A Brief History of the Noncommissioned Officer and Professional Development

 

Robert F. Williams, PhD

 

This is a preview chapter from The Noncommissioned Officer: A Primer, which Army University Press plans to release digitally in July 2026. Robert F. Williams establishes the noncommissioned officer (NCO) as the "backbone of the Army," tracing the NCO Corps' evolution from medieval Europe to its indispensable role in the twenty-first-century military. The Noncommissioned Officer: A Primer, written by Command Sgt. Maj. (Retired) Robert A. Nelson and Command Sgt. Maj. (Retired) Richard J. Russell II, supplements official Army doctrine, such as The NCO Guide and Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, by blending doctrinal principles with historical context, professional insights, and personal anecdotes from experienced senior NCOs. A comprehensive resource, this book moves beyond doctrinal checklists to explore the art and science of leadership, arguing that the most effective NCOs are the ones who lead with empathy, communicate clearly, own their mistakes, and dedicate themselves to developing their soldiers while stewarding the values of the Army profession.

 

The American noncommissioned officer (NCO) is a member of a time-honored corps dating back centuries. Noncommissioned leaders have long played an essential role in training, leading, mentoring, and instilling discipline in military formations. The roles and responsibilities of the noncommissioned officer have evolved but remain rooted in stewarding the profession and taking care of soldiers. As these roles changed, modern US Army NCOs have enjoyed incredible latitude to accomplish their mission with minimal guidance. They are the backbone of the US Army, handling its day-to-day operations. They carry out complex tactical missions, make critical decisions, and work across multiple echelons and agencies, including with allies and partners. NCOs are also responsible for maintaining standards and discipline across the force. NCOs wear many hats: trainers, mentors, advisors, and communicators all rolled into one. These leaders are involved in every part of a soldier's life in the Army.

Every soldier has a sergeant to guide them. Every soldier deserves a leader who knows how to train them well, can be trusted, cares about their health, and helps them grow into future leaders. Throughout the history of the US Army, the noncommissioned officer has been the leader most closely associated with the common soldier. They are the ones dealing with the day-to-day minutia of soldiering. Rather than chronicling every detail of NCO history, this is a story about the evolution of the NCO's role over time. The noncommissioned officer has come a long way from feudal Europe to the decentralized, empowered leader they are today for the US Army.

 

European Origins

The term sergeant comes from the Latin serviens--or servant. These were lesser officers in the medieval feudal period, a step below the armored Knight who fought for a land bounty. Until the reign of Louis XIV, men from various socio-economic backgrounds competed to be sergeants. During Louis XIV's reign (1638-1715), nobles used their riches to purchase commissions; thus, men with no means could only pursue careers as sous officers. As such, over the eighteenth century across Europe, the schism between commissioned and noncommissioned officers grew. This schism helped solidify the commissioned officer class as an aristocracy coming from the gentry and nobility, while noncommissioned officers were from among the commoners. The schism formed along clear lines between those who dealt directly with the soldiers and those who did not.¹

Changes in warfare in the early modern period brought essential changes to the organization and structure of armies. As infantry formations evolved to include more commoners in formations with pikes, particularly in Switzerland in the late eighteenth century, warfare required a more disciplined soldiery. They needed sergeants who were experts in drill to train soldiers and keep them in formation during battle. From there, the sergeant and corporal, according to the historian Ernest F. Fisher, "became the pillars upon which . . . the battleworthiness of a military unit rested."² The NCO was to train soldiers, keep them supplied, and keep them in formation during battle.

The American NCO developed from the Prussian military system and the English militia system.³ Traditions on the German side can be traced to Frederick Wilhelm I, Frederick the Great's father, and two documents. One was a memorandum prepared for Frederick the Great by Prince Leopold I of Anhalt-Dessau, and the other was Frederick Wilhelm's NCO regulations, published in March 1726. General Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, instrumental in developing the first American noncommissioned officers, would have known both. The king, Frederick Wilhelm I, required every noncommissioned officer in the Prussian service to carry a leather-bound copy of the 1726 Regulations for Noncommissioned Officers of Infantry. If they lost their copy, they were "reduced to private and sentenced to three years' imprisonment at hard labor." In the Prussian tradition, the senior NCO in the company, today's first sergeant in the US Army, was die Mutter der Kompanie ("the mother of the company"). This title reflected the need for NCOs not to be brutal disciplinarians but to have steadfast and honest character, with humanity and patience to train and teach.⁴

 

By contrast, British settlers in America brought a different military tradition based on local militias. Every able-bodied man was expected to own weapons and serve in his community's militia. These militias were then organized into small squads, each led by an NCO. This structure was well-suited for dealing with Native American tactics and the challenging terrain of the New World.⁵ As a result, colonial NCOs had more opportunities to show initiative and leadership. These militia units could combine into larger forces for specific campaigns as needed, and this flexible system proved effective in helping British troops defeat the French in Canada and defend against Spanish threats along the southern colonial borders. Concurrently, this approach gave American NCOs more responsibility and autonomy than their European counterparts.⁶

