too late to affect the outcome. Gooding continued for another two miles before encountering a burning camp site left by the retiring rebels. He then returned to destroy the village, or at least those buildings and houses from which his troops had received fire.

Vignette: Regarding the action at Campti, General Liddell wrote, "I had determined to attack this force however disproportionate to my own, when I was informed by Col. Isaac F. Harrison, the immediate commander of the brigade under my command, that his men could not be relied upon to fight infantry, and that he himself, knowing the material of which his brigade was composed, was unwilling to attempt any hazardous enterprise, and this disinclination to risk his command prevailed with him to the end while under my direction. In consequence of these representations and the immediate retirement of the enemy to their boats (they not having come out more than half a mile), my design was not executed."¹⁵

The Federals suffered 4 killed, 18 wounded; the Confederates, an estimated 8 killed, 18-20 wounded, and 3 captured. Despite the disinclination of Harrison's brigade to fight infantry, Liddell continued to do his best to harass Federal forces and send back intelligence about Union movements to Taylor.

The Decision: Which Route to Take?

About the time Gooding received his mission to support Smith on 3 April, Banks arrived at Grand Ecore. He soon discovered that he faced a major decision about the route to Shreveport from Grand Ecore and had to

make his choice quickly. In twelve days Banks would lose Smith's 10,000 soldiers who had to be released by 15 April so he had less than two weeks to take Shreveport. His ponderous delays in Alexandria to gather cotton and hold elections had already ate up much of the time that he needed to address his primary mission. The delays had also allowed Taylor to deliberately plan his every move and keep his balance in the face of much superior US forces. Taylor was already formulating what he wanted to do, but at Grand Ecore, Banks did not even know what route he would take next to go to Shreveport.

The problem was that there appeared to be only three routes he could take to get to his destination. One, of course, was the river. He would use that route for the navy and Smith's command, but he lacked enough transports to move the rest of the Army of the Gulf. There were two land routes, one that led northwest along the east side of the river. The other veered away from the river at Grand Ecore and passed through an area called the pine barrens toward Mansfield, through Keachi, then to Shreveport. Examining the available maps was no help. Army maps and river navigation charts differed markedly. Existing towns, villages, roads, and lakes were not always indicated and some were mismarked. Some maps gave distances between locations, but did not show roads, and the naming conventions for various locations and roads varied.

Apparently unknown to Banks and other Federal commanders was the fact that there were actually two roads leading to Shreveport which closely paralleled the river. The known route, called the "Winter Road" on east bank of the river was a good road and as its name implied, was the route of choice in the cold, rainy wintertime, even though it was the longer way to Shreveport. The "Summer Road" on the west bank was not as good, but was trafficable for an army in the dryer months. On his voyage further north, Porter later discovered the existence of the latter road and that it traversed a very pleasant farming region. As he observed, the area contained much in the way of crops and farm animals and it was clearly visible along the river so the navy could have easily supported the army's move. The road, however, did not appear on any of the available maps.

Banks consulted Withenbury (who accompanied Porter north on the river as his pilot) about the roads. Withenbury was a Connecticut man who had lived in Louisiana for 20 years. As a pilot, Withebury knew the river as well as any man, and far better than most. He certainly knew of the Summer Road, but he failed to mention its existence to Banks. Besides being a river pilot, he also had interests in the cotton trade. Having seen Porter's men seizing cotton and knowing that Confederate forces were

destroying the “white gold” as they retreated, many historians have speculated that Withenbury did not mention the road because he owned property on that side of the river along the road and may have wished to save his own cotton.

Withenbury told Banks that the eastern road (i.e., the Winter Road) was a good road, but that it would add three days to the army’s move because of the winding route around the lakes in the area. Moreover, the road emptied out on the opposite bank of the river at Shreveport and Banks would then have to conduct an amphibious assault to the west bank, probably against resistance.

When asked about routes to the west, the pilot claimed the route through Mansfield to Shreveport was the only feasible road although it was on average about 20 miles inland. Porter then recommended to Banks that he be allowed to conduct a reconnaissance upriver for two or three days to see if other routes might exist, but Banks refused the admiral’s request. He also decided against a cavalry reconnaissance as well, stating that he was running out of time and could not afford to wait for two more days. Thus, Banks fatefully decided on the inland route.

The route now decided, and keeping to the pattern he established before leaving New Orleans, Banks turned over day-to-day command of the army to Franklin while he busied himself with organizing elections that were to be held at Grand Ecore on 5 April.

After the meeting with Withenbury and Porter, Banks and the admiral developed an outline logistics plan to support the army while it was on the new route. The flag officers agreed that elements of Banks command would meet at Springfield Landing on Lake Cannisnia on 10 April. The landing was located about four miles inland from the Red River on a narrow channel connecting with Bayou Pierre. There Banks’s trains could replenish their stocks from the army transports. Banks planned to have the army depart on 6 April and Porter planned to move the next day.

Steele’s Camden Expedition, Phase I (Offsite) (see Appendix L, Map L-6)

The Arkansas pincer of the Red River Campaign was under the command of Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele. Steele’s plan was to move to Arkadelphia where he would be joined by Brig. Gen. John M. Thayer’s Frontier Division marching in from Fort Smith. From there he would proceed south to Shreveport to help Banks invest Shreveport. Once Banks had taken the city, Steele would garrison Shreveport and secure the Red River Valley

while Banks' Army of the Gulf invaded northeastern Texas (or so Banks intended if time allowed).

Steele was not favorably disposed toward this campaign. Initially he offered only to provide a demonstration toward the direction of Shreveport to draw away forces from Banks. Grant, the new general-in-chief, made it clear to Steele that he would fully cooperate in the advance on Shreveport and that a "demonstration" was not sufficient. Reluctantly, Steele led his 6,800-man column, composed of the 3rd Division, VII Corps, 2 cavalry brigades, and artillery, southwest out of Little Rock on 23 March. He was supposed to meet Thayer at Arkadelphia on 1 April.

As a precaution against a flank attack against his column, Steele ordered Col. Powell Clayton, the US commander at Pine Bluff, to distract local rebel forces with a thrust toward Monticello and Camden. On 30 March, after several skirmishes with superior Confederate forces, Clayton won a convincing battle near Mount Elba which effectively eliminated that rebel force from interfering with Steele's movement from that quarter. That would not be enough, however.

Steele's column arrived in Arkadelphia on 29 March and waited three days for Thayer, all the while consuming his limited supplies of food. When Thayer's column failed to show, Steele continued without Thayer to the southwest toward Washington on 1 April and after several minor skirmishes reached the Little Missouri River two days later. With no contact or news from Thayer and evidence of a growing Confederate force in his front, Steele began to sense that continuing the movement on Shreveport was going to be more problematic than he planned.

Steele's forces seized Elkin's Ferry on the Little Missouri River on 2 April and fought a heavy rear-guard skirmish the following day against Brig. Gen. Joseph O. Shelby's cavalry brigade as the Federals began to bridge the river. On 4 April, three additional cavalry brigades under Brig. Gen. John S. Marmaduke joined the fight from the south, but Steele's troops eventually drove them away.

After the Confederate repulse Marmaduke and Shelby moved 16 miles southwest where the newly appointed district commander, Sterling Price, joined them on 7 April. There Price directed his command to prepare defensive positions to oppose any further advance by Steele's Federals from Elkin's Ferry to Washington. The position consisted of lightly fortified earthworks at the western edge of the open and sparsely-populated Prairie d'Ane.

Meanwhile Steele, having finally heard from Thayer on 5 April, decided to wait near Elkin's Ferry for Thayer's column. Thayer's 3,600-man division arrived on 9 April (the same day that the Battle of Pleasant Hill took place which will be discussed at a later stand). Steele now had a combined force of about 10,400 men but his command was almost out of food. His men had been on half rations since leaving Little Rock and now the addition of Thayer's force further strained the dwindling Union supplies. Steele immediately sent word to the quartermaster depot at Little Rock to provide him 30-days rations for 15,000 troops and dispatched hundreds of empty wagons to retrieve the supplies. Continuing on to Shreveport now appeared impossible, but Steele at least perceived an opportunity to attack Price and extract his own command from a difficult situation.

Price believed that Steele's objective was the Confederate state capital of Arkansas at Washington, not Shreveport, and thus his defensive positions at Prairie d'Ane were placed with that object in mind. He further sent other troops to the rear to set up additional defenses to slow Steele's column until the Missouri and Arkansas infantry divisions which had been sent south to Shreveport could return and take up the fight. Steele, however, now had no intentions of going to Washington, but saw a chance to easily maneuver Price out of his positions. On 10 April, Steele sent his command forward with an intention of turning Price's open left flank. After a lengthy battle that lasted into the dark, Price's command fell back to the additional works farther south.

The following day, Steele formed his entire command in front of the Confederate works and waited for the rebels to come out and attack. Price refused the bait and that night, fell back another eight miles. Steele, however, took the opportunity to put his army on the march to Camden, totally surprising the Confederate commander. For the next three days, Steele's column trudged toward Camden and arrived there on 14 April after stiff skirmishing by his rear guard (Thayer's division) and another sharp action with Marmaduke's troops the day before. If not apparent to Steele then, it soon would be that his movement toward Shreveport was at an end.

Confederate Command, Confusion, and Consternation

When Steele left Little Rock on 1 April reports soon arrived at Kirby Smith's headquarters in Shreveport notifying him of the Federal move. Smith had been receiving intelligence since at least mid-March that Steele was preparing for an operation. With that information he faced the decision of which Federal column to fight first. His initial assessment was that Banks column was the most immediate threat (since it was already

in Alexandria by mid-March) and acting on that assessment, Smith ordered Price to send his two infantry divisions (about 2,000 men each), which were under the command of Brig. Gen. Mosby Parsons and Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Churchill, to the department headquarters on 20 March. Positioned at Shreveport, the divisions could then be moved to defend against any Federal thrust towards Shreveport. To help defend southwest Arkansas, Smith also ordered forces under Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Maxey in the Indian Territory to move into Arkansas and assist Price in holding off Steele. Smith's deployments significantly reduced Confederate troops in Texas and the Indian Territory, leaving only 4,600 effectives in those two regions. Most of the remaining forces were gathered in eastern and southeastern Texas to prepare against invasion if Banks captured Shreveport.

While Kirby Smith worried about the big picture, Taylor continued to look for opportunities to strike at Banks' forces. His troops had remained at Beasley's Plantation until 29 March when he directed them to move further north to Pleasant Hill, another depot site. They arrived there the following day while Taylor himself traveled to Natchitoches. That evening, he finally made contact with the first contingent of Green's cavalry division, the 5th Texas Cavalry under Col. Henry C. McNeill. The following day, 31 March, another Texas regiment arrived at Natchitoches but as Lee's cavalry was approaching the town, Taylor ordered them to fall back toward Pleasant Hill and set out for that location himself.

Arriving at Pleasant Hill the following day, Taylor's command was soon joined by Green and his staff. From the Texas cavalry commander Taylor learned that the rest of Green's command, a small cavalry division under Brig. Gen. John P. Major, would not arrive until 6 April. It was at this time that the cavalry actions with Lee's troops at Crump's Hill described earlier took place. Taylor, having received reports regarding the fighting at Crump's Hill, held his troops ready at Pleasant Hill until it was apparent that there was not going to be an immediate advance by Banks. On 4 April, apparently satisfied that Banks was going to move inland along the Natchitoches-Shreveport Stage Road, Taylor ordered his infantry, artillery, and trains to the village of Mansfield, 16 miles north. From there he could also shift his forces east toward the river should Banks end up going by that route. He left what was present of Green's cavalry at Pleasant Hill to conduct patrols and screen against Federal movements.

As all these actions were taking place, there was a series of communications between Taylor and Kirby Smith which aggravated what had already become a poor superior-subordinate relationship. Taylor believed that the most immediate threat was Banks' army. That is not hard to fath-

om since Taylor was defending his home state. Smith, however, steadfastly refused to provide Taylor significant reinforcements to seriously oppose Banks' advance. Smith, as has been indicated, had to be concerned about the whole of the Trans-Mississippi and was not yet convinced that Banks was the more serious threat. Indeed, he expected Taylor to continue trading space (i.e., central Louisiana and the Red River Valley) for time.

Kirby Smith's expectations and other intelligence Taylor received about his commander's actions further exacerbated the problem. On 26 March, Taylor had received a letter from a Confederate congressman, Duncan Kenner, which happened to mention that there were troops from Arkansas in Shreveport and had been there a number of days. Taylor had been sending numerous messages requesting reinforcement from Kirby Smith to help him oppose Banks' superior forces. Now Taylor discovered that there were two divisions of infantry close at hand and Smith had totally neglected to mention that those units were in the area in any of his correspondence with his subordinate. When Taylor angrily demanded an explanation, Smith said the troops had not moved because they were busy replenishing their ammunition supply.

Then on 31 March Smith wrote to Taylor to fall back on Shreveport so that all forces could be concentrated for combined action. He explained to his subordinate, "Our role must be a defensive policy where the enemy is largely our superior, and where our columns come within a practicable distance of each other, concentrating rapidly upon and crushing one or the other of the enemy's columns."¹⁶ The problem was that Smith had also told Taylor earlier that year that he believed that Arkansas was the key theater of the department as well. That fact, Smith's seeming willingness to give up most of Louisiana to the Yankees, the lack of significant reinforcements coming to the District of West Louisiana, and Smith's lack of candor about the presence of possible additional troops, had infuriated Taylor and made him suspicious of the department commander's motives. From this point forward, Taylor now blamed all his problems on Smith (and would continue to blame him for the logistical and command failings of the campaign until the day he died). Even though Green's cavalry had been detained in Texas by Magruder, Taylor even blamed that on Smith.

The political atmosphere at the department headquarters made matters worse. Many of Smith's staff officers were trying to advance their commander's reputation (and thus their own) at Taylor's expense. Even though he was a native Louisianan, the departmental surgeon, Dr. Solomon "Sol" Smith (no relation to the commander), was a sworn enemy of Taylor. Dr. Smith had served as Kirby Smith's surgeon since the early days of the

war. Since then, he had thoroughly ingratiated himself with Kirby Smith and won his confidence more than any other member of Smith's staff. The doctor's ill-will toward Taylor began when Taylor advised Kirby Smith to make Shreveport his headquarters due to Alexandria's vulnerability to Federal attack. Sol Smith, however, was a native of the town and persuaded Kirby Smith to make Alexandria the headquarters. When the Bank's advance up Bayou Teche in the spring of 1863 made the central Louisiana town untenable (as Taylor predicted) Kirby Smith was forced to move his headquarters north to Shreveport, just as Taylor had recommended in the first place. For this and other more personal reasons, Dr. Smith hated Taylor and even went so far as to blame him for the Union incursion.

Additionally, there was another aspect of Kenner's letter to Taylor that was disturbing. Kenner told him that rumors at the department headquarters were that Taylor was to blame for the losses in the Red River Valley thus far. The rumors went further by stating that Taylor had denied any need for reinforcements. What apparently was going on was an effort by Sol Smith (who by this time essentially functioned as Kirby Smith's personal secretary and chief of staff) to make it look like Taylor was to blame for the loss and destruction of Louisiana and that the Arkansas troops would be used by Kirby Smith himself to come to Taylor's rescue. That would make it appear that Smith had saved the day against Banks' army and thereby destroy Taylor's reputation while enhancing that of the department commander. The department's actual chief of staff, Boggs (who would come to despise Sol Smith as well), also suspected this was the case. When Taylor heatedly confronted Kirby Smith by letter about the denial for reinforcements and sent additional pointed messages afterward that accused Sol Smith of rumormongering, the department commander decided he had to travel to Mansfield to meet with his subordinate and try to smooth things over.

Departure from Grand Ecore

On 6 April, the Army of the Gulf finally began the final leg of its movement north toward Shreveport. Lee's cavalry led the column out onto the old El Camino Real (the "Royal Road" of the Spanish colonial period, now Louisiana Highway [LA] 6) which led from Natchitoches to the Sabine River and eventually to San Antonio. Following the cavalry division was the 300 wagons of Lee's train. Normally, on a move such as this, the cavalry train would travel as part of the army's train in the rear. Franklin, however, had insisted on having Lee's wagons follow directly behind the cavalry in order to avoid delaying the army's own trains, which consisted of another 700 vehicles, including ambulances. There were another 50 or so wagons which supported A. J. Smith's men and the

artillery. The wagons carried ten days' supplies for 30,000 soldiers. Some elements of the *Corps d'Afrique* escorted Lee's wagons, but the majority of the 2,500-strong US Colored Troops brigade escorted the infantry's trains. Behind the trains came A. J. Smith's XVI Corps. Gooding's cavalry brigade provided rear security and, when possible, the army's left flank as well. As can be seen, the column's organization meant that the main body of infantry was blocked by wagons in front and rear. The column itself was nearly 20 miles long and its slowness of movement ensured that Smith's corps did not even leave Grand Ecore until 7 April.

About 12 miles west of Natchitoches the column passed near the ruins of the old Spanish capital of Tejas at Los Adaes and then turned north once more on the Stage Road (LA 120). At the intersection stood White's Store (now Robeline, LA). There, some of the men fell out of the column and bought almost everything the storeowner had (on the army's return, other troops would burn the store down). From White's Store the Stage Road continued north to Crump's Corner (near Belmont), then headed north toward Shreveport (LA 175). North of White's Store the terrain opened briefly into relatively flat bottom-land with small streams where soldiers could fill their canteens, then the route began to pass through more hilly terrain.

Banks himself traveled with Franklin at the head of the XIX Corps. For the movement forward, the general commanding insisted that Lee's cavalry moderate its pace in order to maintain contact with the head of the infantry column and to protect its own trains. Thus hobbled, Lee's troops were prevented from efficiently conducting some of the cavalry's most basic missions as the column crawled forward through the pine barrens, its pace set by the movement of the trains.

The same day A. J. Smith's men left Grand Ecore, Porter's detachment of the Mississippi River Squadron started north up the Red River. The admiral decided to leave the *Eastport* behind at Grand Ecore due to the intelligence he received about the river north of there. The channel to Shreveport, referred to as "The Narrows" by local pilots, was too winding and shallow and he feared the vessel would go aground in a tight turn. Porter selected only six vessels for the final stage of the mission: monitors *Osage* and *Neosho*, timberclad *Lexington*, tinclads *Cricket* and *Fort Hindman*, and the ironclad side-wheeler *Chillicothe*. Porter transferred his flag to the *Cricket*. Twenty army transports carrying Brig. Gen. Thomas Kilby Smith's 2,300-strong Provisional Division, XVII Corps, accompanied Porter to provide security for the boats. From Grand Ecore, the detachment headed north toward Springfield Landing for the rendezvous with the Army of the Gulf three days hence.

Analysis

1. The Army of the Gulf spent almost a week a Grand Ecore. What is your assessment of Banks' use of time there?
 - In modern terms, was this an operational pause?
 - What are the reasons for, and benefits of, an operational pause? What are the risks of such a pause?
 - Was the pause good for Banks, why or why not?
 - Assess Confederate actions during this period. Did Taylor and Smith use the time effectively?
2. What is your assessment of the Confederate command climate/relationships?
3. What problems would you anticipate with such a formation for movement?
4. Although Lee's troops had to maintain contact with the infantry, should he have sent advance parties further ahead to recon and gain contact with the enemy? What orders would you have given to your cavalry under these circumstances?
5. Evaluate Steele's actions and plan for his role in the Red River Campaign.
 - What do you see as Steele's most significant shortfall in his overall plan so far?

Stand 6

Engagement at Wilson's Farm




Figure 3.14. Route map to Wilson's Farm. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel to Wilson's Farm is about 45 minutes) From the Corps of Engineers Visitor's Center follow LA 6 west back to Interstate Highway 49 (I-49). At I-49 continue through the underpass on LA 6 and proceed 19 miles west to Robeline, LA. At Robeline turn right (northwest) on LA 120. Proceed 14.7 miles through Marthaville to LA 175. Turn right (north) on LA 175 and proceed 7.5 miles to Pleasant Hill. Proceed on LA 175 through Pleasant Hill for 5.3 miles. Look for Anderson Lane on the left (south) side of LA 175. Turn left and park. The Louisiana State historical marker for Wilson's Farm is located about 100 yards west of the parking area. Walk to the historical marker, but exercise caution as the road can be busy.

Alternate Route: The route outlined below is recommended if time allows. The route follows the actual trace of the Federal army's movement to Mansfield beginning at Boline Road (Note: some roads on the route read "Bolyne" Road). Boline Road today (2023) is not too much improved from the contemporary route and thus is slower, though historically correct. In places, the road also gives one the sense of the closed-in nature of the route at the time. It is strongly recommended that the staff ride facilitator recon the route before the conduct of the staff ride to familiar himself with the route and to ensure that it is suitable at the time for a bus. The road is generally suitable for vans.




Figure 3.15. Alternate route to Wilson's Farm. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: At Robeline turn right (northwest) on Louisiana 120. Proceed through Marthaville. Travel 2.5 miles past Marthaville to Boline Road (Note: some roads on the route read "Bolyne" Road). Turn right (northwest) on Boline Road and proceed to Louisiana 175 (Note: at the intersection with Miles Road, Boline becomes Fire Tower Road). Turn right (north) on LA 175 and proceed through Pleasant Hill. Follow the rest of the directions to Wilson's Farm as described previously.

Orientation: (See Appendix L, Map L-12 for an overview.) You are standing in the center of the engagement area at the beginning of the action at Wilson's Farm. The ground here was generally cleared up to the ridgelines to the north west, and east. The ground to the south was a gently rolling open pasture for about 700 yards. The surrounding areas were wooded. In short, Wilson's Farm was one of the relatively rare cleared areas in a massive forest of densely packed trees. Note that the trees were denser here at



Figure 3.16. Wilson's Farm. Graphic by Robin Kern.

that time than they were along the river and around the plantation areas farther east. The Confederate line was to the west and extended across the road generally southwest to northeast. The Federal line formed about 400-600 yards to your southeast.

Description: On the evening of 6 April, Lee halted his division at Crump's Corners (at the intersection of today's LA 120 and Boline Road) where Crump's Store was situated. Some of Lee's men had been here four days earlier when they skirmished with Bagby's and DeBray's troopers at nearby Crump's Hill. As the cavalymen made their camp civilian refugees passing by informed some of Lee's officers that Confederate forces were assembling at a place called Sabine Crossroads near Mansfield. They further said that the location was, "the point where the rebels said they were going 'to begin to bury the Yankees.'"¹⁷ Thus far, the Confederate videttes (videttes were essentially mounted pickets) facing the US cavalry had shown no indications that they were ready for a fight, thus the boasts of the refugees did not impress the Federals.

The following morning Lee's division set out north again from Crump's Store. The terrain here had changed significantly from that around White's Store. Once past Crump's Corner, the road was so closed in by the thick forests of yellow pine that the infantry column could barely march four men abreast. Most of the way it was impossible to move vehicles forward or to the rear of the columns of marching men. The road changed from red sand to red clay and the dirt alternated with thick, sticky mud. The entire area was almost devoid of water. Between Crump's Corner and Mansfield there were only two watercourses of any size and the cisterns of Pleasant Hill from which one could slake his thirst.

Lee advanced with his three brigades in column with Col. Harai Robinson's 2nd Brigade in the lead, Lucas' 1st Brigade following, and Col. Nathan A. M. "Gold Lace" Dudley's 4th Brigade in the rear (Gooding's brigade was still in Natchitoches at this point waiting for A. J. Smith's men to pass). The ten units he had with him really consisted of only five true cavalry regiments. The other five regiments were actually mounted infantry (many mounted on mules) armed with rifles rather than carbines. While that did give Lee a firepower advantage, the truth was that the infantry were not accomplished horsemen (Lee called them "amateur equestrians") and most were as yet untested in battle. He was not sure how well they would stand under the pressure of combat.

Unknown to Lee, the rebel forces now facing him were the troopers of Green's command, which was recently reorganized as a cavalry corps (which was significantly smaller than an infantry corps). Major's division screened the Federal approach with Col. Walter P. Lane's and Bagby's brigades, along with the as yet unattached 4th Louisiana Cavalry. About noon, Lee's leading brigade reached the village of Pleasant Hill where it briefly met about 200 rebel cavalrymen from Col. George T. Madison's 2nd Arizona Cavalry conducting vidette duty there. After a brief exchange of gunfire, Madison's troopers retreated.

Pushing on, Lee's lead regiment encountered a rare open space in the dense forest about two hours later. It was a local smallholding called Wilson's Farm located three miles northwest of Pleasant Hill. Drawn up on the far side of the field, along a dense wood line, were all four regiments of Lane's brigade of Texas and Arizona cavalry. Madison's regiment had fallen back and taken place in the left center of Lane's line. The Confederate troopers were dismounted with three regiments lined up on a low hill north of the road and one to the south.

Realizing the rebel commander intended to contest the Federal march, Robinson formed his 2nd Brigade along a ridge astride the road and dismounted his two regiments. He next posted a battery next to the road on the right of the 1st Louisiana Cavalry (US). There, the battery opened up on the enemy. Robinson soon ordered his troops forward and came close to actually closing with the rebel force when Tom Green, now on site, ordered a charge of Lane's line and forced the 2nd Brigade back several hundred yards (see Appendix L, Map L-13). At that point, Lucas's 1st Brigade, which had deployed on Robinson's right, came up and fired a volley into the Confederates. Colonel George W. Baylor, commanding the 2nd Arizona Cavalry, recalled that when his unit encountered Lucas' men, "we found them in greatly superior force, and were obliged in turn to fall back to prevent being flanked. Our ammunition being nearly exhausted, Colonel Lane ordered us to fall back until we could get a fresh supply."¹⁸

Hearing the fighting, Taylor rode forward to watch the action. There he observed Green at his best: "I joined him [Green], and enjoyed his method of managing his wild horsemen; and he certainly accomplished more with them than anyone else could have done."¹⁹ Not long after watching Lane's troopers conduct their counterattack, Taylor and the rest of Green's men retired to the rear. The entire action was relatively short, less than an hour and a half, and casualties were relatively light. Lee lost 70 killed and wounded, the rebel losses were slightly less although they lost 25 men to capture as well. In the end, Lane's Brigade was compelled to withdraw, but Green's troops had accomplished what he wanted which was to simply delay the Federals. As for Lee he was satisfied that his green troops had passed their first test and had behaved well in the face of a forceful attack.

While the initial fight was unfolding, the wagons and the infantry column ground to a halt. Franklin and Banks were well to the rear of the action and neither leader rode forward to develop the situation even though neither of them had expected any enemy resistance. After the fight, Lee had sent back messages to Franklin telling him that the rebel cavalry's tactics had changed. The enemy troops were now being far more aggressive. They had picked out a piece of ground to oppose the march, taken a firm stand, and even counterattacked. That usually indicated a strong infantry presence somewhere in the cavalry's rear and often presaged a major fight. Lee requested that he be allowed to send his wagons to the rear and asked for an infantry division to come up behind him for support. Franklin, still doubtful that Taylor planned to seriously oppose the Union advance, refused both requests.

When Franklin's response was received by Lee, the cavalry commander showed it to one General Banks' aides, Col. John S. Clark. Clark had decided to ride along with Lee that morning and had observed the Confederate actions. He agreed with Lee's assessment and rode back to Franklin to personally report his findings and support Lee's request. On hearing Clark's report, Franklin flatly refused again and told the colonel that Lee, "must fight them alone—that is what he is there for. It might require the sacrifice of men, but in war men must be sacrificed." Franklin then informed Clark that if the fighting became heavy he would send infantry support, but he (Franklin) would decide when Lee needed the help. Franklin then told Clark to inform Lee to "keep your train well up," as he wanted to reach Mansfield the next day. Clark, not satisfied, went to his boss, Banks, and laid out the same case. Banks decided to send an infantry brigade forward to support Lee and directed Franklin to do so. Soon, Col. Frank Emerson's 1st Brigade, 4th Division, XIII Corps moved forward with about 1,200 men along with Col. William J. Landram, the division commander. At this point, both Banks and Franklin believed that Lee was just jittery and overly concerned about potential Confederate actions. Still, neither officer believed that Taylor would fight a pitched battle before Shreveport.

Clark returned to Lee to let him know what transpired and that an infantry brigade was moving up to support him in the morning. Lee advanced another three miles beyond Wilson's Farm and decided to halt there for the evening. Soon, however, a message from Franklin arrived ordering Lee to take his cavalry as far forward as possible, with his trains and artillery, so that the infantry would have room to move the next morning without waiting for the cavalry train. Likely perceiving this order to be a reprisal due to his request for infantry earlier, Lee nevertheless remounted his command and advanced northward. The column moved about four miles more when the lead unit encountered another open area. This was Carroll's Mill, a grist mill on Ten-Mile Bayou that served the local area. There, Green's troops were once again lined up for battle, now with an artillery battery in support. This situation forced Lee to deploy his command as well. Despite the appearance of a determined stand, this time Green's men merely skirmished with the Federal troopers for a few minutes then disappeared to the north again, but not before destroying a small bridge across Ten Mile Bayou. Lee decided that he would halt at the mill for the night and posted pickets, but he kept his troops deployed on line and under arms.

At the end of the day, Lee was satisfied that his troops had done well and that the rebel cavalry was an undisciplined mob, yet he was still con-

cerned about what was behind that mob. In reality, Taylor now had a large, reasonably proficient cavalry force. His orders to Tom Green for that day had been to delay Banks, but to avoid a pitched battle. By causing Lee to deploy and skirmish with his troopers several times, Green and his command performed superbly. They had bought Taylor another day of time. That ensured that Taylor's main force at Mansfield would be ready to meet the Army of the Gulf near Mansfield the next day.

Analysis

1. Using the factors of METT-TC, how should Banks/ Franklin have organized the advance through this area?
2. Given Lee's mission, how do you think cavalry should be employed in this area?
3. An old saying in the US Army is that, "The first report is always wrong." What is your assessment of Lee's analysis of the enemy compared to Banks' and Franklin's reaction to it?
4. What are your thoughts regarding Banks' decision to overrule Franklin and send Lee an infantry brigade for support? Is this type of action something that fits within the intent of Mission Command? Why or why not?
5. Was Major's mission an appropriate use of cavalry? Why or why not?
6. Acting as either the Federal or Confederate tactical commander at Wilson's Farm, how would you have done things differently?

Note: This is the last stand for Day 2. Proceed back to Alexandria.

Directions: (Travel time to Alexandria is about 30 minutes) From Wilson's Farm, proceed 5.3 miles south on LA 175 to Pleasant Hill. At the intersection with LA 174 at the center of town turn left and proceed 23.6 miles east LA 174 to the intersection with I-49. Turn right (south) on I-49 S and proceed about 60 miles to Alexandria, LA.




Figure 3.17. Day 2 Overview. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Day 2

Mansfield to Monett's Ferry (8 March–27 April 1864)

- Stand 1, Battle of Mansfield—Confederate Plan (8 April 1864)
- Stand 2, Mansfield—The Federal Deployment (8 April 1864)
- Stand 3, Mansfield—The Initial Attack (8 April 1864)
- Stand 4, Mansfield—The Federal Center and Right Crumble (8 April 1864)
- Stand 5, Mansfield—Attack on the Federal Left (8 April 1864)
- Stand 6, Mansfield—Sabine Crossroads (8 April 1864)
- Stand 7, Mansfield—Chapman's Bayou (8 April 1864)
- Stand 8, Battle of Pleasant Hill—Federal Deployment (9 April 1864)
- Stand 9, Pleasant Hill—Confederate Plan and Initial Attack (9 April 1864)




Figure 3.18. Day 2, Stands 1-7. Graphic by Robin Kern.

- Stand 10, Pleasant Hill—Federal Action/Confederate Repulse (9 April 1864)
- Stand 11, Engagement at Blair's Landing (12 April 1864)
- Stand 12, Arkansas Expedition and The Decision to Retreat (11 April–3 May 1864)
- Stand 13, Engagement at Monett's Ferry (21-26 April 1864)

Stand 1

Mansfield: Confederate Plan




Figure 3.19. Confederate Plan. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel to the Mansfield battlefield from Alexandria is about 90 minutes; from Natchitoches, about 50 minutes; from Shreveport, about 40 minutes. These directions assume an overnight stay in Alexandria). From Alexandria, proceed north on Interstate 49 North for 88 miles to US 84 (Exit 172). Enter the off ramp to US 84 West. Turn left (west) on US 84W and proceed 14 miles to Mansfield. In Mansfield US 84W will become McArthur Drive. Proceed to the intersection of US 84W with Louise Street. Turn left (Louise Street merges with LA 175) and proceed south for 2.4 miles. At about 1.7 miles you will see a house with a small collection of outbuildings and a small water tower on the right (**Note:** During World War II, this area was a small camp for German POWs who worked as laborers in the Mansfield area. The low machine shed and water tower were part of the installation). The apex of the Confederate battle lines was initially located there. Proceed to Gethsemane Baptist Church on the left. Turn into the parking lot and park. The stand is located on the west side of the entrance to the parking lot.

Orientation: (See Appendix L, Map L-14 for an overview of this phase.) You are standing between Honeycutt Hill and the initial Confederate line. Honeycutt Hill is the high ground off to the southeast along LA 175. The apex of the initial Confederate line was located on the highest point you can see along LA 175 to the northwest. That is the point from which Taylor watched most of the initial phase of the battle. To his immediate left was Randal's Brigade and to his right was Waul's Brigade. Positioned on both sides of the road was an artillery battery; one to the north, another to the south. From Taylor's position, the Confederate line extended to his left, facing southeast and south, for about 2.25 miles, and on his right for about 1.25 miles facing east. Given that this area was more heavily farmed and near a population center the woods here were generally more open with less underbrush than the forest through which the Army of the Gulf just traveled.

Confederate Plan and Dispositions

Description: On 6 April Kirby Smith had traveled to Mansfield where he met with Taylor ostensibly to decide on the best course of action now that two federal columns were advancing on Shreveport. Up to this point, the commanding general had vacillated between the two choices. When the Army of the Gulf had made its initial moves to Simmesport and Alexandria, Smith had told Taylor that he thought that Banks was the greater threat and should be the priority. After Steele departed Little Rock on the 23rd, however, Smith began think that Steele's force might be more dangerous than Banks', even though he knew Steele's force to be far weaker.

By 3 April, Smith was more definite about addressing Steele first, despite Banks' much greater strength and proximity to the Shreveport. All of this, along with the personal jabs he had suffered by Smith's staff and the deceptions regarding available reinforcements, infuriated Taylor. When Smith arrived in Mansfield, the department commander further complicated the matter by suggesting two additional courses of action. During the heated meeting, the commanding general suggested that the department concentrate against Steele (still his preferred course of action). But then, he also suggested that the command concentrate at Shreveport and there withstand a siege. When Taylor objected to those ideas, Smith somewhat bizarrely proposed to evacuate Louisiana and Arkansas altogether and fight it out in East Texas. Taylor, predictably, strongly objected to that plan as well. Ultimately, Smith made no decision and departed without giving Taylor any specific orders for future action. For his part, Taylor interpreted his commander's lack of orders as *carte blanche* to make whatever decision he (Taylor) thought necessary and he prepared to act on that

understanding. Taylor then departed to join Green at Wilson's Farm to get a sense of what was transpiring to his front.

On 7 April, sure that Banks was committed to the Natchitoches–Shreveport Stage Road and that Lee's cavalry had been halted at Carroll's Mills, Taylor rode back to Mansfield looking for a place to give battle. His instructions to Green to delay Banks were intended to buy him time to recon the terrain for a site suitable for his plan and get his command into position. As he approached the town, Taylor decided he would stop the Army of the Gulf's advance at a place called the Moss Plantation just south of Mansfield. The town of Mansfield itself was a very important operational objective as it was the junction of three roads leading north to the Trans-Mississippi Department's headquarters (and the capital of Confederate Louisiana). The eastern road, if the Federals were allowed to take it, enabled Banks to establish permanent communications with Porter's squadron on the Red River near Shreveport. The western route passed through the Wallace Bayou swamp and provided Taylor no place to mass his forces to oppose Banks' movement. The center road ended at a ferry landing and, again, provided no opportunities for Taylor to confront Banks before Shreveport. If Banks opted to move on all three routes, it would prove impossible for Taylor to stop him on any of them. Thus Taylor had to fight Banks south of Mansfield.

Once he had picked his ground, Taylor flew into a flurry of action. First, he sent word to Churchill and Parsons, now at Keachi where Smith had sent them to stand by for further orders (see Appendix L, Map L-11). Taylor directed them to move their divisions to Mansfield first thing on the morning of 8 April. He next instructed Walker and Mouton, whose divisions were located just north of Mansfield, where to post their divisions on the Moss Plantation. By 0200 the rebel columns were moving south through town to take their positions. Taylor also had his staff arrange for the set-up of field hospitals in Mansfield homes and for the security and policing of the town. A wagon park was established to the north of town to protect them from attack, but near enough to allow them to still get supplies and ammunition to the troops. Probably to provide himself a plausible excuse if Smith tried to take action against him after the fact, Taylor's primary official act that evening was to send another courier to Smith, back at Shreveport by now, with a message: "I respectfully ask to know if it accords with the views of the lieutenant-general commanding that I should hazard a general engagement at this point, and request an immediate answer, that I may receive it before daylight to-morrow morning." The messenger departed shortly after 2100. Taylor did not really expect an answer back in time and this was probably intended to be a *fait accom-*

pli. In this way, Taylor was making up Smith's mind for him and at the same time providing himself with some protection if the response did not return in time and Smith ordered him not to fight. Anticipating battle the next day, Taylor told his friend the Prince de Polignac that evening, "Little Frenchman, I will fight Banks here if he has a million men."²⁰

The Terrain and Taylor's Deployment

The ground Taylor had chosen on Moss Plantation was a rather large clearing extending southeast until reaching Honeycutt Hill (see Appendix L, Map L-14). Generally speaking, the ground provided excellent fields fire for about 1,000 yards. Pine forests bordered the clearing on the west and north. Toward Honeycutt Hill the open field on the south side of the road was pleated by two small stream beds. One of the streams branched into two which also cut through the field north of the road. Beyond the second stream on the south side, the ground rose gently up to Honeycutt Hill, which itself was predominantly located on the south side of the Stage Road and sparsely covered in trees. Beyond the hill was another small pasture. Continuing southeast along the Stage Road past the second pasture was a stand of trees within which the road to the Sabine River intersected with the Stage Road. This was the Sabine Crossroads.

Taylor deployed his command along the west and north tree lines in an inverted "L" configuration with the apex of the L centered on the Stage Road. On the far right of the north-south line, guarding that flank, were two regiments of Green's cavalry under Brig. Gen. Hamilton P. Bee. To their left was Walker's division consisting of two brigades under Scurry and Brig. Gen. Thomas Waul. Between them was Daniel's Battery. Positioned on either side of the Stage Road were Haldeman's and McMahan's Batteries. Here the "L" turned east and first along this line was Walker's third brigade under Col. Horace Randal. To Randal's left was Mouton's Division of Texas and Louisiana troops starting with Polignac's brigade of dismounted Texas cavalry. To his left was Gray's (formerly Mouton's) Louisiana brigade. At one point, when Taylor rode past them while inspecting the lines, he told the Louisianans that he expected them to draw first blood this day. On a hill behind Polignac's left were Cornay's and West's batteries; the Val Verde Battery took post behind Gray's left. To the east and separated from the main line was Green's cavalry drawn up in three lines. These were the last units to move into line and Taylor placed them there to hold the endangered left flank. In all, Taylor's command totaled about 8,800 troops on the field: about 5,800 infantry and artillery and something over 3,000 cavalry (the latter all fighting dismounted).

With Green's arrival, Taylor's force was complete except for Churchill's and Parsons' divisions en route from Keachi. Within the ranks were also a number of men who Taylor referred to as 'reserves.' Though it is not clear who these troops were, it is likely that they were members of Louisiana 'home guard' units and perhaps a number of exchanged soldiers still waiting to be legally paroled after their capture at Vicksburg or Port Hudson. A number of letters, diary entries, and postwar accounts indicate that these men were used to flesh out the ranks of depleted units before the battle. In short, Taylor's command was ready for battle. At 0940 Taylor sent another message back to Smith explaining that the Federals were advancing and that, "I consider this as favorable a point to engage the enemy as any other."²¹

The Federal Advance

On the morning of 8 April Franklin briefed Banks on his movement plan for the day. He told the commanding general that he planned to move to a point just short of Mansfield so that the lead elements would have a short march, but that he would have the units at the end of the column march much further to close up the distance between tail and head. If all went well, A. J. Smith's XVI Corps would be at Pleasant Hill only 10 miles to the south that night. Banks approved the plan.

Before the brief, Landram, with Emerson's brigade in tow, had already begun his march in the dark at 0300 to link up with Lee which he did at sunrise. Lucas' 1st Brigade, then led Lee's division forward. Within a short distance past Carroll's Mill, Lucas' men ran into Green's Texans. Once again, Green's men vigorously opposed the Federal cavalry to the point that Lee directed Lucas to dismount and deploy a regiment as skirmishers. Lee also sent two regiments of Landram's infantry forward to support the skirmishers. Lee's men continued pushing the Texas cavalymen back for a distance of six miles, advancing, deploying, skirmishing, and reforming all the way. The effort was exhausting to Lee's men and he rotated units frequently. Landram's infantry, however, was getting little relief and Lee sent word back to Franklin that they would need to be replaced with fresh troops.

About 1030 that morning, the head of Brig. Gen. Thomas E.G. Ransom's XIII Corps contingent arrived at Carroll's Mills at Ten Mile Bayou where it had been ordered to stop for the day. Ransom immediately put a regiment to work rebuilding the bridge across the stream that Green's men had destroyed as they fell back on the day before. The bridge was necessary so that the trains could pass unhindered as the army moved up. Other

units began settling in to bivouac at the mills for the night. The general soon received orders from Franklin, however, to send a brigade forward to Lee and relieve Landram's worn out soldiers. He was also directed by the XIX Corps commander to go with the brigade to ensure that Landram's men were returned to the rear and not kept by Lee. Ransom chose Col. Joseph W. Vance's 2nd Brigade, 4th Division (Landram's other brigade) for the mission and set out for the head of the column.

Shortly after noon, the lead elements of Lee's division arrived at Sabine Crossroads. Almost if by magic, the rebel cavalry suddenly disappeared once again. Still deployed and moving forward another 800 yards or so, the US cavalymen approached a ridgeline (Honeycutt Hill) where they encountered rebel pickets who immediately opened a brisk skirmish fire. Both Lee and Landram ordered their men forward and the Confederate pickets soon ceased their fire and retired over the hill. Once they crested the rise, Lee and Landram were shocked to see almost 9,000 Confederate soldiers drawn up in a line of battle all across their front and extending for at least a mile on each side of the road.

Analysis

1. How accurate do you think Kirby Smith's analysis of the operational and strategic situation in the Trans-Mississippi Department has been at this point? Why?
2. There is another old saying in the US Army that an officer "bets his bars" when making a controversial decision. What is your assessment of Taylor's decision-making process regarding his intent to give battle at Mansfield? Is it a risk that should be accepted under mission command?
3. Given the terrain, what is your assessment of Taylor's chosen ground to give battle?
4. What is your assessment of Franklin's plan for the day? What's missing?
5. Are the Federals maintaining a proper OTEMPO for their offensive? How much is the advance limited by terrain, and how much by assumptions and accepted plans?

Stand 2

Mansfield: The Federal Deployment




Figure 3.20. Federal Deployment. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time is about 3 minutes). Turn right (southeast) back onto LA 175. Proceed 1.5 miles to the entrance for the Mansfield State Historic Site. Turn left into the entrance and park in the parking lot. Walk due south to the interpretive marker for Nim’s Battery near LA 175 (Park Waypoint 8).

Orientation: You are at the position established by the right-most section of Capt. Ormand F. Nims’s 2nd Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery on Honeycutt Hill. The hill extends to your north and south. The center of the Confederate line was initially positioned about 1 mile to the northwest on LA 175. The terrain to the front was largely open with a thin band of trees to the west. Emerson’s brigade would establish its line here facing northwest. To his left on Honeycutt Hill, Dudley’s 4th Cavalry Brigade would extend the line south. Vance’s and Luca’s brigades would occupy a line to the north generally along the tree line behind the visitors’ center.

Initial Union Deployment

Description: (See Appendix L, Map L-14 for an overview of this phase.) Once confronted with what he knew was Taylor's whole command, Lee deployed his troops on the flanks of Honeycutt Hill. Lee posted Dudley's brigade to cover the Union left and Lucas' brigade on the right. Landram posted Emerson's brigade of 1,200 men in the center where they supported Nim's and the 6th Missouri Batteries. The head of the cavalry train was a half mile to the rear and now extended beyond Sabine Crossroads. There the Union forward movement ended. The initial Federal line now resembled an inverted "L" which essentially mirrored Taylor's dispositions. Meanwhile, all elements began a low-level, but constant, skirmish with rebel forces to their front.

Soon after the Union positions formed, the 3rd Massachusetts Cavalry made an impetuous mounted charge toward Mouton's lines. A number of rebel skirmishers harassed the troops as they sought to drive them away. When the skirmishers disappeared into the woods, the troopers made the blunder of chasing them too far. Halting short of the tree line, they sent a volley into the woods where a Louisiana infantry regiment was formed but which they could not see. Behind the rebel line, Taylor and Mouton were discussing the tactical situation when a bullet from one of the Federal cavalymen felled Taylor's horse. Mouton yelled to a nearby company commander from the 18th Louisiana that the troopers were Yankees and ordered him to fire. A volley from the rebel company emptied several saddles as the Massachusetts men scrambled back to the Federal lines.

Lee's constant skirmishing with Green's cavalry during the morning as the Yankee troopers approached Mansfield that morning had prompted an annoying accordion effect of stop and start marching among the infantry in the Federal column and made for very slow going. Growing impatient with the column's sluggish movement, Banks turned to Franklin and announced that he was going forward to determine why the movement was so sluggish. He further told Franklin that he would be back if there was no heavy fighting. The XIX Corps commander drily responded, "There will be no fighting."²² Banks and his staff pushed past Vance's brigade and the cavalry wagon train until he arrived at the base of Honeycutt Hill about 1300. To his surprise, he found Lee's and Landram's men in battle line and involved in heavy skirmishing. Behind Honeycutt Hill, Lee reported to Banks that he was being faced by what he wrongly estimated to be 15,000 to 20,000 rebel troops. When Banks asked him what he recommended, the cavalry commander's counsel was to either withdraw or heavily reinforce his existing line. Banks responded by telling Lee to hold the position and

that he would send back to hurry the infantry forward. Banks then sent Lt. Col. George Drake, his Adjutant General, to Franklin to tell him that the enemy appeared to be ready to give battle near Mansfield and that Franklin needed to move his infantry forward. Oddly, he also ordered Franklin to push the trains forward as well since Banks believed, “we shall be able to rest here.”²³

The last statement is curious because it indicates that Banks did not fully understand what he faced, or that he did not take the threat of imminent battle seriously. On the other hand, it is possible that Banks’ assessment of Taylor’s forces led him to think that the rebel force was smaller than Lee reported, or that Banks’ usual optimism caused him to believe that his army was more than a match for Taylor’s. Still, Banks sent another message at about 1330 that urged Franklin to move the infantry forward quickly. As events unfolded, Banks would follow up that message to Franklin with several others throughout the afternoon pressing him to get the infantry forward.

