Strength in Knowledge

The Warrant Officer Journal

Strength in Knowledge: The Warrant Officer Journal

April–June 2023, Volume 1, Issue 2

Disclaimer

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Commandant's Corner

COL Kevin E. McHugh

Thank you for the tremendous feedback we received on the inaugural release of "your" Journal, a great first step towards increased communication across the Cohort. A lot has happened since we published back in January – Completion of the modernized WOCS (V.20) Operational Tryout #1; Release of the Warrant Officer Direct Appointment / Commissioning Army Directive; and the renaming of Ft. Rucker, home of the USAWOCC, to Ft. Novosel (officially on 10 April), named for CW4 (ret.) Michael J. Novosel cited in our *Warrant Officer in History* highlight last issue.

Here at the College, the faculty, staff, and companies remain focused on developing the Army's technical experts that understand and embrace the essential Warrant Officer core competencies highlighted through the acronym ICOLA (See Issue 1). As we finalize our work to codify an improved foundational experience to educate, develop, and appoint WO1's, we are shifting focus to the modernization of educational requirements for our CW2 and CW3 populations. We will achieve this through extensive collaboration, discussion, and analysis with our partners across the Centers of Excellence over the next couple of months, thereby creating a truly progressive and sequential educational continuum that delivers tailored and relevant common core education that effectively augments Warrant Officer technical proficiency.

This volume continues to pull great work from within the Cohort (and USAWOCC students) bringing real-world technical challenges and topics to the forefront for thought, discussion, and in some cases, solutions. Additionally, I have solicited assistance from CW5 (Dr.) Russel Houser. He highlights the history, analysis, and current challenges surrounding the identity of the Cohort - a topic I think deserves additional review and emphasis as opportunities exist to recognize the Cohort or "Corps" for what it is doing today and what it will certainly be asked to do for the Army of 2030. Interested in knowing more, see page 9 and let's talk!

Strength in Knowledge!

Deputy Commandant's Corner

CW5 Julian Evans

USAWOCC is elated to publish the second edition of the Warrant Officer Journal. This medium allows for some critical thoughts and ideas to be exchanged across the WO Cohort. Please continue to send us your insights, observations, and critical information. The Warrant Officer perspective is invaluable to our Army.

Precision or Utility: What is the Prescription for Success

Today's Warrant Officer must adapt to the emerging global technological landscape to meet the future challenges of Army 2030. With an increased talent demand for technical experts, and the complexity of the operational environment; what do Warrant Officers require to sustain technical proficiency and relevancy?

Each year, Soldiers are required to have a medical examination to determine their health to perform to standard and maintain their physical readiness. During this examination, the certified medical examiner may use a manual, semi-automatic, or automatic blood pressure reading device to gain the most accurate blood pressure reading and to determine the patient's risk for heart disease and stroke. If this precision device or tool is not properly calibrated, then the expected results may not be accurate. Inaccurate results due to misutilization may lead to a misdiagnosis and degradation to readiness.

A thought: Using tools to illustrate the Warrant Officer utilization, how do you perceive yourself, as a "Precision Tool" or a "Utility" Tool? A precision tool is highly calibrated to offer a specialized technical edge, quality output, long-lasting durability, accuracy, and may become diminished or lose value if not utilized for its designed purpose or specialization. Utility tools are highly useful, multi-functional, expedient, and can accomplish multiple tasks, but over time quality is compromise. Precision tools are often viewed as special and require periodic recalibration to maintain their edge and continual high performance. On the other hand, because of their plug and play capacity to handle multiple things, utility tools tend to be expedient and convenient.

Some Warrant Officers may consider themselves being utilized as a precision tool; while most, may believe they are being utilized as a utility tool because of their innovativeness, flexibility, and resourcefulness. An investment in a precision tool ensures performance, value, accuracy and when utilized properly comes with some enduring benefits. Just like precision tools, the investment put into Warrant Officers is paramount and can be costly if they are not utilized for their specialization and intended purpose. If misutilization occurs, instead of developing into technical experts Warrant Officer can easily evolve into a "jack of all trades, master of none", a multipurpose utility tool. Further, prolonged misutilization without diagnosis and recalibration has the potential to create a Warrant Officer "identity crisis" within the cohort. If the symptoms continue to go misdiagnosed, it could spread and adversely impact accessions, recruitment, and retention efforts of these highly specialized Warrant Officers.

To mitigate the symptoms associated with misutilization, the Warrant Officer Cohort must apply the necessary recalibration tools to maintain technical expertise. Warrant Officers must have the "Time, Opportunities, Options, and Leader Support" to maintain precision and to produce the expected results.

Time: Warrant Officers need adequate time to attend institutional education and training to develop and improve their foundational and technical knowledge. Education and training must occur at the right time and at the point of need to ensure they are prepared to execute mission requirements.

Opportunities: Warrant Officers must be afforded opportunities outside of the institutional domain to gain additional knowledge and skills in order to maintain relevancy and contribute to the organizational mission and goals. The acquisition of this knowledge and education (academia, industry, inter-service etc.) exceeds the capacity of the traditional Warrant Officer Education System Model.

Options: Expanded options builds ownership and allows Warrant Officers to seek out and develop a career map with experiential, broadening, operational and successive assignments that prevent burn-out, recalibrate skills, and contribute to retention through prolonged job satisfaction.

Leader Support: Most Warrant Officers may be "one-of-one" within their organizational setting and must be strategic when planning professional development. Leader support is a critical tool for recalibration. Leaders must place an emphasis on empowering and employment of their Warrant Officers by providing them the opportunity to "Be All That They Can Be" while achieving the highest levels of precision.

The Army of 2030 ongoing modernizing have placed the Army's system integrators utilization on the doorsteps of change with the expectation of precise and accurate execution to fight and win the nation's war. No matter the tool, both serve a purpose in ensuring commanders and staffs achieve organizational readiness and mission success. To continue to provide commanders with the specialized support they need to effectively integrate systems, Warrant Officers need the necessary "TOOLS" to maintain precision and retain value within their commands.

The calculus to determine the right education and TOOLS requires comprehensive collaboration. Please share your thoughts and ideas on how we can continue to give the right attention to developing and preparing the best Warrant Officer for the Army of 2030 and beyond.

Strength in Knowledge!

Senior Leader Corner

CW5 Yolondria Dixon-Carter – Senior Warrant Officer Advisor to the Chief of Staff, Army

USAWOCC Straight truth. No chaser. The Warrant Officer roadmap to success is Professional Military Education (PME) and talent management. The Army of 2030 will require better trained, educated, and equipped Warrant Officers. As the Army modernizes, we must revolutionize how we fight, learn, and manage talent. We must invest in our most important asset for mission success and as the 40th Chief of Staff of the Army, General James McConville has mentioned, "the centerpiece of the Army" — people. This investment must include our Warrant Officers.

The Army's purpose remains constant: To fight and win our nation's wars. As we have come out of conflicts with Iraq and Afghanistan and are focused on our near-peer adversaries, it is important to modernize our professional military education to meet the demands of 2030. In 2030 and beyond, Warrant Officers will require knowledge, skills, and behaviors that provide commanders a holistic picture of the environment. This will include rapid decisions on an ever-changing battlefield in large scale combat operations, and across multi-domains. No matter the branch, MOS or compo, Warrant Officers will need to explain what happened, how it happened, and provide analyses and critical thinking for an optimal outcome. Furthermore, Warrant Officers must remain technically and tactfully proficient, as well as mentally resilient whether operating an aircraft or processing legal documents.

So how do we get there? PME modernization from Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS) to Warrant Officer Senior Staff Education (WOSSE). We must advance to a more efficient and effective education that focuses on officer development, technical depth, tactical expertise, and employing MOS-specific and core functions that meet the requirements of all compos. Additionally, PME must meet personal and career developmental needs of the Warrant Officer to best equip organizations with the right Warrant Officer at the right time. The end-state is a better trained, educated, and equipped cohort ready to meet the demands of 2030 while retaining talent within our Army.

The Combined Armed Center (CAC) is leading efforts in modernizing Warrant Officer PME for all common core and branch specific curriculum. Common core education to include WOCS, Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education (WOILE), and WOSSE at the Warrant Officer Career College will develop Warrant Officers based on knowledge, skills, and attributes (behaviors) required at the appropriate Warrant Officer grade and echelon. WOCS will focus on transitioning Warrant Officer candidates to officers. WOILE will focus on the fundamentals of how the Army runs, and WOSSE will model a capstone exercise where some students are assigned a Headquarters Department of the Army role and others will incorporate warfighting functions based on the assigned mission.

In 2019, the Army stood-up the Talent Management Task Force to determine the characteristics of a future talent-based system. The Chief of Staff immediately recognized the need to include talent management for Warrant Officers and directed the addition of a warrant officer to help improve talent management across the cohort. In early 2020, nine initiatives were proposed, and today seven of nine are approved and fully implemented.

Army Talent Management Task Force Warrant Officers, senior Warrant Officers and working groups worked diligently to ensure promotion criteria was aligned with talent. Special Forces led the way in phasing direct commission to CW2. Select Non-commissioned officers meeting SF requirements and successful completion of WOCS and WOBC may direct commission to CW2. To retain talent within the ranks of the cohort, Warrant Officers competing for CW3 and CW4 are now eligible for below-the-zone promotions. In addition, Warrant Officers selected for promotion, regardless of promotion zone, are eligible for merit-based promotions. Merit-based selectees will promote on the 1st month of promotions from the start of the promotion list.

Broadening assignments, to include fellowships are unique opportunities for Warrant Officers. For the first time, Warrant Officers are eligible for the White House Fellowship Program (CW3-CW5) and are currently in the second year of the Congressional Fellowship (CW3). There are currently two Warrant Officers (AG and CY) serving at the Congressional level. The Association of the United States Army recently added Warrant Officers to their Leader Solarium and is proposing a Warrant Officer Symposium in 2023. Each talent management-based program, fellowship, or leader development forum prepares Warrant Officers for 2030 and beyond.

The world is changing. The Army is changing with it and within the Army so must the Warrant Officer Cohort. I encourage those in positions to lead change and drive results to participate in the modernization of PME and management of warrant officer talent. Every warrant officer should be afforded the opportunity to "Be All You Can Be," which includes developing and strengthening their technical intellect, thinking strategically, and building cohesive teams that are highly trained, disciplined, diverse, and ready to fight and win our nation's wars.

Strength in Knowledge!

I, Warrant: Looking Through a New Lens Toward the Future of the Cohort

CW5 Russell J. Houser, DMA

Editor's Article of Interest

"The Army warrant officer is a technical expert, combat leader, trainer, and advisor…Warrant officers are innovative integrators…dynamic teachers, confident warfighters, and developers of specialized teams of Soldiers."

AR 600-3 Officer Professional Development and Career Management, 2019, para. 3-19

Rationale

The Commandant, United States Army Warrant Officer Career College wanted to understand Warrant Officer identity better to know if Warrant Officers will be the "technologically agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders" envisioned by General Milley and Acting Secretary of the Army Murphy in The Army Warrant Officer 2025 Strategy published in 2016. This 2016 definition varies from the DA Pam 600-3 Officer Professional Development and Career Management Warrant Officer definition as a "technical expert, combat leader, trainer, and advisor" (2019, para 3-9). These definitions differ significantly in construction and focus. The 2016 definition equates Warrant Officer identity to leaders with fluidic qualities, while the 2019 definition equates Warrant Officer identity with four static roles. The DA Pam definition is the doctrinally correct definition; however, can both definitions be embodied by an individual Warrant Officer?