The American Revolution

During the American Revolution, NCOs played a crucial role in drilling and disciplining troops and leading small units in battle within the Continental Army. General Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, a Prussian military officer, significantly shaped the development of the American noncommissioned officer corps during this period. Appointed as Inspector General of the Continental Army in 1778, von Steuben introduced a standardized drill and training system emphasizing discipline, hygiene, and marksmanship. He wrote the "Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States," also known as the "Blue Book," which became the standard drill manual for the Continental Army.⁷

 

Von Steuben recognized the importance of NCOs in maintaining discipline and order within the ranks. He established a transparent chain of command and defined the roles and responsibilities of NCOs, such as sergeants and corporals. For the Continental Army, NCOs had tasks that would look familiar to NCOs in the twenty-first century: drilling soldiers, inspecting equipment, and maintaining proper hygiene. Von Steuben's most notable contribution, however, came during the 1777-1778 winter encampment at Valley Forge, where, through drill, he helped turn the continentals from a ragtag group into something resembling a professional army amid harsh conditions and limited resources. Von Steuben emphasized selecting qualified and competent individuals for NCO positions based on merit, skill, and leadership potential rather than social class or wealth. This emphasis on merit-based promotion laid the foundation for developing a career NCO Corps in the US Army.⁸

The New Republic

In November 1791, a 2,000-man force led by Arthur St. Clair was destroyed at the Wabash River by an allied Native American force led by Little Turtle (Miami) and Blue Jacket (Shawnee). A significant reason for the defeat was the force's ineptitude due to a lack of training and professionalism.⁹ This defeat led Congress to authorize recruitment and increase the number of noncommissioned officers in the Army. President George Washington appointed Revolutionary War General Anthony Wayne to lead the new "Legion of the United States." Wayne prioritized discipline and training, treating NCOs as professionals who warranted a separate punishment system from that used for privates. In separating the NCO, Wayne further professionalized the NCO Corps, which contributed to Wayne's victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers and the pacification of the Northwest.¹⁰

One member of Wayne's force at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, Capt. William Clark, co-led an expedition in 1803. The Lewis and Clark Expedition featured five noncommissioned officers, four sergeants, and one corporal. Those NCOs helped care for the twenty-three privates, eight civilians, and one enslaved man who went on the journey west. One of the sergeants, Sgt. Charles Floyd, died of disease. He had the distinction of being the first American soldier to die west of the Mississippi.¹¹

 

Into and after the War of 1812, the role of the NCO remained that of keeping the order and good conduct of the company. This emphasis on the administrative role remained after the US Army adopted Napoleonic doctrine in the early nineteenth century. The regimental commander selected NCOs--a practice that continued into the First World War. Corporals were deputy sergeants charged with the overall cleanliness of the men and issued morning reports on the men's status and equipment. Like modern staff duty, sergeants within each company also performed orderly duties, assisting the officer of the day, per a duty roster prepared by the regimental sergeant major. Tactically, sergeants were still primarily responsible for maintaining discipline under fire and orderly, precise movements from march to battle formations. The French system adopted under Winfield Scott's manual enhanced the role of the NCO as more of a critical assistant to the officers than a tactical leader. Nevertheless, these regulations governed the Army into the beginning of the American Civil War.¹²

Between the War of 1812 and the Civil War, the Army was small, spread thin, and never at full strength. In June 1853, for example, the Army authorized 12,821 soldiers. It had only 10,417 on its rolls, 8,342 of which were stationed on the western frontier, and 6,918 were at their posts.¹³ It was also comprised of many foreign-born recruits, many of them from Ireland or Germany. The proportion of foreign-born recruits in the regular Army was as high as 57 percent by the 1850s, and that rose even higher by the Civil War, in which many units were entirely German or Irish. During this period, the Army's primary function was nation-building and protecting settlers moving West. Typical garrison life consisted of drill, guard duty, care and feeding of animals, maintenance of facilities, fatigue labor, and the occasional escort or scouting duty. This reality gave commanders, on average across the force, 124 men with which to conduct operations.¹⁴

 

The American Civil War

When the US Army expanded to put down the slaveholder rebellion in 1861, NCOs, like today, served as the backbone of the Army. At the outbreak of war, the regular Army consisted of only 16,000 men, up from the 11,000 a few years before, but not enough. Congress raised the end strength of the Army to 22,714 in the summer of 1861, which meant that hundreds of regular soldiers were promoted to noncommissioned officers. Eventually, 700,000 men enlisted as volunteers, and more than 2.6 million people served in the US Army during that war. Some former regular army NCOs who had left the service before the war found themselves prized leaders for their experience and knowledge. They would serve in the more than 450 volunteer units raised during the war. While many famous officers turned their backs on their oaths and joined the rebels, the crises were less severe for enlisted regulars, who were locked into the regular Army by contract and for whom resignation was not possible.