As these events transpired, Green had been slowly shifting some of his troops to his left to envelop Lee’s right flank. Lee countered by shifting two of his infantry regiments to better defend against an attack from that direction. At about the same time (roughly 1530), Ransom arrived with Vance’s brigade which was placed in line to the right of Emerson and faced north. About 1600, even though the XIX Corps had not yet arrived, Lee received an inexplicable order from Banks to “move immediately upon Mansfield.” Somewhat astounded, Lee instantly rode back to find Banks to confirm the order. Banks informed him that the order was correct, at which point Lee protested, telling Banks that if he advanced, “we should be most gloriously flogged.” Banks relented and told Lee to wait if he thought it was impossible to advance. Banks then sent yet another message to Franklin to hurry men to the front.

Analysis

1. ADP 3-90 Offense and Defense states that “Defending commanders strive to regain the initiative from attacking enemy forces. . . . Disruption, flexibility, maneuver, mass and concentration, operations in depth, preparation, and security are all defensive characteristics used by commanders to regain the initiative. Evaluate Lee’s selection of terrain and preparations for defense in light of current doctrine.
2. FM-3-0 Operations defines Mission Command as, “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to

enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower subordinates in the conduct of unified land operations. Mission command requires an environment of mutual trust and shared understanding among commanders, staffs, and subordinates. It requires a command climate in which commanders encourage subordinates to accept prudent risk and exercise disciplined initiative to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander's intent. Evaluate Banks' actions as army commander during this phase of the battle in light of this definition.

3. In the Civil War, cavalry was the best thought type of force to conduct reconnaissance. However, how can all forces do better to conduct their own reconnaissance?
 - Even with satellite intelligence, what should lower level forces do to ensure situational awareness?
4. Taylor clearly is ready for battle—but is it decisive?
 - How should commanders look at tactical engagements when planning the operational concept?
 - Today we talk of branches and sequels based on tactical conflicts. This was not a doctrinal concept in the Civil War—but what are the branches and sequels on both sides at this point?

Stand 3

Mansfield: The Initial Attack




Figure 3.21. Federal Deployment, Stand 3. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time is about 1 minute) Moving on foot, proceed due north to the location of the 48th Ohio's position on the Federal right (Park Waypoint 3).

Orientation: You are standing where the 48th Ohio was positioned in the Federal line of battle. At that time, there were woods to the rear of the line and open fields to the front. There was a wood line immediately behind the Confederate line facing the 48th Ohio. The 48th Ohio was the second regiment from the point at which the Union line turned and faced north. To the left was the 130th Illinois, to the right the 19th Kentucky, 96th Ohio, Battery G, 5th US Artillery (6 guns), 2 guns of the 6th Missouri Battery, 83rd Ohio, and then Lucas's 1st Cavalry Brigade on the far right. About 130 yards north of Lucas's line the 8th New Hampshire Cavalry deployed as skirmishers. Lee placed the Chicago Mercantile Battery and the 1st Indiana Battery north of the Stage Road near the Fincher House. This placed them behind and down the slope from the infantry and cavalry. From that position they could provide support for either the Federals' front or their right flank. Beyond the wood line to the right front was Bagby's

Brigade. To Bagby's left and front was Lane's Brigade, and to his rear Vincent's Brigade, all of Green's Division. To the left front (Vincent's right) was Nettles's Texas Battery (4 guns) and then Gray's Brigade. To Gray's right were West's and Cornay's Louisiana batteries (4 guns each), and to his right Polignac's Brigade, both of Mouton's Division.

Mouton Attacks and Falters

Description: (See Appendix L, Map L-15 for an overview of this phase.) Earlier in the day, Taylor rode among the ranks of Brig. Gen. Alfred Mouton's division. As he rode and talked to the men he indicated that he wished for the Louisianans to draw the first blood (they would). It was soon after this that the 3rd Massachusetts Cavalry made its abortive charge. While Banks dithered and Franklin plodded forward, Taylor took pains to entice the Federals to attack. These actions were mostly pushing skirmishers forward to harass, but the Federal troops on Honeycutt Hill showed no disposition to attack. The Federals had arrived on the hill at noon and four hours later they had only traded rifle and artillery fire. Taylor's patience wore thin as he realized that Banks was probably not going to attack him. Taylor had expected Banks to rashly assault into the rebel lines before all his forces were present. But Banks did not attack and now Taylor had only about three hours of daylight remaining (sunset on 8 April 1864 was at 1923). He knew that if he waited longer, more and more US regiments would show up on the field pushing the odds in Banks' favor. About 1600, Taylor sent word to Mouton to start the attack.²⁴

That morning, the field officers of Mouton's Division had agreed that they would ride into battle so that their men could see them and be inspired. On receiving the order, Mouton and his officers mounted their horses and the general ordered his division forward. Mouton had his division attack "en echelon," with one regiment advancing, followed moments later by another and so on, which was not a tactic that Taylor typically used. Mouton's troops climbed over a fence to their front and advanced over half a mile of open ground, Gray's brigade in lead followed closely on the right by Polignac. As Polignac's Brigade moved forward, its avenue of approach squeezed Randal's Brigade (Walker's Division) out of the axis of advance. That brigade now slowed to allow Polignac's to take the lead. Watching the advance, Taylor later wrote, "The ardor of Mouton's troops, especially the Louisianans, could not be restrained by their officers."²⁵ It was described by many as a magnificent charge, but the formation chosen, along with the fact that the officers were mounted, would soon lead to ruinous casualties in the ranks. As the division approached Honeycutt Hill, the Union artillery and infantry began to decimate the ranks by placing

heavy fire on the regiments that had departed first, then sweeping down to the next and so forth. Ransom's men on the hill took careful aim and killed or wounded many of the rebel division's field officers, especially those still mounted. Mouton himself was among the first to fall. Tom Green, who had not been briefed on Taylor's plan, was now the senior Confederate officer on Taylor's left wing.

Green and Walker Advance

Along the right of the Federal line, Ransom's troops were originally lined up behind a strong rail fence. As it became apparent that Mouton was about to attack, Ransom ordered Vance's brigade forward a short distance down the hill and into the field to start the engagement. When Mouton's Division came within a hundred yards, its line faltered due to the heavy Federal fire and seemed to stall. Meanwhile, on the Confederate left flank, Green's dismounted troopers now advanced from the tree line opposite the Union right. Because Vance's brigade was now forward of the initial Federal line, Green's men were in an excellent position to flank it. Lane's Brigade on the far right made first contact when it drove back the 8th New Hampshire Cavalry's skirmish line into the main line. Because of the gap created by Vance's movement, Lucas's five cavalry regiments, now fighting dismounted, were also in danger of being turned on their left.

Over on the right of the Confederate line, Walker's Texans had been watching the fighting on the left unfold. They were anxious to get into the fight and soon orders arrived from Taylor to go forward. Walker sent orders down the line and soon the Texas Division began to move out of the woods toward Honeycutt Hill in one long line, not 'en echelon.' When the rebel line emerged from the tree line with skirmishers forward, it was apparent to Lee and Ransom that the Texans extended well beyond the Federal left. As Walker's brigades advanced with steady discipline, holes began to appear in the rebel ranks as men fell from the rifle and artillery fire coming from the hill. When the line reached a narrow band of timber about 600 yards short of the federal positions, Walker halted it, dressed the ranks, and fixed bayonets. "Aim low boys," Walker told them, "and trust in God," then ordered the line forward.²⁶

Mouton's Men Press On

The attack of Mouton's Division, now under Polignac's command, stalled on receiving the hailstorm of bullets and canister rounds from the Union line. Shortly after Mouton fell, the commanders of the 18th Louisiana Infantry, the 28th Louisiana Infantry, and the Consolidated Crescent Regiment were also killed. The latter regiment lost all of its field officers in

the initial fighting. The heavy fire now pushed Polignac's line back about 200 yards from the Union right flank. In the momentary confusion that ensued due to the loss of so many key commanders, Ransom had just enough time to return Vance's brigade to its original position and solidify the position along the fence.

As Polignac's line reformed, a young officer, Capt. Wilbur Blackman, adjutant of Gray's Brigade, picked up a fallen battle flag, reared on his horse, and urged the Louisianans forward. Waving the flag, he turned and rode for the blue line of troops. Inspired by the leadership, the rebel lines surged toward Honeycutt Hill once again. Despite the efforts of dozens or more Federal infantrymen to bring the officer down, Blackman miraculously remained unscathed as he entered the Union positions. Just behind him were the infantrymen of Polignac's division who swarmed over the fence and pitched into the now retreating Federals.

On the Stage Road toward Mansfield near the position of the 6th Texas Field Battery, Taylor watched the action with a cigar clenched between his teeth. Now mounted on a large coal-black horse, with his leg thrown over the pommel of his saddle, Taylor looked to the rear and saw a courier approaching. When the man arrived and handed Taylor the message, he tore it open and read it aloud. In short, he had been ordered by Kirby Smith, "not to hazard a general engagement." Taylor turned to the courier and responded, "Too late, sir, the battle is won!"²⁷

Analysis

1. Commanders are expected to understand their higher commander's intent and make decisions accordingly. How would you assess the following decisions in light of the concept of risk and mission command:
 - Taylor's final decision to attack, instead of waiting to be attacked?
 - Mouton's decision to attack 'en echelon'?
 - The decision of Mouton's field officers to ride into battle (rather than advance dismounted)?
 - The decision of Captain Blackman to ride toward the enemy with a flag?
 - Ransom's decision to send Vance's brigade beyond the rail fence?

- At what point, or for what reasons, should senior commanders assume great personal risk on the battlefield?
2. Where should today's commander position themselves on the battlefield according to doctrine (FM 6-0)?
 - What factors today influence that decision—and which are different (perhaps technology) and which are the same (perhaps the need to set the example and others)?

Stand 4

Mansfield: The Federal Center and Right Crumple




Figure 3.22. Federal Deployment, Stand 4. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time is about two minutes) Proceed on foot to the location of the 130th Illinois' left flank position in the Federal center (Park Waypoint 2).

Orientation: You are now at the apex of the Union line. The 130th Illinois Infantry held this position at the left of Vance's brigade. To the left front and parallel to the road, Polignac's Brigade of dismounted Texas cavalry attacked directly toward this position. Randal's Brigade of Texas infantry attacked into the rear of this position on Polignac's right and rear along the Stage Road.

Description: (See Appendix L, Map L-14 for an overview of this phase.) In the center of the Federal line Vance's four-regiment brigade of 1,200 men held the right center portion facing north toward Polignac's charging Confederates. On the left was Emerson's brigade of 1,200 infantrymen, straddling the Stage Road facing generally west. Two batteries deployed on either side of the road in support. Observing the coming assault on his position, one US soldier later wrote, "They came like a cyclone..., yelling like infuriated demons."²⁸ Polignac's Texans charged toward the

Union angle as their objective with their right guiding on the road. The 130th Illinois was a regiment composed largely of farmers. Army life was as alien to them before they enlisted as it was to New York fish merchants. Yet they stood dutifully at their posts as Confederate fire swept their ranks from two directions. Their losses were fearful, but they never faltered. The 48th Ohio Infantry, to the regiment's right, suffered a similar fate. Once the Confederate battle line overran this position, there were hardly enough men left in either regiment to formally surrender. That night, only one man of the 130th Illinois was present to answer the roll.

Behind the 130th Illinois and 48th Ohio, Capt. Ormand Nims skillfully led his 2nd Massachusetts Battery in providing deadly and effective canister fire against the Confederate assault. Like the two nearby infantry regiments, however, the unit suffered so many killed and wounded men and horses that it had to abandon three of its guns when the order was given to retreat. The 6th Texas Cavalry Battalion, along with men from the 12th, 13th, and 14th Texas captured the three guns and quickly turned them on the retreating Federals.

Even before this time, it was obvious to Ransom that if Landram's division was to survive, it had to retreat. From two directions the division was being squeezed "as if in a nutcracker"²⁹ as Ransom described it. He directed his adjutant to find Landram and give him the order to retreat. Soon after departing from Ransom the officer was killed and some of the regiments never received the order. Two of those were the 130th Illinois and 48th Ohio. Most of the regiments in Vance's brigade were surrounded and forced to surrender. Vance himself was wounded and captured as well, but soon died from his wounds.

Once the Union line collapsed on the right, Ransom moved off the hill and arrived at the position of the Chicago Mercantile Battery near the Fincher House. Since the two batteries were doing good work and holding steady, he tried to rally his retreating men at that point. Unfortunately, he was soon struck in the knee by shrapnel and carried to the rear by some of his men.

Analysis

1. While most of the soldiers in the Red River Campaign were already combat veterans, the vast majority had started the war as volunteers who had never seen combat. As the United States prepares for future conflicts, how should we prepare our new Soldiers today for the shock of combat?

Stand 5

Mansfield: Attack on the Federal Left




Figure 3.23. Federal Deployment, Stand 5. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time is about 8 minutes) Proceed south on foot to LA 175. Cross the highway and move to the location of the 3rd Massachusetts Cavalry's position on the far Federal left. The area around Stand 5 may not be available at times. If that is the case, conduct the stand somewhere in the open area near the visitors center.

Orientation: Face west in the direction of the Confederate attack. You are now at the location of the 3rd Massachusetts Cavalry. Two of the regiment's companies were deployed as skirmishers on the forward slope of Honeycutt Hill about 500 yards forward and beyond the tree line to the west. The skirmishers were directly in the line of Scurry's axis of attack. The rest of the 3rd Massachusetts and Dudley's 4th Brigade were in battle line to the north along Honeycutt Hill extending to the vicinity of the Stage Road. Walker's Division advanced on line from the west toward this hill.

Description: (See Appendix L, Map L-14 for an overview of this phase.) As he made his advance against the Union left, Walker had expected Bee's Brigade to support his far right flank. Bee's men, however, encountered a dense patch of woods covered in thick brambles and fell

behind the main attack, unable to contribute much to the effort. Waul's and Scurry's Brigades on the other hand swept through the thin line of woods in front of the hill and pitched into Emerson's and Dudley's brigades along the ridgetop. Scurry's Texans hit the 3rd Massachusetts Cavalry which gamely tried to stem the tide. The efforts of the 3rd Massachusetts notwithstanding, the Texans soon rolled up the Union left.

Before he was wounded, Ransom detected the impending collapse on the Union left and ordered the 83rd Ohio to move to support Emerson's men. By the time the 83rd made it to the road, its commander discovered that the Federal left was completely gone and rebels now held the position. During the rout on the left, Emerson, like Vance, was wounded and captured. Once the 83rd's commander reported that fact, Ransom then ordered the regiment to come with him to the right rear to support the Chicago Mercantile Battery. There a new Union line of resistance was being established, at least momentarily.

Other Federal regiments were initially able to withdraw in fairly good order to this new line, at least until some of Green's dismounted troopers to the northeast were able to threaten the line of retreat along the Stage Road. This began a general panic among many US soldiers. To make matters worse, Randal's and Waul's brigades overwhelmed the Union center and aggressively pressed down the Stage Road while Green's men forced Lucas' troopers to break for the rear. As Green's line approached the new Federal line near the Fincher House, they shot down the horses of the Chicago Mercantile Battery. Realizing his battery was about to receive the same treatment, the commander of the 1st Battery, Indiana Light Artillery, Capt. Martin Klauss, ordered his guns limbered up and sent to the rear. The second Union line had now collapsed.

Vignette: Pvt. Joseph P. Blessington of the 16th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted) in Scurry's Brigade later described the attack:

We immediately commenced advancing in the direction of the enemy, who were securely posted behind a rail-fence. They greeted our coming with a perfect shower of leaden hail. The men shouted, at the top of their voices, at each iron messenger as it approached, many indulging in jokes and witticisms, such as, 'This kind of ball-music is fine for dancing.' 'Here comes another iron pill!' 'Dodge, boys, but don't tremble!'³⁰

Analysis

None.

Stand 6

Sabine Crossroads




Figure 3.24. Map to Sabine Crossroads. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time is about 8 minutes) Return to the Mansfield State Historic Site parking lot. Proceed to the exit and turn left (southeast) on Louisiana 175. Proceed 1 mile to the junction of LA 175 and Addison Road. Park near the orange brick building on the right.

Orientation: You are currently at the Sabine Crossroads. The driveway across the road to the north was the original trace of the northern leg of the Sabine-Bayou Pierre Road. LA Highway 522 just to the east of this location generally follows the historic route to Bayou Pierre. Addison Road follows the original route to the south, but today ends after about a mile. Cameron established a line of battle with 3rd Division, XIII Corps about 200 yards west of this location centered on the Stage Road. The line was initially about halfway between the Fincher house and the Sabine Crossroads. Between the Fincher House and Cameron's line, the field was open for about 1,200 yards to the northwest, the direction of the Confederate attack. The ground from Cameron's position to the crossroads here was largely wooded. The cavalry trains would have stretched from a short distance behind Cameron's line southeast for almost two miles beyond the crossroads.




Figure 3.25. Sabine Crossroads. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Description: (See Appendix L, Map L-15 for an overview of this phase.) When Franklin received Banks' urgent messages to send the XIX Corps forward, Franklin decided to accompany Brig. Gen. Robert A. Cameron's small 3rd Division, XIII Corps (only 1,293 muskets) to the front. Due to Franklin's own decision to require Lee to keep his wagons between his division's rear and the lead elements of the XIX Corps, Franklin and Cameron now struggled to push the division forward past the two-mile tangle of stalled wagons on the Stage Road. Just as the Federal left was starting to fall apart on Honeycutt Hill, Cameron's division was passing the head of the wagon train located just beyond the crossroads. As the division cleared the wagons, Cameron deployed his men on line and deployed skirmishers forward. His line then advanced up the road. As Cameron's men advanced, he saw a multitude of broken soldiers from Lee's and Ransom's commands who were streaming to the rear and throwing away packs and weapons in their flight to get away from the Confederate attack. Most fled down the road but many simply crashed through Cameron's ranks. One mob accidentally upended Franklin's horse as they rushed past which caused Franklin to fall and break his left arm. Despite the pain, Franklin continued on to the front.

With Franklin's assistance, Cameron formed a battle line on a ridge facing northwest toward the enemy's approach by about 1630. It was

about halfway between the Fincher House and Sabine Crossroads. Cameron positioned Col. William H. Raynor's brigade to the left of the Stage Road and placed Lt. Col. Aaron M. Flory's brigade on the right. The two brigades together were only a total of five understrength regiments. Fortunately, the 2nd Illinois Cavalry, one of Dudley's regiments, was reformed in a sort of closed dismounted skirmish line about 130 yards to Cameron's front. The troopers were only able to fire a single volley before the Confederate line was almost upon them, but they did provide some time for Cameron to set his line.

As Green's troopers advanced on Flory's brigade, the brigade commander withheld his fire to allow for a closer engagement. When the Confederates made their last lunge forward, Flory finally gave the command and roughly 600 muskets fired in unison into the rebel ranks. The blast staggered the line and drove it back, but the Confederates soon rallied and prepared to press forward again.

On the left, heavy fire from Walker's men forced Raynor's brigade to lie down momentarily to avoid the rain of bullets. Some of the retreating Federals in Raynor's front, most notably Dudley's troopers, attempted to rally on the new Federal line. Dudley, trying to stem the rout, pleaded with Col. Lorenzo D. Sargent, commander of the 3rd Massachusetts Cavalry, to hold his ground for another 15 minutes. Sargent replied, "We will, General, or die on the spot." He then turned to his men and told them, "Try to think that you are dead and buried, and you will have no fear."³¹

When Taylor's men ran into Cameron's line, the Federals were able to hold their ground initially and drive them back for a time. But Franklin was not sanguine about the initial success. He knew the Confederates were merely disorganized due to the earlier attacks, but they would soon sort out their organizations and try again. Wisely, Franklin sent word back to the next division in line, Brig. Gen. William H. Emory's 1st Division, XIX Corps, to set up a position in the rear at the first defensible piece of ground he could find. Emory received the order and set out to find his ground.

Just as Franklin surmised, the Confederates reordered their ranks and made another push. This time the Union flanks were overlapped by the now much larger and better organized rebel battle line. Franklin rode about the line trying to encourage Cameron's men in the face of the charge, but at some point, a rebel bullet tore through Franklin's leg and killed his horse. Now dismounted, he still attempted to inspire the soldiers, but could not stand it for long. Like Ransom before him, Franklin was eventually carried off the field and to the rear. His superior, General Banks, was also trying to

rally fleeing men calling out, “Form a line here, men! I know you will not desert me!”³² One observer recalled that the commanding general, “rode through the storm of lead as coolly as if at a holiday review, encouraging the men to stand up to the work of death.” The efforts were all for naught, however. As the Confederate tide swept up to Cameron’s flanks, the Union line began to buckle again, and finally broke. The brigade fled to the rear like those before them. Banks’s staff now had to hustle him to the rear to keep him from being captured. It was now about 1730.

The 1st Indiana Battery had successfully withdrawn from its position near the Fincher House and made its way past Cameron’s line. As had hundreds of US infantrymen before them, the artillerymen soon found their way impeded by the cavalry’s trains near Sabine Crossroads. As the fighting grew closer, many teamsters had cut the traces from their wagons and fled on mules to escape capture. Their abandoned wagons remained in the road, now blocking the way. Since the rebels were on their heels, the gunners of the 1st Indiana Battery had no choice but to abandon their pieces. There was no time to spike the guns. Within minutes, Green’s men captured the battery intact, less men, its guns still hitched to their horses.

Analysis

1. What is your assessment of the following Federal commanders during this stage of the fighting:
 - Banks
 - Franklin
 - Ransom
2. What actions would you have taken to ensure a different outcome of the fighting at Honeycutt Hill? Fincher House? Sabine Crossroads (Cameron’s Line)?
3. How did the terrain here effect the battle? How did each side attempt to use the terrain, and which side did a better job (if either) in taking advantage of the terrain?

Stand 7

Chapman's Bayou




Figure 3.26. Map to Chapman's Bayou. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time is about 2 minutes) Proceed southeast on LA 175 to Chapman's Bayou. At about .7 miles on the left you will see a restored, antebellum home. This is the Allen House which will be discussed below. As you pass, point out the house to the staff ride participants. Continue on LA 175 for .6 miles. You will cross two bridges; Chapman's Bayou flows under the second bridge. Proceed up the hill to the Chapman's Bayou historical marker (Note: The marker itself is missing but the post is still there). Park in pull off on the north (left) side across the road. This stand is about where the Union battle line was formed. Today, it is difficult to picture the terrain and the battle area due to the growth of trees toward Chapman's Bayou. The staff ride facilitator may wish to use the alternate stand instead.

Alternate Stand: There is an RV park on the right hand side of the road about halfway between Chapman's Bayou and the primary stand location. Crossing Chapman's Bayou, proceed 0.1 mile to the RV park. The RV park is located about 250 yards from Chapman's Bayou. From there one can see to the bayou crossing. The staff ride facilitator will have to




Figure 3.27. Pleasant Grove. Graphic by Robin Kern.

coordinate for the use of the facility for parking. (See Part V, Support for contact information.)

Orientation: On the way here you passed the Allen House which briefly served as both Banks' headquarters and later as a Confederate field hospital. The sloping front of the large ridge on which you are located is where the final fighting took place on the evening of 8 April. Chapman's Bayou to your front runs generally from north to south toward the Sabine River. You are standing in Emory's line of battle facing the direction of the Confederate attack which approached Chapman's Bayou from the northwest and west. In 1864 there was a house owned by Joshua Chapman and a peach orchard on this ridge. Ten Mile Bayou is about three miles to the southeast (behind you) along this road. The trees here are thicker than they were in 1864 and some sections were under cultivation by Chapman. From the Union battle line one could see, from some positions, all the way to Chapman's Bayou.

Emory's Fight

Description: (See Appendix L, Map L-16 for an overview of this phase.) On receipt of Franklin's orders, Emory's large 1st Division, XIX Corps (about 5,000 soldiers) was located at Ten Mile Bayou. Emory immediately set his division on the road to the northwest. The column almost immediately encountered dribbles of soldiers in retreat heading southeast.

The driblets soon became a stream and finally a torrent. The mob of broken troops seriously impeded Emory's line of march. At one point, the division commander was forced to have his men fix bayonets to force their way forward through the mob. During the movement, Emory chanced upon the wounded General Ransom being taken to the rear. Ransom briefed Emory on the fighting earlier in the day and stressed that it was now up to Emory to stem the tide.

Emory moved his division about a mile further and it began to receive skirmish fire and several men were hit. Fortunately, Emory soon came across a good piece of defensible ground at Chapman's Bayou. The position offered a low sloping ridge with good fields of fire down to and beyond the stream. He saw its advantages at once. Moving his command at the double quick, he halted the column briefly at the small farm house of Joshua Chapman on the ridge overlooking Chapman's Bayou. A narrow trail intersected the Stage Road at this point and a ravine which cut through the property's southern edge provided a good defense in that direction. Off in the distance he could see the advancing rebel army, but they were unhurried and disorganized. The disintegration of unit integrity brought on by the earlier attacks slowed the Confederates' progress. Many of the rebels had also stopped to loot the abandoned cavalry wagons which further fragmented their ranks and slowed their progress. The delay gave Emory time to set up a formidable battle line on the ridge.

Emory quickly issued orders to his brigade commanders on where to place their troops. He placed Brig. Gen. William Dwight's 1st Brigade (less the 161st New York) on the division's right flank, just to the right (north) of the Stage Road along the military crest of the ridge. Brigadier General James W. McMillan's 2nd Brigade was posted to the left of the Stage Road and in the division's center. Colonel Lewis Benedict's 3rd Brigade formed on the far left overlooking the ravine to the south. As his brigades deployed, Emory personally led the 161st New York forward across the bayou and had them set up a skirmish line covering the Union front. Returning to the battle line, Emory ordered his men to lie down and await the Confederate attack. As the US troops prepared to resume the battle, the sun was beginning to set in the west.

With some difficulty, Walker, Green, and Polignac had finally pulled their men away from the wagons and reorganized them to resume the fight. Most of Green's cavalry took position on the Confederate left, then moved through the woods to the east, crossed Chapman's Bayou, and groped in the woods for Emory's right flank. Polignac's Division formed on line to the north of the Stage Road. Walker's Texans formed to Polignac's right on

the south side of the road. As at Mansfield, Bee's cavalry troopers secured Walker's right. In the rush forward, neither side made provisions to bring their artillery with them (the rebel batteries were stalled behind the Federal cavalry's wagon train anyway). This was going to be a pure infantry fight.

As the Confederates advanced closer and the skirmishing grew hotter, Emory recalled the 161st New York which then took position on Dwight's right. Polignac's and Walker's men advanced across the bayou and advanced toward the Union center, apparently not yet aware of the Federal line in their front. Emory had his men withhold their fire until the last moment. Once the rebel line was about 100 yards to their front, and he ordered his men to stand and then opened up at point-blank range, throwing the enemy back. A Confederate officer later wrote of the experience: "Never shall I forget that moment. The very air seemed dark, and hot with balls, and on every side was heard their dull, crushing sound, as they struck the swaying mass, tearing through flesh and bone and sinew. The position of our line could have been traced by our fallen dead."³³

After the initial Confederate line fell back, Green ordered his men forward and tried turning the Union right. The rebel cavalrymen pushed Dwight's brigade back on the center of the line. Banks and Franklin had stopped at Emory's line when they arrived to offer assistance and encourage Emory's command. As the fighting grew hot, Banks now rode his horse along the front line and urged his men to stand fast: "My brave men of the Nineteenth Corps, stand your ground and we shall win the day."³⁴ Emory also bolstered his troops by telling them, "Men, you must hold this position at all hazards; before the enemy gets past here, they must ride over me and my little gray mare."³⁵ The commanders of the 13th Maine and 47th Pennsylvania of McMillan's brigade saw the danger from Green's advance on the right and refused their flank to halt that attack. Walker's Texans concurrently tried the Federal left but it too held together. The rebel attack could not break this new Federal position. Still, the Confederates were gradually able to push Emory's entire line back several hundred yards to the top of the hill. The fighting then petered out in the dark sometime after 1830 and Taylor's men backed away. Emory's line had successfully held but the Confederates had secured the only water source in the area.

As the fighting faded, Emory stood in the dark and listened. He could hear the rattle of the captured cavalry wagons moving off to the north. His belief was that the rebels had been defeated and were withdrawing. Locating Franklin, he suggested that Lee's troopers be sent to pursue the supposedly retreating enemy, but there were no organized bodies of

cavalry to be found. No pursuit was undertaken. The Battle of Mansfield was over.

The entire battle barely lasted more than three hours after Taylor's initial attack. In that short time Landram's 4th Division, XIII Corps lost almost 50 percent of its 2,400-man strength: 25 killed, 95 wounded, and 1018 missing. Cameron's 3rd Division suffered 25 percent casualties from its 1,200 men: 317 killed, wounded, or missing. Lee's Cavalry Division lost 39 killed, 250 wounded, and 144 missing. Of Emory's 5,000-man division, only 347 men were killed, wounded, or missing. Total US military losses totaled up to 113 killed, 581 wounded, and 1,541 missing for a total of 2,235 men out of about 12,000 troops present with Banks at Mansfield. Moreover, the Army of the Gulf also lost something over 1,000 stand of small arms to Confederate capture, as well as 20 pieces of artillery. The cavalry had lost at least 156 wagons along with ammunition and the other materiel contained within them.

Confederate losses were comparatively much lighter. Taylor lost approximately 1,000 men killed and wounded out of the roughly 8,800 actually engaged (the Confederate muster reports were subsequently lost or destroyed during the latter stages of the war, thus the actual numbers are unknown). Two-thirds of those casualties were from Mouton's Division alone. Taylor's command also lost a significant number of senior leaders to death and wounds, not the least of which was General Mouton. Both armies, however, would soon be reinforced and the fighting would resume the next day.

Despite the severe setback at Mansfield and Sabine Crossroads, after Emory's success in holding the line at Pleasant Grove (Chapman's Bayou) Banks now perceived an opportunity and ordered his army to halt in place. Emory's division was retired a short distance and went into bivouac, but remained in line of battle in the event Taylor decided to advance again that night. Banks also sent orders back for A. J. Smith to move his corps up to join the rear of the XIX Corps. The commanding general then conversed with several of his subordinates. Almost immediately, Franklin, no doubt in pain and demoralized himself after the day's events, began to list reasons why the army should retreat. Smith could probably not join with the army before morning, he said, and would not be in shape to fight after moving over 36 miles all day and night the day before. Besides, the Confederates held the only nearby water source. Banks then asked Dwight, a close personal friend, his opinion. The brigade commander also recommended retreat. Dwight agreed with Franklin's assessment of the XVI Corps and he believed the cavalry was disorganized and demoralized. He

also ventured the belief that the troops of the XIII Corps probably would not stop running until they got to Pleasant Hill anyway. Other problems were broached as well: supplies, food, and water were short and there were too few ambulances or wagons to convey the army's many wounded. Banks, convinced by the generals' arguments, decided to fall back to Pleasant Hill. The return march began at 2200.

Farther north that evening, Taylor let his men rest. At this point the Confederate commander believed that he still only faced Franklin's XIX Corps. His intelligence sources had been keeping him apprised of Porter's movements on the Red River and he was still under the impression that A. J. Smith's XVI Corps was with the admiral. Taylor heard the noises of Banks' army moving around, but he was not sure if Banks was repositioning or retreating. He knew that Banks might fall back during the night but either way, he intended to begin pursuit of the Federal army the next morning or fight it out at Chapman's Bayou. At about 2230, Taylor wrote Kirby Smith to give him an account of the day's fighting and inform him that he intended to continue to pursue Banks with Churchill and Parsons' divisions who were now heading south to his position.

Sometime before midnight, Taylor left Walker in charge of the army and rode back to Mansfield. Churchill soon arrived there as well and reported that his two-brigade Arkansas Division and Parsons' two-brigade Missouri Division had arrived from Keachi. Taylor directed Churchill to have both divisions on the road toward Pleasant Hill no later than 0300 that morning. Taylor then sent Walker a message directing him to have Green send some of his cavalry to cut the road from Pleasant Hill to Blair's Landing just in case Banks had decided to turn east and link up with Porter there. He also informed Walker that Churchill and Parsons' men were on the way and that, "Arkansas and Missouri have the fight in the morning. They must do what Texas and Louisiana did today."³⁶ Taylor also wanted Walker to attack early in the morning: "Time is everything to us." After ensuring that his wounded, the Union prisoners, and captured materiel were being properly managed, he turned around and headed southeast back to Chapman's Bayou.

Vignette: Emory later described the fight at Chapman's Bayou to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War:

I directed my men to lie down and hold their fire until the enemy had got close up. The enemy came on, apparently not expecting to meet anything there. When the enemy got within 100 yards my line opened on them. In about 15 minutes the

enemy were driven from the field with very considerable loss. By this time it was dark, and we could hear nothing in our front except the noise of wheels, perhaps artillery or wagons going to the rear of the enemy, and the cries of the wounded men calling for water.³⁷

Analysis

1. How would you assess Franklin's orders to Emory and Emory's actions in responding to Franklin in light of today's concept of Mission Command?
2. How would you evaluate Banks' performance at Mansfield in terms of Mission Command? Taylor's performance?
3. To what do you attribute Confederate success, or Federal failure, at the Battle of Mansfield and its immediate aftermath? How much of a factor was the terrain?
4. To what would you attribute this minor, but important, Federal success at Chapman's Bayou.
5. Was Banks decision to withdraw from Chapman's Bayou the correct one? Explain your answer.

Stand 8

Pleasant Hill: Federal Deployment and Confederate Approach




Figure 3.28. Route to Pleasant Hill. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time is about 15 minutes) From Chapman's Bayou proceed 12 miles southeast on Louisiana 175 to the 32nd Iowa Monument on the right side of the road. Park at the pull off or on Parish Road 419 on the north (left) side of LA 175. Use caution when parking and crossing the road.

Orientation: Facing west, you are standing in the initial battle line of Shaw's brigade at Pleasant Hill. The 32nd Iowa monument is located on the far right of the brigade's position (an area actually held by the 14th Iowa). The 25th New York Battery was probably deployed across this road




Figure 3.29. Federal Deployment and Confederate Approach. Graphic by Robin Kern.

(accounts vary having the battery straddling, on the north, and on the south side of the road). To the right (north) of the battery was the 24th Missouri Infantry (US). To the left of the 14th Iowa was the 27th Iowa. The 32nd Iowa was to the left of the 27th and was about 300 yards due south. Ahead of you (west) and around the curve Green's Division formed north of the road, Polignac's Division massed straddling the road, and Walker's Division to south of it. Due west of this position was a large meadow where two batteries of Confederate artillery were posted on a low rise to support the Confederate attack.

Union Situation: The Night of 8-9 April 1864

Description: (See Appendix L, Map L-17 for an overview of this phase.) At 2200, after Banks had made the decision to fall back on Pleasant Hill, the dispirited Army of the Gulf trudged southward with the remnants of the heavily degraded XIII Corps in the lead followed by the infantry wagon train. The US troops tried to move as silently as possible to prevent the rebels from detecting the retrograde. Around midnight, the XIX Corps rearguard, Dwight's brigade of Emory's division, began its march. Progress on the 12-mile movement was slowed by a host of stragglers and the wagon train.

After his arrival back at Chapman's Bayou shortly before dawn, Taylor no longer heard any noises in the direction of the Federal lines. He ordered a battery to fire a few rounds into the Federal camp on the ridge before dawn. When there was no response, General Bee sent cavalry scouts forward who soon returned to report that the enemy had gone. At first light, Taylor pushed on ahead of the army and accompanied Green's cavalry in a pursuit of Banks troops. The infantry also began its march southward led by Churchill's and Parsons' divisions while Walker's and Polignac's divisions followed. The victorious Confederates found the road to Pleasant Hill littered with knapsacks, burning wagons, abandoned arms, and other equipment and supplies. They also rounded up a number of Union stragglers and wounded and sent them to the rear. These were clear indicators of a demoralized and disorganized army. With two fresh divisions in tow, Taylor was confident he would defeat Banks again. What he did not know, however, was that A. J. Smith's XVI Corps, 7,500 muskets strong, had arrived at Pleasant Hill, 14 miles down the road.

Union Deployment at Pleasant Hill (see Appendix L, Map L-18)

During the night, the Federal troops who had hastily retreated at Mansfield had been making their way south to Pleasant Hill. A. J. Smith's XVI Corps contingent had arrived there earlier that afternoon (8 April). As the clots of broken units came through and began assembling there, the word of the disaster that had befallen Lee's cavalry and the divisions of Ransom and Cameron made their way to Smith's ear. Observing the continual stream of refugees and wagons now trundling into Pleasant Hill most of the night, Smith was certain the rumors were true. By about 0650 on 9 April, the lead elements of Green's cavalry ran into Emory's rearguard, already well on its way to Pleasant Hill. Green's men began harassing the Union retreat, but despite the skirmishing in the rear, the head of the organized portions of the Federal column reached Pleasant Hill at 0830 after a 12-mile march.

The original town of Pleasant Hill (which no longer exists) sat on a roughly mile-square plateau. There were cleared fields to the immediate north, south, and west of the town, most of which were either under, or soon to be under, cultivation. To the west was a dense stand of pines, and beyond that were more cleared fields, including Wilson's Farm. Beyond the clearings were dense stands of pine with thick underbrush and deep ravines. The Stage Road ran through the middle of the village, while roads to Grand Ecore, the Sabine River, and to Many (pronounced "MAN nee") and Fort Jesup radiated outward from the town. There were a about dozen

or more residences, a church, stores, a hotel and post office. The largest structures were a cluster of buildings that marked the spot of an unfinished boy's college south of town. As the army made its way into the area, most of the command could be readily observed from a distance since the town and the areas around it were largely treeless.

As the final contingent of troops were approaching the town, A. J. Smith decided to put some troops in forward positions away to the west—away from the town—as a precaution against a sudden rebel attack. The move would also give the broken troops now filtering in some time to reform or rejoin their regiments. Smith sent Col. William Shaw's 2nd Brigade, 3rd Division, XVI Corps up the road to set up a battle line west of the town. Shaw's men were so hampered by the refugee troops moving south that he directed his brigade off the road and marched them through the woods and fields parallel to the route.

About one mile west of Pleasant Hill, Shaw encountered the army's rearguard under General Emory. Emory had initially placed McMillan's brigade to the south of the road to fend off the persistent rebel cavalry probes against his division. On Shaw's arrival, Emory had him relieve McMillan by taking a better position which straddled the road and included a small knoll north of the road. McMillan's brigade, in turn, moved to a ridgeline to the rear of Shaw's men while Dwight's brigade fell in on Shaw's right rear. Dwight's brigade was deployed in a concave formation covering a deep, wooded ravine to the north. Emory placed Benedict's brigade closer to town to cover the Sabine River road, but these positions still left a 250-300 yard gap between Shaw's left and Benedict's right (a problem which Shaw pointed out to both Dwight and Brig. Gen. Charles P. Stone, Banks' chief of staff). Behind these four brigades, the rest of the units in the Army of the Gulf lay down exhausted where they halted in and around the town. Most Federal commanders let their men go to sleep or began preparing breakfast oblivious to the fact that some 12,000 Confederate soldiers were at that moment marching toward Pleasant Hill with every intention of fighting them again.

When Bee's troopers made contact with Emory's rearguard early that morning, they thought that they would be able to keep the Federals on the move with harassment and skirmish tactics. But near Pleasant Hill, around mid-morning, the rebel scouts encountered US infantry formed for battle and they did not seem inclined to move any farther. When he received the scouts' reports, Bee came forward to recon the line and came to the same conclusion. Green and Taylor soon arrived and after receiving Bee's

report, decided that they now had to wait for the rest of the Confederate infantry to arrive before they could do more.

The Union High Command's Actions

Despite the persistent skirmishing toward the west, Banks, his staff, and many senior Federal commanders were confident that there would not be another major fight with Taylor's forces this day. Franklin did not even deploy his XIX Corps in any kind of cohesive defensive positions. Banks had set up his headquarters at the largest house in the area, the Childers House (near the junction of today's LA 175 and LA 177). The yard was a fenced enclosure where Banks and several of his generals, including Franklin, lounged and discussed various topics. While Banks' bodyguard, and many on his staff, dozed in the warm spring sunshine, Franklin nervously twisted his whiskers and Brig. Gen. Charles P. Stone, Banks' chief of staff, smoked cigarettes, evidently engrossed in the "puffs of smoke that curled around him."³⁸

That morning Banks himself was somewhat lost in his thoughts grappling with what he should do next. He essentially had two choices: resume the offensive from Pleasant Hill or fall back to Porter's gunboats on the Red River and decide later. At first it seemed as if he was going to pursue the latter option. That morning he had ordered Lee to send all but 500 cavalymen to escort the majority of the army's wagon trains back to Grand Ecore. For added protection, Banks included the remnants of the XIII Corps, the *Corps de Afrique* troops, and most of the army's artillery batteries. He now had about 12,000 troops remaining with him at Pleasant Hill.

A little before noon, Banks momentarily put the advance or retreat question aside and announced that he was going forward to visit the troops out front from where the skirmish fire was emanating. He assembled some of his staff and rode out to the line. There he talked to the troops and several commanders and reassured himself all was well. Content that there would be no battle this day, despite the continuous, albeit light, skirmishing with rebel cavalry, Banks rode back to the Childers House to have lunch. Although Banks had visited with some of his units, neither he, nor any of his subordinate generals, bothered to inspect the adequacy of how the army was deployed in the event of another Confederate attack.

Once back at the Childers House, Banks sat down to write a message to Porter. Earlier he had sent a note informing the admiral about the events of 8 April, but was not fully candid about the details. After satisfying himself that there was to be no further significant action at Pleasant Hill, he told Porter in the subsequent note that he intended to resume the advance on Shreveport that evening, apparently despite the fact that most of his

supplies were at that very moment rolling toward Grand Ecore, along with a substantial part of his army.

Confederate Plans and Preparations

While Taylor waited for Churchill's column to arrive, he sat down to finalize his plans for the attack on the Union positions at Pleasant Hill based on the intelligence he had received from his cavalry. Green's men had done far more than harass Emory's troops that morning. They had also conducted a thorough, but not totally complete, reconnaissance of the disposition of Banks' units. They had discovered, rather easily, the location and general strength of all Federal units arrayed before the town. The troopers were even able to detect the move of Banks' trains back toward Natchitoches. That fact helped convince Taylor that the Federal positions at Pleasant Hill were only temporary in order to allow the plodding wagon train time to move out of harm's way. What Green's men failed to discover, however, was the remainder of A. J. Smith's XVI Corps situated in bivouacs behind and southeast of the town. The very slight rise of the ground on which Pleasant Hill sat formed an inter-visibility line that apparently prevented the cavalymen from seeing Smith's men camped just below the horizon to the east. Their movements around the town also failed to reveal the presence of the new arrivals. Taylor now believed he far outnumbered Banks with the arrival of the Sterling Price's infantry, especially since he still believed Smith was on the river with Porter.

With the perceived Federal dispositions in hand, Taylor formulated his plan of attack. There would be no frontal assault as had been the case the previous day. Instead he would hold the Federals attention in front while Churchill's "corps" (Churchill turned over his division to Brig. Gen. James C. Tappan to assume command overall troops from the District of Arkansas) made a wide mile-long sweep around the Union left through the woods to the south. Churchill was to form his line so that the right flank would extend well beyond the Sabine Road and the command would use that road to guide the attack into Bank's left flank and rear. Green's Texans, under Brig. Gen. James Major, would likewise attack into the Federal right and block the Blair's Landing Road leading northeast out of the village. Walker's Texas Division was to form south of the road on Churchill's left. The division would demonstrate at first, then advance once they heard the firing from Churchill's attack. When it appeared that the Federals were preoccupied with Churchill's assault, Bee's two-brigade cavalry division would conduct a mounted attack down the Stage Road, through the village, and into the army's rear. Polignac's Division, which had suffered the most on the previous day, was to be held in reserve

Around 1300, Churchill's column arrived at a point about two miles west of Pleasant Hill. Churchill rode forward to confer with Taylor and receive orders and found the commanding general sitting on a log and whittling a stick. Taylor relayed his plan to Churchill, who in turn explained to the commander that his men had marched forty-five miles in the last thirty-six hours and were exhausted. Taylor also knew that the combat actions of the day before had left them rather worn-out as well. Taylor then wisely told Churchill to rest his men and delayed the start of the attack until 1600. He also told the newly-minted corps commander, to "rely on the bayonet, as we had neither time nor ammunition to waste."

Analysis

1. Evaluate Banks' plan for 9 April. What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of his intentions for operations that day?
2. ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense defines a retrograde as a type of defensive operation that:
 - Involves organized movement away from the enemy.
 - Is not conducted in isolation.
 - Is always part of a larger scheme of maneuver designed to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy.
 - Evaluate Banks' command and control of the Army of the Gulf in light of current retrograde doctrine.
3. ADP 3-90 states the three variations of the retrograde are delay, withdrawal, and retirement:
 - A delay is when a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on enemy forces without becoming decisively engaged.
 - A withdrawal is to disengage from an enemy force and move in a direction away from the enemy. Withdrawing units disengage from an enemy force to preserve the withdrawing force or release it for a new mission.
 - A retirement is when force out of contact moves away from the enemy.
 - How would you characterize the Army of the Gulf's retrograde and why?

4. ADP 3-90 defines the characteristics of the Offense as audacity, concentration, surprise, and tempo. Commanders maneuver forces to advantageous positions before an operation. To shape their decisive operation, they initiate selective contact with enemy forces. The decisive operation determines the outcome of the major operation, battle, or engagement. Decisive operations capitalize on the successful application of the characteristics of the offense.

- Which of these four characteristics do you think most define Taylor's attack at Mansfield? Justify your selection.

Stand 9

Pleasant Hill: Confederate Plan and Initial Attack




Figure 3.30. Federal Deployment and Confederate Approach, Stand 9. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time is about one minute.) From the 32nd Iowa Monument, proceed .6 mile southeast on Louisiana 175 to the former American Legion Club on the right side of the road. Park in the club parking lot.

Orientation: You are now standing at the western limits of the village of Pleasant Hill. Dwight's line ran from LA 175 northeast for about 400 yards along the western edge of the village before curving back eastward, with the rightmost regiment facing north. Look to the east for two low sheds near a house on the south side of LA 175. Much of the village stood in the open fields between the sheds and your location on both sides of the highway, though most structures were to the north side. Benedict's brigade was located about 250 yards south of this location. Thus, the position where you are standing is in the major gap between Benedict's right and Shaw's left. At the time of Churchill's attack, the left of Tappan's Division (i.e., Churchill's) would sweep through this area into the village. West of

you, on the north side of the road, is a dogtrot cabin that was present at the time of the battle and used as a hospital afterward.

Description: (See Appendix L, Map L-18 for an overview of this phase.) While his men rested, Taylor talked with Mr. T. J. Williams, a resident of Mansfield. As a local denizen, and formerly the sheriff of De Soto Parish, Williams claimed intimate knowledge of the road net throughout the area and volunteered to serve as a guide for the flanking force. Once he explained his intent to Churchill and Williams, Taylor set his army in motion. At 1500, Churchill began moving his command toward the Sabine River Road. He had about 90 minutes to get his men into position and initiate the attack. Guided by Williams, the column advanced about two miles on a trail that brought them through the densely packed pine forest to the southwest of the town. Not surprisingly, the thick wilderness interfered with the approach march, communications, and lines of sight. Once Williams brought him to the Sabine Road, Churchill formed his command with Parsons' Missouri Division on the right and Tappan's Arkansas Division on the left. Using the road as a guide, Churchill advance his command until skirmishers in front reported that the main Federal line (probably Shaw's brigade) was in front. The Confederate line was not on the far Union flank as planned. Churchill quickly ordered the entire line shifted to the right and Parsons' brigades ended up on the south side of the Sabine Road which now ran generally down the left center of Churchill's line. Continuing the advance, Churchill's diminutive corps now encountered Benedict's brigade deployed to its front.

