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The Anatomy of Disengagement

Colonel John E. Dwan II,
United States Army

NO ONE would deny that the world exists today in a condition dramatically described as the "balance of terror." Both the United States and her Soviet adversary possess strategic weapon systems with unprecedented capacities for swift and devastating attack on the other's homeland. All strategic thinking inevitably must take into account this new fact of life which overarches the entire international scene and profoundly affects the attitudes and actions of peoples and governments.

The advent of the "balance of terror" on the world scene has stimulated a number of diplomatic efforts among governments and a variety of official and unofficial proposals all directed at avoiding the dire consequences of a modern war. One can detect in these efforts and proposals two broad approaches to the problem of mitigat-

ing the "balance of terror." One aims at removing (or reducing) the "terror" by seeking to eliminate or curtail the weapons of strategic destruction themselves. This approach has led to disarmament and arms control negotiations. The other aims more at stabilizing the "balance" by attempting to relax the political tensions between East and West which might produce the flareup that would ultimately lead to large-scale war.

One of the proposals in the latter category, which would hopefully ease tensions and thus reduce the "flashpoint" in US-Soviet relations, is known as the concept of disengagement, applied particularly to a separation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Soviet bloc forces in central Europe. Many of the advocates of the idea are men of respectable intelligence, deeply concerned

that the values of the Western World survive the course of a perilous future. The concept, accordingly, merits objective analysis to determine its validity as a step toward a more peaceful world order within which the interests of the United States and her allies might be more secure.

What Is Disengagement?

The advocates of disengagement say that the way to add stability to the strategic equation is to end the confrontation of hostile forces in central Europe. There, US and other NATO forces are in physical contact with Soviet armies and their Warsaw Pact allies. These forces create an unnatural division of Germany, and contribute to tensions precisely where the stakes are highest for both sides, and where a false move by one side would bring about a violent reaction by the other. Why not disengage these forces, some say, and eliminate one of the most obvious threats to stability in the balance of terror?

A number of things can be said both for and against the proposition that disengagement in central Europe would be desirable from the United States and NATO points of view. Before reviewing them, something should be said about the specific plans that have been advanced for disen-

Colonel John E. Dwan II is a member of the faculty of the U. S. Army War College. He received his Master of Arts and Ph. D. degrees in International Relations from Yale University. He attended the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Conference in 1954 as a member of the United States Delegations. After graduating from the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1956, he served in Korea with the 7th Infantry Division.

agement so that we may construct a typical "model" plan for analysis.

The Eden Plan

The first responsible proposal leading to a serious consideration of disengagement by Western governments was made by Anthony Eden at the 1955 summit meeting. In his view there would be an agreement by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the USSR placing limits on total forces and armaments in Germany and in the Soviet satellites in order to establish a military balance throughout central Europe. Coupled with this limitation would be the denuclearization or demilitarization of a zone on both sides of the East-West demarcation line.

The four major powers and a united Germany would also set up control machinery to inspect specified areas within the zone, and exchange information on a progressive basis regarding the armed forces stationed in the zone. Eden's plan has never become part of an agreed Western policy, but it gave rise to continuing discussion, particularly in Britain, about a possible change in the *status quo* in central Europe.

The Gaitskell Plan

The first thoroughgoing statement of a plan for disengagement was made by Hugh Gaitskell, head of the British Labor Party, in a series of lectures at Harvard University in 1957.¹ Under the Gaitskell Plan, Soviet forces would withdraw from East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Foreign Western forces would withdraw from West Germany, although US and UK forces would remain elsewhere on the Continent. Effective international control would be estab-

¹ Hugh Gaitskell, *The Challenge of Co-Existence*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1957.

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lished over agreed levels and types of national armaments and armed forces to be maintained by the countries from which foreign forces had withdrawn.

In addition to these military aspects, certain essential political conditions would be agreed upon. Within a framework acceptable to the four major powers, Germany would be reunified by free elections, and a European security treaty, backed by the four powers, would be negotiated to assure the territorial integrity of the countries concerned against external aggression or against attack by any one of them. Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary would withdraw from the NATO and Warsaw Pacts. Thus the Gaitskell Plan visualized not only a disengagement of Soviet and NATO military forces, but also a change in the political structure in central Europe. It further attempted to avoid creating a power vacuum in the area by a system of mutual territorial guarantees reinforced by inspection and certain other safeguards.

The SPD Plan

The Social Democratic Party of West Germany, like the British opposition party, has in the past strongly supported disengagement, although recently the SPD appears to have virtually abandoned the idea. Its proposals were generally similar to the Gaitskell Plan, but, as could be expected, placed great emphasis on the development of political conditions that would lead to a unification of Germany.² The SPD proposed the establishment of a zone in central Europe from which all Western and So-

viet forces would withdraw. The zone would include the two Germanies, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. (US forces would withdraw only beyond the western border of Germany.)

The national forces remaining in these countries would not be permitted nuclear weapons, and all the principals would agree to unrestricted ground and aerial inspection in the zone. The countries in the zone would withdraw from membership in military pacts following establishment of a collective security arrangement, to which the United States and the USSR would be parties, embracing the entire area. The proposal goes on to provide steps toward German reunification by calling for establishment of an all-German conference with equal representation between the Federal Republic and East Germany, followed by an all-German parliamentary council, and plebiscites on major political and economic questions including how an all-German government might be established through free elections.

The SPD Plan, put forward in March 1959, ran counter to the expressed policy of the Adenauer Government which opposes disengagement. Since then the SPD has virtually abandoned the idea and now supports German membership in NATO.

The Kennan Proposals

Paradoxically, whereas Gaitskell made public his views on disengagement in the United States, George Kennan journeyed to England to present his opinion on the subject during the Reith series of lectures aired by the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1957.³ Kennan's proposals fell short

² United States Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Handbook on Arms Control and Related Problems in Europe*, 86th Congress, 1st Session, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1959.

³ George F. Kennan, *Russia, the Atom, and the West*, Harper & Bros., 1958, New York, and "Disengagement Revisited," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 37, Number 2, January 1959, pp 187-210.

of qualifying as a "plan" since on a number of important questions of detail he was silent or ambiguous. In essence Kennan advocated the drawing apart of US, UK, and Soviet armed forces from an area variously defined as "East and West Germany," "the heart of Europe," and even "the Continent."

The central European countries, including a reunified Germany, would be politically free and entitled to enter into nonmilitary arrangements, but would be neutralized, would be denied nuclear weapons, and their armed forces would be of the Home Guard type for defense and for purposes of internal security. The territorial integrity of the neutralized countries would be guaranteed by the major powers. The United States would not unilaterally give up her nuclear deterrent nor would NATO (less Germany) be abandoned. The entire arrangement would be a prelude to a wider program leading to disarmament.

The difficulty with Kennan's proposal is its generalized treatment of how the conditions he describes are to be brought about, and how the arrangement, once established, can be made to work. Even though Kennan placed greater stress on objectives than on means, his views reached a wide audience, and had a strong effect in furthering the interest in disengagement.

The Slessor Proposal

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor has agreed generally with Kennan in regard to the necessity for complete withdrawal of US forces from Europe as a *quid pro quo* for Soviet withdrawal from central Europe.¹ He has maintained that US and

UK forces as they are in Germany could not hope to stop 150 Soviet divisions if both sides were armed with nuclear weapons; that a strategic nuclear exchange could not be avoided whether or not there were allied divisions in Germany; and that the German Army, properly armed with conventional weapons, could deal with small outbreaks, prevent *faits accomplis*, and provide as adequate a "tripwire" as do US-UK forces now.

Although Slessor's chief emphasis is on the military aspects of disengagement rather than the political, his general support of the Kennan thesis provided some professional military backing for the concept, albeit from an airman's point of view.

The Rapacki Plan

The Rapacki Plan merits mention here because it has served as a point of reference in most discussions of disengagement, even though it is not a plan for disengagement in the sense of a pullback of forces. Moreover, it represents the first specific and detailed proposal officially advanced by a government addressed to changing the military *status quo* in central Europe.

Adam Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Minister, proposed in the United Nations in October 1957 that a denuclearized zone be established in central Europe to include East and West Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. These states would prohibit domestic or foreign manufacture, maintenance or import of nuclear weapons, servicing facilities, or missile-launching equipment. The four major powers would agree not to place nuclear weapons in the zone, to maintain facilities there, or to use nuclear weapons against the zone. There would be a comprehensive control system consist-

¹Michael Howard, *Disengagement in Europe*, Penguin Books, Baltimore, Md., 1958.

ing of ground and aerial controls and control posts.

After a year Rapacki proposed a modification in the plan, probably to meet Western suspicions that a mutual restriction on nuclear weapons between West and East would tip the balance in favor of the preponderant Soviet conventional ground forces to the disadvantage of the West. In November 1958 he proposed that the plan be implemented in two stages: in the first stage the two Germanies, Poland, and Czechoslovakia would ban production of nuclear weapons, and the major powers would agree not to build further installations or give nuclear weapons to forces that did not have them. In the second stage the nuclear weapons and installations of the big powers in the zone would come under ban, but *only* after an agreement was reached on limiting conventional armaments in the zone.

Noteworthy features of the Rapacki Plan are that it does not provide for a withdrawal of Soviet or Western forces from territories in which they are now located; it contains no direct references to the political conditions under which its provisions might be carried out; and it is vague with respect to measures of inspection and control that would ensure compliance by all concerned.

Nevertheless, the plan captured wide attention, and is considered by numerous segments of Western opinion to be useful as a means of testing the sincerity of the Soviets in a small way as a prelude to further advances in the direction of broader disarmament.

In spite of the coolness of the Western governments to these disengagement schemes, Poland's Premier Gromulka in October 1960 reiterated his

challenge to the Western Powers to accept the Rapacki Plan. In December 1960 Hugh Gaitskell urged again that Britain put forward a new plan for a zone of controlled disarmament "to reduce the danger of conflict in Europe." The appeals of disengagement in some form are great, and we can assume that the question is far from a dead issue.

Composite Disengagement Plan

It can readily be seen from the brief outlines of the various disengagement proposals referred to earlier that no single plan is representative of all the thinking on the subject. Certain variations among the proposals—such as whether US forces would withdraw entirely from the Continent or remain somewhere west of the Rhine, and whether part or all of Germany would remain in NATO—are of critical importance to an evaluation of the merits of each. What can be pieced together of the various disengagement schemes from which we can construct a representative model for analysis? In outline form, the following can serve as a composite proposal:

1. Foreign armed forces would evacuate, by stages, a central European area consisting of the whole of Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, (and perhaps Hungary).
2. Within this central zone national armed forces would be subject to certain quantitative and qualitative limitations, including a prohibition against nuclear weapons. Armed forces within the zone would be subject to inspection and control.
3. A security treaty would be agreed to in which the states in the neutral zone would have their territories guaranteed by the major powers as well as by each other.

4. Germany would be reunified on the basis of free elections.

5. States in the central zone would withdraw from the NATO and Warsaw Pacts.

In justification and elaboration of this model plan advocates of disengagement would say the following:

- US and UK forces would remain on the Continent and NATO would continue to defend Europe. The US nuclear deterrent would continue as the bulwark of that defense.

- The central European vacuum created by withdrawal of Western forces from West Germany and Soviet forces from the satellites would be filled by the US and allied commitment under the security treaty to intervene in the event the central area were violated. West German troops, although not within NATO, would, as part of a unified Germany, provide conventional forces for defense short of all-out attack, and, in event of full-scale Soviet attack, serve as a "trip-wire" for NATO action. If the Soviets attacked, they would have to start from positions some 500 miles farther east than at present, thereby rendering themselves more vulnerable to NATO nuclear counteraction.

- Since Soviet forces would be withdrawn from the satellites, conditions would be more favorable for the evolution of independent governments and gradual liberation of those countries from complete Soviet control.

- A solution to the German problem would be possible under conditions acceptable to both the West and the Soviet Union, thereby eliminating a constant source of tension and possibly war resulting from a crisis growing from German nationalist sentiment.

- Similarly, the danger of another Hungary-type situation arising in the satellites would be eliminated due to the departure of Soviet forces.

- The neutralization of Germany would eliminate the threat to themselves that the Soviets consider inherent in a rearmed West Germany. Since a neutralized Germany would be less of a threat, the Soviets might be more willing to accept the foregoing scheme of disengagement to gain this advantage.

- The general balance of military security in Europe would be retained thereby not creating an unstable situation.

- The plan for arms limitations and controls would be a prelude to a wider program leading to disarmament.

- If the Soviets do not accept such a plan, the West would score a major political and diplomatic propaganda victory, and would be no worse off than at present.

The foregoing model disengagement plan represents a fair "middle ground" position, and can be used as a basis for analysis.

Questioning the Assumptions

An objective analysis should start with a consideration of the assumptions that appear to underlie the disengagement concept. The idea that a spatial separation of Soviet and NATO forces in central Europe constitutes a disengagement of Soviet and US (or Western) power is erroneous. Setting aside for the moment whether such a physical separation of forces would be a "good thing," it simply does not "disengage" the power of the two countries. The United States and the Soviet Union are "engaged" in a contest for power and

security and for the minds of men all around the world—not only in Europe, but in Asia, Africa, Antarctica, and outer space.

As we enter the era of operational intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), to hope that the two nations could "disengage" is simply irrelevant, since the ability to do so no longer exists. The interests of the United States and the Soviet Union meet and

Division Unnatural

Among the disengagers the notion exists that the division of Europe along the present Iron Curtain is "unnatural" and "wrong," and that, therefore, something must be done about it. What this really means is that the current division of Germany is unnatural since it separates parts of a traditionally homogeneous national state. This reasoning implies that



Effective rocket and missile ranges are so great today that we are "engaged" without the confrontation of troops

conflict in virtually every part of the globe as a result of a basic incompatibility in national aims and philosophies regarding the purposes of man and society. A physical separation of Soviet and US forces in Europe, whatever it may accomplish, will not be able to end the confrontation of US and Soviet power on the worldwide scene. So, at the very best, disengagement must be regarded as applying to but one aspect of East-West relations.

some type of abstract, even moral, standards apply to the establishment of international boundaries, and that such standards (as defined by the holder of the notion) are to be used in determining policy rather than the criterion of what is best for the NATO alliance in a given set of circumstances.

The fact that the present division of Germany may be unusual, that some Germans may not like it, and

that Americans may feel sorry for the Germans, may lead some to conclude that the division is unnatural. But none of these considerations necessarily has anything to do with the security of the NATO area—nor has the conclusion that an “unnatural” condition exists. It may be that a change in the *status quo* is desirable from the NATO point of view; but such a conclusion should be reached on grounds other than the imputation of “unnatural” attributes to a borderline. It is the practical consequences of the *status quo*, not its unnaturalness, that should determine the course of action.

Positive Courses of Action

A similar commentary can be applied to the contention that the policy of containment is essentially negative and that Western policy lacks positive attributes and thus contributes to a spiritual deterioration in the Western cause. Whatever “positive” may mean in this connection, it pertains to specific policies and courses of action. The point is that the consequences of action are themselves the matters to be weighed, not just the “positive” character of the action, lest change be accepted for its own sake.

Obviously, no reasonable person would advocate a scheme for changing the *status quo* in central Europe only because it was “positive.” So it is that when people condemn containment because it is *not* positive, they may be right, but for the wrong reason, and one that, of itself, is irrelevant.

Not Disengagement

Whether it is true that Soviet backing for the Rapacki Plan indicates that the USSR is favorably disposed to consider a proposal for disengagement acceptable to the West is not at all self-evident. The Rapacki Plan, as

a scheme for creating a denuclearized zone, is not disengagement; and the reasons for which the Soviets support it may not apply at all to a plan involving a pullback of Soviet forces.

The linking of the Rapacki Plan to Western disengagement proposals as if the latter are a sort of extension of the former is misleading and misses the point. The point is that, rather than making assumptions about increased Soviet willingness to enter into agreements that will end the stalemate in Europe, the West should expect the Soviets to favor proposals in which they see an advantage to themselves. It follows that the West should itself advance proposals on the strength of their intrinsic merits in furthering the West's interests without placing unwarranted faith in one Soviet move or another which appears to be a good “omen” for the future.

Neutral Zone

One final comment on assumptions is relevant. In view of the provisions contained in some proposals for disengagement, one is led to suspect that some disengagers, consciously or otherwise, presume that the USSR or the West will be willing to give up their hard-won positions in Europe. Those who advocate Soviet withdrawals from all the satellites, or withdrawals of US forces from the Continent and the creation of a defenseless neutral zone in the center of Europe, seem to accept this assumption.

Even without prejudging what nations will or will not do and confining discussion only to what they could do, it is difficult to visualize the conditions that would lead either side to accept willingly such a deterioration in its power position. This point is

mentioned only to establish some sort of realistic limits to the possible courses of action one could feasibly expect either side to consider, and to preclude the necessity of commenting on disengagement proposals that would be the equivalent of "giving up" Europe from either side's point of view.

Consequences of Disengagement

Would there be a net advantage to the United States if we were to support a plan for disengagement and it were put into effect? What would be the probable consequences of such a plan? Analysis of these questions seems to divide itself into those consequences that are predominantly military and others that are primarily political. Obviously, neither category is independent of the other, but it is useful to discuss them separately.

Military

A better case can be made for disengagement from a strictly military point of view than on political grounds. Let us accept for purposes of discussion that at present the defense of Europe depends fundamentally on:

1. The deterrent of the US strategic nuclear capability.

2. The presence of US forces in Europe and the tactical nuclear weapons available to them.

3. The contribution within the NATO structure of West German ground strength (since it is the largest).

On the other side of the ledger we can reasonably say that the greatest dangers confronting NATO are:

The proximity to the NATO area of large Soviet forces which could attack with little or no warning.

The Soviet preponderance of ground

strength over NATO ground strength.

The Soviet nuclear capability both in tactical weapons and intermediate range ballistic missiles which could reach targets anywhere in Europe.

To what extent would this picture be changed if our model disengagement plan were put into effect? On the defense side:

The deterrent effect of SAC and other strategic nuclear weapons systems would still remain (effective as under present conditions) as the basic factor in making a Soviet attack on the NATO area appear to be too great a risk—in other words, no change in the deterrent factor of the US strategic nuclear capability.


United States forces would still be on the Continent as demonstrable evidence that the United States would be committed in any Soviet attack on Western Europe. Tactical nuclear weapons, although not positioned in West Germany, would still be in the hands of NATO ground, sea, and air forces, and would be capable of employment against Soviet forces attacking toward the West through the central zone. It is true that such weapons would not be in forward positions with ground forces in West Germany as at present. However, missile ranges are such as to permit targets to be engaged from launching sites elsewhere, and mobile tactical nuclear weapons could be reintroduced into Germany.

West German forces, while not part of NATO, would still serve NATO by conducting a defense of their own soil. George Kennan argues with considerable persuasion that when Germany achieves her 12-division goal, her army will be by far:

... the strongest component of NATO strength generally on the Con-

inent and a much more important factor than the Western garrisons now stationed on German territory. When this occurs . . . Germany will have a ground strength which would be fully able to assume the role fulfilled in the past by the Western garrisons: namely of assuring that any military encroachment by the Russians would, to stand chances of suc-

area from some 500 miles to the east of their present positions in East Germany and traverse Poland and Germany, which would either fight to defend themselves, or, as a minimum, be able to harass and impede the Soviet advance. The time interval inherent in such an advance, even unopposed, would permit NATO forces to take the Soviets under air and mis-



US Army

Berlin is a volatile danger spot where the risks are known by both sides

ress, have to assume dimensions which would make a general war unavoidable.

Furthermore, German forces could be joined and supported by NATO forces as required as soon as the Soviets reentered the formerly evacuated satellite area.

Time Interval

As far as the threat is concerned, Soviet forces would have to launch any ground attack against the NATO

sile attack and to reenter Germany under previously prepared plans.

The preponderance of Soviet ground strength would be of relatively less advantage in view of the loss of surprise and the increased vulnerability of Soviet forces in an attack across central Europe.

The Soviet ground tactical nuclear capability would initially be under the disadvantage of no longer having forward launching sites in central Europe.

Inspection System

All the preceding presupposes that in the central zone there would be some form of effective system of inspection to prevent the Soviets from covertly establishing missile launching sites, stockpiles of weapons, or introducing forces by clandestine means. Such inspection would be militarily feasible, although we leave for the moment whether it is reasonable to expect that adequate political arrangements would be carried through to make it work.

Looked at still from a military viewpoint the states in the central zone could be expected to raise and support ground forces substantially as follows: Germany (unified) 16 divisions; Poland 15; Czechoslovakia 10; Hungary (if included in the central zone) seven. NATO (less Germany) would have some 10 divisions on the Continent supported by NATO air and nuclear missiles. The current NATO "forward strategy" certainly cannot hope to defend every square inch of German soil by making a stand precisely at the zonal boundary. Thus since even NATO as now constituted would have to give at least some German ground under attack, a substantially different situation would not exist if German forces provided their own forward defenses with NATO forces initially behind the Rhine prepared to intervene.

Given an adequate inspection system in the central zone, the NATO and Soviet force withdrawals previously referred to, and the maintenance of the US strategic nuclear capability, there appears to be no conclusive reason to think that NATO could not accomplish its defensive mission as well as under present conditions.

If a persuasive argument could be

made, therefore, that significant political advantages could be realized as a result of such a change in the military situation, then disengagement in the form just outlined would leave the United States and her allies no worse off than at present, particularly since there is evidence that the political future of NATO has many uncertainties even under current conditions.

The critical question, then, seems to be: Is this disengagement scheme politically possible, and, if so, would it be politically desirable?

Political

It is in the political and psychological spheres that disengagement is most clearly inadequate. As one writer has put it, the political consequences of disengagement are what make it unacceptable rather than our concern that the Soviets will launch an attack the minute American troops are gone. Certain aspects of the concept make it infeasible and certain others render it undesirable.

With respect to the repositioning of NATO forces (particularly US forces) now in West Germany, although such a redeployment of US and UK forces to France and the Low Countries is conceivable, two immense obstacles stand in the way: money and De Gaulle. The costs of reconstructing the troop and training facilities and the entire support structure for the redispersed forces would be staggering.

Quite probably the lack of funds for such a mammoth project would alone preclude a disengagement plan. Beyond this, there is no reason to believe that the French Government in any foreseeable frame of mind would be willing to receive this mass

⁵ Roger Hilsman, "Some Basic Requirements for East-West Settlement," *Social Science*, Volume 2, October 1958.

nitude of US forces and installations.

These two considerations have led some to conclude that a withdrawal of US forces from Germany would be tantamount to their withdrawal from Europe altogether.⁶ Such a development would completely change the picture and invalidate such military justification as there may be for the model disengagement plan.

Even assuming that repositioning were possible, to what extent would the United States and her allies find a "better" Europe after disengagement? What about the satellite area, and what about Germany?

Dangerous Situation

The disengagers' concern is that the satellites present a dangerous, potentially explosive situation. The key point, however, is what constitutes a dangerous situation. It is true that in the prenuclear age any abnormal situation was considered essentially dangerous. But in the nuclear age, as Raymond Aron has so well expressed it:

... the dangerous situation is not the abnormal one. It is rather the equivocal situation in which there is no clear line drawn between the two camps and between war and peace. The division of Germany is abnormal, but it leaves no room for ambiguity.

The "stumble into war" that Walter Lippmann has been so concerned about is less likely to come in Europe from an unpredictable border patrol clash more common to the Middle or Far East than through Soviet probing for advantage where the Western allies may have no clear-cut idea of what they would do in response.

⁶ Text of talk by Dean Acheson to NATO Nations' Legislators Meeting in Washington, *New York Times*, 19 November 1959, p. 12.

⁷ Raymond Aron, "Answer to George Kennan," *Western World*, Number 10, February 1958, pp. 13-17.

The Soviets probably strongly suspect what would happen if they attacked West Germany. Would they be half as sure what the United States and her allies would do after foreign troops had withdrawn from central Europe if, for example, the Soviets exploited unrest in a former satellite, made a limited incursion to stop alleged atrocities, and presented the West with an ambiguous provocation to which it could not react positively and in unison? Would such a situation cause the United States to resort to thermonuclear war when she could depend on being a target herself?

Nationalist Opposition

If the answer is no, then disengagement as a means of getting Soviet forces out of the satellites so that they can develop their own political freedoms would not produce the long-range objective desired. On one hand, the regimes in the "neutralized" former satellites would, at least initially, be those that were in power prior to Soviet withdrawal. They might well feel that they had to take stringent measures to resist any liberalization lest tendencies be unleashed which they could not control.

At the same time, would not the departure of Soviet forces encourage nationalist opposition to Soviet-oriented regimes and lead to other Hungaries? Khrushchev has said that the Soviet Union would always lend "timely assistance to a fraternal Socialist state." It could hardly be expected that, even if the Soviets were to agree on a pullback of their forces, they would be content to see the satellites become politically reoriented away from the Soviet sphere. Only dream-world logic could visualize the USSR "giving up" both military in-

fluence in *and* political control over this area, at once a buffer from and an avenue toward the West.

Seen in this light, disengagement would invite new dangers while reducing the forces to meet them. If upheavals occurred in the satellites following Soviet withdrawals, Soviet forces would be readily available to assist in their suppression while US forces would be farther off than at present.

As for the central problem of Germany, one must ask first, whether the foreseeable realities of the power situation between East and West could possibly produce a unified Germany under conditions acceptable to both sides; and, second, even if such a unified Germany came into being, whether it would add stability to Europe or just the reverse.

The likelihood is that neither the Soviet Union nor West Germany and her allies will be able to accept a plan for the reunification of Germany containing provisions that the other considers as minimum essential requirements. The USSR will not agree to a proposal that does not ensure eventual Soviet control of Germany. Naturally, the West will not accept a plan that runs this risk.

Unified Germany

Even if one despairs of a unified Germany in the present power contest, what would be the advantages of unification from the US point of view under the terms of the model plan?

If a unified Germany were armed (a condition essential to an acceptable NATO military posture) she would be a significant factor in the European balance of power. Both sides would vie for her support, and both would fear the direction in which she

might eventually tend. Not only would Germany be the prime target of Soviet pressures, but as a nation neutralized by international agreement, she would present us with an ironical problem.

The United States would logically seek the support of the other treaty powers to keep Germany from straying from the path of neutrality. This would imply the existence of some form of US and Soviet cooperation over Germany, a concept that becomes almost ludicrous when one realizes that any German deviation from neutrality in a direction favorable to the Soviets would hardly motivate the Soviets to take corrective action.

There is another complicating factor. One could scarcely expect a unified and armed Germany to remain content to live for long under restraints on her sovereignty imposed by international treaty. Germans would begin to ask why they should abstain from possession of the most modern weapons, especially after the departure of US forces from Germany, an event which would raise uncertainty about what the United States would really do if Germany were attacked.