In the Army of the nineteenth century, there were three types of noncommissioned officers: those who served as junior leaders and a buffer between officers and men, clerks and orderlies who did most of the paperwork, and old-time leaders who were given jobs as ordnance sergeants at the multiple posts around the country.¹⁵ NCOs maintained their traditional role as administrative experts and trainers. The first sergeant was still responsible for the company descriptive book, which was the living, breathing soul of the unit. They served tactically as unit guides, maintaining the order and alignment of formations. However, throughout the war, and especially in the Western theater, NCOs led small units in expanded skirmisher formations more akin to modern infantry maneuvers than the linear tactics often portrayed in popular representations of that war.¹⁶

 

These NCOs had to rely on the training manuals available, with new ones published in 1854, 1855, and again in 1862.¹⁷ Much of the infantry fighting was performed using Brig. Gen. Silas Casey's 1862 manual Infantry Tactics.¹⁸ Part of Casey's instructions suggested less-vulnerable tactical formations of skirmishers where a senior noncommissioned officer might oversee a unit as large as a platoon. Their role was to "see that the men economize their strength, keep cool, and profit by all the advantages the ground may offer for cover."¹⁹ Regular and volunteer units had NCOs, with those in volunteer units typically more educated than those from regular units as volunteer units had to train their own NCOs and officers who were often elected from within the pool of local volunteers to that unit. Nevertheless, regular and volunteer noncommissioned officers performed the same duties, and the Civil War did much to cement the role of the NCO as a tactical, small-unit leader.²⁰

 

Reconstruction and Indian Wars

After the Civil War, Congress reduced the Army to below pre-war levels. Yet, it was responsible for nation-building duties in the South and West. Because the country had its Army spread so thin, NCOs took on increased importance in leading small units. The noncommissioned officer corps of the post-Civil War army was an eclectic blend that included former rebel commissioned officers, veterans of the Civil War, and some even with service as far back as the Mexican War. They became what historian Ernest Fisher called "the archetype of the tough old sarge" during this period.²¹ While many sergeants and corporals lived up to that stereotype, NCOs were also known for brutality and neglect, which contributed to the high desertion rates throughout the period. According to August Kautz's manual governing soldier and NCO behavior, the Army's NCOs reiterated that the regimental commander selected NCOs. But being tough was not the same as being out of control. As Kautz's manual implored: "The confidence of the soldiers in the integrity of a noncommissioned officer can only be obtained by his being rigidly just and impartial to those under him, and by keeping his temper on all occasions, and discharging his duty without passion or feeling." Nonetheless, a failure to obtain his soldiers' respect and obedience was seen as a failure of the NCO's most basic duty.²²

Doctrine centered on Emory Upton's updated 1867 manual Infantry Tactics, and within, Upton emphasized simplicity in maneuver, which NCOs could teach more quickly to their troops. He also emphasized flexibility by prescribing that units move in two groups of "fours," which were squads of eight, that became the basic unit in his infantry system. Much like the fire team of the twenty-first century, these groups replaced platoons and sections in earlier drill manuals. This change was not yet the end of close-order tactics, which remained in effect until the First World War but led to a much more flexible version after introducing the rapid-fire rifle. The squad of Upton's manual could not maneuver independently; they existed mainly to control fire and movement.²³ Reorganizing in such a manner was crucial in cementing the NCO's tactical role as a small-unit leader, even if the training was, as the historian Robert Utley said, "more a hope than a reality" due to the wide dispersion of units on the frontier.²⁴

Fighting various Native American groups across the American West facilitated prompt change. The tactical theory of the day emphasized small-unit leaders taking the initiative. Skirmish formations and open-order drills quickly gained precedence, and some theorists foresaw an increased role for the noncommissioned officer. Officers realized this and, in an updated drill regulations for 1891, published by the Army (rather than previous manuals published by individual officers under their name), codified the idea of a squad of two "fours" consisting of one corporal and seven privates. This squad formed the basis of the Army's loose-order tactics and significantly increased the influence of the NCO in combat.²⁵

 