At about 1630, a 12-gun battery under Taylor's Chief of Artillery, Maj. Joseph L. Brent, opened up a brisk fire aimed at Shaw's brigade and the four guns of the 25th New York Battery posted there. The US battery traded a few blows with Brent but was soon forced to retire.

Vignette: Shaw was less than impressed with the performance of the 25th New York Battery:

A few moments before 5 o'clock the enemy opened heavily on me with artillery, which was replied to feebly, for a few moments, by the 25th New York Battery, when they limbered up and disgracefully left the field, leaving one caisson and one gun in the road, which were drawn off by Lieutenant Buell, of my staff.³⁹

Hearing the firing off to the west, Churchill interpreted the noise as the opening of the attack and he gave the command to move forward. On the right, Parsons' men were able to make their way through the pines in fairly

good order. Tappan's brigades, however, had a much tougher time breaking through the brush and soon fell behind. Entering into more open terrain, Parsons saw Benedict's brigade drawn up on a slight rise to his front and ordered his men to attack. Charging down a slight slope and through a thicket along a dry streambed at the base of the rise, the Missourians pitched into the Federal line. One by one, from right to left, Benedict's four regiment's folded and ran. As Tappan's men came up, the frontage of the combined attack more than overlapped Benedict's frontage and penetrated the gap between Shaw's left and Benedict's right. To add to the Federal's dilemma, Benedict fell mortally wounded.

In the Confederate center, Walker sent his men forward once he heard the heavy fighting over on the rebel right. Concurrently, Green, now thinking that Churchill's attack was routing the Federals to the south, and having watched the retirement of the 25th New York Battery which reinforced that impression, ordered Bee's cavalry to conduct the mounted attack. Bee directed his gray horsemen in a headlong charge against Shaw's brigade, but the Federals were stalwart. Shaw held his command's fire until the rebel troopers were less than 200 yards away then gave the order. The effect of 1,200 massed muskets was devastating. Of the 300 or so horsemen, fully half were killed or wounded in the blast. One brigade commander, Debray, had his horse shot from under him which fell on his leg and severely injured it. Debray was at least able to limp back to safety after the charge. The rest of the mounted troopers quickly made for the rear. After an unsuccessful second mounted charge, the other brigade commander, Col. Augustus C. Buchel, knowing another such charge would be just as devastating to his troops, ordered his men to charge on foot on their third attack. In this advance, Buchel was killed along with a number of his men. Lt. Col. William O. Yager assumed command of the brigade at that point.

Coming up from behind Bee's troopers were the men of Walker's Division followed by Polignac's troops moving parallel to the Stage Road (See Appendix L, Map L-19). As Bee's men backed away, Walker immediately took up the fight. To their front, Shaw's brigade was isolated. Benedict's brigade on the left was totally separated and collapsing in the fight with Churchill. Dwight's brigade, to the right rear, was busy fighting with Green's dismounted attack from the north. Shaw saw that he was now about to be flanked by Walker to the south and requested that Dwight send regiments to shore up the Federal left there. Dwight sent word back to Shaw that he had no orders from A. J. Smith for such a move and declined. Shaw had to face the onslaught alone. Fortunately, Shaw soon received orders from Smith to withdraw and he immediately began a fighting retro-

grade. The orders came too late for the 32nd Iowa, however. That regiment was flanked initially by Col. Horace Randal's Brigade on the left, then by some of Major's cavalry on the right when the rest of Shaw's brigade pulled back. The commander, Col. John Scott, refused both flanks and continued the fight in a horseshoe-like formation. Remarkably, the 32nd Iowa would continue the entire fight at their position in the woods, entirely surrounded, until withdrawing that night.

Once Shaw pulled back, Dwight, whose line had already been pushed east some distance, saw that he was likely to be flanked as well since there was no one now on his left (See Appendix L, Map L-18). He ordered his leftmost regiment, the 116th New York, to hold fast while he moved two regiments south to the other side of the Stage Road. With a fourth regiment, he refused (bent back) the left of the line to address the threat of Randal's and Waul's Brigades there. Emory, observing Dwight's movements, quickly called up his reserve, McMillan's brigade, and ordered its commander to fill the space that Dwight's regiments had just vacated on the right flank.

Vignette: One of the soldiers in Dwight's brigade was a Private Thomas of the 38th Massachusetts, who wrote to his wife while pinned down by Confederate fire. He commented that, "I don't know why this place is called Pleasant Hill—Seems darn unpleasant to me right now. The Rebs are fighting like dogs but we will whip them, you can bet on that."⁴⁰

Analysis

1. Which army has the advantage of terrain here? Use the Army acronym OCOKA to help in your analysis:
 - Observation and Fields of Fire
 - Cover and Concealment
 - Obstacles (man made and natural)
 - Key or Decisive Terrain
 - Avenues of Approach

Stand 10

Pleasant Hill: Federal Actions and Confederate Repulse




Figure 3.31. Federal Deployment and Confederate Approach, Stand 10. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time is about one minute.) From the American Legion Club parking lot, proceed southeast on Louisiana 175 to the monument pull-off on the left (north) side of the road. Turn into the parking lot. Move north around the rail fence, then west to a small gate beyond the pond.

Orientation: This location is where the original town of Pleasant Hill was located. The area is now privately owned. The village itself was situated on the east side of a large cleared field that ran along the stagecoach road. Pleasant Hill had been established here in 1846. By the time of the battle it had a store, a recently built Methodist church, and about a dozen houses. To the northeast is the old village cemetery, just to the east of the large, white monument, in which both Union and Confederate soldiers were buried after the battle. The town once boasted two schools: the Pleasant Hill Academy for Girls, which operated from 1850 to 1870 and had as many as 65-70 pupils, and Pierce-Payne College, which opened in 1858 as a companion school to Mansfield Female College. The construction of the




Figure 3.32. Federal Actions and Confederate Repulse, Day 2, Stand 10. Graphic by Robin Kern.

latter school was halted by the Civil War and its buildings were never completed. To the east about 300 yards near the intersection of LA 175 and LA 177 stood the Childers House, Banks' headquarters during the battle. Just beyond the house was a stand of dense pine trees and beyond them a very large open field where part of A. J. Smith's troops initially bivouacked. In 1881, when the railroad was built, the townspeople literally moved and rebuilt at the present location about two miles away. The new town was originally called "Sodus" by the railroad, but the residents, most of whom had moved from the old town, continued to call it Pleasant Hill and incorporated it as such in 1893. In 1922, the railroad commissioners bowed to the inevitable and dropped the name Sodus.

Description: The 160th New York's left rested on the cemetery's northern boundary, while the 16th Maine's right was well inside it; both were from McMillan's brigade. About 500 yards northwest was Dwight's brigade, facing northwest, above a wooded ravine. About 200 meters west and parallel to LA 175 south of you was Smith's XVI Corps (See Appendix L, Map L-19).

Stabilizing the Union Right

When Emory realized there was a breakthrough in the Union left caused by the collapse of Benedict's brigade (3-1-XIX), McMillan (2-1-

XIX) had just put the 13th Maine into position in preparation for the rest of his brigade to go in on the Federal right. At that point, most of McMillan's command was still formed in column about 200 yards behind Dwight. Emory now ordered McMillan to move the rest of his brigade southwest to support Dwight's left and generally fill the hole left by Benedict's rout. McMillan, at the head of the 47th Pennsylvania, the lead regiment, promptly moved the brigade southeast at the double-quick (a slow run or trot). As it approached the Stage Road, the brigade encountered the troops of Tappan's Division, probably from Col. Lucien C. Gause's Brigade. These troops had advanced past the wood line near what is now the American Legion Club and were advancing steadily toward the town. Some of Gause's troops had halted in and among some houses along the south side of the Stage Road and loosed a volley at the approaching Federal brigade. The majority of the blast struck the 47th Pennsylvania which suddenly broke and fled to the rear through the follow-on regiments (the 160th New York and 15th Maine). Fortunately, those two units held steady and McMillan ordered them into line where they opened up a brisk return fire into Tappans' men. As they did so, the 47th Pennsylvania rallied and came up on the right of the 15th Maine.

Surprise on the Confederate Right

While the fight between McMillan's men and the rebels on Tappan's left transpired, the rest of Tappan's Division advanced with Parsons' troops who had crushed Benedict's brigade. The Confederates had also created a huge gap between Emory's division on the Union right and Smith's corps on the far left. Both rebel divisions were headed directly for Banks' headquarters at the Childers House. Part of Tappan's command was able to fight its way into the western and central portions of the town. As they swept through, some of the Confederates, most likely from Grinsted's Brigade, captured the left section of Battery L, 1st US Artillery which was posted along the Stage Road in the village. On the right, Parsons' men were now advancing east almost unopposed. Churchill's attack had gone well. His troops had smashed through Benedict's brigade on the Union left and had entered the village. By all appearances, it looked as if Pleasant Hill was going to be another Confederate victory.

It was at this point, however, that the tide of battle began to change dramatically. Since the Confederate cavalry had failed to detect A. J. Smith's two fresh divisions, and Churchill (or perhaps his guide, T. J. Williams) failed to properly place his corps in the correct location to begin with, the seemingly rapid and easy advance of the Confederate right actually left the rebels vulnerable and now gave Taylor's opponents an opportunity. As the

Confederate attack became evident early in the battle, the initial fighting allowed Smith time to deploy his divisions into a cohesive battle line near where they bivouacked just east and south of the town. As Churchill approached this new Federal line, he and his soldiers failed to watch to their right front. There, A. J. Smith's XVI Corps stood waiting to give battle.

Watching the Confederate lines advance across his front, A. J. Smith gave Mower's 3rd Division an order to attack into Churchill's flank. The 58th Illinois Infantry, which had been hidden in a copse of trees directly on the rebel right flank, delivered the initial surprise to Parson's Division. Just after a volley from that regiment ripped across the ranks from the right, the rest of Col. William F. Lynch's 1st Brigade, 3rd Division, XVI Corps, hove into view and opened fire as well, catching half of Parson's Division in a crossfire. To Lynch's right were the brigades of Col. Sylvester G. Hill (3rd Brigade, 1st Division) and Col. Risdon M. Moore (3rd Brigade, 3rd Division) on line and facing Parsons as well. As Lynch's brigade advanced and began to roll up the Confederate right, Smith ordered the other two brigades forward. Shaw's and Benedict's brigades, now rallying, soon joined in the counterattack. The sudden blast from the right flank combined with the massive advancing Federal line to the right front abruptly halted the rebel charge. Parsons' men now fell back to the dry streambed from which they had earlier driven Benedict's brigade.

The sudden retreat of Parsons' Division now left Tappan's right flank exposed. Moreover, the fire from McMillan's brigade on Tappan's left threatened to put his entire command in a crossfire. Tappan wisely gave the order to abandon his gains in town and fall back on Parsons' new line. Walker, detecting the retrograde of Churchill's men sent Scurry's Brigade forward to bolster Tappan's troops. As Tappan retreated however, Gause's men ran headlong into those of Scurry. In the ensuing confusion, a Federal force on Scurry's left flank, most likely McMillan's troops and Mower's men now advancing, heavily pressed that brigade as well.

Earlier, during the course of the fight against Shaw's brigade, Walker was wounded but remained on the battlefield. When Taylor heard of the incident from a staff officer, he directed Green to take command of the Confederate center, then rode forward to find Walker. Taylor found him in the woods suffering from a contusion to the groin, probably from a spent bullet. Walker was still giving commands and he had just given the order for Scurry to support Tappan. Nevertheless, Taylor ordered Walker to the rear for treatment, which he obeyed, but only after protesting the order.

At about this time, Taylor also tried to salvage the situation by committing the army's reserve, Polignac's Division, along the Stage Road. At most, that effort merely stabilized Taylor's own line and did not result in any significant advance against the Federals. Meanwhile, Smith's XVI Corps slowly pushed the Confederate left back (see Appendix L, Map L-20). The fighting on all fronts continued into the early darkness of the evening before petering out. By then, the XVI Corps, aided on its right by reformed brigades of the XIX Corps, had forced the rebel line back to about where Taylor started that morning.

Aftermath

At Pleasant Hill, the Army of the Gulf lost about half the number of troops it lost the day before at Mansfield. Union losses on 9 April were 289 killed, 773 wounded, and 1,062 missing for a total of 1,605. By way of making up for the 20 cannon lost at Mansfield, one Federal account reported 16 Confederate field pieces were captured by United States forces that day (Taylor reported that he lost three guns). Confederate losses were heavier than the day before but commensurate with those of Banks' command. Taylor lost 1,200 men killed and wounded and another 426 taken prisoner for a total of about 1,626 casualties.

The battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, fought over two consecutive days, had left dead and wounded spread over a distance of twenty miles, but mostly on the two battlefields. At Mansfield, most of the Confederate dead were buried in the town's cemetery. Officers were placed in adjacent graves at the crest of the hill on which the cemetery was located. At other locations, Confederate dead were buried in makeshift graves near where they fell for reburial later. Some of the Union dead at Mansfield were also buried near the town's cemetery although two trenches were dug near the Sabine Crossroads and hundreds of Federal soldiers were buried there only to be reinterred at a national cemetery sometime later. At Pleasant Hill it took two days to bury the Confederate dead near the village's cemetery, near where we stand. The Union dead at Pleasant Hill were buried in a makeshift graveyard to the rear of the Pearce-Payne College, some in individual graves and others in common trenches.

There were also hundreds of wounded soldiers. Homes, schools, and all other available buildings at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill were pressed into service by both armies as hospitals. Banks' headquarters at the Childers House doubled as the army's main field hospital as well. As already related, hundreds of wounded Federal soldiers were abandoned by Banks to the mercies of General Taylor and his already inadequate med-

ical system. Taylor's doctors, supplemented by civilian women, treated Confederate and Federal soldiers side by side for days after the fighting. Many Federal soldiers later wrote of the kind care they had received in the homes of people in DeSoto Parish. The captured Union wagon train at Mansfield provided much-needed medical supplies for the casualties, but the Confederate physicians were nevertheless quickly overwhelmed by the number of wounded men from both sides for which they had to care. Finding enough food to feed the all of the wounded was also a problem.

After the fighting at Pleasant Hill, US military commanders discovered that most of the medical supplies their surgeons needed to treat the wounded was not available. This was due to the fact that most of it was on wagons with the trains headed for Grand Ecore. What few ambulances the army still possessed had also gone with the trains. With the wounded of both sides laying between lines that night shrieking with pain and pleading for water, the thought that there were so few supplies to treat the wounded in the rear embittered many men toward their army commander. When the Federal commanders and soldiers learned that the ambulances were gone too and that the wounded would be left to the mercy of the Confederates, that further estranged the army against Banks. Perhaps as a sign of penance, after the Army of the Gulf had arrived back at Grand Ecore, Banks sent six wagon loads of medical supplies under a flag of truce into the Confederate lines earmarked to treat the Federal wounded under Taylor's care. Still, of the roughly 400 wounded US soldiers that became POWs, more than half later died of their wounds.

Union Decisions after Pleasant Hill

Despite the senior leaders' poor efforts at building an appropriate defense at Pleasant Hill, the Federal forces had generally performed well on 9 April. Most of this was due to the fighting spirit of the men and regiments involved despite the events of the day before. Of course, A. J. Smith and his western men deserved most of the credit for the day's results. Banks realized this and that evening when he rode up to Smith he shook his hand warmly and said, "God bless you general. You have saved the army."⁴¹

Later, after the fighting died down, A. J. Smith asked Banks what he intended to do next. Banks informed the general that he intended to move on Shreveport once again. Apparently buoyed by the army's performance at Chapman's Bayou and Pleasant Hill, Banks' confidence had returned. Indeed, he even dispatched a message to Lee to turn around the trains and bring them back. Smith was in agreement with commanding general's decision and rode off to tend to his troops and prepare them for

the advance. All this, however, was before Banks met with other generals later that evening.

Calling together a small group of leaders a short time later which included Franklin, Emory, and Mower, Banks proposed to continue the movement on Shreveport. To his dismay, however, his generals disagreed for several reasons. First, on the army's present route there was no easy access to Porter's naval support until arrival at Shreveport. Also, Banks' next resupply of food and ammunition was located on the transports moving with Porter. Additionally, Emory's division was almost out of food. Second, no one knew the status of Porter's flotilla, whether it was still moving north or if it had been captured or destroyed. There was no word even on whether Porter could reach Shreveport given the falling water level. Third, Banks had not heard anything regarding Steele's progress in Arkansas. Was that column still en route, or had it met disaster? Fourth, it was now 10 April and Banks only had five days to capture Shreveport before Smith's troops had to depart for Memphis. Was it possible to reach the city and take it in five days? Finally, there was still the lack of water in the pine barrens and precious little remained at Pleasant Hill. What was remaining would be gone by the morrow.

Franklin offered that the army should march for Blair's Landing to link there with Porter and be resupplied. From there a decision could be made about what to do next. Emory concurred. Dwight, Banks' closest confidant, suggested that the army return to Grand Ecore since nothing had been heard from Porter. After considering the three options, Banks gave in, but selected the advice of the most junior general, Dwight.

Once the decision was made, Banks sent off another series of messages. First, he informed Lee to once again keep the trains heading for Grand Ecore and to watch his flanks in case of attack by rebel cavalry. He also wrote to Porter to let him know about the events at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, but did not indicate he was retreating to Grand Ecore. He also sent word to Grover (2-XIX) to march his division to Grand Ecore immediately. Finally, he directed Franklin to start the XIX Corps on its move "silently" in the early morning darkness back toward Natchitoches. Franklin was also instructed to find a good defensible position with water. The army would move there on its retreat from Pleasant Hill so that men and animals could be refreshed.

Sometime after midnight, Smith, who was not at the meeting, caught wind of Banks' reversal and became livid.⁴² He sought out Banks and strongly offered his protest. First, Smith reminded Banks that he had al-

ready said he was going to advance on Shreveport and therefore urged Banks to reconsider. Banks refused. Smith then offered that he wanted to remain behind for a time the next day to bury his dead and retrieve his wounded. Banks denied him permission. Finally, Smith told Banks that if Porter's flotilla now came under attack, Kirby Smith's 2,500 soldiers would be left aboard the transports without any support to back them up (which perhaps indicated that Smith had in mind the same idea regarding Franklin's suggestion about heading for Blair's Landing). Banks flatly rejected all that Smith was recommending. He told Smith that the army was being forced to return to Grand Ecore due to the lack of water and his mind was made up.

Angrier still, Smith departed and immediately sought out Franklin at his headquarters. There he suggested that Franklin should place Banks under arrest and that Smith and his troops would back him up. By this time Franklin was as fed up with Banks' generalship as Smith and the thought might actually have been appealing. After briefly thinking about the idea, however, Franklin then asked his fellow corps commander, "Smith, don't you know this is mutiny?"⁴³ At that remark, Smith demurred and returned to his command. The army was headed for Grand Ecore.

At this point, the Army of the Gulf had had engaged Taylor's Confederates in a series of battles for three straight days (including the fight at Wilson's Farm). It had sustained moderate casualties but was still a viable force of over 25,000 soldiers (when concentrated) facing a Confederate army of 11,000 men at best. But the army's senior leaders were dispirited and had lost all confidence in their commander. The average soldier was disgusted with Banks as well and now openly mocked the general. For all their fighting thus far, they had gained nothing substantial other than a few thousand bales of cotton. To make matters worse, although they knew that the Battle of Pleasant Hill was a Union victory, they also understood that Banks's decision to retreat turned it, and maybe the entire campaign, into a strategic defeat.

Confederate Decisions after Pleasant Hill

After his victory at Mansfield, Taylor was disappointed by his setback at Pleasant Hill. Mansfield had been costly, especially among senior officers, and now the repulse at Pleasant Hill had severely affected the morale of his army. If the defeat was not unpleasant enough for Taylor, his superior, Kirby Smith, decided to pay a visit to the army. Taylor's dispatches from Mansfield about fighting a pitched battle before Shreveport had troubled Smith, despite the fact that the messages were of victory, not defeat.

Smith was convinced that Taylor had only struck Banks' advance guard and was also concerned that Taylor's actions might have ruined his plans to lead his desired counteroffensive against Steele in Arkansas. Smith arrived at Taylor's headquarters at 2200 on 9 April. In assessing the situation as he rode through the rebel camp and after talking with Taylor, Kirby Smith later wrote that, "Our repulse at Pleasant Hill was so complete and our command so disorganized that had Banks followed up his success vigorously he would have met but feeble opposition to his advance on Shreveport."⁴⁴

For his part, after three days of riding, fighting, and almost no sleep, Taylor was exhausted. He had fallen asleep next to a fire along with Generals Gray and Bee and that is where Smith found him. Fearing now that Banks would regroup, mass, and attack Taylor with everything he had, Smith opened his dialog with Taylor:

"Bad business, bad business General," Smith remarked. Taylor thought otherwise. He replied, "I don't know, General. What is the trouble?"

"Banks will be upon you at daylight tomorrow with his whole army," said Smith.

"Well General," said Taylor, "if you listen, you will hear Banks' artillery moving out now on their retreat."⁴⁵

Several Federal prisoners brought in soon after confirmed Taylor's remark. As for Smith, he was surprised to hear the news of a Federal withdrawal.

Taylor then indicated to the department commander that it was his plan to pursue Banks to Grand Ecore and attack him there. Smith disagreed with the idea. Instead he ordered his subordinate to meet with him in Mansfield the next day to discuss the next move. The meeting at Mansfield on 10 April began a series of heated meetings and messages between Kirby Smith and Taylor for the next three days over the strategy that the Trans-Mississippi Department should pursue. The end result on 13 April was an order for Taylor to send Walker's, Churchill's, and Parson's divisions to Smith in Shreveport. Smith was going to personally lead them on a campaign to defeat Steele in Arkansas. Initially, Smith had indicated that Taylor would come along to play a leading role in the fight against Steele.

On 15 April when Taylor arrived in Shreveport, he learned that Steele's column was no longer heading southwest toward Shreveport, but northeast to Camden, Arkansas. In effect, Steele was in retreat. Taylor was elated because now Kirby Smith had no immediate reason to take the infantry divi-

sions to go defeat Steele. That column was no long a threat to Shreveport and now the entire Confederate force could be used to march against Banks and thoroughly defeat, or perhaps even destroy, the Army of the Gulf and even Porter's vessels. Taylor was soon disabused of that thought. Smith curtly informed his subordinate that he, Smith, would still march into Arkansas to pursue and destroy Steele. As for Taylor, the department commander now told him that he would remain behind in Shreveport to act as the department rear area commander while Smith was in Arkansas. Smith, however, also gave Taylor the option of returning to his command to resume field operations against Banks, such as they may be. Not surprisingly, Taylor became angry over Smith's treatment of him, as well as the department commander's wrongheaded (in Taylor's eyes) and obstinate intention to fight the lesser of two threats. Despite the fact that he now had less than 6,000 troops in Louisiana to operate against the Army of the Gulf, Taylor decided that he would take to the field again and do as much damage to Banks as he could. One of the first things he did was to send the remnants of Vincent's 2nd Louisiana Cavalry and Col. Louis Bush's 4th Louisiana Cavalry to report on and harass Grover's troops in Alexandria and attack any Federal detachments which may be moving up through Bayou Teche from the south. Another brigade of Texas cavalry under Brig. Gen. William Steele was marching from Marshall, Texas, to bolster the District of Western Louisiana at about the same time. Steele's brigade and most of the rest of Taylor's cavalry was to be employed on a much grander mission.

Since Banks' departure from Grand Ecore on 7 April, Taylor's cavalry and other intelligence operatives had been reporting on the composition of Porter's squadron and its movements up the Red River. On 10 April, Taylor had received word that Porter had passed Grand Bayou headed upriver on the morning of the 9th. Taylor now formulated plans to try and either seize or destroy Porter's boats. The problem was that Bayou Pierre lay between the Red River landings and the Shreveport–Natchitoches Stage Road and the only crossing sites were small ferries positioned on the lateral roads. There was a Confederate pontoon train at Shreveport for which Taylor had asked on several occasions but had never received. It would have been ideal for just such an obstacle. Nevertheless, the next morning, 11 April, the general sent Bagby's Brigade with an attached battery northeast to try and intercept Porter at Grand Bayou Landing on the Red River. At about the same time, he also sent Green with 750 troopers and two batteries to perform the same mission at Blair's Landing (see Appendix L, Map L-17). Porter was having enough trouble just negotiating the river. He would now have to fight his way back to Grand Ecore, once he learned of Banks' defeat and retreat.

Vignette: After the war, Taylor wrote that,

These were creditable results [at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill], yet of much less importance than those that would have been accomplished but for my blunder at Pleasant Hill. Instead of entrusting the important attack on my right to a subordinate I should have conducted it myself and taken Polignac's division to sustain it.⁴⁶

Analysis

1. How did the terrain affect the outcome of the fighting 9 April?
2. Evaluate the actions of the Federal high command (Banks, Franklin, A. J. Smith, Emory) to prepare for and fight the Battle of Pleasant Hill. What do you see as the key decision(s) made by any of these commanders which you believe led to success?
3. What would you have done differently to prepare for a defense at Pleasant Hill?
4. Evaluate the actions of the Confederate high command (Kirby Smith, Taylor, Churchill) to prepare for and fight the Battle of Pleasant Hill.
5. What would you have done differently to prepare for an attack at Pleasant Hill?
6. What modern-day elements of the operational art did Banks consider when making his decision for future operations? Which elements did he fail to take into account? What other options did he have?
7. What do you think Banks should do next?
8. What modern-day elements of the operational art did Kirby Smith and Taylor consider when making plans for the Confederates future operations? Which elements did he fail to take into account? What other options did he have?
9. What do you think Kirby Smith should do next?

Stand 11

Engagement at Blair's Landing




Figure 3.33. Route to Blair's Landing. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time to Blair's Landing is about 20 minutes.) From the parking lot, turn left (south) onto LA 175. Proceed east 0.1 mile to the junction of LA 175 and LA 177. Turn left onto LA 177 and proceed 2.8 miles to Bob Wilson Road. Turn right onto Bob Wilson Road and proceed 1.4 miles to the junction with LA 174. Turn left (east) onto LA 174 and proceed 10.7 miles northeast to the intersection of LA 174 and LA 1. Turn left and proceed northwest on LA 1 for about 400 yards. Turn right on Porter's Island Road and proceed about two miles until reaching the stone dam overlooking the Red River. While en route you will pass the roadside marker commemorating Brig. Gen. Tom Green. There are restrooms located beyond the causeway. There are also picnic shelters in the event of inclement weather.

Orientation: You are about 16 miles east northeast of Pleasant Hill and approximately 45 miles north of Grand Ecore. On 12 April 1864 Tom Green's Texas cavalry arrived here and deployed along the ground to the right of the stream bed you see to your front. Most of Porter's vessels had




Figure 3.34. Blair's Landing. Graphic by Robin Kern.

already passed this section of river, but the USS *Osage*, USS *Lexington*, and the transport *Black Hawk* were still in the vicinity. If facing east, the vessels would have passed directly in front from right to left.

Alternate Stand: After turning right on Porter's Island Road, proceed .6 miles to Porter's Lake on the right. If facing east, the vessels would have passed in front from right to left. The Confederate forces, however, would have been located in the loop further east.

The Naval Operations toward Shreveport

Description: (See Appendix L, Map L-17 for an overview of this phase.) With the decreasing water level, emerging sandbars, and maps showing how winding and narrow the river was, Porter carefully selected the vessels that would accompany him up the Red River to Shreveport. He based his selection on firepower and shallow drafts. Ultimately, Porter selected only nine gunboats to escort the army transports for the journey to Shreveport. The monitors *Osage* and *Neosho* each carried two 11-inch naval smoothbore guns in a single turret mounted at the bow and one 12-pounder smoothbore cannon. Each was 180 feet long, displaced 523 tons, but drew only four and one-half feet of water. The turrets carried six inches of armor plate. Their sloping decks running just above the waterline earned them the nickname of "Turtle Backs." The turrets in the bow and

armored engine houses in the stern made them unwieldy and difficult to steer in tight places. *Osage* also had a periscope that officers used to help direct the fire of its guns.

Porter also selected the hybrid ironclad USS *Chillicothe*. The *Chillicothe* was driven by two protected sidewheels and two screw propellers. It carried two 11-inch smoothbore guns and one 12-pounder smoothbore cannon. The boat measured 162 feet long and displaced only 395 tons, but drew almost seven feet of water.

The USS *Lexington*, constructed in 1860, was one of the oldest warships in the squadron. *Lexington* was a timberclad sidewheeler, 177 feet long and displaced 362 tons. It was called a timberclad because it had thick layers of wood as protection. It mounted two 8-inch smoothbores, one 32-pounder, two 30-pounders, and one 12-pounder howitzer and drew six feet of water.

Porter also selected two tinclads which were boats that were protected by only one-half to three-quarters of an inch thick armor. The *Fort Hindman* was a 280-ton side-wheeler, 150 feet long, and carried two 8-inch smoothbore and four 8-inch rifled cannons. It drew only two feet, four inches of water. The USS *Cricket*, a sternwheeler, weighed 178 tons, was 154 feet in long, and mounted six 24-pounder howitzers. Drawing only 18 inches of water, *Cricket* served as Porter's flagship for the operations up north.

The final vessels in the Navy contingent were the tugs *Dahlia* and *William H. Brown* and the supply transport *Benefit*. Despite being a tug, the *William H. Brown* mounted two 12-pounders. Large for a tug, the *Brown* was also often used as a dispatch boat.

Porter's squadron escorted at least 20 Army transports (there were 45 vessels in all) carrying supplies for the main column and the 1,600 soldiers of Kilby Smith's provisional division of the XVII Corps (Note: Brigadier General Kilby Smith is a US military commander and no relation to Kirby Smith, the Confederate commander of the Trans-Mississippi). Even though these were transport vessels, Smith had armed many of these boats with field guns, mounted on the decks, from his attached batteries. He also had the troops place bales of cotton and sacks of oats around the deck railings for protection against small arms fire.

After departing Grand Ecore on 7 April, the squadron headed north and reached Campiti at 1700. The next morning, the transport *Iberville* ran aground almost immediately and took several hours to get afloat. With the water level dropping steadily, it was the first of many such trials and tribulations the expedition was to experience over the next 9 days.

As the river dropped, more navigation hazards emerged. Snags, mostly remnants of the Great Raft, threatened to rip open the boats' bottoms so Porter slowed the vessels to just above steerageway (slightly more speed than the flow of the river against which the vessels were moving) to avoid striking them. By 1800, the fleet finally arrived at Coushatta at the mouth of Bayou Coushatta (also known as "Coushatta Chute"). On arrival, Kilby Smith sent a brigade ashore for security and quickly took two prisoners.

Starting out the following day, the vessels moved in single file because of the river's winding course and narrowness. It was about here that Porter observed the Winter Road, the river route that Banks could have used for the advance. Other than that discovery, the day passed without incident. On 10 April, the date for the rendezvous with Banks' army at Springfield Landing, the fleet arrived at the mouth of what Porter indicated was Loggy Bayou at about 1400 (the location was actually several miles farther north). Here, Porter also believed that he had reached Springfield Landing. Springfield Landing, however, was actually located on Bayou Pierre, four miles due west from his position on the Red River. On his arrival there, Porter described what he found in a letter to General Sherman:

When I arrived at Springfield Landing I found a sight that made me laugh; it was the smartest thing I ever knew the rebels to do. They had gotten that huge steamer, *New Falls City*, across Red River, 1 mile above Leggy [sic] Bayou, 15 feet of her on shore on each side, the boat broken down in the middle, and a sandbar making below her. An invitation in large letters to attend a ball in Shreveport was kindly left stuck up by the rebels, which invitation we were never able to accept.⁴⁷

Porter quickly resolved to remove the wreck of the *New Falls City* while Kilby Smith landed troops to secure the position and conduct a reconnaissance of the area. Smith's men soon detected a number of Confederate troops openly watching them. The fact that the rebel soldiers made no attempt to hide their actions made both Porter and Smith sense that something might be wrong. Porter remarked to Smith that, "Banks has been defeated or we wouldn't see those men here. If Banks was still advancing, the outposts would keep on the main road to Shreveport. If defeated, the enemy's look-outs would be watching for our arrival, and be ready to turn their whole force upon us."⁴⁸ Porter and Smith then wisely decided that the fleet should prepare to descend the river while Smith's troops drove off the rebel scouts. Porter also ordered additional artillery placed on the upper decks of the transports and more on-deck barricades

from behind which the infantry could fire to defend the transports. Once all was accomplished, Smith reloaded his troops and Porter started the return trip toward Grand Ecore.

The trip down would not be as easy as the voyage up to the *New Falls City*. The Federal vessels were essentially bow to stern since the river was so narrow here. The large boats were thus forced to back down the river, stern first, for several miles which strained the engines and caused problems with steerage assemblies. Moreover, the snags that the boats successfully avoided coming upstream, would have to be negotiated again going down. There was also the possibility that the convoy could be attacked by elements of Taylor's command who were now free to engage the flotilla. Therefore, Porter had the gunboats distributed among the transports for added protection. Kilby Smith placed his steamer at the rear, while Porter in his small flagship, *Cricket*, moved among the vessels where he was needed.

The fear of river obstacles and Confederate attackers were well founded. Before the cluster of vessels moved very far, the USS *Chillicothe* struck a snag. Fortunately, the damage was slight, but it took the *Black Hawk* two hours to pull the vessel loose and for the crew to make appropriate repairs. Other snags damaged rudders and paddle wheels and boats ran aground frequently in the low waters of the river as the convoy moved south. The increasing amount of rifle and carbine fire from Liddell's cavalry on the north bank of the river added to the friction.

The fleet reached Coushatta Chute on the evening of 11 April. About 2200, a company of 50 troopers from the 14th New York Cavalry made contact with Porter along the river. The commander, Capt. William H. C. Andres, confirmed to Porter the Banks had been defeated at Mansfield and provided a number of messages addressed to Smith. The captain also provided orders from Banks to Smith for the latter to return his division to Grand Ecore, but there were no instructions or messages from Banks to Porter. The confirmation of the news about the recent fighting almost ensured that Taylor, with forces now freed to pursue other missions besides chasing Banks, would attack Porter's vessels.

Not long after the convoy passed Coushatta Chute, it began to come under almost constant rifle and occasional cannon fire from Liddell's cavalry. About midmorning, the *Lexington* collided with the transport *Rob Roy*, causing a great deal of damage to the latter's upper works. That incident, and a grounded vessel, forced another temporary halt to recover and make repairs, all the while under fire from Liddell's men.

Confederate Countermoves Against Porter

On 11 April, Taylor had dispatched Bagby's Brigade with an attached battery to try and catch Porter's fleet at Grand Bayou Landing 18 miles east of Mansfield. As he approached Bayou Pierre, however, Bagby received word, no doubt from some of the troops who had been watching Porter near the *New Falls City*, that the Union fleet had turned around. On that news, Bagby headed southeast intending to link up with Green's cavalry at Blair's Landing.

Green, meanwhile, had headed east from Pleasant Hill on the Bayou Pierre Road to Jordan's Ferry at 1800 on 11 April. When he arrived at Jordan's Ferry that night, Green could only locate a single small boat on which to ferry his troops across Bayou Pierre. It was now that the unemployed pontoon train sitting in Shreveport would have been of great value. Instead, Green was forced into an all-night effort to convey his men and artillery across the water obstacle. He was able to get all of his men and horses across, but only three guns of West's Battery (4th Arkansas Field), before he was forced to depart for Blair's Landing in time to catch Porter.

Porter's fleet approached Blair's Landing around 1600 on 12 April (see Appendix L, Map L-21). At least a portion of Green's troops had already arrived. Several vessels were forced to stop, either for repairs or had run aground, and rapidly came under light small arms fire as crews labored to correct their respective issues. Meanwhile, most of Porter's boats continued downstream a short distance to Grapp's Bluff. Near Blair's Landing, the *Hastings* had pulled over to the north bank to repair several damaged paddles. The *Alice Vivian* and the *Osage* were aground and the *Rob Roy* was behind them all, unable to pass through. The *Lexington* had pulled close to the north bank shore further downstream. The *Black Hawk* was attempting to pull the *Osage* free when its crew spotted a large Confederate force moving into an attack position. This was the remainder of Green's force now moving to take the stranded boats under fire.

Green had been reinforced by now and possessed somewhere between 1,000 to 2,000 troops (Porter states the strength was as high as 2,500). These troops included Bee's Division (less Bagby's Brigade) and Major's Division of two brigades. Green dismounted his troops and moved them and his three cannon into position to fire on the *Black Hawk*, *Osage* and *Lexington*. The US sailors, however, were able to open fire first. The *Lexington* commenced first with her 8-inch guns and, in short order, disabled one of the rebel field pieces. Green's men soon responded with cannon

fire on the *Hastings* and small arms fire concentrated on the *Black Hawk*. The *Hastings* was able to pull away and escape the fire by heading back upstream, but the latter vessel was soon engulfed in a lead storm. Due to the intense fire, soldiers on the *Black Hawk*'s decks were initially ordered below. The rebel fire was so intense, however, that the soldiers and crew of the *Black Hawk* were eventually evacuated to the *Osage*. Porter later said of the *Black Hawk* that, "that there was not a place six inches square not perforated by a bullet."

Other Federal vessels soon entered the battle. Field artillery pieces mounted on the *Rob Roy*, *Black Hawk*, and the *Emerald* now opened fire on the Confederate positions as well. After about an hour, the *Lexington*'s heavy guns gradually silenced the guns of West's Battery one by one.

Meanwhile, for over an hour, the crew of the *Osage* struggled to set her free from the sandbar and finally succeeded. The *Osage*'s commander let the current drift the boat closer in toward the Confederate positions. There he brought his 11-inch guns into action. One gun crew noticed a Confederate officer conspicuously mounted on a horse and obviously leading the efforts of the rebel line. At a range of only about 20 yards, the crew fired a load of grapeshot and canister toward the man, who immediately fell off his horse to the ground. The officer was Tom Green. A grapeshot had carried away the top of the general's head and killed him instantly. Several soldiers ran out and retrieved Green's body under the fire.

Vignette: Lieutenant George M. Bache, commander of the *Lexington*, reported that

the enemy opened on the rear end of the fleet with three pieces of artillery.... I immediately got the *Lexington* under way, steamed past all the other vessels toward the battery, engaged it with our bow guns (VIII-inch) and drove it off in a few minutes, disabling one of the pieces. When within 600 yards of the battery, we encountered a very heavy fire of musketry from some fifteen hundred men, whom we passed at a distance of twenty feet. The enemy came boldly up to the edge of the bank, yelling and waving their side arms, so close that as a portion of the bank caved in under from our fire, one of the rebels tumbled down within a few feet of the vessel. I now got our port broadside to bear on the enemy's line, and while the *Osage* poured in a front fire of grape and canister, we raked them with shell and shrapnel. They retreated precipitately into the woods after an engagement of forty minutes, having ex-

perienced a loss in killed and wounded of about 150 men, among them General Green...and one of their colonels.⁴⁹

With the loss of Tom Green, the fight went out of the Confederates. Their fire began to dwindle as the rebel line backed away from the river. The fight lasted about two hours and ended around 1800. Bagby's Brigade arrived at Blair's Landing a short time later, too late to engage in the battle.

Despite the fact that both sides claimed a high number of casualties inflicted on their opponent, the actual numbers were relatively low. Union casualties were only about seven killed or wounded. Confederate casualties were much higher at about 200 killed and wounded, but still, when one considers the short distances involved, and the fact that the rebel cavalry was largely fighting from relatively unprotected positions (as compared to the Federals), the figure is small. Of course, the major blow was the loss of Tom Green to the Confederate cause. Taylor had relied a great deal on the aggressiveness and fighting abilities of Green. Now that valuable leadership was gone.

The Naval Expedition Arrives Back at Grand Ecore.

After the rebel retreat, Porter kept his squadron moving into the night with torches and moonlight lighting the way (see Appendix L, Map L-22). Throughout the night and into the morning of 13 April, vessels continued to ground and pull free, each time slowing the movement of the convoy. At about 1200, the squadron and transports began to arrive at Campiti, 24 miles south of Blair's Landing, but only about 8 river miles north of Grand Ecore. When Porter's flagship, *Cricket*, finally arrived about 1600, he found the situation at the anchorage at Campiti in confusion since many boats were aground. The crews struggled throughout the night to free those grounded. Moreover, Liddell's troops sporadically fired on the vessels from the north bank of the river.

On the morning of 14 April, Porter decided to leave the ironclad *Fort Hindman* to protect the grounded *John Warner* for protection. Both were under fire from Liddell's infantry and elements of Capt. T. Kinlock Fautleroy's 2nd Louisiana Heavy Artillery. Even though the cannon and rifle fire from Liddell's troops and the federal vessels could plainly be heard from Grand Ecore, Banks had made no move to send troops to Campiti to aid the navy. The rest of the convoy went ahead to Grand Ecore. Porter himself reached Grand Ecore at about 1700. There he was greeted by A. J. Smith who immediately agreed to send 1,700 troops under Shaw to clear the north bank of the troublesome rebels up to Campiti. Shaw's column crossed the pontoon bridge that evening and soon swept Liddell's

troops away from the river. The following day, the *Fort Hindman* managed to pull the *John Warner* off the bar unhindered by rebel sniping. Once the last two vessels pulled away from Campti, Shaw's troops burned the village before starting back. Both of the boats and Shaw's brigade reached Grand Ecore later that day. The fleet was once again safely under the army's protection.

Analysis

1. How feasible was the plan for the Army of the Gulf to link up with the navy at Springfield Landing?
2. What do you see as the most important "lessoned learned" from Porter's naval expedition up the Red River?
3. How well are Smith and Kilby Smith conducting Joint Operations? Consider some of Common Operating Precepts from US Joint Publication 3-0. Here are some examples that might be applicable to this campaign:
 - Achieve and maintain unity of effort within the joint force.
 - Integrate joint capabilities to be complementary rather than merely additive.
 - Focus on objectives whose achievement suggests the broadest and most enduring results.
 - Ensure freedom of action.
 - Avoid combining capabilities where doing so adds complexity without compensating advantage.
 - Maintain operational and organizational flexibility.
4. Was Taylor's use of Green's cavalry to attack the United States naval force on the Red River the best use of that resource at the time?

Stand 12

Grand Ecore: Arkansas Expedition and the Decision to Retreat




Figure 3.35. Map to Grand Ecore. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time to Grand Ecore is about 20 minutes) Proceed back to Louisiana 1. Turn left (south) on LA 1 and proceed 16.5 miles through Powhatan, Louisiana to the junction with LA 6. Turn left (east) on LA 6. Turn left on LA 6 (Business LA 6 comes in from your right). Proceed 3.5 miles to Grand Ecore on LA 6. Before crossing the Red River Bridge, turn left onto Tauzin Island Road (Parish Road 429), then an immediate right into the Corps of Engineers Visitor's Center. If the weather permits, execute the Camden Expedition from the visitors' center porch overlooking the Red River.

Alternate Stand Location: If access to the Grand Ecore Corps of Engineers Visitors' Center is not available, staff ride facilitators can use an alternate stand across the Red River where the bluffs may be viewed.

Orientation: To your front is the Red River. After the description and analysis of the Camden Expedition, take the trail to the east leading to an overlook built above the fortifications in order to conduct the second half of the stand.




Figure 3.36. Decision to Retreat. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Kirby Smith Takes the Field and Steele Retreats: The Camden Expedition

Description: (Note that this part of the staff ride covers events that do not take place on this terrain. Use visual aids to help guide the discussion).

On 16 April Kirby Smith marched north out of Shreveport with Walker's, Churchill's, and Parson's Divisions headed for Arkansas to engage Steele. Smith promised Taylor that he would return the infantry to him in Louisiana once he defeated Steele. Smith initially sent Walker's Division 30 miles north to Minden, Louisiana, but soon ordered the Texas Division to continue on for another 30 miles along the Fort Towson Road. Walker's mission was to ensure Steele (or other Federal forces) could not link up

with Banks from the west. Smith himself moved with the other two divisions to Calhoun, Arkansas, to link up with Price's command. If all went well, Smith would defeat Steele and recapture Little Rock.

On the same day Kirby Smith marched north out of Shreveport, Steele easily captured the fortified town of Camden (see Appendix L, Map L-6). There, Steele planned to hold in place until he could be resupplied with food and ammunition from Little Rock. If the Federal commander could resupply his army there, he might be able to resume his efforts to combine with Banks and capture Shreveport. Since his men were going hungry in the meantime, Steele ordered Col. James M. Williams, commander of the 1st Kansas Colored Cavalry, to take his regiment, an artillery battery, and almost 200 wagons and scour the surrounding countryside for any food they could find. The foraging expedition headed west on the road toward Prairie D'Ane on 17 April for about 20 miles, then spread out to find food. Most of the foraging teams found a fair amount of corn and other grains and reassembled near Poison Springs on the morning of 18 April for the return trip to Camden. Reinforcements, which included a regiment of infantry, two companies of cavalry, and two mountain howitzers, joined the foraging column en route. The column now numbered about 1,100 men and four field guns.

Even though Steele's men were out of food, Price wisely opted not to attack the Federal army at Camden since the Federals now at least had the benefit of prepared fortifications. Instead, Price chose to attack Steele's logistics. Price quickly took action after Marmaduke reported on Williams' foraging activities. Price sent Maxey's Division to reinforce Marmaduke who was at Lee Plantation, about fifteen miles from Camden. Maxey arrived at Lee Plantation on the morning of the 18th. Although Maxey was the senior officer, he left command responsibility with Marmaduke since the battle was imminent and because he believed that the cavalry commander understood the situation better than he. As the Federal column trundled its way east along the Upper Washington Road. Marmaduke positioned two brigades under Brig. Gen. William L. Cabell and Col. William A. Crawford (both of Brig. Gen. James F. Fagan's Division) across its line of advance to the east. Marmaduke's line was on the high ground above a stream called Poison Springs from which the ensuing fight took its name. The two brigades of Maxey's Division, under Colonels Charles DeMorse and Tandy Walker, formed a line in the woods to the south and parallel to the road. The configuration was essentially a classic "L" shaped ambush. The Confederate strength now stood at about 3,100 troops, a three to one advantage.

About 0930, Williams' column rolled into the trap. Williams had the two infantry units protecting the rear while the 1st Kansas Colored Cavalry led the movement and it was the latter regiment that made the initial contact. The rebel skirmishers moved forward to open the fight and Williams soon discovered that he was largely outnumbered and tried to close the wagons in tighter for a defense. He ordered the infantry forward to defend the wagons but that effort rapidly became hopeless as the weight of rebel rifle and artillery fire increased in intensity. Before long, the column was overwhelmed and the Federals were forced to abandon the wagons and retreat northward through a swampy region. Many men surrendered and, by several accounts, a number of the black troopers from the 1st Kansas Colored Cavalry were shot down as they attempted to do so. Williams and the other survivors regrouped in the marsh and made their way back to Camden while the Confederates returned southward with the Federal forage train and about 125 prisoners. The Federals lost 200 or so killed and 65 wounded in addition to four guns and all the wagons and their contents. The Confederate losses numbered about 114 men killed, wounded, or missing.