The lack of a demonstrable US commitment to fight in Germany's defense would argue strongly for German possession of the nuclear weapons that would be her only hope of successful deterrence or defense. One wonders how realistic it is to assume that the psychology of German nationalism can be so transformed that this kind of discrimination would be tolerable for long.

It should be evident, if this analysis is correct, that even an effective system of inspection and control over the central zone would not be the key

to the success of disengagement. The factors affecting success are too deep, too complex, and too little subject to manipulation to be overcome by a procedural device to ensure against violation of certain provisions of an international agreement. The detection of violations would not be as difficult a problem as that of carrying out effective action after detection.

One concludes, therefore, that the kind of Europe that would exist after disengagement would be less stable and more subject to risks than is the *status quo*. It would not necessarily be a "better" Europe from either the US or European point of view. The fundamental reason is that Germany and the satellite area would remain, as they are now, a high stake in the struggle for power and security between the Soviet Union and the Western allies. Removal of foreign forces from the area would render the balance more precarious since the military vacuum created would be filled only by a treaty commitment whose strength would depend on Soviet honorable intentions—a commodity notably in short supply.

The Balance of Terror

The problem is how to maintain the conditions of stability in Europe that will prevent terror from becoming calamity. Disengagement of Soviet and NATO forces in central Europe, while superficially attractive, would lead to an imbalance in the power situation in Europe to the disadvantage of the West. As such, the resultant condition would be less stable, more productive of tensions, and less likely to perpetuate even the present uneasy peace.

The purely military problems connected with disengagement might not be insurmountable. But it is totally

unrealistic and even disastrous to isolate the "purely" military. The real difficulties—and dangers—lie in the political field and in the psychological effects of disengagement on the future resolve of the Western allies to persevere in the common effort.

The present situation is not as dangerous as the disengagers suggest. Eastern Europe is not on the verge of revolt. The conditions existing in that area are not such that we are likely to "stumble into war." The assassination of a latter-day Austrian archduke is not likely to be the determining factor in a major power's decision to go to war. Even granting that Berlin is the most volatile danger spot in the world today, if the Soviets try to force the issue there, they will be accepting the risk of war. In such a case the proximity of Soviet and NATO forces in central Europe will not in itself have been a causative factor.

The present confrontation of Soviet and Western power in Europe has at least the advantage of presenting an unambiguous situation. If our basic strategic defense concept is to prevent war by deterrence, it follows that the enemy should have a clear idea of what he cannot do without bringing on our counteraction. Disengagement would render the likelihood of that action more equivocal.

The direction in which the Western Powers should proceed is to continue to confront the Soviets in Europe with unequivocal power. This means the strengthening of NATO and the development of really effective forces, both tactical and strategic, which, by constituting a clearly credible deterrent, will better maintain the balance of terror upon which our survival in this imperfect world seems to depend.



BUT WHAT ABOUT DUNKIRK?

Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall,
United States Army Reserve, Retired

A review of *The Sands of Dunkirk* by Richard Collier, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, 1961, was published by the MILITARY REVIEW in December 1961, page 111.
—Editor.

AMONG attractive recent books is *The Sands of Dunkirk* by an Englishman, Richard Collier.

The title reveals the subject matter. Its theme—the so-called miracle of the British Army's escape from the German noose in May 1940—has heretofore attracted some literary giants, among them John Masefield who wrote *Nine Days Wonder* in 1941.

In a longer and more entertaining book than Masefield's, which throbs with human interest, Collier has topped all the others. The Poet Laureate put his accent on the event

rather than on the people who energized it. Collier writes of the actors, large and small, in their triumph and tragedy. It is a person-to-person story like John Hersey's classic *Hiroshima*. The job of research which makes such revelation possible staggers the imagination.

Still, oddly enough, the haunting mystery of why the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) made it back to England (316,663 British and French troops escaped through Dunkirk) when Hitler's hosts had Lord Gort's Army figuratively in the palm of their hand is intensified, rather than explained, by this book's oversimplifications.


Viewers from afar were enthralled by the story when the news was first flashed that the bulk of the BEF, evacuated from France, had been saved to fight somewhere else another day.

But what made it possible, the weather? Every book on Dunkirk published since that time has had a different explanation. Since no two of them agree, the reader may either take his choice or simply gape at a prime example of how history is woven out of various fables.

Collier is quite certain that he has the true explanation. His book does not advance it as a hypothesis or fer-

principals are either dead or have become old men depending on their memories.

To clarify what is under discussion, let's turn to the situation of about 20 May 1940. The Hitler armies had broken into France at Sedan. Then an armored corps out of General Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group "A," which is going at France, streaks for the channel coast. On 23



Ships leaving Dunkirk for England during evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force

British Information Services

tile speculation. It is told as if it happened just that way, giving dates and places, naming the main actors, and quoting, supposedly verbatim, their orders and conversation. This is tricky stuff when the chief German

May the German armor reaches blue water at Abbeville, cuts the line of the Somme, invests Boulogne and Calais, while the Luftwaffe unloads its heaviest bombs on Dunkirk.

Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall, United States Army Reserve, Retired, is an editorial writer and military critic for The Detroit News. He was Theater Historian, European theater of operations, during World War II, and was with the 8th Army in Korea during the fighting there.

All the ports useful to the British are under assault. At Abbeville the Panzers are in the right position to wheel and in a relatively short run seal off Dunkirk. So doing, they will be on the rear of a British Army not yet in retreat and under attack from General Fedor von Bock's Army Group "B" in Belgium.

Spearhead Is Halted

Then on 24 May, when the vise seemed ready to close, the order was sent by the German High Command to halt the armored spearhead on the line of the Aa Canal and hold there. That was done; the German tankers used the break to rest and swim and play.

A gap opened on the British rear for a few days of high crisis—just long enough for Gort's Army to slip through to Dunkirk and glory. What went wrong with the German drive to end the war in the west at one fell swoop?

Collier tackles this mystery right around the ankles. He explains that Rundstedt was an old-fashioned soldier, ever fearful that his armor would run too far too fast and become trapped. So he, Rundstedt, first ordered the tanks to pause at the Aa Canal. Then, Collier continues, the army's supreme commander, General Walther von Brauchitsch, takes to the idea, decides that the 1,200 or so Panzers are wasted in the broken country amid the coastal canals, and orders that they be transferred from Rundstedt to Bock so that they can make a complete swing-around and attack from the front in Belgium.

Soon after, according to Collier, Adolf Hitler arrives at Rundstedt's headquarters and hits the ceiling. He is outraged at the halt order, beside himself that the Panzers are to be shifted (physically) to Bock's distant army. And well he might be (if this were true), for Nazi Germany had made her first fatal operational blunder. Then from Collier we get the picture of Rundstedt, through massive calmness and reason, gradually winning Hitler over to his notions of how to manage the big battle. Some

days later it becomes plain as a pike-staff that the BEF has slipped away and all the big Germans go around kicking themselves.

This is an intriguing story. Collier describes the boob plays with relish. The one trouble is that according to the most pertinent record of all it is 180 degrees wrong.

Revealing Document

Among my World War II souvenirs is the day-by-day command diary of General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Supreme Command, which job posted him at Brauchitsch's elbow. It has never been published, yet it is the most illuminating document kept by any German during World War II.* The notes on decision making and the personal attitudes which influenced it could hardly be fuller or more revealing.

Let us turn the page to the entry of 23 May when events took their fateful turn. We find Halder quarreling with Brauchitsch because he thinks his chief is either in a blue funk or lacks guts. Brauchitsch has just issued the order which, giving Bock's Army Group operational control over General Paul von Kleist's Panzers at Abbeville, stops them on the line of the Aa Canal until Bock can bring about control. Rundstedt has nothing to do with it except the relaying of the message.

Further, it was never in Brauchitsch's mind that the tanks would pull back from the coast and make a circle tour into Belgium. He was thinking of the envelopment as a nutcracker operation, Bock's armies to push from the front, Kleist's tanks to collect the

* A translation of parts of the Halder Diary is available among the Nürnberg trial documents. In recent years General Halder has been engaged in the preparation of a complete, annotated version of his diary.

British fragments on the rear, in the classic maneuver.

For the sake of timing and coordination, he felt both jaws of the pincers should be under one commander. Bock was the obvious choice since Rundstedt's main forces were moving on a different axis. Halder's quarrel with him was that he didn't think this was Brauchitsch's real reason. The

He orders that the new boundary line (shifting the Panzers to Bock) must not go into effect today. Says he must talk to Brauchitsch at once. Brauchitsch answers summons.

Within a few hours Brauchitsch is back, chastened. There has been a stormy scene with Hitler. Naturally, Hitler wins the argument. It is that the Panzers will be held right where



British Information Services

A sailor assists a wounded British soldier, followed by French troops

commander should be running the show himself and was trying to duck from under. Wrote Halder: "It's his own device to escape responsibility, but he also foregoes the honors of victory."

Hitler's Inspirations

Then next day, 24 May, Hitler gets with Rundstedt. Yes, he hits the ceiling. From Halder's diary:

they are under Hitler's orders only. And why? Because the Führer has concluded that Bock has enough power to destroy the BEF, provided that the Luftwaffe interdicts Dunkirk. It is another of his inspirations—a lunatic idea of how best to manage the big battle.

General Halder wrote:

He has the fixed idea that the battle of decision must be fought on

Flemish soil and not in northern France. To camouflage this political move, the assertion is made that Flanders is unsuited for tank warfare. This completely reverses the elements of our plan. We want to make the armor the hammer and Bock's armies the anvil. Now Bock will be the hammer but what of the anvil? Bock is going against a solid front. His progress will be slow, his casualties high. This divergence of views costs more nerves than does the conduct of operations.

The proposition was elementary. The argument of Halder and his chief with Hitler was simply that the surest way to break an army is to get on its rear, and when that advantage is won, it is madness to throw it away.

Still, for 70 hours, Kleist's Panzers stayed in suspension doing nothing, while Hitler wrangled with his top military advisors. Meanwhile, Gort's worn divisions were slipping past the pincers' jaws to the port.

Fantastic Order

The question remains: Did Rundstedt discuss this concept with Hitler as is stated categorically by Collier? In support of his explanation, Collier quotes Colonel (later General) Gunther von Blumentritt, Rundstedt's Chief of Staff. Having long dealt with defeated German generals, including Blumentritt, I would note that their memories are undependable and some are overinclined to say what the listener is pleased to hear. In my conversations with Rundstedt, he blamed Hitler absolutely and called the order "fantastic."

But let us look again at Halder's diary. There is this entry on 26 May:

Rundstedt, too, apparently cannot stand this folly any longer. He has gone up front to Kleist and Hoth to

get the lay of the land for the next moves by his armor.

If this means what it says, then Rundstedt was renouncing the order and risking Hitler's wrath.

Moving forward in the morning, he had picked the propitious moment. At noon Halder's telephone jangled. It was an aide calling in for Hitler, who had changed his mind:

The Führer authorizes the left wing (Kleist's armor) to move up within artillery firing distance of Dunkirk.

At the same time Brauchitsch was summoned to the presence. The diary says:

He returns beaming at 1430. The Führer has given permission to move on Dunkirk and stop the evacuations.


But there was no longer anything for Mr. B to beam about. What three days earlier had been the open and fully vulnerable rear of the BEF had become a fighting flank.

There follows in 24 hours this entry by Halder: "On the left wing Kleist is encountering far stronger resistance than was expected. The attack makes very slow progress."

Then toward the close of the Dunkirk episode, there was one final lament as Halder wrote:

Brauchitsch is angry this morning. The reason is the effect of blunders forced on us. We lost time. The pocket might have been sealed at the coast if only our armor had not been held back. Bad weather has grounded our air force. Now we must stand by and watch countless thousands of the enemy get away to England right under our noses.

There are many stories about why the miracle happened. At least this one was not written in the vain hope that it will have settled all argument.



ROTC Required or Elective?

David M. Young

STUDENTS and educators on many campuses across the United States are vigorously attacking the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program. The attack centers not on ROTC as a whole, but on the widespread compulsory feature that requires students on some campuses to take two years of ROTC training.

Anticompulsory sentiment is becoming so widespread and intense that the entire program may be jeopardized. In the Midwest alone, the giant universities of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan State, and Ohio State in varying degrees already have curtailed ROTC, and several other schools are considering the move.

Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, note the growing assault on compulsory ROTC in their book, *Education and Military Leadership. A Study of the ROTC*, published in 1959:

Recently, however, a number of developments have created considerable concern among many college administrators and military planners. These developments include the failure of the federal government to provide continuous and meaningful support for legislation authorizing aid in the construction of ROTC facilities, the reexamination at several institutions of the requirement for compulsory basic ROTC instruction, the high turnover rate of officer personnel from ROTC and other procurement sources, and the general decline in enrollment in ROTC courses.

In a pamphlet entitled, "The Campus Protest Against ROTC," by Allan Brick of Dartmouth, published by the American Friends Service Committee and distributed to all National Student Association (NSA) delegates at the national NSA Congress at Madison, Wisconsin, in August 1961, general campus discontent

with compulsory ROTC also is noted.

At present there are perceptible anticompsulsory movements on most major campuses, including particularly active movements at the Universities of Arizona, Arizona State, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan State, Missouri, Ohio State, Oklahoma, Oregon State, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.

Michigan State University adopted a voluntary program in the spring of 1961; Ohio State University has offered an academic substitute for compulsory ROTC since the spring of 1961; and Wisconsin abolished its compulsory program in 1959.

The Department of Defense has considered the problem critical enough to issue several opinions. Charles C. Finucane, Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Eisenhower administration, maintained that compulsory ROTC was not necessary to satisfy Army manpower needs. His viewpoint was widely interpreted as an expression of the official Defense Department position. Subsequently, then Secretary of the Army Wilbur M. Brucker stated in effect that compulsory ROTC was necessary to meet the Army's annual requirement for second lieutenants (then 14,000 per year). Neither the United States Military Academy at West Point nor the Officers' Candidate Schools graduated enough officers to fill the need.

Although the Department of Defense and the Department of Army today see eye to eye on the requirement for ROTC, the divergent views expressed earlier only served to con-

David M. Young is on the staff of The Daily Illini published by the University of Illinois. He is an advanced Reserve Officers' Training Corps cadet at the university.

fuse the colleges affected by the statements. Several administrators felt that the Department of Defense's seeming impartiality to the issue justified abolition of compulsory ROTC. Others felt that the Army knew better whether it could meet its quotas without compulsory ROTC.

Current Thinking

With the change of national administration, those colleges that were still undecided about a proper course of action requested another statement of the Defense Department position, and, to a lesser extent, the Army's. In April 1961, Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a letter to Dr. Clifford M. Hardin, chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Association of Land-Grant Colleges and State Universities (many of which have compulsory ROTC), reviewed certain facts and conclusions the Defense Department had developed up to that time. His letter discussed the current thinking in five areas of interest:

1. The Department of Defense is considering entirely new programs for the Army and Air Force ROTC programs. (The Air Force already has announced a new, shorter program of a completely voluntary nature.)

2. The Defense Department reiterates its long-standing position that the ultimate decision on the retention or abolition of compulsory ROTC lies with the individual schools and states, and that properly organized and supported elective programs could fill the Army manpower quota.

3. The Defense Department will support the ROTC program at any school that maintains a *status quo* on compulsory ROTC, pending adoption of new programs.

4. The Defense Department urges enthusiastic local support of the ROTC program, especially if an elective program is instituted.

5. The Defense Department urges the individual schools to include instruction on national security affairs for the benefit of the student body as a whole.

Clarification Needed

Reaction to this letter was varied and indicated that the situation still needed clarification. Michigan State abolished compulsory ROTC, Ohio State offered a substitute for compulsory ROTC, and Illinois decided to retain its program pending a statement from the Army on whether elective ROTC would seriously endanger its ability to meet its manpower needs.

Though many smaller schools have virtually no ROTC program, among the larger schools ROTC may be found on both an elective and a compulsory basis. Compulsory programs are not, however, restricted to the large, land-grant schools. In 1960, of the 233 schools having Army ROTC, more than half (154) had a compulsory program. Of the 154 compulsory schools, 61 were land-grant colleges.

Land-grant colleges generally have larger enrollments, varying from about 10,000 to 20,000 undergraduates, and usually furnish a substantial part of the Army's manpower. For example, the Universities of Minnesota and Michigan, both land-grant schools with elective ROTC programs, each graduate about 50 second lieutenants per year, while Illinois with a slightly larger undergraduate enrollment and a compulsory program graduates 150 to 200 second lieutenants each year.

Before some of the finer points of the compulsory ROTC controversy can be discussed, it is helpful to know a

little about the history of ROTC, the compulsory ROTC programs, and the term "land-grant college."

The Morrill Act

The Land-Grant Act of 1862, commonly known as the Morrill Act after its author, Congressman Justin Morrill of Vermont, provided that tracts of Federal land, given to the states, were to be sold with the stipulation that the funds raised from their sale be devoted to the "endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts. . . ."

Since most colleges during the late 19th century offered fairly standardized and rigid programs of studies anyway, and in conformance with the provisions of the Morrill Act, a course in military tactics often was required of all males. Supplementary acts of 1866, 1888, and 1891 provided that Regular Army officers, rather than the overburdened civilian faculties, were to teach military tactics. The term "land-grant college" refers to a school that was either established or assisted as a result of this form of Federal aid.

The National Defense Act of 1916 incorporated ROTC, whereupon many schools then replaced military tactics with a compulsory ROTC program, even though they were under no obligation to do so. For the most part, the land-grant state supported schools made ROTC compulsory in the first place. These are the schools now involved in the attack on compulsory ROTC.

Compulsory Training

The word compulsory, in regard to ROTC, often is misleading. At most schools with a compulsory program, all able-bodied males who have not seen previous military service, or who have not had prior military training such as high school ROTC, who are below a given age, or who have less

ship, simple communications, map reading, small unit tactics, and the role of the Army in national security. He drills one hour a week. He must wear his uniform at drill during which the manual of arms, military discipline, and courtesies are taught. By far, the greatest objection to compulsory ROTC, regardless of what its



US Army

The subject matter taught in ROTC courses includes military history, an important part of the cadet's training

than a junior standing in school (on a class-hour basis) must enroll in basic ROTC. Participation in some activity such as playing in a band may exempt them.

The basic cadet spends about three hours a week for two years to satisfy the ROTC requirement. He generally spends two hours a week in class studying military history, marksman-

opponents contend, arises from the uniform regulation. Only slightly less onerous is attendance at a drill regulated by upperclassmen demanding military bearing and courtesies.

Upon successful completion of the basic program, a student may enroll in the completely elective advanced course. It is from the advanced course, taken during the junior and senior

college years, that the new second lieutenants are commissioned.

Individual compulsory basic ROTC programs at each school are the subject of much discussion, both pro and con. The compulsory ROTC program each year introduces thousands of college freshmen to military service. The reaction to this introduction is not always enthusiastic. Students have labeled ROTC everything from "a waste of time" to "Mickey Mouse"—a college slang term referring to anything trivial and of little value—and even "undemocratic."

Opposition Not New

The attack on required ROTC is not unique to the post-Korean War decade. A large-scale assault on compulsory ROTC was waged during the 1920's and early 1930's, when the threat of war seemed remote. As a result 17 major colleges, including such notable institutions as Boston University, City College of New York, University of Cincinnati, Georgetown University, and Rose Polytechnic Institute, abolished compulsory ROTC. Several schools, including Wisconsin, reestablished the compulsory program during World War II. Although the cry against ROTC subsided temporarily during the war years, soon after the Japanese surrender the anticompulsory ROTC assault again got underway. The Korean Conflict likewise saw a slackening in the attack on the required program and a renewal when the shooting war ended.

Today, the attack on compulsory ROTC stems primarily from two sources: disgruntled students and college faculty members. According to Colonel Merton E. Munson, Professor of Military Science at Michigan State:

The source of opposition to required ROTC seemed to stem princi-

pally from a limited number of students, some of whom were girls, and some faculty members. The basis for their opposition to a nonelective program appeared to be that such a program 'infringed upon the academic freedom of the University campus.'

Faculty Criticism

Faculty opposition to required ROTC appears to be directly proportional to student sentiment. Although many faculty members generally will remain silent until student sentiment is aroused, they doubt the academic value of ROTC, according to a survey taken at several large midwestern universities in 1961. Evidence of this low academic evaluation is often reflected in the class-to-credit-hour ratio at many schools. On many campuses, a student is allowed only part credit for the number of hours that he spends in ROTC class. For example, several schools give a student only one credit hour for every three hours that he spends in basic ROTC class. Many colleges and departments within the universities refuse to give any credit whatsoever for ROTC, either basic or advanced. In other words, a student may be forced to spend three hours a week in a course in which he is receiving no credit from his college or department.

Much of the faculty criticism of the ROTC program is seemingly well-founded. In many instances the basic course program requires little study on the part of the student. Several professors have attacked the intellectual level of the ROTC textbooks, which are in some respects identical to those used by the Army in regular basic training programs. One Ohio State basic cadet was heard to comment:

The multiple guess (college slang for multiple choice test) type test is so simple that one need not study at all to pass the course—if he is awake during class. A better type testing should be devised for this course. The tests are a farce.

Staff Overburdened

A few of the professors interviewed attacked the ROTC staff as being overburdened with noncommissioned offi-



US Army

An instructor points out shot grouping to a member of an ROTC rifle team

cers who lack college educations themselves, and officers who have apathetic attitudes toward teaching ROTC. One college astronomy instructor maintained that there were several non-commissioned officers teaching at his school who were not able to compete intellectually with their students. The instructor cited an example, brought to his attention by an irate student.

The student, a sophomore majoring in astronomy, had used the term "Constellation Cassiopeia" in answer-

ing a question on celestial navigation. The sergeant grading the paper marked the answer wrong even though it was technically correct. When the student inquired about the basis for marking the question wrong, he was told flatly that the Army manual calls the constellation The Big M (so named because Cassiopeia is in the shape of an M. Also called, by Army manuals, the Big W) and, therefore, no other answer was acceptable. The student fled to his astronomy instructor who considered the sergeant's action nothing short of heresy. The outraged instructor could only interpret the action as indicative of the Army's inflexibility and oversimplicity. He condemned the entire ROTC program on the strength of one oversight.

Student Influence

Such action is common. Many college instructors are heavily influenced by the complaints of students, even though the complaints may be groundless. As was pointed out by Colonel Munson, few college faculty members have actually seen ROTC classes in action and must, therefore, base their arguments on secondhand information.

Colonel Josef E. Prall, Professor of Military Science at Wisconsin, wrote:

... and a limited number (of students) indicated that they felt that the ROTC courses were not college level. The latter was a frequently expressed opinion by faculty members, most of whom, however, would readily admit that they did not know what was being taught in ROTC, that they had never visited an ROTC class, and that their opinions were largely based on student complaints.

The role of the faculty member in the attack on ROTC should not, however, be overemphasized.

There are large numbers of college professors who favor the retention of compulsory ROTC, not only for the benefit of the Nation, but for the students' benefit. Of the faculty members who expressed an opinion on ROTC, about half felt that ROTC was worthwhile. Those who favored compulsory ROTC generally felt that the program could be made more worthwhile, but that it should not be abolished, merely altered slightly.

Those against compulsory ROTC favored the substitution of an elective program for the existent program. Virtually none favored the complete abolition of all ROTC programs. Many felt that if the compulsory ROTC program could be made more worthwhile, then it should be retained. A few felt that compulsory ROTC is archaic, that it stifles academic freedom, and that it should be abolished at all costs.

Most of the professors admitted that they were not too familiar with the subject matter being taught in basic ROTC, although they had a reasonably good idea. Few professors favored the idea of their colleges granting more credit hours to ROTC, even for academically stronger programs.

On the other hand, the role of the student in the attack on compulsory ROTC cannot be underestimated. Students are able to influence their civilian instructors, their local administrations, their parents, and even local legislators. A solidly built argument attacking the intellectual side of ROTC can be quite convincing, especially if the listener is not familiar with ROTC.

Active and Passive Resistance

Student oriented attacks on compulsory ROTC range from active to passive, depending on the amount of

popular support available and a school's policies on demonstrations and picketing. Usually, attacks against ROTC are unorganized, although they may be supported by popular acclaim among the students. Passive resistance usually is exhibited by a contempt for the basic program on the part of the unwilling participants. Sloppy dress, deliberate disregard for military bearing, lack of attention to details, and apathy are all symptoms of discord among the ranks of the college underclassmen. Passive resistance, though harmless, usually is frustrating to the local cadre and advanced cadets, and can forewarn of an active assault on required ROTC.

Active resistance to compulsory ROTC may come from any quarter of the college campus, from the student newspaper to the student assembly, and small pressure groups.

Student governing assemblies, comprised largely of underclassmen, regularly condemn compulsory ROTC. Student governing bodies from the University of Massachusetts to Purdue University and the University of California have indicated that an elective program is preferable to the *status quo*. At Illinois, armed with a quote from the Finucane letter, the student senate passed legislation which, in effect, asked the university administration to press for an elective program. Ohio State's senate attempted to organize a mass anticompulsory ROTC demonstration on the same day that the local ROTC unit was having a parade.

The National Student Association, the American student union with chapters organized on about 380 campuses—which claims to be the voice of the 1.2 million college students in the United States today—also stands

against anything but elective ROTC. In 1960 the NSA declared that compulsory ROTC was "an infringement upon the academic freedom of the American college student, of questionable academic value in a student's education, and a great waste of some student's time."

Organized Resistance

Most campus newspapers editorially attack compulsory ROTC, either on principle or academically. *The Daily Illini* (Illinois), *The Daily Cardinal* (Wisconsin), *The Exponent* (Purdue), and *The Lantern* (Ohio State), among others, all have editorially opposed compulsory ROTC. An editorial in the *Michigan State* daily stated:

President Hannah [President of Michigan State University] the administration and the Trustees should be commended for recognizing the wishes of the students and the faculty. But the mood of calm in which the recommendation [for the abolition of compulsory ROTC at Michigan State] was passed should not conceal or blur the past agitation and constant pressure of these groups. Their hard work and reports were largely responsible for bringing about Tuesday's change [the abolition of compulsory ROTC there by a 4-2 vote of the Board of Trustees on Thursday 18 May 1961, reversing an earlier decision].

Ranging from mass demonstrations to picketing and "committees of correspondence," organized resistance demands the doom of the required program by popular acclaim through peaceful and constitutional means of public expression. In short, it is geared to overwhelm by weight of numbers the faction who believe in compulsory ROTC.

One interesting example of organized resistance to compulsory ROTC occurred on the Illinois campus in the spring of 1961. A group of about 20 students formed an organization called Students Against Compulsory ROTC, abbreviated SACROTC. The sole aim of the group was, as their title implied, the abolition of compulsory ROTC at Illinois.