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, NCOs maintained their role as company administrators, responsible for discipline and punishment.²⁶ They were expected to be cool and collected in high-stress situations. One such situation arose in Hays City, Kansas, where white civilians looted the homes of some Black residents. When a detail of 5th Infantry and 7th Cavalry troops arrived, one sergeant quickly identified the source of the problem--a single rabble-rouser on top of a building inciting the riot--and drew a bead on him with his rifle, ready to fire on his officer's command. It was unnecessary, and the crowd dispersed soon after the troops arrived. The incident demonstrated the calmness required of noncommissioned officers in high-stress situations. Regardless, the nature of a small army at numerous posts across the expanses of the West made for a tight-knit group. As one 5th Infantry officer described them in 1878, NCOs were "the bone and sinew of the regiment."²⁷ These units, sleeping in Spartan sleeping quarters where the corporals slept with the men and the sergeants nearby, helped develop a familial relationship in which the first sergeant stood as the matriarch of the company. He was like the foreman of a company, managing everything on a day-to-day basis.²⁸ He maintained the family bible--the descriptive book--and was chief advisor to the captain on all matters pertaining to the soldier.²⁹

Until World War II, no standardized promotions, permanent change of station moves, or NCO professional development career maps existed. Training and education were the responsibility of the unit. These manifested themselves in the "school of the soldier" and the "school of the company," which referred to unit-level training programs for the individual and the collective. NCOs stayed in the same regiment, likely with the same officers and men, for years and sometimes decades. Except in rare cases, any NCO who transferred units was reduced in rank to private.³⁰ Likewise, the American NCO had little formal, professional education. Aside from schools for technical careers such as the artillery, medical, and signal services, the infantry and cavalry relied on ad hoc, on-the-job training to raise and develop competent noncommissioned officers. By the 1890s, many officers, after observing European armies, believed the US Army needed a similar professional education system for all its NCOs. Emory Upton was particularly impressed with the German system. Yet, a debate emerged on establishing a centralized, permanent school in the United States or a decentralized system that relied on the individual NCO and his command. Most company-grade officers believed they knew their men's capabilities better than the rest of the Army and were much better suited to training their personnel. Others wanted formal schooling in such diverse subjects as elementary mathematics, science, mechanical drawing, surveying, and engineering. No changes were implemented until after the turn of the century, and the NCO Corps performed admirably during the Spanish-American War despite multiple institutional-level difficulties.³¹

 

NCOs for Empire

Between the turn of the century and World War I, the US Army participated in overseas contingency operations in China and the Philippines, resulting in the first-ever overseas garrison of American troops. This became especially difficult for NCOs, considering the army policy that they would not maintain their rank if moved to a different regiment. Therefore, NCOs were compelled to either stay overseas or leave the service. To help rectify the issue, the Army enacted a small policy change in 1908, but only for senior noncommissioned officers to keep their grades if they moved to different units.³²

Handbooks and doctrine continued to emphasize the role of the NCO and described their duties in garrison and the field. They were official manuals from the War Department that finally superseded privately printed training manuals issued in 1914 and 1917. The US Army outlined the NCO's role as assisting the company's officers but gave little autonomy. Nevertheless, the First Sergeant remained at the apex and had to be chosen from the line sergeants of the company for his intelligence and military bearing, among other traits. In many units, the First Sergeant was like an all-powerful being; good ones ran their companies by the book and with rigid discipline.³³ The 1917 Manual for Noncommissioned Officers and Privates of Infantry of the Army of the United States and its predecessor were widely distributed in the decentralized American tradition. It soon became apparent, however, that on-the-job training and self-study were insufficient for creating a large National Army ready to take on the Germans on the Western Front in World War I.³⁴

 

World War I

When the United States entered the First World War, then raging on the European continent, the Army worked closely with the professional armies of European allies for the first time. Cooperation was everywhere, from liaisons to the thousands of French and British trainers descending on American units to prepare them for combat. It also revealed to the allied nations and US leaders that the American NCO was deficient in many areas compared to his British and French counterparts, to say nothing of the impressive German Unteroffizier. French and British trainers in the United States expressed considerable doubt about whether the American NCO would perform well in combat. Allied NCOs had much greater prestige and status, giving them more authority than the American NCOs, who were not given the same importance and status. Also, there was an expectation that NCOs would lead in the absence of officers, which happened often thanks to the high casualty rates among company-grade officers throughout the First World War. Once the fighting started, NCOs were essential in leading troops in trench warfare and adapting to new technologies such as machine guns and tanks. Yet the eight-man squad of Upton's manual and the flexible version of close-order tactics remained. The Army also changed the status of NCOs so that they could transfer units without losing their grade, further adding to the prestige of the noncommissioned officer.³⁵

In April 1918, General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, recognized the crucial role of noncommissioned officers in modern warfare. After observing the difference between American and Allied noncoms, Pershing wrote to the Secretary of War to propose ideas to expand his NCOs' training, responsibility, and prestige. His recommendations were based on the bleak reality that NCOs often replaced wounded or killed commissioned officers under fire. Pershing suggested special schools to standardize training and separate messes to differentiate noncommissioned officers from enlisted men. Within weeks, the Secretary approved Pershing's proposals. Training shifted to instill American sergeants with "the habit of command." The idea was to enable them to step into officer roles when necessary. The Army implemented these changes post-haste. However, the innovations were limited to the overseas American Expeditionary Forces rather than Army-wide and, as such, had little impact on the Army.³⁶