These Warrant Officer identities in both publications are occupational identities. "Occupational identity refers to the conscious awareness of oneself as a worker" (Skorikov & Vondracek, 2011), and we know "…strength and clarity of occupational identity are major determinants of career decision-making…" (Skorikov & Vondracek, 2011) such as retention. Knowing and understanding Warrant Officer identity as defined by regulations and other publications is important, but after more than 100 years of service by Warrant Officers, why has no one studied Warrant Officer identity to see if the definition is right? Additionally, the current DA Pam 600-3 definition of a warrant officer is a litany, e.g., "expert…leader…trainer…advisor …integrator…teacher…warfighter…developer…" (HQDA, para 3-9, 2019); however, in the previous chapter "…the goal of warrant officer training and education is to produce…expert officers…leaders…trainers…problem solvers…operators…maintainers… administrators… and managers…" (2019, para 2-5b(1)). The internal variation of DA Pam 600-3 arises after the third static term and, perhaps, truncating at three terms is sufficient.

Given a point common to all Warrant Officers to "…well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office…" (DA Form 71, August 1, 1959) and the definition from DA Pam 600-3, it is fair to ask Warrant Officers who specifically discharges duties - dynamic leaders, static experts, or someone else?

Statement of the Problem

Very little research exists about Army Warrant Officer occupational identity, and the available literature does not include essentialist or social constructionism perspectives that "…provide a reasonably discreet way of sorting much of the conceptual and practical work surrounding identity…" (Houser, 2021). Historical references that follow include definitions of Warrant Officers that have shaped our contemporary understanding of the cohort; however, as the Army and the cohort struggle with recruiting and retention, discerning the factors contributing to WO occupational identity could reveal potential means for strengthening recruiting and retention. Additionally, understanding how those factors influence the perspective of Warrant Officers in their occupational identity can offer clues to leaders to tailor messages for their current and future aviators and technician WOs in the institutional and operational domains.

First Interlude

As part of this study, a literature review about Army Warrant Officer identity is needed. I searched standard online resources for formal studies, military publications, and other government products. Subsequently, I found multiple publications. Then I extracted implicit and explicit definitions from those sources and listed them to consider, historically, what Warrant Officers are and are not. The definitions from these publications are arranged chronologically to show how Warrant Officer identity has evolved.

1. 1941: "A warrant officer is between the highest noncommissioned role and the lowest commissioned grade." (Committee on Military Affairs, 1941)

2. 1965: "The warrant officer in the Army's personnel structure…used the rank (and the corps) as a "dumping ground" for former commissioned officers and as a carrot to hold out before enlisted personnel with long service" (Bourjaily, 1965)

3. 1965: "…for budgetary purposes, warrant officers were counted as Commissioned officers." (Bourjaily, 1965)

4. 1965: "…is a highly skilled technician who is provided to fill those positions above the enlisted level which are too specialized in scope to permit the effective development and continued utilization of broadly trained, branch-qualified commissioned officers…" (Bourjaily, 1965)

5. 1973: "neither fish nor fowl"—the exact term which was used by the legislators in their grasping to understand the warrant officer's status" (Coroneos, 1973)

6. 1973: "…not enough to "vaguely define the warrant officer as a technician who is neither commissioned nor enlisted…" (Coroneos, 1973)

7. 1973: "…warrant officers are the "third" distinctive personnel…" (Coroneos, 1973)

8. 1973: "…they are not officers, and they are not enlisted personnel…" (Coroneos, 1973)

9. 1976: "…warrant is defined as a highly skilled technician and not a high-level manager…" (Brown, 1976)

10. 1976: "…The technician in the United States Army is basically defined as a highly skilled person who is neither enlisted nor commissioned, He holds the rank and status of warrant officer…" (Brown, 1976)

11. 1976: "…The Army warrant officer is a highly specialized technician, who like his civilian counterpart, is not completely understood…" (Brown, 1976)

12. 1976: "…The warrant officer in the United States Army has historically and traditionally been a highly specialized technician…" (Brown, 1976)

13. 1976: "…Definitions. a. A warrant officer is an officer appointed, by warrant, by the Secretary of the Army and vested with limited powers. His rank and precedence are below those of a second lieutenant but above those of a cadet. He is a highly skilled technician who is provided to fill those positions above the enlisted level which are too specialized in scope to permit the effective development and continued utilization of a broadly trained, branch-qualified commissioned officer." (Brown, 1976)

14. 1976: "…The Warrant Officer, under the Army's present concept is a highly skilled technician who is provided to fill positions above the enlisted level that are too specialized in scope to permit the effective development and continued utilization of broadly trained, branch qualified commissioned officers…" (Brown, 1976)

15. 1976: "…The warrant officer, prior to the Korean Conflict, was considered a "super enlisted man." Even though he was given officer status, he was not thought of as an integral part of the Army structure…" (Brown, 1976)

16. 1977: "…Each warrant officer is a technical manager in varying scope and magnitude as determined by each assignment…" (Department of the Army, 1977)

17. 1977: "…An aviation warrant officer is a highly skilled technician in the field of aviation…" (Department of the Army, 1977)

18. 1984: "…(a) reward enlisted men of long service and also to reward former commissioned officers of World War I who lacked either the educational or other eligibility requirements necessary for continuance in the commissioned status…" (Government Printing Office, 1984).

19. 1984: "…It was to be a capstone rank…" (Government Printing Office, 1984)

20. 1984: "… an incentive in connection with the Enlisted Career Guidance Program…" (Government Printing Office, 1984)

21. 1984: "…a completely new warrant officer concept…stipulated that the warrant officer category would not be considered as a reward or incentive for enlisted men or former commissioned officers… "The warrant officer is a highly skilled technician who is provided to fill those positions above the enlisted level which are too specialized in scope to permit the effective development and continued utilization of broadly trained branch-qualified commissioned officers". (Government Printing Office, 1984)

22. 1985: "…the warrant force is a highly motivated service-oriented segment of the Total Army…" (Study Group for CoS Army, 1985)

23. 1985: "…In aviation, the warrant officer is both a combat arms warrior and a technician…" (Study Group for CoS Army, 1985)

24. 1985: "…In engineer, the warrant officer is a technical expert (engineer equipment repair technician), a manager (construction technician), or a commander (utilities detachment commander) …" (Study Group for CoS Army, 1985)

25. 1985: "…technical expert …a manager and/or, in some cases, a staff officer…" (Study Group for CoS Army, 1985)

26. 1985: "…He is the expert who provides for correct operation and maintenance of the Army's systems, either as an operator, technician, or both…" (Study Group for CoS Army, 1985)

27. 1985: "…the warrant officer is the highly specialized expert and trainer who, by gaining progressive levels of expertise and leadership, operates, maintains, administers, and manages the army's equipment, support activities, or technical systems for an entire career…" (Study Group for CoS Army, 1985)

28. 1985: "…the warrant officer is a distinct category of officer, but not separate from the Officer Corps…" (Study Group for CoS Army, 1985)

29. 1985: "…The typical Reserve Component warrant officer is fundamentally a citizen soldier…" (Study Group for CoS Army, 1985)

A Foundation

These definitions reveal a lack of organizational clarity about where in the Army's vertical rank structure Warrant Officers should be; however, descriptions of Warrant Officers caring for technical equipment are found in the earliest extant document currently cited (Committee on Military Affairs,

1941). Subsequent definitions of Warrant Officers as technicians and clarification about why the Army required technicians was a significant turning point. The requirement for 2-3% of the Army to fulfill a technical mission was an implicit recognition of a third "social" warfighting function: the leadership, combat, and technical support functions.

From March 8-10 and 19-22, I conducted two informal one-question surveys about Warrant Officer Identity on LinkedIn. The first question asked about influences on Warrant Officer Identity and the second question asked about how Warrant Officers view their experience. Most of the participants were U.S. Army Warrant Officers who currently serve or are retired. The participants were nearly evenly divided on the most influential component – the work or the people - on WO identity, as seen in Table 1. The majority (53%) of participants in the second question believed being a WO was a career, while a significant minority (40%) responded that being a Warrant Officer was a calling (See Table 2). Skorikov and Vondracek (2011) described career and calling as both being intrinsically motivated; however, the career outlook focused on the rewards of the occupation and growth (p. 697) while the calling outlook focused on the "work that they actually do" (p. 697) and stability in that work. In total these two outlooks accounted for more than 90% of the responses. Approximately 7% of participants believed that being a Warrant Officer was either a job or a social ladder. The results of these informal surveys suggest that static factors, e.g., the career, and dynamic factors, e.g., the people and a calling, influence how Warrant Officers view themselves.

Table 1 **Warrant Officer identity is most influenced by:**

Answer	% of Response
WO practical work	49 %
People in the Cohort	51 %

*(n=136)

Table 2 **What is your outlook on your role as a Warrant Officer**

Table 2 (n=93) Answer	% of Response
Social ladder	2 %
Job	5 %
Calling	40 %
Career	53 %

*(n=93)

Making sense of these dynamic and static factors and their influence on Warrant Officer identity may be leveraged for recruiting and retention. For instance, in a March 8, 2023, interview with CBS, General McConville shared that the slogan "Be All You Can Be" was being reused to inspire "…kids to have an opportunity to do great things in life, to have an impact, be part of something bigger than themselves, to have a purpose…" (McConville, 2023). General McConville's words may appeal, especially, to technician

warrant officers are usually accessed after several years of service. Because my surveys were exploratory and informal, I did not seek participant's MOS and could not identify technician or aviator career dynamic trends.

There is vast territory explore in the domain of Warrant Officer identity. These basic understandings of how Warrant Officers view themselves may eventually influence Warrant Officer IMT and PME curricula in common core and technical tracks. Further, these understandings can possibly facilitate more linkages among retired, currently serving, and future Warrant Officers. Ultimately, I believe a more methodical exploration with Colonel McHugh will generate greater cohort self-awareness while providing understanding about who those leaders are to improve the cohort and improve the Army.

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Learning Requirements for Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)

CW3 Artimus Incognito

Introduction

The U.S. Army is continuously evolving its operations to be more efficient, effective and lethal on the battlefield. To achieve this objective, the Army is focused on Multi-Domain Operations, which is a concept that aims to integrate land, sea, air, space, and cyber capabilities into a cohesive operational force. The need for Multi-Domain Operations has been driven by the ever-changing nature of modern warfare, characterized by the proliferation of advanced technologies, hybrid threats, and the rise of near-peer adversaries.

Learning requirements for Army Multi-Domain Operations

To ensure success in Multi-Domain Operations, the Army must invest in learning and development to equip its Soldiers with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities. The following are the learning requirements for Army Multi-Domain Operations:

1. **Understanding Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)**

   Soldiers must have a thorough understanding of the MDO concept, which involves the integration of all domains of warfare, including air, land, sea, space, and cyber. This understanding will enable the soldier to think critically and creatively about how to use different domains to achieve their mission objectives.

2. **Developing strategic thinking**

   The Army requires Soldiers who can think strategically and develop plans that encompass all domains of warfare. This includes understanding the enemy's strengths and weaknesses, assessing the operational environment, and developing courses of action that consider all domains.

3. **Cyber operations**

   Cybersecurity is a critical aspect of modern warfare. Soldiers should be trained on cybersecurity protocols to protect sensitive information and systems from cyber-attacks, which could compromise the effectiveness of the operation.

4. **Joint warfare**

Army Soldiers must operate within joint warfare environments and need to understand how the Army interacts with other services and agencies such as the Navy, Air Force, and intelligence community.

5. **Battlefield coordination and communication**

Effective coordination and communication across domains and services are essential for successful Multi-Domain Operations. Soldiers must be trained to communicate effectively with their fellow soldiers and other services to ensure a coordinated effort.

6. **Emerging technologies**

As technology continues to evolve at a rapid pace, Soldiers must be trained on emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, and robotics. Soldiers should be able to operate these systems and apply them to the mission.