Although the group's efforts were fruitless, they did manage to create such a controversy that the university officials were seriously considering the ROTC problem. A strong lobby by the local American Legion unit, an aggressive defensive campaign by the local ROTC cadre, and an administration that refused to be bullied by the student body finally doomed the campaign for voluntary ROTC. SACROTC produced and distributed a "flyer" the wording of which conveys the anti-compulsory ROTC sentiment of an excellent cross section of the students that it affects. The flyer said:

Army bureaucrats, of course, give other opinions, but we place our trust in the Department of Defense, which, it might be pointed out, has no occupational vested interest in the matter.

Under the present compulsory system, a large number of students who have no intention of becoming officers are forced to waste several hours a week for two years, while participating in an onerous and objectionable program which does neither themselves nor their country any appreciable amount of good.

Could not the money wasted on these students be better used to help educate scientists and technicians? We believe this would help our defense system more than a program which attempts to indoctrinate unwilling college students in marching,

regulation shoe polishing, and military folklore.

Finally, the defenders of forced ROTC (this refers to several comments made by the American Legion in its defense of compulsory ROTC) claim that it builds 'Americanism' and good, disciplined citizenship. Since when has our country needed a

take two years of ROTC. Many feel that the money "wasted" on these students could be better used elsewhere. Many feel that the instruction gained in ROTC is not of a high enough quality to warrant taking it.

Often a small segment of "radicals" can create the impression that an entire society favors one thing or an-



US Army

A motor-powered raft is used in a river crossing demonstration during ROTC summer training

military machine to train or indoctrinate its youth in citizenship?

Shades of Benito Mussolini!

Forced RO (slang for ROTC) must go!

We want educators not dictators!

Aside from its emotional ending, the flyer contains the crux of the anticompsulsory ROTC argument. This sentiment is not limited to one campus. Many students who have no intention of continuing in ROTC do not see why they should be forced to

other. It simply is not true that the entire student body of every school having required ROTC favors its extinction. Although there is no accurate index to student sentiment on this subject, measurement probably would show about a 50 percent division of feelings. As in the case of the various college faculties, the more conservative students see no reason for expressing themselves. They do not form committees or demonstrate for compulsory ROTC because they

feel such actions are unnecessary. Since the conservative element usually does not make itself heard—most students in favor of compulsory ROTC seem to be the older upperclassmen—it often appears that only the liberal viewpoint prevails.


Cross Section of Opinion

Underclass opinion on compulsory ROTC recently was probed by the author in a questionnaire distributed to

scale. The questionnaire was aimed at the so-called average student who was compelled to take basic ROTC.

A majority of the respondents felt that ROTC was academically inferior to other university courses. Many of the students felt that ROTC was a waste of time and that the subject matter taught in basic ROTC was generally inferior to subject-matter taught in other university courses.

Most students held that the local



Sandtable instruction during ROTC summer camp

U.S. Army

about 1,000 basic course cadets at the University of Illinois. Although no claims are made as to the validity of the answers as an index of feeling of the total student population, the answers reveal a cross section of opinion at a land-grant school, and are indicative of some definite feelings that have been evident on a national

ROTC instructors were not responsible for the poor academic standing. Generally, they rated their ROTC instructors equal or better than their civilian college instructors from the standpoint of interest in the material covered and teaching in general.

Students who were planning to continue ROTC felt that they had bene-

fited from the basic program, while those who were not going to continue with ROTC indicated that they had gained little.

Most of the participating students believed that some kind of a change was necessary in the compulsory program at Illinois. The exact changes desired varied widely. Many students indicated that a more demanding program was in order. Those who wanted a tougher program also wanted more credit for their efforts.

As might be expected, a large number of the interviewees felt that the only solution was a voluntary program.

Drill Program

Students were more critical of drill than any other part of the ROTC program. Conservatives and liberals alike thought that drill should be changed. Again, there was no real unanimity on the exact course of action to be taken, but drill was attacked as being everything from too rigid and "Prussian" to too easy and even archaic in its approach.

The weight of the attack on the ROTC drill program indicates that a general dissatisfaction exists; however, it should be pointed out that many of the complaints were trivial and personal. (Example: "I don't like Cadet Second Lieutenant Jones because he doesn't give a left flank' on the proper foot.") Without fear of contradiction, we may conclude that most of the students don't want to wear the uniform or observe the discipline and military courtesies required by ROTC, even for as little as one hour per week.

Active student opinion is definitely against compulsory ROTC. Student demonstrations against the required program are now commonplace, stu-

dent newspapers continually attack the program, and student legislatures oppose compulsory ROTC. Faculty opinion judged by the sample is against compulsory ROTC on the grounds that it violates academic freedom.

It seems that there is still no concrete plan of action which military and civilian planners can follow. Both the Department of Defense and the Army have stressed local autonomy on matters of compulsory ROTC. However, the Defense Department maintains that the Army has no manpower requirements which demand the existence of a large compulsory program while the Army has, in the past, differed with that view and maintained that it needed the compulsory program to meet its 14,000 new officers per year requirement. The quota now has risen to approximately 16,000 men. The Army is studying the possibility of a large-scale voluntary program to replace the existing programs, but the plan as yet has not been announced.

ROTC—An Institution

It is obvious that there are several military colleges, like Norwich University and Virginia Military Institute, at which compulsory ROTC is, by its very nature, an institution. These schools can be depended on to retain a *status quo*, and produce a given number of new officers every year. However, these military schools generally graduate a fixed number of officers each year, and cannot be counted on to expand. They will continue to provide the Army with a number of second lieutenants each year, but will not keep up with the rising population.

It is equally evident that, regardless of the rising population figures,

the existing voluntary programs have not expanded; in fact, some have even declined. Minnesota adopted an elective program in the early 1930's and graduated almost 150 officers per year then. Today, Minnesota commissions only about 50 officers per year even though its enrollment had doubled. In 1956-57, the University of Michigan graduated 89 officers from its voluntary program, but by 1960 the number of commissions had dropped to 53, even though the enrollment increased.

Publicity Campaign

If a voluntary program is the answer, and it seems certain that compulsory ROTC is due for revision at most public schools unless some widespread action is inaugurated immediately, then a publicity campaign will be needed to attract prospective officers to the program. Comparatively, the Army ROTC program does not seem to appeal to students the way that Navy ROTC does.


The subject matter taught in ROTC courses is going to have to be brought up to the level of other college courses. Many military educators feel that the answer may lie in a general slackening of the "during school" courses

and a corresponding increase of emphasis on summer camp-type study courses. The Air Force already has proposed to eliminate basic ROTC and has substituted a two-year program which concentrates most of the subject matter during the summer camp period between the junior and senior years. The Army is considering such a move. The combined manpower requirements of the Air Force and Navy ROTC programs, however, are exactly half that of the Army. The Army, therefore, will need a recruiting system, starting virtually from scratch, that will be larger than that possessed by the Navy and Air Force together, if the Army is expected to meet its quotas.

Only time will point to the correct action. The problems are large, but not insurmountable. At present, the Army is caught between a proved system that is dying and a modern replacement that yet has to come off the drawing boards. The Army presently does not meet its manpower quota but is devising a solution to its problem. Rome, too, found that she could not meet her manpower quotas without conscription. It is possible that history already has indicated the answer.

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SOVIET MILITARY AID

SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

THE cold war which the Soviets wage under the perfidious password "friendly coexistence" is designed to offset the Western pact system and to establish permanent beachheads and bases for further expansion in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The undisputed success in this field is the result of the flexible employment of Soviet economic aid, including the export of arms and military training personnel. This planned operation under the collective concept of Soviet economic aid represents one of the major weapons in the cold war. It has proved for the Soviets to be the best method of infiltration and display of power in the so-called underdeveloped countries.

Thorough examinations by Western experts have revealed documentary evidence that the Soviet Union and the satellites of the Eastern bloc employ economic and military aid exclu-

sively to achieve clearly defined political goals. In a report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program which was published in August 1959, this was clearly expressed:

... it (Soviet military aid) is to be considered a cause for economic chaos, political discord, and social disorder rather than an aim for development and stabilization. It induces political upheaval, party and personal intrigues, and suicidal guerrilla wars. It constantly strives to support the fol-

This anonymous article was translated and digested from the original which was published in WEHR UND WIRTSCHAFT (Federal Republic of Germany) May 1961. First published in German under the title, "Die Sowjetische Militärhilfe—Der Ursprung Internationaler Konflikte."

lowers of the Communist Party but in the long run seeks political and economic dependence of the recipient countries upon the Soviet world.

The full story of Soviet military aid has not yet been written; it would be exciting but depressing reading. It would have to tell about the political errors of the West and the carelessly created vacuums into which the Soviets moved in pursuance of their aims.

Export of Obsolete Weapons

Soviet military aid, which sails under the colors of economic aid, is primarily the result of the reorganization of the East bloc forces. This reorganization, decided upon by the Soviet military chiefs between 1955 and 1956, involved the abandonment of the old Stalin doctrine which called for the employment of immense troop masses. Giving up this doctrine left an enormous arsenal of weapons and equipment. Their maintenance and storage alone entailed astronomical expense.

Accordingly, the Soviet leaders were faced with the alternative of scrapping this materiel or finding a market for it. Only a part of this stock was in a marketable condition.

The agreement between Egypt and Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1955 represents an example of Soviet arms export in practice. Czechoslovakia turned out to be an obedient and willing traveling salesman for the USSR.

The Model Example—Egypt

Soviet military aid techniques have attained impressive perfection. No binding clause was imposed in the first agreement with Egypt. The arms were delivered through Czechoslovakia under the most favorable conditions, including long-term credits at a low in-

terest rate. The weapons were sold below the so-called world market price, there were no restrictions whatsoever in regard to type or model of arms, and presumably there were no political strings.

Egypt, who was also negotiating with the West, found the Soviet conditions extremely advantageous, for the West imposed complicated provisions in regard to credit and method of payment.

The Soviets wanted to prove that dealings with the Soviet bloc could be more pleasant and more profitable than transactions with the West and that political dependence does not necessarily follow. This illusion was strengthened by the fact that the Soviets in this case expressly waived sending advisors and training personnel. This clever beginning of Soviet military aid had an important effect upon other countries such as Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.

Import of Soviet Doctrine

The military collapse of the Egyptians in the Sinai Campaign caused Nasser to contemplate the reasons for failure. He arrived at the conclusion that Western military doctrine was to blame because it obviously was not adapted to the existing conditions. He, therefore, resolved to train the new Egyptian Army according to Soviet doctrine with the aid of Soviet advisors. This denoted the beginning of Sovietization of the Egyptian armed forces.

From then on the sending of Soviet training personnel and advisors was a prerequisite to Soviet military aid. In addition, about 1,000 officers of the United Arab Republic (UAR)¹ from all branches of the service attended

¹ This article was written prior to the dissolution of the United Arab Republic in September 1961.

military schools in the Soviet Union and the East bloc countries. Some of the courses, for instance at the Military Academy in Moscow, were two to three years in length.

"Warsaw Pact" for Africa

There should be no doubt that Moscow considers this "Egyptian model" as an article excellently qualified for export. Moscow will intensify its efforts in that direction, primarily in the African and Asiatic countries. In Africa, the Soviets must visualize a type of Warsaw Pact, an undertaking which has been partially realized.

Morocco's independence was obtained under King Mohammed with a pro-Western policy of neutrality in mind. But, less than four years later, Soviet *MiG's*, military aid for the Moroccans, have landed in Rabat on the airfields built by the United States. These were accompanied by the Soviet Vice Minister President Bresniev, who arrived for an official visit.

One year before, Morocco had made overtures to purchase arms in the United States. The USSR coupled the aircraft delivery with the promise of diplomatic assistance for Morocco's claims in Mauritania. The USSR used this same method in the Far East by promising aid to Indonesia for her claims on Dutch New Guinea. As these territorial claims of the young nations are a matter of national prestige, communism has succeeded in arousing strong anti-Western feelings in these areas almost overnight.

The Soviet *MiG's* delivered to Morocco, without a doubt, will serve as a Trojan horse to open the gates for Soviet infiltration in Morocco.

If Sovietization progresses according to the Egyptian model, and the establishment of an African high command materializes, nearly all members

of these forces will be equipped with Soviet war materiel, the first step toward complete Communist penetration.

Infiltration Through Arms Deliveries

The Soviets pursue another scheme to deliver arms via Morocco. The recent change of sovereigns in Morocco seems to favor the Soviet efforts because King Hassan II is known as a strict nationalist who has indicated anti-Western feelings.

In 1959 Guinea also accepted Soviet military aid. Since then an important beachhead of the Eastern bloc has come into existence there. The first agreement provided for the delivery of 8,000 old rifles, a small number of antitank and antiaircraft cannons, and a few armored vehicles. The arms were delivered as a "gift" from the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany. All these countries now maintain embassies in Guinea with many hundreds of persons who have been specially trained for political, economic, and military tasks. It is known that the President of Guinea, Sekou Touré, was refused arms by the United States in April 1959. He then turned to the USSR which took pleasure in fulfilling his requests and thus found an obliging promoter of Soviet policy who, with Egypt, could form the nucleus for a future African army.

Soviet military aid to Algiers is a special story. There is proof that the Algerian rebels received aid indirectly from the USSR, either through the satellite states of the Eastern bloc or through Egypt. The Soviets have always stayed behind the scenes. Nevertheless, the extent of the military aid was sufficient to maintain the activity of the rebel army and even to guarantee a gradual buildup of arms.

Most of the arms reached the rebels

in Algiers by overland route via Egypt. These are partly Soviet materiel from Egyptian stocks and new products made in Egyptian factories with the aid of Soviet facilities, technicians, and licenses.

Political Infiltration

Since the Belgians' withdrawal, the Congo has become the object of another concentration of Soviet expansion endeavor. However, the expulsion of the diplomatic missions of the East bloc countries, and the ousting of several hundred dubious "advisors," prevented the realization of this scheme at the last minute. There is still a flow of weapons and equipment into the Congo. According to American information the arms are shipped up the Nile from Egypt into Sudan, then overland to the Congo.

Moscow will not hesitate to sustain civil war in the Congo. Five thousand followers of Lumumba have received comprehensive training in guerrilla and sabotage warfare in the USSR. When employed in the Congo, they will be under the leadership of Soviet and Czech officers.

There seems to be proof that Soviet ships have unloaded their arms cargo in Port Sudan, surely, however, without the knowledge of the government of Sudan. The anti-Communist leaning of Sudan is a fact which does not preclude the Eastern bloc and later perhaps the African states from exerting growing pressure on this country. In 1955 the Sudanese Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari was approached with concrete proposals during his visit in Cairo. Another approach was made by Czech functionaries in 1956.

After the collapse of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai Campaign in November 1956, the numerous Soviet advisors hurriedly withdrew from Egypt

via the Sudan to their homeland. The treatment which the Communists received during their brief stay in Sudan was rejective and under the strict control of the Sudanese authorities.²

Sudan is firmly set against any Communist influence. This country, which was led into national independence by the British after a leading native upper and middle class had been cultivated for such a move, has obviously recognized the fatal blessing of Soviet gifts in the form of military aid. During the first part of April 1961 the British Foreign Office announced that Sudan purchased six armored vehicles, 12 amphibious vehicles, and four jet aircraft from Great Britain. This order was a result of Major General Hassan Beshir Nasr's visit in London. Nasr is a Minister in the Cabinet of General Abboud and Commander in Chief of the Sudanese armed forces. This agreement seems to portray a relationship of trust between London and Khartoum.

Information that considerable shipments of arms were recently unloaded on the coast of Somaliland has been confirmed. These arms deliveries are supposedly the result of a military agreement concluded between Nasser and the Minister President of Somaliland. This example reveals the consequences that Soviet military aid has in the African countries.

Nasser, Moscow's Arabian Pupil

Soviet military aid to Egypt, which began in the fall of 1955, must be considered a typical case of Communist infiltration tactics. This action began with the withdrawal of the British from the Suez Canal Zone.

² Since this article was written, Sudan is reported to have signed an agreement for the USSR to provide 22 million dollars worth of industrial machinery to that country.

Naturally, the Soviets pushed into the vacuum thus created. When Nasser asked the West for arms in June 1955, the conditions quoted were so unfavorable that the chance to trade weapons for Egyptian cotton fell into the hands of the Czechs. From then on Soviet advisors and Soviet influence poured into that country.

The exact value of the Soviet military aid for Egypt, prior to the Suez venture, has never been made public; however, it is estimated at roughly 60 million dollars. This estimate is based on the substantial value of the Israelian war booty comprising 600 tanks, mainly *T34*'s and *JS100*'s, about 650 antitank and antiaircraft cannon of various caliber on self-propelled mounts, 10,000 light automatic weapons, more than 6,000 vehicles—mostly jeeps and trucks of Soviet make—and approximately three million gallons of fuel.

Major General Weitzmann, Commander in Chief of the Israelian Air Force, recently declared in London that the UAR received during recent years more than 200 *MiG-17* aircraft, from about 60 to 80 bombers, and even a few modern *MiG-19*'s. The almost pathologic hatred the Arabs bear toward Israel plus the pledges of Nasser and Kassem to extinguish the Jewish land with fire and sword in a "holy war" highlight the possibility that a small spark could ignite the Arabian powder keg.

The little country of Yemen, which in 1958 joined the United Arab States, cannot be overlooked. Yemen received Soviet military aid as early as 1955; however, it was limited to light automatic weapons, mortars, antitank guns, and a few *T34*'s. The latter proved unfit for practical use in Yemen. However, in the spring of 1958,

the troops of Yemen made considerable trouble for the British by intermittent minor warfare along the borders of the Aden protectorate.

The penetration of the Soviets into the Middle East, primarily by means of military aid, has given them considerable influence over the local armed forces, and has provided bases which pose a threat to the waterways vital to the West. Soviet submarines which are based at Alexandria could restrict forces of the US 6th Fleet in the event of war and harass maritime routes in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Soviet submarines in Yemen represent a danger for the British base at Aden and also for the strait of Bab el Mandeb and the Persian Gulf.

In Portuguese Angola, on the African Continent, police authorities discovered quantities of small arms of Czech origin after the suppression of the recent uprisings. These were probably smuggled in from Cairo, hence, initially supplied by the Soviets. It is interesting that it was established that the majority of the leaders of these uprisings entered Angola illegally from foreign countries.

Iraq and Jordan

Soviet arms have been brought into Iraq in large quantities since the revolution in the summer of 1958. Subsequently, the standard equipment of Iraq's forces was adapted to the Soviet system. These gigantic arms consignments were shipped by sea and unloaded at Basra. Soviet military aid techniques in Iraq have been an exact repetition of those used in the classic Egyptian case. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Kassem has managed to carry on a smooth political seesaw policy which at times has allowed him to

ignore or suppress the Communist partisans in his country.

These developments in Iraq, a former member of the Baghdad Pact, are especially noteworthy because the forces of Iraq under the former pro-Western regime of King Faisal and his Prime Minister Nuri al Saïd had been exclusively equipped with British and American arms and materiel. The training of the army and air force also had, for the most part, been performed by British military advisors.

After this success in Iraq, it is not surprising that Moscow attempted to make Jordan dependent upon the USSR through military aid. Under King Hussein or Glubb Pascha, the former Chief of General Staff of the Jordan armed forces, the chances of success for such dealings were very slim. Therefore, in July 1957 the Soviet military attaché in Syria induced General Ali Abu Nuwar to conclude a secret arms treaty under which the Soviet Union pledged to deliver to Jordan several hundred T34 tanks, 40 MiG-15 interceptors, and approximately 300,000 light automatic weapons.

It was the Soviet Union's misfortune that King Hussein discovered the activities of Chief of Staff Nuwar in time. Prime Minister Nabulsi, who had been let into the secret, was dismissed. General Nuwar fled to Cairo where he now maintains and directs a well-endowed center for political agitation and propaganda against Jordan.

The Plot Against Turkey and NATO

The Soviets saw clearly that whoever has Turkey as an ally essentially determines the trend in the Middle East. Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the Turkish Republic is a pillar of the defense sys-

tem against Soviet aggression. A few days before the political upheaval in Turkey, Menderes had accepted Khrushchev's invitation to visit Moscow. Menderes allegedly explained the purpose of this feeler to the Soviets by stating that he would try to get extensive financial aid in the Soviet Union.

It would have been a good bargain for the Soviets to make a generous offer of aid to Turkey in the form of economic and military gifts. There is no doubt that the realization of such an agreement with the Soviet Union would have been disastrous for NATO.

Located farther east, Afghanistan was pushed into a neutral alliance with Moscow. Afghanistan has always had ties with the West. The official and unofficial attempts of this country to obtain military armament from the West have ended each time in disappointment. The reasons given for the Western refusals were that a military emancipation was undesirable because Afghanistan shares a common border with the USSR. She necessarily maintains economic relations with that country. It was also felt that Soviet interest in the Phaton mountain tribe, which is settled only partially on Afghanistan territory, would inevitably lead to conflicts and border disputes with Afghanistan and Iran. Oddly enough, these very same reasons caused Moscow to seek relationships with Afghanistan.

In 1956 Moscow succeeded in concluding the first treaty on the delivery of light arms to Afghanistan. The treaty runs over a period of eight years and approximately 11 million dollars are involved. This marked the beginning of comprehensive cooperation in military aid. In the following year an exchange agreement, provid-

ing for the trade of obsolete *MiG* aircraft for cotton and minerals, was signed. This agreement stipulated that Afghanistan would permit entry of 500 Soviet technicians and military advisors.

These technicians and advisors are treated by the Afghans with suspicion and at times with open contempt. But this has not deterred the Soviets from other efforts. They have built several strategic roads and airfields. The Soviet *Aeroflot* airline is guaranteed the use of the latter. Today, Afghanistan is, for Soviet strategy, a salient base against Pakistan, and Iran if necessary.

In the past year the author had the opportunity to discuss this problem with Afghan leaders. They expressed great concern about the Soviet penetration because it discloses an approach to the age-old dream of Russian foreign policy—that is, to hold a firm base for a thrust to the Indian Ocean.

Burma and Laos

In Burma also the Soviets have improved their position by means of practical military aid. Last March, the Burmese Chief of the General Staff, Nu Win, and the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service allegedly signed an arms agreement in Moscow. Reuter correspondents mentioned anti-aircraft artillery, *MiG* interceptors, and other war equipment, valued at approximately 25 million dollars. If this transaction actually goes through it may be expected that hundreds of technicians and so-called advisors will pour into that country and take care of the Sovietization according to the classic scheme. Thus Burma could become a threat against East Pakistan, Thailand, and even the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization as a whole.

The most convincing current example of Communist infiltration through military aid is, without a doubt, Laos. Prior to the commencement of the rebel actions, the Soviets shipped, within four months, more than 200,000 tons of war materiel into the assembly areas of the *Pathet Lao* via North Vietnam. During the recent battles an estimated 200 tons of materiel was supplied daily, mainly by air. The Soviets have performed thousands of flights, openly and under the observation of American pilots. These efforts enabled the Communists to take possession of more than 60 percent of the eastern area of this country to secure a superior position for negotiations at Vientiane.

The Laos conflict revealed publicly for the first time the effects of the internal struggle for power within the Communist bloc between the Soviet Union and China. It is not known yet to what extent Red China took part in the enormous arms deliveries for the rebel army in Laos. Having possessions or influence in this country is of relatively minor value for Moscow; however, this is not so for Red China. Red China was interested in participating in the international negotiations on this dispute as an equal and in this way forcing the recognition of her regime. That is why the Soviet Union agreed to truce negotiations during which the United States and Red China would meet for the first time at a conference table. Nevertheless, the example in Laos proves what inevitably follows for small countries after an arms pact with the USSR: He who dines with the devil needs a long spoon.

Total Sovietization of Indonesia

Economic relationships with the USSR by an unstable, unorganized,

and young national structure is an experiment with life and death. The best proof of this is furnished today by Soviet "coexistence" with Indonesia.

To be fair, it must be said that Sukarno, the President of this young country, has tried to practice a policy of neutrality. In pursuance of his aims

respect for the territorial claims of the Netherlands on New Guinea. Consequently, the Soviets had an easy task during 1955-56 with an agreement providing for the exchange of military aid for products such as rubber, coffee, and pepper for which the Indonesians needed a market. An-

CHINA TO AID GUINEA
 Technical Agreement Signed for Development Projects
 CONAKRY, Guinea, Sept. 19 (Reuters)—Guinea and Communist China have signed a technical aid agreement which Guinea will receive in Chinese loan equivalent.

GHANA GETS SOVIET AID
 Signs Contract for Building of a Volta Power Plant
 LONDON, Sept. 25 (AP)—Ghana has accepted more than a vast Volta River project from the Soviet Union.

POLES AIDING GHANA
 Technical Experts Will Grow From 14 Aides to 36
 ACCRA, Ghana, Sept. 7.—The number of Polish technical experts working on industrial projects in Ghana undertaken with Polish aid will be increased from fourteen to thirty-six.

Peiping Offers Indonesia Rice
 JAKARTA, Nov. 4 (AP)—Communist China, itself short of food, has offered to supply rice and clothing to Indonesia to help her over a shortage, the Indonesian Government announced Saturday.

SCHOLARSHIPS FOR IRAQ
 Soviet Bloc Lands Offer 65 for 1961-1962 Year
 BAGHDAD, Iraq (Reuters)—The Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Rostavia and Poland are offering Iraq sixty-five scholarships for the 1961-62 school year.

RED AID FOR ETHIOPIA
 Soviets to Begin Work Soon on an Oil Refinery.
 Moscow, Nov. 16 (AP)—Tass reported today that Soviet technicians soon will begin construction of an oil refinery on the Red sea coast.

Nepal-China Pact Ratified
 Special to The New York Times.
 KATMANDU, Nepal, Nov. 13.—The instruments of ratification of a ten-year treaty of peace and friendship between Nepal and Communist China were exchanged in Peiping Monday, according to the Foreign Ministry here.

The daily press provides frequent reminders of the extent of Soviet penetration of developing nations

for order, he tried to purchase the military equipment for this vast nation of islands from both sides—the countries of the West and the Soviet bloc. But foreign policy considerations did not permit arms deliveries to Indonesia because of the Communist influence in the country and

other credit offer in the amount of six million dollars was the beginning of a series of military deliveries valued at nearly 25 million dollars. In view of the Indonesian balance of trade, this is an astronomic figure.

Even when the United States declared herself willing to deliver equip-

ment for 20 Indonesian battalions, the policy toward Indonesia was somewhat ill-fated. The American offer gave rise to a vehement protest by the Dutch who pointed out that these troops would be used for an invasion of Dutch New Guinea.

Great Britain also had stated that she was ready to fill an order for about two dozen seagoing transports. This, however, led to a heated debate in Parliament and as a result only 18 *Gannet* patrol vessels, which were to be put out of service by the navy anyway, were sold. But Indonesia had no trouble in placing orders for the construction of ships. Most of these orders were with Italian and West German shipbuilding yards but part went to Polish shipyards.

