Response to Maj. Matt Graham, "U.S. Cyber Force One War Away"

(*Military Review*, May–June 2016)

William Thayer

I subscribe to several military publications, and they have many articles on cyberwarfare. The scope of these articles (as with the present article) is always offensive and defensive cyberwar. It is never about "recovery" from a cyberattack. If some nation or subnational groups want to attack our electrical grid, they will eventually succeed. What then? No one is discussing a recovery.

In fact, even worse than a complete takedown of our electrical grid would be an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack, which would destroy all microchips even in cars and trucks. An attack on our electrical grid could leave us without power, communication, and even a water supply. An EMP attack would leave us without transportation also. Few books address a recovery: *Civil-Military Preparedness for an EMP Catastrophe* and *One Second After ... in San Diego*. The common theme of these books is that the military will be the only organized force left standing. Military bases will be like lily pads for organizing recovery. The military has organization, and it has equipment that will survive either an electrical grid attack or an EMP attack (e.g., the satellite communications systems, air/sea/ground transportation). Yet, no one is writing even a single article on "How to recover from a grid or EMP attack". The basics that are needed are water, food, communication, and transportation.

William Thayer, San Diego, California

(Photo by Senior Airman Franklin R. Ramos, U.S. Air Force)

U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Jerome Duhan, a network administrator with the 97th Communications Squadron, inserts a hard drive into the network control center retina server 24 January 2014 at Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma, in preparation for a command cyber readiness inspection.

U.S. Cyber Force One War Away

Maj. Matt Graham, U.S. Army

In *Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776, Adam Smith explains how division of labor allows the greatest efficiency: farmers focus on producing food, blacksmiths focus on crafting goods from metal, and so on.[1] The principle still holds true today; individuals and organizations develop expertise by focusing on a single activity. In the U.S. military, the division of labor between armed services accomplishes this expertise: the Air Force concentrates on air superiority, allowing the Army to focus on land warfare and the Navy to concern itself with maritime combat. The Marine Corps develops its expertise in bridging the gap between land and sea.

Although it possesses some very different characteristics from the physical domains, cyberspace has recently emerged as an independent domain that requires its own particular military expertise. With nations seeking advantages in this new domain, competition within cyberspace has assumed many of the traits of warfare, and

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Explaining Suicides in the U.S. Military

Birth Cohort Vulnerability and the All-Volunteer Force

Col. James Griffith, U.S. Army, Retired

Recently, I saw a couple of published news articles on the seventh year of increased suicides in the U.S. military, expecting fewer given the various research and prevention efforts. I am not very optimistic that this phenomenon is going to change much unless more recent birth-cohort characteristics change, and the methods used to obtain those who enter military service change.

I have been investigating suicides in the military, largely the Army National Guard (ARNG), since having been called into active duty to assist the director of the National Guard Bureau to respond to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army's request to more closely examine ARNG suicides. Tying together the various findings concerning suicide in the military and in the civilian population, Dr. Bryan and I formulated an explanation of increased suicides among military personnel.

Among more recent birth cohorts, age-interval suicide rates among younger ages (adolescents and teens) has increased, with decreased rates among middle adults. Sociologists Stockard and O'Brien reliably predicted these changes by birth-cohort size and nonmarital births, reported in *Social Forces* and *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*. They speculate that these findings demonstrate less social integration among more recent birth cohorts and reason that larger birth cohorts and nonmarital births result in fewer financial resources available and/

or fewer adult providers within a household than in previous birth cohorts. Consequently, members of larger birth cohorts and cohorts with fewer adults in the home are more likely to be influenced by peer relations, thereby creating a "youth culture'" that is "relatively insulated from the influence of older generations," resulting in less connection to groups and internalized ways of behaving. Dr. Twenge, a psychologist, reports somewhat disconcerting evidence related to this argument. She examined several large-scale data sets of different generations of high school students and young adults. In published studies, Twenge reported in the *Clinical Psychology Review* and *Social Indicators Research* increased psychopathic deviant, paranoia, hypomania, and depression in more recent generations. Overall, then, there appears to be some fundamental shifts occurring in more recent birth cohorts related to vulnerabilities of negative psychological health.

The military is most likely to evidence these shifts relative to suicide. The military, due to its mission, is comprised of those young males that are at risk, as reported by both civilian and military studies— young males. Another primary risk factor is being white, and the Army has become increasingly more white. Military studies have also reported trends in increased psychological problems (personality adjustment and mood disorders) among soldiers visiting medical treatment facilities, increased medical, and misconduct waivers for new entrants, and pre-enlistment history of suicide risk and psychiatric conditions. Further, what makes these vulnerabilities more evident in today's military is the way in which

individuals enter military service. In the all-volunteer force (compared to the draft era), there are far fewer applicants (annually some two hundred thousand), and of these nearly half are taken, with a large percentage with wavered status. During the draft era, millions were considered for military service, but a small percentage taken, and of these, very few were waived for military service. There is also evidence that increasingly applicants come from nontraditional households and are wanting of group membership and identity—the explanatory dynamic of suicide in Durkheim's treatise on suicide, as offered by Stockard and O'Brien.

While tentative and somewhat speculative, this explanation clearly calls for a different way of thinking about, examining, and preventing suicides in the military. For example, current preventive programs should be aimed more directly at domains related to social integration, such as training and experiences associated with group identity and solidarity, leadership, and group norms that develop individual-to-group ties, providing social connections and control of individual-level behaviors.

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
SOCIAL MEDIA AS A TOOL OF HYBRID WARFARE

PREPARED BY THE
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