Conclusion

Multi-Domain Operations is the future of warfare, and for the Army to succeed on the battlefield, Soldiers must be trained to operate in a Multi-Domain environment. The Army must focus on developing the necessary learning requirements to equip its soldiers with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to operate effectively and efficiently in a constantly evolving battlefield. By investing in learning and development, the Army can ensure that its Soldiers are better prepared to meet the challenges of modern warfare. **(*Note – Please continue to read after the Bibliography)**

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-Break-

__Note -__ If you have made it this far, you deserve an explanation. The previous author is fictitious, and the above article was produced by utilizing OpenAI's ChatGPT-3 [Generative Pre-trained Transformer] natural language model interface. For context, the following prompt was delivered to the chatbot system:

"Provide a comprehensive explanation of learning requirements for Army Multi-domain Operations in a professionally written format suitable for presentation to college students."

The only other parameters established were that the results should be 2-3 pages in length and include sources. For those unfamiliar with these systems, the amazing part of this experiment is that the results were produced (with sources) in under 60 seconds from prompt submission to output received. While nothing revolutionary is discussed in the product and it surely lacks depth, how many of us (or anyone we know) could produce this level of "thought", organization, and sourcing in less than a minute. Also, for those already familiar with the system, you understand that giving minimal additional "back-and-forth" with the bot, the above article could easily be turned into a much more comprehensive work to include depth in each sub-category and APA style citations.

The purpose of this experiment is not to encourage the nefarious use of artificial intelligence (AI) in Professional Military Education (PME). Fortunately, as AI evolves there is a growing parallel effort to develop digital forensic tools to detect its use in undesired ways (Keith, 2023). Such capabilities will provide a means for educators to mitigate the undesired effects of AI on learning, while being able to deliberately leverage it within the learning context itself to improve each student's experience. Our purposes here are to introduce the systems to some of our readers, let them know that we are aware of them, and that we are working through how they can be properly used to enhance your learning. Plagiarism still matters. Intellectual integrity is still a cornerstone of actual learning.

While the initial response to AI, from many educators, was that of fear, it turns out that there are many potential benefits for both students and educators. Fear was driven by the idea that education institutions (and therefore educators) would no longer be needed. Seasoned professors saw themselves being replaced by machines. While that has not happened, AI has the potential to change the way students learn and instructors teach.

If the real goal is knowledge gained, does the path towards that end state have to be a human instructor doing it all? Can AI help support the desired end state by streamlining, right-sizing, and or right-timing the education process? According to David Karandish (2021) of *The Journal*, students can benefit from AI in the following areas:

1. **Personalization:** Personalization is one of the biggest trends in education. With the use of AI, students now have a personalized approach to learning programs based on their own unique experiences and preferences. AI can adapt to each student's level of knowledge, speed of learning and desired goals so they're getting the most out of their education. Plus, AI-powered solutions can analyze students' previous learning histories, identify weaknesses and offer courses best suited for improvement, providing many opportunities for a personalized learning experience.

2. **Tutoring:** While it's not uncommon for students to require extra help outside of the classroom, many teachers don't have free time for students after hours. AI tutors and chatbots are a perfect solution in these scenarios. While no chatbot can truly replace an educator, AI tools can help students sharpen their skills and improve weak spots outside of the classroom. They provide a one-on-one learning experience without having the teacher

there to answer questions at all hours of the day. In fact, an AI-powered chatbot can answer student questions at a response rate of 2.7 seconds.

3. **Quick Responses:** There is nothing more frustrating than asking a question only to have it answered three days later. Teachers and faculty are often bombarded with repetitive questions on a daily basis. AI can help students find answers to their most commonly asked questions in seconds through support automation and conversational intelligence. Not only does this free up a lot of time for educators, but it also helps students spend less time tracking down answers or waiting for a response to their questions.

4. **Universal 24/7 access to learning**: AI-powered tools make learning accessible for all students, anytime and anywhere. Each student learns at their own pace, and 24/7 access makes it easier for students to explore what works for them without waiting on an educator. Additionally, students from all over the world can gain access to high-quality education without incurring traveling and living expenses. (paras. 3-5)

Potential AI benefits to educators include the following:

1. **Personalization:** Just as AI can personalize students' learning courses, it can do the same for educators. By analyzing the students' learning abilities and history, AI can give teachers a clear picture of which subjects and lessons need to be reevaluated. This analysis allows teachers to create the best learning program for all students. By analyzing each student's specific needs, teachers and professors can adjust their courses to address the most common knowledge gaps or challenge areas before a student falls too far behind.

2. **Answering questions:** With access to a school's entire knowledge base, AI-powered chatbots can answer a variety of generic and repetitive questions students typically ask without involving a faculty member. In bypassing the educator, AI leaves more time for them to focus on lesson planning, curriculum research or improving student engagement.

3. **Task automation**: The power of AI can automate the most mundane of tasks, including administrative work, grading papers, assessing learning patterns, replying to general questions and more. According to a *Telegraph* survey, teachers spend 31% of their time planning lessons, grading tests and doing administrative work. However, with support automation tools, teachers can automate manual processes, leaving more time to focus on teaching core competencies. (paras. 3-5)

These systems will play a very important and ever increasing role in the Army (research Project Linchpin or the Army's AI Integration Center for a deeper dive) and in PME. Universities around the globe are already using AI to support student-centered learning and teacher efficiency and effectiveness. We plan to do the same here at the U.S. Army Warrant Officer Career College. Hopefully, CW3 Artimus Incognito's article made you think and helps generate discussion about learning. He did highlight a need for understanding "Artificial Intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, and robotics" as learning develops for MDO. We see new technologies, like AI, as exciting opportunities and look forward to the future and modernization of Warrant Officer education.

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Irregular Warfare: The Application of Military Capability Across the Competition Continuum

Editor's Article of Interest

CW4 Jason P. Gambill

Military Capability Untapped in Preparation of an Uncertain Future.

The U.S. is transitioning from a nation that approached conflicts as event-based with clear beginnings and endings to a strategy that continuously applies pressure on its adversaries (Gambill, 2021). The Biden Administration's National Security Strategy states, "Amid intensifying competition, the military's role is to maintain and gain warfighting advantages while limiting those of our competitors" (Biden, 2022, p. 20). Furthermore, the U.S. intends to defend itself "across the spectrum of conflict to prevent competitors from altering the status quo in ways that harm our vital interests while hovering below the threshold of armed conflict" (Biden, 2022, p. 22). In order to secure the homeland, the administration clearly intends that the military will maintain continuous pressure on its adversaries. This essay proposes irregular warfare as the military's means to achieve results during competition. As a service, the U.S. Army must increase investment and institutionalize its approach towards irregular warfare to shape the environment, enable integrated deterrence, and counter adversaries across the competition continuum.

The Army must increase its understanding and expand the employment of irregular warfare (IW) in competition and preparation of large-scale combat operations (LSCO). To best convey this argument, the author will first provide an expanded description and definition of IW. Second, the author will argue that the Army must employ IW continuously across competition continuum to fulfill its strategic roles and achieve national policy objectives. Finally, the capstone will provide three DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendations (DCR) (U.S. Army, 2021, p. 1).

Irregular Warfare

The Department of Defense's (DoD) current definition of IW is too narrow and does not consider all possible military activities across the entire competition continuum. Though JP 1-02 currently describes IW as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)," the DoD is currently redefining the term (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019, p. 119; Ucko & Marks, 2022). The current definition is biased towards the spectrum of armed conflict and hinders the idea of employing IW in competition and shaping.

Many IW experts define the term more broadly than JP 1-02 in both scopes of conflict and the application of its effects. Seth Jones describes IW as "activities short of conventional and nuclear warfare that are designed to expand a country's influence and legitimacy as well as weaken its adversaries" (Jones, 2021). Kevin Blims describes IW as "one way the military can apply its power complementary with the diplomatic, economic, financial and other elements of government power to secure strategic outcomes"

(Blims, 2021). Jones and Blims' descriptions of IW relate to what was defined over 75 years ago as political warfare. In 1948, George Kennan defined Political Warfare as the "employment of all means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives" (Kennan, 1948, p. 1). Similar to the Central Intelligence Agency's covert action and the Department of State's diplomacy and statecraft, the DoD conducts irregular warfare as its contribution to political warfare. This Army capstone will define IW as "military capability, excluding conventional and nuclear warfare, employed throughout the competition continuum to shape the environment, prevent conflict, prevail in LSCO, and consolidate gains."

IW as a full-time tool of statecraft. The U.S. government's approach to leveraging military capability tends towards events based on a particular conflict or crisis with a clear beginning and termination. However, several Army leaders are working to change that. LTG Jonathon Braga explains, concerning China and Russia, "We have to rethink everything we do, how we live in a contact layer and look to seek to provide options" (Hearing to Receive Testimony on United States Special Operations Command's Efforts to Sustain the Readiness of Special Operations Forces And Transform The Force For Future Security Challenges, 2022, p. 27). Braga also states that "There is no sanctuary at home or abroad. We must change how we think about protecting and projecting our forces" (Braga, 2022, p. 4). LTG Maria Barrett stated, "we are in constant contact with the adversary every single day, who seeks to weaken our strengths as a nation and undercut our strategic advantages" (Cutshaw, 2022). Much like the Army's strategic goals of shaping, preventing (or deterring), prevailing, and consolidating, IW is best leveraged throughout the competition continuum to attain the desired effects. The U.S. is not alone in its efforts to leverage IW in a nearly continuous manner.

Russia and the People's Republic of China leverage IW to set the conditions for LSCO and achieve other national policy objectives. One example is Russia's use of Private Military Companies (PMC), like Vagner Group, to expand its influence and achieve national policy objectives while offering the Putin regime plausible deniability. PMCs are private industry with ties to the Russian government through its intelligence agencies and military (Asymmetric Warfare Group & John Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, 2020, p. X). As depicted by Figure 1, PMCs conduct a wide range of activities that include counter-terrorism, security force assistance, counter-insurgency, and direct participation in hostilities (Asymmetric Warfare Group & John Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, 2020, p. 4). Russia employs PMCs across Africa, Syria, and Ukraine to extend its influence, secure income that circumvents the U.S. imposed sanctions, and directly support its military (Putin's Proxies: Examining Russia's Use of Private Military Companies, 2022, p. 4). More alarmingly, Russia has used PMCs as a deniable combatant in LSCO against the U.S. and its partners in Syria (Gibbons-Neff, 2018). Currently, Russian PMCs are fighting the Ukraine military somewhat successfully for control of the city of Bakhmut (Yuhas et al., 2023).

Though Russia's use of IW is malign by U.S. standards, the Army should recognize from this example that IW is a versatile tool that could contribute to multiple strategic goals. The U.S. should employ IW across the same spectrum, but more consistent with its values and laws. Subsequently, PMCs primarily operate outside of combatant command authority and circumvent other U.S. agencies' efforts to disrupt those activities. IW offers the military a secure method to disrupt PMC activities.

Figure 1: Russian PMC Activities by U.S. Army Strategic Roles

Russian PMC Activities Aligned to U.S. Army Strategic Roles			
Shape	**Prevent**	**Prevail**	**Consolidate**
Deception	Provide Regime Security	Mechanized Infantry	Security Force Assistance
Blackmail	Targeted Assassination	Combat Advisors	Personnel Protection
RUS GOV Influence/ Support	Kidnapping	Coordinate Fires and	De-mining
Maintain Zones of Stability	Sabotage	Forward Air Controllers	Counterinsurgency
Subversion		Reconnaissance	Counterterrorism
Deception		Artillery	Information Operations

Note: The image was accessed from Asymmetric Warfare Group & John Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, 2020, p. 13; U.S. Army, 2019, pp. 1–5.

DOTMLPF-P Recommendations

1) Doctrine, Leadership and Education: Immediately redefine IW in Army doctrine to represent the full scope of available military capability required to shape the environment and achieve national policy objectives across the competition continuum. Use professional military education to indoctrinate leaders in the application of IW. The Army should strive to ensure its leaders as comfortable with conducting IW as they are of LSCO.

2) Organization and Personnel: Identify or create an Army unit of action for IW that not only represents special operations, cyber, and space but also includes conventional military elements like the Security Forces Assistance Command. This unit would advise the Headquarters Department of the Army on the application of IW in support of the Joint Force and interagency.