The following day, Kirby Smith arrived at Calhoun with his three rebel infantry divisions after marching 80 miles in three days. Taking full command of operations, Smith quickly dispatched Fagan's Division and Shelby's Brigade north on a mission to block Steele's line of retreat from Camden to Little Rock and to prevent Steele from being resupplied from that direction. He also ordered Churchill's and Parson's Divisions to move to a position near Camden to reinforce Steele's belief that a major attack would take place against the city.

As these moves were taking place, Steele received messages from Banks. The first told of the "victories" at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill. It also told Steele that Banks had withdrawn to Grand Ecore for resupply of his army since the cavalry's wagon train had been lost in the fighting. The next day Steele received another Banks message that urged him to join the Army of the Gulf on the Red River as soon as possible. Steele responded immediately with a letter that informed Banks that he was unsure when or where he might be able to link up with him on the Red River. Steele also informed him that he had good evidence that about 8,000 infantry had arrived in his area of operations under Kirby Smith and that the rebel commander had issued a recent order, "detailing his successes against your command."⁵⁰ Steele went on to say that he feared a general attack by the entire reinforced Confederate command in Arkansas and that he was having supply problems of his own. In short, Steele indicated to Banks that he was not coming any time soon, if at all.

Steele had good reason to worry. On 24 April Fagan learned that Steele's 240-wagon Federal supply train was returning to Camden from Pine Bluff. Fagan immediately marched his division to Mount Elba and by the following morning was at Mark's Mill where the road from Pine Bluff intersected with the road to Camden. There Fagan set his ambush.

The resupply column was under the command of Lt. Col. Francis Drake. After the disaster at Poison Springs, Drake had been ordered to Pine Bluff to acquire enough food to feed 15,000 men for an extended period and transport it back to Camden. In addition to the 240 wagons, Drake's column consisted of three regiments of infantry, with artillery and cavalry in support. In all, he possessed about 1,750 troops. On the morning of 25 April 1864, Drake had received reports of a large rebel force in the neighborhood but dismissed them as nonsense. Soon, however, the lead elements of the 43rd Indiana Infantry, Drake's advanced guard, encountered several unoccupied but recent rebel campsites along the route. As the regiment arrived at Mark's Mill, elements of Fagan's Division immediately attacked. The Hoosiers initially repelled the assault, but were then struck on their right flank by Cabell's Brigade. The 36th Iowa moved up to support, but both regiments were quickly forced back to the center of a clearing where they took their stand among a number of log cabins. There, an artillery duel opened between Drake's Battery E, 2nd Missouri Light Artillery and the 8th Arkansas Field (Hughey's) Battery.

About this time, Shelby's Brigade entered the fight and struck the 43rd and 36th Iowa on the left flank. Now outnumbered two to one, the two Federal regiments were fighting in three directions. The 77th Ohio Infantry, the rear guard, and the 1st Iowa Cavalry moved to the sound of the guns and tried to prevent the Federals in the clearing from being surrounded but gradually found themselves threatened from the rear and fighting for their lives. The battle lasted for four hours until most of the Federal command was finally compelled to surrender.

As a result of this battle, Drake's command lost all of its wagons and somewhere between 1,100 and 1,600 US soldiers killed, wounded, or captured, with the vast majority in the latter category. Only about 190 Federals escaped. Additionally, rebel troops reportedly killed a number of black troops after they were captured here as well. Confederate losses were estimated to be about 41 killed, 108 wounded, and 144 missing.

On receipt of the news of this second disaster, Steele knew he could dally no longer at Camden. With the loss of manpower and dwindling supplies, Steele gave up all thoughts of uniting with Banks and determined

that he had to return to Little Rock in order to save his army. That night, Steele ordered careful preparations for a deception plan to cover the retreat. The next day, all remaining food was issued to the troops. Anything not to be taken on the march was destroyed. On the evening of 26 April, buglers loudly played various calls to give the appearance that all was well to any rebel troops or spies who might be listening. The movement of the remaining trains started right after dark and by midnight, they passed over the pontoon bridge on the Ouachita River and headed north. The infantry and artillery followed and the bridge was immediately taken up.

The Confederates did not discover that Steele had departed until 0900 the following morning. Churchill's and Parson's Divisions, now forming an ad hoc corps under Sterling Price, entered the town and found it vacated. When Kirby Smith was notified, there was little he could do. The only pontoon train Smith possessed had been sent off to Taylor (though he no longer needed it) when the department commander left Shreveport. Nevertheless, the infantry went to work on building a floating bridge to get the army across while Marmaduke's cavalry departed to ford the Ouachita River at White Hall and begin the pursuit of Steele's command.

Marmaduke was across the Ouachita River by the morning of 27 April, but the bridge at Camden was not ready until dusk. Inexplicably, the rebel infantry did not begin crossing until the following morning. Moreover, that day Kirby Smith decided to send Maxey's Choctaw cavalry brigade back to the Indian Territory and this at a time when the mission required as large a cavalry force as could be assembled to pursue the retreating Federals. Additionally, Fagan, who was not yet aware that Steele had abandoned Camden, began to make his way north on his blocking mission. Due to the heavy rains, he was not able to find a ford across the flooded Saline River. Reaching Pratt's Ferry well to the north, he still found the river there too high to ford and no means to ferry across. Since his men were running low on food, Fagan ordered his troops to head for Arkadelphia—away from Steele's line of march—on the morning of 29 April to resupply.

As Smith was leisurely getting his command on the road out of Camden, Steele was driving his men with a passion. The Federal commander decided to take the road to Jenkin's Ferry on the Saline River because the route via Mount Elba traversed the large swampy areas along the Moro River which, given the recent rains, would make for slower going. Shortly after noon on 29 April, the Union van reached Jenkin's Ferry. Troops immediately began corduroying the road's approach to the ferry site to facilitate the crossing of the heavy wagons and artillery. Pontonniers, meanwhile, began construction of the bridge over the swollen Saline

River. The bridge was ready by about 1615 and the wagon train began to cross. The rain was so heavy and the ground so muddy, however, that the process of crossing took far longer than normal. By early morning only about half the wagons and part of the artillery had made it across the river. The road on the north side was as bad as that on the south and efforts went into corduroying there as well. Meanwhile, the infantry and cavalry remained on the near side in case of trouble, the former erecting breastworks.

Late on 29 April, Marmaduke's cavalry caught up with the Federal rearguard, Col. Adolph Englemann's 3rd Brigade, 3rd Division, VII Corps. The two opposing forces began to skirmish along the bluffs about two miles from Jenkin's Ferry in the dark. The US troops were gradually pushed off the high ground until Marmaduke's men reached an open area called Jiles Field on the morning of 30 April. The field was about a quarter-mile square, and at its eastern end was a stand of timber about 300 yards in depth. Beyond this was the larger Kelly Field that extended east to within a mile of the river. Englemann's brigade retreated past Jiles Field to the Union main line. Once down off the bluffs, Marmaduke's advance was naturally funneled down toward a narrow rectangle formed by Jiles Field. Advancing through the band of trees beyond Jiles Field, the rebel troopers encountered the main Union defenses.

The delay of the pontoon crossing, provided Brig. Gen. Frederick C. Salomon, commander of the 3rd Division, VII Corps, time to establish the main Federal defense line at the east side of the Kelly Field. Salomon had chosen his positions well. Toxie Creek (sometimes referred to as Cox's Creek), a stream with steep, slippery banks, protected the right flank of Federal positions. To the south was a heavily wooded swamp which helped protect the Federal left. To the front, running north and south through Kelly field, was a slough-like hollow on which Salomon formed his main defenses.

Salomon's 1st Brigade, under Brig. Gen. Samuel A. Rice, was positioned south of the Camden–Little Rock Road with its right flank resting on the route. To Rice's left, and in the center, was Col. William E. McLean's 2nd Brigade. Englemann's 3rd Brigade took up positions on the Union left and anchored its own left on the swamp to the south. Thayer's Frontier Division was in reserve behind the main line. The troops of Salomon's three brigades defended from behind breastworks and rifle pits with abatis cut in swaths before them. Kelly Field was to their front extending about a quarter mile to the east and bordered by a thick pine forest on all sides. Englemann later described the battle area as, "a majestic forest,

growing out of the swamp, which it was very difficult to pass through on horseback, the infantry being most of the time in water up to their knees.” The ground in front was on the flood plain below the bluffs and was very muddy due to the rain. In some places the standing water and mud was two feet deep through which the Confederate infantry would have to attack.

Price and Churchill’s division arrived on the bluffs after daybreak. Price, who Kirby Smith had appointed as an ad hoc corps commander in charge of Churchill’s and Parson’s Divisions, formulated his plan for a frontal attack against the Union defenses. About 0800, Price first committed one of Churchill’s brigades (Tappan’s) which advanced and was quickly stopped the heavy fire from Salomon’s line. Churchill then sent in Brig. Gen. Alexander T. Hawthorn to support Tappan’s left about 45 minutes later. Meanwhile, observing the action, Kirby Smith ordered a regiment from Brig. Gen. Thomas P. Dockery’s Brigade to cross north of Toxie Creek to flank and get behind the Union line. This force, the 15th & 19th Infantry Arkansas Infantry (Consolidated) under Lt. Col. H. G. P. Williams, was met by two of Englemann’s regiments which prevented Williams from succeeding on his mission. Sometime before 1000, Churchill committed his final brigade under Gause to the fighting, but still the rebel line made no headway.

The gray weather, combined with fog and gun smoke made target acquisition for both sides difficult, but especially for the Confederates. The Federals merely had to aim low and point in the direction of the rebel line and they had a good chance of hitting someone. They themselves also made small, difficult to spot targets behind their works. One of the results of the poor visibility was the accidental capture of three guns of Ruffner’s Missouri Battery. The artillerymen were struggling to move their guns into position near a line of infantry which they believed were fellow rebels. In the smoke and fog, however, the troops turned out to be the men of the 2nd Kansas Colored Infantry who promptly relieved them of their guns and their liberty.

Seeing that Churchill was making no progress, Price ordered Parson’s Division into the fray about 1000. Parson, like Churchill, now piecemealed his two brigades into the fight, but they too quickly stalled in the mud and heavy fire. By 1130, Price saw that his two divisions were faltering and ordered them back to the western bluffs. At about this same time, Kirby Smith ordered Walker’s Division, newly arrived, to send two brigades in on Parson’s right to try and turn the Union left. As Scurry’s and Randal’s Brigades went into the attack, Parson’s men withdrew, leaving no one to protect the Texans’ own left flank. Detecting the problem, Walker sent in

his final brigade, Waul's, to fall in on Randel's left. Though Walker's men made their attack with dash and spirit, they too were driven back by the Federals, but not before all three brigadiers were wounded, Scurry and Randal mortally. Rice, too, was mortally wounded in the Texans' charge.

In the breathing space that ensued after Walker's repulse, Steele quickly ordered his remaining infantry across the river under protection of the guns and rifles of units now emplaced on the far side northern bluffs. Before leaving the field, however, some of the soldiers of the 2nd Kansas Colored Infantry reportedly shot wounded Confederate soldiers laying near Salomon's line in retaliation for the shootings of black troops at Poison Spring and Marks' Mill. By about 1500, all US troops, artillery, horses, and wagons were across. The pontoon bridge was pulled up and burned on the northern bank. Curiously, Kirby Smith allowed the final crossing to go unmolested.

With the burning of Steele's pontoon bridge, Kirby Smith's dreams of a complete victory over Steele's Department of Arkansas literally went up in smoke. The Confederate commander had no way to cross his army at Jenkin's Ferry in a manner timely enough to pursue Steele and catch him before he reached Little Rock (which he did on 3 May). At Jenkin's Ferry, Smith's men sustained about 1,000 casualties (out of 8,000 engaged), mostly in repeated piecemeal attacks against the well-entrenched Federals. Steele's command, meanwhile, did not go unscathed. He lost a total of about 700 men killed, wounded, and missing. For the entire campaign, however, Steele's losses were disastrous. Of the roughly 10,000 men he brought on the campaign, 2,750 became casualties or were captured. He had also lost 635 wagons, nine guns, and 2,500 mules. Kirby Smith's troops did not fare well either. The Trans-Mississippi Department was reduced by 2,300 men by the end of the campaign as well, but only lost 35 wagons (more than made up for by the number of captured Union wagons) and three cannon.

Foiled in his plan to destroy or capture Steele's army, for the next three days Kirby Smith pondered his next move. Finally, on 3 May he moved the army to Camden, and three days later, ordered Tappan's, Churchill's, and Walker's divisions back to Louisiana. It was too late of course. Those troops would not arrive back there in time to assist Taylor in the pursuit of Banks.

Banks Dallies at Grand Ecore

On 11 April, Banks' wagon train, escorted by Lee's cavalry division, rumbled into the tiny village of Grand Ecore (see Appendix L,

Map L-17). The remainder of that day and part of the next, the rest of the Army of the Gulf's units slowly tramped into the area and took up their assigned positions in the perimeter. The troops were ordered to dig trenches and prepare other defenses for a possible attack. Ultimately, the army was packed into fortifications that took up about six square miles on both sides of the river.

At this point, Banks still had at least 25,000 troops with him at Grand Ecore. He would soon have Brig. Gen. Henry W. Birge's brigade of Grover's division from Alexandria to add to that number. Banks believed that Taylor still possessed about 25,000 men to confront him, so on 11 April, the day he arrived at Grand Ecore, he sent an order to Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand, commander of the XIII Corps, directing him to leave 2,000 troops in his positions on the Texas coast, and come to Louisiana with the rest. McClernand was to consolidate those troops with the remnants of the wounded Ransom's XIII Corps detachment and take overall command of the corps. Ostensibly that would give Banks an army of over 30,000 troops, at least until A. J. Smith's corps departed.

Birge's men traveled up to Grand Ecore on transports over the next several days. The troops experienced a lively time as Liddell's men attacked the boats along the river here and there as they made their way north. Once all Birge's troops had arrived they went into the line as well.

As they mingled with the troops who had been to Honeycutt Hill and back, they quickly discovered the low state of morale which gripped the entire army. Many of the men were outwardly irreverent towards Banks and other officers. They believed they had been let down by poor generalship and their sacrifices, as well as those who were killed and wounded, were frivolously wasted. Soldiers began referring to the commanding general as "Mister Banks" and "Napoleon P. Banks." Banks, however, seemed almost oblivious to their discontent.

As things gradually dawned on him that no one believed that the Army of the Gulf had prevailed against Taylor, in typical political fashion, Banks felt compelled to find scapegoats for the failure. On 16 April he relieved his chief of staff, Stone, and Lee, the cavalry chief, ostensibly for incompetence. His close friend, William Dwight took over as chief of staff, while the former artillery commander, Richard Arnold, assumed the new role as the commander of the cavalry division. Dudley was relieved of his cavalry brigade as well. None of these moves satisfied anyone and even Banks later wrote that he believed Lee had actually performed his duties creditably.

As he pondered his next move, Banks also sat down to write a report to Grant explaining what had transpired in the campaign thus far. In the message, Banks made five major points. The first was that the primary focus of the Confederate defenses in Louisiana was Shreveport. Second, he (falsely) stated that the Confederates were on the defensive. Almost contradicting himself, he also informed Grant that he believed that the Kirby Smith was likely planning an invasion of Missouri (which was accurate). Banks also complained to the general-in-chief that Steele's column had rendered Banks no assistance at all (which was not true had Banks actually resumed the offensive again). Finally, Banks unfairly stated that he believed Porter's gunboats had been useless to the army because the Red River had failed to rise. He concluded the message by stating that he intended to restart the advance on Shreveport by a different route.

Banks had other problems as well. Brigadier General John M. Corse soon arrived bearing a message from Sherman. Not surprisingly, Sherman strongly requested the immediate release of A. J. Smith's troops for return to Vicksburg. Banks, however, believed he still needed Smith and his 10,000 guerillas and directed the XVI Corps commander to stand fast. Porter, for once, agreed with Banks' assessment in this matter, probably because he believed that Banks would have no problem abandoning the navy if necessary, but Smith could be depended upon if needed – but only if he was still nearby.

Soon after Porter arrived back at Grand Ecore he visited Banks. On Porter's arrival at Banks' quarters, the commanding general mentioned to Porter that he had been reading *Scott's Tactics* when the admiral arrived, at which point Porter could not help but thinking to himself that Banks, "should have read it before he went to Sabine Crossroads."⁵¹ During the visit, Banks insisted that he had won the Battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill and, as he had also told A. J. Smith, that the only reason he did not move forward again was the lack of water. Porter reminded him that if that were so, he could have obtained water only twelve miles from Pleasant Hill (i.e., Jordan's Ferry on Bayou Pierre). Banks then changed the subject to inform Porter that he was planning to head north again to Shreveport, to which the admiral responded that the navy could not go up again since the river had fallen so low. Banks assured Porter the river would rise again soon.

Destruction of the USS Eastport

Notwithstanding Banks' prediction, Porter had already decided to send some of his vessels back to Alexandria before it was too late. On 15

April, the admiral ordered the huge *Eastport* south to Alexandria. Not too far from Grand Ecore, the *Eastport* struck one of six torpedoes that the rebels, most likely Liddell's men, had placed in the river there. The *Eastport* quickly took on water and came to rest on the shallow bottom only a few feet below. The vessel now blocked the channel. Alarmed, Porter boarded the *Cricket* and moved south to the *Eastport*'s location. On arrival, he found that the *Eastport*'s captain, Lt. Cdr. Seth L. Phelps, had acted quickly. The captain hailed the pump boat *Champion No. 5* which crew pumped water while Phelps's sailors made repairs to the hull and hoisted the boat's guns onto rafts towed by the *Cricket* to lighten the load. Despite the rapid actions, it took until 21 April to get the gunboat refloated.

The problems were not over, however. The *Eastport* continued to ship water as it proceeded downstream. For the next 40 miles the vessel grounded several times on snags and bars and had to be pulled off by the other boats. Finally, on 26 April near the town of Montgomery, the *Eastport* ran onto some submerged snags and became firmly stuck. *Champion No. 5*, *Champion No. 3*, and *Fort Hindman* all tried freeing the gunboat but were unsuccessful. With the continually falling river, Porter knew that the *Eastport* now threatened the survival of all navy vessels north of the falls at Alexandria should it block the channel. The admiral therefore ordered a ton of powder (eight barrels) placed throughout the boat and ignited. At 1345 that same day *Eastport* was blown to pieces. The rest of the boats made their way around the wreck and continued south toward Alexandria. But their trials and travails were not yet over.

Vignette: Account of *Eastport*'s destruction, from R. Adm. David Dixon Porter's report to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, 28 April 1864:

One ton of powder was placed in her in various positions..., and at 1:45 p.m., April 26, the *Eastport* was blown up, Lieutenant Commander Phelps applying the match and being the last one to leave the vessel. He had barely time to reach the boat when the *Eastport* blew up, covering the boat with fragments of wood. Seven different explosions followed, and the flames burst forth in every direction. The vessel was completely destroyed, as perfect a wreck as ever was made by powder. She remains a troublesome obstruction to block up the channel for some time to come.⁵²

Under "Siege" at Grand Ecore

With the Army of the Gulf dug in around Grand Ecore, Taylor's army, now consisting of between 5,000 and 6,000 troops, 'besieged' 25,000

demoralized Federals. The harassers, mostly Hamilton Bee's cavalry at Natchitoches and the troops of Liddell's command, constantly sniped at and otherwise annoyed the Federal troops as they waited for their commander to act. At this point, Taylor himself was still in Shreveport writing reports and preparing to rejoin his men. On 18 April, he was joined by Maj. Gen. John A. Wharton, a respected and seasoned cavalry leader who had fought at Shiloh, Perryville, Stone's River, and Chickamauga. The Confederate high command in Richmond had assigned Wharton to Taylor's command to replace the recently deceased Green. The following day, the two generals departed Shreveport for Natchitoches where they arrived at the camp of Polignac's Division on the 21st.

At Natchitoches, Taylor learned that the Federals were making all the signs of an impending retreat. Taylor immediately ordered Bee to have his division occupy the Cane River Valley between that stream and the Red. He was also instructed to keep his videttes close to Natchitoches to detect any move by Banks to retreat in his direction. If the Federals were to pursue that course of action, Bee was to concentrate on the bluffs above Monett's Ferry to block Banks' advance while Taylor used Polignac's Division and the rest of the cavalry to attack Banks' flank and rear.

Resuming the Retreat

As the water continued to fall, Banks bowed to the inevitable. He was not going to be able to resume the advance without the navy, so the only other option was retreat again to Alexandria. Having made the decision, he now set in motion plans for the retrograde. On 19 April, he ordered A. J. Smith to move his corps to Natchitoches as a vanguard to prepare the way for the rest of the army to pass through en route to the south. The following day, Smith advanced four miles to the town and drove out the remaining rebel cavalry there. It was news of Smith's move that convinced Taylor that the Federals were about to retreat. The next retreat of the Army of the Gulf began the following day.

On 21 April at 1700, the Army of the Gulf set out for Alexandria (see Appendix L, Map L-22). In the lead was Arnold's cavalry followed by Birge's brigade (recently arrived). As the sun set, the cavalry set fires (many of them in homes and barns along the way) to light and guide the army's move. After Birge's men came the army's trains, then the remainder of the XIX Corps, with the XIII Corps bringing up the rear. The tail end of the column did not depart Grand Ecore until 0300 the next morning. When it did, all remaining stores of military value were burned, along with the small number of buildings which constituted the town. Once the

column had passed through Natchitoches, A. J. Smith's XVI Corps and a brigade of cavalry formed the rearguard and set a number of fires in that town as well (which Wharton's troopers were able to put out before much of the town burned).

Analysis

1. What were Kirby Smith's objectives in taking the offensive in Arkansas? Do you think they were justified?
 - Once ensconced at Camden, what were Steele's options?
 - What do you think should he do next?
 - What is the proximate cause of the failure of the Camden Expedition?
 - Evaluate Confederate operations in Arkansas.
 - What are Banks' options at Grand Ecore?
 - What should do you think he should do next?

Stand 13

Engagement at Monett's Ferry




Figure 3.37. Route to Monett's Ferry. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time to Monett's Ferry is about 30 minutes) From the parking lot at the Corps of Engineers Visitors' Center turn right onto Louisiana 6. Proceed 8.8 miles west on LA 6 to I-49. Turn left onto I-49 South. Proceed on I-49 S to Exit 119. Exit I-49 and turn left (north) on LA 119. Proceed .4 mile to LA 1. Turn right (south) on LA 1. Proceed 6.5 miles through Cloutierville, over the Cane River Bridge, to the junction of LA 1 and LA 490. Note that the small cluster of buildings (St. Simon's Church) at Little Eva Road is the location where Banks and Franklin made their headquarters for the battle (though none of the current structures existed at the time). Park near the junction.

Orientation: The pecan orchard just to the northeast of the LA 1 and LA 490 road junction is the location of Emory's headquarters for the battle. Standing at a point on LA 490 slightly to the west of the road junction you will see two bluffs in the distance to the southeast. Those are the bluffs where Bee positioned his main defenses. Just below those bluffs is the Monett's Ferry crossing, marked by a LA 1 highway bridge over the Cane




Figure 3.38. Monett's Ferry. Graphic by Robin Kern.

River today. To the right of those bluffs was where most of the fighting between Birge's and Baylor's commands took place at Monett's Ferry.

Movement to the Ferry

Description: The Army of the Gulf's planned route to Alexandria would have it follow the road that tracked through the Cane River Valley for almost two-thirds of the roughly 55 miles to Alexandria (see Appendix L, Map L-22). The Cane River itself diverged from the Red just south of Grand Ecore, then generally paralleled the latter stream for 30 miles until emptying back into the Red River near the village of Colfax. The Cane's channel had been the main course of the Red River in the days of French ownership and was then the navigable part of the river. At that time, what is now the Red River between Colfax and Grand Ecore, the French had named as the Rigolet du Bon Dieu. By the time of the Civil War, however, the Red River had switched its primary flow back into the Rigolet and the Cane was no longer navigable except when flooded. The area between the two watercourses was in fact an island of very rich and productive soil. As a result, many farms and plantations had sprung up in the area. The region to the west of the Cane, of course, was an extension of the pine barrens which had hindered Banks' move earlier in the campaign. The other route, west to White's Store (through which the army had marched en route to Mansfield) and then south, would have taken the army through the same kinds of difficulty, and even

further away from Porter's fleet which was confined to the Red River. Thus, the Cane River road was the logical route of egress.

As the army marched, one of the primary memories of many participants was the vision of burning homesteads along the route. As the army marched, virtually every building between Natchitoches and Alexandria was set on fire. Most of the conflagration was initiated by A. J. Smith's troops, but certainly not all. Smith's troops were in the rear and many soldiers farther forward in the column recalled marching past burning structures all along the way. T. Kilby Smith confirmed that at least a major portion of the destruction lay at the feet of Smith's men. "The inhabitants here are pretty tolerably frightened," he recalled. "Our Western troops are tired of shilly shally, and this year they will deal their blows very heavily."⁵³

Vignette: The historian of the 114th New York in Dwight's brigade recalled that regiment's impressions:

Destruction and desolation followed on the trail of the retreating column. At night, the burning buildings mark our pathway. As far as the eye can reach, we can see in front new fires breaking out, and in the rear the dying embers tell of the tale of war. Hardly a building is left unharmed . . . The wanton and useless destruction of property has well earned [A. J. Smith's] command a lasting disgrace . . . In order that the stigma of rendering houseless and homeless innocent women and children, may not rest upon us, be it recorded that not only the Commander of the army, but our Division and Brigade commanders have issued orders reprobating it, and threatening offenders with instant death.⁵⁴

By 0230 on 22 April, the head of the army was bivouacked about 20 miles south of Natchitoches. The rest of the army closed up throughout the night and the march resumed about 1100 that day. Since leaving Natchitoches, A. J. Smith and the rearguard cavalry brigade engaged in a series of sharp skirmishes with Wharton's men. More than once did Smith have to deploy his brigades to chase off the troublesome rebel cavalry. The rapid pace of the march pushed the limits of physical endurance for the Union infantry. Straggling became a problem as men fell out from the pace. News of the Confederate cavalry attacks against the rearguard and west flank compounded the soldiers' fatigue, frustration, and anger. When the exhausted army stopped marching on that day, the van was camped three miles south of Cloutierville. By that time, Banks had learned that Taylor had moved some of his forces (i.e., Bee's Division) to a blocking position

at a place called Monett's Ferry where the Cane River Road crossed the river. Banks had sent Gooding's 5th Brigade ahead and it discovered Bee's men already there (see Appendix L, Map L-23).

Emory's division, in the lead, was camped only four miles from the ferry crossing. About midnight, Emory received an order from Banks to move forward and clear Monett's Ferry of any rebel forces. Emory was to take the XIX and XIII Corps and a brigade loaned from A. J. Smith. When Smith received the directive to give up a brigade, the crusty general informed Banks that he could not spare it given how hard Wharton's cavalry was pressing the army's rear. At 0430 on 23 April, Emory started forward toward the ferry. When he arrived, Gooding's men had already driven most of the Confederate videttes back across the river.

In the early morning light Emory could plainly see Bee's men and their defenses. On the steep and wooded bluffs across the river from the ferry, Bee had positioned four brigades roughly 1,600 men, and supported by four batteries in support. in a very strong position. Taylor had directed Bee to hold the ferry crossing and contain Banks while Polignac's infantry division marched to block the ford at Cloutierville leading to Beasley's Planation to the west. To the east on the north side of the river Liddell had also positioned his men near Colfax in case Banks attempted to try and use the crossing site of the Cane River there. Wharton and the remainder of his cavalry were still pressing in the rear of the army.

Emory quickly realized that Bee's position was too strong for a frontal attack, so he therefore deployed his division and sent skirmishers forward to feel out the enemy's strength. He also sent Col. Edmund J. Davis (who had replaced Dudley) with the 4th Cavalry Brigade to scout for another ford to the east (toward Colfax). If he found one, he was to cross and attack into Bee's rear. Davis was unable to find an alternate crossing but he was able to drive off or capture a number of rebel skirmishers. Those who escaped went to inform Bee of the Federal presence on his right. Meanwhile, Banks also sent Lt. Col. Joseph Bailey, the XIX Corps' chief engineer, to the east to see if he could find a ford, but Bailey's efforts also failed to locate a crossing. The Federals were now essentially surrounded and Taylor wanted to continue to try and squeeze Banks' 30,000 men with 6,000. By doing so, Taylor believed he could cause Banks serious trouble and was determined to do as much damage to the Army of the Gulf as possible.

Birge's Flanking Movement

While Davis and Bailey were on their futile searches, troops, likley from Lucas' brigade, approached a local black man and asked him if there

was a place to cross the Cane other than at Monett's Ferry (see Appendix L, Map L-24). The man indicated that there was another crossing about two miles back towards the north. The man led them to the location and the troopers quickly determined the Confederates had posted no men to cover the site. They sent word back to Emory about the ford. Emory, who had effectively, though not officially, taken over field command of the XIX Corps due to Franklin's wounds, swiftly developed a plan of action. He began an artillery barrage on the bluffs above the ferry and ordered his infantry to demonstrate as if the Federal army was forming for a frontal attack. Meanwhile, he sent an ad hoc division under Birge, consisting of Birge's brigade and Col. Francis Fessenden's (formerly Benedict's) 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division, XIX Corps, along with the remnants of the XIII Corps, to make an attack into Bee's left flank.

Birge assembled his command and headed for the hidden crossing. After wading the ford, Birge led his men south then east through a thick wood, crossed a farm field, then encountered a small, muddy bayou. Passing through the bayou, the lead elements entered a dry, more open woodland where Birge brought his troops on line. Throwing out skirmishers, the division advanced slowly until reaching a low rise that dominated a cotton field to the east. On the far side of the field was another rise. On the near rise shots began to ring out as skirmishers from both sides discovered each other's presence. After quickly surveying the ground, Birge concluded he had no option other than a direct attack on the Confederate position across the field.

Birge placed his brigade on the left and Fessenden's on the right and sent them forward, holding Brig. Gen. Robert A. Cameron's 3rd Division, XIII Corps in reserve. Before the attack, Fessenden ordered his brigade to fix bayonets and wait to fire in volley to increase its effectiveness. As Birge's line moved forward, the Confederates of Baylor's Cavalry Brigade (who had taken over from the wounded Lane) opened a stiff fire. Fessenden went down early in the charge with a bullet to his right leg and Lt. Col. Justus W. Blanchard assumed command. Crossing the field, the US troops encountered a rail fence that was quickly thrown down and a gully beyond that which was also rapidly negotiated. The line then climbed a wooded ridge where it began to pack closer together and become confused. As the line descended the ridge some units ran into a slough on the right that caused the crowding as the men shifted left. Nevertheless, Birge's troops thronged up the hill in a headlong charge.

Baylor's troops were soon forced to fall back in the face of the aggressive Federal charge. The rebels reformed behind an overgrown fence

where they were joined by Baylor's own 2nd Arizona Cavalry and Col. Isham C. Woods' 2nd Texas Partisan Rangers who were sent by Bee to reinforce his beleaguered left. Feeling great pressure, Baylor sent word to Bee for two additional regiments to protect his now exposed left flank. With the forces he had he could not adequately cover the ground between the Cane River and a swamp called Mill Lake (sometimes referred to as Nash Lake). Bee did not respond to the request for more troops, however.

The initial attack had disordered Birge's lines, so he halted them on the hill to reform and bring up Cameron's reserve (see Appendix L, Map L-25). While the command regrouped, Birge and his staff rode ahead to reconnoiter. Behind them, the line moved forward again, crossed another open field, and began to dismantle yet another rail fence when the new Confederate line, unseen, suddenly exploded with fire. Soon, Birge and his staff came frantically racing to the rear which caused the sympathetic stampede of two Federal regiments. After a momentary panic in which the Union line was driven back a slight distance, most units then halted and reformed. The two offending regiments soon resumed their assigned places. The line then moved forward once again and plunged into the far wood line where the rebels desperately engaged the determined Federal assault a second time. After about ten minutes of heavy musketry, the Federals noticed that the rebel fire began to slacken significantly. Soon after, the Confederates seemed to have melted away totally.

Unbeknownst to Birge's men, Emory was watching the Federal movements from across the Cane River. It was about the time that Birge's troops bolted that Emory directed one of his batteries to support the Union advance. He also ordered his infantry forward to feint as if they were about to force a crossing on Baylor's flank. The ruse worked. Faced with what looked like two attacks, Baylor was now forced to either ignore one, or split the fire of his single battery to engage both enemy forces. Baylor sent another urgent request for Bee to direct one of his batteries to counterfire against Emory's guns. Instead of a promise of support, however, Baylor, to his surprise, was directed to abandon his position.

The Confederate commander of troops at Monett's Ferry had been watching the Federal movements all morning (see Appendix L, Map L-26). Bee, like Banks, however, was a politician by trade and not a soldier. The only real battle experience he possessed had been gained at Pleasant Hill. Personally brave, Bee did not have the military experience to fully understand what he was facing and appreciate the advantages he held. Convinced that Davis' cavalry on the right and Birge's division on the left had turned both his flanks (they had not), he ordered Baylor fall back to his

location to join the main body of troops. When Baylor rejoined, Bee then abandoned his strong positions above the ferry crossing and retreated 30 miles west to Beasley's Plantation.

Banks Slips the Noose

(For an overview see Appendix L, Map L-26.) Taylor, who had remained with Wharton's command as it was harassing A. J. Smith, was located just south of Cloutierville when Bee began his retreat. At this point, Taylor believed that his trap was working, but Bee's retreat left the ferry landing wide open. Once the rebel retreat was detected, Emory immediately threw a New York regiment across the river to hold the ferry site while the pontoon train was brought up and the bridge constructed. Arnold's cavalry vanguard was ordered to pursue the fleeing Bee but lost the scent and took a wrong turn. The rest of the army began crossing that day and A. J. Smith's rearguard crossed the following afternoon. During the course of the fighting on the march and at Monett's Ferry, Taylor's troops inflicted about 300 casualties on the Union forces, most of which were from Birge's troops. Taylor's command had sustained about half that number. In the fighting at Monett's Ferry itself, Bee's Division had suffered only fifty casualties of all types, mostly in Baylor's Brigade.

When he discovered what had happened, Taylor was livid. Not only had Bee given up the ferry so easily, he rode virtually out of the campaign, at least temporarily. Taylor quickly sent a courier to Bee at Beasley's with an order for Bee to ride to McNutt's Hill. That eminence, about twenty miles northwest of Alexandria, dominated a part of the road from Monett's to Alexandria and was a good artillery platform from which they could further attrit the Federal column. Bee arrived at McNutt Hill on 26 April and joined William Steele's Brigade already posted there. Most of the rest of the Confederate cavalry also soon arrived with Wharton, at which point he finally assumed command over all of the elements of the cavalry corps. Wharton then continued the 'escort' of A. J. Smith's rearguard the rest of the way to Alexandria.

The vanguard of the Army of the Gulf marched into Alexandria on the afternoon of 25 April. A. J. Smith's corps, continuing its burning and looting along the way, completed the march the following day.

Vignette: From Pvt. Joseph W. Crowther, Co. H, 128th New York Volunteers, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division, XIX Corps described the march to Alexandria:

Commenced marching at 6 a.m. After marching from 3 to 4 miles our advance cavalry was fired into and the advanced

of our army was attacked by a force of rebels. The 2nd & 3rd brigade was ordered to cross the Cane River and surround the enemy. We forded the river we was about up to our waists in water. The cavalry skirmished and infantry with them until about 3 p.m. when we charged on them and skedaddled them from their positions. They was on a high bluff. They had an excellent position. But they skedaddled when we charged on them like a pack of blood hounds after a lot of runaway slaves. The 128th Regiment was the first in the charge. We had in our regiment 10 wounded 2 of which died from the wounds...After we had made the first charge and scattered them we again fell in line to charge on another hill. We charged but there was no rebels there. The brigades then fell in line and marched to the Cane River crossing where we stopped until 10 a.m. 24th when we again fell in line of march. We marched about 3 miles when the army was again drawn up in line of battle and halted until 4 p.m. when we again took the line of march and marched until a 11 p.m. when we halted and stopped for the rest of the night. At 11 a.m. we again took the line of march that day we marched through the pine woods. Burned every thing we came to. Destroyed a great deal of cotton. We arrived at Alexandria at 9 p.m. and rested for that night. When we got to Alexandria the gun boats were shelling the wood on the north side of the river.⁵⁵

Analysis

1. Were Taylor expectations for Bee's mission reasonable given Bee's available resources?
2. What could have Bee done to improve his chances of success?
3. Evaluate Emory's actions at Monett's Ferry.
4. Evaluate Birge's leadership at Monett's Ferry.
5. Evaluate Taylor's leadership and actions at Monett's Ferry.
6. Compare the use of intelligence provided from the "local black man" with today. What are the keys to whether we can use this type of source and information in combat situations today (i.e., is the source reliable and trustworthy; is it useful and actionable information)? How does one determine the reliability of informant information?

Note: This is the last stand for Day 2. Return to Alexandria.




Figure 3.39. Back to Alexandria. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Day 3

Alexandria to Simmesport (27 April–19 May 1864)




Figure 3.40. Day 3, Overview. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Stand 1, Union Strategic Situation and Bailey's Dam (25 April–13 May 1864)

Stand 2, Battle of Mansura (13–16 May 1864)

Stand 3, Engagement at Yellow Bayou (17 May 1864)

Stand 4, "One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End" (17–19 May 1864)

Stand 1

Alexandria Interlude: Union Strategic Situation and Bailey's Dam




Figure 3.41. Bailey's Dam. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: In Alexandria, from the intersection of Louisiana 1 and US 71, proceed southeast on LA 1/North Bolton Avenue for 1.3 miles to the intersection with Jackson Street. Turn left on Jackson Street and proceed 1 mile over the Jackson Street Bridge. Turn right at first turn onto the Main Street connector. Turn right onto Main Street and proceed 0.1 mile to junction with Riverfront Drive. Turn right onto Riverfront Drive and proceed 0.7 mile through the gate of Forts Randolph and Buhlow State State Historic Site to the parking area for an overlook gazebo on the left. Dismount and move to the gazebo.

Orientation: Look upriver toward the Curtis-Coleman Memorial Bridge over the Red River. The upper dams of Bailey's Dams and the upper rapids were located just south of the mouth of Bayou Rigolette beyond where the bridge is now located near the railroad bridge in the distance. The lower dams were located in front of you. The remnants of Bailey's Dam were still visible during low water until the late 1980s when

the Army Corps of Engineers created a series of locks and dams to make the Red River navigable once again. The boulders and rock outcroppings which formed the rapids were removed by the Corps of Engineers at that time. To the north stand the remnants of Forts Randolph and Buhlow. These were earthwork and moat fortifications constructed beginning in October 1864 by Confederate forces who anticipated another Union Red River expedition in 1865. Construction, completed by March 1865, was under the command of Capt. C. M. Randolph and supervised by a military engineer, Lieut. Alphonso Buhlow, for whom the forts are named. The work was performed by about 1,500 soldiers and civilian workers with additional, compulsory aid provided by 500 enslaved people. A third and larger fort, planned for the Alexandria side of the river, was never built.

Action at Deloges Bluff

Description: After the destruction of the *Eastport* on 26 April, the remainder of Porter's vessels from Grand Ecore continued on toward Alexandria (see Appendix L, Map L-22). Below the mouth of the Cane River, the Federal flotilla encountered a four-gun rebel battery positioned on the west bank above the river at a place called Deloges Bluff. The unit was Capt. Florian Cornay's 1st Louisiana Battery. About 200 riflemen of the 34th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted) under Lt. Col. John H. Caudle from Polignac's division, supported the battery. A little after 1430, the forward gun of Porter's flagship, *Cricket*, opened fire first. Cornay's Battery and the infantry immediately returned fire on the vessels. The captain of the *Cricket*, Acting Master H. H. Goringe, stopped the engines so that his gun crews could engage the rebel guns and provide cover for the boats following him. Porter, however, realized that the move was a mistake and countermanded the order to keep the boats moving, thereby minimizing the risk of being sunk. Nevertheless, the Confederate fire was heavy and began inflicting heavy damage on the *Cricket*. In short order, two of its guns were put out of action and the crews killed or wounded.

Aboard *Cricket*, Porter personally displayed great personal bravery and presence of mind. After the two guns were put out of commission, Porter gathered some of the enslaved, who had fled their bondage and sought passage on the vessel, and quickly instructed them how to load and fire. The contrabands performed creditably through the rest of the battle and helped distract the rebel artillerymen thus helping to ensure the *Cricket* was not sunk.

Soon after his cannon class, a Confederate shot passed through the fire room and struck the steam pipes. The resulting blast killed all but one

man . As the steam dissipated, Porter went to the engine room and found the chief engineer dead. He then found the assistant engineer and put him in charge to get the steam pressure back up. Porter next went back to the pilothouse and discovered that one of the two pilots had been wounded and that the remaining bridge crew was taking cover. Porter took personal command of the *Cricket* and steamed past the battery, albeit with severe damage to the vessel and crew.

The follow-on boats did not fare as well. The boilers of the pump boat *Champion No. 3* were also struck by a shell. Below decks, more than 100 previously-enslaved runaways, out of the 175 that took shelter there, were scalded to death when a steam fitting burst. All but three of the others later died of their wounds. The boat drifted into shore where the Confederates quickly seized it.

The *Champion No. 5*, towing the disabled *Juliet*, came next and both vessels were also bought under heavy fire. The *Juliet*'s tiller ropes and steam pipes were shot away and both boats swung around with their bows upstream. The crew of the *Champion No. 5* attempted to cut the *Juliet* loose in an attempt to regain steerage. The captain of the former vessel, however, abandoned the pilot house. Thinking quickly, the pilot of the *Juliet*, William Maitland, and several crew members, leapt aboard the *Champion* and re-lashed the *Juliet*. Maitland then headed both boats back upstream followed by the *Fort Hindman*.

Meanwhile downstream, Porter located the *Osage* and *Lexington* which had been engaging Capt. Timothy D. Nettle's Valverde Battery and the 3rd Battery, Louisiana Light Artillery commanded by Capt. Thomas O. Benton. When Porter found them, the wooden *Lexington* had been struck 15 times. It was also too large to risk sending back up river so Porter ordered it south to Alexandria. He then sent the *Osage* north to support the three vessels still stranded north of Cornay's Battery.

While the crews of the stranded Union vessels made repairs that night, the rebels sank the captured *Champion No. 3* in the channel in an effort to block the river to follow-on traffic. Thinking the attempt to navigate past the wreck in the dark too dangerous, the senior officer present, Phelps formerly of the *Eastport*, decided to wait and run the vessels past the gauntlet once again about noon on the 27th. The results were not much better. In the ensuing dash, all three boats were struck repeatedly. The *Champion No. 5* and *Fort Hindman* had their steering assemblies shot away and drifted past the battery. *Juliet* was luckier in that she was able to keep control, but also sustained a number of hits. The *Champion No. 5* drifted to shore and was

abandoned by her crew. The *Fort Hindman* was more fortunate in that it drifted downstream to the safety of the *Osage's* guns.

The fighting had been intense. In short order, Confederate artillery had struck the *Cricket* thirty-eight times, killing and wounding twenty-five sailors—half of the boat's crew. The *Juliet* also lost half its crew, with fifteen killed and wounded. *Fort Hindman* had three killed and four or five wounded. Confederate reports stated that over 100 bodies were brought ashore from the two captured vessels and predicted that another eighty would die from having been scalded (these men were most likely the contrabands referred to earlier). Porter later estimated that his boats had killed 500 Confederates over the two day trial but Taylor's report noted that the rebel forces suffered only one wounded and one killed in the scrap with the navy. The KIA was Capt. Florian Cornay, the battery commander. There were no other casualties reported.

Over the two-day period of these engagements Porter had received no messages from Banks nor any offers of support. When these actions took place, the Army of the Gulf was already in Alexandria. Banks' inaction and the ongoing tension between the two officers increased Porter's apprehensions that Banks would desert the navy if given the chance. Some army officers shared Porter's apprehensions. After the retreat from Grand Ecore, Kilby Smith, furious with Banks, wrote to Porter from his camp at Cotile that, Banks had, "ordered peremptorily [the XVI Corps] to Alexandria." He further informed Porter that, "General A. J. Smith and I both protest at being hurried away; I feel as if we were shamefully deserting you. If I had the power I would march my troops back to Calhoun, or wherever you might need us."

Vignette: In his official report to Secretary Welles, Porter excoriated Banks. He stated that the army commander possessed,

a too blind carelessness on the part of our military leader . . . Our retreat back to Alexandria from place to place has so demoralized General Banks' army that the troops have no confidence in anybody or anything. I do not include, however, the troops of that veteran soldier General A. J. Smith, whose men have behaved with a bravery seldom surpassed and have saved the honor of the country. They have never failed in anything they have undertaken, and have been prevented from reaping the fruits of victors by the order of higher authority.⁵⁶

Analysis

1. Porter actually departed Grand Ecore on 15 April before the Army of the Gulf departed for Alexandria. What is your assessment of Porter's decision to try and save the *Eastport*?
2. What actions do you think Banks could have taken to help prevent Confederate attacks on Porter's vessels?

Banks, the Union High Command, and Union Strategic Plans

On his arrival at Alexandria on 25 April, Banks' troubles were not at an end. Indeed, some of them were just beginning to come to a head. Back on 31 March, when the Army of the Gulf first arrived at Grand Ecore, Grant, having then superseded Halleck as general-in-chief, sent an order to Banks directing him to place Steele, with navy support, in command of Shreveport on its capture, as well as the rest of the Red River region. Banks was also ordered to organize a 25,000-man expedition by withdrawing all his forces from Texas except those at Brownsville and garnering men from his other posts along the Mississippi River. He was then directed to move to Mobile Bay to seize the fortifications there from the Confederates. The order arrived in Banks' hands on 18 April at Grand Ecore. At about the time Banks received Grant's order, Halleck received Banks' 2 April message declaring his intent to chase Smith into Texas. When Grant learned of the latter message, he was dismayed to say the least. If allowed, Banks' pursuit of his own (and Halleck's) goals would upset Grant's strategy for a coordinated Union offensive that spring. The new general-in-chief had planned on Mobile being captured, or at least under siege, by 1 May in order to keep Confederate forces in Mississippi and Alabama occupied. Such an offensive would tie down rebel forces in that area and keep them away from Sherman's advance from Chattanooga into Georgia.

To ensure that Banks understood what Grant wanted, on 17 April the general-in-chief sent Maj. Gen. David Hunter, who had been serving on the Courts of Inquiry in Washington, to Alexandria. With him, Hunter carried verbal and written instructions from Grant which reinforced to Banks the importance of the upcoming Mobile Campaign and Grant's vision for the Army of the Gulf's role in that effort. Hunter arrived in Alexandria on 27 April and quickly ascertained that, despite Grant's desires, the Army of the Gulf would not be able to participate in the Mobile venture. The following day he wrote to Grant succinctly explaining the dilemma now facing Banks and Porter: "We have some six, eight, or ten gun-boats, among them two monitors, above the rapids, with no possibility of getting them out. The question, then, is reduced to this: Shall we destroy the gun-boats

or loose the services at this critical period of the war of the 20,000 men necessary to take care of them?"

Even before Hunter's message reached him, Grant received newspaper articles and reports from Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton (who himself had received them from the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles) regarding the true results of Banks's defeat at Mansfield, the retreat, and the subsequent action at Pleasant Hill. Other reports from army sources detailed Banks's losses and in men and material. Grant quickly saw that the campaign had already failed and he did not even yet know of the retreat to Grand Ecore, much less of the move back to Alexandria. On 22 April, Grant recommended to Halleck that Banks be immediately replaced by Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds who was in command at New Orleans. The general-in-chief followed this up three days later with a note to Halleck that he had received several additional letters detailing Banks' managerial incompetence. When Halleck showed Grant's recommendations to Lincoln, the president merely stated that, "we must delay in acting on it." Lincoln, ostensibly, wanted to leave Banks in place due to the need for New Englanders' votes in the coming fall election.