The agreement on the delivery of arms concluded on 6 January 1961 in Moscow amounts to nearly 420 million dollars. With this the Soviet position in the Java Sea has been firmly cemented. In this strategically important area, Moscow has figuratively obtained its own military bases.

The full seriousness and meaning of the direct interference of Moscow in the internal affairs of Cuba have actually never been realized. The military aid rendered to Castro greatly exceeds the help the Soviets have given Cuba in the economic sector. Moscow played up the Cuban question to an international problem of first rank supported by immense deliveries of arms to maintain a terror regime of a Communist mold. The world, and especially the United States, has from the beginning offered opposition merely through diplomatic protests which did not prevent the Soviets from continuing their systematic subversion.

Annihilation of the Western World

During the course of one year, the Soviets have delivered arms valued at more than 60 million dollars to Castro. Because of Soviet aid Cuba now has the largest ground forces in the Western Hemisphere, except for those of the United States.

The Free World is obviously unable to comprehend that according to Communist theory the war against the non-Communist world never ceases. Peace is only a temporary cessation of battles in the military sphere during which the cold war with its psychological, political, and economic measures of blackmail and infiltration goes on. There has never been a moment since the October Revolution in which the binding force of this ultimate goal of Communist policy has been abandoned.

Coexistence is only a tactical interlude for the purpose of causing the Free World to defer necessary armament measures and to give the Soviets the opportunity to better their military positions, to reduce the risk of aggression, and then to dare the attack. The proposed disengagement in central Europe, again propagated by the Communists, also serves this purpose.

The interpretations of the Soviet-Chinese secret agreement are confirmed in practice; they are the source of all international conflicts. This is expressed in their foreign policy by economic and military aid, disengagement propaganda, Cuba and Congo actions, as well as in their internal policy of increasing and speeding up armament; Moscow's goal still remains: to again make feasible a war of aggression against the West by reducing the risks involved.

The charges of colonial oppression and exploitation which have been hurled at the Western Powers by the residents of the Kremlin have thrown a smokescreen over the colonization which has been going on within the USSR and her satellites since the Communists' revolution.

This article discusses the oppression of non-Russian groups within the USSR. "Soviet Colonialism in the Baltic States" published in the January 1962 MILITARY REVIEW outlines the methods used to subjugate the countries of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia to Russian control. "The Evolution of a Police State," which will appear in a future issue of the MILITARY REVIEW, sheds light on these methods and their significance to military evaluations.—Editor.

STEP by step with the growing tendency of Western empires to abolish colonies, a powerful colonialist movement is developing under the control of Moscow. This movement, moreover, is not merely communistic, but Russian—a nationalist imperialism. It threatens to swallow up those countries which are emerging from the Western colonial system, and to rob them of the independence which they are in the process of acquiring.

The most important sign of this expanding colonialism is the Soviet Union's annexation of foreign territories—begun during World War II and leading to the establishment of a vast system of satellite countries. Moscow's colonialism, however, strikes not only at foreign countries but also at non-Russian regions within the Soviet Union herself.

It is strange that the head of the

RUSSIAN COLONIALISM WITHIN THE USSR

Paul Barton

Russian Government should so readily claim to be the champion of independence for colonial peoples. It is even more strange that he should presume to refer to the "independence and self-determination" enjoyed by the various nationalities within the Soviet Union. Confronted with such presumption, we would do well to glance a little more closely at the real situation of these nationalities.

This article was digested from the original which was published in NATO LETTER, June 1961. First published under the title, "Imperialism in the Soviet Union."

The author is a sociologist and writer who has concentrated on problems of totalitarianism.

It is true that the Soviet Constitution describes the USSR as a Federal State comprising 15 Federated Republics. If, however, we look beyond Soviet officialese, we find that "federated" does not mean quite what it means elsewhere. As early as 1913, Lenin categorically rejected any idea of a Federal State, in that federation is a "union of equals, depending upon common consent."

After Lenin and his successors achieved power, they nonetheless accepted the principle of federation, but only after they had emptied it of all real meaning. Their squalid "federalism" was a distribution of power and functions among authorities at different levels. The Soviet State, operated like an enormous business, is a structure in which different components participate, not with various interests and rights, but with various kinds of subjection.

Where Are the Ministers?

Thus since 1944 the Federated Republics are constitutionally entitled to have their own foreign affairs ministries, and to enter into direct relations with foreign states, concluding agreements and exchanging diplomatic representatives. However, except for the Ukraine and Belorussia, which are represented at the United Nations (thereby increasing the number of Soviet votes), not one Federated Republic has so far maintained a foreign mission of any kind. Their foreign affairs ministries exist only in theory.

The Federated Republics also obtained the right to have their own defense ministries, but this right also has proved illusory. Command and organization of the Soviet armed forces is so highly centralized—and distinguished, moreover, by a marked

predominance of the Russian nationality—that it is hard to see what role these ministries could play. Not one order from the defense ministry of a Federated Republic has ever been published. The explanation is not difficult to find: No such ministry has ever been set up, and a minister of defense in a Federated Republic has yet to be appointed.

Nominal Right to Secede

Similarly, the right of each Republic to withdraw from the Soviet Union was written into the Constitution at the outset. This right was conceded to the Federated Republics by the men in power for purely propagandist reasons. In 1913 Lenin not only rejected federalism, but also the right of secession: "Generally speaking," he said flatly, "we are against secession," adding that "the right to secede is an exception to our general centralist position," but that this exception was necessary to keep the chauvinistic Russian elements in check.

In other words, the proclamation of the right of secession had no purpose other than to obtain the support of the national minorities who were being threatened and ill-treated by Russian chauvinistic elements. In any case, during the 43 years' existence of the self-styled federative state, not one Federated Republic has ever begun the procedure necessary for leaving the USSR.

In fact, only the opposite has thus far occurred. For example, during the early years of Soviet power, the armies under its command overthrew by force the governments of several territories which had attempted to separate from the Russian State. This happened to Georgia, the Ukraine, Turkistan, and the Crimea.

Toward the end of the 1920's the

movements known as "National Independence" and "National Unification" were liquidated on the pretext that they were working for "the overthrow of the Soviet regime and the institution of a bourgeois state." Eight Armenians were executed in 1938, after having been accused of "wishing to separate Armenia from the Soviet Union." Moreover, "agitation and propaganda aimed at undermining or weakening the Soviet State" are considered as treason and punishable by up to seven years' imprisonment.

Changes of Boundary

Finally, the Soviet Constitution lays down that no change may be made in the boundaries of a Federated Republic without its consent; but in practice, no Republic has ever opposed plans to take away part of its territory or even to wipe it out completely. Part of the Finnish Karelian Republic was incorporated in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in 1945, and the rest of its territory went the same way in 1956, which put an end to its existence as a Federated Republic. In 1955 the RSFSR itself ceded the Crimea to the Ukraine; the following year, part of the territory of Kazakhstan was transferred to Uzbekistan; and in 1957 Georgia presented the RSFSR with its part of Chechen-Ingush territory.

In view of the precarious status of the Federated Republics, it is scarcely necessary to dwell on the national formations at a lower level—the Autonomous Republics, the Autonomous Regions, the national zones, the national districts, the national village soviets, and the national collective farms, all of which are integrated in the Federated Republics and particularly in the RSFSR. Even the illusory constitutional guarantees providing rights

of secession and of territorial integrity do not extend to the Autonomous Republics, let alone their internal components. Larger or smaller slices of their territories are incessantly transferred, as are their capitals. National zones and districts emerge and disappear. All these matters are settled by simple decree.

Communist Party Is Centralist

No picture of Soviet pseudofederalism would be complete without mention of the Communist Party organs which "double" the governmental bodies at all levels, and direct them. It may be said without exaggeration that the governmental bodies are mainly concerned with carrying out the decisions of the party.

The Soviet Communist Party, centralist as it is, does not exhibit the slightest trace of federalism. The Communist Parties of the Federated Republics are not autonomous parties, even on paper. Their Central Committees are classified by Communist Party statutes as regional committees, and their congresses as regional conferences. All these bodies are entrusted with the task of ensuring that directives from the Secretariat of the Central Committee are duly implemented. Party officials in the Federated Republics—and still more in the Autonomous Republics—are frequently not of the same nationality as the bulk of the population concerned; specifically, there is a very high proportion of Russians among them.

Russianization

Until 1956 there was one exception to this arrangement: The Russian Soviet Republic had no party organization of its own. Since 1956 there has been a bureau of the Central Committee directing party activities in the

RSFSR, but its powers are extremely limited. This is not a form of discrimination against the RSFSR but, on the contrary, an indication of its privileged position. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is, in fact, the Russian Communist Party, and the Communist Parties of the other Federated Republics are merely its offshoots.

Walter Kolarz, an expert on Soviet policy toward nationalities, has revealed the marked predominance of Russians among party members—es-

First, there was a massive influx of Russians intended to form an elite. These ranged from skilled workers to party leaders, administrators, and police. In addition, the local nationalities were deprived of their customs, were taken on as low-level workers in the emerging industries, and were even transferred to other regions.

A Change in Moscow's Policy

As time went on, Russianization received more and more powerful encouragement from a radical change

20-YEAR BALANCE SHEET

Freedom Lost Through Communism		Independence Gained Through Democracy	
Captive Regions	Millions of People	Former Governing Country	Millions of People
Eastern Poland	10	Belgium	13½
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	6	France	63½
Tibet	3	The Netherlands	70
Bessarabia	3½	United Kingdom	523
Karelia	½		
East Prussia	¼		
Ruthenia	¾		
Eastern Europe	90		
	114		670

pecially among the leaders. The same author has also pointed out the Russian character of the 1917 October Revolution: The Bolsheviks, by urging the supremacy of the proletariat over the peasants, established Russian domination over all the other peoples who were chiefly rural.

The exploitation of distant and underpopulated territories dealt a double blow to the native inhabitants.

in the Moscow policy toward nationalities. Despite the Russian character of the Bolshevik Revolution, this policy in the early days made it a point of honor to oppose Russian chauvinism.

Step by step, however, Moscow policy came to require only a struggle against "local nationalisms," and since the 1930's this has been its dominant, if not only, preoccupation. Its

most striking manifestations are the introduction of the Russian alphabet among a number of nationalities (a few years after the introduction of the Latin script), compulsory instruction in the Russian language in all non-Russian schools (decreed on 13 March 1938) and the mass deportations of minority nationals to distant regions inhabited by other minority nationalities.

This last procedure is the most characteristic feature of Russian colonialism as practiced within the Soviet Union. This colonization has involved the migration of scores of thousands of people. Native populations who were alone in the "invaded" territories soon found themselves in the minority; in many places, it seems that they are doomed before long to disappear.

The evolution which these regions have undergone since some of the concentration camp prisoners were released does not represent any radical break with the past. A large proportion of those released are compelled to remain in the area. Others have been replaced by convicted criminals. Finally, there are also to be found there the young people who have been enrolled in other regions through pressure of various kinds, and the workers taken on under "organized recruitment." Thus these regions continue to be increasingly Russianized by other peoples who are themselves being Russianized.

Exploiting the Virgin Lands

Similar onslaughts have been organized in recent years as campaigns to exploit virgin or fallow land. During his recent tour of inspection in Kazakhstan, Nikita Khrushchev made a speech at Akmolinsk. Among other things, he observed:

Our hearts are filled with pride in our country when we find among the best workers in the virgin lands the names of Russians and Ukrainians, Kazakhs, and Belorussians, representatives of all the peoples of our multinational homeland. We have here Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Jews, and Germans: All the ethnography, so to speak, of our great Soviet Union is here represented, and all are working valiantly for the good of our Soviet people who are building Communist society.

Commenting on this colonialist profession of faith, Walter Kolarz raised the key question:

Who could believe that the Letts wanted to turn their backs on their civilized capital of Riga in order to settle on State farms in the province of Kustanai where they are cut off from their national culture and their traditions, and deprived of the comfort to which they are accustomed?

The Disappearing Kazakhs

And what has happened to the Kazakhs who were once the sole inhabitants of the country which is being colonized? This unhappy people, which numbered almost four million in 1926, had already been reduced to three million in 1939 as a result of the forced collectivization of agriculture and the crusade against nomadism.

At present, the Kazakhs number a little over 3.5 million, but only 2.8 million of these live in Kazakhstan where they represent only 30 percent of the population. Nearly four million inhabitants of this Federated Republic gave their nationality as Russian in the census of 1959; the number of Ukrainians living there is over three-quarters of a million.

In short, the colonization of minority territories by members of other

minorities makes it possible to kill two birds with one stone. The colonists themselves soon become Russianized, since they find themselves in the middle of an ethnic mosaic where Russian is the only common language. More than half of the 1,380,000 Poles living in the USSR no longer speak Polish.

In the regions from which the colonists depart, Russianization is accomplished either directly by Russians or indirectly by citizens of other minority groups. The case of the Baltic States is typical. In Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, Russians make up a tenth, a fifth, and more than a quarter of the respective populations; the proportion of the native ethnic group has been reduced to four-fifths in Latvia, less than three-quarters in Estonia, and less than two-thirds in Lithuania.

Mass Deportations

Additionally, mass deportations and transfers affect nationalities by increasing the mortality rate and reducing the birth rate. The last population census in the Soviet Union provides eloquent proof of this. The number of Kalmyks living within the territory of the USSR dropped from 129,000 in 1926 and 134,000 in 1939 to 106,000 in 1959; nearly one-tenth of the survivors no longer speak their native language. The Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians in the Soviet Union are less numerous than in 1940; the difference amounts to 300,000 for the first, 150,000 for the second, and 10,000 for the last.

It goes without saying that when a phenomenon occurs on this catastrophic scale, it is the result of avowedly punitive deportations. We should have no illusions as to the methods used in current population transfers, the effects of which will be

seen in future censuses. Even where these transfers are officially justified on purely economic grounds, as in the case of the organized descent on the virgin lands, most of the colonists are thrust into living conditions which can only result in increased death rates and lowered birth rates.

Several Soviet writers, who had previously glorified the "reeducation" carried out in the concentration camps, have had the courage to paint a truthful picture of the life led by the settlers in the virgin lands—it is a grim picture, indeed. But there is no need to look for information in literature; to see what is happening, we need only glance at the newspapers and the official statements which continually complain of the impossibility of preventing the escapes, flights, and departures of the colonists.

Denationalization

While emphasizing this particular feature of Russian colonialism—the deportations and transfers of peoples—we should not lose sight of the fact that the Soviet Government also makes use of "classic" methods of denationalization.

Compulsory instruction in Russian throughout all non-Russian schools has already been mentioned. In addition, the number of hours devoted to teaching Russian in these schools increases as courses become more advanced, to the detriment of instruction in the national language. In the national schools of Uzbekistan, for example, Russian in the eighth year takes up six hours per week and Uzbek two hours.

We have also seen that members of minority groups are unable to send their children to national schools if they live outside their national territory.

It should be added that Russian schools are attended by numerous native children even in non-Russian republics. The percentage of school children in Russian schools in Belorussia amounts to more than double the percentage of Russians among this republic's population; much the same applies to Georgia; and in Armenia and Moldavia, the proportion is as high as three times the percentage of Russians in the population. Among other reasons is the fact that previous attendance at a non-Russian school is a handicap in applying for admission to a higher educational institution, and is thus prejudicial to the individual's career.

The press plays an important part in the Russianizing process. Only a third of the newspapers published in the USSR appear in the languages of those minorities, which make up 45 percent of the population; the circulation of non-Russian papers represents only 17 percent of the over-all circulation of the Soviet press. Russian domination is still more marked as regards magazines and books.

The combined effect of these differ-

ent denationalization methods shows in demographic statistics. The proportion of Russians in the population as a whole is increasing rapidly: 36 percent in 1897, 53 percent in 1926, and 58 percent in 1939. Territories inhabited by more than 22 million non-Russians have since been annexed, but Russians nonetheless still account for 55 percent of the population; if we add the 10.2 million members of other nationalities who gave their native tongue as Russian at the last census, the proportion rises to 59 percent.

Russians numbered 78 million in 1926, 99 million in 1939, and 114 million in 1959; the minority nationalities numbered some 69.5 million in 1926, 70.5 million in 1939, and 95 million in 1959 after the annexations. In other words, the non-Russian population remained stationary from 1926 to 1939, and then increased only by the population of newly annexed territories. It follows that its natural growth has been obliterated by Russianization. Never before has a colonial power succeeded in so firmly barring its subject peoples from future development.

Following the Second World War, whole nations and peoples were swallowed up behind the Iron Curtain in violation of agreements and without a free vote of the peoples concerned. These included Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and then Czechoslovakia in *coups d'etat*. . . .

The disgrace, barbarity and savagery . . . of Soviet imperialist rule is indicated by the never ending flow of refugees from the countries made colonies by the Soviet Union. More than 12 million persons have escaped since the Second World War from the Soviet Union, Communist China and the areas they control: Albania, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Tibet.

Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson

MR

1922
Fortieth
Anniversary
Supplement
1962

40



Elvis J. Stahr, jr.
Secretary of the Army

Message From the Secretary of the Army

The Military Review, during 40 years of continuous publication, has spanned an era which saw the Army expand from 137,000 soldiers in 1922 to a peak of 8,290,000 in World War II; an era in which the foundation of tactics changed from the machine-gun dominance of World War I to the reality of mass destruction weapons on a nuclear battlefield.

Throughout this age of remarkable development, the Military Review has kept pace with the needs of the Army it serves. Through its close association with the Command and General Staff College, it has provided an important medium for the presentation and dissemination of modern Army doctrine. As a forum for the expression of informed opinions and advanced thinking, the Military Review has afforded our military leaders that opportunity for critical analysis and frank evaluation which is so essential to progress.

The international flavor imparted by a judicious seasoning of its contents with articles translated from foreign military sources keeps the United States Army informed on important doctrinal developments and evolutionary concepts in other countries. The Military Review also serves uniquely as a vehicle for the exchange of thought between military leaders of all countries serving the cause of freedom.

As our Nation faces the grave challenges of today and tomorrow, the need for the development and discussion of new ideas for the advancement of our national security has never been greater. I am confident the Military Review will help to meet this vital need in the future with the same high standard of performance that has been its hallmark in the past.

Washington, D. C.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Elvis J. Stahr, Jr." with a stylized flourish at the end.

THE FIRST 40 YEARS

Arvid Shulenberg

THE MILITARY REVIEW has progressed through 40 years of modern history in much the same manner as the United States Army which it has always served. Its characteristics have changed with changing times. Its essential nature, its central aims and ideals, and its continuity have endured. Commandants, editors, writers, formats (the journal's "uniform"), and even the titles of the journal have come and gone. The general intent and purpose of the publication, however, have been maintained from the first to its latest numbers. As an early statement reported, that purpose has been to provide for the military officer "succinct and unbiased information of those things he should know."

That the MILITARY REVIEW has maintained continuous publication from its beginning, through four decades of world upheaval, economic boom and depression, periods of wartime fervor and eras of intense pacificism, is an impressive fact which should be noted in the beginning of even a brief historical description.


During 37 of its 40 years, the journal has been known as a "review," and even called familiarly "the Review." The word *Review* throughout those 37 years has been a keyword in its title; for the past 23 years the official title has been the present one—MILITARY REVIEW. Only during its first three years was it known as a "sum-

mary" (*Instructors' Summary of Military Articles*)—a title excessively modest even in those early years.

In its first year (1922) the new journal established itself as a quarterly publication, on a schedule which was then maintained for 22 years without discontinuity. The quarterly numbers reveal no greater irregularity than an apparent delay of two or three weeks at the end of the calendar year 1941—the month of the Pearl Harbor attack. Since 1943 MILITARY REVIEW has been a monthly periodical.

Serialization of the magazine has also been continuous since the beginning—volume and number sequences having been preserved in good order. The single major shift in practice is that only since 1939 have volume

Cover, Volume I Number 1



numbers been used, in accord with contemporary magazine practice.

Original Circulation

Initially founded for use by instructors at the General Service Schools, the Review known from 1925 as *Review of Current Military Writing* proved to be of sufficient value that it was included in the mailing lists to National Guard and Reserve units throughout the country. Until 1934 the journal was distributed free to instructors in the General Service Schools, to National Guard and Reserve units, and to other service schools in the United States. In 1934 a subscription price of \$1.00 per year was introduced—the deflated United States dollar of that period seeming doubtless a respectable figure to its contemporaries.

Circulation of MILITARY REVIEW has, in general, increased through the years. This is true of its subscription circulation, its “hard core” of professional military readership—though the total circulation figures have fluctuated strongly during certain years when the “official” (nonsubscription) circulation has varied with the ebb and flow of the tides of national emergency. The present circulation—about 18,000—while seemingly modest, represents a widespread, mature, and influential group of readers.

Designed for Use

Utilitarian considerations, not artistic, determined the design of the

Arvid Shulenberg is Associate Professor, Department of English Language and Literature, at the University of Kansas. He received his Ph. D. degree from the University of Chicago in 1951. During World War II he served with the United States Army Air Corps in the Pacific Theater.


early issues. “The publication,” its editors announced, “will be printed to uniform size, 6 by 9 inches, prepared for convenient filing.” Five hundred copies of those issues were printed by the General Service Schools’ Printing Press. It may be noted that among professional journals at a high level this is by no means a small number even today.

Instructors at the General Service Schools took an active part in developing the journal, both as readers and as contributors. Design and content of the new periodical were dictated by the requirements of professional military officers engaged in research, instruction, and independent study.

During the first decade and more of the REVIEW’S existence, it differed in one important respect from the REVIEW in its maturity. In those early years it included a great many pages of indexes and bibliographical or library references, as compared with later issues.

The reason for this is natural and interesting in retrospect. The “Roaring Twenties” were not, for US military forces, a period of vigorous or even unhindered development. Students and teachers of the military art had recourse chiefly to books and various publications, many of foreign origin, for their study and research. For one thing, such resources were relatively economical. For another, there were comparatively few actual wars—“brush fire,” guerrilla, or other—for direct observation. Not until the 1930’s, and only gradually then, did military study and research move strongly out of the library to become primarily a program of reporting, analyzing, and comparing actual contemporary combat factors.

The Sino-Japanese War



The Sino-Japanese War



Chinese troops attack on the battlefield.

The first military... of an importance made by the... (The text is partially obscured and difficult to read due to the high contrast of the scan.)

The study of war moves out of the library onto the battlefield

A Research Tool

The early volumes of the journal are today, by virtue of their extensive bibliographies and annotated lists, first-rate guides to historical research into military developments of those years.

The new-born periodical of 1922 contained neither editorials nor authors' names; its contents were severely ordered under five heads. The sections of the magazine dealt with:

1. Reviews of new books.
2. Digests of selected articles and documents.
3. A list of documents received.
4. A list of magazines received.
5. A selective index of articles, documents, and books.

There were no illustrations.

In mere appearance the journal promised little in the way of future greatness, but it began with succeeding issues to develop and grow. From the beginning, it was in demand among

military readers, filling a need which was evidently real though as yet not clearly defined.

Editorial innovations and statements of purpose and policy appeared as they were required but not in abundance. Reviewers were instructed to achieve "brevity and conciseness." Without by any means encouraging a cult of personalities, the editors began to identify reviewers by their initials. Writers were instructed to "limit coverage to matter valuable to instructors, in general, rather than to a single branch or individual, and to matter containing new information or information confirming, opposing, or broadening the existing knowledge, policies, or teachings at the General Service Schools."

Translation of Foreign Items

Translations of foreign essays and articles were introduced "by special arrangements with the G-2 section." These translations proved immediately

so useful that their number and importance as an element in the magazine increased steadily.

Criteria for contents of the journal were established. It was editorially determined that such contents should:

1. Contain specific new information of an important military character.

2. Confirm or correct specific existing information on important military subjects by means of historical illustrations, war experiences, or as the result of peacetime experiments or test.

3. Broaden or amplify the existing knowledge, policies, or teaching of the General Service Schools.

Even from a distance of 35 years, the military concerns of the 1920's as revealed in the REVIEW reflect for a modern reader the problems of a democratic, prosperous, and peace-seeking nation in an increasingly divided world. Those concerns are indicated by such titles as "Combat Methods of the Japanese," "Man Power of the Nations," "Airplanes in the Next War," "Europe Is in the Air—Is America?" "Russia's Air Force Is Growing," and "Japan's Air Force Is Full Grown." Essays under such titles, collected from worldwide sources, were noted, reviewed, and briefly commented upon. Editorial comment, reserved to a few digests and articles, was sometimes indeed brief: "The principles set forth in the above account . . . are considered sound and are in accord with those taught at these schools."

Subject Matters Reviewed

Representative subjects as listed in a published index include Air Service, Antiaircraft, Antitank Defense, Biography, Cavalry, Chemical Warfare, Citizenship, Civil War, and Coast Defense.

As the format of the REVIEW became stabilized during the 1920's, its proportions maintained both consistency and continuity. On the average, a half dozen extended digests of foreign articles, with the same number of book reviews, appeared in each issue. Some of the reviewers' estimates are interesting. Of *Jane's All the World's Aircraft*, a favorable review reported also that it was "a fairly comprehensive pro-British book. . . ." *The World Crisis* by Winston S. Churchill was praised as "a valuable contribution." Reviews were consistently written with a view to potential usefulness of the material reviewed; there was no concern with reading for pleasure alone. Nor were there many occasions for unfavorable reviews; books judged to be of no value were returned to the library unreviewed, "with a brief written statement of . . . reasons for the negative classification."

Subjects of concern to reviewers included Gandhi's nonviolence movement, the "Pan Islam" movement, vulnerability of the Panama Canal, and the "Polish-Bolshevick" War. Hannibal's campaigns and the Napoleonic Wars were noticed. Instead of "guerilla wars," there were named in frequent reference "small wars" and "semicivilized and savage wars." Psychology but not "psychological warfare" was an increasingly common preoccupation.

Morale, leadership, command, and the principles of war were frequent concerns, as they were to continue even to the present day. Among military theorists, General J. F. C. Fuller and Captain B. H. Liddell Hart were rising names.

New Magazine Format

In 1931 the periodical assumed the appearance and organization of a full-

REVIEW OF CURRENT MILITARY LITERATURE

VOL. XI

DECEMBER, 1931

No. 43



New cover and change of format

THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL PRESS
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

scale magazine. A heavy stock cover was adopted, colored yellow at first, imprinted with the official military crest of the Command and General Staff School. Both the inside cover page and the table of contents were formalized, the table of contents being set up in two main sections: "Periodical Literature" and "Book Reviews." A minor title shift also occurred. Having been titled for eight years *Review of Current Military Writing*, the publication now became the *Quarterly Review of Military Literature*.

During the 1930's changes in content took place which brought the REVIEW to maturity as a professional journal. Translated and digested materials became some of the liveliest elements in every issue. In fact, the

abstracts, translations, and summaries of foreign materials became the main section of the magazine.