3) Policy: Create policy that operationalizes Army capability and personnel at rest that assists the Joint Force and interagency with developing and implementing IW strategies. Furthermore, assist both with campaigning against identified adversarial systems and capabilities that could be held at risk before LSCO or to enable integrated deterrence.

Conclusion

This capstone argued that the Army must increase investment and institutionalize its approach towards irregular warfare to shape the environment, enable integrated deterrence, and counter adversaries across the competition continuum. It provided an expanded description and definition of IW. The capstone explained that IW is a useful tool to accomplish all Army strategic goals and contribute to the success of national policy objectives. Finally, it recommended three DOTMLPF-P Change Requests (DCR).

Historically, the U.S. has disproportionally prioritized large scale combat operations (LSCO) over irregular warfare (IW). In his memoir, Robert Gates explained that the military services are preoccupied, "with planning, equipping, and training for future major wars with other nation-states, while assigning lesser priority to current conflicts and all other forms of conflict, such as irregular or asymmetric war" (Gates, Robert M., 2014, p. 142). This preoccupation with LSCO is unlikely to change with the ongoing

Russia-Ukraine war and the growing tensions between the People's Republic of China (China) and the U.S. regarding Taiwan. The Department of Defense (DoD) cannot predict the future and whether LSCO with China or Russia is forthcoming, but it is evident that both adversaries are currently conducting activities globally below the threshold of armed conflict against the U.S. and its allies. By not committing military capability now, the U.S. is abandoning the current battlefield to malign actors and nations without a fight.

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No Integration Without Acculturation

CW5 Julian Evans

WO1 Beedy

The Culture

The Army Culture reflects the common mission, purpose, and sacrifice of each member of the Profession. It is the glue that forms unit trust and cohesion, instills discipline within the ranks, and gives the Army its identity. The Army Culture is an outward representation of its values and an inward reflection of our operations. New members who join the Army team undergo an intentional acculturation onboarding process. Army onboarding is receiving and integrating new individuals into an organization, team, group, or squad, ensuring they have the foundational knowledge to be effective members. Onboarding is not unique to the Army; several corporate organizations agree that good onboarding enables employees to perform and provide value to the organization. In fact, an expert onboarding analyst explains that a good onboarding framework should focus on culture, rules, networks, collaboration, competencies, and performance (Harpelund, 2019). Onboarding is important to new members of any organization, but more critical for individuals transitioning to different roles with increased leadership responsibilities. Transitioning requires a systematic approach that provides deliberate acculturation for new members. This is no different for the new members of the Warrant Officer Cohort and acculturation is the pivotal transition method of choice that is deliberately woven into the fabric of the Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS).

The Warrant Officer Community of Practice

Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS) is a branch immaterial, initial military training course that educates and trains enlisted Soldiers, from junior enlisted to senior Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs), with diverse backgrounds who possess varying degrees of knowledge, skills, and behaviors (competencies). The candidates going through the course start in the Warrant Officer Acculturation Phase (WOAP). WOAP provides candidates with foundational leadership development concepts and assessments to build upon and improve their leadership competencies and attributes in accordance with Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Leadership Development*. During, the WOAP portion of the course, Training, Advising, and Coaching (TAC) Officers gain a clearer perspective on the candidates' leadership development strengths and weaknesses and develop individual coaching strategies to meet the individual candidate needs. Through the WOAP, candidates are exposed to continuous refinements related to their roles and responsibilities as an Army Warrant Officer. The path along this transformation carries individuals into a professional cohort through continuous assimilation. WOCS gives each Warrant Officer a foundational blueprint that prepares them for their technical training and their first unit of assignment.

Assimilation is at the forefront of a professional transformation into becoming a Warrant Officer. The act of creating a Warrant Officer is no small feat, and the task becomes increasingly more complex as the candidate's military experience rises due to the concrete NCO operational mindset. Although extremely capable, senior NCOs are not typically focused on the same aspects of the organization's

mission as their commissioned counterparts. Senior NCOs are trusted leaders and fill a niche that takes years of experience to master and typically have autonomy in task completion.

NCOs selected to become Warrant Officers transition from being the face of small units to becoming the "Quiet Professional," a term coined by the Cohort. That transition of growth would be impossible without change. The eventual change from NCO to Warrant Officer is only possible through progressive levels of structured education, starting with WOCS, and once that proverbial seed is planted, something new, something different, and something great will grow. No longer will this future company-grade Warrant Officer only concern themselves with a mission end state. They now instead are educated and developed to thoughtfully consider every facet of military operations, accounting for impacts up and down a formation, and at times across a branch.

In the article "*The Truth About Transitions,*" from Psychology Today, Schnelderman (2012) writes of a theory of change in the professional setting. The theory invokes that every change follows a framework, starting with an ending and finishing with a beginning. This neutral zone falls in between ending what once was and the start of what is to come, and many prefer foregoing this stage. However, those individuals would "miss important insights and gifts, putting them at risk of poor decision-making in the future" (Schnelderman, 2012). Direct appointment or commission without an integration plan or acculturation places these selected high performers directly in the middle of the "neutral zone" between enlisted and warrant officers, potentially risking their future maturation and placing their identity at risk. Though it may seem like an easy transition from the outside looking in, it will be anything but easy.

Transition From NCO to Warrant Officer

Officers in the military must bear unwavering traits, though these traits are not exclusive to Officers, they are important. For this article, the primary roles of Army Warrant Officers are categorized into five competencies: Integrator, Communicator, Operator, Leader, and Advisor (Momeny, Dowling, & Wolf, 2023, p. 11-14). Understanding the roles and functions is critical for a Warrant Officer's success and overall organizational readiness. Through this lens, former NCOs now turned junior Warrant Officers are prepared for duty by converging experience with the depth of what is expected of them.

Being an integrator is at the tip of the spear for innovative technical acumen. Commanders have an expectation of their Warrant Officers to be the technical expert and lead system integrators. Integration is a skillset that expands outside of the system employment. It is the ability to combine knowledge, skills, assets, and people from across the organizations to support organizational readiness and mission accomplishment.

All Officers in the military must be well-versed and talented communicators, the Warrant Officer is no exception. As subject matter experts on systems and system integration, Warrant Officers must communicate critical information to commanders and staff clearly and concisely.

No system can function without a skilled Operator. Army Warrant Officers are educated to be technical experts in their field, skilled at efficiently and effectively operating the systems they integrate. However, this competency requires knowledge of application with context to the operational environment. Success as an operator means that Warrant Officers must also possess and apply doctrinal competency of Army and Joint operations (Momeny, Dowling, & Wolf, 2023, p. 12).

Every Officer is a leader, and the transformation from NCO to Warrant Officer does not absolve one from their leadership responsibilities. On the contrary, their leadership responsibilities and technical purview significantly increase over the span of their career.

Finally, the Army Warrant Officer is an advisor through and through. The expertise held by Warrant Officers through years of experience would be unexploited without the proper employment of their advisory role. Commanders and staff expect Warrant Officers to advise them on their system integration in planning and decision-making.

To accomplish these competencies, leaders must remain unyielding in their efforts to provide Commanders, organizations, and Soldiers with the best-educated Warrant Officer. The transition to becoming a junior officer requires a realization that is undenounced to the mentality of NCOs and the generational shift ongoing in the Army. A successful leader in today's Army must find a way to get to the "yes" for their commanders. FM 3-0 discusses the art of command and states that "Command is more art than science because it requires commanders to exercise their judgment, leverage their experience, and use their intuition when leading their units" (HQDA, 2022). This is a prevalent notion, as intuition is shunned due to the fear of failure as humans grow into adulthood. Leadership requires it, failure is not an end-state, but a state of mind. The Warrant Officer does not accept failure, they mold it into an opportunity to achieve success and find the yes.

A Change in the Warrant Officer Accessions Landscape

To counter talent gaps, specifically regarding inadequate Warrant Officer inventories amongst certain technical specialties, and accessions shortfalls, the Army implemented an accelerated pathway for high-performing Soldiers to become Warrant Officers. Army Directive 2023-02 (Direct Appointment and Commission of Certain Warrant Officers) expands opportunities for Soldiers to apply for direct appointment to Warrant Officer One (WO1) or direct commission to Chief Warrant Officer Two (CW2). High-performing enlisted Soldiers and NCOs will receive constructive credit for prior education, forego WOCS, and be directly appointed to WO1 following accession. After successfully completing their respective Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC), some will be afforded the opportunity to commission to CW2. This process may cause long-term effects due to the absence of an effective warrant officer acculturation.

Acculturation is far too important to grant constructive credit for mastery-based upon experience and complementary education from an NCO with a different scope of duties and responsibilities. Senior NCOs may have mastered their craft; however, there is potentially a higher margin for error among Warrant Officers who forego the formal transition of the Warrant Officer acculturation. Continuing to operate as an NCO may chip away at the foundational principles of the Warrant Officer Cohort. The Army must assess viable candidates from a talent pool to retain exemplary leaders without compromise. There are no cliff notes, how-to videos, or pretests to alleviate anyone from the acculturation process. Highly qualified Soldiers or NCOs deserve the same formative professional military educational baseline as their peer group. Without Warrant Officer acculturation and a clear understanding of their new roles and responsibilities, a void in collaborative efforts would begin to develop and proliferate throughout the Cohort.

A Path Forward

Army Directive 2023-02 has provided a guide path to transition from an enlisted Soldier to a Warrant Officer; however, Senior Army Officers and Leaders have a fundamental responsibility to ensure the Army, its organizations, Commanders, staffs, and Soldiers have the best educated and trained Warrant Officer integrator, communicator, operator, leader, and advisor to fight and win our Nations wars! Acculturation and integration into the Warrant Officer Cohort is non-negotiable and requires a course median consistent with the Army Direct Commission Course. The course must focus on the acculturation and education of newly appointed WO1s or commissioned CW2s with the knowledge, skills, and behaviors to perform their Warrant Officer functions and responsibilities across various operational assignments. Through Senior Warrant Officer coaching and instructions, these Warrant Officers will be taught the necessary competencies to enhance their critical thinking skills, tenants of problem-solving, doctrinal concepts of Multi-Domain Operations and Large-Scale Combat Operations, organizational and advanced communications, research methods, teamwork, and planning needed to support their first unit of assignment's mission. This course should include three fundamental phases: transition, acculturation, and integration, which will prepare them for successful assimilation into the Warrant Officer Cohort. Each phase is progressive and sequential and will provide outcome-based education focused on preparing new Warrant Officers to adjust and internalize a new set of norms, heritage, traditions, and lineage that would otherwise be forgone with the direct integration without acculturation.

Technically and tactically competent Warrant Officer Leaders are critical to Army system integration and operational success. To develop and prepare these exceptional merit-based individuals to meet future challenges an effective acculturation learning experience is paramount for the integration into the Officer Corps!

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The Evolution of Russian Information Warfare

CW4 Charles Davis

Author's Note: Thoughts and assessments in this work are those of the author and are not meant to reflect organizational opinions of the Warrant Officer Career College or the Army.

Editor's Note: The Author has requested that footnotes remain to assist readers.

**Editor's Article
of Interest**

"Information technology has significantly enhanced human interaction around the globe and elevated the importance of information as an instrument of power wielded by individuals and societies in politics, economics, and warfare. Advances in information technology have significantly changed the generation of, transmission of, reception of, and reaction to information." -**Joint Concept for Operations in the Information Environment July 2018**

The Russian concept of Information Warfare (IW) began to develop in the post WWII Soviet Union. However military theory on the concept gained traction with the USSR's Military Research Institute (MRI), through the writings of Dr. Vladimir Lefebvre (Murphy, 2018)[1]. Lefebvre is credited with developing Reflexive Control (RC) Theory in the 1960s, while working for the MRI. His book, "The Algebra of Consciousness", was the foundation for classifying the theory and establishing a Soviet research institute to assess its applications (Murphy, 2018)[2].