Now, more fully understanding of what had transpired in Louisiana, and in particular Porter's dilemma, on 25 April Grant rescinded his orders for A. J. Smith's return to Memphis. In his note of 28 April, Hunter recommended destroying the trapped gunboats. Grant, however, probably recalling Porter's yeoman efforts to support Grant's Army of the Tennessee in the Vicksburg Campaign, wanted to give the admiral every opportunity to save his vessels and believed Smith would help ensure that end. With the order for A. J. Smith to hold in place, Grant concurrently gave up on the idea that there would be an effort made against Mobile that spring. Unaware of the firestorm brewing in Washington over his handling of the campaign, Banks turned to matters concerning the extrication of his army from yet another difficult situation.

Union Situation in Alexandria

On the Army of the Gulf's return to Alexandria, the troops immediately began to improve on the few existing fortifications around the city. A. J. Smith's XVI Corps (Kilby Smith's XVII Corps division attached) was assigned the eastern perimeter from where the Bayou Rapides emptied into the Red River north of the town, south and west over to the Opelousas Road. The remnants of the XIII Corps were deployed to defend the city's western approaches from the Opelousas Road north to the bridge on the Bayou Rapides Road. Franklin's XIX Corps, less Birge's division,

was generally held in reserve. Franklin was ordered to throw the pontoon bridge across the river and Birge's division was sent over to set up defenses in the Pineville area. The troops went to work renovating existing trench and breastworks and digging new positions in a sort of zigzag pattern around the town. Redoubts and other strongpoints were prepared as well, along with new belts of abatis to help break up any rebel attacks that might develop. Before long, the town was encircled by two lines of defenses, an inner ring and an outer ring.

In addition to the defenses, Banks began receiving reinforcements almost immediately. On 26 April, McClernand arrived from Texas with about 2,700 men and an artillery battery from Brig. Gen. Michael K. Lawler's 1st Brigade, 1st Division, XIII Corps. The following day, that brigade was placed into the line along Bayou Rapides to the north of Alexandria to bolster the XIII Corps troops on that part of the line. In short, Banks had at least 30,000 men with him in Alexandria before the end of May, or at least five times the number of troops available to Taylor and another brigade of about 2,600 men was en route from Texas under Brig. Gen. Fitz Henry Warren.

Confederate Situation and Actions Along the Red River

Taylor, of course, did not have the forces to properly besiege Alexandria. At best he now possessed about 6,000 troops though small detachments occasionally dribbled in. Polignac's Division had now dwindled to about 1,200 muskets, essentially providing a weak brigade's worth of infantry. Taylor's real strength was mostly in cavalry and artillery. Oddly, in the latter arm he possessed nine batteries, or parts thereof, which would do considerable damage in the days ahead, but mostly to Federal shipping on the Red River. Still, Taylor could primarily observe and harass, but not much more unless Banks attempted to send out detachments that could be isolated. Only then could Taylor possibly bring superior forces to bear.

Taylor deployed his command to maximize its ability to attrit and harass the 'surrounded' Federals and their supply line. At Alexandria, Liddell's 600-man brigade conducted operations against Union troops in and near Pineville on the east side of the river. Steele, with Parsons' Brigade, operated north and west of the town on the Bayou Rapides Road while Vincent's Brigade patrolled along Bayou Teche to the far south. Bagby's Brigade blocked the Bayou Boeuf Road west of Alexandria. Wharton, with Bee's Division in tow, was in the vicinity of Polk's Plantation to block the Bayou Robert and River Roads to the south and southwest. Major's Di-

vision was farther south in the vicinity of David's Ferry to engage Union traffic along the Red River and to cut off Federal communications with the Mississippi. Taylor moved Polignac's Division near Cheneyville to be in a position to support either Major or Bagby. The Confederate commander's goal at this point was clear: "I expect to fight the enemy every day as long as I can get at him. We must either capture or force him to destroy the immense fleet he has above the falls."⁵⁷

While the bulk of Taylor's command was tied up trying to keep the gunboats from escaping, Major's force, along with Capt. A.A. West's 6th Louisiana Field Battery, set out to wreak as much havoc as possible along the Red River (see Appendix L, Map L-22). Major's force arrived near David's Ferry on 30 April and the following day, fire from West's battery enabled Major's men to capture the transport *Emma* which they promptly burned. On 3 May, West's battery repeated its previous performance, this time against the transport steamer *City Belle* as it neared Wilson's Landing. The *City Belle* was carrying the 120th Ohio upriver to reinforce Banks but the battery's accurate fire disabled the vessel and killed and wounded scores of men on the boat. Some were able to get to the opposite shore and escape, but the Confederates captured well over 200 of the Ohio men.

The greatest achievement of Major's command was the capture or destruction of three vessels on 4 May. On 3 May, the transport *John Warner*, carrying the 56th Ohio and escorted by the tinclads *Signal* and *Covington*, departed for New Orleans. The *John Warner* was taking the Ohio troops home for their veterans' furlough leave. All that day, Confederate rifle and carbine fire peppered the vessels as they made their way south. The following afternoon, the convoy approached Snaggy Point. There, Baylor's cavalrymen and a section of West's artillery were set up very close to the river bank. The Confederate fire on the *Warner* was merciless and soon the vessel was cut to shreds and numerous men of the 56th Ohio were killed and wounded. The captain of the *Warner* ran up the white flag to end the slaughter. By that time, the rest of West's battery arrived and concentrated their fire on the two remaining tinclads. The *Signal's* steam pipe was soon severed and it drifted downstream to the opposite shore. The *Covington* attempted to turn back upstream but had part of her rudder shot away and became unmanageable. The vessel tied up on the opposite shore to fight back and make repairs, but the rebel fire was just too great. The captain set fire to the boat and the crew set out to make their escape. Meanwhile, the *Signal* was captured along with the *John Warner* and Baylor's men burned both vessels.

In four days, Major's command had destroyed five US vessels and inflicted over 600 casualties including POWs. The navy suffered more

losses in men and vessels over these four days than in the rest of the entire campaign. Taylor's forces now controlled Fort DeRussy and several other choke points below Alexandria. Additionally, they had successfully shut down all Federal traffic on the Red River and the closure would last for another 14 days.

Banks understood that keeping the Red River open to Union shipping was vital to his long-term success in extricating his army from its situation and he did not stand idly by. On 3 May, therefore, Banks, through Emory, ordered Brig. Gen. Franklin S. Nickerson to embark his brigade and an artillery battery and reoccupy Fort DeRussy to help keep the river open. Nickerson got as far as Wilson's Landing when he discovered Major's men holding the Snaggy Point–Dunn's Bayou–David's Ferry area in force. Nickerson sent back to Emory for reinforcements, but was instead ordered to return to Alexandria the next day. Five days later, Fitz Warren's command, the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, XIII Corps, arrived at Fort DeRussy by coming north up the river from Texas via New Orleans. Warren's troops reoccupied Fort DeRussy against no opposition. Still, it took until 14 May until the river was cleared enough to reopen traffic to Union vessels.

Bailey's Dam

The losses on the Red River south of Alexandria were troublesome, but they were not the greatest of Porter's worries. The relationship between Porter and Banks, which had never been very good, were increasingly deteriorating and marred by distrust and contempt.

Vignette: Porter wrote to Welles explaining his dilemma:

Our army is now all here, with the best general (Franklin) wounded and unfit for duty in the field. General Banks seems to hold no communication with anyone, and it is impossible for me to say what he will do. I have no confidence in his promises, as he asserted in a letter, herein enclosed, that he had no intention of leaving Grand Ecore, when he had actually already made his preparations to leave . . . General Banks has got himself into a bad scrape and involved me in it with him, yet it is a scrape that a good general could easily get himself out of, by making this his base of operations, and chasing the enemy until he was whipped at every point. His retreat to Alexandria, instead of being made in an orderly manner, was conducted with great rapidity, and the enemy hung upon his flanks, annoying him, though they gained no advantages, under which circumstances he should have driven them into the

river . . . [T]he enemy are splitting up into parties of 2,000 and bringing in the artillery (with which we have supplied them) to blockade points below here, and what will be the upshot of it all I cannot foretell, I know that it will be disastrous in the extreme, for this is a country in which a retreating army is completely at the mercy of an enemy. Little consideration was paid to the situation of myself and little squadron . . . An intelligent general would get us out of the difficulties, but I see no prospect of it now. If left here by the army, I will be obliged to destroy this fleet to prevent it falling into the enemy's hands. Unless instructed by the Government..General Banks will make the least effort to save the navy blockaded here.⁵⁸

Of course, Porters' greatest quandary was the fact that he had ten of his best gunboats trapped above the falls of Alexandria and the river's level continued to drop. In many places rocks and sandbars now appeared above the waterline. The main channel itself held just over three feet of water. To get over the falls, the *Louisville* and several other vessels needed at least six feet, six inches of depth. If Porter could not figure out a way to rescue the stranded boats he would be forced to destroy them in order to prevent them falling into enemy hands. He knew Banks, and probably not even Grant, would approve of the idea of keeping a large Federal army in idleness until autumn rains could once again raise the level of the river. Even if they did approve, that would just give Taylor and Kirby Smith more time to raise enough forces to properly lay siege to the town. Then, the boats might still be lost anyway and the army as well. It just was not feasible.

The only reasonable possibility of saving the boats was a scheme which had been originally proposed by Lt. Col. Joseph P. Bailey of the 4th Wisconsin Cavalry (see Appendix L, Map L-27). Bailey, who at the time was the acting Engineer Officer for Franklin's XIX Corps, was a school-trained engineer in civilian life. He had worked in the Wisconsin logging industry before the war and became experienced in dam building to float logs downstream to sawmills during the dry season. In the summer of 1863, he had supervised the building of dams to refloat grounded steamers at Port Hudson. The day after the *Eastport* was lost, he had made a proposal to Franklin to build what he called "wing dams" to raise the level of the river high enough to get the rest of the fleet over the falls. Franklin, also a trained engineer, was not initially impressed with the idea but later came to believe it could work. The general sent Bailey with a letter of recommendation to meet with Porter and give him a brief on the concept. Porter, possibly because an army officer suggested it, rejected Bailey's ideas out

of hand and there the matter stood until a meeting between Banks and Hunter on 29 April. Bailey's idea was brought up in the meeting by Franklin. Banks liked the proposal, but Hunter was skeptical. The latter general, however, ultimately supported giving Bailey's idea a try simply because there were no other viable solutions and time was running out.

Bailey's plan was to build two wing dams, one on either side of the river, to raise the river's depth. In theory, the dams would channel the flow of water over the shoals to create enough depth that would allow the gunboats to float over the falls. Construction began on 30 April. Banks provided Bailey about 3,000 troops to accomplish his task. Most were from the various US Colored Troops regiments, but he possessed a Maine regiment that was largely composed of former lumberjacks. They set out to cut trees while others gathering heavy stones and other materials to build the rock cribs that formed the basis of the wing dams. Many buildings on both sides of the river contributed their walls and foundations to the effort. Once the wings on either side of the river were completed, Bailey sank two barges in the gap to form a basin to let the water build up. The whole time the dam was being constructed, Taylor looked on in deep frustration knowing that he could do little to affect the outcome. Meanwhile, his troops merely took potshots at the workers and taunted US troops by calling out, "How's your dam building going?" After nine days of effort, on 8 May the water levels were almost sufficient to float the vessels through the gap. The boats were positioned in the basin and supposed to be prepared to proceed through the chute when ordered. However, in the early morning darkness of 9 May, the building pressure of the trapped water pushed aside the stone barges sunk at the lower dam. Porter quickly ordered the *Lexington*, the only boat with steam up, to proceed over the rapids and through the gap. The *Osage*, *Neosho*, and *Fort Hindman* were able to follow, but several boats, to include the *Louisville*, *Mound City*, *Pittsburg*, *Chillicothe*, *Carondelet*, and *Ozark*, were still trapped above the falls when the water level receded.

Vignette: With more than a little dramatic flair, Porter later wrote in his memoirs that the *Lexington*,

steered directly for the opening in the dam, through which the water was rushing so furiously that it seemed as if nothing but destruction awaited her. Thousands of beating hearts looked on anxious for the result. The silence was so great as the *Lexington* approached the dam, that a pin might almost be heard to fall. She entered the gap with a full head of steam on, pitched down the roaring torrent, made two or three spasmodic rolls, hung for a moment on the rocks below, was then

swept into the deep water by the current, and rounded-to safely into the bank. Thirty thousand voices rose in one deafening cheer, and universal joy seemed to pervade the face of every man present.⁵⁹

Bailey's dam builders immediately set to work to repair the damage. Bailey built additional wing dams at the upper falls to help with relieving some of the pressure downstream at the gap. Meanwhile, sailors finally began lightening the remaining heavier gunboats by removing iron plating and off-loading guns, as well as the navy's much-coveted cotton. Put into wagons, the items were transported below the rapids to be reloaded there. Porter opted not to retain eleven of his 32-pounder smoothbores, but instead ordered them to be spiked and dumped in the river. Bailey's follow-on modifications were successful and the new dams were completed on 11 May but the water was still not high enough. Characteristically, Bailey built an additional dam which did the trick. On 13 May, the remaining six vessels of Porter's fleet safely cleared the falls and two days later they reentered the Mississippi River.

Banks Continues the Retreat

While Bailey built his dams to save Porter's boats, Banks prepared the Army of the Gulf for its movement back to the Mississippi River (see Appendix L, Map L-22). In a field order issued on 9 May, Banks designated the order of march: Lucas' 1st Cavalry Brigade and Lt. Col. John M. Crebs' 2nd Cavalry Brigade would form the army's advance guard; the XIX Corps, officially under Emory since 2 May, would follow with its heavy infantry as the back-up; next would be the engineers and pontoon train followed by the army's wagon trains; McClernand's XIII Corps would be next; and A. J. Smith's XVI Corps with Davis' 4th Cavalry Brigade would form the rear guard. Gooding's 5th Cavalry Brigade was to protect the army's right flank as it moved.

In addition to issuing march orders, Banks directed Arnold to place 500 horsemen under reliable officers inside Alexandria to prevent troops from setting fire to the town when the march started. Many rumors had been floating around that some US soldiers wanted to burn the place down before they left. Both blue-coated good Samaritans and blue-coated villains who simply wanted to put fear into them, warned numerous citizens what was coming. Not surprisingly, most of the evidence of just who might do this deed pointed to Smith's western men. Even while the dam building project was going on, plantations and other structures around the city's periphery began to mysteriously go up in flames, although not all of

the destruction was perpetrated by Federal troops. Some of it was committed by Confederates against Union sympathizers as well.

On 11 May, units began to move their camps to locations that would allow them to take their proper place in the march whenever it began. The vanguard of the army departed Alexandria at 0700 on 13 May, the day that the rest of Porter's vessels made it safely over the falls. As feared, sometime after 0800, with most of the column still in town, buildings began to catch fire. Some Union soldiers with mops and buckets of turpentine and camphene (a mixture similar to napalm) smeared the concoction on buildings. One Alexandrian citizen later reported that the cavalry officers who were assigned to protect the city were actually directing some of the burning. A few Federal units, several of Banks' staff officers, and the provost guards made efforts to extinguish the flames by using explosives and demolishing buildings in the path of the conflagration, but the fires were too numerous and the wind fanned the flames. In three hours, most of the center of Alexandria was gone.

Analysis

1. What is your assessment of Taylor's efforts while the Army of the Gulf was delayed at Alexandria?
2. What is your assessment of US engineer operations in this campaign? How did they help or hinder over all Union efforts?
3. What is your assessment of Confederate engineer operations in this campaign? How did they help or hinder over all Confederate efforts?
4. What is your assessment of Porter's preparations and efforts to free his fleet?
5. Many National Guard and Army Reserve units possess soldiers with specialized skills gained from their civilian employment (similar to the Maine regiment's lumberjacks). As a commander, what do you think is the best way to use those skills and maximize unit capabilities in a war zone?
6. In both armies there were soldiers who inflicted destruction on, or acquired, private property. Sometimes such destruction or acquisition (such as foraging) is required for military reasons. At other times soldiers destroy or steal things without orders. What safeguard should leaders take to prevent illegal actions of this type during military operations?

Stand 2

Engagement at Mansura




Figure 3.42. Engagement at Mansura. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time to Mansura is about 35 minutes) From Fort Randolph Park drive southeast on Riverside Drive to Main Street. Turn left (northeast) on Main Street and proceed north. Turn left and proceed back over the Jackson Street Bridge to 3rd Street. Turn left onto 3rd Street/ Louisiana Highway 1. Proceed 35 miles south to the intersection of LA 1 and LA 107 just north of Mansura. Turn right (south) on LA 107 (which is also L'Eglise Street) and proceed 0.6 mile into Mansura to the intersection of LA 107 and High School Street. Turn right on High School Street and park in front of the Desfossé House. Move to the rear of the house to view the open field to the north.

Orientation: Look north along LA 107. You are now located along the picket line near the center of the Confederate battle line. The Federal approach would have been from the north. Taylor's battle line was generally located along what is now Baton Rouge Avenue in the center of Mansura to our south. The town itself lay astride the route from Marksville to Moreauville where the bridge over Bayou de Glaizes was located. That

stream was the last significant obstacle between the Army of the Gulf and Simmesport. Taylor’s force, in effect, blocked the way. The Union attack came generally down what is now LA 107 with one division to the right (east) of the road and three on the left. The area around Mansura was much more open then than today. Most of the tree lines one sees today were not there and the fields of fire were long and flat. Taylor called the ground here “smooth as a billiard table.”⁶⁰




Figure 3.43. Engagement at Mansura, Day 3, Stand 2. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Description: (See Appendix L, Map L-22 for an overview.) As the Army of the Gulf marched from Alexandria toward Simmesport, it followed the River Road. As it moved, Taylor’s cavalry harassed the column from all sides. Steele’s men resumed the pressure on A. J. Smith’s rearguard. Annoying Emory and the cavalry advanced guard was Major and Bagby’s commands. These troops also attempted to slow the Federal march by cutting trees and placing other obstacles in the way. Parson’s men skirmished with Gooding’s troopers on the right flank. None of the rebel cavalry’s efforts, however, appreciably slowed the Union column.

On 14 May, the army’s van arrived at Bayou Choctaw. Emory called the pontoon train forward and within a short time, the pontonniers had the stream bridged and the army was crossing (Note: the actual location is north of Fifth Ward, LA, in the vicinity of the Bayou Choctaw bridge

at the intersection of LA 1195 and River Road). That evening the troops of the XIX Corps bivouacked beside the wrecks of *John Warner*, *Signal*, and *Covington*. Strewn upon the ground were the letters many of the men had mailed to their loved ones earlier and had been placed on the *Warner* bound for New Orleans. The rebel soldiers had opened the letters, read them for entertainment, and simply tossed them aside. The idea did not sit well with the Federals, but neither did the wanton destruction and plunder of civilian homes with the Confederates.

On 15 May the column slowly crossed the Bayou Choctaw Swamp and entered the Avoyelles (pronounced “a-voy-ull”) Prairie. There, Major’s cavalry, later along with Bagby’s troops, attacked the lead elements several times. The fighting became so hot at moments that Emory deployed his artillery to help drive the bothersome rebel troopers away. The artillery would succeed in driving them back, only to be encountered again a short time later. By nightfall, however, the XIX Corps had reached Marksville with the rest of the army strung out behind.

Late on 15 May, Banks learned that Taylor had massed his forces six miles ahead at the town of Mansura, evidently with the intention of blocking further Federal movement on the road to Simmesport (see Appendix L, Map L-22). On learning of the concentration of rebel forces, Banks sent orders to Emory directing him to move no later than 0300 on 16 May and to attack the enemy at daybreak. Further, Smith advanced on Emory’s right to attack into Taylor’s left flank. The XIII Corps, now under Lawler since 9 May (McClernand took ill with malaria and departed) was to remain in front of Marksville as the reserve. The trains were held behind that town. In order to protect Smith’s right and rear, Arnold sent most of his command to the west. It was a sound plan.

As ordered, the Army of the Gulf moved south before sunrise. As morning dawned, the Federal army began its deployment on the wide open plain of the Avoyelles Prairie. The US troops advanced with Emory’s XIX Corps in the lead with Grover’s 1st Division on the Federal left near the Grand River and McMillan’s 2nd Division on Grover’s right. The XIX Corps was followed by A. J. Smith’s XVI Corps in column; Mower’s division was followed by that of Kilby Smith. As the Federal brigades deployed on the field they could see the Confederate battle line in the distance. Virtually in the center of the battlefield was the tiny village of Mansura. Taylor had placed eight dismounted cavalry regiments from Major’s and Bagby’s commands to the east of the hamlet. were by At least 19 cannon with the batteries interspersed among the brigades supported these troops. Polignac posted his two small infantry brigades and two regiments

of dismounted cavalry on the left, west of town, and thirteen more guns supported Polignac's force. At this point, about half of Taylor's 32 cannon present at Mansura had been captured earlier in the campaign from the Army of the Gulf.

As the two lines prepared to open the battle, many participants afterwards remarked on what a wonderful martial pageant the scene made with the orderly marching of units on a flat, green savanna seemingly made for such spectacles. A light wind made the morning pleasant, at least initially, and prompted the many regimental and national colors to flap gracefully in the breeze. Once the XIX Corps advanced far enough, A. J. Smith deployed his divisions to the right of the line. When the Federal commanders formed their lines, it was apparent that the two deployed corps of the Army of the Gulf drastically outnumbered the District of West Louisiana. Banks had about 18,000 men on the field; with Taylor stood virtually every one of his available 6,000, less Liddell's command. The Confederate forces were actually reduced even more by the need for horse holders to remain in the rear with the cavalry regiments' animals.

The battle began sometime after 0600 with a mutual artillery bombardment. As the fusillade opened, commanders on both sides ordered their men to lie down in order to reduce casualties during the artillery duel. The tactic was effective. The barrage lasted about four hours, but few men were struck by the many rounds fired. As the Union battle line rose and moved forward on occasion, Taylor's skirmish line responded by slowly giving ground (see Appendix L, Map L-29). Finally, at about 1000, as the XVI Corps pressed forward on the Confederate left to flank Taylor's position as planned, the rebel line quickly sidestepped the move and fell back toward their trains which were located southwest in the direction of the village of Evergreen. Despite all the noise and smoke of the artillery duel, few casualties were sustained by either side. More importantly for Banks, the way to Simmesport was now wide open.

Analysis

1. What is your assessment of Taylor's decision to offer battle at Mansura? What do you think he hoped to achieve?
2. Why do you think Taylor's decision was an acceptable risk—or not?

Stand 3

Engagement at Yellow Bayou




Figure 3.44. Route to Yellow Bayou. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time to Yellow Bayou is about 15 minutes) From the intersection of Louisiana 107 and LA 114, proceed .7 mile south on LA 114 to the junction with LA 1186. Turn left (east) on LA 1186 and proceed 1.3 miles LA 1. Turn right onto LA 1 and proceed 11.8 miles to the Yellow Bayou Memorial Park at the junction of LA 1 and LA 1183. Turn into the parking lot. Walk southwest toward the gazebo to the small drainage ditch that runs along the west side of the park. Look west toward the far tree line.

Orientation: The small mounds of dirt you see here are the remains of Fort Humbug which was built to delay any Federal advance up the road from Simmesport to Marksville and Fort DeRussy. The fortifications were abandoned by Scurry in the first day or so of the campaign due to the position's poor defensibility made worse by the low flow of water in Yellow Bayou. The Confederate line of battle was at Norwood Plantation, two miles west of Yellow Bayou, south of LA 1, and just beyond the heavy tree line in the distance. Mower's line was just in front of the tree line.




Figure 3.45. Engagement at Yellow Bayou. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Description: After driving off Taylor at Mansura, Banks resumed the order of march southeast toward Bayou de Glaise (see Appendix L, Map L-22). Arnold’s cavalry found the bridge at that stream intact. The XIX Corps advanced to secure it and camped there for the night. The next morning, Banks continued the march hoping to reach Simmesport that day. That morning, Wharton’s horsemen attacked A. J. Smith’s XVI Corps, once again performing as the rearguard, before it even left the Mansura area. Near Moreauville, Yager’s cavalry made a dash at the army’s trains and while Taylor later claimed the raid, “killed and drove off the guard and destroyed much property,” the Federal reports indicate that the damage was minimal.⁶¹ The march continued throughout the day and by nightfall, most of the Army of the Gulf was concentrated around Simmesport which was now just a small collection of foundations, blackened chimneys, and burned rubble since A. J. Smith’s first visit just over two months before.

On arrival, Lieutenant Colonel Bailey once again put his engineering talents to work by constructing a bridge over the Atchafalaya River. That project, however was going to take time and the Army of the Gulf was still under attack. On the morning of 18 May, Confederate skirmishers pressed forward to continue the harassment of Arnold’s cavalry videttes posted as the army’s rear guard. To support Arnold efforts, A. J. Smith ordered Mower to take whatever force he needed and drive the pesky rebels

away. Mower picked two brigades from the 3rd Division and one from the 1st, and along with three artillery batteries, headed for Yellow Bayou, two miles from Simmesport. He had about 4,500 soldiers in this force (see Appendix L, Map L-30).

A picket line composed of the 31st Massachusetts Infantry (Mounted) from Davis' 4th Cavalry Brigade was already posted on the west side of Yellow Bayou and had been skirmishing with rebel cavalry all morning. About 0900, the Confederates attacked and drove the Federal picket line back. The plucky 31st Massachusetts, however, regrouped and regained the ground which it held until 1030 when Mower arrived with his brigades. At about 1100, Mower crossed his command to the west side of Yellow Bayou and remained in column. With the 31st Massachusetts in skirmish order extending to the left, Mower advanced his ad hoc division toward a dense tree line in the distance.

As Mower advanced, the 31st Massachusetts skirmished with the Confederates and drove them rearward across an open field and through a narrow, but dense band of brush strewn with dead trees at the edge of the pasture (see Appendix L, Map L-31). Pressing on through the thicket, Mowers' column emerged on the far side to find a Confederate battle line in the distance. The rebel troops, drawn up around a sugar mill called Norwood's Plantation, were those of Wharton's cavalry and Polignac's infantry, together around 5,000 men and 12 pieces of artillery. Almost immediately, the Confederate cannon opened fire and the rebel line advanced (see Appendix L, Map L-32). Concerned that he might be running into a trap, Mower fell back to the edge of the field and beyond the thicket. Using the concealment provided by the narrow band of brush, he formed his own line of battle, brought up his artillery, and prepared to receive the enemy.

Mower posted Colonel Lynch's 1st Brigade, 3rd Division on the left with the 9th Indiana Battery. He placed Col. Sylvester G. Hill's 3rd Brigade, 1st Division in the center and right supporting Battery M, 1st Missouri Artillery. Mower placed Shaw's 2nd Brigade, 3rd Division with the 3rd Indiana Battery on the right rear of the line facing generally north to protect that flank. Wharton, who was the senior commander on the field, sent Polignac's infantry in against Mower's right and Major's cavalry attacked the left of the Union line. Major's men succeeded in driving back the cavalry on Mower's left and some of them were able to work their way into Mower's left rear. Mower pulled Shaw's Brigade and the 3rd Indiana Battery away from the right and counterattacked to drive the enemy back from the Federal left. In the meantime, Hill's troops conducted a bayonet charge and drove away the Confederate infantry as well.

Mower recalled his disordered troops back to their original line behind the thicket for protection (see Appendix L, Map L-33). There they could also reform and briefly rest. He then advanced his line back into the brush only to discover that Wharton had reordered his own command as well and attacked again. With the rebels already advanced into the wood, the fighting this time was at much closer range and a desperate struggle ensued in the brush. As the sun grew hot, the still air in the humid thicket became almost intolerable. Soon added to the misery was the fact that sparks from rifle fire and exploding shells ignited the dry underbrush in places. The added heat and smoke from the flames made even breathing difficult. The Federal troops finally fixed bayonets once again and charged with the result of finally driving the rebel troops out of the wood. Initially the Federal line sought to pursue their erstwhile attackers, but Confederate artillery fire, coupled with the rising flames in the thicket, compelled Mower to recall his command. He reformed once again on the east side of the stand of trees. By this time, the flames of the burning wood kept the two sides apart until nightfall when the firing ended all together.

In the big scheme of the war, the half-day long contest was a small affair, but it was as bitterly fought as any other battle. At the end of the day, the battle cost Wharton another 608 men killed, wounded, and missing. Mower lost about 350 men in total. Taylor had gained nothing from the fight, but at least Mower had accomplished his mission which was to protect the Army of the Gulf as it crossed over the Atchafalaya on Bailey's steamboat bridge. Mower's men were the first troops in the campaign to arrive in the Red River Campaign area at Simmesport. They were also the first to fight at Fort DeRussy. Now they were the last US troops to fight in the campaign and would be the last to leave when they crossed at Simmesport. They had certainly seen more than their share of fighting.

Analysis

1. What was Taylor's objective, purpose, and end state for this battle?
 - Wharton's?
2. In what ways do you think Taylor and Wharton missed an opportunity here to destroy a piece of the United States forces?
3. At this late stage in the campaign, what do you think the psychological impact might be on the soldiers of both sides after the battle?

Stand 4

Simmesport Landing

”One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End”




Figure 3.46. Route to Yellow Bayou, Day 3, Stand 4. Graphic by Robin Kern.

Directions: (Travel time to Simmesport is about eight minutes) From the Yellow Bayou Memorial Park, turn south on Louisiana 1. Proceed 1.9 miles to Simmesport. Turn left (north) at the stop light onto North Martin Luther King Drive. At the second street, turn right (east) onto Riverside Drive. Follow Riverside Drive east to the bluff on the river. Stop at the gravel parking lot on the left. The Atchafalaya River highway bridge should be visible on your right.

Orientation: The Atchafalaya River Bridge to your right is located at about the same point where Lt. Col. Joseph Bailey constructed a makeshift pontoon bridge by lashing together US Army transports. The successful completion of the project ensured that the Army of the Gulf was able to successfully evacuate the campaign area with virtually all its remaining men, animals, and equipment.

Description: When he finally arrived at Simmesport, Banks discovered that the army’s pontoon bridge could not be used to move the com-




Figure 3.47. One damn blunder from beginning to end. Graphic by Robin Kern.

mand across the Atchafalaya River. Ironically, the Atchafalaya was in flood stage and the flow was too swift for the bridge to hold in place. Now it was the Army of the Gulf which was trapped by the vagaries of a river. Once again, Lieutenant Colonel Bailey came to the rescue. This time, the enterprising engineer gathered 22 army transports and lashed them side by side until they spanned the river to the far side. He then constructed a span by placing stringers across the boats' bows and planking them over to form the road bed. The 1,500-foot structure was completed on 18 May as Mower's men kept Wharton at bay at Yellow Bayou. The movement of the trains and artillery commenced that day while many troops were ferried over on other transports. The crossing was completed on 20 May and the bridge was disassembled. Taylor had no way to pursue. The campaign was over.

Aftermath: Union

On 7 May, the day before the first four of Porter's gunboats negotiated the falls at Bailey's Dam, a new geographical command was created in the United States Army. It was called the Military Division of West Mississippi. The command absorbed the formerly independent Departments of the Gulf and Arkansas as subordinate commands. Unbeknownst to both Banks and Steele, the officer appointed to command this new entity was Maj. Gen. Edward R. S. Canby, a professional military man and

West Point graduate. The move was a face-saving, but brilliant tactic by Lincoln which allowed Banks to retain his nominal title of Commanding General of the Department of the Gulf, while at the same time removing all military decision making authority from him and vesting it in Canby.

On 18 May, while Mower fought Wharton and Bailey built his bridge, Canby arrived at Simmesport. There he informed Banks of the new organization and the fact that he, Canby, was Banks' new boss. Canby also told Banks that he was to return to New Orleans and await instructions on his future duties as the Gulf Department commander. Those duties later turned out to be writing reports and handling certain civil and political affairs in Louisiana for the remainder of the war. At Simmesport, Canby placed Emory in charge of the department's troops and sent them to Morganza, Louisiana, on the Mississippi to rest, refit, and prepare for future operations. Interestingly, the day that Canby arrived at Simmesport, he reported to Halleck that his observation of the Army of the Gulf indicated that the army was actually in better shape than had been reported to him.

Aftermath: Confederate

After his operations against Steele in Arkansas, Edmund Kirby Smith returned to Shreveport believing that he had saved his department. With Steele's army back in Little Rock, Smith released Walker's Division to return to Taylor at Alexandria. For his part, Taylor, though he had won an impressive victory against significant odds, was an embittered man. He blamed Kirby Smith for what he believed was a failed campaign. The more he thought about it, the more he blamed Smith. After a series of more frustrating communications between the two generals, on 5 June, Taylor wrote a letter to Smith boldly stating that Smith was at fault for Taylor's inability to destroy or capture Porter's fleet and Banks's army and asked to be relieved of command. Instead, Smith put Taylor under arrest five days later and sent a message to President Jefferson Davis explaining his actions. To Smith's later surprise, that same day, 10 June, the Confederate Congress passed a joint resolution praising Taylor and promoting him to lieutenant general. Davis, rather than punishing Taylor, appointed him as commander of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, a command he held to the end of the war.

On 6 May 1865, Taylor surrendered his Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana to General Canby at Citronelle, Alabama. Kirby Smith surrendered the Department of the Trans-Mississippi to Canby exactly three weeks later. On 6 June, US troops finally occupied Shreveport, two months after Gen. Robert E. Lee surrendered at Appomattox.

Outcomes

The results of the Red River Campaign were in no way decisive to the outcome of the Civil War. For the Union, this was a good thing. When asked about his opinion regarding the conduct of the campaign, General Sherman characterized it as, "One damn blunder from beginning to end."⁶² Beyond that, the impact of the campaign on the overall Union war effort was minor. Arguably, the major consequences were essentially the transfer of some Confederate troops from Alabama to Georgia where they helped oppose Sherman's offensive into Georgia and an almost year-long delay in the start of the ground campaign against Mobile. Even in the latter case, the strategic impact was minimal. In early August 1864, Admiral David G. Farragut effectively shut down the port of Mobile, the last open port on the Gulf of Mexico, by forcing his way into the bay and defeating Confederate naval forces there.

Economically, the sideshow effort by the navy, army, and speculators to seize cotton during the campaign, bore some, but minimal fruit. With Confederate troops still retaining control of most of the plantation areas in Louisiana (and in the rest of the South), Northern cotton mills remained largely idle due to the dearth of cotton. Although some southern cotton was now making its way to some of those mills, the amount was small. On the other hand, one of the South's major markets for cotton, England, was now acquiring what was needed from plantations in India. That development was to have an even more long-term detrimental impact on the South's economy post-war.

Although the efforts of Kirby Smith, Taylor, Price, and the Confederate army in the Trans-Mississippi Department ensured large parts of Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas remained firmly in Confederate control, their success came at a cost. In Louisiana, Taylor's forces lost about 4,300 men killed, wounded, and missing. In Arkansas, Kirby Smith's command lost about 2,300 killed, wounded, and missing during Steele's Expedition.

On the Federal side of the ledger, Banks' Army of the Gulf lost about 5,500 men. Steele lost about 2,700 troops. The navy's losses in men was relatively small, but Porter lost four gunboats in various actions or incidents. Many other vessels sustained significant damage due to enemy action or mishaps negotiating the water-starved Red River. The US Army Quartermaster Department also lost at least six transports to various causes during the campaign. Combining the Camden Expedition's numbers with Banks's statistics, Union losses in men during the campaign surpassed 8,200 men killed, wounded, or missing. The Federals also lost 57 artillery

pieces to capture and 822 wagons to either capture or destruction. Finally, 3,700 horses and mules were lost to capture or died due to combat, starvation, or exhaustion.

No major Federal force ever attempted to enter western Louisiana again during the war.

Analysis

1. What were the most significant results of the Red River Campaign?
2. How would you assess the conduct of joint operations during the campaign?
4. What were the primary factors contributing to the United States failures in Louisiana?
5. What were the primary factors contributing to the United States failures in Arkansas?
6. What were the primary factors contributing to the Confederate failures in Louisiana?
7. What were the primary factors contributing to the Confederate failures in Arkansas?
8. What were the primary factors contributing to the Confederate successes in Louisiana?
9. What were the primary factors contributing to the Confederate successes in Arkansas?
10. What is your assessment on the United States side regarding:
 - Unity of command and leadership.
 - Operational and tactical planning.
 - Command and control.
 - Communications.
 - Logistics.
11. What is your assessment on the Confederate side regarding:
 - Unity of command and leadership.
 - Operational and tactical planning.
 - Command and control.
 - Communications.
 - Logistics.

Endnotes

1. US War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, DC: USGPO) Vol. 34 (Part 1), 599. Hereafter referred to as “OR.”
2. OR, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 305.
3. Gary D. Joiner, *One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End: The Red River Campaign of 1864* (Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2003), 23-26. Dr. Joiner provides a good description of this water diversion effort in his book. A number of other historians, however, disagree with Dr. Joiner’s assertions that the diversion was effective. In lowering the river levels and that it was the sparse winter rains that year that were primarily to blame.
4. US Government, *Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War: Red River Expedition* (Washington: USGPO, 1865), 8. Hereafter referred to as, “JCCW.” This quote was from Banks quoting Porter.
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7. John G. Nicolay and John Hay, *Abraham Lincoln: A History*, Vol. 8 (New York: The Century Co.: 1890), 291.
8. David D. Porter, *Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1886), 219.
9. Porter, 219.
10. Susanna Michele Lee, *Claiming the Union: Citizenship in the Post-Civil War South*, Cambridge Studies on the American South, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 113; Gary B. Mills and Elizabeth Shown Mills, *The Forgotten People: Cane River’s Creoles of Color*, (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2013), 356, n103.
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12. OR, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 501.
13. OR, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 505.
14. Joseph P. Blessington, *The Campaigns of Walker’s Texas Division* (New York: Lange, Little and Co., 1875), 177.
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16. OR, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 516.
17. Joiner, *One Damn Blunder*, 86.
18. OR, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 616-617.
19. Richard Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Late War* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955), 192.
20. Gary D. Joiner, *Through the Howling Wilderness: The 1864 Red River Campaign and Union Failure in the West* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 2006), 91.
21. OR, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 526.
22. US Congress, *JCCW, Vol. 2*, 37.

23. US Congress, *JCCW, Vol. 2*, 30.
24. There is some dispute as to whether Taylor actually ordered Mouton to start the attack. Mouton may have started the attack on his own.
25. Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 196.
26. Prushankin, *Crisis in Confederate Command*, 96.
27. Prushankin, 96.
28. Joiner, *Through the Howling Wilderness*, 94.
29. Joiner, 95.
30. Blessington, *Campaigns of Walker's Texas Division*, 188.
31. James K. Ewer, *The Third Massachusetts Cavalry in the War for the Union* (Maplewood, MA: William G.J. Perry Press, 1903), 156.
32. Ludwell H. Johnson, *Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War* (Kent, OH: Kent State University press, 1993), 137.
33. Lawrence L. Hewitt, Arthur W. Bergeron, eds., *Confederate Generals in the Trans-Mississippi*, vol. 2 (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 2015), 150.
34. James G. Hollandsworth, Jr., *Pretense of Glory: The Life of General Nathaniel Banks* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1998), 188.
35. T. Michael Parrish, *Richard Taylor, Soldier Prince of Dixie* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 351.
36. Parrish, 355.
37. US Congress, *JCCW, Vol. 2*, 218.
38. Johnson, *Red River Campaign*, 151.
39. N. B. Baker, *Report of the Adjutant General and Acting Quartermaster of the State of Iowa* (Des Moines: F. W. Palmer, 1866), 316.
40. Joiner, *Through the Howling Wilderness*, 104.
41. Joiner, 106.
42. It is unclear whether Smith did not attend the council of war because he ignored it, or because he was not a member of the "inner circle" and was not invited.
43. Joiner, *One Damn Blunder*, 116.
44. Michael J. Forsyth, *The Red River Campaign of 1864 and the Loss by the Confederacy of the Civil War* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2002), 85.
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49. US Navy Department, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion* (Washington, DC: USGPO) Series 1, Vol. 26, 50.
50. Johnson, *Red River Campaign*, 189.
51. Joiner, *One Damn Blunder*, 148.
52. US Congress, *JCCW, Vol. 2*, 247.
53. Johnson, *Red River Campaign*, 224.

54. Johnson, 224.
55. Joseph W. Crowther, "Diary of Joseph W. Crowther Co. H. 128th NY," Vol. 1, Advent Hope, accessed 6 December 2019, <https://billcork.wordpress.com/civil-war-diary-1/>.
56. US Congress, *JCCW*, Vol. 2, 251.
57. *OR*, Vol. 34 (Part 1), 579.
58. US Congress, *JCCW*, Vol. 2, 251.
59. David D. Porter, *The Naval History of the Civil War*. 1886, Reprint (Seacaucus, NJ: Castle Books, 1984), 531.
60. Joiner, *One Damn Blunder*, 273.
61. Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 232.
62. Joiner, *Through the Howling Wilderness*, 164.

Part IV

Integration Phase

Introduction

As this handbook has previously emphasized, a staff ride consists of three phases. The first phase is the “Preliminary Study Phase.” This phase is conducted beforehand to prepare the participants for the visit to the battlefield. The second phase is the “Field Study Phase.” This phase is conducted on the battlefield and offers the participants a better understanding of historical events through analysis of the physical terrain. The final phase of a staff ride is the “Integration Phase.” No staff ride is complete without an integration phase, because it is critical for the participants to understand what happened, why it happened, and, most importantly, what can be learned from the battle or campaign and how it will contribute to the education of the military professional.

There are several factors which the staff ride leader should consider when planning for and conducting the integration phase. First, the leader must coordinate with the organization that is participating in the ride and select a time and location for the integration session. Occasionally, units may have to depart shortly after the last stand of the field study phase, and the staff ride leader must conduct the integration phase on the battlefield immediately after completing the field study phase. However, when possible, participants should have some time for personal reflection and thought before the integration phase. Thus, the integration phase is best if conducted the day after the field study phase ends. Even if you cannot wait an extra day, it is best to do the integration session at a location different from the last stand: a comfortable, dry place that will encourage open discussion from all the participants.

The staff ride leader should organize the integration phase based on the unit, time available, and training objectives. The leader can conduct the integration phase in a format similar to an after action review (AAR), or may simply lead a discussion with participants on what they learned. You can have specific participants brief particular items, or just have an open discussion with minimal structure. It is important to keep in mind that the integration phase is *not* an AAR of the ride itself (i.e., ways to improve the ride). While it is useful to seek constructive criticism in order to continue to improve the conduct of the ride, this should be done at another time or perhaps with written AAR comments. Instead, the integration phase is used for the participants of the campaign to integrate their preliminary

study with the fieldwork to gain insights that are relevant to their current duties and enhance their professional development. Whatever method the staff ride leader chooses to employ, the most important thing to remember is that the participants should do the majority of the talking.

One method that often produces a fruitful integration phase is to conduct the session in three parts based on three broad questions. Sometimes, the leader need only present the general question and let others carry the conversation, or the leader may have to ask more follow-up questions to prod the discussion. Each of the three questions is discussed below.

What were some of the impressions of the campaign had you developed in the preliminary study phase that changed or were strongly reinforced because of your study of the ground?

This is a crucial question because seeing the terrain is central to a staff ride, otherwise the campaign could simply be studied in the classroom. Of course, participants may develop a wide range of answers based on personal study and observations in the field. Some of the more popular aspects of the discussion of terrain for the Red River Campaign include the large distances encompassed by the operational maneuver, the wooded and hilly nature of the region, the use of water routes for transportation and supply, the help or hindrance of terrain on the attack and the defense, Taylor's use of terrain to effectively block Banks' movement north, the effective use of engineer support to aid or hinder movement on or across water obstacles, and the Red River itself as both help and hindrance to movement for both sides. The staff ride leader can ask a related question, which may also generate good discussion: *Did seeing the terrain alter your opinion of any of the leaders or change your thoughts about the conduct of the campaign?* A common response to this question is that Banks failed to realize the difficulties he would encounter logistically and tactically in operating in the upper Red River Valley of Louisiana.

What aspects of warfare have changed and what aspects have remained the same since the Red River Campaign?

The answers to the 'changed' aspects will probably seem more obvious to the modern military professional and often will be related to technology. This may include changes in weapons, transportation systems, communications, and numerous other pieces of equipment. The aspects that have "remained the same" may not seem as numerous at first, but the participants will often build on some initial answers and find many good examples. The role of personalities; command relationships; the impor-

tance of proper logistics planning; the need for strong, positive leadership and an ability to motivate soldiers; the importance of operational maneuver; determination; courage; and fear are just some of the items of warfare that seem to have changed little since 1864. Depending on the group, you may want to ask a few more focused questions. For example, if you are instructing a sustainment unit, you can ask the following: *What aspects of logistics have changed and what aspects have remained the same?*

What insights can the modern military professional gain from the Red River Campaign that are relevant today?

Clearly, the participants can take this discussion into a vast number of arenas. Once again, the type of unit participating in the staff ride might help to guide the discussion. For example, a military intelligence unit might focus the commander's situational awareness, intelligence gathering, and the importance of reconnaissance. Keeping in mind that the Red River Campaign is as much an operational-level staff ride as it is tactical, it might be useful to prompt discussion by using the elements of operational art as a framework for relevant lessons. These elements are:

- End state and conditions
- Center of gravity
- Decisive points
- Lines of operations and lines of effort
- Culmination
- Operational reach
- Phasing and transitions
- Tempo
- Basing
- Reach

These terms are provided as a tool; the staff ride leader may use some of them, use another framework, or simply let the participants take the discussion in whatever direction they want.

The three suggested integration phase questions are to aid in sparking discussion, not to provide “hard and fast rules” of warfare. Note that the handbook provides examples of possible answers to the questions, but it does not attempt to provide a list of “right” answers. The staff ride leader

should take time before the session to write down his or her own answers to these questions to have some potential ideas to generate participant discussion. At the same time, the staff ride leader should strive for the participants to develop their own answers, and thus be prepared to let the discussion roam many different paths.

Part V

Support

1. Information, Access, and Assistance.

a. The Staff Ride Team, Army University Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The Staff Ride Team conducts numerous Staff Rides covering various wars and can provide advice and assistance on every aspect of this campaign. The Staff Ride Team can also provide facilitators to lead a Red River Campaign Staff Ride. Visit the Army University Press website for information on obtaining staff ride assistance or facilitation. Staff Ride Team support includes background information, detailed knowledge of the campaign, battles, and battlefields, and overall familiarity with the Red River Campaign area.

Address: Army University Press

ATTN: Staff Ride Team Chief

290 Stimson Ave, Unit 1

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1293

Telephone: DSN: 552 – 2131

Commercial: (913) 684 – 2131

Website: <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Educational-Services/Staff-Ride-Team-Offerings/>

e-mail: <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Educational-Services/Staff-Ride-Team/Staff-Ride-Team-Contact-Us-Form/>

b. Mansfield Battlefield, Mansfield, LA. The Louisiana Department of Culture, Recreation, and Tourism, maintains and operates the Mansfield State Historic Site. The rangers stationed there can provide advice and assistance to any group desiring to visit the park. In addition, the park historian can help coordinate visits to the sites of the preliminary battles, many of which are on private land. The park rangers can also provide information and assistance on the engagements at Pleasant Hill, Wilson's Farm, Sabine Crossroads and Pleasant Grove. The Mansfield State Historic Site has a museum, bookstore, and restrooms. Picnic areas are available within the park. Although there is a small fee to enter the park, military

groups or educational groups may be exempted if requested in advance. Coordinate group plans with park headquarters in advance of your visit especially if desiring to use the park during non-duty hours and days. The park rangers will generally try to accommodate your needs. Ensure that coordination is made ahead of time for access to Stand 5, Day 2 (attack on the Federal Left) as that area is not usually open to the public.