A journalistic event of importance to the REVIEW occurred in December 1933. The first original article coming from the Command and General Staff School was published. "The Conduct of a Holding Attack" was the article; its author, Major J. Lawton Collins, Infantry. The article was an extended military study, orderly in presentation, and scholarly in method and extent. Although strongly fortified with footnotes, the essay was not entirely dry in style. Its conclusion was drawn in terms of a football metaphor: "Our holding forces should not only hold the line for decisive attack; they should also help to run the interference

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL
QUARTERLY



by taking out enemy reserves, and should deceive the enemy as to where the real play will strike."

The End of Anonymity

The name of the editor was now duly listed in each issue for the first time, the first editor thus listed, in the September 1933 issue, being Major C. A. Willoughby. Names of officers contributing were also henceforth listed in each issue on a separate page preceding the first pages of text.

Thus by the late 1930's the journal had emerged from most of its early professional anonymity, under the conventionally used title "the REVIEW," and had moved onto the national and international scene through standard mail subscription. Circulation had risen to 2,000 by 1936; with another change in format in 1938, it rose sharply to nearly 4,200 in 1939. The first illustrated cover appeared in 1938, a striking color painting reproduction of Lieutenant General Sheridan and members of his staff, mounted, in the full dress uniforms of 1888. In the same year photographs were used for the first time to illustrate the text of the lead article.

Some articles and essays of the mid-thirties might strike a modern reader as being almost as remote from today as those of the twenties. A German article, for instance, argued for the development of a greater horse cavalry. The Russo-Polish War and the Chaco War were subjects of much discussion, as was "the Abyssinian War."

Rise of Military Powers

The world situation was, in fact, changing rapidly, however. German Army maneuvers of 1936 were reported at length, with the notation that "information as to German air units [was] not . . . freely circulated." The maneuvers themselves were de-

scribed as "the first since 1913" on such a scale. An original study of Japanese attacks at Shanghai reported that "The Japanese did not show their usual dash and spirit."

A section of the REVIEW entitled "Military News around the World," drawn chiefly from current news dispatches, proved to be a forerunner of the present-day "Military Notes" section.

By the late 1930's, America's lack of military preparedness was a matter of great concern to her professional military officers—but a matter which professional soldiers could hardly argue in public print as civilian authors might have done. The problem was ingeniously sidestepped if not solved in one article called simply "Mechanization." The article was constructed within a framework of fiction: Its opening sentence read, "The Republic of ATLANTIS is considered the wealthiest nation in the world. . . ." "Atlantis" is further identified as "a fictitious country, without mechanization policies, doctrines, or tactics thereof." The authors go on to explain: "Should this study inspire a great many differences of opinion . . . its mission is accomplished." Within such a framework, a survey of British, French, German, Italian, and Russian mechanization makes its clear implication suggesting American reform.

Wars of the 1930's

As the close of the thirties neared, every United States officer's need for "succinct and unbiased information" was becoming acute. The Spanish Civil War and the Sino-Japanese War were raging. The storm of war appeared to be rising over the world. The REVIEW had grown to maturity and was itself emerging as a signifi-


Military News around the World was a forerunner to the present-day Military Notes

cant weapon in America's arsenal for defense. Original studies, translations, digests, and criticism held dominant positions in every issue. Illustrations were by now freely used both for cover and text. In March 1939 the page size was increased to 9 by 12 inches, which continued for the next five years.

In June 1939 "MILITARY REVIEW" became the official title which has endured without subsequent change.

The magazine section, heretofore regularly entitled "The Spanish Civil War," was in 1939 replaced by "The European War." New words and concepts appeared in the text: blitzkrieg, for example. "The Polish campaign," an author reported, "will go down in history as one of the most brilliant campaigns of all times. In the incredibly short period of three weeks the military destruction of a nation of 30,000,000 people, defended by an army of 1,500,000 men was completed. This tremendous achievement bids fair to revolutionize many concepts of warfare." Another author reported that "the German army stands today as the smoothest running military machine in the world."

Progress of Aviation



THE U. S. ARMY AIR CORPS (1917-19)

A Notable Book Review

The book review section of MILITARY REVIEW had by this time become highly selective. In December 1940 a review of *Why England Slept*—a book written by a rising 23-year-old political theorist, one John F. Kennedy—was included. "John Kennedy's book is a sincere and scholarly work. The painstaking research that went into it would do credit to men of twice Kennedy's age and experience." Nevertheless, the reviewer continued, the youthful author had "minimized such elements in the British unpreparedness equation as party maneuvering and a highly questionable political leadership." The reviewer concluded, "*Why England Slept* is an intelligent book and a valuable book."

The United States went to war. The MILITARY REVIEW section titled "War in Europe" had become, as early as 1940, "World War II." Authors' pre-occupations became the tactics and strategy of a warfare immediately confronting them. Matters treated in MR, in the main, are still too well-known to the present-day reader to need recapitulation. Not all the problems of modern warfare were equally weighty ones, however. One gallant

MILITARY REVIEW



June 1939 Quarterly Review of Military Literature
VOL. XIX, NO. 2

article was entitled, "Reduction of Paperwork—It Can Be Done." It concluded with a poem, "The Mimeograph":

*I wish I had a commission
In Caesar's legions of old
Where the mimeograph as we
know it
Was a story that hadn't been
told;
Their orders were then mostly
verbal;
They were seldom called on to
write,
For most of an officer's duties
Were training his men how to
fight.*

New Weapons Foreseen

Of considerable interest to a present-day reader is the writers' early concern, during the years of World War II, with emerging weapons systems and with tactics which were as yet untried. Little "conservatism of the military mind," certainly no backwardness in entertaining fresh and novel ideas, is evident in the pages of the journal during that period. Jet airplanes and the Whittle engine are reported and theorized about; rocket planes and unmanned craft, by war's

Military Review became the official title
with the June 1939 issue

end, are foreseen as replacing even those. (News of jet aircraft was "first made public" in January 1944.) The author's conclusion to an early report on the German V-1 "Winged Bomb" was clear: "The next goal [is] the actual rocket projectile bomb . . . proof against all attack by aviation as a result of its projectile-like speed." Of "rockets and their capabilities" it was reported, "The field artillery has a new member in its family, and we bid it welcome."

Distinctly prophetic was the report, "How Fast Can We Fly?" "Soon some daring pilot will push through the shock wave trouble and regain control on 'the other side' at speeds faster than sound. And then will open an era of speeds as yet unimaginable."



MR Is Standardized

The MILITARY REVIEW having become a monthly periodical in April 1943, reverted in June 1944, under the wartime pressures for economy, to a compact (6 by 8) format—emphasizing convenience and austerity in format. For the next 16 years the journal maintained not only its same general appearance but also its essential character, and content. Orig-

The Second World War

German Tactics in Russia

LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U. S. ARMY INFANTRY
INSTRUCTOR, COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL



As early as 1940 reports on the war in Europe were carried under "World War II"

nal articles and essays, foreign translations and digests, and military notes and book reviews during the whole of this period have made up the bulk of its contents.

MR has become a major standard periodical in its field, and the only military journal devoted primarily to tactics and strategy at the division and higher levels. It has pioneered in the advancement of the combined-arms approach and, from the early days, championed the forthcoming of interservice understanding and cooperation. Always in pace with advancing technology, MILITARY REVIEW in recent years has given extensive coverage to the tactics and techniques of nuclear weapons employment. With one eye on the realities of today, it has focused ever on the future—with prediction, analysis, and explanation of new concepts. The Army's new ROAD organization is a recent example.

Spanish, Portuguese Editions

In 1945, upon authorization by the Department of the Army predicated on requests from the countries concerned, a Spanish-American edition and a Brazilian edition were inaugurated. Colonel Andres Lopez was the first editor of the Spanish-American edition, and Major Severino Sombra, Brazilian Army, became editor of the Brazilian edition. By arrangement with the governments concerned, these editions are distributed to subscribers in Latin American countries through agencies in those countries.

Thus the influence of MR had expanded to worldwide proportions in keeping with the development of US military stature. That stature was emphasized in a pronouncement by the Army Chief of Staff, General Dwight D. Eisenhower as printed in the MR:

It is my personal opinion that the greatest single motivating force for world peace today is the organized



Recovery, Evacuation, and Salvage in the Combat Zone

Major J. J. GARDNER, Jr., University of Maryland
 Colonel J. J. GARDNER, Jr., University of Maryland

THE success of the attack is dependent on the effectiveness of recovery, evacuation, and salvage of damaged and unexpended material in the combat zone.

The basic thought involved in these three functions is to recover, evacuate, and salvage as much as possible. Why must the fighting soldier continuously be taking time and effort to look up on the ground? Why must he provide services for this purpose when his primary mission is to fight?

There is no answer to these questions. Rather, the answer is a combination of several factors which make it possible to do these things. The first factor is the necessity of recovering the material. When the Axis tanks rolled into South France and the Germans rolled out tanks with other armor, our own material situation was greatly aggravated. The second question is that of recovery, and this is the question which is the production of the material. In many cases, we have been forced to depend upon our own material resources. In other cases, it has been necessary to develop complex recovery systems. Although the problem of being subjected to the question of recovery is not a new one, it is a question which is being faced by all nations. The question is not only how to recover, but also how to salvage. The question is not only how to recover, but also how to salvage.

The second of the factors in the transportation system is the problem of evacuation. The problem of evacuation is not only how to evacuate, but also how to salvage. The question is not only how to evacuate, but also how to salvage.

The third of the factors in the transportation system is the problem of salvage. The problem of salvage is not only how to salvage, but also how to recover. The question is not only how to salvage, but also how to recover.

recovery problem that will be faced. These problems are vital components in the efforts now being made. All of the factors mentioned are of the fact that it is extremely difficult to get the fighting troops. If that was the case, the entire effort to recover in those cases which have a really low level of fuel should be abandoned. It is the material problem which is the key to the recovery problem.

The material problem is a complex one. It is the material problem which is the key to the recovery problem. It is the material problem which is the key to the recovery problem.

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Under wartime pressures for economy, the *Military Review* in June 1944 reverted to a 6 by 8-inch size emphasizing austerity and convenience

military potential of the United States—its resources, its technological advancement, and its superbly trained manpower.

MR a Team Effort

In January 1961 the *MILITARY REVIEW* came out in a new format, which has continued with minor refinements to the present issue. While preserving the tradition of a serious professional journal, emphasis was placed on attractiveness and readability.

For the first time in the history of the journal an extensive reader survey was conducted to determine reader views and preferences. Findings of the survey were published in the July issue. Practices and policies resulting are reflected in the *REVIEW* today.

Although distinguished authors both military and civilian, in the United States and from foreign countries around the globe, have contrib-

uted to the *MILITARY REVIEW*, the journal itself has never dealt in the exploitation of personalities. The purpose and professional level of the magazine have prevented any such development—as indeed they should, for as a journal representing the military profession, *MR* has from its first to latest issues been as much a team effort as the Army itself.

It would hardly be profitable, even if possible in a brief sketch such as this, to consider the writers and editors of the journal in terms of personality or personal achievement. It is worthy of note that many former lieutenants, captains, and majors who contributed to the *MILITARY REVIEW* in early days have risen to high rank in positions of great responsibility. Among them are familiar names such as Maxwell D. Taylor, Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Arthur G. Trudeau, James M. Gavin, and many others.

An Appraisal

The essential nature of the MILITARY REVIEW itself may profitably be considered in conclusion to these notes. It is a journal of a particular kind, and can be rightly understood and assessed only in terms appropriate to it.

As to the content of MR almost from its beginning, a threefold distinction can be made. One kind of subject matter may be labeled military data—weapons development, actual combat, events, and movements on the world scene. Thus MR has provided a record of particular unique phenomena.

At the opposite extreme from such newsworthy matters of detail—whether historical or current—the MILITARY REVIEW has dealt occasionally with broadest matters of speculation and theory. Essays in geopolitics, in theory of leadership, in politics, economics, and general theory of war have had their place in its pages.

Such matters have been relevant to the needs of its readers, and to the science of war in its broad sense.

Military Art Not Pure Theory

Not the *science* of war, however, but the *art* of war has been the journal's central concern. This classical distinction has been clearly made in the pages of the journal, as in the statement by an author in 1933, that "all human activities consist of two aspects, organized knowledge (which is a *science*), and the practice or application of that knowledge (which is an *art*)."

To observe that MILITARY REVIEW has been devoted to the military art is to observe that it has had to avoid, on the one hand, too great a concern with the merely unique and newsworthy events of its time, however interesting those might be in themselves. It is to observe on the other hand that its editors and writers have had also to avoid overemphasis on the

The Spanish-American and Brazilian Editions begin

EDICION HISPANOAMERICANA

MILITARY REVIEW



EDICAO BRASILEIRA

MILITARY REVIEW



ESCUELA DE COMANDO Y ESTADO MAJOR

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS, E.U.A.

UNA REVISTA MENSUAL DE LITERATURA MILITAR



ESCOLA DE COMANDO E ESTADO MAIOR

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS, E.U.A.

REVISTA MENSAL DE LITERATURA MILITAR

purely theoretical and speculative, however beguiling such armchair philosophizing might be.

Military authors, as their field of specialization is neither an exact laboratory science nor a historical knowledge of events however recent, are confronted with the difficult task of relating their general ideas and views to the particular and irreducible facts before them, or even to facts likely to be before them in the near future. Their field is an art, and one of the oldest—an application of general knowledge to particular cases, often cases of peculiar difficulty.

Science Into Art

The "science of war" under actual battle conditions is no longer a "science" but an "art"—a way of making war. The art of war, like all other arts, does not have merely public "principles" to guide it. Instead, it has chiefly the craft, skill, and experiential knowledge possessed by the commander and his subordinates. Great commanders in war are not great "scientists" but great "artists," in the ancient sense of those words. The scientists of war have been the Clausewitzes and Fullers—quiet authors in their studies. The artists of war were the Grants and Pattons—generals who may even have been somewhat inarticulate as to the nature of their own skills. The authors and editors of MILITARY REVIEW have found themselves concerned ultimately with the *art*, not merely the science of war.

In their treatment of such troublesome matters as combat leadership and the "principles of war," for instance, MR authors have shown a consistent and commendable restraint—the restraint of the artist, not the scientist—in almost all of their writ-

ings. To a man, they have questioned or even rejected the notion of "scientific principles" applicable in all contingencies of war. They have questioned these by the light of a hard-won knowledge that such "principles" suitable to the library and laboratory will not always work out well in the great *uncontrolled* experiments of combat. The military authors, however, have equally known that the question of "principles" is important, and have returned to a discussion of the matter many times in the history of the journal.

Leadership in Fact and Theory

The same is true for discussions of leadership. Opinions in this vast field during 40 years have ranged widely, but have in the main been based on the experiential knowledge of the authors. Unlike a number of academic speculations on leadership which are now fashionable, these views as expressed by MR authors strike the reader as opinions which have been *earned*. A noted combat general, for example, ends his treatment of "leadership" with a telling observation of a kind not available to academic theorists, that:

Soldiers are subjected to a special kind of feeling when there is nothing between them and the enemy but the muzzles of their rifles and a few yards of ground. That is the moment when good leadership . . . will pay off.

The best of military writing has been accomplished in awareness of this "moment of truth" which is the test of the military art.

MILITARY REVIEW has consistently through its 40 years of growth escaped the kind of complacency and self-satisfaction that have in the past destroyed journals and armies alike.



Major General Harold K. Johnson
Commandant, USA CGSC

THE YEARS AHEAD

The great value in a summation of the past is the perspective it sets for the future. In *Military Review's* past record we find the keynote of our plans for the future—*continued progress*. There are four specific areas of emphasis in our current program for improvement.

The first objective is authoritative coverage of significant military problems. Operating within the framework of a planned program which anticipates critical problems, we are seeking challenging and forward-looking articles from recognized experts in these areas

The second objective is to stimulate the exchange of views, both among US military thinkers and with the defense leaders of our allies. The *Military Review* provides an effective sounding board for the testing of military concepts. We challenge our readers to take exception to the principles and theories set forth in this magazine. The best way the reader can do this is to prepare an article setting forth his views.

The effectiveness of any journal is a product of the number of its readers. Every professional can benefit from the *Military Review* and should have it in his personal library. Wider distribution, then, is an objective of our improvement program.

Finally, we shall continue to emphasize readability. This we are attaining not only in the selection of material for publication but also in the editorial process. Acknowledging that military problems are serious and complex, we shall continue to exert every effort to clarify and simplify expression, to advance the readers' understanding.


I am gratified with the progress made by the *Military Review* over the years. Ours is a professional service journal. I pledge that we shall keep it *professional* and of *service*.

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Harold K. Johnson". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

WHAT IS CIVIL DEFENSE

Lieutenant General Clarence R. Huebner,
United States Army, Retired



During the past years civil defense has engendered much discussion. In December 1961 the President presented a program that calls for Federal subsidies to build shelters for 20 million Americans and completion of an earlier announced program utilizing existing structures to protect an additional 50 million Americans in community shelters. He has assigned major responsibility for the civil defense program to the Defense Department. MILITARY REVIEW reported on "Swedish Total Defense" in its September 1961 issue and on "European Civil Defense Plans" in October. A further report on United States civil defense preparations will be presented in a future issue.

—Editor.

SURVIVAL, hence civil defense, is a fundamental problem of our times.

A nation, like an individual, need perhaps give no reason for wanting to survive. A deep instinct and an unreasoning will are, in the last analysis, what counts. But the age in which we live justifies making this objective explicit and affirming it solemnly. The threat to the survival of the United States is today greater than this country has ever experienced, even in its first uncertain years as a Nation. It is confronted by a hostile power system equipped with weapons of destruction that pose for the rest of the world the issue of survival in its darkest form.*

This means that we, as a people,

* *Prospects for America. The Rockefeller Panel Reports.* Doubleday & Co., Inc., New York, 1961, Report Number 1, Chapter 2, p 18.

must prepare to survive in this modern world while we still have time to do so. In planning for survival we must consider the environment under which our people and our Government will be called upon to operate if war comes.

Civil defense's mission is to prepare for the operation of civil government in time of war. Preparation and operation extends from the Federal Government down through all governments to include all towns and villages.

Our governors, mayors, and chairmen of the boards of supervisors are our elected leaders and they will not be supplanted just because we are at war. They will lead in wartime and make no mistake about that.

Wartime Missions

All governmental employees have a wartime duty to perform. If their wartime duties differ from their normal peacetime duties, they should train so that they can carry out their war tasks. Passage from peace to war may come so rapidly that there will not be sufficient time for this training. Those in charge of governmental operations should determine what the agencies' war task will be and then assure that their employees learn how to perform these duties.

Many agencies of our Government have insufficient personnel to carry out their wartime missions. Welfare agencies provide an example; police are another. They will need thousands of well-trained auxiliaries. Therefore,

Lieutenant General Clarence R. Huebner, United States Army, Retired, is a private consultant on civil defense matters in Washington, D. C. He served as Director of the New York State Civil Defense Commission from 1951 to January 1961.

we must use personnel of other government agencies that will have a surplus, or we must depend on volunteers.

In some areas of skill and necessity we have no peacetime agencies with the capabilities to meet wartime requirements. Radiological monitoring is a case in point. Reassigned governmental personnel or volunteers must fill the gap. Some of our states have conscription laws but they are not effective until a state of war exists; this may be too late to conscript and train the necessary personnel. In fairness to the individual and the community, volunteers should be trained for their jobs in peacetime.

The Government, in order to function in wartime, must have effective plans and operational procedures set up. In many instances, new techniques have to be developed, textbooks have to be prepared, schools organized, and teachers trained in various techniques to instruct other personnel, whether they are governmental workers or volunteers. These groups may number many thousands. The equipping and training of auxiliary firemen, for example, is a must if we expect efficient operations. Combined training exercises should cap off all training. Operation *Alert 1961* exemplifies such a training exercise.

It would be impossible to list all of the wartime obligations and functions of our Government in an article such as this, but we can analyze some of the requirements.

National Plan

When the Federal Government began working on the civil defense problem it became apparent that a national plan was required if we hoped to control and coordinate the activities of the Federal agencies and the

State and local governments. Such a plan has been prepared and has been signed by the President in his role as Commander in Chief. This national plan is binding on all agencies of government at all levels.

Why do we need this Federal coordination and control? Why can't we communicate our orders and instructions to the people after the war starts? The answer is simple: If a nuclear war comes, it will be too late then to do all of those things.

Consider the shelter problem. The primary duty of Government in war is to win the war. Winning presupposes that the bulk of our population not only will survive the initial phases of the war, but that survivors will conduct the recovery measures needed to assure our Armed Forces the supplies and equipment to bring about a military victory. Protection must be available immediately if we expect to shield our people from the blast, radiation, and thermal effects caused by our enemies' bombs.

Emergency Operating Centers

Government personnel not only must protect themselves from the hazards of war, but they should have emergency operating centers which will accommodate all members of the staff required to carry on the functions of government during the emergency.

Where governments are located in or near probable target areas shelter will have to be as bombproof as possible. Money is one of the controlling factors on how much protection can be furnished. Where governments are located in areas distant from target areas, they probably will be able to function if fallout protection only is furnished.

Plans, shelters, and supplies should

provide at least two weeks' protection for the entire staff. Adequate communications systems, installed in peacetime, are, of course, essential.

The people as a whole should be given as much protection as possible. Fallout, generated by the explosion of enemy bombs, potentially will kill more people than any other single weapon. Fallout protection can be secured at no great expense to the individual. Home shelters are easily constructed. If private, family-size home shelters are out of the question, then community or group shelters will be necessary. If shelters are intended to provide full protection—from blast and initial radiation—the cost will be extremely high, and even then survival cannot be guaranteed.

All shelters should be equipped and stocked so the occupants can live for at least two weeks without outside assistance, just as the emergency operating centers are. As a minimum, communications of some kind, probably battery-powered radio, must be available so that information and instructions from the civil authorities can be received. Radiation measuring instruments also are highly desirable. At least one and preferably more of the shelter occupants must be skilled in the use of the instruments. All people should learn the behavioral techniques for living in the confines of a shelter; there will not be enough time for this after taking refuge.

Continuity of Government

Continuity of government is difficult to assure. Most of our political jurisdictions have provided satisfactorily for it. But the number of competent persons who can take over under emergency conditions is very limited. We need greater depth in leadership. Leaders should be desig-

nated in peacetime and their order of succession should be specified. Our plans should provide for a chief or head at all levels of government at all times.

At one time the governorship of New York in times of emergency passed successively to only three echelons—the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the Assembly, and the President of the Senate. Recently, the statutes were amended to extend the line of succession to include 12 people. Similar action is required at every level of government.

Warning Systems

Timely warning to our people in the event of emergency is essential, if we are to take full advantage of such shelter as we have provided. People must be instructed when to take shelter and for how long to remain. This is one of the responsibilities of local government officials.

We are fortunate that we have one of the most comprehensive warning systems the world has ever known. This system is a responsibility of our Defense Department. The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), a combined United States and Canadian organization entrusted with the air defense of our homeland, operates the system. Any hostile act, any place in the world, is reported almost instantaneously to its headquarters near Colorado Springs, Colorado. There military information is converted into civil defense instructions and information by a highly trained group of civil defense staff members, who then transmit it to civil defense jurisdictions all over the country. They spread the word over a special closed-circuit telephone system known as the National Warning System (NAWAS) with more than 500 outlets in the

United States and many more in Canada.

This system is so efficient that information and instructions are received by all stations in a matter of seconds. The system is manned at all times and is tested twice daily. Many states have augmented NAWAS by state systems that transmit information down to county level. The system should be expanded to include every town and village.

Civil Defense Director

The Civil Defense Director, appointed by the head of government in whose jurisdiction he is to serve, can never assume the responsibilities of the head of government, but the head of government may delegate to his director almost any degree of authority he deems fit. A practical example is the decision to sound the sirens at the time of emergency. Information upon which to base the decision comes over the NAWAS net. Ordinarily, the Civil Defense Director decides whether the sirens should be sounded and whether they should signal "take cover" or merely the "alert." Concurrently, he decides what instructions he will issue to the people and the Government workers.

The Civil Defense Director can take these actions only if the head of government has delegated this authority to him. If the director does not have this authority, the head of government must make the decisions and issue the instructions. In many states, the Civil Defense Director is the chief assistant to the head of government in matters pertaining to war. A Civil Defense Director should be charged with the responsibility of coordinating the actions of all agencies of government involved in the wartime effort. His duties are so numerous that

he requires a staff to assist him in his work.

CONELRAD

Whether the head of government personally acts or delegates to his Civil Defense Director, instructions and information normally are transmitted electronically to the people. American communications facilities are among the best in the world. Our system includes telephone, television, and radio, both AM and FM. Unfortunately, wartime conditions will deny us the use of some of these facilities, because our enemies could use electronic beams which our systems emit to guide their missiles or bombs to target. The system whereby we transmit CD information is known as CONELRAD (control of electromagnetic radiations).

The instructions issued by the Civil Defense Director to the people over the warning systems may take several forms, but the most important is "evasive action." New York State has three degrees of action: "TAKE COVER," "GO HOME," or "EVACUATE." Within the time available to him, the director must decide on a line of action, determine what instructions he will issue, and how he will issue them.

Based upon the information received over NAWAS, the Civil Defense Director has several alternatives. He may decide to stay put and sound the "take cover" signal when the time is proper. Or he may decide to evacuate the more densely populated portions of his area, provided plans have been made for that purpose, or execute a "go home" which is only a partial thinning out of his area (sending school children to their homes if the war should start during school hours).

Deciding when to sound the "take cover" signal is one of the most difficult decisions. In New York State it is mandatory that the Civil Defense Director sound the "take cover" signal if the enemy can be over his area in 30 minutes or less.

CONELRAD comes into play as the result of a decision by the Commander in Chief of the North American Defense Command. You probably have heard the sounding of a deep beep signal on your radio or television, followed by a voice saying something like this "We are going to interrupt this program to cooperate with the Federal Government in a CONELRAD Test." You will then hear a few more beeping sounds and in about 30 seconds the station is back on the air with its regular program.

In wartime, the reference to a "test" would be omitted. Instead of coming back on the air with its regular programs, the station would transmit instructions and information from the Civil Defense Director. We have practiced this CONELRAD change-over many times and we know that it is possible to change from a peacetime broadcast to wartime CONELRAD in just a few seconds.

Rescue and Relief Operations

In case of a hostile attack we expect the civil defense agency of our Government to organize and carry out the rescue and relief operations in destruction areas, and to monitor continuously and evaluate the fallout radiation.

Preliminary actions by the civil defense forces include locating the bomb strike; determining the yield of the bomb, whether it was a ground or an air burst; and determining the intensity of radiation, not only in the area of destruction, but the whole

area for which the Civil Defense Director is responsible. When the preliminary operations have been undertaken, the Civil Defense Director in charge of the rescue and relief operation assigns areas of responsibility to the various civil defense leaders he has available. He issues orders and instructions to assemble the necessary civil defense operating teams, directs them to the area of destruction, and upon arrival of these teams assigns them definite tasks to perform.