Reflexive Control Theory requires a foundational understanding of the psychology of the target. Developing a targeted operation requires deep cultural understanding and occurs through modeling the target's logical reasoning, character traits, and socio-cultural traditions, habits, and beliefs (Murphy, 2018)[3]. As a result, Russian military theorists study US military processes such as the Military Decision-making process (MDMP) and OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) Loop. They have also committed a great deal of study to American society, what divides us, and more importantly how emotions elicit responses.

Lefebvre's philosophy was reaffirmed in a 1976 paper by V Druzhinin and D Kontorov, titled "Problems with Military systems Engineering." The work firmly asserts; control of the target's decision process derives from a profound knowledge of the state of his forces, military doctrine, objectives, and personal qualities of his executive personnel. Additionally, an adversary's politics, ideology, emotional state, and mutual relations can also be leveraged to influence decision-making (Chotikul, 1986)[4]. Putin's approach to conducting Information Warfare through RC is firmly intrenched in these concepts, with global implications.

Russia does not distinguish Information Operations (IO) as a peacetime or conflict tool and there are no restrictions between leveraging RC against military or civilian targets. Therefore, adversaries such as the United States can expect IW to be a constant in competition, crisis, and conflict. As such, IW is

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[1] https://sofrep.com/news/russian-reflexive-control-is-subverting-the-american-political-landscape/
[2] ibid
[3] ibid
[4] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA170613.pdf

conducted globally and indiscriminately. Putin affirmed this position in his 2006 address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. "We must take into account the plans and directions of development of the armed forces of other countries…. Our responses must be based on intellectual superiority, they will be asymmetric, and less expensive" (Putin, 2006)[5].

An early example of Soviet forces applying Lefebver's Reflexive Control is evident in interviews with Vladimir Ryzhkov (Russian State Duma Deputy 1993-2007). Ryzhkov recalls conversations with KGB propaganda officers regarding their efforts in Afghanistan in the 1980s and several points can be taken. The Afghan population had to be convinced the government was acting in their interests and the enemy provoked the crisis. Operations also focused on fabricating incidents of persecution of Russian speaking populations, using just enough truth to draw social attention and outrage. Using these incidents, IOs focused on demonizing the adversary and masking Soviet aggression as humanitarian aid to those persecuted. Controlling the narrative was most important and crackdowns on all accessible media outlets secured their ability to direct the message (Ryzhklov, 2014)[6].

Later examples provided by Ryzhkov present RC in a new light. For example, in 1999 Russia used reports of Chechen attacks into Dagestan as a mechanism for driving public opinion in support of a second military incursion into Chechnya. None of the jihadist groups ever took responsibility for the August and September apartment bombings and there is broad speculation that Moscow conducted false flag reporting to justify a military presence.

Additionally, Russian press suggested as many as 100 foreign instructors participated in training Chechen terrorists. Other Russian press reporting indicated Usama Bin Laden was sending mercenaries from Afghanistan and Yemen (Oliker, 2001)[7]. Narrative control here provided popular support for elevated military operations in the region. Media influence during the second Chechen war was highlighted in a Newsline piece by Paul Goble: "Indeed, the Russian government's own newspaper 'Izvestiya' noted rather critically that "the introduction of centralized military censorship regarding the war in the North Caucasus is the only new idea in the much-vaunted national security doctrine" (Goble, 1999)[8]. These examples along with press observations suggesting a shift in tactic, reinforce the presence of RC as a recognized component of Russian political and military strategy.

Also in the 1990s, the Russian government started to see the value in state-sponsored think tanks. While Russia leveraged academia for research and analysis, it did not apply the concept of state sponsored institutes, like RAND in the United States. The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI) is one such organization, which was established by presidential decree in February of 1992. Atlantic Council Research indicates; by 2007 there were roughly seventy researchers, working on international security, the near abroad, military-strategic questions, international economic security, and market economic issues (Graef, 2019)[9].

RISI provides a unique view of how Lefebvre's concepts for RC are studied and applied. A 2019 product by Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center provides an in-depth study of several think tanks in today's Russia. According to Barbashin and Graef, in April of 2009 RISI was identified as a Federal Scientific Institution. Categorizing it in this manner solidified funding through the Presidential Administration. The

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[5] http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23577

[6] http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/thekremlins-war-propaganda/496779.html

[7] https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1289/RAND_MR1289.pdf

[8] http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/1999/99-10-12.rferl.html#28

[9] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/thinking-foreign-policy-in-russia-think-tanks-and-grand-narratives/

increased funding allowed RISI to broaden its scope and add new departments. Putin also installed Lieutenant General (ret) Leonid Reshetnikov, formerly the Director of Foreign Intelligence Services, as administrator (Graef, 2019)[10].

Between 2011 and 2014 Reshetnikov was able to expand RISI research and analysis capabilities. In 2011, RISI established a Center for Regional and Ethno-Religious Studies. Then in March 2014 Reshetnikov hired representatives from Helsinki, Belgrade, and Warsaw to support his newly established Information Center in Tiraspol Transnistria. At the opening ceremony, he spoke of the importance of the Crimean vote for reunification with Russia (Minisrty of Foreign Affairs Moldovian Republic , 2014)[11]. RISI remained supportive of the creation of Novorossiya (New Russia) and endorsed escalation of military operations in eastern Ukraine (staff, 2015)[12].

RISI remained vocally supportive of Russian operations in Ukraine throughout 2014 and drafted a report in October framing the events as a western plot. In the October 2014 report, titled "The Ukrainian Crisis: Instrument of Geopolitics of the West", RISI analysts asserted the United States was waging an information, economic, and political operation against Russia. Russia was portrayed as foiling US plots to establish a new world order of US "business and political elites" (Reshetnikov, 2014)[13]. The October report also alluded to US intentions for American military bases on the Black Sea. The report and narratives to insight fear of the US and incompetence in Ukrainian governance all align with the primary concepts of RC.

Also in 2011, Russian Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov began to voice his reservations that Russia's military had not successfully adopted to the requirements of modern warfare. Specifically, he did not believe the military would be successful in non-contact warfare such as Information Operations. Makarov's concerns fueled General Valery Gerasimov's efforts to address the question of how to describe/define modern war and frame operational concepts for Russian success in 2013. One key distinction in Gerasimov's framing of Information Warfare (IW), and that of western generals is that Russia does not distinguish cyber warfare from other types of IO: it's simply another tool in the box (Vogler, 2016)[14].

By 2014 there were two primary templates for IO. The first, "Red Web", written by former KGB officers Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan centered on media control. But an article in the Journal of the Academy of Military Science, written by several Belarusian nationals approached the concept in much broader terms. The concept focused on 13 goals and more closely aligns with Reflexive Control Theory. They are described in an article by MITRE as:

> ·Changing the citizen's moral values ·Creating a lack of spirituality ·Destroying traditions and cultivating a negative attitude toward cultural legacy ·Manipulating the social consciousness ·Disorganizing systems and creating obstacles ·Destabilizing political relations ·Exacerbating political struggles and provoking repression ·Reducing information support ·Misinforming, undermining, and discrediting administrative organs ·Provoking

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[10] ibid
[11] https://mid.gospmr.org/en/DPj
[12] https://lithuaniatribune.com/russian-think-tank-that-pushed-for-invasion-of-ukraine-wants-moscow-to-overthrow-belarus-lukashenko
[13] https://riss.ru/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AO_2014_ves-tekst.pdf
[14] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1019062.pdf

social, political, national, and religious conflicts ·Mobilizing protests and strikes ·Undermining authority -Damaging interests of a state (Thomas, 2019).[15]

Where Soldatov and Borogan focused on a single platform, the Belarusian theorists addressed measurable objectives. Their approach has garnered more attention, and practical application of their concepts has appeared more recently in Russian IW efforts.

In 2014, Vladislav Surkov left his position of Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation for an appointment as Presidential Aide to Putin. Surkov assumed responsibilities for the Presidential Directorate for Social and Economic Cooperation with the CIS Member Countries. In this capacity, Surkov assumed the responsibility for developing policy towards Ukraine and began to receive daily updates focused on social, economic, and political issues in specific regions of the country. The data allowed Russia to frame a narrative and develop supporting disinformation that would manipulate Ukrainian public sentiment and political decision-making.

Hacked emails, associated with Surkov's position during the annexation of Crimea, also provide supporting evidence Surkov relied on several Russian think tanks to assist with developing RC concepts to use in IW against Ukraine and NATO countries. This data provides a connection back to Reshetnikov and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, supporting direct involvement in privately funded efforts to recruit and finance the separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine (Grozev, 2017).[16]

In 2019, The Royal United Service Institute was able to establish a chronology of Surkov- led activities during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. The final paper was a direct result of hacked emails from Vladislav Surkov during this period (Shandra, 2020).[17] Authors, Alya Shandra and Robert Seely, assert Russia accomplished the seizure of Crimea through overt and covert activities, along with local ideologs and paid collaborators.

> At the covert level, Russia interfered in Ukrainian elections, organized, and funded a pan-Ukrainian campaign for a 'soft federalization' of the country, attempted to change Ukraine's constitution and establish an alternative center of power, and created an illusion of widespread support for these activities…. The Kremlin conducted painstaking research into the intricacies of Ukrainian daily life to understand the Ukrainian world view and identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited. Then, using media, front groups, provocateurs, and paid rallies, it created a virtual reality designed to compel Ukraine into making decisions serving Russian objectives (Seely, 2019).[18]

Stark similarities can be drawn between Russian actions in the second Chechen war and that of the annexation of Ukraine. Pro-Russian proxies in the Donbas were inundated with fake news targeting Ukrainian government and military atrocities; while the Russian population was provided similar media coverage focused on stimulating their emotional support of the ethnic Russian people trapped in Ukraine. In the international community, Russia continued to distract, and deceive, creating information overload paralysis and indecision among the NATO partners.

The May 2nd, 2014, street fighting and fire in Odesa is an excellent example of Russian IO. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed, "Ukrainian nationalists drove defenseless people into the Trade Union

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[15] https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/prs-19-1004-russian-military-thought-concepts-elements.pdf
[16] https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/03/04/kremlins-balkan-gambit-part/
[17] https://euromaidanpress.com/2020/03/26/a-guide-to-russian-propaganda-part-5-reflexive-control/
[18] https://static.rusi.org/201907_op_surkov_leaks_web_final.pdf

building and burned them alive." Reporting goes on to reassert the pro-nazi position of the western backed Ukrainian government (Head, 2014)[19]. The Russian Federation continues to use the incident for propaganda purposes, through heavily financed exhibitions and select witness testimony in European countries.

Learning from IW activities in numerous other countries, Putin enhanced and refined Russia's IO capabilities and turned his sights on the United States. Russia's primary platforms to manipulate social consciousness, destabilize political relations; exacerbate political struggles; provoke repression; reduce information support and misinform, undermined and discredit administrative organs were Facebook and Twitter. The weapons he intended to use were Russian Troll Farms.

In Late 2014, Russia experienced a great deal of internal social unrest. Citizen protests regarding corruption and abuse of power seemed to appear without warning, fueled by social media. To manage domestic social unrest, he turned to the Internet Research Agency (IRA), financed and developed by Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2013 (Chernova, 2023)[20]. Christian Science Monitor correspondent Fred Weir states:

> The IRA is a well-funded "internet marketing" operation that may perform commercial functions but has become notorious for its political activities. These include loading Russian social media with pro-Kremlin commentary, blogs, postings, and graphic content. Experts believe there are several such operations around Russia, some aimed at regional audiences (Weir, 2018)[21].

Russian expatriate and investigative reporter, Lyudmila Savchuk, describes IRA troll operations as mental bullying, explaining how lies are mixed with the truth to discredit and repress dissenting political opinions in Russia. In her Oslo Freedom Forum interview, Savchuk discusses her infiltration of IRA and the operational effectiveness of the Troll Farms, fake accounts, and fictitious activist groups (Savchuk, 2020)[22]. Other interviews indicate she had daily quotas of 5 political posts, 10 non-political and 150-200 troll comments (Chen, 2015)[23].