Address: Superintendent

Mansfield State Historic Site

15149 Highway 175

Mansfield, LA 71052

Phone: (888) 677-6267 toll free or (318) 872-1474

Website: <http://www.crt.state.la.us/louisiana-state-parks/historic-sites/mansfield-state-historic-site/>

Hours of Operation: 0900 to 1700, Wednesday-Sunday. Closed on Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Year's Day.

c. **Fort DeRussy, Marksville, LA.** Fort DeRussy near Marksville is privately owned by the Friends of Fort DeRussy, a group dedicated to the preservation and history of the fort. The Friends maintain the site primarily through private funds and donations. Facilities include only a parking area and a small picnic area. No food is available for purchase, nor are restrooms available. The Friends can assist with information about this portion of the campaign. Prior coordination is recommended since the fort is on private property.

Address: Friends of Fort DeRussy

7126 Highway 29

Cottonport, LA 71327

Phone: (318) 876-3702

E-mail: admin@fortderussy.org

Website: <http://www.fortderussy.org/>

d. A and G RV Park. The A and G RV Park is a privately-owned business near Chapman's Bayou. It is the best location to conduct Day 2, Stand 7. Prior coordination is recommended before using the site.

Address: 16732 LA-175
Mansfield, LA
Phone: (318) 461-0094
(318) 871-6111

e. Grand Ecore Visitors Center, Grand Ecore, LA. The Grand Ecore Visitors Center for the Cane River National Heritage Area is part of a cooperative effort between the Corps of Engineers (which owns the building and grounds) and the Cane River National Heritage Area to showcase the history of the Cane River area and the Corps of Engineers' efforts to improve the utility and safety of the Red River. The visitors' center is located on the bluffs where Federal forces encamped and built defenses in 1864 and overlooking the anchorage where Porter assembled his vessels that sailed north of the falls. The museum personnel can provide advice and assistance to any group desiring to use the facility for the stand which is physically located on the back side of the building. The visitors' center has a small museum and restrooms. Picnic areas are available. It is recommended that group plans be coordinated with the visitors' center in advance of your visit especially if desiring to use the stand during non-duty hours. The museum personnel will generally try to accommodate your needs.

Address: Director, Grand Ecore Visitors Center
Cane River National Heritage Area
115 Washington Street
Natchitoches, LA 71457
Phone: (800) 874-9431 toll free or (318) 354-8770
E-mail: <http://canerivernha.org/contact-us>
Website: <http://canerivernha.org/grand-ecore-visitor-center>

Hours of Operation: Daily from 1000 to 1600. Closed on Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Year's Day.

f. Forts Randolph and Buhlow State Historic Site, Pineville, LA.

The Forts Randolph and Buhlow State Historic Site offers a useful vista for discussing the return of the Army of the Gulf to Alexandria. The gazebo on the grounds near the Red River overlooks the site of the location where Bailey's lower dams were constructed. As with Mansfield, the rangers stationed there can provide advice and assistance to any group desiring to use the gazebo. In addition, the interpretive ranger can help coordinate visits to other sites of interest in the campaign area, though much of the focus of the park is on Bailey's dam and the two forts there which were constructed after the campaign. The visitor's center has a museum and restrooms. Picnic areas are available within the park. Although there is a small fee to enter the park, military groups or educational groups may be exempted if requested in advance. Though not required, it is recommended that group plans be coordinated with the park headquarters in advance of your visit.

Address: Superintendent

Forts Randolph and Buhlow State Historic Site

135 Riverfront Street

Pineville, LA 71360

Phone: (877) 677-7437 toll free or (318) 484-2390

E-mail: fortsrandolphbuhlow@crt.la.gov

Website: <http://www.crt.state.la.us/louisiana-state-parks/historic-sites/forts-randolph-buhlow-state-historic-site/>

Hours of Operation: 0900 to 1700, Wednesday-Sunday. Closed on Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Year's Day.

g. Desfossé House, Mansura, LA. The Dr. Jules C. Desfossé House in Mansura is owned by the town of Mansura and is operated by a historical organization, the La Commission des Avoylles. Access to the stand (which is physically located on the back side of the structure) at the Desfossé House is always open to the public although the house itself has limited hours of operation. Even so, it is recommended that group plans be coordinated in advance of your visit especially if desiring to use the stand during non-duty hours and days. The town's small convention center next door has restrooms and a small portico in front which can be used as a covered stand during periods of bad weather.

Address: Director, Desfossé House
1832 L’Eglise Street
Mansura, LA 71350

Phone: (318) 964-2152

E-mail: townofmansura@centurytel.net

Hours of Operation: 0830 to 1500, Wednesday-Friday. Closed on major holidays.

2. Logistics.

a. Meals. No facilities exist within any of the parks themselves, but several restaurants, grocery stores, and fast-food establishments are located in the larger towns like Alexandria, Natchitoches, and Mansfield. Most of the campaign area is rural, as are most of the key event sites, with few food or restroom facilities nearby. Groups conducting this staff ride are strongly encouraged to carefully plan for meals and should consider bringing bag lunches, etc. for the noon meal, especially on Day 2.

b. Lodging. Alexandria offers plentiful hotel and motel accommodations and is centrally located in the campaign area. There are a number of hotels located at I-49 Exit 90 west of Alexandria that are particularly well-situated for the purposes of the staff ride. There are also a number of restaurants in the area. Some motels offer reduced rates for large groups. Lodging is adequate in Natchitoches, but it is a college town so lodging during some periods may be unavailable. Apart from these two locations, lodging availability is sparse throughout the campaign area. Shreveport is an option but is not recommended due to the additional driving time required to reach key sites, especially in the southern portions of the campaign area.

3. Medical.

There are civilian hospitals located at Alexandria and Natchitoches. There are small regional hospitals/clinics in Marksville and Mansfield. The nearest military facilities are located at Fort Polk near Leesville (60 miles south of Natchitoches and 60 miles west of Alexandria) and Barksdale Air Force Base in Shreveport. During the Mansfield stands of the staff ride only, Barksdale is marginally closer to the campaign area.

Bayne-Jones US Army Community Hospital
Fort Polk, LA

Comm: (337) 531-3118/3119

Website: <http://www.polk.amedd.army.mil/>

4. Other considerations.

a. Except for those areas preserved within the various state or local parks, much of the Red River campaign area and most of the battlefield sites are in private hands. Do not trespass on private property without prior approval from the owner. The Mansfield State Commemorative Area/Mansfield Battlefield Park historian can help with permissions for military and educational groups at many locations. The stands listed herein require no approval for access, but where possible, we highly recommend that agencies listed in this section be contacted before visiting to ensure availability of the sites.

b. Ensure that your group has proper clothing for inclement weather. Violent thunderstorms can occur in any season.

c. Mosquitoes, fire ants, chiggers, and ticks are prevalent from March to November, so insect repellent is strongly advised.

d. Maintain good relations with the various agencies (state and local parks, Corps of Engineers, etc.) by coordinating unusual requirements well in advance. Be sure to obey established rules.

e. Because of the long driving distances involved when following the progress of the campaign, it is virtually impossible to follow the entire campaign in less than two full days. Plan your driving routes and timetables carefully (the Combat Studies Institute or Mansfield State Historic Site can help).

f. Roads and bridges, particularly in the rural areas, are sometimes closed due to flooding, repairs, or construction. Park personnel at Mansfield State Historic Site can provide up-to-date information on routes in many areas.

Appendix A
Red River Campaign Order Of Battle

United States Armed Forces

Army of the Gulf

Army Commander

Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks

Personal Staff

Col. Richard B. IrwinAssistant Adjutant General
Maj. George B. DrakeAssistant Adjutant General
1st Lt. Charles S. Sargent.....Acting Assistant Adjutant General
Col. Charles C. Dwight (XIXCorps)*Acting Assistant Inspector General
Lt. Col. William S. Abert Assistant Inspector General
Maj. G. Norman Lieber.....Judge Advocate General
Surg. Richard H. AlexanderSurgeon General
Col. John S. ClarkSenior Aide-de-Camp
Col. Horace B. Sargent (WIA)..... Aide-de-Camp
Col. James G. Wilson..... Aide-de-Camp
Maj. Carl J. Von Hermann (German Army) Aide-de-Camp
Capt. John S. Crosby..... Aide-de-Camp
Capt. Robert T. Dunham Aide-de-Camp
1st Lt. J.L. Andrew.....Secretary
2nd Lt. William SimpsonSecretary/Aide-de-Camp
Alphonse de Luc Volunteer Aide-de-Camp

Army Staff

Brig. Gen. Charles P. Stone (relieved 16 April).....Chief of Staff
Brig. Gen. William Dwight (appointed 16 April)Chief of Staff
Brig. Gen. Albert L. Lee (relieved 18 April).....Chief of Cavalry
Brig. Gen. Richard Arnold (appointed 18 April)Chief of Cavalry
Brig. Gen. Richard Arnold (departed 18 April)Chief of Artillery
Maj. David C. Houston Chief Engineer
Capt. John C. Palfrey Acting Chief Engineer

Col. John S. Clark Topographic Engineer
 1st Lt. William S. Beebe Chief of Ordnance
 Capt. Frank W. Marston Chief Signal Officer
 Col. Samuel B. Holabird** Chief Quartermaster
 Lt. Col. John G. Chandler (XIX Corps)* ... Acting Chief Quartermaster
 Col. Edward G. Beckwith** Chief Commissary
 Surg. Eugene F. Sanger (XIX Corps)* Acting Medical Director
 Maj. William Sentell (XIX Corps)* Acting Provost Marshal

*These officers were from the XIX Corps but functioned in the positions indicated on the Army staff for all or most of the campaign.

** Col. Samuel B. Holabird and Col. Edward G. Beckwith remained in New Orleans during the campaign.

Army Headquarters Guard and Escort

Companies A, B, and C, Headquarters Troops

Army Units

Detachment, XIII ARMY CORPS*

(*attached to the XIX Corps 3 Mar-26 Apr)

(1st Division (-) and 2nd Division remained in Texas)

Brig. Gen. Thomas E. G. Ransom (3 Mar-8 Apr) (WIA 8 Apr)

Brig. Gen. Robert A. Cameron (8-26 Apr)

Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand (26 Apr-6 May) (Sick 6 May)

Brig. Gen. Michael K. Lawler (6 May-18 May)

1st Division (-), XIII Army Corps (arrived 9 May)

Brig. Gen. Fitz Henry Warren.....Commander

1st Brigade (arrived 9 May)

Col. Henry D. Washburn.....Commander

22nd Iowa

23rd Iowa

33rd Illinois

35th Wisconsin

2nd Brigade (arrived 26 Apr)

Brig. Gen. Michael K. LawlerCommander

Col. James KiegwinCommander (As of 6 May)

34th Iowa

49th Indiana

69th Indiana

16th Ohio

114th Ohio

22nd Kentucky

3rd Division, XIII Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Robert A. Cameron (3 Mar-8 Apr)
Col. William H. Raynor (8 Apr-6 May)
Brig. Gen. Robert A. Cameron (6 May-18 May)

1st Brigade

Lt. Col. Aaron M. Flory (WIA).....Commander
Col. Thomas H. Bringham.....Commander
46th Indiana
29th Indiana

2nd Brigade

Col. William H. RaynorCommander
Col. James R. Slack Commander (As of 8 April)
24th Iowa
28th Iowa
56th Ohio

Artillery

A Battery, 1st Missouri Light Artillery
2nd Battery, Ohio Light Artillery

4th Division, XIII Army Corps

Col. William J. Landram.....Commander

1st Brigade

Col. Frank Emerson (WIA/POW 8 Apr).....Commander
Maj. Francis A. Sears..... Commander (as of 8 April)
Col. Frederick W. MooreCommander
77th Illinois
67th Indiana
19th Kentucky
23rd Indiana

2nd Brigade

Col. Joseph W. Vance (KIA 8 Apr)Commander
Lt. Col. Albert H. Brown Commander (As of 8 April)
Col. John R. ParkerCommander
130th Illinois
48th Ohio
83rd Ohio
96th Ohio

Artillery

1st Battery, Indiana Light Artillery
Chicago Mercantile Battery

XIX ARMY CORPS

(3rd Division in defenses of New Orleans)

Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin (WIA) (3 Mar-2 May)
Brig. Gen. William H. Emory (2 May-18 May)

1st Division, XIX Army Corps

Brig. Gen. William H. Emory (3 Mar-2 May)
Brig. Gen. James W. McMillan (2 May-18 May)

1st Brigade

Brig. Gen. William Dwight.....Commander
Col. George L. Beal Commander (As of 16 April)
29th Maine
114th New York
116th New York
153rd New York
161st New York

2nd Brigade

Brig. Gen. James W. McMillan.....Commander
Col. Henry Rust, Jr..... Commander (As of 2 May)
13th Maine
15th Maine
160th New York
47th Pennsylvania

3rd Brigade

Col. Lewis Benedict (KIA 9 April).....Commander
Col. Louis Fessenden (WIA 23 April) Commander (As of 9 April)
Lt. Col. Justus W. Blanchard (23 April)... Commander (As of 23 April)
30th Maine
162nd New York
165th New York
173rd New York

Artillery

25th Battery, New York Light Artillery
L Battery, 1st United States
1st Battery, Vermont Light Artillery

2nd Division, XIX Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover.....Commander

1st Brigade (arrived 19 April)

Brig. Gen. Franklin S. Nickerson.....Commander

133rd New York

176th New York

2nd Brigade

Brig. Gen. Henry W. Birge.....Commander

13th Connecticut

1st Louisiana

90th New York (3 companies)

159th New York

3rd Brigade

Col. Jacob Sharpe.....Commander

38th Massachusetts

128th New York

156th New York (3 companies)

175th New York

Artillery

F Battery, 1st United States

C Battery, 2nd United States

7th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery

26th Battery, New York Light Artillery

Artillery Reserve, XIX Army Corps

1st Battery, Delaware Light Artillery

1st Indiana Heavy Artillery (two companies)

Cavalry, XIX Army Corps

3rd Maryland

Detachment, XVI Army Corps, Army of the Tennessee

Brig. Gen. Andrew J. SmithCommander

1st Division, XVI Army Corps

(1st Brigade at Memphis and Division Artillery split between Memphis
and Vicksburg)

Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower.....acting commander

2nd Brigade

Col. Lucius F. Hubbard.....Commander
47th Illinois
5th Minnesota
8th Wisconsin

3rd Brigade

Col. Sylvester G. Hill.....Commander
35th Iowa
33rd Missouri

3rd Division, XVI Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower.....Commander

1st Brigade

Col. William F. LynchCommander
58th Illinois
119th Illinois
89th Indiana

2nd Brigade

Col. William T. ShawCommander
14th Iowa
27th Iowa
32nd Iowa
24th Missouri (with elements of 21st Missouri)

3rd Brigade

Col. Risdon M. MooreCommander
49th Illinois
117th Illinois
178th New York

Artillery

3rd Battery, Indiana Light Artillery
9th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery

Provisional Division, XVII Army Corps (attached to XVI Corps)

Brig. Gen. T. Kilby SmithCommander

1st Brigade

Col. Jonathan B. MooreCommander
41st Illinois
3rd Iowa
33rd Wisconsin

2nd Brigade

Col. Lyman M. Ward.....Commander
81st Illinois
95th Illinois
14th Wisconsin

Artillery

M Battery, 1st Missouri Light Artillery

Mississippi Marine Brigade* (attached to the XVI Corps; departed from theater 27 March)

Brig. Gen. Alfred W. Ellet.....Commander
1st Infantry, MMB
1st Cavalry Battalion, MMB
Battery C, Pennsylvania Artillery

* see list of brigade boats in Figure 8, Section III, Suggested Routes and Stands

Separate Army Troops

Cavalry Division, Army of the Gulf (2nd Brigade remained at Port Hudson)

Brig. Gen. Albert L. Lee (releaved 18 April).....Commander
Brig. Gen. Richard Arnold.....Commander (as of 18 April)

1st Brigade

Col. Thomas J. Lucas.....Commander
16th Indiana Infantry (Mounted)
2nd Louisiana Infantry (Mounted)
6th Missouri Cavalry (US)
14th New York

3rd Brigade

Col. Harai Robinson (WIA 8 April).....Commander
Lt. Col. John M. Crebs.....Commander (As of 8 April)
87th Illinois Infantry (Mounted)
1st Louisiana Cavalry (US)

4th Brigade

Col. N.A.M. Dudley (releaved 18 April).....Commander
Col. Edmund J. Davis.....Commander (as of 18 April)
2nd Illinois Cavalry
3rd Massachusetts Cavalry
31st Massachusetts Infantry (Mounted)
8th New Hampshire Infantry (Mounted)

5th Brigade

Col. Oliver P. Gooding.....Commander
2nd New York Cavalry
18th New York Cavalry
3rd Rhode Island Cavalry

Horse Artillery, Cavalry Division

2nd Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery
G Battery, 5th United States

1st Division, Corps D' Afrique

1st Brigade

Col. William H. DickeyCommander
1st Infantry (redesignated 4 April 1864 as 73rd U.S. Colored Troops)
3rd Infantry (redesignated 4 April 1864 as 75th U.S. Colored Troops)
12th Infantry (redesignated 4 April 1864 as 84th U.S. Colored Troops)
23rd Infantry (redesignated 4 April 1864 as 92nd U.S. Colored Troops)

Engineer Brigade, Army of the Gulf

Col. George D. Robinson.....Commander
3rd Engineers, *Corps D' Afrique* (redesignated 4 April 1864 as 97th US Colored Troops)
5th Engineers, *Corps D' Afrique* (redesignated 4 April 1864 as 99th US Colored Troops)

Confederate Forces

Department of the Trans-Mississippi

Lt. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith.....Commander

Personal Staff

Dr. Solomon A. Smith.....Physician

Col. J.F. Belton.....Assistant Adjutant General

Capt. Edward Cunningham.....Aide-de-Camp

1st Lt. Edward WalworthAide-de-Camp

Department Staff

Brig. Gen. William R. BoggsChief of Staff

Brig. Gen. Elkanah Greer..... Chief, Bureau of Conscription

Brig. Gen. Benjamin Huger Chief, Bureau of Ordnance

Col. T.G. Clemson.....Chief, Bureau of Nitre & Mining

Col. Samuel S. AndersonAssistant Adjutant General

Maj. George WilliamsonAssistant Adjutant General

Capt. P.H. Thomson Acting Assistant Adjutant General

Col. Benjamin Allston..... Inspector General

Maj. Wright Schaumberg Assistant Inspector General

Col. John M. Brown..... Chief of Artillery

Maj. Thomas G. Rhett..... Chief of Ordnance

Maj. Henry T. Douglas..... Chief Engineer

Capt. John G. Meem, Jr..... Chief Signal Officer

Lt. Col. L. W. O'Bannon..... Chief Quartermaster

Maj. William H. Thomas..... Chief of Commissary

Maj. Clement D. Hill Chief Inspector, Field Transportation

Maj. W.B. BlairChief of Subsistence

Maj. Charles E. Carr Chief Paymaster

Surgeon David W. Yandell Department Medical Director

Surgeon John M. Hayden*..... Department Medical Director

**Effective 25 March 1864.*

District of West Louisiana

Maj. Gen. Richard TaylorCommander

Personal Staff

Maj. Eustace SurgetAssistant Adjutant General
Capt. A.H. May Acting Assistant Adjutant General
Maj. William M. Levy Inspector General
Capt. Charles LeD. Elgee (POW) Aide-de-Camp
Lieut. Edward Cunningham Aide-de-Camp
Lieut. Thomas Hunter Aide-de-Camp
Capt. LeClerc Fusilier Volunteer Aide-de-Camp
Lt. T. J. Williams Volunteer Aide-de-Camp

District (& Army) Staff

Maj. Joseph L. Brent Chief of Artillery & Ordnance
Maj. R. W. Sanders Quartermaster
Capt. William Stevens Assistant Quartermaster
Capt. James McCloskey Assistant Quartermaster & Chief of Forage
Maj. Alexander H. Mason Commissary
Capt. T.B. Gray Chief Signal Officer
Surgeon P. Beekman McKelvey Chief Surgeon
Surgeon J.C. Egan District Medical Inspector

Headquarters Guard and Escort

Benjamin's Louisiana Cavalry Company
2nd Battalion Louisiana Reserves

Units under District Control

Walker's Division (also referred to as the "Texas Division" and the "1st Infantry Division")

Maj. Gen. John G. Walker (WIA 9 Apr) Commander

Wauls' Brigade

Brig. Gen. Thomas N. Waul Commander
8th Texas Infantry
18th Texas Infantry
22nd Texas Infantry
13th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
4th Texas Field (Haldeman's) Battery

Scurry's Brigade

Brig. Gen. William R. Scurry.....Commander
3rd Texas Infantry
16th Texas Infantry
17th Texas Infantry
19th Texas Infantry
16th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
(Edgar's) Battery A, 1st Texas Lt. Artillery

Randal's Brigade

Col. Horace Randal.....Commander
11th Texas Infantry
14th Texas Infantry
6th Texas Cavalry Battalion (Dismounted)
28th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
9th Texas Field (Daniel's) Battery

**Mouton's Division (also referred to as "Polignac's Division"
and "2nd Infantry Division")**

Brig. Gen. Alfred Mouton (KIA 8 April)Commander
Brig. Gen. Camille J. de Polignac..... Commander (As of 8 April)

Polignac's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Camille J. de Polignac.....Commander
Col. Joseph Taylor (KIA 8 Apr)Commander
Col. Robert D. Stone (KIA 18 May) Commander (As of 8 April)
Col. James E. Harrison (18 May)..... Commander (As of 18 May)
15th Texas Infantry
17th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
22nd Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
31st Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
34th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)

Gray's Brigade

Col. Henry GrayCommander
Crescent Regiment
18th Louisiana Infantry
28th Louisiana Infantry

Division Artillery Battalion

Maj. Joseph L. BrentCommander
4th Arkansas Field (West's) Battery
5th Louisiana (Pelican) Battery

Detachment, District of Texas

Cavalry Corps

Brig. Gen. Thomas Green (KIA 12 Apr)Commander
Brig. Gen. Hamilton BeeCommander(from 12-21 April)
Maj. Gen. John A. WhartonCommander (As of 21 April)

Bee's Cavalry Division (also referred to as "1st Cavalry Division")

Brig. Gen. Hamilton P. Bee (released 14 May)Commander
Brig. Gen. Arthur P. Bagby Commander(As of 14 May)

Debray's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Xavier B. DebrayCommander
23rd Texas Cavalry
26th Texas Cavalry
36th Texas Cavalry

Buchel's Brigade

Col. Augustus C. Buchel (KIA 9 April)Commander
Lt. Col. William O. YagerCommander (As of 9 April)
Col. Alexander W. TerrellCommander (As of 13 April)
1st Texas Cavalry
35th Texas Cavalry (attached early May to Liddell)
37th Texas Cavalry

Major's Cavalry Division (also referred to as "2nd Cavalry Division")

Brig. Gen. James P. MajorCommander

Lane's Brigade

Col. Walter P. Lane (WIA 8 April).....Commander

Col. George W. Baylor..... Commander (As of 8 April)

- 1st Texas Partisan Rangers
- 2nd Texas Partisan Rangers
- 2nd Arizona Cavalry
- 3rd Arizona Cavalry

Bagby's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Arthur P. BagbyCommander

Col. William P. Hardeman Commander (As of 14 May)

- 4th Texas Cavalry
- 5th Texas Cavalry
- 7th Texas Cavalry
- 13th Texas Cavalry

Artillery Battalion

Maj. Oliver J. Semmes.....Commander

- 2nd Texas Field (McMahan's) Battery
- 7th Texas Field (Moseley's) Battery
- 12th Texas Field (The "Valverde") Battery
- 16th Texas Field (Gibson's) Battery (arrived about 8 May)
- 6th Louisiana Field (West's) Battery (arrived early May)

Steele's Cavalry Division (organized 22 April)

Brig. Gen. William SteeleCommander

Parson's Brigade (Arrived 10 April)

Col. William H. Parsons.....Commander

- 12th Texas Cavalry
- 19th Texas Cavalry
- 21st Texas Cavalry
- Morgan's Cavalry Battalion
- 10th Texas Field (Pratt's) Battery
- 1st Confederate Regular Light Artillery (Barnes' Battery)

*Vincent's Brigade**:

Col. William G. Vincent.....Commander
2nd Louisiana Cavalry
4th Louisiana Cavalry
1st Louisiana Cavalry Battalion (State Guard)
2nd Louisiana Cavalry Battalion (State Guard)
1st Louisiana Field (Cornay's) Battery

*Vincent's brigade was organized from formerly unattached Louisiana units and placed under Steele's command on 22 April. Though it briefly operated against the Army of the Gulf's rearguard as it retreated from Grand Ecore, the brigade was soon sent south to Opelousas to screen the Bayou Teche region and did not work with Steele's command from that point forward.

**Detachment, District of Arkansas
(Arrived 6 April 64; departed 14 April)**

Brig. Gen. Thomas J. ChurchillCommander

Arkansas Division

Brig. Gen. James C. Tappan.....Commander

Tappan's Brigade

Col. Hiram L. GrinstedCommander
19th & 24th Consolidated Arkansas Infantry
27th & 38th Arkansas Infantry
33rd Arkansas Infantry
338th Arkansas Infantry
6th Arkansas Field (Etter's) Battery

Gause's Brigade

Col. Lucien C. Gause.....Commander
26th Arkansas Infantry
32nd Arkansas Infantry
36th Arkansas Infantry
3rd Arkansas Field (Marshall's) Battery

Missouri Division

Brig. Gen. Mosby M. Parsons.....Commander

First Brigade

Brig. Gen. John B. Clark, Jr.....Commander

8th Missouri Infantry
9th Missouri Infantry
Ruffner's Battery (MO)

Second Brigade

Col. Simon P. Burns.....Commander

10th Missouri Infantry
11th Missouri Infantry
12th Missouri Infantry
16th Missouri Infantry
9th Missouri Battalion, Sharpshooters
Lesueur's Battery (MO)

Sub-District of Northern Louisiana

Brig. Gen. St. John Richardson
Liddell (3 March-10 May)Commander
Col. Isaac F. Harrison.....Commander (From 10 May-18 May)

Harrison's Brigade

Col. Isaac F. Harrison.....Commander
3rd Louisiana Cavalry
4th Louisiana Cavalry
5th Louisiana Cavalry
35th Texas Cavalry (attached early May from Buchel's Brigade)
Johnson's Cavalry Battalion

Artillery (ordered to Arkansas 26 April)

Capt. T. Kinlock Fauntleroy.....Commander
Elements, 2nd Louisiana Heavy Artillery Battalion
1 Section, 4th Louisiana Field (Cameron's) Battery
1 Section, Battery H, 1st Mississippi Light Artillery

Unattached Army Troops

1 Company, 8th Missouri Cavalry

3rd (Benton's) Battery, Louisiana Light Artillery

Wade's Battery (MS)

Appendix B
Camden Expedition Order Of Battle

United States Armed Forces

Department of Arkansas & Army of Arkansas

Army Commander

Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele

Department Staff

Col. Francis H. Manter.....	Chief of Staff
Maj. Charles T. Scammon.....	Aide-de-Camp
Maj. William D. Green.....	Assistant Adjutant General
Capt. Eddy D. Mason.....	Assistant Adjutant General
1st Lt. George D. Sokalski.....	Acting Assistant Adjutant General
Lt. Col. John L. Chandler.....	Provost Marshal
Capt. Junius B. Wheeler.....	Chief Engineer
1st Lt. Thomas D. Witt.....	Chief of Ordnance
Capt. Byron O. Carr.....	Chief Quartermaster
Lt. Col. Spencer C. Benham.....	Chief Commissary of Subsistence
Surg. Joseph R. Smith.....	Medical Director

VII Army Corps

Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele

Headquarters Escort

Company D, 3rd Illinois Cavalry

Company H, 15th Illinois Cavalry

3rd Division, VII Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Frederick C. Salomon

1st Brigade

Brig. Gen. Samuel A. Rice (MW 30 Apr).....Commander
50th Indiana Infantry
29th Iowa Infantry
33rd Iowa Infantry
9th Wisconsin Infantry

2nd Brigade

Col. William E. McLeanCommander
43rd Indiana Infantry
36th Iowa Infantry
77th Ohio Infantry

3rd Brigade

Col. Adolph Englemann.....Commander
43rd Illinois Infantry
40th Iowa Infantry
27th Wisconsin Infantry

Artillery

E Battery, 2nd Missouri Light Artillery
Springfield (IL) Light Artillery
Voegesles' Battery (WI)

Frontier Division

Brig. Gen. John Milton Thayer

1st Brigade

Col. John M. Edwards.....Commander
1st Arkansas Infantry (US)
2nd Arkansas Infantry (US)
18th Iowa Infantry
2nd Indiana Light Artillery

2nd Brigade

Col. Charles W. AdamsCommander
1st Kansas Colored Infantry
2nd Kansas Colored Infantry
12th Kansas Infantry
1st Battery, Arkansas Light Artillery (US)

3rd Brigade

Lt. Col. Owen BassettCommander
2nd Kansas Cavalry
6th Kansas Cavalry
14th Kansas Cavalry

Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. Eugene Asa Carr

1st Brigade

Col. John F. RitterCommander
3rd Arkansas Cavalry (US)
13th Illinois Cavalry (Company B)
3rd Iowa Cavalry (detachment)
1st Missouri Cavalry (US) (8 companies)
2nd Missouri Cavalry (US)

3rd Brigade

Col. Daniel Anderson.....Commander
10th Illinois Cavalry (detachment)
1st Iowa Cavalry
3rd Missouri Cavalry (US)

Independent Cavalry Brigade (Post of Pine Bluff)

Col. Powell Clayton.....Commander
1st Indiana Cavalry (8 companies)
5th Kansas Cavalry
7th Missouri Infantry
18th Illinois Infantry
28th Wisconsin Infantry

CONFEDERATE FORCES

Department of the Trans-Mississippi

Lt. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith

District of Arkansas

Maj. Gen. Sterling Price

Headquarters Escort

14th Missouri Battalion

Fagan's Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. James F. Fagan

Cabell's Brigade

Brig. Gen. William L. CabellCommander

1st Arkansas Cavalry

2nd Arkansas Cavalry

4th Arkansas Cavalry

7th Arkansas Cavalry

Gunter's Arkansas Cavalry Battalion

Trader's Regiment, Arkansas State Troops

7th Arkansas Field (Blocher's) Battery

Dockery's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Thomas P. DockeryCommander

12th Arkansas Mounted Infantry Battalion

18th Arkansas Mounted Infantry

19th & 15th Consolidated Mounted Infantry

20th Arkansas Mounted Infantry

Crawford's Brigade

Col. William A. CrawfordCommander

2nd Arkansas Cavalry

12th Arkansas Cavalry

Poe's Arkansas Cavalry Battalion

McMurtrey's Arkansas Cavalry Battalion

8th Arkansas Field (Hughey's) Battery

Marmaduke's Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. John S. Marmaduke

Greene's Brigade

Col. Colton GreeneCommander
3rd Missouri Cavalry
4th Missouri Cavalry
7th Missouri Cavalry
8th Missouri Cavalry
10th Missouri Cavalry
Harris' Missouri Battery

Shelby's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Joseph O. ShelbyCommander
1st Missouri Cavalry Battalion
5th Missouri Cavalry
11th Missouri Cavalry
12th Missouri Cavalry
Hunter's Cavalry Regiment
Collins' Missouri Battery

Maxey's Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Maxey

Gano's Brigade

Col. Richard Gano Commander, WIA 11 April
Col. Charles DeMorse..... Commander, as of 11 April
1st Texas Cavalry, Arizona Brigade
30th Texas Cavalry
31st Texas Cavalry
Welch's Cavalry Company
17th Texas Field (Krumbhaar's) Battery

Choctaw Brigade

Col. Tandy Walker.....Commander
1st Chickasaw & Choctaw Cavalry Regiment
2nd Choctaw Cavalry Regiment

Texas Division

Maj. Gen. John G. Walker (WIA)

Waul's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Thomas N. Waul..... Commander, WIA 30 April
8th Texas Infantry
18th Texas Infantry
22nd Texas Infantry
13th Texas Cavalry (dismounted)

Scurry's Brigade

Brig. Gen. William R. Scurry..... Commander, KIA 30 April
3rd Texas Infantry
16th Texas Infantry
17th Texas Infantry
19th Texas Infantry
16th Texas Cavalry (dismounted)

Randal's Brigade

Col. Horace Randal Commander, KIA 30 April
11th Texas Infantry
14th Texas Infantry
28th Texas Cavalry (dismounted)
6th Texas Cavalry Battalion (dismounted)

Arkansas Division

Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Churchill

Tappan's Brigade

Brig. Gen. James Camp Tappan..... Commander
19th & 24th Consolidated Arkansas Infantry
27th & 38th Arkansas Infantry
33rd Arkansas Infantry
338th Arkansas Infantry
6th Arkansas Field (Etter's) Battery

Gause's Brigade

Col. Lucien C. GauseCommander
26th Arkansas Infantry
32nd Arkansas Infantry
36th Arkansas Infantry
3rd Arkansas Field (Marshall's) Battery

Hawthorn's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Alexander T. HawthornCommander
34th Arkansas Infantry
35th Arkansas Infantry
37th Arkansas Infantry
39th Arkansas Infantry

Missouri Division

Brig. Gen. Mosby M. Parsons

1st Brigade

Brig. Gen. John B. Clark, Jr.Commander
8th Missouri Infantry
9th Missouri Infantry
Ruffner's Battery (MO)

2nd Brigade

Col. Simon P. BurnsCommander
10th Missouri Infantry
11th Missouri Infantry
12th Missouri Infantry
16th Missouri Infantry
9th Missouri Battalion, Sharpshooters
Lesueur's Battery (MO)

Appendix C

Order of Battle—Fort DeRussy, 14 March 1864

United States Armed Forces

Detachment, XVI Army Corps, Army of the Tennessee

Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Smith

1st Division, XVI Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower (acting commander)

2nd Brigade

Col. Lucius F. Hubbard.....Commander
47th Illinois
5th Minnesota
8th Wisconsin

3rd Brigade

Col. Sylvester G. Hill.....Commander
35th Iowa
33rd Missouri

3rd Division, XVI Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower

1st Brigade

Col. William F. Lynch.....Commander
58th Illinois
119th Illinois
89th Indiana

2nd Brigade

Col. William T. Shaw.....Commander
14th Iowa

27th Iowa
32nd Iowa
24th Missouri (elmts 21st MO attached)

3rd Brigade

Risdon M. MooreCommander
49th Illinois
117th Illinois
178th Illinois

Artillery

3rd Battery, Indiana Light Artillery
9th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery

**Provisional Division, XVII Army Corps
(attached to the XVI Corps)**

Brig. Gen. T. Kilby Smith

1st Brigade

Col. Jonathan B. MooreCommander
41st Illinois
3rd Iowa
33rd Wisconsin

2nd Brigade

Col. Lyman M. Ward.....Commander
81st Illinois
95th Illinois
14th Wisconsin

Artillery

M Battery, 1st Missouri Light Artillery

Confederate Forces

Commander Fort DeRussy

Lt. Col. William A. Byrd

Officer	Enlisted	Unit
1		C.S.A. Engineer Corps
1		C.S.A. Quartermaster Corps
2		1st Louisiana Artillery
	1	H Company, 3rd Louisiana Cavalry
4	25	Crescent Regiment
1	44	St. Martin's Siege Battery
	3	Cassidy's Cavalry
	1	8th Texas
3	42	A Company, 11th Texas
	5	E Company, 13th Texas
3	19	G Company, 14th Texas
3	30	Companies A, B, E, & I 16th Texas
1	39	Companies A, B, D, E, G, I, & K 17th Texas
1	21	H Company, 18th Texas
3	32	A & H Companies, 19th Texas
2	19	E Company, 22nd Texas
	11	D & I Companies, 28th Texas
25	292	Totals

Table C.1. Confederate Forces.

Appendix D

Order of Battle—Henderson’s Hill, 22 March 1864

United States Armed Forces

1st Division, XVI Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower

2nd Brigade

Col. Lucius F. Hubbard.....Commander
47th Illinois
5th Minnesota
8th Wisconsin

3rd Brigade

Col. Sylvester G. Hill.....Commander
35th Iowa
33rd Missouri

Artillery

E Battery, 2nd Missouri Light Artillery
Springfield (IL) Light Artillery
Voegeles’ Battery (WI)

Attached Units

Det., Lee’s Cavalry Division

1st Cavalry Brigade

Col. Thomas J. Lucas.....Commander
16th Indiana Infantry (Mounted)
2nd Louisiana Infantry (Mounted)
6th Missouri
14th New York

Det., 3rd Division, XVI Army Corps

89th Indiana

9th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery

Confederate Forces

Col. William G. Vincent

2nd Louisiana Cavalry

(Edgar's) Battery A, 1st Texas Light Artillery

Appendix E

Order Of Battle—Mansfield Sabine Crossroads, 8 April 1864

United States Armed Forces

Army of the Gulf

Army Commander

Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks

Army Headquarters Guard and Escort

Companies A, B, and C, Headquarters Troops

Army Units

Detachment, XIII Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Thomas E. G. Ransom (WIA)

Brig. Gen. Robert A. Cameron (8 Apr)

3rd Division, XIII Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Robert A. Cameron

Col. William H. Raynor (8 Apr)

VII Army Corps

Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele

Headquarters Escort

Company D, 3rd Illinois Cavalry

Company H, 15th Illinois Cavalry

3rd Division, VII Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Frederick C. Salomon

1st Brigade

Lt. Col. Aaron M. Flory Commander, WIA 8 April
Col. Thomas H. Bringhurst Commander as of 8 April
46th Indiana
29th Wisconsin (five companies)

2nd Brigade

Col. William H. Raynor Commander
24th Iowa (five companies)
28th Iowa
56th Ohio

4th Division, XIII Army Corps

Col. William J. Landram

1st Brigade

Col. Frank Emerson Commander, WIA/POW on 8 April
Col. Frederick W. Moore Commander, as of 8 April
77th Illinois
67th Indiana
19th Kentucky
23rd Indiana

2nd Brigade

Col. Joseph W. Vance Commander, MW on 8 April
Col. John R. Parker Commander, as of 8 April
130th Illinois
48th Ohio
83rd Ohio
96th Ohio

Artillery

1st Battery, Indiana Light Artillery
Chicago Mercantile Battery

XIX Army Corps

Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin (WIA 8 Apr)

1st Division, XIX Army Corps

Brig. Gen. William H. Emory

1st Brigade

Brig. Gen. William Dwight.....Commander
29th Maine
114th Indiana
116th New York
153rd New York
161st New York

2nd Brigade

Brig. Gen. James W. McMillan.....Commander
13th Maine
15th Maine
160th New York
47th Pennsylvania

3rd Brigade

Col. Lewis Benedict.....Commander
30th Maine
162nd New York
165th New York
173rd New York

Artillery

L Battery, 1st United States
25th Battery, New York Light Artillery
1st Battery, Vermont Light Artillery

Cavalry Division, Army of the Gulf*

Brig. Gen. Albert L. Lee

* Under the operational control of Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, XIX Corps.

1st Brigade

Col. Thomas J. LucasCommander
16th Indiana Infantry (Mounted)
2nd Louisiana Infantry (Mounted)
6th Missouri Cavalry (US)
14th New York

3rd Brigade

Col. Harai Robinson..... Commander, WIA 8 April
Lt. Col. John M. Crebs..... Commander, as of 8 April
87th Illinois Infantry (Mounted)
1st Louisiana Cavalry (US)

4th Brigade

Col. N.A.M. Dudley.....Commander
2nd Illinois Cavalry
3rd Massachusetts Cavalry
31st Massachusetts Infantry (Mounted)
8th New Hampshire Infantry (Mounted)

5th Brigade

Col. Oliver P. Gooding.....Commander
2nd New York Cavalry
18th New York Cavalry
3rd Rhode Island Cavalry

Horse Artillery, Cavalry Division

2nd Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery
G Battery, 5th United States Artillery

Confederate Forces

District of West Louisiana

Commander

Maj. Gen. Richard Taylor

Headquarters Guard and Escort

Benjamin's Louisiana Cavalry Company

Units Under District Control

Walker's Division (also referred to as the "Texas Division")

Maj. Gen. John G. Walker

Waul's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Thomas N. Waul.....Commander
8th Texas Infantry
18th Texas Infantry
22nd Texas Infantry
13th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
4th Texas Field (Haldeman's) Battery

Scurry's Brigade

Brig. Gen. William R. Scurry.....Commander
3rd Texas Infantry
16th Texas Infantry
17th Texas Infantry
19th Texas Infantry
16th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
Edgar's) Battery A, 1st Texas Lt. Artillery

Randal's Brigade

Col. Horace Randal.....Commander
11th Texas Infantry
14th Texas Infantry
6th Texas Cavalry Battalion (Dismounted)
28th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
9th Texas Field (Daniel's) Battery

**Mouton's Division (also referred to as "Polignac's Division"
and "2nd Infantry Division")**

Brig. Gen. Alfred Mouton (KIA 8 April 1864)
Brig. Gen. Camille J. de Polignac (8 April 1864)

Polignac's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Camille J. de Polignac.....Commander
Col. Robert D. Stone.....Commander, as of 8 April
15th Texas Infantry
17th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
22nd Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
31st Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
34th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
3rd (Benton's) Battery, Louisiana Light Artillery

Gray's Brigade

Col. Henry Gray.....Commander
Crescent Infantry Regiment
18th Louisiana Infantry
28th Louisiana Infantry

Cavalry Corps

Brig. Gen. Thomas Green

Bee's Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. Hamilton P. Bee

Debray's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Xavier B. DebrayCommander
23rd Texas Cavalry
26th Texas Cavalry
36th Texas Cavalry

Buchel's Brigade

Col. Augustus C. Buchel.....Commander
1st Texas Cavalry
35th Texas Cavalry
37th Texas Cavalry

Major's Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. James P. Major

Lane's Brigade

Col. Walter P. Lane Commander, WIA 8 April
Col. George W. Baylor..... Commander, as of 8 April
1st Texas Partisan Rangers
2nd Texas Partisan Rangers
2nd Arizona Cavalry
3rd Arizona Cavalry

Bagby's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Arthur P. BagbyCommander
4th Texas Cavalry
5th Texas Cavalry
7th Texas Cavalry
13th Texas Cavalry

Artillery Battalion

Maj. Oliver J. Semmes.....Commander
2nd Texas Field (McMahan's) Battery
7th Texas Field (Moseley's) Battery
12th Texas Field (The "Valverde") Battery
4th Arkansas Field (West's) Battery

Unattached Army Troops

1st Confederate Regular Light Artillery Battery (“Barnes’ Battery”)

Appendix F

Order Of Battle—Pleasant Hill, 9 April 1864

United States Armed Forces

Army of the Gulf

Army Commander

Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks

Army Headquarters Guard and Escort

Companies A, B, and C, Headquarters Troops

Army Units

Detachment, XIII Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Robert A. Cameron

3rd Division, XIII Army Corps

Col. William H. Raynor

1st Brigade

Maj. Bradford HancockCommander
46th Indiana
29th Indiana

2nd Brigade

Col. James R. SlackCommander
24th Iowa
28th Iowa
56th Ohio

Artillery

A Battery, 1st Missouri Light Artillery
2nd Battery, Ohio Light Artillery

4th Division, XIII Army Corps

Col. William J. Landram

1st Brigade

Maj. Francis A. SearsCommander
77th Illinois
67th Indiana
19th Kentucky
23rd Indiana

2nd Brigade

Lt. Col. Albert H. BrownCommander
130th Illinois
48th Ohio
83rd Ohio
96th Ohio

Artillery

1st Battery, Indiana Light Artillery

XIX Army Corps

Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin

1st Division, XIX Army Corps

Brig. Gen. William H. Emory

1st Brigade

Brig. Gen. William DwightCommander
29th Maine
114th New York
116th New York
153rd New York
161st New York

2nd Brigade

Brig. Gen. James W. McMillan.....Commander
13th Maine
15th Maine
160th New York
47th Pennsylvania

3rd Brigade

Col. Lewis Benedict.....Commander, KIA 9 April
Col. Louis Fessenden.....Commander, as of 9 April
30th Maine
162nd New York
165th New York
173rd New York

Artillery

25th Battery, New York Light Artillery
L Battery, 1st United States
1st Battery, Vermont Light Artillery

Artillery Reserve, XIX Army Corps

1st Battery, Delaware Light Artillery
1st Indiana Heavy Artillery (two companies)

Detachment, XVI Army Corps, Army of the Tennessee

Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Smith

1st Division, XVI Army Corps

(1st Brigade at Memphis and Division Artillery split between Memphis
and Vicksburg)

Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower (acting commander)

2nd Brigade

Col. Lucius F. Hubbard.....Commander
47th Illinois
5th Minnesota
8th Wisconsin

3rd Brigade

Col. Sylvester G. Hillt.....Commander
35th Iowa
33rd Missouri

3rd Division, XVI Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower

1st Brigade

Col. William F. Lynch.....Commander
58th Illinois
119th Illinois
89th Indiana

2nd Brigade

Col. William T. Shaw.....Commander
14th Iowa
27th Iowa
32nd Iowa
24th Missouri (w/elmts of 21st MO)

3rd Brigade

Col. Risdon M. Moore.....Commander
49th Illinois
117th Illinois
78th Illinois

Artillery

3rd Battery, Indiana Light Artillery
9th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery

Seperate Army Troops

Cavalry Division, Army of the Gulf

Brig. Gen. Albert L. Lee

1st Brigade

Col. Thomas J. LucasCommander
16th Indiana Infantry (Mounted)
2nd Louisiana Infantry (Mounted)
6th Missouri Cavalry (US)
14th New York

2nd Brigade

Lt. Col. John M. Crebs.....Commander
1st Louisiana Cavalry (US)
87th Illinois Infantry (Mounted)

4th Brigade

Col. N.A.M. Dudley.....Commander
2nd Illinois Cavalry
3rd Massachusetts Cavalry
31st Massachusetts Infantry (Mounted)
8th New Hampshire Infantry (Mounted)

5th Brigade

Col. Oliver P. Gooding.....Commander
2nd New York Cavalry
18th New York Cavalry
3rd Rhode Island Cavalry

Horse Artillery, Cavalry Division

2nd Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery
G Battery, 5th United States

1st Division, *Corps D' Afrique*

1st Brigade

Col. William H. DickeyCommander
1st Infantry (redesignated 4 April 1864 as 73rd US Colored Infantry)
3rd Infantry (redesignated 4 April 1864 as 75th US Colored Infantry)
12th Infantry (redesignated 4 April 1864 as 84th US Colored Infantry)
23rd Infantry (redesignated 4 April 1864 as 92nd US Colored Infantry)

Engineer Brigade, Army of the Gulf

Col. George D. Robinson.....Commander
3rd Engineers, *Corps D' Afrique*
5th Engineers, *Corps D' Afrique*