The most crucial tactical lesson from the Western Front was the importance of small-unit actions. European armies had learned this lesson through devastating campaigns across France that had resulted in massive casualties. Survivors of these battles learned to avoid large formations. Instead, small teams, typically led by NCOs, learned to use terrain and environmental conditions to their advantage while providing covering fire for nearby units, much like modern maneuvering fire teams. Pershing insisted that American forces adopt these tactics as well and emphasized the role of NCOs as small-unit leaders, that they can often decide a battle by their sheer initiative and boldness in action.³⁷

The exploits of Cpl. Alvin York, an Appalachian American from Pall Mall, Tennessee, are among the most prominent examples of an NCO taking initiative under fire. On 8 October 1918, York was trying to knock out German maxim machine gun positions as part of a seventeen-man patrol from Company G, 328th Infantry Regiment, 82nd Infantry Division. One of York's sergeants led the patrol, as York was still a corporal. In their initial contact, they took multiple German prisoners, who yelled to their comrades on the machine guns for help. York's platoon leader was already dead, and the subsequent machine-gun fire killed his patrol leader and wounded the other NCOs, so York took charge. In the ensuing firefight, York took on the enemy machine gun, defeated the enemy attack, and eliminated the machine gun position. Rather than lose any more men, the German commander on site surrendered his unit to York and his men. In all, York brought 132 German prisoners back to American lines, as well as the remaining eight members of his patrol. He was promoted to sergeant and later awarded the Medal of Honor and French Croix de Guerre for that action.³⁸

 

Although Pershing's wartime initiatives did not continue after demobilization, the exceptional performance of many NCOs during the war's final months demonstrated the value of his reforms. As warfare continued to evolve throughout the twentieth century, with advancements in weapons and tactics, the role of the NCO grew increasingly important, reflecting the ongoing significance of effective small-unit leadership in modern military operations.³⁹

Interwar NCOs

The 1920s and '30s were a period of regression for the status of noncommissioned officers. This shift was partly due to the downsizing of the Army after World War I. It was also partly due to the chaotic nature of the enlisted grade structure, which by 1919 included more than twenty different grades and ranks. As such, throughout the interwar period, the Army expanded the warrant officer ranks to account for administrative and technical duties and created specialist positions in the lower grades that carried additional pay but no increased rank or authority. The significant change was the establishment of seven standard grades for all enlisted personnel regardless of specialty: private, private first class, corporal, sergeant, staff sergeant, first sergeant or technical sergeant, and master sergeant. Nevertheless, on the eve of World War II, the US Army had a weakened NCO Corps that had been reduced in status from its height in World War I. Once again, the difficulties of combat, coupled with the reality that the Army needed leaders at all echelons, forced change.⁴⁰

Throughout the interwar years, the so-called "backbone of the Army" was invisible at the highest levels. Between 1927 and 1941, no mention was made of noncommissioned officers in the Secretary of War's annual reports. This omission reflected the long-standing American military tradition of only referring to two elements--officers and men--rather than acknowledging the existence and importance of NCOs. In doing so, the US Army gave the noncommissioned officers no special status, seeing them only as enlisted men temporarily elevated to a higher rank at the will of their officer. It was also part of the American tradition of disdain for standing militaries and, therefore, the idea of professional NCOs. This attitude contrasted with other European militaries, which considered themselves composed of noncommissioned officers and men.⁴¹

World War II and Prestige Worldwide

World War II impacted important developments within the NCO Corps. The Army rapidly grew from 17,000 to 227,000 after the Germans invaded Poland in September 1939. In September 1940, Congress authorized a 370,000-soldier regular army to be raised through the first peacetime draft in US history. Further, the War Department planned to have an army of one million in October 1941 with plans for two million by January 1942, and four million by April 1942.⁴² Mobilization in World War II involved nearly 25 percent of the nation's manpower--almost double the 13.6 percent engaged in World War I. This extensive mobilization led to a concomitant increase in the number of NCOs and inflation in the grade structure. The infantry squad's expansion from eight to twelve soldiers created further structural changes emblematic of the entire force. The squad leader's position was elevated to sergeant. In contrast, the corporal, previously the squad leader, became second-in-command and a fire-team leader.⁴³