Applying this very successful media exploitation weapon against the 2016 US presidential elections, Russia's IRA was able to establish 3,184 Twitter accounts responsible for posting 175,993 election related tweets (Guynn, 2018)[24]. Additionally, Facebook assesses 126 million Americans received posts from roughly 470 IRA accounts and 3,000 IRA adds (Guynn, USA Today, 2017)[25]. Investigations, by both the Justice and Treasury Departments, determined:

> [IRA] tampered with, altered, or caused a misappropriation of information with the purpose or effect of interfering with or undermining election processes and institutions. Specifically, the IRA tampered with or altered information in order to interfere with the 2016 U.S. election. The IRA created and managed a vast number of fake online personas that posed as legitimate U.S. persons to include grassroots organizations, interest groups, and a state political party on social media. Through this activity, the IRA posted thousands of ads that reached millions of people online. The IRA also organized and coordinated

[19] https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/05/03/ukra-m03.html

[20] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/14/europe/russia-yevgeny-prigozhin-internet-research-agency-intl/index.html

[21] https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2018/0221/Before-Russia-s-troll-farm-turned-to-US-it-had-a-more-domestic-focus

[22] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4OAQfoMyC8

[23] https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html

[24] https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/01/19/twitter-there-were-more-russian-trolls-than-we-thought/1050091001/

[25] https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/11/01/russians-used-facebook-way-other-advertisers-do-tapping-into-its-data-mining-machine/817826001/

political rallies during the run-up to the 2016 election, all while hiding its Russian identity. Further, the IRA unlawfully utilized personally identifiable information from U.S. persons to open financial accounts to help fund IRA operations (Treasury Sanctions Russian Cyber Actors for Interference with the 2016 U.S. Elections and Malicious Cyber-Attacks, 2018).[26].

Additional details from federal investigations into the IRA operation known as "Project Lakhta" indicate a multimillion-dollar budget, financed by Prigozhin, and supervised by GRU officers assigned to Russia's Unit 26165 and 74455 (Treasury Targets Russian Operatives over Election Interference, World Anti-Doping Agency Hacking, and Other Malign Activities, 2018).[27]. In total four entities, seven individuals, three aircraft and a yacht were determined to be directly involved: resulting in asset seizures and sanctions. The Internet Research Agency was designated for directly or indirectly engaging in, sponsoring, concealing, or otherwise being complicit in foreign interference in a U.S. election (Treasury Targets Assets of Russian Financier who Attempted to Influence 2018 U.S. Elections, 2019).[28].

However, Russia's attempts to apply RC measures against the American population continued, leading up to the 2020 elections. According to researchers from MIT Technology Review "Facebook's most popular pages for Christian and Black American content were being run by Eastern European troll farms" (Hao, 2021).[29]. Furthermore, content from troll farms was viewable to 140 million US accounts each month and these farms boasted the largest Christian American page, largest African American page, second largest Native American page and the fifth largest women's' page. Lastly, as of October 2019 roughly 15,000 Facebook Pages were being operated from Kosovo and Macedonia (Hao, 2021).[30].

In March 2021, the Director of National Intelligence released assessments of malign Russian activities targeting the 2020 US elections. In this report, the Intelligence Community assessed Putin authorized influence operations to denigrate the Biden candidacy and the Democratic Party, through proxies. The intent was to disseminate influence narratives and misleading allegations to media and government officials as well as influential private citizens. Some activities intended to undermine public confidence, sow division, and exacerbate social tension were directly linked to Iran.

More recently, a June 2022 Chatham House report indicates Russia's IO efforts are targeting South Africa, India, Brazil, and Mexico; attempting to garner support and sympathy for Russia's position on Ukraine. (Kowalski, 2022).[31] Chatham House concerns, along with July 2022 reporting from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, paint a stark picture for US relations with the Latin American Countries. Russian IW in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, will require significant counter-efforts from the US Department of State and with malign leadership in a number of these countries, it is likely to be a hard-fought war on perception. (Ellis, 2022).[32].

As stated in the Department of State report, Pillars of Russia's disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem: "The perpetual conflict that Russia sees in the information environment also means that officials and state media may take one side of an issue, while outlets with a measure of independence will adopt their own variations on similar overarching false narratives. The ecosystem approach is fitting for

[26] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0312
[27] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm577
[28] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm787
[29] https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/09/16/1035851/facebook-troll-farms-report-us-2020-election/
[30] ibid
[31] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/06/disinformation-fight-goes-beyond-ukraine-and-its-allies
[32] https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-western-hemisphere-assessing-putins-malign-influence-latin-america-and-caribbean

this dynamic because it does not require harmonization among the different pillars. By simultaneously furthering multiple versions of a given story, these actors muddy the waters of the information environment in order to confuse those trying to discern the truth" (GEC, 2020).[33].

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[33] https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-of-Russia%E2%80%99s-Disinformation-and-Propaganda-Ecosystem_08-04-20.pdf

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Documenting Vietnam War Experience: The 1ˢᵗ Infantry Division Band at Thunder Road

CW3 Jonathan L. Crane.

Technical Area of Interest – Army Band

Introduction

Human memory is susceptible to many different factors. Dr. Daniel Schacter (2001) describes seven influences on our ability to form and recall memories. Three of these, susceptibility, bias, and misattribution, are particularly important when trying to accurately portray historical events during wartime. Suggestibility means that our memory can be swayed by misinformation or leading questions either by the individual or outside forces. Bias is something everyone must grapple with, as the sum of our experiences and culture affect the way memories are stored. We must also be aware of misattribution. Ursano (1984) recognized before other clinicians how the effect of trauma influenced memory recall in Vietnam War Veterans. He identified that recall was influenced by life circumstances, group dynamics, and time displaced from an event. Inaccurate sources or just plain believing something for so long that it changes the memory can make it hard for that belief to be altered even when someone is presented with facts.

As we study military history to help us understand future conflicts, we must be aware of the factors affecting memories that often get written down as facts. The more those details are shared, particularly in the digital age, the more they become the accepted truth. If you ask the average person in the United States if the conflict in Vietnam was a worthwhile and just war, you would be hard-pressed to find any agreement. How could a reasonable person have any kind of positive view of that conflict or their experience? For some, it was their defining experience as they entered adulthood, and the memories made (however biased) are incredibly important to their self-identity.

U.S. Army Musicians in Vietnam

U.S. Army musicians who served in the Vietnam War were a mix of draftees and career soldiers with a wide range of musical skills. Our all-volunteer force of today only has room for the most select and highly skilled musicians, but the need for soldiers, including musicians, during that time was massive. Many felt a need to place meaning on their service, with some almost feeling guilty for being 'saved' from front-line fighting by being in the band. Five currently active Army Bands participated in campaigns throughout the war: the 101st Air Assault Division Band, 1st Cavalry Division Band, 4th Infantry Division Band, 25th Infantry Division Band, and the 1st Infantry Division Band, which is the main interest of this essay. The band's main job was to improve troop morale and inspire the will to fight, while members also took their turns on guard patrols.

One specific event involving the 1st Infantry Division (ID) Band has been used for decades to bolster the prestige of the unit and describe how bands have affected battlefield outcomes in the era after commands were no longer issued by bugle, fife, and drum. From Army Techniques Publication 1-19 (2021, July 28):

> "*One notable example of the use of bands in Vietnam was the 'Thunder Road' incident, which received national publicity. Major General John Hay, Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division, ordered his band to march down Thunder Road while playing the Colonel Bogey march. The road was critical to the division but was under control of a North Vietnamese Army regiment. The enemy, confused by the action, withdrew from the area. The band fulfilled a remarkable combat mission without firing a shot*" (paragraph A-20).

This particular vignette can also be found on the 1st Infantry Division's Band website and has been shared extensively through social media. On first read, it seems to be a unique and special event that breaks the mold of traditional reporting during the war. Looking at the account with a more critical eye reveals some aspects needing further investigation. What does "national publicity" mean? South Vietnam press, United States press? Although it does happen, generals typically do not give direct orders to bands. At that time, bands were still the equivalent of a platoon, attached to a company for command and control. Was it North Vietnamese Army or Viet Cong elements in the area? Luckily, a few official documents from the event and one 1st ID Band veteran's account align with those documents. These pieces of evidence paint a more accurate, but no less remarkable, picture of how bands are an emotional influence tool in combat operations.

Thunder Road

In June 1966, then Major General (MG) John Hay was leading the 1st Infantry Division after their arrival in country the year prior. Their main task was to defend and clear Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces from the Highway 13 corridor northwest of Saigon. This highway would come to be called the Thunder Road, because of the frequency of land mine explosions and the local call sign used. While the new strategy of search and destroy had just begun, MG Hay (2002) also recognized: "While the enemy must be destroyed or forced to surrender by a combination of firepower and maneuver, it is pacification which must end the unrest created by the enemy, improve the lot of the people, and build a cohesive, viable state." He understood that his mission was not only to destroy any Viet Cong/NVA forces but also to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people. He ordered Operation Lam Son II to be carried out. It was designed to provide morale and pacification to the locals in the form of a county fair (hamlet festival) style event, while other units could root out Viet Cong in the area and gather intelligence.

The 1st ID Band was indeed ordered to play along Thunder Road, but only as part of Operation Lam Son II. The Band was part of the integrated force of the Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Soldiers, U.S. psychological operations, civil affairs, civic action, medical, and food services. The festival also included the 7th ARVN Band and cultural teams, creating a blend of U.S. and Vietnamese cultures. Music

and food are two of the strongest cultural identifiers. MG Hay (2002) put the 1st ID Band's contribution succinctly: "It was not just a concert but a weapon in the 'other war'." Further evidence of the Band's presence at the event comes from one of the Band's veterans contacted through an Army Musician Facebook Group (2023). Bandsmen John served in the 1st ID Band during their Vietnam tour in 1966-67. He remembers marching through the town and that the event was part of a larger pacification action. When asked about what songs were played, he remarked "…just a regular selection of marching songs; we did find out the road hadn't been cleared of mines before we got there…" Despite the safety of this mission, there were still perceived risks. Further research would be needed to determine if "Colonel Bogey" was played on that day. The actual songs probably did not matter much, just that the music represented America ("Colonel Bogey" was written by British composer Malcolm Arnold). Bandsmen John certainly did not have a romanticized view of the mission, he recalled it as just another performance with unappetizing food.

1ST INFANTRY DIVISION BAND PERFORMING AT TAN PHUOC KHANH

Note: The picture was accessed from Tactical and Material Innovations, CMH Publication 90-21-1.

The Division's lessons learned report (Department of the Army, 1966) cited 117 persons of interest discovered during the festival, with an estimated 50% reduction in Viet Cong capability in the area. The report confirms the Band's performance on the last day and brings it to a close at the end by marching through the town. The most notable aspect of the whole operation is that it integrated many elements of influence into the overall combat plan. For the first time in the Vietnam War, pacification was the goal, with combat being in a supportive role (Hay, 2002). Some aspects of this type of engagement were continued by the 1st Cavalry Division Band in 1969, which allegedly led to the Band's capture of a North Vietnamese officer who just wanted to hear their music a little too closely (Crane, 2020).

Expanding this concept to the macro level, war is ultimately about exercising political will over another group (Von Clausewitz, 1997). Nations attempt to balance diplomatic and military effects to prevail in conflict. The interplay of kinetic and non-kinetic effects is often what leads to favorable strategic outcomes. The U.S. has struggled to find the balance of these effects beginning with the Vietnam War.

The 1st ID Band was a critical part of Operation Lam Son II. It provided music that represented the U.S. and allowed for positive interactions with the South Vietnamese. It may have had a slight risk of engagement with the enemy, but nothing like the vignette from ATP 1-19 or on the Band's website. The Band did not march into unfamiliar territory to directly clear a village of Viet Cong without any support. What they did achieve is probably more important: integrating music into civic action operations, which, if more thoroughly used, may have helped to prevent the prolonged costs borne by U.S. forces in Vietnam.