Confederate Forces

District of West Louisiana

Commander

Major General Richard Taylor

Headquarters Guard and Escort

Benjamin's Louisiana Cavalry Company

Walker's Division (also referred to as the "Texas Division")

Maj. Gen. John G. Walker (WIA 9 Apr)

Waul's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Thomas N. Waul.....Commander
8th Texas Infantry
18th Texas Infantry
22nd Texas Infantry
13th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
4th Texas Field (Haldeman's) Battery

Scurry's Brigade

Brig. Gen. William R. Scurry.....Commander
3rd Texas Infantry
16th Texas Infantry
17th Texas Infantry
19th Texas Infantry
16th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
Edgar's) Battery A, 1st Texas Lt. Artillery

Randal's Brigade

Col. Horace Randal.....Commander
11th Texas Infantry
14th Texas Infantry
6th Texas Cavalry Battalion (Dismounted)
28th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
9th Texas Field (Daniel's) Battery

Polignac's Division (formerly Mouton's Division)

Brig. Gen. Camille J. de Polignac

Polignac's Brigade

Col. Robert D. Stone.....Commander
15th Texas Infantry
17th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
22nd Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
31st Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
34th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
3rd (Benton's) Battery, Louisiana Light Artillery

Gray's Brigade

Col. Henry Gray.....Commander
Crescent Infantry Regiment
18th Louisiana Infantry
28th Louisiana Infantry

Cavalry Corps

Brig. Gen. Thomas Green

Bee's Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. Hamilton P. Bee

Debray's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Xavier B. DebrayCommander
23rd Texas Cavalry
26th Texas Cavalry
36th Texas Cavalry

Buchel's Brigade

Col. Augustus C. Buchel.....Commander, KIA on 9 April
Lt. Col. William O. Yager Commander, as of 9 April
1st Texas Cavalry
35th Texas Cavalry
37th Texas Cavalry

Major's Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. James P. Major

Baylor's Brigade

Col. George W. Baylor.....Commander
1st Texas Partisan Rangers
2nd Texas Partisan Rangers
2nd Arizona Cavalry
3rd Arizona Cavalry

Bagby's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Arthur P. BagbyCommander
4th Texas Cavalry
5th Texas Cavalry
7th Texas Cavalry
13th Texas Cavalry

Artillery Battalion

Maj. Oliver J. Semmes.....Commander
2nd Texas Field (McMahan's) Battery
7th Texas Field (Moseley's) Battery
12th Texas Field (The "Valverde") Battery
4th Arkansas Field (West's) Battery

**Detachment, District of Arkansas
(organized as an *ad hoc* corps on arrival)**

Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Churchill

Arkansas Division

Brig. Gen. James C. Tappan

Tappan's Brigade

Col. Hiram L. GrinstedCommander
19th & 24th Consolidated Arkansas Infantry
27th & 38th Arkansas Infantry
33rd Arkansas Infantry
6th Arkansas Field (Etter's) Battery

Gause's Brigade

Col. Lucien C. GauseCommander
26th Arkansas Infantry
32nd Arkansas Infantry
36th Arkansas Infantry
3rd Arkansas Field (Marshall's) Battery

Missouri Division

Brig. Gen. Mosby M. Parsons

1st Brigade

Brig. Gen. John B. Clark, Jr.Commander
8th Missouri Infantry
9th Missouri Infantry
Ruffner's Battery (MO)

2nd Brigade

Col. Simon P. BurnsCommander
10th Missouri Infantry
11th Missouri Infantry
12th Missouri Infantry
16th Missouri Infantry
9th Missouri Battalion, Sharpshooters
Lesueur's Battery (MO)

Unattached Army Troops

1st Confederate Regular Light Artillery Battery ("Barnes' Battery")

Appendix G

Order Of Battle—Monett’s Ferry, 23 April 1864

United States Armed Forces

Army of the Gulf

Army Commander

Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks

Army Headquarters Guard and Escort

Companies A, B, and C, Headquarters Troops

Army Units

Detachment, XIII Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Robert A. Cameron

3rd Division, XIII Army Corps

Col. William H. Raynor

1st Brigade

Maj. Bradford HancockCommander
46th Indiana
29th Indiana

2nd Brigade

Col. James R. SlackCommander
24th Iowa
28th Iowa
56th Ohio

Artillery

A Battery, 1st Missouri Light Artillery
2nd Battery, Ohio Light Artillery

4th Division, XIII Army Corps

Col. William J. Landram

1st Brigade

Maj. Francis A. SearsCommander
77th Illinois
67th Indiana
19th Kentucky
23rd Indiana

2nd Brigade

Lt. Col. Albert H. BrownCommander
130th Illinois
48th Ohio
83rd Ohio
96th Ohio

Artillery

1st Battery, Indiana Light Artillery

XIX Army Corps

Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin

1st Division, XIX Army Corps

Brig. Gen. William H. Emory

1st Brigade

Brig. Gen. William DwightCommander
29th Maine
114th New York
116th New York
153rd New York
161st New York

2nd Brigade

Brig. Gen. James W. McMillan.....Commander
13th Maine
15th Maine
160th New York
47th Pennsylvania

3rd Brigade

Col. Louis Fessenden.....Commander, WIA 23 April
Lt. Col. Justus W. Blanchard.....Commander, as of 23 April
30th Maine
162nd New York
165th New York
173rd New York

Artillery

25th Battery, New York Light Artillery
L Battery, 1st United States
1st Battery, Vermont Light Artillery

2nd Division, XIX Army Corps

2nd Brigade

Brig. Gen. Henry W. Birge
13th Connecticut
1st Louisiana
90th New York (3 companies)

Artillery Reserve, XIX Army Corps

1st Battery, Delaware Light Artillery
1st Indiana Heavy Artillery (two companies)

Seperate Army Troops

Cavalry Division, Army of the Gulf

Brig. Gen. Albert L. Lee

1st Brigade

Col. Thomas J. LucasCommander
16th Indiana Infantry (Mounted)
2nd Louisiana Infantry (Mounted)
6th Missouri Cavalry (US)
14th New York

3rd Brigade

Lt. Col. John M. Crebs.....Commander
1st Louisiana Cavalry (US)
87th Illinois Infantry (Mounted)

4th Brigade

Col. Edmund J. DavisCommander
2nd Illinois Cavalry
3rd Massachusetts Cavalry
31st Massachusetts Infantry (Mounted)
8th New Hampshire Infantry (Mounted)

5th Brigade

Col. Oliver P. Gooding.....Commander
2nd New York Cavalry
18th New York Cavalry
3rd Rhode Island Cavalry

Horse Artillery, Cavalry Division

2nd Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery
G Battery, 5th United States

Confederate Forces

Cavalry Corps

Brig. Gen. Hamilton Bee

Bee's Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. Arthur P. Bagby

Debray's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Xavier B. DebrayCommander
1st Texas Cavalry
23rd Texas Cavalry
26th Texas Cavalry

*Terrell's Brigade**

Col. Alexander Terrell.....Commander
32nd Texas Cavalry
34th Texas Cavalry
35th Texas Cavalry

*Brigade not present; guarding supplies at Beasley's Plantation

Major's Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. James P. Major

Baylor's Brigade

Col. George W. Baylor.....Commander
1st Texas Partisan Rangers
2nd Texas Partisan Rangers
2nd Arizona Cavalry
3rd Arizona Cavalry

Bagby's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Arthur P. BagbyCommander
4th Texas Cavalry

5th Texas Cavalry
7th Texas Cavalry
13th Texas Cavalry

Artillery Battalion

Maj. Oliver J. Semmes.....Commander
2nd Texas Field (McMahan's) Battery
7th Texas Field (Moseley's) Battery
12th Texas Field (The "Valverde") Battery
4th Arkansas Field (West's) Battery

Appendix H

Order Of Battle—Mansura, 16 May 1864

United States Armed Forces

Army of the Gulf

Army Commander

Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks

Army Headquarters Guard and Escort

Companies A, B, and C, Headquarters Troops

Army Units

XIII Army Corps (held in reserve)

Brig. Gen. Michael K. Lawler

2nd Brigade, 1st Division, XIII Army Corps

Col. James KeigwinCommander
49th Indiana
22nd Kentucky
69th Indiana
16th Ohio
34th Iowa
114th Ohio

3rd Division, XIII Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Robert A. Cameron

1st Brigade

Maj. Bradford HancockCommander
46th Indiana
29th Indiana

2nd Brigade

Col. William H. RaynorCommander
24th Iowa
28th Iowa
56th Ohio

Artillery

A Battery, 1st Missouri Light Artillery
2nd Battery, Ohio Light Artillery

4th Division, XIII Army Corps

Col. William J. Landram

1st Brigade

Maj. Francis A. SearsCommander
77th Illinois
67th Indiana
19th Kentucky
23rd Indiana

2nd Brigade

Lt. Col. Albert H. BrownCommander
130th Illinois
48th Ohio
83rd Ohio
96th Ohio

Artillery

1st Battery, Indiana Light Artillery

XIX Army Corps

Brig. Gen. William H. Emory

1st Division, XIX Army Corps

Brig. Gen. James W. McMillan

1st Brigade

Col. George L. Beal Commander, as of 16 April
29th Maine
114th New York
116th New York
153rd New York
161st New York

2nd Brigade

Col. Henry Rust, Jr. Commander, as of 2 May
13th Maine
15th Maine
160th New York
47th Pennsylvania

3rd Brigade

Lt. Col. Justus W. Blanchard.....Commander
30th Maine
162nd New York
165th New York
173rd New York

Artillery

25th Battery, New York Light Artillery
L Battery, 1st United States
1st Battery, Vermont Light Artillery

2nd Division, XIX Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover

1st Brigade

Brig. Gen. Franklin S. Nickerson.....Commander
133rd New York
176th New York

2nd Brigade

Brig. Gen. Henry W. Birge.....Commander
13th Connecticut
1st Louisiana
90th New York (3 companies)
159th New York

3rd Brigade

Col. Jacob Sharpe.....Commander
38th Massachusetts
128th New York
156th New York (3 companies)
175th New York

Artillery

F Battery, 1st United States Artillery
C Battery, 2nd United States Artillery
7th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery
26th Battery, New York Light Artillery

Artillery Reserve, XIX Army Corps

1st Battery, Delaware Light Artillery
1st Indiana Heavy Artillery (two companies)

Cavalry, XIX Army Corps

3rd Maryland Cavalry

Detachment, XVI Army Corps, Army of the Tennessee

Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Smith

1st Division, XVI Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower (acting commander)

2nd Brigade

Col. Lucius F. Hubbard.....Commander
47th Illinois
5th Minnesota
8th Wisconsin

3rd Brigade

Col. Sylvester G. Hillt.....Commander
35th Iowa
33rd Missouri

3rd Division, XVI Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower

1st Brigade

Col. William F. Lynch.....Commander
58th Illinois
119th Illinois
89th Indiana

2nd Brigade

Col. William T. Shaw.....Commander
14th Iowa
27th Iowa
32nd Iowa
24th Missouri (w/elmts of 21st MO)

3rd Brigade

Col. Risdon M. MooreCommander
49th Illinois
117th Illinois
78th Illinois

Artillery

3rd Battery, Indiana Light Artillery
9th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery

Provisional Division, XVII Army Corps (attached to the XVI Corps)

Brig. Gen. T. Kilby Smith

1st Brigade

Col. Jonathan B. MooreCommander
41st Illinois
3rd Iowa
33rd Wisconsin

2nd Brigade

Col. Lyman M. Ward.....Commander
81st Illinois
95th Illinois
14th Wisconsin

Artillery

M Battery, 1st Missouri Light Artillery

Seperate Army Troops

Cavalry Division, Army of the Gulf

Brig. Gen. Richard Arnold

1st Brigade

Col. Thomas J. LucasCommander
16th Indiana Infantry (Mounted)
2nd Louisiana Infantry (Mounted)
6th Missouri Cavalry (US)
14th New York

3rd Brigade

Lt. Col. John M. CrebsCommander
1st Louisiana Cavalry (US)
87th Illinois Infantry (Mounted)

4th Brigade

Col. Edmund J. DavisCommander
2nd Illinois Cavalry
3rd Massachusetts Cavalry
31st Massachusetts Infantry (Mounted)
8th New Hampshire Infantry (Mounted)

5th Brigade

Col. Oliver P. GoodingCommander
2nd New York Cavalry
18th New York Cavalry
3rd Rhode Island Cavalry

Horse Artillery, Cavalry Division

2nd Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery
G Battery, 5th United States

1st Division, Corps D' Afrique (wagon train guard)

1st Brigade

Col. William H. DickeyCommander
73rd US Colored Troops
75th US Colored Troops
84th US Colored Troops
92nd US Colored Troops

Engineer Brigade, Army of the Gulf (held in reserve)

Col. George D. Robinson..... Commander

97th US Colored Troops

99th US Colored Troops

Confederate Forces

District of West Louisiana

Commander

Major General Richard Taylor

Headquarters Guard and Escort

Benjamin's Louisiana Cavalry Company

Cavalry Corps

Brig. Gen. John A. Wharton

Bagby's Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. Arthur P. Bagby

Debray's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Xavier B. DebrayCommander
1st Texas Cavalry
23rd Texas Cavalry
26th Texas Cavalry

*Terrell's Brigade**

Col. Alexander Terrell.....Commander
32nd Texas Cavalry
34th Texas Cavalry
35th Texas Cavalry

Major's Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. James P. Major

Baylor's Brigade

Col. George W. Baylor.....Commander
1st Texas Partisan Rangers
2nd Texas Partisan Rangers
2nd Arizona Cavalry
3rd Arizona Cavalry

Bagby's Brigade

Col. William P. HardemanCommander
4th Texas Cavalry
5th Texas Cavalry
7th Texas Cavalry
13th Texas Cavalry

Steele's Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. William Steele

Parsons' Brigade

Col. William H. Parsons.....Commander
12th Texas Cavalry
19th Texas Cavalry
21st Texas Cavalry
Morgan's Cavalry Battalion
1st Confederate Regular Light Artillery (Barnes' Battery)

Corps Artillery Battalion

Maj. Oliver J. Semmes.....Commander
2nd Texas Field (McMahan's) Battery
7th Texas Field (Moseley's) Battery
12th Texas Field (The "Valverde") Battery
6th Louisiana Field (West's) Battery

Polignac's Division

Brig. Gen. Camille J. de Polignac

Stone's Brigade

Col. Robert D. Stone.....Commander, KIA on 18 May
15th Texas Infantry
17th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
22nd Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
31st Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
34th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)

Gray's Brigade

Col. Henry Gray.....Commander
Crescent Infantry Regiment
18th Louisiana Infantry
28th Louisiana Infantry

Division Artillery Battalion

Maj. Thomas A. Faries.....Commander
1st Field (Gordy's) Battery, Louisiana Light Artillery
5th Field (Benton's) Battery, Louisiana Light Artillery
3rd (Benton's) Battery, Louisiana Light Artillery (attached)

Appendix I

Order Of Battle—Yellow Bayou, 18 May 1864

United States Armed Forces
Detachment, XVI Army Corps, Army of the Tennessee
Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower

1st Division, XVI Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower (acting commander)

3rd Brigade

Col. Sylvester G. Hill.....Commander
35th Iowa
33rd Missouri

3rd Division, XVI Army Corps

Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower

1st Brigade

Col. William F. Lynch (WIA).....Commander
Col. Thomas J. Kinney (WIA).....Commander
Lt. Col. Hervey Craven.....Commander
58th Illinois
119th Illinois
89th Indiana

2nd Brigade

Col. William T. Shaw.....Commander
14th Iowa
27th Iowa
32nd Iowa
24th Missouri (elements of 21st MO attached)

Artillery

3rd Battery, Indiana Light Artillery
9th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery

Attached

31st Massachusetts Infantry (Mounted)

Confederate Forces

District of West Louisiana

Maj. Gen. John A. Wharton (acting)

Bagby's Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. Arthur P. Bagby

Debray's Brigade

Brig. Gen. Xavier B. DebrayCommander
1st Texas Cavalry
23rd Texas Cavalry
26th Texas Cavalry

Terrell's Brigade

Col. Alexander Terrell.....Commander
32nd Texas Cavalry
34th Texas Cavalry
35th Texas Cavalry

Major's Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. James P. Major

Baylor's Brigade

Col. George W. Baylor.....Commander
1st Texas Partisan Rangers
2nd Texas Partisan Rangers
2nd Arizona Cavalry
3rd Arizona Cavalry

Bagby's Brigade

Col. William P. HardemanCommander
4th Texas Cavalry
5th Texas Cavalry
7th Texas Cavalry
13th Texas Cavalry

Steele's Cavalry Division

Brig. Gen. William Steele

Parsons' Brigade

Col. William H. Parsons.....Commander
12th Texas Cavalry
19th Texas Cavalry
21st Texas Cavalry
Morgan's Cavalry Battalion
1st Confederate Regular Light Artillery (Barnes' Battery)

Corps Artillery Battalion

Maj. Oliver J. Semmes.....Commander
2nd Texas Field (McMahan's) Battery
7th Texas Field (Moseley's) Battery
12th Texas Field (The "Valverde") Battery
6th Louisiana Field (West's) Battery

Polignac's Division

Brig. Gen. Camille J. de Polignac

Stone's Brigade

Col. Robert D. Stone.....Commander, KIA on 18 May
15th Texas Infantry
17th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
22nd Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
31st Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
34th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)

Gray's Brigade

Col. Henry Gray.....Commander
Crescent Infantry Regiment
18th Louisiana Infantry
28th Louisiana Infantry

Division Artillery Battalion

Maj. Thomas A. Faries.....Commander
1st Field (Gordy's) Battery, Louisiana Light Artillery
5th Field (Benton's) Battery, Louisiana Light Artillery
3rd (Benton's) Battery, Louisiana Light Artillery (attached)

Appendix J

Biographies of Primary Participants

Helpful Hints

1. During the field study phase of the staff ride, you will provide a brief introduction of your character the first time you are asked a question. At a minimum, your brief introduction should include:

- Year born & age at the time of the battle
- Place of birth and location where historical character grew up
- Education (e.g. West Point Class of 1846, Virginia Military Institute, Princeton, etc.)
- Previous military experience (e.g. served with distinction as a captain of artillery during the Mexican War)
- Health (e.g. lost a leg at the Battle of Second Bull Run)
- Source of commissioning (e.g. West Point graduate, politician)
- Analysis of character (e.g. length of time serving in current position, personality, how viewed by superiors, peers, and subordinates, combat record, etc.)

2. During both the preliminary study (classroom) phased of the staff ride, you may be asked questions about your character. Be sure to know:

- The name and your relationship to your higher commander
- The names and your relationship to your peers
- The name and your assessment of your subordinate commanders (if applicable)
- When discussing events on the battlefield, you will be responsible for knowing:
 1. Where you fought
 2. How you deployed your subordinate formations
 3. Location of adjacent friendly units
 4. Changes of command (due to friendly casualties) that occurred during the fighting.
 5. The details of any controversies surrounding your actions. Examples: Were there disagreements between commanders

regarding courses of action? Were your orders discretionary? Were you acting without explicit orders? Were you taking the initiative? Did you not receive orders sent to you? Etc.

Final note: Remember, your insights represent a critical component of the staff ride experience. Your preparation will enrich everyone's educational experience!

Principal Union Participants

Nathaniel P. Banks. Banks was born 30 January 1816 at Waltham, Massachusetts. He attended local schools until the age of 14 when he was compelled by family financial difficulties to go to work in a cotton factory. His first job was to replace bobbins of thread on the machines and because of this humble work, he later became known as the "Bobbin Boy," a nickname he played when he later went into politics. He did not give up on his education, however, and he continued to read and participate in debates as a way of self-educating. His oratory skills brought him to the attention of local Democrat politicians and Banks soon stood election for two local offices in the mid-1840s, but lost both races.

On 16 May 1861, Banks was notified that he had been appointed by President Abraham Lincoln to be a Major General of US Volunteers. Lincoln believed that appointing such men as Banks to high military position would help garner not only political support for the war effort, but also help with recruiting volunteers and raising money. While Banks was a bundle of energy and threw his best into any situation for which he was responsible, his lack of any military training would haunt him throughout the Civil War.

Banks' initial assignment was as the Commanding General of the District of Annapolis in Maryland. His primary duty was to ensure that communications remained open between Washington, DC and Pennsylvania since his district included hotbed areas of secession like Baltimore. He was transferred in July to command the Department of the Shenandoah with headquarters at Harper's Ferry. In February 1862, Banks received his first real orders to command an army in the field. Major General George B. McClellan wanted Banks to keep Confederate forces under Major General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson occupied in the Shenandoah Valley. McClellan planned to advance on Richmond via the James River Peninsula in Virginia and did not want Jackson reinforcing rebel forces around the Confederate capital. The initial fight at Kernstown (Banks was not present) in March was a tactical success against Jackson but Lincoln felt compelled

to hold an entire corps back from McClellan to protect the capitol. After some amazing maneuvering in the valley, Jackson fought a follow-on battle against Banks at Winchester on 25 May. Jackson handily defeated Banks' army and captured so much in the way of wagons and supplies, that the rebels nicknamed the United States general, "Commissary Banks."

In December 1862, Banks was ordered to New Orleans in to replace Major General Benjamin F. Butler in command of the Department of the Gulf. The following year, he and his new command were involved in a number of key actions in the Western Theater. In the early spring of 1863, Banks led the XIX Corps up Bayou Teche in south central Louisiana to drive back Confederate forces under Major General Richard B. Taylor. The column succeeded in capturing Alexandria for the first, but not last, time. From Alexandria, Banks moved the XIX Corps to Morganza, Louisiana, crossed the Mississippi and soon besieged Port Hudson, a heavily fortified outpost on the Mississippi River north of Baton Rouge. Like Vicksburg, 160 miles up the river, the defenses of Port Hudson had been well-prepared by 6,500 Confederate defenders. It took the 30,000 troops of Banks' Army of the Gulf 48 days to capture the town which only surrendered after learning Vicksburg had capitulated.

After the capture of Port Hudson, Banks was pressured by Major General Henry W. Halleck, the army's general-in-chief, to plant the flag of the United States on the soil of Texas. The primary purpose of the expedition was to send a message to the French emperor Maximilian in Mexico to remain neutral in regard to the ongoing civil war in the United States. The first attempt was an aborted landing at Sabine Pass, Texas, after which Banks sent Major General William B. Franklin and the XIX Corps back along the Teche to search for a land route to Texas. Franklin advanced west from New Iberia and Berwick Bay toward Texas but the swampy route, rebel attacks, and successful landings along the Texas coast by other of Banks' troops that October and November led to the termination of Franklin's mission.

Banks' mission into the Red River Valley in the spring of 1864 was also prompted, in large measure, by administration desires to secure larger pieces of Texas. Halleck wanted Banks to advance up the Red River, capture Shreveport, and enter Texas to capture and destroy war making facilities there. For his part, Banks considered the Red River Campaign unnecessary and Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant considered it a strategic distraction. Grant, as the new general-in-chief, wanted Banks to capture Mobile, and from there thrust up into central Alabama to wreak havoc on

Confederate war making facilities there. Halleck prevailed, however, and Banks headed into central Louisiana once again.

In short, the Red River Campaign, which lasted from 7 March to 18 May 1864, was an operational and strategic failure. Consisting of two pincers—Banks's Army of the Gulf moving up the Red River and Major General Frederick Steele's VII Corps moving south from Arkansas—neither of the two columns were able to reach Shreveport before being turned back by numerically inferior Confederate forces. Despite being defeated at Mansfield (only a part of the Federal army was engaged there) the Army of the Gulf won every other tactical fight during the campaign. In each case, the US force was not only larger, but also better equipped and supplied than its rebel counterparts. Indeed, Banks, on several occasions seemed intent on renewing the offensive, only to be talked out of it by his professional army subordinates, despite the Army of the Gulf's great advantages.

David D. Porter. David D. Porter was born in Chester, Pennsylvania, on 8 June 1813. The son of a US Navy War of 1812 hero, Commodore David Porter, the future admiral was born into a seafaring family of naval officers. Addition ally, his stepbrother was Admiral David G. Farragut and his cousin was Major General Fitz John Porter of the US Army.

With the approach of the Civil War at Fort Sumter, the various Confederate states began to seize Federal arsenals and fortifications around the South. These seizures included the US Army's coastal fortifications that guarded southern harbors. To ensure Fort Pickens at Pensacola, Florida, did not fall to the rebels, Secretary of State William H. Seward, Captain Montgomery C. Meigs of the US Army, and Porter, now a lieutenant, devised a plan, which had the full support of President Lincoln, to go to the relief of Fort Pickens. The plan was developed in secret. Only the president, Seward, Meigs, and Porter knew the details. With orders from the president Porter would assume command of the USS *Powhatan* to carry reinforcements from New York Harbor to the fort. The problem was that the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, planned to use the *Powhatan* to escort a flotilla of other vessels to reinforce Fort Sumter. The vessel was to be used as the fire support platform in case rebel batteries around Charleston Harbor opened fire. When the flotilla departed for Fort Sumter, the *Powhatan* was already on its way to Florida under Porter's command.

When Seward discovered that the *Powhatan* had sailed, he went straight to the president to demand that control of the ship be returned from Seward to the US Navy. Lincoln summoned Seward and directed him to return the ship to Welles. When Porter received an order from Welles to

return to port, and give up the ship to its original captain, Porter responded that he was acting under orders of the president and sailed off to Pensacola, not knowing that Welles' own directive actually came from the president. The end result was that Fort Pickens was reinforced and remained in Federal hands throughout the war. When the relief flotilla arrived off Charleston Harbor without the *Powhatan*, however, the rebels opened fire on Fort Sumter, the post was surrendered, and the Civil War began.

Despite Welles' initial frustration with Porter's actions in the *Powhatan* affair, he was soon promoted to the rank of commander and assigned the task of constructing a small fleet of mortar boats to be used in the capture of New Orleans. The mortar flotilla was assigned to operate with the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, commanded by Farragut, Porter's adopted brother. Porter's initial task was to reduce the coastal fortifications of Forts Jackson and St. Philip which guarded the mouth of the Mississippi River. After five days of bombardment, the forts seemed as strong as ever, and the impatient Farragut decided to run the forts on the night of 24 April. Porter's mortars bombarded the forts to distract the rebel gunners as Farragut's vessels successfully steamed past. Once the fleet was above the forts nothing significant stood between them and New Orleans; While Farragut steamed north to demand the surrender of the New Orleans (which it did on 29 April, Porter continued to hammer Fort Jackson for four more days. The post finally struck its flag and Fort St. Philip soon followed. On 28 April, Porter accepted the surrender of the two forts and soon sailed up to New Orleans to join Farragut there.

Farragut next ventured upstream to sound out the Confederate defenses of the Mississippi River. He was able to slip by all the defenses until reaching Vicksburg where he discovered that the defenses on the bluffs there were at too high an angle to be reached by his ships' guns. Farragut's solution was to order Porter to bring up his mortars. With Porter's mortar support, Farragut was able to get past the batteries at Vicksburg. The city could not be captured, however, without army support, so the initial bombardment of Vicksburg ended on 8 July. Porter was soon after ordered to Hampton Roads to assist in Major General George B. McClellan's failing Peninsula Campaign.

The Red River Campaign was a major mission for Porter in the spring of 1864. Following the Red River Campaign, Welles assigned Porter to command the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. In this post, Porter was to play a key role in the reduction of Fort Fisher, the fortification guarding the port of Wilmington, North Carolina, one of two rebel harbors which remained open. Porter supported Major General Butler's failed at-

tempt in December 1864. Grant replaced Butler with Major General Alfred H. Terry, and on 13 January 1865, Terry tried again. Porter's task was to take out the cannon posted at the fort with naval gunfire to reduce enemy fire against a ground attack by the army. Porter designated specific gun positions for each of his ships to fire upon to destroy or unseat the enemy cannon there. After two days of bombardment, Terry made his attack and successfully captured Fort Fisher.

After the war, Porter was assigned as the superintendent of the US Naval Academy and instituted a number of badly needed reforms. His reforms ensured that the navy received better educated, well-rounded, and professional naval officers who were prepared for the duties expected of them when they entered active duty. Porter was promoted to the rank of full admiral in 1870 and reached the age of retirement in 1875, though he was allowed to remain on active duty for a time. In 1890 Porter survived a heart attack but passed away on 13 February the following year.

Frederick Steele. Frederick Steele was born 14 January 1819, in Delhi, New York. Little is known of Steele's early life, but he attended West Point was a classmate of Ulysses S. Grant. He was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry in 1843 and later served in the Mexican War from 1847 to 1848. From then until the start of the Civil War he served at posts in Pennsylvania, California and various stations in the West. On 14 May 1861, Steele was promoted to major with the newly constituted 11th US Infantry, but never saw service with the regiment. Instead, he was assigned to assemble an ad hoc battalion of regulars which he led into combat at Dug Springs and the Battle of Wilson's Creek in Missouri. On 23 September he was appointed as colonel of the 8th Iowa Volunteer Infantry. He later received an appointment as Brigadier General of US Volunteers on 29 January 1862.

In December 1864, Steele was reassigned to command the "Column from Pensacola," which consisted of a division of US Colored Troops assigned to Canby's Army of West Mississippi. Steele took command of this force on 18 February 1865 and commanded it through Canby's Mobile campaign. The division served at the sieges of Spanish Fort and Fort Blakely.

After the war, Steele was assigned to command the Department of the Columbia in the Pacific Northwest in December 1865. He held the command until November 1867. While on an extended leave of absence in San Mateo, California, he suffered a stroke on 12 January 1868 and died. He was buried in Colma, California.

William B. Franklin. Franklin was born 23 February 1827 in York, Pennsylvania. Appointed by Senator and future president James Buchanan to West Point, he graduated 1st in 1843 in a class of 39. Due to his high standing, he was appointed second lieutenant in the highly prestigious topographical engineers. He initially surveyed the Great Lakes region, then accompanied Colonel Stephen Watts Kearny on the South Pass Expedition in 1845. During the Mexican War, he served under General John E. Wool at the Battle of Buena Vista and received a brevet promotion to first lieutenant for his actions. In 1859, Franklin replaced Montgomery C. Meigs as the supervising engineer for the construction of the United States Capitol dome, a task still incomplete by the time the Civil War began.

Soon after the beginning of the Civil War, Franklin was appointed Brigadier General of US Volunteers. He commanded a brigade at the Battle of First Bull Run and soon after rose to division command. In March 1862, when the Army of the Potomac was reorganized into several corps Franklin was assigned to command the new VI Army Corps. He commanded the corps through the fighting of the Peninsula Campaign, South Mountain, and Antietam.

In late summer 1863, Franklin was recalled to active service as the commander of the XIX Army Corps in Louisiana. As such, he led the corps on two expeditions up the Bayou Teche that summer and fall and on the ill-fated Sabine Pass Expedition in Texas where a single Texas field artillery battery prevented the landing of Franklin's troops. In March 1864, Franklin led the XIX Corps up Bayou Teche once again to participate in Bank's Red River Campaign. Though Franklin was only one of three corps commanders on the campaign, Banks essentially used him as the overall field commander. On one level this made sense due to Banks' lack of military experience. However, a number of poor decisions regarding the positioning of troops and failures to fully appreciate the enemy commander's aggressiveness combined to once again demonstrate a lackluster performance on Franklin's part. Personally Franklin demonstrated bravery and commitment in battle (he was wounded and broke an arm at the Battle of Mansfield) but also poor generalship and a lack of situational awareness. Though in pain, he remained in command of the XIX Corps until 2 May when he was evacuated to New Orleans due to his wounds. The campaign ended on 18 May.

After treatment in New Orleans, Franklin returned east to Washington, DC. In July he was captured on a train near Washington by Confederate raiders under Maj. Harry Gilmore, but was able to escape the following day. Due to his demonstrated poor performance in the field, and disabili-

ties due to his wounds, Franklin was never given another major command. After the war, Franklin resigned from the service and became the general manager of the Colt Firearms Manufacturing Company in Connecticut. In that capacity, he displayed excellent skills as an engineer and administrator. He also dabbled in politics and civil engineering projects to include the Connecticut state capitol building. Franklin died at Hartford, Connecticut, in 1903 and is buried near his birthplace in York, Pennsylvania.

Andrew J. Smith. Smith was born Bucks County, Pennsylvania. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1837 ranked 36th in a class of 45. He was commissioned as a second lieutenant of cavalry and ordered west for service on the frontier. Smith was assigned to the 1st Dragoon Regiment with which he served against the Indians of the plains and in Oregon prior to the Mexican War. By the beginning of the Civil War, he had risen to the rank of major and was still assigned to the 1st Dragoons.

Due to the delays of the Red River Campaign, Smith's command did not return to Vicksburg in time to participate with Sherman's advance on Atlanta. Instead, Smith was sent to tackle the marauding cavalry of Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest in Mississippi and protect Sherman's railroad supply line in Tennessee. In early July, Smith, with a force of 14,000 infantry and cavalry, now designated as the "Right Wing, XVI Corps," advanced from LaGrange, Tennessee into northern Mississippi. Near Tupelo, Smith entrenched his troops and on 14 July Forrest attacked him. The attack failed miserably and the Confederates took numerous casualties. Forrest himself was wounded. Though Forrest's command wasn't destroyed, it was essentially incapable of seriously threatening the railroad afterwards.

Later that fall, Kirby Smith authorized Major General Sterling Price to conduct a major raid through the state of Missouri for the purposes of gaining recruits, acquiring supplies, and perhaps even fomenting an uprising in the largely pro-Confederate areas of the state. Major General Rosecrans, now the commander of the Department of Missouri, had few troops available to counter Price's threat. Smith had moved his troops back to Cairo, Illinois, in preparation for his command to embark to finally rejoin Sherman. Once again orders came down for Smith to go on a detached mission. Smith's command took off in October and began a long hard march across Missouri to catch Price's column which was well in the lead. Just as Smith was about to cut off Price's retreat in western Missouri, Rosecrans diverted him north in response to faulty information from Major General Alfred Pleasanton. Price was able to slip away at Hickman's Mills, albeit temporarily, but Smith's men had marched all the way across the state only to be denied the chance to engage the enemy.

Thoroughly disgusted, Smith headed his men back east toward St. Louis. Meanwhile, Major General John B. Hood's Army of Tennessee headed for Nashville where Major General George B. Thomas was defending the state capitol. En route to St. Louis, Smith's orders were changed again and he was ordered to reinforce Thomas at Nashville. His command embarked on steamers at St. Louis and reached Nashville on the 1st and 2nd of December 1864, almost simultaneously with Hood's arrival. With Smith's troops now on hand, Thomas made preparations to attack Hood which he did on 15 and 16 December. Hood's army was crushed and fled in disorder. Smith pursued, but poor weather prevented a thorough destruction of Hood's remaining units.

By this time, Smith's command was the size of a corps, and thus was redesignated as the XVI Army Corps. He received orders in early 1865 to join Canby's movement against Mobile, Alabama. On 6 February, Smith's veterans boarded transports and sailed via the Tennessee, Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to New Orleans. From there, the corps traveled by ship to Mobile Bay. After participating in the capture of the defenses of Mobile, Smith marched his command inland toward the state capitol of Montgomery where he performed occupation duty until the fall of 1865. He briefly commanded the district of Western Louisiana until he was mustered out of the volunteer service on 15 January 1866. On 28 July 1866 he was assigned as the colonel of the 7th Cavalry and was the officer who preferred charges against Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer for Absence Without Leave and Conduct to the Prejudice of Good Order and Military Discipline in June 1867.

Smith resigned from the army on 6 May 1869 to pursue a civilian career. That year, Grant was elected president and appointed Smith as the postmaster for St. Louis. Smith retained that post until his death in the city on 30 January 1897.

T. Kilby Smith. Thomas Kilby Smith was born in Boston, Massachusetts, on 23 September 1820. In his early youth, his family moved to Cincinnati, Ohio, where he later received a military and engineering education through a local professor. He took exams to become a lawyer and was later admitted to the bar. During the administration of President Franklin Pierce he held office as a special agent for the Post Office Department at Washington, D.C., and later served for a brief time as United States Marshal for the Southern District of Ohio and the deputy clerk of Hamilton County, Ohio.

Apparently, the arduous nature of the Red River Campaign affected Smith's health as well and he was granted a leave of absence until January

1865. Two months later, on 13 March 1865 he was commissioned as brevet major-general for his services during the war. Six days later, Smith was appointed as the commander of the District of South Alabama, and subsequently the District and Post of Mobile. He held those commands until 22 August 1865 was honorably mustered out of the service 15 January 1866.

After the war Smith served as the US consul at Panama during the administration of President Andrew Johnson. Due to the effects of the war on his health, most of his post-war life was spent in retirement at his home in Torresdale, Pennsylvania. He passed away on 14 December 1887 and was buried in Torresdale.

William H. Emory. Born 7 September 1811 in Queen Anne's County, Maryland, Emory attended the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. He graduated in 1831 and was appointed as a second lieutenant of artillery. He was assigned to the 4th Artillery, but he resigned his commission in 1836 to pursue a civil engineering career. He returned to the service in 1838 and was commissioned in the topographical engineers. Between 1838 and 1860 he entered on a number of projects which had highly enduring value to the United State. During this phase of his army career, for example, he was instrumental in the mapping of the United States border along the Texas-Mexico border and the Gadsden Purchase and conducting boundary

In March 1862 he was commissioned as a Brigadier General of US Volunteers and assigned to a cavalry brigade command in the Army of the Potomac. That spring, he and his brigade participated in McClellan's Peninsula Campaign as part of Brigadier General Philip St. George Cooke's Cavalry Reserve. In December, he was transferred to the Department of the Gulf where he was assigned as a division commander in the XIX Army Corps under Banks. As such, Emory participated in the investment and siege of Port Hudson, and in both expeditions with Franklin up Bayou Teche in 1863. During the Red River Campaign, Emory's 1st Division was the lead force in Franklin's corps and as such was the force responsible for halting the Confederate advance at Chapman's Bayou after the collapse of US forces at Mansfield on 8 April 1864. After Franklin's wounding at Mansfield, Emory increasingly assumed charge of the XIX Corps, particularly on the marches to Grand Ecore and Alexandria, and played the primary field command role at the Battle of Monette's Ferry. On 2 May, he was officially appointed as commander of the XIX Corps when Franklin was evacuated to New Orleans. Emory led the corps through the remainder of the campaign.

In mid-May, Emory and the XIX Corps were at Morganza, Louisiana, on the Mississippi River, resting, refitting, and otherwise preparing for the corps' next mission. Canby had planned for the corps to support the Department of the Gulf's Mobile Campaign, but Grant ordered the corps to the eastern theater to reinforce the defenses of Washington during Grant's Overland Campaign. There Emory led the corps through various battles in the Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864. Emory's leadership of the corps was especially notable at the Battle of Cedar Creek where his actions helped save the US Army of the Shenandoah from a devastating defeat until Major General Philip Sheridan's arrival. Emory remained in command of the XIX Corps until January 1865 when he was assigned as the commander of the Department of West Virginia, a command he held until January 1866 when he was mustered out of volunteer service.

Post-war, Emory was assigned as the colonel of the 5th Cavalry. He was assigned to command of the District (subsequently changed to Department) of Washington, on 11 October 1866 until 14 August 1868. He was detailed on various assignment until appointed to command the District of the Republican in July 1869 and later to the Department of the Gulf in 1871. He retired from active service on 1 July 1876. Emory died in 1887 in Washington, D.C. and was buried in the Congressional Cemetery.

Albert L. Lee. Albert Lee was born 16 January 1834 in Fulton, New York. He graduated in 1853 from Union College in Schenectady where he studied law. Passing the bar that year, he started a law practice in New York City. In 1858, Lee moved to Elwood, Kansas where helped found the Elwood Free Press newspaper and became involved in Republican politics. In 1859, he was elected as a district judge and when the American Civil War began Lee was serving as a justice on the Kansas Supreme Court.

In October 1861, Lee entered service with the US Army as the major of the 7th Kansas Cavalry. He was later promoted to colonel of the regiment and as such, participated in the took capture of Corinth, Mississippi, in 1862. A short time later, Lee was appointed as commander of the 2nd Brigade, Cavalry Division, Army of the Mississippi and led his command during the battle of Corinth in October. On 29 November 1862, Lee was promoted to Brigadier General of US Volunteers and made permanent brigade commander.

In early 1863, he was appointed as chief of staff for McClelland's XIII Army Corps. He served as such through most of the Vicksburg campaign until 17 May when Brigadier General Peter J. Osterhaus was wounded during the fighting at the Big Black River and Lee was appointed to temporary

command of Osterhouse's division. Two days later Lee assumed command of the 1st Brigade, 9th Division just before leading it in the 19 May assault on the Vicksburg defenses. This command was also short-lived as Lee was wounded in the head during the assault. He spent most of the summer recuperating from his wounds until being appointed to command of a division in the XIII Corps. In August 1863 he was placed in command of the Cavalry Division of the XIII Corps which was ordered to New Orleans.

In New Orleans, Lee was appointed as chief of cavalry in Banks' Department of the Gulf, and was in command of the cavalry division during the Red River Campaign. During the campaign Banks and Franklin were critical of Lee's handling of the US cavalry. Both commanders felt that Lee was too timid and overstated rebel intentions of fighting before Shreveport. One result of Banks' and Franklin's impressions was that Lee's division was routed by a far superior infantry force at Mansfield. Lee was eventually relieved of command on 16 April and returned to New Orleans.

After the war, Lee was the editor of a New Orleans newspaper and later engaged in various business ventures in New York City to include banking. He died on 31 December 1907 in New York City and was buried in his boyhood home of Fulton.

Joseph A. Mower. Mower was born 22 August 1827 in Woodstock, Vermont. After his family moved to Lowell, Massachusetts in 1833, he was educated there and later at Norwich Academy (now Norwich University). He served in the War with Mexico as a private and became enamored of military service, though he departed the army in 1848. In 1855, however, he secured an appointment as a second lieutenant of infantry in the Regular Army and was assigned to the 1st Infantry, the regiment with which he was serving when the war began.

In 1862, he was elected colonel of the 11th Missouri Volunteer Infantry and led that regiment during the siege of Corinth. He was soon after appointed to command the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division, Army of the Mississippi, and led that command later at the battle of Corinth that October. During the fighting, he was wounded in the neck and taken prisoner by rebel troops but was recaptured by U.S. soldiers later the same day.

Having demonstrated excellent leadership skills, Mower was promoted to Brigadier General of US Volunteers on 20 November 1862. He soon recovered from his wounds and was assigned to command the 2nd Brigade, 3rd Division of Sherman's XV Army Corps during the Vicksburg Campaign and the siege of Vicksburg. It was during this campaign that Sherman marked Mower for higher command.

In early 1864, Mower was promoted to division command in the XVI Corps. During the Red River Campaign he was placed in command of the 1st and 3rd Divisions of the XVI Corps as part of A. J. Smith's detachment. He superbly led the division through the fighting at Fort DeRussy, Pleasant Hill, Mansura, and Yellow Bayou. For his actions at Fort DeRussy and Yellow Bayou he was awarded brevet promotions to brigadier general and major general for his leadership.

After the Red River Campaign, Mower commanded the 1st Division of A. J. Smith's Right Wing, XVI Corps at the Battle of Tupelo in July and the following month was promoted to major general. Soon after Sherman ordered Mower to join the US forces in Atlanta where he was placed in command of the 1st Division, XVII Army Corps. Mower led this division during Sherman's March to the Sea and the Carolinas Campaign in 1865. For his excellent leadership of men in battle, Sherman appointed Mower as the commander of the XX Army Corps in the Army of Georgia on 2 April 1865.

After the war ended, Mower was sent to Texas where he was assigned as commander of the District of Eastern Texas. In 1866, Mower reverted to his Regular Army rank of colonel and was assigned to command the 39th Infantry, an African-American regiment. This unit became the 25th Infantry in 1869 and was stationed in New Orleans. Mower died there of pneumonia on 6 January 1870 in command of his regiment. He was buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Joseph Bailey. Joseph Bailey was born near the town of Pennsville in Morgan County, Ohio. He received his college education at the University of Illinois where he earned a degree in civil engineering. In 1847, he moved to Wisconsin where he employed his engineering knowledge in the lumber business.

In July 1861, Bailey entered service with the US Army as the commander of D Company, 4th Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry. His regiment was assigned to Butler's Army of the Gulf and was part of the occupation force for New Orleans after Admiral Farragut captured the city in April 1862. Due to his engineering background, Bailey was soon named as acting chief engineer for the city of New Orleans.

In May 1863, Bailey was promoted to major and soon after was involved in supporting the Army of the Gulf's engineering efforts during the Siege of Port Hudson. After Port Hudson surrendered, Bailey was employed in building dams designed to refloat two enemy vessels which had been abandoned in the mud. In August 1863, he was promoted to lieu-

tenant colonel when his regiment was reorganized and redesignated as the 4th Wisconsin Cavalry and the position came open.

In a campaign which otherwise had few Union successes about which to boast, Bailey's engineering efforts during the Red River Campaign are considered by many, past and present, as the reason why the campaign did not end in disaster. As the flow of the Red River continued to fall in April, ten of Porter's gunboats and a number of army quartermaster vessels were stranded above the falls at Alexandria. Bailey's proposal to dam the river to raise the water level, initially rebuffed by Porter, was finally adopted and Bailey went to work. The effort, which was hailed as an amazing achievement by both US and Confederate soldiers who observed it, resulted in the rescue of much of Porter's squadron by 14 May 1864. The achievement earned Bailey a formal resolution of thanks by the US Congress, making him one of only fifteen men to receive such an honor during the Civil War. Moreover, he was the only person to receive the honor who did not command at least a division or higher at the time.

In June 1864, Bailey was promoted to colonel and assigned as the commander of the 4th Wisconsin Cavalry. His talents as an engineer, however, were too valuable to waste and he was soon reassigned to command the Engineer Brigade of the Department of the Gulf and later to the command of the District of West Florida from August until November 1864. In November, Bailey was promoted to Brigadier General of US Volunteers and returned to Louisiana to assume command of the District of Baton Rouge and Port Hudson. In February 1865, he received orders to proceed to Mobile and on 16 March 1865, Bailey assumed command of the Engineer Brigade, Army and Division of West Mississippi, at Navy Cove, Alabama. He led this organization through the Mobile Campaign until the end of the war.

Bailey left the army after the war and moved his family to Vernon County, Missouri, where he was elected sheriff. On 21 March 1867 he was killed near Nevada by two brothers he had arrested for stealing a hog. General Bailey was buried in the military cemetery at Fort Scott, Kansas. His remains were later moved to Evergreen Cemetery in the same town. On 28 March 1867, President Johnson nominated Bailey posthumously for the award of the brevet rank of Major General of US Volunteers to rank from March 13, 1865. The US Senate confirmed the honor on 30 March 1867.

Principal Confederate Commanders

Edmund Kirby Smith. Smith was born 16 May 1824 in St. Augustine, Florida. He graduated from West Point 25th in a class of 41 in 1845. He was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the 5th US Infantry and transferred to the 7th US Infantry the following year.

When Florida seceded, he resigned his commission in the US Army on 6 April and offered his services to his state.

After joining the Confederate army, Smith was assigned as the chief of staff for Major General Joseph E. Johnston's Army of the Shenandoah. He was soon promoted to brigadier general and assigned to command the 4th Brigade, Army of the Shenandoah. Smith led the brigade at First Bull Run, but was severely wounded severely in that battle. After his recovery, he was promoted to major general and given command of the 4th Division, Department of Northern Virginia. He received orders in February 1862 dispatching him west to command the Department of East Tennessee. In that assignment, he formed the Army of Kentucky and cooperated with Major General Braxton Bragg in the invasion of Kentucky in the late summer-early fall of 1862. His victory at Richmond was one of the few bright spots of that campaign and earned him promotion to lieutenant general.