When the need for assistance exceeds locally available relief, additional aid is requested from State and Federal authorities. All of the disaster services of civil government will be needed in rescue and relief operations, as will large quantities of medical supplies, first aid equipment, and many emergency hospitals to care for the sick and wounded. Transportation—for moving the injured, for evacuating the homeless and the sick to prepared facilities located in the nearby undamaged areas—will be critical. Food, water, clothing, bedding, and personal first aid kits must be supplied in great quantities.

Radiological Services

Our experience in analyzing the radiation requirement for New York quickly revealed that an extensive radiological service would be needed if we expected to cope with this hazard. There the service is being organized around radiation monitors and evaluators. Each jurisdiction in the state, to include the counties and the larger cities, has such services headed by a chief. Every town in the state and every ward in the cities is setting up at least two fixed monitor stations which will total about 2,000 stations when the program is complete.

Personnel manning these stations will be equipped with radiation intensity measuring instruments and will be well-trained in their use. Every station will be able to communicate with the emergency operating center of either the county or city. Physical properties built into the stations will attenuate at least 1,000 to one of radiation intensity. Supplies and equipment on hand will permit occupancy of the station for at least two weeks without resupply.

Mobile Monitor Teams

In addition to the fixed stations, at least one mobile monitor team will be organized in each town. The mission of these mobile teams is to cover those parts of their respective areas not in range of the fixed monitors and to be prepared to move to other areas of the county or state where needed. Each disaster service, such as fire, medical, police, welfare, and rescue, will have its own radiation monitors responsible for measuring the radiation intensity. The leader will advise the team chief in all matters pertaining to radiation.

Some areas may undergo such intense radiation that it would not be possible to measure it through the use of ground monitors. Aerial monitor teams are being organized for such contingencies; in New York the Civil Air Patrol has been charged with this mission. Their instruments are capable of measuring intensities from the air and converting these readings to equivalent ground intensities. They will be tied in by radio to the emergency operating center.

Another aspect of the radiation problem which requires a different procedure is the radiation found in food, water, clothing, and other items that may be contaminated with alpha



Exterior view of one of the entrances to the Phoenix-Maricopa County civil defense control center, a State of Arizona civil defense installation tied in with NORAD



*Office of Civil and
Defense Mobilization Photos*

Operations room of the Phoenix-Maricopa County civil defense control center

and beta particles. These monitors are equipped with special instruments or "spot monitors." Each county is organizing 60 teams for this special purpose.

All radiation intensity information, wherever gathered, is communicated to the radiation evaluating group at the emergency operating center of the county or city. From this information the evaluating group prepares a chart that depicts the radiation intensities found over the entire area. For all intents and purposes this map becomes the operations map of the Civil Defense Director.

Recovery After Attack

This part of the civil defense effort embraces all activities directed toward recovery from damage on our people, our industry, and our supplies. The objectives of the "recovery after attack program" are twofold: to ensure that the Armed Forces have enough supplies, equipment, and men; and to maintain the economy of our country. The Armed Forces should receive all they need to conclude the war successfully. The civil population must be given the means to produce the necessities for the Armed Forces and their own maintenance.

In past wars the Federal Government managed most of the recovery programs. This will not be possible in a nuclear war because of the great destruction that might be incurred. In a real sense, the recovery program will reach down to and include the

towns and the villages of the country. The fortunes of war may isolate entire areas of our country so that there can be no central control. Under such conditions local heads of government do those things that are necessary to protect their people.

The national plan sets forth the principles that will guide our efforts in the recovery program. When the enemy attacks have ended, our civil government, coordinated by its civil defense agencies, will undertake to cope with the initial problem of recovery and eventual return to pre-attack conditions. This means restoration of the public utilities, rehabilitation of transportation, communications facilities, and the reestablishment of industry—all of which will require the combined efforts of local, State, and Federal authorities.

The supply of food, water, and clothing, financial assistance, housing, and manpower are just a few of the problems government will be called upon to solve in the postattack recovery period. All of this calls for positive programs to manage available resources and to produce essential commodities.

Civil defense is the combined effort of our governments at all levels and the people to assure ourselves that we will not be destroyed by a hostile power equipped with weapons of destruction that pose the issue of survival to the rest of the world. A realistic, thoroughly organized program is essential to our national security.



DETERRENT AND DISARMAMENT

Alastair Buchan

THERE is a twilight area of thought where most of the pioneering work still lies ahead of us. This is in the relationship between the strategy of deterrence, which has hitherto been the cornerstone of international security, and the proposals for disarmament that are gathering greater and greater political strength throughout the world.

Superficially or traditionally, there is no such connection. In the past, those who have been responsible for national security, strategic thought, and military planning have not been greatly concerned with the problems of disarmament. Similarly, the more fervent advocates of disarmament have tended to be impatient with strategic considerations.

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Mr. Buchan is the Director of The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Editor of SURVIVAL magazine, and a recognized author and authority on international defense matters.

Any attempt to relegate the problems of strategy or national security, and the problems of disarmament or international security, to separate compartments of the mind, or departments of government, is not only misleading and potentially disastrous, but is impossible. I would like, therefore, to begin with an examination of the contemporary arms race, to look at the practical validity of the types of disarmament schemes most commonly put forward, and, finally, to examine the measures of control or restraint that are the essential connecting link between a world of uncontrolled and increasing armaments and one in which their level has been lowered.

We live in a very heavily armed world. There are 14 million men under arms in the Northern Hemisphere alone—three times the number under arms before the Second World War. In this same hemisphere, we spend well over 280 million dollars a day on armaments and armed forces. The nuclear powers have between them a stockpile of nuclear bombs on the order of 55,000 megatons, or the equivalent of 20 tons of TNT for every man, woman, and child on earth—a stockpile that is still growing. We must never forget the magnitude of the forces of destruction that are being accumulated, but we do no service to clear thinking if we assume, in a defeatist fashion, that because armaments are accumulating so fast we are heading for an inevitable holocaust.

Arms Race and War

It is historically incorrect to argue that arms races between hostile groups of nations always lead to war. It is true that the First World War came at the end of a period of intensive competition in naval armaments.

However, there was an equally intensive competition in naval armaments between the British and the French in the last 40 years of the 19th century which ended not in war but the Entente Cordiale. It petered out, as other arms races have, through the discernment on the part of the competing powers that both had a more important common enemy—a consideration that may be highly relevant in the next 20 years as China becomes a great, and apparently implacable, power. Conversely, the two savage conflicts of our own time, the Second World War and the Korean War, were the product of situations in which one side had been unwilling to enter into a sufficiently energetic armament program.

This present arms race, in which we and the Soviet bloc are engaged, is different from any that have preceded it. It can be argued that both sides are trying to build up a purely deterrent or defensive capability, not a war-winning capability. It has been suggested that the present contest differs from the classic pattern of armament races in that neither side is any longer trying to pile up a superiority in offensive weapons and that both are tacitly seeking the same objective, namely, stability through the creation of the most effective form of deterrence to attack upon themselves at a bearable economic cost.

This argument has considerable force. The Soviet Union has a very different general concept of stability from Britain. However, all the evidence shows that in terms of the nuclear balance of power, the Soviet Union has so far made no attempt to build a long-range striking force which could win a nuclear war with the United States. She has merely at-

tempted to provide what is now called a "minimum deterrent." Britain, of course, has never pretended to be capable of anything but a minimum deterrent.

Requirements of Deterrence

In the United States, there has been prolonged controversy as to whether or not an effective posture of deterrence, adequate to ensure the safety of the US and her allies, requires a war-winning capacity; that is, a force large enough to ensure the destruction of all the enemy's forces as well as to retaliate against his cities. But it has become equally clear that such a force is beyond America's capacity and the present trend is to concentrate money and resources not on larger long-range striking forces but on achieving the highest degree of invulnerability that is possible for the present level of striking power by such devices as *Polaris*, hardened bases, and later, *Minuteman*.

Thus it can be argued that both sides are tacitly working on parallel lines to improve the stability of the existing balance of nuclear power. The optimist can argue that when political thinking on both sides has caught up with the facts of strategy and technology we shall have a stable balance of power, a *Pax Atomica* in which both sides have the effective means to deter war but neither has the incentive—or possibly the means—to initiate it with any hope of success.

Technology and Stability

However, I would like to suggest two fundamental reasons why I find it impossible to believe that a stable pattern of international relations can be developed or, indeed, that nuclear war can be avoided by unilateral ac-

tion alone on the part of the great powers.

The first is that we have reached an era of continuous scientific and technological innovation in which change has become not the exception but the rule. This is essentially a qualitative and not a quantitative arms race.

Scientific innovation no longer depends on the work of lonely men of genius, but has become institutionalized with the resources of the two richest states in world history behind it. The United States now spends on military research and development over 100 times as much in real terms—that is discounting changes in the value of the dollar—as she spent 20 years ago, and nearly four times as much as she was spending on the whole of her defense effort in 1939. In the Soviet Union, I have no doubt, the contrast is even more striking. Moreover, military technology is intimately related to civil progress and is not an isolated phenomenon created by the exigencies of the cold war.

Since the military contest between the great powers takes this qualitative form, the balance of power is at the mercy of technological change. It has been profoundly transformed twice by such change in the past 15 years—by the Soviet development of nuclear weapons between 1950 and 1954 and by the introduction of the missile between 1957 and the present day.

On each occasion, technological advances created a greater political impression than their actual strategic consequences justified. Can we be sure that it will not be as profoundly affected in the next 15 or 30 years by similar changes?

I am prepared to assume that the

pace of change is decelerating, that new "breakthroughs" are improbable in most fields, and that we should think primarily in terms of developments of known concepts in the fields of both explosives and means of delivery. However, as Dr. Jerome Wiesner, the scientific advisor to President Kennedy, has written:

It is an unpleasant fact that almost any invention the weapons engineers can conceive of can now be built, and the logic of the arms race seems to require that any possible weapons be built, no matter how horrible.

Four Sources of Danger

Science and technology have brought the nuclear balance of power to a position of great delicacy. In this situation, there is a striking similarity in the views of both Western and Soviet leaders that the danger of nuclear war has four main sources.

The first is premeditated war. This is perhaps the least likely cause but it is one that still cannot be ruled out. The existence of nuclear weapons, by awarding so great an advantage to the country which strikes first, has given a powerful impetus to this particular cause of war, while at the same time providing powerful deterrents to it.

The danger of premeditated war arises not from a Bismarckian figure at the head of one of the great powers but from a calculation by one side or the other, at the end of a long period when nerves have been rubbed raw by continuous international tension, either that it has achieved a decisive but temporary strategic advantage over its opponent, or that it is about to enter a long period of decisive strategic inferiority.

The second source of danger is preemptive war. The necessity for a

blunting attack has always played a part in the calculations of general staffs, particularly in Europe. It has acquired a new significance from the conjunction of catastrophic forms of explosive with very fast means of delivery. The latter has had the effect of reducing the time available for a considered political decision on the nature of an adversary's preparations or intentions from a matter of months and weeks to at best days and at worst hours.

In times of crisis or high tension, there is a constant danger which unilateral action can only minimize and not eradicate. Each party to the nuclear missile balance may interpret the defensive preparations of the other side—the alerting of aircraft, the dispatch of ships to sea, the departure of governments from capital cities, or the partial evacuation of cities—as preparations for attack.

If such precautions are taken in a crisis by one side, or by both, it might require only a minor false step—the accidental discharge of a missile or a squadron of bombers 100 miles off course—to convince one side that the other is about to attack. If a responsible leader is absolutely convinced that his country is about to be attacked, he has no option in responsibility to his own citizens but to strike first.

The third danger is what is known in modern jargon as "catalytic war"; that is, the involvement of the responsible major nuclear powers in a war situation by a third party, presumably an ally of one side or the other. It can be argued that the stakes of nuclear war are too high to permit either side to become embroiled with the other, in this fashion, against its will.


On the other hand, it must be remembered that during the past 15 years both sides have acquired a large number of treaty commitments to allies of varying degrees of responsibility. The political exigencies of the cold war force them to maintain these in order to protect the widest possible area from ideological or political encroachment by the other side.

The fourth danger, which is closely allied with this, is of "escalation," of nuclear war arising from the inability of one side or the other to accept defeat or rebuff in a local situation. This would lead to the application of increasing force, first by one side and then the other, the introduction of nuclear weapons into the battle, tactical perhaps at first but rapidly mounting in scale before calmer views could prevail, to full-scale thermonuclear war.

Realities of the Threat

These are not fanciful dangers and their existence has been acknowledged and analyzed in similar fashion both in the Soviet Union and in the West. What is also developing on both sides is a growing identity of view that continuous technological innovation may heighten rather than diminish them. The more secure strategic balance which we see developing in the years immediately ahead, as the West develops forms of retaliation comparable in vulnerability to those of the Soviet Union, may be only a plateau of security which could be upset later in this decade or certainly in the next. Let us, therefore, try to relate these four principal dangers to what we know to be brewing in the laboratories.

Starting with the danger of premeditated war, we have first the theoretical possibility of an antimissile



The US Army's *Nike Zeus* antimissile missile, the Free World's most advanced missile defense weapon, hurls from its launcher at Point Mugu, California


missile. Such a weapon would have the effect of making one side, presumably the United States, relatively much less vulnerable to missile attack than the Soviet Union, and this would be profoundly destabilizing.

Another well-advertised development is the possibility of putting hydrogen weapons into orbit in outer space with a controllable return path. This would give both sides unlimited powers of menace over the other, even if both sides developed such weapons simultaneously, and would bring organized international relations to a full stop.

A third incentive to premeditated war would be rapid advances in radiological weapons, such as the neutron bomb now being discussed in the American scientific press, which, by enabling an aggressor to destroy human life without smashing towns and industries, would present a particularly severe temptation for the Soviet Union.

As far as the danger of preemptive war is concerned, technology is for the moment working in favor of stability. There are, however, some developments which must tend to diminish the relative invulnerability of the retaliatory forces of both sides and, therefore, make each more nervous and overanxious to react in an emergency. One is steadily improving missile accuracies. Another is developments in antisubmarine detection which will diminish the value of *Polaris*. Another is the reconnaissance satellite. In general, the problem of preemption may become worse as the missile steadily displaces the aircraft in the deterrent forces of either side, and as the time factor is condensed.

As far as the dangers of catalytic war or of escalation from limited con-



US Navy
Polaris, submarine-launched missile fired from a submerged vessel

ventional to strategic nuclear warfare are concerned, clearly the most dangerous aspect of continuous technological innovation is the steady cheap-

ening of the processes involved in the production of nuclear weapons, and the clear danger that they will spread to other countries.

In the more distant future, advances in the techniques of fusion might so cheapen the process as to put nuclear bombs within the group of the poorest countries, or even of insurgents. This danger is not limited to nuclear weapons; chemical and biological weapons will become increasingly available as the years go by.

Weapons and International Tension

The qualitative arms race in which we are engaged carries a second danger, distinct from the danger of war itself but almost as grave. Modern weapons of mass destruction and fast means of delivering them have become an independent source of political tension. The strategist and the disarmament have for generations carried on an inconclusive argument as to whether arms are the cause or the effect of international tension.

In general, I think it is fair to say that historically they have been the product of tension, but that they are now a prime cause. Moreover, the technological revolution is not the only revolutionary force at work in the world, for we are also in the midst of a revolution of political nationalism which is producing great instability in the area outside the main East-West conflict. The danger is that continuous technological innovation may produce a deep and complex deadlock between the Soviet Union and the West which will continue long after the real interests of both require a certain amount of cooperation to confront common dangers—for instance, the rise of China as a new and much more aggressive great power.

Unilateral search for stability,

through continuous innovation, is not capable of producing and sustaining a stable balance of power. This is, I think, a conclusion that many people in the West have been reaching in recent years. I have recently been in Moscow for discussions with Soviet scientists and strategic thinkers and there is no doubt that this conclusion is shared by them.

I have no doubt that they are, for the first time, genuinely interested in seeking multilateral agreements with the West. For one thing they fear that if they and the United States maintain their present policies, both will lose control of their allies with all the dangers of embroilment this implies. They sense that they no longer have the technical lead of a few years ago while at the same time the dangers of accidental or preemptive war have not lessened. They are aware that unless they can reach some measure of agreement their economic burden will be increased by the need to compete with the diversity of American technological prowess.

Total Disarmament

The question is: How do we exploit this favorable moment? The Soviet answer is to negotiate on total and complete disarmament to be carried out in the shortest possible time, the abolition of all weapons, stockpiles, armies, staffs, military budgets, and research establishments. It would involve the creation of a world authority to police the process of disarmament, but would not involve any change in the structure of sovereign states.

This cannot be regarded as a serious proposal. At the worst, it is political warfare. At best, it can only be regarded as a substitute for serious thought about the problem.

Total disarmament is a conceivable idea if we are prepared to envisage a world entirely different from our own with a strong authoritarian world government, in which nations have been reduced to the same status as county councils, and in which man has relinquished many social characteristics that he acquired over the thousands of years that have gone into the making of the nation state.

In a world of sovereign states, the idea of total disarmament encounters two wholly unsurmountable obstacles. First, technology is recoverable, and if you destroy all weapons and disband all staffs and forces, you cannot prevent scientists and officials from secreting well-remembered equations and designs to be converted once again into weapons if the disarmament agreement breaks down. And it would break down unless the level of tension between states was maintained at a very low point for all time—something that is hard to conceive in an era when the world is going through a series of scientific, economic, and political revolutions simultaneously.

In the second place, a totally disarmed world of sovereign states would continue to be dominated by a definite ratio of power, since it assumes the retention of internal security forces. The internal security forces of the Soviet Union, some 350,000, are more than all the police forces of Free Europe combined. Military power, moreover, is only one form of power and if it alone were abolished, other forms of power would simply become more important.

If the idea of total disarmament is impossible in the present state of the world, where is agreement to be found? We know that for the time being total nuclear disarmament is

equally unfeasible; since it is impossible to devise a system of inspection that would satisfy the parties to such an agreement that no clandestine stock of bombs had been concealed. Not all inspection systems need be completely foolproof to create the confidence that is necessary to make disarmament acceptable. Nuclear weapons are, unfortunately, the one exception.

Phased Disarmament

This leaves us with the various schemes of comprehensive-phased disarmament which have formed the focus of negotiations between East and West over the past 10 years. Without going into wearisome details of the abortive plans presented by either side, it is possible to single out a number that are common to both Soviet and Western plans. They include ceilings on the military manpower of the great powers and eventually of the smaller powers; a corresponding reduction in level of conventional armaments; a "cutoff" of the production of nuclear weapons and some plans for the destruction of stockpiles; since 1960, special measures to control and eliminate the means of delivering weapons of mass destruction; and, also since 1960, the creation of special control and enforcement machinery.

The timing and the order of priorities suggested by East and West is different, but both envisage a three-stage plan and both now relegate final nuclear disarmament to the final stage.

Now, without discussing the merits of different plans, it is possible to be somewhat more sanguine about the chances of negotiating a far-reaching agreement of this kind than it has been in the past. For one thing, the complexity of modern weapons sys-

tems does give some force to the standing argument of the enthusiasts for disarmament that a far-reaching measure would be easier to inspect and enforce than a limited measure. For another, it is now widely accepted, at least by the advanced military nations, that there is no longer any such thing as national security, only international security. Most important of all, there is a much greater similarity in the military strength of the major powers. The Soviet Union is more prepared to accept inspection; the West is less insistent on foolproof inspection.

Problems of Multilateral Disarmament

However, quite apart from the discouraging history of attempts to negotiate multilateral disarmament, the idea rests on three conditions which are not easy to translate into reality.

In the first place, since it assumes the continuation of an international order based on the sovereign state, it would involve the negotiation of a treaty, and this must be framed in such a way that it puts no one state at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its adversaries and neighbors. This involves reconciliation, first, of opposed ideas on timing and emphasis of different phases, for each nation naturally frames its own plan in a fashion that gives it the greatest security.

It also involves an exceedingly complex series of negotiations to maintain the existing ratio of power at a progressively lower level of armaments, and translates into agreements such indefinable advantages as geography.

Moreover, insofar as disarmament would be comprehensive, it involves agreements not only between the larger states but between the larger and the smaller states of the world.

The latter, most particularly the new countries of Africa and Asia, are very anxious to see the great powers disarmed, but there is no certainty that they are ready to disarm themselves.

I don't say that it is impossible to negotiate such a treaty; what I do say is that it would take a very long time, and time is not on our side. It took the League of Nations 12 years to draw up a set of disarmament treaties in a world which comprised only some 30 sovereign states, and against a background of much simpler and less dynamic military technology. Nuclear weapons undoubtedly create a greater sense of urgency in the 1960's than existed in the 1920's. But can we be sure that our negotiators could shorten this timespan in a world which is not composed of 30 sovereign states but of nearly 100? Can we afford to let another decade elapse before any physical action has been taken to get the arms race under control? The world of 1971 will be infinitely more complex than it is today.

World Authority and Reduced Tension

The second requirement for a system of partial disarmament is a world authority. This need not be as all-embracing as it would have to be for a system of total disarmament, because it would not require a complete monopoly of military force in the world. It would have to be powerful enough to be capable not only of arbitrating disputes between nations but also enforcing its decisions. Again, this is something that is not impossible of fulfillment. But how long is it going to take us to get agreement on such an authority at a time when the Soviets are actively questioning the whole structure of the United Na-

tions? How can it operate if there is no concert of the great powers?

The third requirement of general and comprehensive disarmament is that we maintain, during the whole of the disarmament period, a low level of tension between sovereign states. This is not as unrealistic as assuming the absence of all international tension, but can we even assume a low level of international tension in an era when the military revolution is only one of several that are going forward simultaneously?

One can only conclude that the Soviets, in stating that disarmament must be achieved while encouraging unrest and subversion throughout the world, have not yet begun to do the most elementary thinking about the political conditions which are necessary to bring disarmament negotiations anywhere near fruition.

Arms Stabilization

Discouragement with the tremendous problems of multilateral disarmament in the present state of the world, coupled with a sense of urgency, has led many people in the West to approach this difficult and urgent problem from a new angle. This is to try to identify those areas of the arms race or the balance of power, particularly the nuclear balance, where both the West and the Soviet Union have a genuine identity of interest, and from this to evolve a concept of "arms stabilization" by mutual agreement. This school of thought has many exponents in the United States.

Its central premises are, first, that the proper objective of negotiations should be not the dismantling of the nuclear balance of power but the perfecting of it. It is concerned not so much with the elimination of weapons as with attacking the likely causes

of war. It is concerned with the most urgent current dangers and, therefore, primarily with the Soviet-American relationship. The second premise is that the objective of negotiation is the identification of common interests—areas where both we and the Soviets could lose equally—rather than attempting to resolve conflicting interests. It follows from this that success does not necessarily depend on mutual trust, and continued distrust or political hostility is assumed.

Now there are a number of pitfalls in this doctrine of arms stabilization or arms control which I will examine later. However, it does have the shining merit of taking the world as it is. Many of our present troubles spring from a wrong ordering of priorities; from an attempt to put last things first and to draw up schemes for an ideal world before we have yet laid its foundation.

Common Interest

What are these areas of potential common interest, these fields where both sides could lose equally? At this moment three things seem to stand out. One is to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading to powers other than the four that already have developed them—to the so-called Nth Powers. There are two ways of tackling this problem.

The first is by a negotiated ban on further nuclear testing. The negotiations on this first got underway in 1958 for a different reason—through world anxiety about the medical effects of nuclear tests. The longer they have gone on, the clearer it has been to both sides that a test ban represents a very useful device for preventing the smaller countries from developing their own nuclear weapons. For this reason the Soviets, the

Americans, and the British have been anxious to pursue negotiations in spite of the complex technical problems which they have encountered, and in spite of a continuing high level of political friction between the three countries.

If a nuclear test treaty is signed, it will be the first really significant step toward arms control that has been taken since the cold war began. It will probably be on the order of seven years between the beginning of the negotiations and the complete installation of the control machinery, even if France, China, and the other major countries can be persuaded to adhere to it.

The other avenue of progress is through stringent control of all fissionable material that is transferred to smaller countries for civil reactors. The idea of inspection meets with considerable resistance from smaller countries, but it may be necessary to abandon certain scientific developments which would markedly cheapen the process of developing nuclear weapons.

Protection From Surprise

The second field of clear common interest is that of providing safeguards against surprise attack. Like all measures of arms control, this must start with unilateral action before multilateral action can be fruitfully pursued.

In this case unilateral action must be taken by both sides, but particularly by the West, to go ahead as fast as possible with the development of the most invulnerable forms of second strike deterrence possible and with the development of improved control and reaction systems. When this has happened—and we should see some good progress in two to three years

—it is possible to envisage negotiations along two lines.

The first would be the progressive scrapping of more dangerous weapons systems in the armories of both sides; weapons that are provocative because they are so vulnerable that they could only be used to strike first. The Soviet Union has always refused to discuss this problem of surprise attack, except in the context of the withdrawal of the American Strategic Air Command from its overseas bases around the periphery of the Soviet Union. As the United States develops more dependable and effective forms of deterrence, it may prove possible to negotiate on such a basis.

Warning of Attack

The other approach is to discuss forms of warning and inspection. The older ideas on this subject are now obsolete. The speed of missiles, and even of jet aircraft, has rendered ideas of tactical warning out of date. Indeed, if invulnerability is a real safeguard, it is in the interests of both sides to abandon developments which could diminish it.

It is probably now necessary to consider the problem not in military but in political terms. If the danger of preemption is a real one, then there is high interest on both sides, in a time of crisis or tension, in reassuring the other that it is not preparing any form of attack or aggressive action.

What this probably means is the mutual appointment of ambassadors of Cabinet rank or special status in the nuclear capitals, and establishment of some form of direct communication between Moscow, Washington, and London; something which does not exist at the moment.

It is also well worth considering a

special surveillance force, probably under the UN, which, at the bidding of either side, could rapidly move into the strategic bases of either side to provide direct material and physical evidence that no form of attack was being planned.


Limiting the Deterrent

Closely allied with measures to safeguard against surprise attack are ideas for mutual agreement to stabilize the size of the deterrent force. Such calculations have little connection with reality, particularly since it is impossible to assume complete

increased. The point is that by this means the focus of inspection can be shifted from operational readiness, which involves vast interference with national sovereignty, to inventory inspection at ports, shipyards, airfields, and depots which is much less onerous. Agreement to stabilize the size of deterrent forces is, in fact, the essential connecting link with nuclear disarmament; is, indeed, the prior condition of it.

Limiting the Use of Space

The third area of common interest is to avoid the militarization of outer



The nuclear-powered *Abraham Lincoln*

US Navy

parity on each side in missile performance or accuracies, or geographical location. But they contain the germ of a fruitful idea, namely, agreement on limitations of the over-all size of deterrent forces.