Closing

Military music is a unique subculture with a history fully intertwined with their respective branches. It is a powerful tool for instilling the will to fight in our own troops and as an emotional weapon of influence across the conflict continuum. We must document the stories of those who participated directly in U.S. campaigns. We also need the perspective of time and outsider context to fully understand the contributions of service members. In this way, we learn how to be successful in the next fight and honor the service of those who defended our way of life.

About the Author

Jonathan L. Crane, U.S. Army, is a Chief Warrant Officer 3 and a graduate of The Hartt School of music in composition. Along with his Hartt School Artist Diploma, he has a Master's in composition from Bowling Green State University, and a Bachelor's in Music Education from Lebanon Valley College. In 2013, Mr. Crane was given the National Federation of Music Clubs Military Composition Award for "Open Field." He is a contributing author to "Music Therapy with Military and Veteran Populations," Frontiers in Psychology, Modern War Institute, and The Journal of the AGRCA. Mr. Crane attended basic training at Ft. Jackson in 2009. His first duty station was with the 25th Infantry Division Band, and while there he deployed to Iraq in support of Operation New Dawn. He has also served with the Signal Corps Band from Ft. Gordon, GA. In 2014, he graduated from Warrant Officer Candidate School and became the commander of the United States Army Military Intelligence Corps Band until 2017. From 2017-2021 he was a research analyst for the West Point Music Research Center, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY. Currently, he has returned to Command the 25th Infantry Division Band.

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US Army Warrant Officers in the Joint Force

CW3 Michael Lima

Editor's Article of Interest

Introduction

The Army's primary mission to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces is integral to military operations. The future battlefield will be far different from those in the past; while the intent of warfare remains an act of force to compel an enemy to do our will, the means will be drastically different. The Army will not be alone and will require all Soldiers on that landscape to be experts in warfare. Soldiers must be able to lead at the lowest level and have intellect while skilled at producing results. Regardless of cohort, they must also possess the skills required for military art and science. This described competence should represent all those required for serving in the U.S. Army and its formations, and this includes Warrant Officers. Recall that continuous learning is a concept embedded in all professional military education, including joint. The Army's technicians, the Warrant Officer cohort, must champion the hallmarks of solid character and competence to win in future multidomain operations and dedicate themselves to the reality of continuous learning in order to better solidify their role in the greater joint force.

Multidomain Operations

Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, establishes multidomain operations as the Army's operational concept and builds upon the operational environment's changes over the last forty years. The manual describes multidomain operations as the following:

> "*Multidomain operations are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders*."

While Army forces conduct operations supporting joint campaigns, they may also be part of an even larger coalition operation. The military leaders within Army organizations must understand the role and capabilities of their forces, but even more so, understand the forces provided by other services to generate meaningful and effective combat power. The joint force, which includes forces composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more military services, will be the leading effort of the next conflict. The contribution of the Army to this fight remains its focus on readiness to conduct and prevail in large-scale combat operations (Department of the Army, 2017, p. 1-10). Field Manual 3-0 defines large-scale combat operations as extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Combat will involve operations by multiple corps, divisions, and forces from the joint and multinational forces. As the Army adapts to the change of the world, this will also require U.S. Army Warrant Officers to expand their knowledge, skills, and abilities further than at any other time in our cohort's history.

Warrant Officers

Department of the Army Pamphlet 611–21, Military Occupational Classification and Structure, defines a warrant officer as:

"An officer appointed by warrant by the Secretary of the Army based upon a sound level of technical and tactical competence. The warrant officer is the highly specialized expert and trainer who, by gaining progressive levels of expertise and leadership, operates, maintains, administers and manages the Army's equipment, support activities or technical systems for an entire career."

Warrant Officers are the few subject matter experts in their field that make up less than three percent of the total Army (U.S. Army, 2022). The principles of Warrant Officer management are used to determine whether certain officer-level positions should be designated for a Warrant Officer. One such principle is that the position must support a highly technical field, with complex equipment and a high density of multiple models or types of equipment with a requirement for technical management of subsystems, e.g., occupational fields focused on electrical, mechanical, or administrative areas of expertise (DA Pam 611-21, 2022). These technical officers are in the motor pools, criminal investigation divisions, supply warehouses, and aircraft, applying their unique tradecraft to support Army operations. The U.S. Army Warrant Officer must overcome the complexity and challenges they will face in large-scale combat operations within their domain through both focused education and leader development. This development must include strategically ready Warrant Officers within the joint force, who can think critically and creatively in integrating their skill set within military power to link their tactical objects to national strategy.

These Warrant Officers in the joint force will require both their unique skill set and a more in-depth understanding of the revised physically defined portions of the operational environment, including land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace. The U.S. Army trains and educates its leaders to be experts in land domain operations. However, a Warrant Officer must also develop a shared understanding of integrating their capabilities with services that tend to focus on the other domains external to land. And, in some cases, this must extend to the capabilities of other foreign militaries. The further and more deliberate integration into joint teams will challenge U.S. Army Warrant Officers, as our system may seem unique to other services and nations.

Additionally, there must be a consideration of the differences between Warrant Officers across the greater joint force. The Warrant Officer is a rank or category of rank in many of the world's armed forces but can vary differently depending on the country and service. The same Warrant Officer rank (WO1) from other countries can be classified as a company-grade commissioned officer in one nation or the highest group of non-commissioned ranks in another country but does not hold the leader's commission. The condition is because the military grade of Warrant Officer is one of the oldest in Western military systems and goes back to when Nobles assumed command of ships as Lieutenant and Captain. The ship captains would rely on senior sailors' technical expertise and cooperation and subsequently be rewarded with a Royal Warrant (Warrant Officer Historical Foundation, 2015). The rank was historically not considered a commission in that period.

The origins of the U.S. Army Warrant Officer Corps come from an act of congress establishing the Army Mine Planter Service as part of the Coast Artillery Corps in 1918. It was not until the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 amended Title 10 of the United States Code to provide Warrant Officers appointed by Commission (Warrant Officer Historical Foundation, 2015). In the U.S. Navy, the service selects its Warrant Officers from among enlisted

personnel late in their careers. Most selected are in grade E-7 (chief petty officer) and bypasses the lowest Warrant Officer pay grade, appointing most selectees in grade W-2 (Congressional Budget Office, 2002). In the Air Force, the service does not have warrant officers. Their technical experts are senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and, depending on the field, senior company grade officers (CGO) or junior field grade officers (Kreuzer, 2016). The vast differences between Warrant Officers are just one aspect that U.S. Army Warrant Officers must understand and integrate with joint, multinational allies and partners. One of many distinctions not taught in professional military education but must be learned through experience. Still, there is a requirement for U.S. Army Warrant Officers to learn and gain the experience they need to operate the joint force.

Joint Integration

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Officer Professional Development and Career Management, offers a very similar definition to the one above, except that it adds that Army warrant officers "…integrates Army systems and equipment across unified land operations." The newest FM 3-0, *Operations*, states that Unified Land Operations emphasized the integration and synchronization of Army, joint, and other unified action partners during operations. The DA Pamphlet 600-3 explicitly goes into detail about which Warrant Officers should integrate and synchronize Army systems into the Joint Force:

> *"CW4s [Chief Warrant Officers 4] are senior-level technical and tactical experts who perform the duties of technical leader, manager, maintainer, sustainer, integrator, and advisor and serve in a wide variety of branch-level positions. As they become more senior they focus on integrating branch and Army systems into joint and national-level systems."*

Focusing on large-scale combat operations builds on integrating joint and multinational capabilities. U.S. Army Warrant Officers have a statutory obligation to expand their capabilities in multiple domains in support of joint-level systems. The traditional method of concentrating on the land domain is unacceptable and must go the way of training for only the counterinsurgency environment. Integration must be focused on two or more domains, and the Army warrant officer must expand and create opportunities within the joint force to generate more opportunities for integrating systems.

Recommendations

Warrant Officers do not have the career management opportunity for Joint Qualification. For branch commissioned officers, DoDI 1300.19 (2018), DOD Joint Officer Management Program details the Joint Qualification System (JQS), a multi-level system open to all officers and recognizes joint experiences, regardless of where they accrue. Branch commissioned officers have a three-path system to obtain joint qualifications. The paths are Standard-Joint Duty Assignment (S-JDA) Traditional Path, Experience-Joint Duty Assignment (E-JDA) - Experience Path, or a combination of S-JDA and E-JDA. These paths offer branch commissioned officers eligibility for consideration awarded joint qualifications level II-IV. But Level IV is for General Officers/Flag Officers only. Branch commissioned officers can gain joint expertise based on participation in joint exercises,

joint training, and education other than joint professional military education (JPME), all of which count towards earning Joint Qualification. Earning Joint Qualification would provide senior-level warrant officers with validation of progressive levels of expertise and leadership within the joint environment. Furthermore, incorporating Warrant Officers into the Joint Leader Development and aligning professional military education systems and Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) to develop warrant officers skilled in the application systems across the joint force. Ensuring the PME develops not only warrant officers but joint warfighters.

Conclusion

U.S. Army Warrant Officers must better understand how to conduct Joint Warfighting to demonstrate tactical proficiency and better link their commander's objectives to operational, theater, and/or national strategic levels of warfare. Technicians must understand how the U.S. joint force organizes, deploys, employs, sustains, and redeploys military capabilities to support national interests. Warrant Officers provide commanders with options to execute military operations in the modern operational environment. They focus on integrating their various branches and Army systems into joint and national-level systems. While the U.S. Army is one vital piece to the future joint team, both education and planning should include the whole of government approaches to joint operations of armed conflict and make better use of the Army Warrant Officer.

About the Author

Michael K. Lima. U.S. Army, is a Chief Warrant Officer 3 and currently serves as a training developer with Ordnance Training Development Division. He is assigned to the Ordnance Corps & Ordnance School under Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Gregg-Adams, Virginia. He was a training with industry participant at Raytheon Missile Defense and an accountable officer for the ammunition supply point at Kadena Air Base, in Okinawa, Japan. He holds a doctorate in business administration and a master's degree from Baker College Center for Graduate Studies.

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The Attributes – 25 Hidden Drivers of Optimal Performance

Written by Rich Diviney, Published by Random House
New York, NY 2021. 304 pages.

A book review by Dr. Brian Davis.

Book Review

Rich Diviney wrote The Attributes – 25 Hidden Drivers of Optimal Performance in which he argues that beneath obvious skill sets, there are hidden drivers of performance known as attributes that truly determine a person's effectiveness. The author is a retired U.S. Navy SEAL Commander who completed multiple overseas deployments during his military career, including Iraq and Afghanistan. He also served as the Officer in Charge of a training command where he led the creation of the "Mind Gym" which supported special operators' ability to train their brains in decision-making in high-stress environments. Since retirement, Rich Diviney serves as a speaker, facilitator, and consultant to the DoD, civilian corporations, and sports teams. I was introduced to this book as it was being used at the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence, Fort Novosel, AL to drive discussions during professional development sessions. Several members of the U.S. Army Warrant Officer Career College began reading it in preparation for these sessions and the discussions it instigated were immediate. The author's methodology is to define core attributes (mostly through storytelling which makes it very readable) and then to teach how understanding your own attributes, and those of people around you, can lead to optimal performance for the reader. The remainder of this book review will briefly describe the book's organization, a summary, and my assessment.