The changing character of warfare in World War II required more technical specialists to operate and maintain them. To manage these new technical skill sets, the Army introduced a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) system that used three-digit numbers to identify the individual's skills and placed them where needed.⁴⁴ The MOS system also had significant drawbacks. It struggled to identify individuals with the qualities necessary to be good noncommissioned officers. The system became overly complex and led to an abundance of technical specialists. Because these specialists received NCO status, a typical rifle company had only one private first class and seventeen privates, while everyone else held NCO rank. This situation placed an undue burden of work details and guard duty on a diminishing number of soldiers. To address this, in late 1943, Army leadership revoked the NCO status of technicians even though they would continue to wear the letter T under their NCO chevrons and receive pay corresponding to enlisted grades 3, 4, and 5. These "techs," though sometimes the subject of jokes, proved essential to the war effort.⁴⁵ Technicians were important in the services of supply, especially as medics, radio operators and repairmen, mail clerks, mechanics, cooks, and musicians, but did not have the same roles and responsibilities as noncommissioned officers.

 

One of the most significant changes during World War II was the ability of noncommissioned officers to transfer to other units within the Army. This was a crucial change in an army that expanded quickly and needed to move experienced, noncommissioned men around to train the millions of draftees. By 1943, all transfers were made in grade as the wartime situation supplanted long-standing traditions thanks to the need to spread leaders and expertise across the growing Army.⁴⁶ The large influx of new NCOs, drafted, trained, and promoted during the intense mobilization of 1942 and 1943, played a crucial role in the war. These citizen-soldiers admirably performed their duties as noncommissioned officers across all fronts during World War II. Small-unit leadership was critical in every theater of the war, from the jungle warfare of New Guinea to the Hürtgen Forest battle in Europe. Warfare in World War II highlighted the challenges of rapid military expansion and the vital importance of adaptable, skilled NCOs in modern warfare.

 

NCOs took on increased responsibilities, such as leading platoons and companies in the absence of commissioned officers. NCOs also earned most of the Medals of Honor awarded during the war. Of the 195 Medals of Honor awarded to enlisted men, 100 went to NCOs and 95 to privates. This is compared with 67 earned by commissioned officers. Of those 100, only nine were earned by regular NCOs who had served since before the war. The overwhelming majority were earned by NCOs who entered the service after 1940. This fact speaks to the overall expansion of the NCO Corps and the relegation of the older noncoms to training and teaching duty. War is, after all, a young person's game, and the most prominent pre-war NCOs were aging and found their best service in preparing the younger generation to lead tactical units.⁴⁷ Rapid promotions during the war, alongside the expansion of the technical ranks, brought about challenges in career management. NCOs were naturally more inclined to continue their military service than lower-ranking soldiers, and as such, despite a massive demobilization process, the ranks of NCOs remained disproportionately large.⁴⁸

Cold War Professionalization

While the Army had incorporated leadership training into unit preparation during the war, Army leadership recognized the need for standardized NCO training across the service, as many lacked the skills required for their new roles. In response, the Army created new education institutions like the Lido Training Center in Italy (1945) and the Constabulary School in Sonthofen, Germany (1946). The Seventh Army Noncommissioned Officers Academy in Munich, established by Brig. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke in 1949, became particularly well-known as it was the first to be devoted to NCO professionalization.⁴⁹ After World War II, NCO academies expanded across the Army.⁵⁰ However, these new institutions faced numerous challenges: inconsistent selection criteria, curricula, instructional quality, and course durations due to inadequate central guidance. And to top it off, despite the high demand for NCOs, attendance at NCO academies was optional for promotion. As such, most NCOs never attended; instead, they continued to rely on traditional on-the-job training for their development.⁵¹ Nevertheless, this early phase of NCO education laid the groundwork for a more standardized, professional education system that followed later wars.⁵²

Meanwhile, there was an overall decline in readiness across the Army thanks to the rapid demobilization of the eight-million-strong citizen army fielded for World War II. To help combat that, in 1949, the Army rolled out a new Career Guidance Program to provide "a broadly qualified, well-rounded, noncommissioned" corps to fill critical shortages in times of emergency. It was a career map akin to something the officers of the period followed, outlining successive assignments toward promotion. According to NCO-turned-historian Tom Hanson, the program emphasized "universal" officers and NCOs and "diluted what little institutional memory of combat remained in the US Army after 1947."⁵³ Nearly every unit across the Army lacked requisite NCOs. For example, in 1949, the 34th Infantry Regiment reported having only 29 of 59 authorized Master Sergeants, 89 of 158 Sergeants First Class, 152 of 258 Staff Sergeants, and 359 of the required 582 Sergeants. This shortage of noncoms was typical across the Eighth Army in the Far East and the rest of the Army. Without these NCOs performing their traditional functions, meaningful preparation was impossible, and unit effectiveness suffered at the war's outset.⁵⁴