If this ceiling could once be established, it could then be progressively lowered as accuracies and dependability improved and mutual confidence

space. Neither side at the moment wishes to militarize outer space but, unless agreement can be negotiated, both will probably feel forced to do so. There are two hopeful aspects about a negotiated agreement in this field.

The first is that the weapons do not exist at present. It is the experience of arms control that it is much easier

to get agreement not to produce something in the future than it is to dismantle something that is actually embedded in national military systems. The other is that, at present, there are only two powers, the USSR and the United States, who could possibly put military weapons into outer space.

What one can tentatively envisage in this field is a three-stage agreement by which the two countries would move progressively from notifying each other of their plans for space exploration, to a cooperative program, to a joint program operated either by the two powers themselves or by the United Nations.

There are a number of other ideas to be explored in the field of arms control. I have long felt that abolition of the missile represents a possible area of agreement, for the missile undermines international security, because of speed and ease of concealment, to a far greater extent than the bomber. There are certain hopeful factors; the missile has no civil use at present and it can only be tested publicly. But there are formidable difficulties. Production can be easily concealed, and there is a problem of definition, for the "missile" extends all the way from a *Guy Fawkes* rocket to the intercontinental ballistic missile.

Disengagement

Finally, there is an older set of ideas on arms stabilization, such as disengagement, or denuclearized zones in Europe, the Middle East, or the Pacific. The point to note here is that increasing ranges may make such agreements less meaningful. There is no value in reaching agreements that just register the fact that a particular area is no longer of strategic significance.

There is no doubt that the American school of thought that gives specific measures of arms control priority over the completion of a comprehensive disarmament treaty is motivated by a right sense of priorities. At the same time I don't believe that a policy of arms control is sufficient by itself.

For one thing, such schemes assume the indefinite continuation of international order dominated by the Soviet-American balance of power, an assumption that it is not wise to make in the world that is becoming less bipolar. For another, the rest of the world, backed up by the Soviet Union, will not accept arms control as a long-term substitute for disarmament, since the rest of the world is concerned not only with the dangers but also the economic burdens of armaments to a much greater extent than Britain or the United States.

Indispensable Stability

Measures of arms stabilization are the indispensable preliminary to disarmament. A runaway train cannot be set into reverse without first applying the brake, except at great risk to the train. A stabilized system of deterrence is the only background against which disarmament negotiations will have any hope of success.

Only by maintaining a posture of minimum deterrence—albeit at a lower and lower level—through the period of negotiation and the initial phases of disarmament proper can the great powers be given sufficient confidence to begin the process of actually disarming and to accept inspection. Only by first reaching limited agreements to meet the worst dangers of a world of uncontrolled armaments can experience be acquired in

the techniques and skills—political and scientific—that are necessary to police disarmament proper. Only by identifying areas of common interest between the great powers can you create the germ of that world authority that is necessary to enforce disarmament on a world in which the number of sovereign states is increasing yearly.

I would like to see the Western Powers make a candid declaration to the world that, in the present state of international relations, total, or even far-reaching, measures of disar-

mament are incapable of fulfillment, but to couple this with a number of specific and imaginative proposals on arms stabilization. These the Soviet Union would find hard to resist, since in reality she is as deeply concerned with stabilization, and as unwilling to face the implications of a totally disarmed world, as we. The time is past for generalizations, and unless we can rapidly apply the same kind of intellectual brilliance to the problem of stabilization that we now apply to the arms race, not only disarmament but peace itself may elude us.

Inasmuch as the Soviet Union and the US agreed in the declaration of principles in September, at the end of the McCloy-Zorin talks, on the goal of general and complete disarmament, the problem now becomes an attempt to implement that goal stage by stage. The Soviet Union and the US have a basic disagreement which must be resolved on this question. We believe that there must be adequate inspection, to make sure that each side is disarming and staying in accordance with the agreements which they make. The Soviet Union has stated that it will permit us, or the international body, to inspect those weapons which are destroyed but will not permit us to carry out an inspection to see what weapons remain. One side could destroy a hundred bombers but still have a thousand or two thousand bombers left. If you are really going to provide for orderly disarmament, it seems to me you have to inspect not only those weapons which have been destroyed, but also those weapons that remain. Otherwise we do not have any guarantee of security for either side. If we can agree to an effective inspection system so that each country can know that the other is living up to its agreement, then, in my opinion, we can move into general and complete disarmament.

President John F. Kennedy



THE FLASHING SWORD OF VENGEANCE

Major Mario G. Paolini,
United States Army Reserve

A swift vigorous transition to the attack—the flashing sword of vengeance—is the most brilliant point of the defensive. He who does not bear this in mind from the first, who does not from the first include it in his conception of the defense, will never understand the superiority of the defensive.

—Von Clausewitz

WHEN *Panzergruppe* Von Kleist crossed the Luxembourg border early on 10 May 1940, with the van of the attack through the Ardennes, the form of positional defensive warfare as demonstrated by the French was put to the test on a grand scale. The verdict was immediate and unequivocal. A rigid defensive posture that could not sustain a massive penetration would first splinter, then rupture. In the absence of depth and resiliency, the entire interior position of the defender would thereby be exposed to fatal exploitation by the forces pouring through the breach.


Despite this vivid lesson, the United States Army entered upon and fought World War II with essentially the same doctrine of defense that led to the abrupt demise of the French Army. The same inherent weakness was repeatedly confirmed. Before the influence of its critics could be heard, however, the advent of nuclear weapons was upon us and we were compelled to reexamine the entire spectrum of warfare, from major strategic concepts down to small unit tactics. From this emerged our current doctrine. As we grow accustomed to this new environment, we may better

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appreciate the significance of the new defensive posture by contrast with past concepts and their shortcomings.

Our former defensive doctrine contemplated the selection and organization of a battle position "to be held at all costs." The mission of the infantry in defense was, with the support of other arms, to stop the enemy by fire "in front of the battle posi-

trine was the emphasis. We recognized the possibility of a penetration; we always maintained a reserve, and we planned for the use of the reserve to counterattack. In reality this was considered an alternative to our defensive plans as though our defense had been unsuccessful and had been overcome, not as though this were part of our defense. We considered



tion," and to repel his assault by close combat if he reached it, and to eject him by counterattack if he penetrated it.

The important factor in this doc-

Major Mario G. Paolini, United States Army Reserve, is an instructor in the Command and General Staff Department of the 6227th USA R School at the Presidio of San Francisco. An attorney in civil life, he served in the Asiatic-Pacific theater during World War II.

withdrawal during daylight with greatest reluctance.

This doctrine of accomplishing the defensive mission in front of the battle position was subject to criticism even in a nonnuclear environment, primarily because it lacked tactical flexibility. A graphic illustration of our innate aversion to tactical withdrawal were the events that occurred on 22 December 1944 in the Saint-Vith horseshoe perimeter.

General Hasbrouck commanded the

7th Armored Division and combat command B of the 9th Armored Division together with an orphaned regiment of the 28th Division and remnants of the 106th Division. After five days of valiant defense against overwhelming forces, it is reported he was relieved of command because he requested permission to withdraw to a new line behind the Salm River. When Montgomery heard of this, he had the order rescinded the same day and permission was granted.¹

The next day Montgomery suggested to General Gavin that the 82d Airborne Division should be withdrawn to a ridgeline south of Werbomont. Hodges, Ridgway, and Gavin all demurred to this. Gavin has written that he knew it was tactically essential to withdraw, but that he was afraid of the attitude of his troops because of his division "never having made a withdrawal in its combat history." Finally, Montgomery had to insist upon this withdrawal. R. W. Thompson in his *Battle for the Rhine* declares that this fear of withdrawal "held in it the whole tragic problem of the U. S. Army in war."

Another historian wrote that our faith and pride made us reluctant to execute any voluntary withdrawal, that we considered it "un-American," and that this resulted in a considerable sacrifice of tactical flexibility and strategic balance. In brief, we had a doctrine to hold every position at all costs and to fight in front of it—there was no compromise. We could not distinguish between a Mortain and a Saint-Vith. We could not conceive that

in the same battle area there might be both a Bastogne and a Saint-Vith.

Hitler's Doctrine

The Allies were not the only adherents to this form of defensive tactics. The Germans attribute their defensive failures on the Eastern Front to the rigid defensive means they were compelled to adopt because of "Hitler's ever increasing predilection for hanging on at all costs."²

Liddell Hart questioned many generals regarding this and "All felt that Russia's offensive power could have been worn down by elastic defense—if they had only been allowed to practice it." Von Kleist declared to him: "Hitler always tried to make us fight for every yard, threatened to court-martial anyone who didn't"; Tippelskirch stated that "the root cause of Germany's defeat was . . . above all in fruitless resistance at the wrong time and place"; and Dittmar replied, "The disaster in each case was due to the fundamental error of a rigidly defensive strategy."³ If a common denominator is to be found in the postwar writings of the German generals concerning the defensive battles in the East, it is the unanimous condemnation of Hitler's policy of a rigid defense despite the vigorous insistence of the various staffs to the contrary.

But the protests of all concerned were to no avail. Illustrative of this is an incident reported by Guderian. Despite their repeated failures, the German General Staff in the early fall of 1944 again tried to persuade Hitler to establish a new defensive posture. The Germans had, thereto-

¹ Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe*, Collins, London, 1952, p. 596. Although no comment is made about this by Robert E. Merriam in *Dark December*, Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., or by John Toland in *Battle: The Story of the Bulge*, Random House, Inc., New York, Wilmot cites the precise hour of the order of relief and of the later order of reinstatement.

² Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, *Lost Victories*, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1958, p. 280.

³ B. H. Liddell Hart, *The German Generals Talk*, Berkeley Publishing Corp., New York, 1958, Chapter 15. Published in England in 1948 with the title *The Other Side of the Hill*.

fore, included in their defense organization a so-called main defense line which was backed up by the so-called major defense line. The army recommended that the major line henceforth be at least 12 miles behind the main line, but Hitler declared that he would never surrender 12 miles of front without a fight, and ordered the major line not more than one to two miles behind the main line.

In January 1945 the Russians began their all-out offensive. Under this avalanche, the main line, the major line, the reserves: everything was buried beneath a tidal wave of attackers. When Hitler learned of this, he flew into a rage and demanded to know: "Who was the half-wit who gave such idiotic orders?" His staff produced the minutes of the earlier meeting, and after reading a few sentences, Hitler dismissed the meeting.

Offensive Maneuver

History is replete with examples and illustrations of our initial premise that a shallow, rigid defensive position which is unable to sustain a concentrated penetration will rupture with fatal consequences. The commander of forces in the defense who establishes a shallow defense along rigid lines has lost the battle before it begins. This type of defensive failure calls to mind Schlieffen's observation that both sides in a battle, the loser just as much as the winner, contribute to the outcome.

A recent U. S. Army Command and General Staff College lesson declares that our current doctrine obliterates our old concepts of defense. Does this mean that we must file away all our former theories? No. Only the emphasis on the application of certain basic concepts has changed. No longer will units be deployed in fixed, rigid

lines of resistance. Depth and mobility must, of necessity, be integrated into defensive formations. Flexibility will be the keynote of defense. Defense operations will be more than passive waiting for an enemy to attack while we surrender the initiative. The new doctrine stresses offensive maneuver. The commander on the defense must seize the initiative and destroy the enemy.

Defense as a Concept

A given defensive posture can no longer be conveniently described as either area or mobile. These titles are inadequate. Defense is a concept. One feature may be a defensive posture holding specific terrain to serve as an anchor of the defensive position. Another feature may be a defensive posture where selected terrain is exchanged for the facility of maneuver so that the enemy can be led along a path of our own choosing to a point where we elect to destroy him.

Most defenses probably will be an amalgamation, a blending of both features. The label is immaterial; the distinction now exists primarily in the intent of the commander. Part of the force will be engaged in holding critical terrain while part will be engaged in a delaying action seeking to maneuver the enemy to the crucible of his destruction. In brief, the commander is no longer corseted, but is provided with a doctrine granting him maximum flexibility for the accomplishment of his mission.

This doctrine is now in its early stages of dissemination. Caution must be observed relative to the terminology. One text will refer to the position defense and the mobile defense; another will refer to defense based on retention of specific terrain and a delaying defense; and another will

refer to an area defense and a delaying defense. Until the dust has settled, a caveat on labels. The reader must study the substance, keeping in mind the basic principles of the new doctrine.

Analysis of the Terrain

It is well to review the various factors to be taken into account in developing a defensive course of action under our new concept. Planning is initiated by an analysis of the terrain and the avenues of approach. Estimates are made of the extent to which an enemy penetration could be allowed to develop so as to provide the most advantageous employment of our combat power. Next is an analysis of the enemy organization, firepower, and tactical doctrine in order to indicate his capability to develop a penetration. This must be contrasted to our own capability so that we can deduce the width and depth of the penetration which we are finally willing to accept and still retain a reasonable assurance of being able to overcome with our available fires (both conventional and nuclear) and maneuver.

Then we tentatively fix the extent to which the penetrations on each avenue of approach will be allowed to be developed and the means through which these penetrations can be controlled. This is followed by plans for the employment of our counterattack force against these assumed penetrations on each avenue of approach. Last, the planner computes the minimum forces required in the forward defensive area which, in turn, will establish the size of the force that can be retained for the counterattack mission.

We refer to this current defense concept as new, but the ingredients

are really not new. It is a truism to recall that war, like a chess game, limits us to the moves of certain figures. The art resides in the figures we choose to move and when and how we choose to move them. It is the emphasis that we give to certain combinations that constitutes a doctrine. Thus in the Battle of France in 1940, when Germany had only half the armor strength of her opponents, it was the adaptation of ancient theories (such as mass at the decisive point) to new weapons that brought her victory under the name of blitzkrieg warfare.

Fabian Tactics

Accordingly, when we say that at one end of the scale of our new defensive posture is a delaying defense, this is not new doctrine. In fact, these tactics have been called Fabian Tactics from the time when the Roman Dictator, Quintus Fabius, after the defeat of the Romans by Hannibal at Lake Trasimeno, ordered his generals to harass the enemy at all times but to withdraw before becoming involved in pitched battle. The wisdom of this thinking was well-illustrated when one of his generals, Varro, chose to disobey and provided future students of military history with the classic battle of Cannae. Kutuzov's famous withdrawal deep into Russia before Napoleon's invading armies is a classic example. Unfortunately, the impression derived from this illustration is that this form of defense is suitable only as a strategic maneuver on a grand scale if a tremendous depth is available to the defending forces.

A lesser known but carefully planned and well-executed delaying defense was that of the Serbian Army in 1914. Under General Voivode Putnik, the numerically inferior Serbs

retired on successive lines against the Austro-Hungarian invaders. All through November 1914 the Serbs delayed along the river lines of the Drina and the Save, the Ub and the Kolubara. When Putnik felt that his attackers had exhausted themselves and the time was propitious, he began his counteroffensive on 3 December and by 13 December had thrown his enemy back across the Save River from whence he came. The invaders suffered twice the number of casualties of the Serb Army.

Contributing Elements

In a study of these illustrations of a delaying defense, one must keep in mind the reliance by the defense upon the elements of weather, terrain, obstacles, and the self-exhaustion of the assaulting forces. Except for the intervention of a superior element (as in the case of the Russian winter), the defense cannot as a general rule hope to achieve any ultimate success unless the delaying tactics are supplemented by a counterattack plan.

Von Clausewitz proclaimed that an active defense was a fundamental principle. He considered the defense as a whole the stronger form of warfare and declared that the defense should never be passive, that the defense is a means to attack the enemy most advantageously in terrain chosen in advance where we have arranged things to our own advantage.

The Battle of Tannenberg was a defensive victory, yet it had all the characteristics of offensive action and is used as an example of a double envelopment. It was conceived with all the boldness of a most daring commander. The Germans were able to accomplish a defensive mission by offensive tactics. Leaving only an economy of force defense at Königsberg

in the face of Rennenkampf's 1st Army, Hindenburg maneuvered his elements to concentrate superior forces in the south against Samsonov and thereby gained the famous victory of Tannenberg.

Von Leeb wrote that war is the infallible testing field where the teachings elaborated in peacetime are tested and troops can prove whether they were established on a basis of reality. Fortunately, for humanity, there is no precedent of nuclear war. The lessons of the past can, however, be of assistance if we orient them in proper perspective with the capabilities of nuclear warfare.

While we can find many battles illustrative of some of the points discussed, too often the results obtained were not by design but because of the development of the situation. To be sure, the Battle of the Bulge involved the reduction of a massive penetration, but it was an afterthought thrust upon us by circumstances that befell us to our complete surprise. Here, too, there was no harmony of design in the reduction of the penetration between the use of the 1st Army by the patient Montgomery in the north and the 3d Army by the impatient Patton in the south.

The Zone Defense

Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-201, a historical study prepared by German generals of improvisations on the Russian Front, contains an excellent summary of their experiment with a zone defense. First, the Germans concluded that a prerequisite to a Russian breakthrough was a rigid defense of the sector, and that, therefore, the solution was to provide flexibility. The zone defense they improvised was comparable to saber-fencing tactics where a cut is warded off

by sudden retirement with appropriate guard followed by an immediate counterthrust which permits the fencer to regain his former position.

The terrain was carefully chosen for the experiments. Strongpoints and local reserves were distributed in depth throughout the position and even in the rear of the artillery. Troop disposition was so planned that even the fire from the heaviest Russian concentrations would only do local damage and never wipe out a unit. German artillery arranged for numerous alternate positions, as many as five to eight per battery, each battery being registered for each alternate position. All commands from battalion to army were to shift to alternate command posts (CP's) as soon as the attack was launched or suspected.

Communications were always in separate bunkers and supplemented to include wire, radio, visual signals, dispatch riders, and runners. Alternate bridges, together with new approach roads, were prepared distant from existing bridges. The reserve was prepared to move from its assembly areas as soon as the attack was suspected.

Avenues of approach for armor were heavily mined in depth up to 15 miles throughout the battle position but with lanes for the counterattack forces. Antitank guns were distributed in depth deep into the position. Reserve assembly areas for use after the attack was launched were placed in the center of gravity of the position from which they could be used to support the entire front. Commanders were indoctrinated by briefings, map exercises, and tactical walks. The defensive preparations for the zone defense were most extensive.

When the Russians launched their

attack with their usual artillery preparation, they destroyed vacated artillery positions, empty troop assembly areas, and abandoned CP's. When the Russian infantry began its assault, it was taken under fire by German artillery and forced to disperse into the extensive minefields that had been prepared behind the line of contact. The stalled infantry called for armor and armor responded, many to be lost in the minefields, and those that penetrated were met by the antitank guns established in depth. As the armor stalled, the German Panzer reserves counterattacked.

The result was a Russian withdrawal and a numerically inferior defender had provided his position with sufficient depth that a breakthrough could not be achieved. Unfortunately, for the Germans, these experiments could not be implemented because Hitler, as a matter of policy, would not permit the defense to surrender terrain to the enemy.

Alam Halfa, a New Model

On the allied side, Alam Halfa furnishes us with a clear example of an assumed penetration. The 8th Army held a line north-south through El Alamein, with the right flank secured by the Mediterranean and the left flank protected by the impassable Qattara Depression. Montgomery had made up his mind "that Rommel's attack would be made in a certain way and I planned to receive it on ground of my own choosing." Expecting an envelopment against his left flank,


⁴This battle has come to be recognized as a model defensive battle, considered by some to be "Monty's finest battle." Although Montgomery has apparently assumed credit for the plan of the battle (cf. *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K. G., The World Publishing Co., Cleveland, Ohio, 1958), a recent history takes issue with this and credit for the plan of battle is given in part to Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck and Major General E. Dorman-Smith (cf. Correlli Barnett, *The Desert Generals*, Viking Press, New York, 1961).

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this sector was, therefore, lightly held by the 7th Armored Division in an economy of force role. Special emphasis to barrier construction supplemented this front to canalize and constrict the penetration.

The 7th Armored Division was not to become entangled but was to fight and retire intact, always harassing, yielding in the face of expected superior attacking forces. Rommel was to

The battle was fought exactly as planned by the defender. Rommel's infantry assaulted all along the front. In the area of the expected penetration, he had superiority and his infantry opened gaps in the minefields through which passed the *Afrika Korps*. The 7th Armored Division took no firm stand, but fought and retired, never becoming engaged, always keeping its tactical balance.



be allowed to penetrate this sector, and as he turned northward in his envelopment toward Alam Halfa Ridge, the key to the defensive position, the penetration was to be blocked and halted. Then the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the artillery were to visit their combined destructive power upon the Axis forces in the bulge while the 8th Army forces in the north were to attack south and close the gap.

Rommel swung north and planned shifts were effected by the defenders. He was blocked and halted, and the RAF and the 8th Army artillery combined to strike the penetration with everything in their arsenal while the counterattack began to seal the base of the penetration. Rommel withdrew in the face of an obvious trap.

Here was an assumed penetration defensive battle which, although fought in a nonnuclear environment,

could be adapted easily to our nuclear era. Nuclear fires, both planned and on-call, would be used to strike the penetration when its forward momentum was blunted by the blocking forces and the counterthrust would be initiated in the wake of the nuclear assault to restore the battle position and complete the destruction of the enemy forces.

What Might Have Been

While Alam Halfa offers us a study of an assumed penetration, and although it is classified as a model defensive battle, it falls short as a perfect example of the premise of this article because of the limited use of the counterattack force, "the most brilliant point of the defensive." Montgomery admits that he has "sometimes been criticized for not following up Rommel's withdrawal by launching the Eighth Army to the attack." His reasons that he was "not happy" with the standard of training and the equipment situation seem difficult to appreciate.

Rather more appropriate might have been his basic philosophy never to launch an attack until he was so absolutely prepared and so superior to his foe that the outcome could not possibly be doubted. Had Montgomery exploited at Alam Halfa, the crushing battle of El Alamein might possibly never have been fought. On the other side, Kesselring asked himself the question, "Was it right under these circumstances to wait for the British offensive in the El Alamein position?" Then, after an analysis, he replies, "Looking back, I see it was a mistake to remain there."

Here, then, is an analysis from the German side of the line as to whether

³ Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, *Kesselring—A Soldier's Record*, William Morrow & Co., New York, 1954, pp 154-155.

El Alamein proved to be an inappropriate defensive posture adopted by Rommel. As it developed, Rommel's tenacious hold at Alamein finally ruptured in the face of the overwhelming superiority of 8th Army, and the retreat that ensued began the German denouement in Africa.

The Master—Von Manstein

Liddell Hart has written that "The ablest of all the German generals was probably Field Marshal Erich von Manstein." After he had demonstrated his keen grasp of the power of the offensive as author of the *Schwerpunkt* through the Ardennes in the Battle of France, and as a commander of Panzer forces in the early phases of the Russian Invasion, he was to adapt himself to the defense with equal brilliance. In fact, the Kharkov riposte, a dazzling counterstroke in the Battle of the Donets in early 1943, has been called his "great achievement."

This battle had been preceded by general withdrawals all along the Southern Front. Army Detachment Hollidt had retired through Rostov to entrenchments along the Mius; Stalingrad had fallen; Army Detachment Kempf had been compelled to evacuate Kharkov. In the north center of the zone, a gap opened and the Russians seemed heading for the Dnieper at Zaporozhe, Manstein's headquarters, threatening to cut off the entire Southern Front.

At the insistence of Manstein, Hitler visited him on 6 February. The fall of Stalingrad a few days earlier must have influenced him because he yielded to Manstein's proposed plan. The salient was permitted to grow in depth but the anchors at its base held firm. "Manstein was perfectly calm; indeed he watched the Russian ma-


neuver with satisfaction." When Hitler again visited Manstein on 17 February, Manstein had to convince him "that the farther the Russian masses advanced to the west and southwest, the more effective would be his counterstroke."

On 22 February Von Manstein deemed the time for counteraction had arrived. Five Panzer divisions held poised in the south were unleashed northwesterly against the

with accepted tactical principles, instead of being hampered with 'holding at all costs' as the battlecry. . . . Field Marshal von Manstein proved in this operation that Russian mass attacks should be met by maneuver and not by rigid defense.

The Supreme Test

World War II has been committed to history. The atom has been added to the arsenal, the missile has given



south flank of the salient. By 15 March the penetration had been sealed off and eliminated, Kharkov had been recaptured, and the Russians, minus 615 tanks, had been thrown back across the Donets. Major General Frederick W. von Mellethin in *Panzer Battles* states:

These operations showed once again what German troops were able to do when led by experts in accordance

depth to the battlefield, and the rotary wing has created another dimension. But the war of tomorrow will still involve forces on the offense and the defense. Von Clausewitz wrote that contempt for the defensive has always been the result of an epoch in which a certain style of defense has outlived its day. If we have witnessed the failure of one form of defense, we have also been witness to the success of

other forms. Our technological advances have provided us with the combat power: the art of victory will depend upon the manner in which we will use it, whether on the defense or on the offense.

As was stated in a college text, the conduct of defensive operations under adverse conditions is the supreme test of the field commander—the highest order of leadership and tactical skill is demanded. The offensive is one of

our basic principles of war, but we must not overlook the fact that the defense is still a means to win a battle and to destroy the enemy. To achieve this, the author of the battle must articulate the defensive posture with sufficient depth, elasticity, and resiliency to undertake the initiative at the most propitious time, and then to employ the flashing sword of vengeance, the most brilliant point of the defensive.

Fitting Words:

"General, I will do it!"

Major Peter Keenan, commanding the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry, 400 strong, acknowledged the order to charge Stonewall Jackson's army of 10,000. Date: 2 May 1863; place: Chancellorsville. Federal troops faced disaster. A sacrificial move became imperative. It was necessary to buy time with blood. Confronted with the problem of duty, Major General Pleasanton and Keenan exchanged penetrating, understanding glances. The 34-year-old major smiled wanly, saluted, clicked his spurred heels as he about-faced, mounted and galloped into the red flashes of death, leading the gallant Pennsylvanians. Ten minutes were gained for the Union cause. Mission accomplished.

UNITED STATES

Shorter R&D Leadtime

The Department of the Army is concentrating efforts on the reduction of the leadtime in the development of new materiel for the combat forces. Long recognized as one of the major obstacles to qualitative superiority in our Armed Forces, the leadtime factor has averaged from eight to 12 years. Objective of the new program is to reduce this time to "four years or less from project initiation to first production rolloff of materiel, followed by expeditious procurement in adequate quantities. . . ."

Procedures established to accomplish this objective include the creation of a standardized information service for all materiel in the development and procurement cycle for all Army staff agencies. Management systems throughout the technical services are to be standardized. Early preparations will be made for production and the uninterrupted distribution of the new item, and the concurrent availability of required support and trained personnel.—News item.