The promotion was followed in March 1863 by assignment as commander of the vast Department of the Trans-Mississippi. The command covered Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Indian Territory, Missouri, and Arkansas, but possessed, at best, only about 40,000 troops to defend it. One of the first major challenges he faced was Banks' advance up the Bayou Teche in April and May 1863. Unable to stop that advance due to the lack of manpower, Smith was relieved when Banks turned east and headed for Port Hudson after capturing Alexandria. Smith then pressured Major General Richard Taylor, commander of the District of West Louisiana, and Major General Theophilus Holmes, commander of the District of Arkansas, to take offensive actions to help relieve the pressure on Vicksburg. Neither effort succeeded, Vicksburg fell, and Port Hudson followed suit.

During the Red River Campaign, Smith was largely indecisive. Once he made a decision, it was generally detrimental to the overall effort, or came too late to achieve the kind of results he needed. He never fully committed to opposing Banks' column even though it posed the greatest threat to his capital. Taylor's actions forced the issue and resulted in a significant victory at Mansfield. Taylor also decided to commit Smith's two-division reserve to battle at Pleasant Hill the following day. After the second battle, Banks decided to retreat to the Red River and Taylor likely had enough

force to severely degrade the Army of the Gulf, if not ultimately defeat and capture it. He may even had the chance to destroy at least ten of Porter's gunboats. Instead, Smith decided to remove the three infantry divisions from Taylor's command and march to Arkansas to confront Steele, even though the latter had essentially culminated his efforts to reach Shreveport. Although Kirby Smith's department succeeded in driving Banks out of the Red River region and Steele back to Little Rock, what should have been a tremendous victory rang hollow. The victorious Confederate leaders were only slightly less discouraged with the results of the campaign than were their US counterparts.

After the war, Kirby Smith became the President of the Pacific and Atlantic Telegraph Company, a job held until 1868 when he became the President of the Western Military Academy which he founded. Education seemed to suit him and in 1870, he was appointed Chancellor of the University of Nashville and held that post for five years. His final job was as a Professor of Mathematics at the University of the South where he taught until his death from pneumonia in 1893. At the time of his death, Smith was the last surviving full general who had served in the Civil War. He was buried in the University of the South Cemetery at Sewanee, Tennessee.

Richard Taylor. The son of President Zachary Taylor, Richard Taylor was born 27 January 1826 at "Springfield," the family estate near Louisville, Kentucky. Though Taylor did not initially pursue the army life, he grew up at various posts around the country while his father was in the US Army. Taylor was educated in Europe, Harvard, and Yale and received a degree from the latter institution in 1845. After graduation, he served his father for a time as his military secretary during the War with Mexico. After the war he moved to Louisiana where he established a successful sugar plantation. He also became involved in Democrat politics there and served as a state senator from 1856 until the beginning of the Civil War.

Taylor's greatest success as a field commander came in March of 1864, when the Army of the Gulf advanced up the Bayou Teche yet again for the third time. Reinforced by A. J. Smith's XVI Corps detachment coming from Vicksburg and Steele's VII Corps detachment advancing from Little Rock, Banks easily captured Alexandria and advanced to within 40 miles of Shreveport before Taylor decisively defeated the US army at Mansfield. Despite having his command being reduced by over half (including three-quarters of his infantry force) Taylor succeeded in driving Banks out of central Louisiana in what may be considered as the most significant Union defeat of the war.

Taylor's bitter disagreement with Kirby Smith's handling the Trans-Mississippi Department in general and with his management of the Red River Campaign in particular, led Smith to fire Taylor as the commander of the District of Western Louisiana. Unbeknownst to Smith, however, was the fact that the Confederate congress had promoted Taylor to lieutenant general and Davis appointed him to be the commander of the Department of Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana.

Due to various delays, Taylor did not arrive at the headquarters of his new department at Montgomery, Alabama, until September 1864. The new job was at least as frustrating as the previous, and as a department commander, Taylor now experienced many of the same difficulties that Kirby Smith dealt with in the Trans-Mississippi. Like Smith, he encountered little cooperation from state governors, legislatures, and local militia units. He also experienced Jefferson Davis' poor management procedures and the Confederacy's unwieldy bureaucracy. His headaches as department commander far exceeded his struggles as a district commander. Still, given the resources at hand, he performed creditably.

One of the assets Taylor had at his disposal was Nathan Bedford Forrest and his very capable cavalry corps. Taylor's esteem for Forrest's ability to raid enemy supply lines and generally keep the US cavalry at bay in the northern regions of his department, was matched by Forrest's admiration for Taylor's leadership. After Hood's Army of Tennessee was driven out of that state in January 1865, Taylor briefly assumed command of the army. Rather than try to rebuild the army, probably an impossible task at that point of the war, Taylor chose to parcel the units out to various defenses within his department

Like many, Taylor paid a heavy personal price for his choice in following the South. His plantation was destroyed by US troops and his family driven from their home as refugees in 1862. His two young sons died of scarlet fever during the war and the strains of their loss, along with all the other tragedies she experienced during the conflict, led to his wife's premature death. After the war, Taylor moved to New Orleans and worked in the canal business and returned to Democrat politics. Like many Southerners, Taylor became embittered by the Reconstruction policies of the Radical Republicans and as a result, he "lent tacit approval to the corrupt, blatantly violent backlash by Southern white Democrats against freedmens' efforts to assert their new voting rights." Taylor also wrote an excellent memoir, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, which is considered to be one of the best accounts of the Civil War era. It was published shortly before his death. Taylor died in New York City on 12 April 1879 due to complications re-

sulting from his long struggle rheumatoid arthritis. He was buried in a family crypt in Metairie Cemetery, New Orleans.

John G. Walker. Walker was born 22 July 1821 in Jefferson City, Missouri. He was raised in the St. Louis area and graduated in 1844 from a predecessor school to what is now Washington University-St. Louis. Walker was commissioned in the US Army in 1846 as a first lieutenant in the Regiment of Mounted Rifles. As such, he served in the War with Mexico and was breveted to captain for his actions at San Juan de los Llanos. He was wounded at the Battle of Molino del Rey in September 1847. After the war, he was promoted to the permanent rank of captain in June 1851.

In July 1861, Walker offered his services to the Confederate States Army and was appointed to the rank of major in the cavalry. The following month, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the 8th Texas Cavalry and sent with his regiment to serve in the Department of North Carolina. One month later, he was promoted to colonel.

Kirby Smith, believing the District of Arkansas to be more important than Louisiana, sent Walker's division back to the former location in late 1863. However, as intelligence made it plain that Banks was about to head up the Red River in March 1864, Smith ordered Walker to rejoin Taylor. Taylor positioned the division in the Bayou de Glaise–Avoyelles Prairie region near Marksville to oppose any Federal force that tried to drive through that area en route up the Red River. During the initial stages of the campaign, Walker's Division, along with most of Taylor's other forces, retreated all the way back to Mansfield without engaging in any significant actions. On 8 April, however, Walker led his division on an attack of the Federal defenses at Honeycutt Hill just south of Mansfield and rapidly rolled up the US left flank. Over the next 24 hours, Walker's Division helped press Banks' army back to Pleasant Hill where a second battle was fought on 9 April. Walker was wounded during the fight, but returned to command in time to accompany his division back to Arkansas to help defeat Steele's column at the Battle of Jenkins' Ferry on 30 April and drive Steele back to Little Rock. After Steele's defeat, Smith once again ordered Walker and his division back to help Taylor, but the division did not reach Alexandria until 23 May, four days after Banks completed his crossing of the Atchafalaya River at Simmesport.

Kirby Smith ostensibly relieved Taylor of command of the District of Western Louisiana on 10 June 1864 and appointed Walker in his stead. Walker now assumed Taylor's headaches and commanded the district until 4 August when he was reassigned to replace Major General John B.

Magruder as commander of the District of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Walker held that command until replaced by Magruder in March 1865, after which Walker took over Major General John A. Wharton's cavalry corps.

Like a number of former Confederate officers, Walker bolted to Mexico at the close of the Civil War. He soon traveled to Havana, Cuba, and took ship to England, where he remained for several years with his family. He returned to Texas in 1868 and pursued a career in the life insurance and railroad businesses. In 1876, he moved his family to the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, the early home of his mother-in-law. Walker later served as the United States Consul in Bogotá, Colombia and as a Special Commissioner to the Pan-American Convention. He died of a stroke on 20 July 1893 in Washington, DC, and was buried in the Stonewall Cemetery in Winchester.

Alfred Mouton. The son of former Louisiana Governor Alexandre Mouton, Jean-Jacques-Alfred-Alexandre Mouton was born 10 February 1829 in Opelousas, Louisiana. He received his early education at St. Charles College in Grand Coteau, Louisiana, and later received an appointment to the United States Military Academy in 1846. For one who grew up speaking only French, Mouton was still able to graduate from West Point in 1850 with a ranking of 38 out of 44 cadets. Mouton apparently did not relish the army life and resigned his commission three months after graduating. Instead he served as a civil engineer for the New Orleans, Opelousas and Great Western Railroad and later established a sugar plantation in Lafayette Parish, Louisiana. There he joined a local militia unit and in 1850, was appointed as a brigadier general in the Louisiana State Militia.

Soon after the beginning of the Civil War, Mouton was appointed to command the 18th Louisiana Infantry. He soon gained a reputation as strict disciplinarian but he was not above friendly banter with his troops. His regiment was soon sent to Corinth, Mississippi, where it was assigned to Pond's brigade in General Albert Sidney Johnston's Army of Mississippi. At the Battle of Shiloh in April 1862, Mouton's regiment participated in attacks against Sherman's and McClelland's divisions. During one of these attacks, Mouton was seriously wounded in the face. Along with the rest of the rebel army after Shiloh, the 18th Louisiana was ordered back to Corinth and subsequently returned to Louisiana to replenish its depleted ranks. There Mouton recovered from his wound and was promoted to brigadier general.

At the beginning of the Red River Campaign, Mouton's brigade was posted just northeast of Alexandria. In mid-March, however, Taylor selected Mouton to command an ad hoc division composed of his brigade (now commanded by Colonel Henry Gray) and a Texas brigade commanded by Brigadier General Camille J. de Polignac. Like the rest of Taylor's forces, Mouton's division was forced to retreat before Banks' Army of the Gulf all the way to Mansfield before a feasible opportunity arose to attack. Since Mouton was commanding the most sizable Pelican state force on the field on 8 April, Taylor chose him to make the initial attack against the U.S. line on Honeycutt Hill. Unfortunately, Mouton and his field officers made the poor decision to ride mounted into the assault and he quickly fell with five bullets riddling his body.

Initially Mouton's body was buried on the Mansfield battlefield. In 1874, however, it was disinterred and reburied at St. John's Cemetery in Lafayette, Louisiana.

John A. Wharton. Wharton was born 3 July 1828 near Nashville, Tennessee. His family moved to Galveston, Texas when he was a child and he grew up on a plantation in Brazoria County. He was educated locally at a school in Galveston and later attended South Carolina College (now the University of South Carolina) where he served as a commander in the student cadet corps. After graduation Wharton studied law and later established the law firm of Wharton and Terry in Brazoria. In 1860 he served as a presidential elector and later represented Brazoria County at the state Secession Convention by voting for secession. Wharton was also a successful planter and owned \$167,004 of taxable property and 135 slaves by the beginning of the war.

At the start of the war, Wharton was elected captain of Company B, 8th Texas Cavalry where he knew and served with John G. Walker. In January 1862, Wharton rose to command the regiment (more famously known as Terry's Texas Rangers) after the deaths of Colonel Benjamin F. Terry and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Lubbock. Wharton led the regiment with distinction at the Battle of Shiloh where he was wounded. He soon returned to command and led the regiment through Bragg's 1862 Kentucky invasion that fall. His leadership during the time earned him the rank of brigadier general on 18 November 1862 and he was reassigned to command a brigade and subsequently command of a cavalry division in Forrest's cavalry corps. After the Battle of Chickamauga in the fall of 1863 he was promoted to major general.

In February 1864 the general was transferred to the Trans-Mississippi Department and on the death of Major General Thomas “Tom” Green, Wharton was assigned to take over command of the cavalry corps in Taylor’s District of Western Louisiana. Assuming command about 19 April, Wharton’s corps set about harassing and attacking Banks’ Army of the Gulf during the latter stages of the Red River Campaign.

After the Red River Campaign, military activities in Louisiana and Texas lowered significantly and Wharton’s command was engaged in routine patrolling in Louisiana and Texas. On 6 April 1865, Wharton was in Houston, Texas, on a visit to the Department headquarters at the Fannin Hotel. About to enter the hotel he encountered Colonel George W. Baylor and the two soon struck up an argument on military matters. The two went to Major General John B. Magruder’s offices and during the continuation of the quarrel there, Wharton called Baylor a liar. At that point, Baylor pulled a pistol and shot Wharton, killing him almost instantly. Although Wharton had been unarmed, Baylor was acquitted of murder charges in 1868. Wharton was originally buried in Hempstead, Texas, but his body was later removed to the State Cemetery in Austin.

Camille J.de Polignac. Camille Armand Jules Marie, Prince De Polignac was born into a notable family of French nobles at Millemont Seine-et-Oise, France, on 16 February 16 1832. As a boy, Polignac studied mathematics and music at St. Stanislas College in the 1840s. Enlisting in the French army in 1853 he secured a second lieutenant’s commission for his services in the Crimean War. He resigned from the army in 1859 and traveled to Central America to study political economy and geography and was there when the American Civil War began.

In 1861, Polignac offered his services to the Confederacy and was appointed to the rank of lieutenant colonel. He initially served as a staff officer under Major General Pierre G. T. Beauregard and later under Braxton Bragg. In January 1863 he was promoted to brigadier general and transferred to the Trans-Mississippi Department two months later. There Polignac was assigned to command an infantry brigade composed entirely of rough-hewn Texans. Though the brigade was formed in 1862, it had seen little service; only a lot of marching. Despite the fact that Polignac, whom the Lone Star troops soon named, “Prince Polecat” due to their inability to pronounce the French name properly, did not speak fluent English either, the Texans soon came to love and respect their foreign commander. Polignac led the unit through its first significant skirmishes at Vidalia and Harrisonburg, Louisiana, in February and March 1864.

When the initial elements of Banks' Army of the Gulf arrived at Simmesport on 11 March, Polignac's Brigade was located at Trinity, Louisiana, 50 miles northeast of Alexandria. He soon received orders from Taylor to concentrate with Mouton at Carroll Jones' plantation. There, Polignac's command was brigaded into a division command by Mouton. On 8 April Polignac's Brigade conducted the initial assault on the US lines at Honeycutt Hill near Mansfield. When Mouton was killed, Polignac immediately took charge of the division and led it through the remainder of the battle and campaign.

Soon after the campaign, Polignac was promoted to major general and that fall, Kirby Smith ordered him to march his division to Arkansas. In his next major operation, Polignac employed his division in distracting Steele's VII Army Corps in Little Rock, while Sterling Price conducted his raid through Missouri in October. In January 1865, Polignac was sent by the Confederate government to gain an audience with Napoleon III of France. There he was to attempt to acquire the Emperor's consent for France to intervene in the war of the Confederacy. The journey, of course, was for naught as Polignac arrived too late to secure such agreement.

After the war Polignac returned to Central America where he initially took up the pen as an author. He later served as a French brigadier general in the Franco-Prussian War after which he continued to study mathematics and music. At the time of his death, which occurred in Paris, France, on 15 November 1913 at the age of 81, he was the last living Confederate major general. He was buried with his wife's family in Germany in the Hauptfriedhof in Frankfurt-am-Main.

Thomas J. Churchill. Churchill was born near Louisville, Kentucky on 10 March 1824. In 1844, he graduated from St. Mary's College in Bardstown, Kentucky and later studied law at Transylvania University in Lexington. In 1845 he joined the 1st Kentucky Mounted Rifles to serve in the War with Mexico during which he rose to the rank of first lieutenant. While on a reconnaissance in January 1847, he and several others were captured by Mexican cavalry and held as POWs in Mexico City. Late in the war, he was exchanged and returned to his regiment. In 1848, he left the army and moved to Little Rock, Arkansas, where he served as the postmaster from 1857 to 1861.

When the war began, Churchill was elected as colonel of the 1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles. On 10 August 1861, Churchill led his regiment in the fighting at the Battle of Wilson's Creek near Springfield, Missouri and

later at the Battle of Pea Ridge in March 1862. Promoted to brigadier general on 4 March 1862 he was assigned to the 3rd Division of Kirby Smith's Army of Kentucky and commanded it during Bragg's campaign to retake that state in October 1862. Churchill's Division played a significant part in the Confederate victory at Richmond, Kentucky. by conducting a successful flank attack along what is still known today as, "Churchill's Draw."

After the war, Churchill became active in Democrat politics and was elected Arkansas State Treasurer for three terms between in 1874 and 1878. He was elected Governor of Arkansas in 1881 and served until his resignation in 1883 under a cloud of corruption stemming back to his days as treasurer. Churchill passed away on 14 May 1904 in Little Rock and was buried in historic Mount Holly Cemetery with military honors.

Mosby M. Parsons. Parsons was born 21 May 1822 in Charlottesville, Virginia. His family moved to Cole County, Missouri when he was a young lad of 13. Two years later, they moved to Jefferson City, where Parsons grew up and attended school. Mosby decided to pursue a career in law and passed the bar exam in 1846. With the advent of the War with Mexico, he put his law career on hold and volunteered for service in the US Army. During the war, he rose to the rank of captain in Colonel Alexander W. Doniphan's 1st Regiment of Missouri Mounted Volunteers. He served with distinction in New Mexico and California and was cited for gallantry at the Battle of Sacramento on 28 February 1847. After the war, Parsons served as the United States District Attorney for western Missouri and in 1856 was elected to the state legislature as a representative. In 1858, he was elected state senator and was serving in that capacity until the beginning of the Civil War.

In December 1863, Parsons became ill and handed over leadership of his command, now a division, to Colonel Simon B. Burns. With the threat of US forces preparing to invade the Red River region, Parsons returned to command. In March, Smith ordered Parsons' and Churchill's Divisions to march for Shreveport and report to Taylor. On 9 April, Parsons' troops participated in the Battle of Pleasant Hill. After an initially successful attack, Parson's Division was flanked and forced to fall back to its original line. After that battle, Kirby Smith ordered Parson's and Churchill's Divisions back to Arkansas to help blunt Steele's Camden Expedition. On 30 April Parsons led his division in several attacks against Federal forces at the Battle of Jenkins' Ferry on the Saline River which ended Steele's expedition to Shreveport. Due to his leadership in these actions, Parsons was appointed to the rank of major general by Kirby Smith although his promotion was never confirmed by Jefferson

Davis. Parsons continued to command his division through the remainder of the war but saw little action. He surrendered his troops to Federal authorities in May 1865 in Arkansas.

After the war's end, Parsons, like some other former rebel soldiers, fled to Mexico to avoid feared prosecution. On 15 August 1865, Parsons, along with two companions were en route to Camargo Municipality in Tamaulipas. Near the village of China they were captured by a band of cavalry, apparently from the Mexican regular army, and then executed. It remains unclear if the bodies of Parsons and his comrades were thrown into the San Juan River or buried in unmarked graves where they were killed.

Thomas J. Green. Thomas Jefferson Green was born 8 June 1814 in Buckingham County, Virginia, and moved with his family moved to Tennessee in 1817. There Green attended Jackson College and later attended Princeton College in Kentucky. In 1834, he graduated from the University of Tennessee. Initially Green planned a career in law, but departed for Texas in 1835 when the Texas Revolution began. He enlisted as a volunteer in the Texas Army at Nacogdoches on 14 January 1836 in Isaac N. Moreland's artillery company. The company manned the famous "Twin Sisters," two six-pounder cannon donated to the Texas cause by the citizens of Cincinnati, Ohio. Green served with the company at the battle of San Jacinto on 21 April 1836 at which Santa Ana's army was completely devastated and the war concluded. From that point on, Green's star rose rapidly. Within days after the battle Green was commissioned as a lieutenant and jumped to the rank of major the following month. On 30 May, he left the army to return home to his law studies.

Enamored with the Lone Star Republic, Green returned to Texas in 1837. He acquired a land grant in Fayette County due to his service in the Texas Army. There he settled in La Grange and was hired as the county surveyor. He was elected soon after as the engrossing clerk for the House of Representatives for the Republic of Texas. He was then elected as the House Representative for Fayette County in the Texas Congress and served one term. He served twice as Secretary of the Senate and from 1841 to 1861 and he was clerk of the state Supreme Court.

After Texas seceded in 1861, Green was elected colonel of the 5th Texas Cavalry. As commander of that regiment, he participated in Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley's invasion of New Mexico in 1862 against opposing US commander, Brigadier General Edward R. S. Canby. At the Battle of Valverde, 20-21 February, Green assumed field command of the Confederate forces and soundly defeated Canby's men who were forced to

retreat into Fort Craig after losing six artillery pieces (which became the foundation of the Valverde Battery of Red River fame). Ultimately, however, Sibley's command was driven back out of New Mexico by Canby's forces and returned to Texas.

Taylor had come to value Green's fighting spirit and thus became a most-trusted subordinate. On 12 September, Green led an ad hoc division of two cavalry brigades and an infantry brigade on a raid against a US XIII Army Corps outpost at Sterling's Plantation on Bayou Fardoche. There, Green succeeded in surprising the Federals and captured most of the almost 900-man garrison. Banks responded, in part, by sending Franklin's XIX Corps up the Bayou Teche toward Alexandria in October. Green's troops harassed the Federal advance most of the way and Franklin turned back in November after reaching Opelousas due in part to Green's harassment, but also to bad weather and muddy roads. During the course of Franklin's autumn incursion, Green's command, now consisting of about 3,000 men, attacked an isolated 1,600-man US brigade under Brigadier Stephen G. Burbridge at Bayou Bourbeau on 2 November. On conclusion of the fight, Burbridge had been soundly thrashed losing 44 men killed and almost 700 wounded and missing. Once Franklin had returned to the Burwick Bay area, Kirby Smith sent Green and his cavalry back to Texas to rest, refit, recruit, and help defend against any Federal incursions there.

In March 1864, Smith once again ordered Green's cavalry to Louisiana to help Taylor counter Banks' incursion up the Red River. Green and his lead elements arrived about the time Banks was leaving Grand Ecore for Mansfield on 6 April. Green conducted his first significant action at Wilson's Farm against Banks' cavalry under Albert Lee. From that point on, Green led his men in the almost constant harassment of Lee's march northward. On 8 April, Green led his entire command against the Federal right at Mansfield, helping to roll up and drive back Lee and Ransom's commands. At Chapman's Bayou and the following day at Pleasant Hill, Green's troopers continued to attack the US right of the line, although in the latter two engagements, they achieved little success.

After the battle at Pleasant Hill, Taylor sent most of Green's command east to intercept, and destroy if possible, Porter's gunboats on the Red River. On 12 April, Green led his troops into action against several of Porter's vessels at Blair's Landing. Choosing to remain mounted, he was riding along the bank waving his sabre when he was struck in the head by a grapeshot fired from the USS. *Neosho* within yards of the vessel. His body was retrieved by his troops under fire and was conveyed to Austin, Texas, where he was buried in the family plot at Oakwood Cemetery.

Hamilton P. Bee. Born in Charleston, South Carolina, on 22 July 1822, Bee and his family moved to Texas while he was still a boy. Educated at home, he became involved in Texas politics at a very early age. Only 17 years old in 1839, he was selected to serve as secretary for the commission that established the boundary between the Republic of Texas and the United States. Four years later in 1843, Texas president Sam Houston sent dispatched Bee and two other men to convene a peace council with the Comanche Indians which ultimately culminated in the Treaty of Tehuacana Creek. In 1846, at the age of 24, Bee was named secretary of the Texas Senate.

At the beginning of the Civil War, Bee was elected as a brigadier general of Texas militia in 1861. On 4 March 1862, he was appointed brigadier general in the Confederate States Army and assigned to command a large cavalry brigade of six regiments. With this force, he was assigned command of the Lower Rio Grande District with headquarters at Brownsville. As part of his duties, Bee was responsible for trading cotton in Mexico for the purposes of expediting the import of arms and munitions from Europe. By November, Bee had sent most of his brigade toward Sabine Pass due to Franklin's attempted landing there and possessed only 150 men at Brownsville. On 2 November, a Federal force of 6,000 men from the XIII Army Corps under Brigadier General Napoleon T. J. Dana, landed at the mouth of the Rio Grande River and marched on Brownsville. Bee, with only his six small companies of cavalry evacuated millions of dollars of rebel stores and munitions and prevented its capture, although he readily abandoned the town in the process.

In March 1864, Bee's brigade received orders to report to Richard Taylor in Louisiana. Bee was a very capable man in many ways, but at this point in time, he had seen almost no action as a field commander. He had no formal training in the art of war and had largely served in the administrative post of a district commander, thus he did not yet have the characteristic understanding of leadership, troops, terrain, and logistics that a more seasoned commander would normally possess. At Mansfield, his brigade stumbled into heavy brush and woods and as a result, contributed little to the Confederate victory. His troops held together at Chapman's Bayou, but like other rebel units there, were driven back by Emory's determined Federals. He was directed to conduct a mounted cavalry charge at Pleasant Hill, but his command suffered terrible casualties as a result. Personally brave, he had two horses shot from beneath him and he suffered a slight face wound.

When it became apparent that Banks was going to retreat from Grand Ecore, Taylor sent Bee's three-brigade division to the Cane River crossing at Monette's Ferry to hold the high ground there. His mission was to stall Banks' army while Taylor and the other parts of his command inflicted as much damage as possible on the Federals. However, Bee's inexperience led him to miscalculate the Federals' strength, positions, and intentions in coming against him. As a result, Bee abandoned a very strong position without much of a fight, then retreated 30 miles to the west to Beasley's Plantation and out of the campaign. Taylor was furious and had to call Bee back to the front. From that point on, Bee's actions were closely monitored and controlled by Taylor, or his new cavalry commander (after Green's death), John A. Wharton.

Although he was heavily criticized afterward for the loss of Monette's Ferry, Bee was not relieved of command. Instead, in February 1865 he was assigned to division command in Gen. John A. Wharton's cavalry corps, but was reassigned a short time later to command an infantry brigade in Gen. Samuel B. Maxey's division.

As with a number of former Confederate generals from the Trans-Mississippi, Bee went to Mexico with his family after the war where he lived in Saltillo, in the state of Coahuila, Mexico. He returned in 1876 and moved to San Antonio where he established a law practice. Involved with Democrat politics, he soon appointed as the Texas Commissioner of the Office of Insurance, Statistics, and History (now the Texas Department of Insurance) for the 1885-1886 legislative term. Bee died on 3 October 1897 and was buried in the Confederate Cemetery in San Antonio.

St. John R. Liddell. Liddell was born 6 September 1815 near Woodville, Mississippi. Born into a wealthy plantation family, he became a schoolmate of future Confederate President Jefferson Davis. He was appointed in 1843 to the United States Military Academy but only attended the school for a year before he was found for low test scores. Liddell moved to Catahoula Parish in Louisiana where he established his own plantation (that his father purchased), which he named "Llanada," near Harrisonburg. There, he had a run-in with a neighbor with Charles Jones which developed into a feud in the 1850s

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Liddell received a commission and volunteered his services to Brigadier General William J. Hardee as a staff officer. He also later served on the staff of Major General Albert S. Johnston. In 1862, he received command of the Arkansas Brigade in Patrick Cleburne's Division in the Army of Tennessee and received promotion

to brigadier general on 17 July 1862. He later led his brigade at the battles of Corinth, Perryville, Murfreesboro, and Chickamauga. During the fighting at Murfreesboro, Liddell's 16-year old son Willie was killed and at Chickamauga, his brigade suffered the highest casualty rate of any in the battle.

In late 1863, Liddell, disgruntled with Bragg's leadership, wrote President Davis to request a transfer to command the Sub-District of Northern Louisiana. Davis agreed and assigned him there to serve under Richard Taylor. Outspoken and irascible like Taylor himself, it was inevitable that the two would clash. During the entire Red River Campaign, Taylor was dissatisfied with what he perceived to be Liddell's lack of effort, while Liddell blamed Taylor for the failure to destroy Porter's fleet and capture the Army of the Gulf. Before the campaign was ended, Liddell requested, and Taylor granted, relief from command of the sub-district.

As he did with Taylor himself, Davis came to Liddell's rescue and re-assigned him to command the infantry defenses on the east side of Mobile Bay. Interestingly, Liddell was to serve under Taylor in that department, but not directly. During the Mobile Campaign in the spring of 1865, Liddell opposed Canby at the siege of Fort Blakely, one of the last engagements of the war, was captured on 9 April when the fort surrendered.

Liddell returned to operate his plantation in Louisiana after the war. In 1866, he wrote a notable memoir in which he was highly critical of various Confederate leaders and his fellow officers, including Davis, Bragg, and Taylor. In 1870, he was murdered by his nemesis, Charles Jones. The incident was the culmination of a twenty-year quarrel that started over a flock of geese then extended to a land dispute and the lie that Liddell had shot Jones in the face (it was an offended woman who shot him). On 14 February 1870, Jones and his son boarded a boat on which Liddell was dining with friends and shot him to death in cold blood. Two weeks later, about 20 friends of Liddell surrounded Jones and his son hiding the home of the local sheriff. The crowd allowed the sheriff and his family out of the house, then entered it and provided Jones and his son the same treatment that they had dealt to Liddell. Liddell was buried on his plantation in Louisiana.

William R. Boggs. Boggs was born in Augusta, Georgia on 18 March 1829. He was educated in his early years at the Augusta Academy. He was appointed to the United States Military Academy in 1849 and graduated four years later. He was initially brevetted as a second lieutenant and assigned to the prestigious Topographic Corps and was soon working on various surveys connected with the efforts to build a railroad to the Pacific

coast. In 1854, he was transferred to the Ordnance Corps and assigned to Watervliet Arsenal in Troy, New York. In December he was finally promoted to the permanent rank of second lieutenant and promoted to first lieutenant two years later. Over the next five years he served at various ordnance postings to include the Louisiana Arsenal at Baton Rouge, inspector of ordnance at Point Isabel, Texas, and at Alleghany Arsenal in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

When his home state of Georgia seceded, Boggs resigned from the US Army and was soon appointed by Georgia Governor Joseph E. Brown as the state's purchasing agent for arms, ammunition, and supplies. He later secured an appointment in the Confederate Army and was assigned as an engineer and ordnance officer on the staff of P.G.T. Beauregard at Charleston. His initial work was centered on completing fortifications and supply depots in the harbor defenses of Charleston, South Carolina. He later assumed the same duties under Braxton Bragg in the fortifications at Pensacola. Dissatisfaction with Bragg's handling of affairs in Pensacola, along with the frustration of seeing junior and less experienced officers than he receive higher promotion, caused Boggs to resign his commission and re-enter the service of Georgia.

Promoted to the rank of colonel and appointed to the position of chief engineer by Brown, Boggs was sent to Savannah in March, 1862, to supervise the development of fortifications for the harbor there. From Savannah he erected fortifications along the upper Apalachicola River to protect cotton plantations from raids by Federal gun boats. In August 1862, he returned to Confederate service when Governor Brown offered to send Boggs to work on Kirby Smith's staff for the impending invasion of Kentucky. Boggs worked with Smith throughout the campaign and on its conclusion Smith recommended Boggs for promotion to brigadier general, which he received on 4 November.

In early 1863, Smith was sent by President Davis to command the Department of the Trans-Mississippi. Boggs went with him to be his chief of staff. There Boggs not only functioned as chief of staff, but also became deeply involved in various engineering projects, particularly in Louisiana. He supervised from afar the construction and renovation of various defensive positions and measures to include Fort DeRussy, Fort Humbug, and the fortifications at Grand Ecore, Alexandria, and Shreveport. He also designed the system of dams to diverted water from the Red River into Bayou Pierre in an effort to lower the water in the former stream to confound Porter's efforts to get his gunboats to Shreveport.

Due to Kirby Smith's insistence on using a civilian physician as his de facto chief of staff, Boggs resigned his position on Smith's staff after the Red River Campaign. For a short time, he commanded the District of Western Louisiana, but was replaced by Brigadier General Harry T. Hays. Early in 1865 Boggs volunteered to join an expedition to Mexico to fight for Juarez. When he discovered that the expedition's purpose was to bolster Maximilian, he dropped out and returned to Confederate service for the remainder of the conflict. In May 1865, Boggs was in Houston with Kirby Smith when the latter surrendered his department to Canby. Boggs was paroled on 9 June 1865.

After his parole, Boggs went to work for various railroad projects in the west as a construction engineer. In 1875, he secured a position at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute at Blacksburg as a Professor of Mechanics. In 1881, however, he lost the position due to a reorganization of the faculty. He then moved to Winston-Salem, North Carolina, where he died on 11 September 1911 at the age of 82. He was buried in the Salem Cemetery in Winston-Salem.

Appendix K

Red River Campaign Chronology

1862

20 Aug—Maj. Gen. Richard Taylor assumes command of the District of Western Louisiana at Opelousas, LA.

17 Dec—Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks assumes command of the Department of the Gulf at New Orleans, LA.

1863

7 Mar—Lt. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith assumes command of the Department of the Trans-Mississippi at Alexandria, LA.

25 Mar—The first Bayou Teche Campaign begins.

8 Apr—Army of the Gulf concentrated at Brashear City; Banks arrives from New Orleans.

13 Apr—Taylor's troops driven from Fort Bisland and Irish Bend by Banks.

7 May—Admiral David D. Porter arrives in Alexandria on the USS *Benton*. Banks arrives with the vanguard of Army of the Gulf occupies the city for the first time.

14 May—The Army of the Gulf begins the march to invest the Confederate defenses at Port Hudson, MS. First Bayou Teche Campaign ends.

20 May—Taylor reoccupies Alexandria.

2 Jun—Maj. Gen. John G. Walker's Texas Division arrives at Monroe, LA, to join Taylor's command.

7 Jun—Taylor's command conducts unsuccessful attacks against US supply points at Milliken's Bend and Young's Point on the west bank of the Mississippi River in support of the defense of Vicksburg.

22 Jun—Taylor's command captures 1,700 Federal troops at Fort Buchanan and Brashear City.

4 Jul—Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton surrenders Vicksburg to Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant.

9 Jul—Maj. Gen. Franklin Gardner surrenders Port Hudson to Banks.

8 Sep—Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin's amphibious landing attempt at the mouth of the Sabine River on the coast of Texas is defeated and turned back.

3 Oct—The second Bayou Teche Campaign. Franklin, leading 19,000 men from two divisions each from the XIII and XIX Corps, begins an advance northwest from Berwick Bay up Bayou Teche.

15 Oct—Franklin and Taylor fight an inconclusive battle at Buzzard's Prairie, LA.

24 Oct—Franklin reaches Moundsville, LA; begins his return march to Berwick Bay the following day.

3 Nov—A portion of Taylor's command under Brig. Gen. Thomas Green conducts a surprise attack on a brigade from Franklin's command at the Battle of Bayou Bourbeau. The Federals lose 716 men.

6 Nov—Banks personally leads an expedition of XIII Corps units to capture Brownsville, TX. The US flag is raised over the town.

17 Nov—Franklin's expedition arrives back at Berwick Bay. The second Bayou Teche Campaign ends.

1864

16 Jan—Banks informs Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, US Army General-in-Chief that he agrees to conduct the Red River Campaign.

23 Feb—Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand reassumes command of the XIII Army Corps at New Orleans.

2 Mar—Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman visits Banks in New Orleans and decides not to accompany the Army of the Gulf on the campaign.

5 Mar—Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder orders Brigadier General Tom Green's Texas cavalry division to report to Taylor in Louisiana.

7 Mar—Franklin's XIX Corps and assembles at Franklin, LA. Brig. Gen. Thomas E. G. Ransom's detachment of the XIII Corps assembles at New Iberia, LA. Brig. Gen. Albert Lee's cavalry division departs Berwick Bay en route to Franklin.

8 Mar—McClernand moves his headquarters to Pass Cavallo Island at Matagorda Bay, Texas.

10 Mar—Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Smith's XVI Corps detachment departs Vicksburg, MS.

11 Mar—A. J. Smith's command arrives at Simmesport, LA, on the Red River; a detachment is landed to conduct local foraging and security.

12 Mar—The bulk of A. J. Smith's troops land at Simmesport.

13 Mar—Lee's cavalry division departs Franklin in a heavy rain en route to Alexandria.

14 Mar—Fort DeRussy is captured by A. J. Smith's troops.

15 Mar—Lt. Cdr. Thomas O. Selfridge, commander of the USS *Osage*, accepts the surrender of Alexandria. A. J. Smith's troops and the rest of Porter's gunboats arrive later that afternoon. The XIII Corps and XIX Corps depart Franklin en route to Alexandria.

16 Mar—Maj. Gen. Sterling Price replaces Maj. Gen. Theophilus Holmes as the commander of the District of Arkansas. Taylor orders his units to concentrate at the supply depot at Carroll Jones' Plantation.

18 Mar—Kirby Smith orders Churchill's and Parson's Divisions to move to Shreveport. Smith also orders the diversion of water out of the Red River into Bayou Pierre.

19 Mar—All elements of Taylor's command are concentrated at Carroll Jones' Plantation, less Liddell's units north of the Red River. Skirmish at Black Bayou.

20 Mar—Lee's cavalry division arrives at Alexandria. Skirmish at McNutt's Hill on Bayou Rapides. Churchill's and Parson's Divisions arrive at Shreveport.

21 Mar—Banks arrives at Alexandria on the USS *Black Hawk*. Brig. Gen. James A. Mower's division captures the 2nd Louisiana Cavalry at Henderson Hill leaving Taylor with almost no reconnaissance capability.

23 Mar—Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele's column departs Little Rock en route to Shreveport. Taylor orders his command to move north to the supply depot at Beasley's Plantation.

25 Mar—The lead elements of Franklin's XIX Corps and Ransom's XIII Corps arrive at Alexandria.

26 Mar—Lead elements of the Army of the Gulf begin the march to Grand Ecore, LA. The army's *Corps d'Afrique* units arrive at Alexandria by transports.

29 Mar—Banks receives a letter from Grant reminding him to release A. J. Smith's XVI Corps detachment no later than 15 April and conclude

the Red River Campaign no later than 30 April. Steele's column arrives at Arkadelphia, AR. Taylor orders his command to move north to the supply depot at Pleasant Hill.

30 Mar—Green and the lead elements of his cavalry division arrive near Natchitoches, LA, to join Taylor's command. Lee's cavalry division enters Natchitoches. Col. Powell Clayton's brigade from Pine Bluff defeats Brig. Gen. Dockery's rebel forces near Mount Elba, AR.

31 Mar—Grant sends an order to Banks directing him to immediately hand over command of the Red River region to Steele after the fall of Shreveport and prepare for an expedition to seize Mobile Bay. Kirby Smith orders Taylor to fall back on Shreveport.

1 Apr—The Army of the Gulf is assembled at Grand Ecore. Taylor orders Walker's and Mouton's Divisions to move to Mansfield.

2 Apr—Banks departs Alexandria for Grand Ecore on the *Black Hawk*. Cavalry skirmish at Crump's Corner between Lee's troopers and Green's cavalymen. Steele's VII Corps defeats Brig. Gen. Joseph O. Shelby's cavalry brigade at Elkin's Ferry, AR.

3 Apr—Banks arrives at Grand Ecore. Porter's gunboats arrive at the same time. The bulk of Taylor's command arrives at Mansfield, LA. Smith orders Churchill's and Parson's Divisions to move to Keachi and placed in department reserve under Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Churchill. One of Lee's cavalry brigades conducts a reconnaissance up the east side of the river to Campti.

4 Apr—Skirmish at Campti. Steele fights and engagement against Brig. Gen. John S. Marmaduke's cavalry division at Prairie d'Ane, AR.

6 Apr—The Army of the Gulf departs Grand Ecore on the inland route toward Mansfield. Kirby Smith holds a council of war with Taylor at Mansfield. The bulk of Green's cavalry arrives at Keachi and is reorganized as a corps.

7 Apr—Green’s Texas cavalry skirmishes with Lee’s Federal cavalry at Wilson’s Farm. Porter sails north from Grand Ecore with 6 gunboats and 20 transports with Kilby Smith’s division en route to the rendezvous point at Springfield Landing. Taylor orders Churchill’s and Parson’s Divisions to move to Mansfield.

8 Apr—Battle of Mansfield. Churchill’s and Parson’s Divisions arrive at Mansfield.

9 Apr—Battle of Pleasant Hill. Brig. Gen. John M. Thayer’s Frontier Division from Fort Smith joins Steele at Prairie d’Ane.

10 Apr—Banks orders the retrograde of the Army of the Gulf to Grand Ecore. Porter’s flotilla arrives at Loggy Bayou. Porter receives word of the loss at Mansfield and begins return movement to Grand Ecore.

11 Apr—The Army of the Gulf’s wagon train arrives at Grand Ecore followed by the rest of the army over the next two days. Price abandons Camden, AR. Banks sends orders to McClelland to move as many XIII Corps troops as possible from the Texas coast to Alexandria.

12 Apr—Engagement at Blair’s Landing. Steele’s column begins a retrograde movement to Camden, AR, for resupply.

13 Apr—Kirby Smith orders Walker’s, Churchill’s, and Parson’s Divisions to return with him to Shreveport.

14 Apr—Steele’s column arrives at Camden.

15 Apr—The USS *Eastport* strikes a torpedo south of Grand Ecore and sinks, but is raised.

16 Apr—Porter and Kilby Smith’s flotilla arrive back at Grand Ecore. Kirby Smith marches out of Shreveport with Walker’s, Churchill’s, and Parson’s Divisions en route to Arkansas.

18 Apr—Banks receives Grant's 31 March order directing him to seize Mobile Bay after completion of the Red River Campaign.

19 Apr—Banks makes the decision to abandon the campaign and retreat back to Simmesport. McClelland departs Pass Cavallo with 2,700 XIII Corps troops headed for Alexandria. Maj. Gen. John A. Wharton assumes command of the Texas Cavalry Corps.

21 Apr—The Army of the Gulf departs Grand Ecore.

22 Apr—Grant recommends to Halleck that Banks be replaced by Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds as commander of the Department of the Gulf.

23 Apr—Engagement at Monett's Ferry. Lead elements of the Army of the Gulf arrive at Alexandria.

25 Apr—Porter's fleet arrives at the Alexandria falls. The Army of the Gulf completes its movement to Alexandria. Steele's resupply column from Pine Bluff is ambushed and destroyed at Mark's Mill, AR. Grant rescinds his order for A. J. Smith's return to Vicksburg.

26 Apr—Steele's column abandons Camden and begins a retreat to Little Rock. The USS *Eastport* is destroyed to keep the Red River clear for follow on vessels. McClelland arrives at Alexandria with a division to take command of the XIII Corps detachment.

27 Apr—Porter fights an engagement with 3 vessels against Cornay's artillery battery at Deloges Bluff. Maj. Gen. David Hunter arrives at Alexandria to report on conditions in the Army of the Gulf.

29 Apr—Steele's column fights off an attack by Kirby Smith's forces at Jenkin's Ferry, AR, and crosses the Saline River. Smith cannot pursue due to lack of any bridging assets.

1 May—The transport *Emma* is captured and destroyed by Major's cavalry. McClelland falls ill with malaria. Brig. Gen. Michael K. Lawler, chief of staff, assumes effective command.

2 May—Lt. Col. Joseph Bailey begins building dams at the Alexandria falls to save Porter's fleet. Steele's column arrives back at Little Rock.

3 May—The transport *City Belle* is captured and destroyed by Major's cavalry.

4 May—The *Signal*, *Covington*, and *John Warner* are destroyed by Major's cavalry.

6 May—Brig. Gen. Michael K. Lawler assumes command of the XIII Corps troops; McClelland departs for New Orleans for hospitalization. Kirby Smith orders Walker's, Churchill's, and Parson's Divisions back to Louisiana.

7 May—Maj. Gen. Edward R.S. Canby appointed commander of the new Military Division of West Mississippi which included the Departments of the Gulf and Arkansas.

8 May—The first four of Porter's vessels successfully steam over the Alexandria falls due to Bailey's dams.

10 May—Brig. Gen. Michael K. Lawler assumes command of the XIII Corps troops; McClelland departs for New Orleans for hospitalization.

13 May—The rest of Porter's fleet pass over the Alexandria falls. The Army of the Gulf begins its departure from Alexandria.

16 May—Battle of Mansura.

18 May—Engagement at Yellow Bayou. Canby meets Banks as the Army of the Gulf arrives at Simmesport. Relieves him of command of the army.

19 May—The Army of the Gulf crosses the Atchafalaya Bayou on Bailey's pontoon bridge made of army transports. The Red River Campaign ends.

Appendix L

Red River Campaign and Battle Maps




Figure L.1. Department of the Gulf, March 1864. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.2. Department of the Trans-Mississippi, March 1864. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.3. Disposition of Confederate Forces, District of West Louisiana, March 1864. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.4. General Grant's Strategic Plan for 1864. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.5. General Banks' Campaign Plan for Red River. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.6. Camden Expedition, 23 March-3 May 1864. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.7. Red River Campaign Area, Southern Half, Key Events 3-27 March 1864. Courtesy of the author.



Figure L.8. Capture of Fort DeRussy, 13 March 1864, Late afternoon. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.9. Engagement at Henderson's Hill, 21 March 1864, Late afternoon. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.10. Engagement at Henderson's Hill, 21 March 1864, Night. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.11. Red River Campaign Area, Northern Half, Key Events, 28 March-8 April 1864. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.12. Engagement at Wilson's Farm, 7 April 1864, 1200 to 1230. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.13. Engagement at Wilson's Farm, 7 April 1864, 1230 to 1400. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.14. Battle of Mansfield, Initial Attack, 8 April 1864, 1600-1630. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.15. Battle of Mansfield, Sabine Crossroads, 8 April 1864, 1630-1700. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.16. Battle of Mansfield, Pleasant Grove, 8 April 1864, 1700 to Dark. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.17. Red River Campaign Area, Northern Half, Key Events, 9-26 April 1864. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.18. Battle of Pleasant Hill, Initial Attack, 9 April 1864, 1600-1630. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.21. Engagement at Blair's Landing, 12 April 1864, 1600-1800. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.22. Red River Campaign Area, Southern Half, Key Events, 23 April-19 May 1864. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.23. Engagement at Monett's Ferry, Initial Dispositions, 23 April 1864, 0600. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.24. Engagement at Monett's Ferry, Birge's Ford, 23 April 1864, About 1200-1400. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.25. Engagement at Monett's Ferry, The "Critical Moment," 23 April 1864, 1400-1600. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.26. Engagement at Monett's Ferry, Final Dispositions, 23 April 1864, After 1700. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.27. Bailey's Dams, Alexandria, LA, 30 April-13 May 1864. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.28. Battle of Mansura, 16 May 1864, 0600-0900. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.29. Battle of Mansura, 16 May 1864, 0900-1000. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.30. Engagement at Yellow Bayou, 18 May 1864, 0600-1100. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.31. Engagement at Yellow Bayou, 18 May 1864, 1100-1300. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.32. Engagement at Yellow Bayou, 18 May 1864, 1300-1600. Courtesy of the author.




Figure L.33. Engagement at Yellow Bayou, 18 May 1864, 1600-Dark. Courtesy of the author.



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