The lack of NCOs was readily apparent in the opening months of the Korean War. Stateside NCOs at various training centers were levied for quick overseas service to compensate for shortages in Korea, which left their previous units understaffed.⁵⁵ Meanwhile, the arduous terrain in Korea necessitated decentralized small-unit leadership. As in earlier conflicts, capable NCOs frequently assumed command when officers were incapacitated. Army leaders then developed a new Ranger training program in the summer of 1951, and the Army aimed to have one Ranger-trained NCO per rifle platoon. The Army also created an eight-week NCO course at the Infantry School to produce squad leaders for the war, but that did not begin until the summer of 1953. Instead, individual units developed programs that were generally successful. Even though the US Army was constantly short of NCO strength, hovering around 50 percent unit to unit, the Korean War marked a significant shift in recognizing NCOs as battlefield leaders.⁵⁶

 

The Korean War had exposed a critical need for more and better-trained leaders at the small-unit level. The Army Staff recognized the shortcomings of relying on improvised courses and on-the-job training to prepare NCOs for leadership in the nuclear age. At General Bruce C. Clarke's urging, the Army's NCO Academy system was developed in June 1957 when the Department of the Army published its first regulation to establish standards for NCO academies.⁵⁷ These early NCO academies often needed more consistency in the quality of their instructors. Teaching duty was not prestigious, and unit commanders hesitated to release senior NCOs for academy attendance, much less to teach. The academies remained separate from the Army's formal school system, and relatively few NCOs attended.⁵⁸

The status of NCOs in the US Army underwent gradual changes with Congressional legislation throughout the 1950s. The Army introduced a revamped MOS system in 1954 and a new specialist rank system reminiscent of the old technical ranks.⁵⁹ A pivotal development was the Military Pay Bill of 1958, which introduced two new pay grades, E-8 and E-9. This change highlighted the growing importance of senior NCOs in the post-Korean War era and provided a means to reward exceptional E-7s for their outstanding service.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, atomic warfare was slowly becoming the Army's focus. Army leadership emphasized NCOs' increased responsibilities in theoretical nuclear warfare, where scattered units might need to operate independently. Warfare in that manner would require highly decentralized leaders to operate at the distances required for perceived atomic combat. The five-sided divisional structure required more NCOs in leadership roles than World War II divisions.⁶¹

 

Vietnam and "Shake and Bake" NCOs

The Vietnam War presented new challenges for NCOs. Initially, many experienced American NCOs served as advisors to South Vietnamese forces before transitioning to combat roles as US involvement escalated. Yet, throughout the war, NCO positions were constantly short-staffed, and junior soldiers were promoted quickly, thanks to individual replacement policies. As such, company-grade officers often bypassed NCOs, diminishing their traditional leadership role. The diminishing prestige of the NCO Corps in Vietnam led to an identity crisis for many NCOs during a conflict fought mainly at the squad level.⁶² The Vietnam era also included growing internal tensions within the Army. Soldiers directed hostility and resentment at officers and career NCOs, or "lifers." As such, incidents of insubordination and violence toward senior NCOs and company commanders increased as the war progressed. The shift to an all-volunteer force in 1973 marked a move toward a professionalized force and offered a solution to the crisis.⁶³

 

To address professionalism and the need for qualified NCOs to lead maneuver squads in the field, in 1967 Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson created the Noncommissioned Officers Candidate Course (NCOCC). This ten-week program, followed by ten weeks of practical training, was designed to produce combat-ready infantry NCOs quickly. After completing the course, these newly trained NCOs were sent to Vietnam to lead infantry teams and squads in combat operations. While the "shake and bake" NCOs generally performed well, the Army recognized that NCOCC was a wartime expedient, not a long-term solution. The school was not extended to those outside of the infantry, but the program's success stimulated fresh thinking about how to educate NCOs across the force.⁶⁴

In the next evolution of standardized NCO education, the Army developed a formal Noncommissioned Officer Educational System (NCOES) in 1971. The new NCOES consisted of three levels of instruction, later expanded to five, guiding NCOs through progressive skill levels in their MOSs. The system included introductory courses for E-4s and E-5s, advanced courses for E-6s and E-7s, and a senior-level course at the Sergeants Major Academy for selected E-8s.⁶⁵ The implementation of the NCOES in 1971 marked a significant milestone in NCO professional development: for the first time, the Army had a formal, standardized system that educated its noncommissioned ranks.⁶⁶

 

Post-Vietnam Professionalism

Discipline challenges continued as the war ended. In addition to ending what was, at the time, the service's longest war, the army was also transitioning from a conscript army to an all-volunteer force. Army leaders, and NCOs in particular, had to manage a myriad of discipline issues, including rampant use of drugs and the presence of criminal gangs within the ranks.⁶⁷ The Army improved family support structures and training facilities and introduced a revamped NCO career management program in 1975. The Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS) provided career development paths for all NCOs. The EPMS was further complemented by the Noncommissioned Officer Development Plan (NCOPD) in 1980, emphasizing formal NCO leadership training at all command levels.⁶⁸ These new systems provided the institutional and structural framework necessary to produce professional NCOs for a modern Army.