Portable Power Source

Research is continuing on the development of a highly portable electric power supply source under terms of a contract awarded by the US Army Signal Corps. The current program will concentrate on the development of a thermionic converter which will use conventional fuels such as gaso-

line. A unit of this type could produce electric power to operate field electronic and communications systems or it could be used as a standby power supply when other sources fail.

Direct conversion devices are attractive for military use because potentially they are lighter and can operate longer than conventional batteries. They need not be recharged or



North American Aviation, Inc
Portable power unit for remote areas

replaced and can be refilled with readily available fuel. Also, the converters have an indefinite shelf life and operate silently.

Thermionic converters produce electricity by heating an electrode or metal plate to very high temperatures, causing electrons to boil off and jump a small gap to a cooler electrode. An electric current is thus produced.—News item.

New Field Cable

The United States Army Airborne and Electronics Board, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is testing a Canadian-developed lightweight cable for use with field telephones. The cable would be used for point-to-point communications over distances of less than two miles. In addition to its light weight, the cable is low enough in cost to eliminate the requirement for recovery or repair where faults are difficult to locate.—News item.

Radio Procurement

Quantity procurement has been approved for two new lightweight portable radio sets. The man-packed AN/PRC-25 will replace the AN/PRC-8, 9, and 10 now in use. The PRC-25 can communicate on 920 FM channels all of which are controlled by 13 crystals. It will net with sets used by infantry, artillery, and armored units. Except for one electron tube, the new set uses all transistorized circuits. Tuning is accomplished by adjusting two knobs and can be accomplished in the dark. Two channels can be preset for quick tuning. It weighs 17 pounds 11 ounces, slightly less than any of the three sets it is replacing, and measures 11 by 11 by 4 inches.

The transistorized circuitry has re-

duced power requirements and simplified the problem of battery resupply and weight. A recent contract calls for production of 8,598 of the new sets at a cost of nine million dollars.

A 65.8 million-dollar order has also been placed for a new vehicular radio, the AN/VRC-12, for use in tanks,



US Army

New AN/PRC-25 portable radio

armored vehicles, and command vehicles. The VRC-12 also makes extensive use of transistorized circuits to improve reliability and reduce weight. It weighs but 102 pounds, a weight reduction of 48 percent from the current AN/GRC-3, 5, and 7 series. The VRC-12 provides 920 channels and is compatible with present FM equipment having common frequency coverage and with the new man-packed sets.—News item.

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Estimate Of Soviet Forces

An unclassified estimate of Soviet military forces contained in a speech by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the United States Army credits the USSR with having three million men under arms. Some 2.2 million of these are contained in a 150-division ground force.

The Soviet Army is organized into motorized rifle divisions, tank divisions, and specialized airborne divisions. Although streamlined and re-equipped to increase flexibility, mobility, and firepower, these divisions are very similar in organization to their World War II predecessors. The motorized division consists of three motorized rifle regiments, a tank regiment, an artillery regiment, and an anti-aircraft artillery regiment. Each division of this type has over 200 tanks.

The tank division is composed of a heavy tank regiment, two medium tank regiments, a motorized rifle regiment, an artillery regiment, and an anti-aircraft artillery regiment. Each tank division has over 300 tanks.

The tank division and the motorized rifle division are grouped into two types of armies: a combined-arms army, typically consisting of four motorized rifle divisions and one tank division; and a tank army, normally containing four tank divisions.

Soviet tactical doctrine has been modified to employ nuclear weapons delivered by both aircraft and missiles. Emphasis is on the use of armor to exploit their own nuclear fires and to minimize casualties from enemy nuclear weapons.

Great emphasis is also placed on maintaining the momentum of an attack. It is planned to keep an advance moving day and night. Toward this

end the Soviets include frequent night operations in their training program. They have developed a variety of excellent bridging equipment, light amphibious tanks, and amphibious armored personnel and cargo carriers which will reduce delays at water barriers.

Protective techniques against nuclear weapons include hugging tactics—that is, maintaining constant close contact with the enemy to discourage his use of nuclear weapons on forward echelons. Where a halt is necessary, the digging in of men and materiel is prescribed.

The Soviets have delivery means for nuclear weapons by all major echelons. Support for division operations can be provided by a free rocket and a guided missile, both mounted on a tracked chassis. The 203-millimeter gun-howitzer, the 310-millimeter gun, and heavy mortars from higher echelons may also have a nuclear capability which could be placed in support of a division. For army and front (roughly equal to an army group) targets there are guided missiles with longer ranges. Air delivery is carried out by elements of the front's organic air army.

The concept for defense is characterized by dispersion in depth, with troops, materiel, and supplies dug in, and with the troops so deployed that not more than one battalion would be destroyed by a medium-yield nuclear weapon. The plan is to defend obstacles and key terrain in order to delay and compress enemy forces into concentrations vulnerable to nuclear attack, and then to counterattack enemy penetration with strong armored forces. The doctrine instructs Soviet commanders to assume the offensive

if the counterattack is successful.

The Soviets have been modifying their logistical organization and procedures in an effort to meet the requirements of fully mobile and fast-moving forces in modern warfare. Recent developments include increases in the mobility and mechanization of supply operations, increases in the level of reserves of forward units, employment of cargo helicopters and cargo aircraft of good design, the establishment of a more mobile and flexible repair and recovery organization, expansion of the scope of medical treatment and evacuation, and the organizing, training, and equipping of rear units for rear area security and damage control.

Changes in Soviet tactical doctrine cannot be predicted with certainty. Current trends, however, clearly indicate that the employment of large armored forces and conventional artillery will be continued, while nuclear delivery means within the front will be increased. It is likely, therefore, that the Soviets will retain a dual capability in their ground forces for the foreseeable future.—News release.

Maximum Speed Tests For The 'X-15'

The X-15 research aircraft successfully completed speed tests recently by obtaining a speed of 4,093 miles per hour. Following launch from a B-52 carrier at an altitude of 45,000 feet, the slim craft climbed to an altitude of 101,600 feet. At 95,800 feet above sea level, it reached a speed of Mach 6.04. The rocket engine burned at maximum throttle for 86 seconds. Over-all flight time during this test was 10 minutes.

The X-15 (MR, Jun 1960, p 74) is a joint United States Air Force, Navy, and National Aeronautics and Space

Administration project designed to obtain scientific information on many factors including aerodynamic heating, stability and control, and operating problems. Objectives for the air vehicle established early in the program was a speed of 4,000 miles per hour and an altitude of 50 miles. The program now calls for an attempt to reach an altitude of more than 75 miles in tests scheduled over the next 18 to 24 months.—News item.

Rocket-Driven Anchor

The United States Army Corps of Engineers has developed an explosive-driven anchor designed to moor tankers at offshore points from which they can discharge oil through undersea pipelines.

The mooring system consists of a platform-type buoy and the anchor. The buoy is towed into position and the anchor is released from the buoy by remote control. Upon contact with the bottom, the solid rocket fuel is detonated and drives the anchor deep into the ocean bottom. Latest tests show a 34-foot penetration into a hard harbor bottom by the anchor.

With the anchor in place, an incoming ship simply moors itself to the buoy, attaches its discharge pipe to the pipeline in the base assembly of the buoy, and begins to pump oil ashore. Should it be necessary to abandon the site, the buoy can be cut loose from the anchor leaving the anchor embedded in the ocean floor. Because of its relatively low cost the explosive-driven anchor is considered expendable.

The new device will not eliminate the need for the conventional anchor, which, with its chains, will continue to be carried by ships at sea.—News release.


'Hercules-Goer' Teamed Up

The Army's second generation *Nike* air defense missile has been successfully fired from a mobile launching device mounted on an experimental *Goer* transport vehicle. The first launching, conducted at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, followed four weeks of extensive testing of the vehicle loaded with missile and launching equipment. The adaptation of the *Hercules* missile to the *Goer* mount is commercially sponsored and is not an officially endorsed US Army research and development project.

The *Goer* vehicle concept (MR, Feb 1960, p 73) employs the large tire and independent wheel suspension system which has been used for a number of

years in commercial earthmoving equipment. The Army has conducted extensive tests with *Goers* as cargo vehicles. Test models of the *Goer* are amphibious, provide a high cargo-to-weight ratio, have a very short turning radius in comparison with other vehicles of similar size, and have demonstrated their ability for off-the-road operation in mud and broken terrain.



Recent improvements in the *Nike Hercules* system include the incorporation of a new high-powered radar system which is reported to be 10 times more discriminating in target detection than earlier equipment. The new radar is also said to increase the effective range of the missile.



Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc
Hercules missile mounted on a *Goer* mobile battlefield transporter

The *Nike* missile family includes the *Ajax* and the *Hercules*, which are deployed in air defense roles in the US and overseas, and the *Nike Zeus* antimissile missile now in the advanced development stage.

More than 5,000 missiles of the *Nike* family have been fired by troops in training.—News item.




US Army Photos

A *Hercules* heads for its target after being fired from a *Goer*-mounted launcher (right). *Goers* demonstrate their mobility. These are the fuel-transporter versions of the vehicle (above).



GREAT BRITAIN

"Scissors" Bridge



British Information Services

Britain's tank-transported "scissors" bridge, mounted on a *Centurion* hull, is capable of spanning a 45-foot gap. The over-all length of the bridge is 52 feet. It can carry any British military vehicle normally used in forward areas.—News release.

New Self-Propelled Artillery

A turret-mounted self-propelled 105-millimeter gun called the *Abbot* has been developed for the British Army to supersede the 25 pounder. The new weapon is designed to provide close artillery support to ground units and is capable of firing high-explosive, smoke, or antitank rounds to a range of nearly 11 miles. The turret mount is capable of a 360 degree traverse, a marked improvement over previous self-propelled guns.

In addition to improved range and flexibility, the *Abbot* has an amphibious capability. It is now undergoing service trials.—News release.

New Lighter For Armed Forces


The British Army has a new ship-to-shore lighter in service. Designated ramped powered lighters (RPL's), the new craft were developed by the Technical Policy Wing of the Army's Royal Engineers for offshore use. They are highly maneuverable, can turn in their own length, and change from full ahead to astern in seconds. With an over-all length of 72 feet and a deadweight of 55 tons, they can carry a 50-ton armored fighting vehicle, or any 50-ton load, including that weight of liquid in double-bottom tanks. The hulls are of welded steel, but with upperworks of aluminum alloy the craft

are light enough to be handled as deck cargo in transit. They are powered by two electric-starting diesel engines and have a speed of about nine knots.

The first units were shipped to Singapore in November for operation with a port squadron.—News release.

Supersonic Test Model

A scale model of what may develop into a supersonic airliner has been successfully flown at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Bedford, England. Called the *HP-115*, the experimental aircraft is claimed to have a sweep of leading edge greater than any aircraft yet built and to be the




British Information Services
HP-115 aircraft on the ground

world's slenderest delta. The purpose of the current test program is to determine the handling characteristics, stability, and control to be expected from an aircraft of its shape at the low speeds necessary for takeoff, approach, and landing.—News item.

European Space Program

Great Britain has joined with seven other European nations and Australia to develop a peaceful space research program. Participants include France,



British Information Services
Britain's *Blue Streak*, first-stage engine for European space program

Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, and Spain. The program will include the launching of satellites from the Woomera Rocket Range in southern Australia. The first test will use the British-developed *Blue Streak* as the first stage of a three-stage launch vehicle. The second stage will be a French-developed unit and the third stage will be made in Germany.—News item.


TURKEY

'Nike' Marksmen

The 1st Turkish *Nike* Missile Battalion has completed a successful season at Fort Bliss, Texas. Out of 12 practice rounds fired, the unit scored 11 direct hits.—News item.

USSR

Record Claimed For New Aircraft



Soviet compound helicopter

The Soviet press has claimed a speed record for one of the new aircraft first displayed at the Red Aviation Day celebrations last fall (MR, Sep 1961, p 107). The aircraft, which has been named the *Hoop* by Western observers, is a combination helicopter and wing-supported plane. It is reported to have both a vertical (VTOL) and a short (STOL) takeoff and landing capability. Other aircraft in this category include the British *Rotodyne* and the United States *XV-1* research plane.

The Soviet claim is for a sustained flight of 30 minutes' duration at 1,500 meters altitude with an average speed of 366 kilometers per hour.

The limited data available on the *Hoop* indicates that it is nearly 100 feet long and uses two gas turbines mounted in nacelles at the wingtips. Each engine drives a large four-bladed

rotor. The large wing is mounted at the top of the fuselage amidships. A conventional tail assembly provides stabilization and control.

Early releases on the new plane credited it with a 100-passenger capacity; however, subsequent, more critical analysis indicates that it is probably considerably less than that. —News item.

Officers On Central Committee


Military representation on the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party has sharply increased as a result of elections which took place during the recent Party Congress in Moscow. There are now 12 senior military men holding full Central Committee memberships as compared to four before the elections. Eight additional military men are candidate members of the Central Committee. —News item.

BRAZIL

Geodetic Survey Project

The United States Army Inter-American Geodetic Survey (IAGS) has recently completed a geodetic tie across the northeastern tier of countries in South America from Venezuela to the northeast bulge area of Brazil. The new link connects previously existing first-order triangulation in Venezuela with similar surveys in Brazil.

Work was accomplished with the assistance of US Air Force photomapping agencies and the cooperation of the Latin American gov-



One of 10 aluminum towers built to establish azimuth control for IAGS surveys in Brazil

ernments concerned. The project traversed the jungle areas of British Guiana, Dutch Surinam, French Guiana, and the Amazon region of Brazil by using airborne *HIRAN* equipment supported by ground parties using electronic equipment. The ground parties were positioned at selected positions, usually by helicopter.

The now completed survey, one of several IAGS projects, extends from Venezuela down the west coast of South America into Peru, across the Mato Grosso area of Brazil, and up the east coast of that country. Data from the project will be shared by the governments concerned and will become available to the public through published maps and charts.—News release.

MOROCCO

Soviet Military Aid

A Swiss source reports that there are 100 pilots and technicians from Communist bloc countries in Morocco training the Moroccan Air Force in the use of their newly acquired *MiG-17* aircraft.—News item.

POLAND

New Aircraft For Navy

The Polish naval air arm is replacing its Soviet *MiG-15* fighter aircraft with newer *MiG-17*'s. The air element of the Polish Navy consists of four squadrons totaling 40 to 50 aircraft. Although manned by navy personnel, these units are under the operational control of the Polish Air Force.—News item.

PAKISTAN

Nuclear Research And Training

The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission has opened its first Nuclear Training and Research Center at Lahore. The center will provide facilities for training 30 to 35 students every four months in the application of radio isotopes.

A similar center is under construction at Dacca. It is expected to be operational near the end of 1962.—News item.



MILITARY

BOOKS

KREMLIN TARGET: U. S. A. Conquest by Propaganda. By Donald Dunham. 274 Pages. Ives Washburn, Inc., New York, 1961. \$4.50.
BY COL ERVAN F. KUSHNER, *USAR*

... our security may be lost piece by piece, country by country, without the firing of a single missile or the crossing of a single border.

When President John F. Kennedy uttered these words on 20 April 1961, in an address delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the Commander in Chief was not referring to any new developments in Soviet military strategy or tactics.

The statement, according to Mr. Dunham, was the first top official recognition of the significance of the propaganda war now being waged against this country.

The seemingly erratic conduct of the Soviets in the management of their diplomatic affairs is not accidental. It is the result of a deliberate design to divide and subjugate the Free World by artfully contrived psychological measures. We, in the United States, have been made the primary subject of slander and diatribe.

This book is written with clarity and logic. It demonstrates how the Communists have been able to exploit our news media in a most effective manner and how the human qualities and emotions of our citizenry can be and have at times been exploited.

Communist propaganda methods are exposed and documented with case histories. The mission is always to-

ward subversion by subtle and undeviating efforts. Distorting our national image abroad by deluding our allies through "front" activities and by the promoting of "antidemocratic" and "anti-imperialistic" demonstrations is but another example of the techniques employed by the Kremlin.

Mr. Dunham feels that we have not been too successful in our counterattack: America, he writes, needs a political blueprint which will spell out the weaknesses of the USSR, both outside her own geographical borders and inside them.

The Communists are extremely vulnerable; their totalitarian rule, Khrushchev communism, and misbehavior before the United Nations are among the fertile fields for a major propaganda effort by us.

Kremlin Target: U. S. A. demonstrates how we can best win the war of words. In this respect the book makes a most important contribution. Our public must be taught to recognize and understand the dialectics of Soviet propaganda since it is basic that words and bullets can often have an equally devastating effect.

Included is a series of appendixes illustrating the Communist technique and extent of their propaganda distribution by radio and the press, and a Suggested Reading List on Soviet Propaganda.

The book is useful, particularly for personnel engaged in public information or psychological warfare activities.

THE ORDEAL OF CAPTAIN ROEDER. Translated and Edited by Helen Roeder. 248 Pages. St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York, 1961. \$5.00.

By LT COL ROBERT G. MATTE, *Inf*

The defeat and disintegration of the Grand Army of Napoleon during the Russian campaign of 1812-13 are portrayed vividly in this fascinating account by an officer who was there.

Captain Hans Roeder's diary, translated by his great granddaughter, should be of particular interest to military historians.

Captain Roeder, if we may credit his account, was unique for his times. As a company commander of a Hessian unit serving in the armies of Napoleon, he was conscientious in his performance of duty and genuinely concerned for the welfare of his men.

His attempts to maintain some semblance of discipline and order in his own unit, while the high command and the army at large fled in panic from the elements and marauding Cossacks, provides an interesting study of small-unit leadership under adverse conditions.

Although Captain Roeder's diary is a personalized account, it is sufficiently objective to permit an analysis of the many strategic and tactical errors that led to Napoleon's defeat. Familiar to all historians are the usual faults assessed against Napoleon: gross underestimation of the enemy, inadequate provisions for logistical support, and faulty intelligence on the weather and terrain. To these Captain Roeder adds the failure of leadership. Competent commanders and an adequate staff system might have prevented a debacle, and the shattered remnants of the troops of the emperor, although defeated, might yet have remained an army.

POLITICAL DECISION-MAKERS. Edited by Dwaine Marvick. 347 Pages. The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., New York, 1961. \$7.50.

By COL JOHN E. DWAN II, *Inf*

This book is a collection of original essays by a group of scholars who use the analytical techniques of behavioral research in attempting to understand what makes public policymakers tick. Each author has his own approach.

The assumption underlying the behavioral approach to the study of policymaking is that, since decisions made by people in positions of power have a crucial effect on the course of events, there is some merit in trying to find out what political decision-makers are like, and how their own personalities and outlooks influence their decisions.

A lot of scholarly ink has been spilled in this effort since World War II, and much work remains to be done. The question here is: Can the professional military man extract any profit from these scholarly efforts in general and from this book in particular?

The answer is a qualified yes. This book has relevance for the military leader in that he and the political decision-maker have some things in common. Both face the hard practicalities of real situations, both deal with people, both seek practical results, and the quality of their decisions determine their success or failure. As a decision-maker the military leader, like the politician, is influenced by subjective factors in his own makeup, his unexamined biases, his built-in value patterns.

While the book will not appeal to anyone impatient with scholarly discourse, military readers so inclined may find in it some insights that will help them meet the foremost demand of leadership—"Know thyself."

MILITARY BOOKS

THE MANAGEMENT OF PERSONNEL. By William B. Wolf. 378 Pages. Wadsworth Publishing Co., San Francisco, Calif., 1961. \$10.60.

BY LT COL WILLIAM N. MARTASIN,
AGC

This book, intended primarily for supervisors and students, covers personnel management from the viewpoint of those who actually manage people.

In a simple illustration portraying the growth of a fictitious commercial organization, the author presents the varying factors affecting personnel relationships. Dr. Wolf, Professor of Business Management at the University of California, claims that each individual organization as well as structural elements of that organization are unique, and have an impact on the personnel management "climate."

The author does not neglect the role of the formal personnel department in managing people, but stresses that management of people is a line function "carried out by those directly concerned with and responsible for accomplishing the main purposes of the enterprise."

While a considerable portion of the book is devoted to personnel techniques related to industry, military managers of civilian personnel will find this a handy reference volume.

THE OLD CHINA HANDS. By Charles G. Finney. 258 Pages. Doubleday & Co., Inc., New York, 1961. \$3.95.

BY CAPT ROBERT M. WORCESTER,
USAR

This is the story of soldiering in China, a warm nostalgic account of the highlights of a soldier's life in the 15th Infantry.

Lieutenant Colonel George C. Mar-

shall was the regimental executive. Matthew B. Ridgway and Joseph W. Stilwell were both majors in the unit. Twenty-two regimental officers who served with the 15th Infantry in China later became general officers.

But this is not their story. It is the story of the privates, the privates first class, the corporals, and an occasional sergeant. This is the story of well-pressed khaki, gleaming buttons, and shining leather; of soldiering with the British, Italians, Japanese, and others of the international compounds.

CIVIL WAR DAY-BY-DAY: 1861. A Chronology of the Principal Events of the War's First Year. Compiled by Alexander C. Niven. Edited by Arthur W. Monks. 64 Pages. The Berkshire Publishing Co., Cambridge, Mass., 1961. \$1.00.

This small paperback is a concise chronology of the first year of the Civil War. The chronology is interspersed with anecdotes and brief biographical sketches of the opposing leaders.

FORTS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. By J. S. Whiting and Richard J. Whiting. 90 Pages. J. S. Whiting and R. J. Whiting, Seattle, Wash., 1960. \$5.00.

The influence of the United States Army in the settling of the West is probably as evident in the place names of California as anywhere else in the country.

Forts of the State of California is a reference volume giving brief data on each of the forts, camps, and stations established in that state. It covers some 129 geographical locations to which the term "fort" has been applied and briefly considers presidios, Russian settlements, and Sutter's establishment.

COLD WAR AND LIBERATION. A Challenge of Aid to the Subject Peoples. By John F. O'Connor. 611 Pages. Vantage Press, Inc., New York, 1961. \$7.50.

BY LAWRENCE J. DONDERO

Mr. O'Connor's work divides itself into two parts, each of which has a separate impact and evokes a separate reaction. The first element is a comprehensive chronicle of Soviet duplicity and aggression—from the ascendancy of the Bolsheviks in World War I to the present—which have resulted in the virtual enslavement of 800 million people in the Sino-Soviet bloc. Its painstaking completeness and thorough documentation make it a valuable source book on Soviet imperialism.

The second and more controversial element of the book is first, a sweeping indictment of the Free World for having missed so many opportunities to forestall Soviet aggression and, second, the delineation of a positive program for rectifying these mistakes by liberating the subject peoples who desire escape.

These failures were attributable, in the author's view, to a persistent lack of a real appreciation of the Soviet animus in international affairs and to the periodic evaluations of the Russian nation as being cast in the image and likeness of the nations of the Free World. Granting a degree of validity to these retrospective assertions, one is still forced to ask certain questions.

Is it suggested, in the light of our aims in World War I, that United States actions vis-à-vis political affairs in the Soviet Union might conceivably have been drastically different from what they were? Are the stakes in the Suez crisis and the possible Hungarian intervention somehow considered as having been about equal?

Is it clear, even in retrospect, that a different US course of action in the "many similar opportunities" would not have required an unlimited war or even the risk of war?

These questions are not meant to suggest that US actions in every international crisis in our generation have been appropriate and reasonable. On the other hand, neither is it at all clear that an anti-Soviet "intervention" by the US in all of these missed "opportunities" would have resulted in the furtherance of the cause of freedom with only inconsequential cost to the West.

Having thus documented our failures, Mr. O'Connor then argues that it is not too late to make amends. He proposes a program to provide material aid and arms to volunteer national refugee groups and to broadcast a consistent policy of moral support of the subject peoples' aspirations to freedom. Such refugee armies are to be used to assist the people themselves "to enforce their own legitimate demands for freedom . . . *without the cobelligerence of the United States.*"

These proposals are indeed provocative—and attractive in terms of our own minimal commitments—but one would again like to ask for some convincing analysis that assistance to refugee armies without US "cobelligerence" could ever be successful on the massive scale implied.

This is a provocative book, but it leaves one with a series of rather critical questions that are not fully explored. The motivation and the objectives can be subscribed to readily by those who cherish human freedom; the means prescribed, however, need further analysis before becoming a basis for specific policy.

SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH. By Edward J. Stackpole. 413 Pages. The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1961. \$5.95.

BY LT COL WILLIAM D. BEARD, *Inf*

The beautiful and picturesque Shenandoah Valley of Virginia was of vital importance to the Confederacy for strategic, logistic, and supply purposes. As a result it was the scene of many bitter fights during the Civil War.

The campaigns in "The Valley" witnessed the establishment of the military reputation of the Confederate General "Stonewall" Jackson after the brilliant operations of "Jackson's Foot Cavalry" in 1862; and the repudiation of the reputations of the Union Generals Fremont, Shields, Milroy, Banks, and Hunter, and the Confederate General Jubal Early.

In the spring of 1864 General Jubal Early swept the Union Forces from the Shenandoah Valley and advanced to the outer defenses of Washington. The timely arrival of Union reinforcements stopped the Confederate advance and they withdrew to the Shenandoah Valley where they remained a threat to Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.

To meet this threat General Grant sent General Philip Sheridan, the commander of his cavalry corps, with reinforcements, to take command of the Union Forces in "The Valley." Sheridan's mission was to destroy the Confederate Forces, crops, and industry in the Shenandoah Valley.

General Sheridan's reputation had been established as a highly successful regimental, division, and cavalry corps commander. He was noted as a fighter, a sound tactician, and for his ability to instill confidence in his men.

Sheridan prepared his command deliberately and thoroughly. When his

preparations were completed he struck with overwhelming force. He defeated General Early in the Battles of Winchester, Fishers Hill, and Cedar Creek; it was during the latter that he arrived on the field after the battle had started, rallied his defeated forces and directed the counterattack which routed the enemy, and destroyed them in the pursuit which followed.

The Confederate Forces withdrew from "The Valley" and Sheridan systematically destroyed the crops and industry in the Shenandoah Valley so that it was of no further assistance to the Confederacy.

Sheridan in the Shenandoah is written in an interesting and readable style, with excellent maps and illustrations. The author is well-known for his books on the Civil War. This book is a worthwhile contribution to the writings on this important period of our history.

AVIATION & SPACE DICTIONARY. Fourth Edition. Chief Editor Ernest J. Gentle. Associate Editor Charles Edward Chapel. 444 Pages. Aero Publishers, Inc., Los Angeles, Calif., 1961. \$10.00.

BY 2D LT RUSSELL W. MUNSON, JR.,
SigC

Aviation & Space Dictionary, formerly titled *Aviation Dictionary and Reference Guide*, has been published since before World War II.

While retaining the conventional aviation definitions, the new edition has been expanded to include the more important terms of space technology.

In addition to the 10,000 definitions in this book, many photographs and drawings of recent aviation and space vehicle projects are included.

This book is a convenient reference guide in a field where new terms are outproducing missiles.