After a brief introduction that defines the term attribute and differentiates them from skills, the author foreshadows the future of the book and then dives right into the attributes. He organizes the attributes as follows:

- The Grit Attributes: Courage; Perseverance; Adaptability; and Resilience
- The Mental Acuity Attributes: Situational Awareness; Compartmentalization; Task Switching; and Learnability
- The Drive Attributes: Self-efficacy; Discipline; Open-mindedness; Cunning; and Narcissism
- The Leadership Attributes: Empathy; Selflessness; Authenticity; Decisiveness; and Accountability
- The Teamability Attributes: Integrity; Conscientiousness; Humility; and Humor

After discussing the attributes in great detail, the author does a solid job of "operationalizing" the new knowledge. Every learning experience should have a "so what?". In the case of this book, the "so what?" answers the question, how can this new information help me optimize my own performance and that of my team? The author provides a series of online assessments (theattributes.com) that allow the reader to decode and understand their own attributes. These assessments allow for an honest self-appraisal which ultimately allow for a deeper understanding of an individual's strengths and weakness when it

comes to attributes. The book continually reminds the reader that as humans, we have all of the attributes but in sometimes extremely varying degrees. Once the reader appreciates their own attributes, they are offered real-world examples of how to operationalize the newly gained knowledge.

My assessment of this book is very positive. Helping the reader understand what attributes are (and what they are not), how their presence is hard-wired into every human, and how understanding them can help optimize individual and team performance are all extremely beneficial. Appreciating the difference between skills (no matter how amazing) and attributes is a big part of this research. Attributes, according to Diviney (2021), are "the innate traits that determine how an individual will absorb, process, and respond to the world around them" (p. 23). Learning that we are born with attributes but, that they can be developed throughout life is another important aspect of this research. As an example, while each of us is born with a certain level of adaptability (or what may seem like a lack thereof), we can work on this attribute if we recognize it as an area requiring growth. Also, important to remember is that the attributes are neutral (one is not better or more important than another unless viewed through a specific lens in a specific environment). For example, the level of an individual's courage could be an asset or a liability depending on the situation and how that attribute is used. Knowing more about yourself, how you are wired, and why you respond to situations the way you do can only benefit someone trying to get better. This book will help most people learn and grow in this area.

In conclusion, I recommend this book to everyone that is attempting to grow. If you are a lifelong learner, this book will support your journey. The book's organization, style, and cognitive level make it extremely consumable for anyone who would be investing time into Strength in Knowledge. It is applicable to leaders and followers at all levels and offers the potential to make each of us stronger performers and better team members.   If this topic interests you and you would like to dive deeper into it, I recommend researching Mindset – The New Psychology of Success by Dr. Carol Dweck and Grit – The Power of Passion and Perseverance by Angela Duckworth.

About the Reviewer

Dr. Brian Davis currently serves as the Chief of Academic Operations Division at the U.S. Army Warrant Officer Career College. He is a retired Marine and current U.S. Army Master Instructor. He is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College, the Joint Forces Staff College, and was the first civilian to earn a Graduate Certificate in National Security Studies from the Army War College. His civilian academic background includes a BA (History) from Auburn University, an MA (Human Resources Development) from Webster University, and an EdD from The University of the Cumberlands.

Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know

Written by Serhy Yekelchyk, Published by Oxford University Press
Oxford, England, 2020. 230 pages.

A book review by LTC Nate Colvin (Ph.D. Student).

Book Review

In 2000, I was signed up to travel to Ukraine for a short exchange with the military academy in Kyiv. The day before I stepped on the plane, the trip was canceled. But I never forgot about Ukraine. I finally traveled there in 2017 and interviewed many of the pilots from the 2014 Russian invasion. I learned a lot from that trip – especially how much I did not know. Of course, Ukraine kicked off a whole series of events including NATO's Wales Summit, the creation of the enhanced Forward Presence, the U.S. Army's Atlantic Resolve, the reshuffling of US forces in Europe, and huge defense security cooperation programs. But how much do you really know about Ukraine?

Whether you have a historical interest in Ukraine or not, it is probably time for a primer or a review. To this end, I highly recommend *Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know* by Serhy Yekelchyk. Yes, the title is a bit on the nose, but for good reason. In around 200 paperback pages, the author takes the reader back to the time when Viking settlers mixed with Slavic people, creating *Kyivan Rus* all the way to contemporary international relations. This provides a clear understanding of the major cultural, political, and social aspects of the Ukrainian people in a very readable form.

Yekelchyk employs a mostly chronological and sometimes thematic review of an assortment of topics. His simple "question-and-answer" format creates an indexed approach for easy reference. Because of this, you can either read straight through or pick an area to review for better understanding. The Q&A style also makes it an enduring reference. The book actually starts with the question "Why Ukraine?," addressing the most pressing issues likely to be on the mind of English-speaking readers. Further sections include the following, *The Land and the People*, *The Making of Modern Ukraine*, *Ukraine after Communism*, *The Orange Revolution and EuroMaidan*, *Russia's Annexation of the Crimea and the War in the Donbas*, and *The War in Ukraine as an International Issue*.

Although not the point of the book, Yekelchyk's factual approach skillfully exposes Russian cultural intrusions without resorting to nationalism. This ultimately creates a more supportable case for the Ukrainian narrative. He succinctly lays out the long history of Kyivan Rus before the emergence of Russia, alongside the distinctive cultural components of Ukraine. He is even-handed in his treatment of controversial groups without condoning their behavior. At the high level of understanding, this is especially helpful in understanding complex topics like Maidan or how miners and other eastern workers were funded to become political protest groups in the Donbas. Relations with both east and west are better understood. You learn how Crimea went from being a Tartar stronghold to being dominated by ethnic Russians. On the smaller issues you will learn why it's Kyiv and not Kiev, Ukraine, not "the Ukraine,"

and that Maidan is a Turkic-derived word meaning square, and not an alternate spelling of maiden like a reader might be thinking.

Even those who remember the Cold War firsthand would do well to read this book, as so much of our understanding is often tied to Ukraine as a member of the USSR. As a signatory to the Budapest Memorandum, it is also critical that we understand why Ukrainians justifiably seek security from the United States and other countries. Amongst the many topics, I enjoyed learning more about the Poroshenko presidency. To help your visualization, consider watching a few episodes of Zelensky's "Servant of the People" on Netflix then plunge into this book. Highly recommended for professional reading lists and your next course on Ukraine, Russia, or Eastern Europe.

About the Reviewer

LTC Nate Colvin is an Army War College Fellow at the College of William and Mary. He holds a Graduate Certificate in Modeling and Simulations from Old Dominion University, where he is also completing his last semester of coursework toward a Ph.D. in International Studies as an I/ITSEC Leonard P. Gollobin Scholar. He earned master's degrees in Aeronautics and Space Studies (Embry-Riddle University), Administration (Central Michigan University), and Military Theater Operations (School of Advanced Military Studies). He has deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Latvia as an aviator, operational planner, and strategist. He is currently participating in the HillVets LEAD program.

Warrant Officers in History

Hershel "Woody" Williams

The greater Warrant Officer community of the United States Military lost a giant in 2022, CW4 (ret.) Hershel "Woody" Williams. This legendary Warrant Officer was not in the United States Army but instead served in the United States Marine Corps. Until his passing at age 98, Mr. Williams was the last surviving World War II Medal of Honor recipient from the Battle of Iwo Jima. His service record is extensive and goes beyond the uniform, as he worked as a veteran service representative in the Department of Veterans Affairs He honorably retired from the United States Marine Corps after 17 years and retired once more from the Department of Veterans Affairs after 33 years of service. His Medal of Honor citation is recalled below:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Demolition Sergeant serving with the First Battalion, Twenty-First Marines, Third Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces on Iwo Jima, Volcano Island, 23 February 1945. Quick to volunteer his services when our tanks were maneuvering vainly to open a lane for the infantry through the network of reinforced concrete pillboxes, buried mines and black, volcanic sands, Corporal Williams daringly went forward alone to attempt the reduction of devastating machine-gun fire from the unyielding positions. Covered only by four riflemen, he fought desperately for four hours under terrific enemy small-arms fire and repeatedly returned to his own lines to prepare demolition charges and obtain serviced flame throwers, struggling back, frequently to the rear of hostile emplacements, to wipe out one position after another. On one occasion he daringly mounted a pillbox to insert the nozzle of his flame thrower through the air vent, kill the occupants and silence the gun; on another he grimly charged enemy riflemen who attempted to stop him with bayonets and destroyed them with a burst of flame from his weapon. His unyielding determination and extraordinary heroism in the face of ruthless enemy resistance were directly instrumental in neutralizing one of the most fanatically defended Japanese strong points encountered by his regiment and aided in enabling his company to reach its objective. Corporal Williams' aggressive fighting spirit and valiant devotion to duty throughout this fiercely contested action sustain and enhance the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Faculty Spotlight

James (Jim) Steddum, MBA.

Jim Steddum serves as the Communication and Management Systems Subject Matter Expert, at the United States Army Warrant Officer Career College. Jim retired from the Army after 30 years of service which culminated in the role of Chief Warrant Officer of the Judge Advocate General's Corps and Chief Knowledge Officer, Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Jim holds a Master of Business Administration with a specialization in Human Resource Management and a Bachelor of Arts in Criminal Justice with a minor in corrections management. He recently earned a graduate certificate in National Security Studies from the U.S. Army War College. He holds the Certified Knowledge Manager certification and ASI 1E from the Army KM Qualification Course. Additionally, he holds ASI 3R, Force Management from the Army Force Management School. In addition to his academic duties, Jim serves as the Community Manager for the Warrant Officer Network (WONet) om milBook, the Volunteer Coordinator for the College, and is an associate editor for the Warrant Officer Journal: Strength in Knowledge.

Strength in Knowledge!

Announcements and Administrative Notes

Call for Papers

The organizational journal Strength in Knowledge is maintained by current faculty and staff working at the United States Army Warrant Officer Career College (USAWOCC). The journal aims to be a quarterly publication that supports efforts to improve education and training for the U.S. Army and all areas of the Warrant Officer's education, whether common core or technical in nature. This publication represents an enduring effort to provide a professional forum for sharing of information focused on current and emerging topics within the Warrant Officer Proponent. Finally, the journal seeks to inform and shape the continued growth of the greater profession of arms through the sharing of key insights and lessons learned.

We continuously accept manuscripts for subsequent editions with editorial board evaluations held once a quarter. The *journal* invites practitioners, researchers, academics, PME students, and military professionals to submit manuscripts that address the issues and challenges of military education and training, training development, doctrine (whether specific data from manuals or discussion of concepts), systems warfare, Army modernization and other subjects relevant to the profession of arms. Submissions related to technical areas of various Warrant Officers' specialties will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Book reviews of published relevant works are also encouraged.

Submission Guidelines

Submissions should be between 1,500 and 5,000 words and supported by research, evident through the citation of sources. Scholarship must conform to commonly accepted research standards such as described in *The Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association*, 7th edition. For resources on writing in approved APA format simply reach out to USAWOCC. Book reviews should be between 500 to 800 words and provide a concise evaluation of the book and its relevance to the professional Warrant Officer or current fight.

Manuscripts should be submitted by either 15 November (Jan – Mar Publication), 15 February (Apr – June Publication), 15 May (July – Sep Publication), or 15 August (Oct–Dec Publication). For additional information, call 334-255-3142 or send an email to wo_journal@army.mil.

Resources of Interest – Podcasts

Breaking Doctrine is the podcast of the US Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The podcast explores timely topics of interest, regarding current and emerging Army and joint doctrine. Our guests will include a broad range of Army and other Service professionals with the vast knowledge and years of experience required to facilitate discussion on a variety of military doctrine-related topics. Most recently, during Episode 36, the host, Lieutenant Colonel (R) Nikki Dean sits down to discuss the implementation of FM 3-0: Operations.

Upcoming Events – Warrant Officer IMT and PME Conferences

USAWOCC is hosting Center of Excellence representatives from 17-21 April and key members of the USAWOCC faculty and staff are set to visit Fort McClellan from 28-30 April. During these events, the College will present Warrant Officer Common Core topics to continue collecting relevant feedback from the field regarding the value and applicability of military education. These Conferences mark opportunities to provide crucial insight and feedback to the USAWOCC faculty and staff responsible for driving the change that ensures the modernization of common core Warrant Officer education.