One critical component of professionalization in the period was the development of the Creed of the Noncommissioned Officer. The creed emerged from a period of significant change and challenge within the US Army in the early 1970s, following the Vietnam War and the transition to the all-volunteer force. The creed was developed within the NCO Subcommittee at the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Sgt. 1st Class Earle Brigham recalled starting the process by simply writing the letters "NCO" on a blank sheet of paper then brainstorming from there. The goal was to create a standard--a "yardstick"--for NCOs to assess their own performance and embody the values of the NCO Corps. First appearing in NCO course materials in 1974, the Creed was not officially formalized in an Army publication until the 1986 edition of Field Manual 22-600-2, The NCO Guide.⁶⁹ To this day, the creed provides basic guidance for noncommissioned officers regardless of MOS, duty position, status, or location.

 

By the end of the Cold War in 1989, the NCO's role was as vital as ever. The modern Army developed a competent, adaptable, and proficient NCO Corps to lead small units as it modernized technology throughout the later years of the Cold War. This was coupled with a post-Vietnam refocus on large-scale combat operations rather than low-intensity counterinsurgency. The army's success in preparing for this type of combat was evident in its performance in Operation Desert Storm. However, the rest of the 1990s included a massive drawdown of forces, and the Army shed approximately 40 percent of its total personnel between 1990 and 1995.⁷⁰ The Army's commitments increased in Somalia and the Balkans, however, and deployments increased by 300 percent during this time. Navigating immense fiscal constraints, an information revolution, and an increased operations tempo, the Army relied on its NCOs to keep morale high and units ready. The NCO Corps was instrumental in sustaining relatively high retention rates and shaping the modern US Army as it entered the new millennium.⁷¹

 

Into the Twenty-First Century

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks altered the future of the US Army in the most dramatic way possible. For the first time since the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States had been attacked, and the country was at war against an elusive foe. By October, Special Forces NCOs served as the vanguard for American forces in Afghanistan, setting the stage for a two-decade war that emphasized small-unit leadership. It was, after all, during the Global War on Terror that the Army coined the phrase "strategic corporal," referring to the broad, global impact that corporals can have from their tactical fighting positions.⁷² Years of focus on NCO professional development paid off in the opening phases of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and throughout the counterinsurgency phases in which individual NCOs had an immeasurable impact on the overall mission.

 

NCOs continued to exhibit incredible bravery and initiative under fire. The story of Sgt. Salvatore Giunta in the Korengal Valley provides a keen example. One night in the fall of 2007, Sergeant Giunta's platoon came under intense enemy fire from multiple directions. In the initial blast, the point man, lead fire team leader Sgt. Josh Brennan, was wounded. As his automatic rifleman returned fire, he was also wounded, as were the squad leader and others on the patrol. Knowing that his friend and fellow team leader Brennan was under fire, Giunta ran to the sound of the guns, found two members of the Taliban carrying Brennan off, killed one and wounded the other, and disrupted the ambush. The enemy combatants dropped Brennan, and Giunta was able to recover his severely wounded comrade-in-arms. Brennan succumbed to his wounds, as did the platoon medic, Spec. Hugo Mendoza. Nevertheless, Giunta was awarded the Medal of Honor for disregarding his personal safety to save his comrades.⁷³

 

In early Global War on Terror efforts, the Army identified a need to improve how it educates NCOs to share lessons from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) implemented a new curriculum for NCO education in 2009. That same year, Command Sgt. Maj. Raymond Chandler became the Commandant of the US Army Sergeants Major Academy, marking the first time an NCO held the position of Commandant at a significant Army school.⁷⁴ To better coordinate NCO development across the Army, TRADOC established the Institute for NCO Professional Development (INCOPD) in August 2009. INCOPD was tasked with coordinating and developing all NCO education and professional development aspects. The institute developed a comprehensive NCO Educational and Professional Development System, replacing previous education and professional development systems. This new system was introduced to the Army with the publication of NCO 2020 Strategy: NCOs Operating in a Complex World in December 2015.⁷⁵ The NCO 2020 strategy included a new plan for NCO professional development known as the NCO Professional Development Strategy that focused on developing skills and knowledge, matching NCOs with appropriate roles, and upholding the profession's standards across five sequential schools that NCOs attend at different career stages.⁷⁶

Conclusion

The post-9/11 era, with its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the Global War on Terrorism, has presented the Army and its NCO Corps with their greatest trial to date. The prolonged state of war has placed immense pressure on troops and resources. Tactically, today's NCOs bear more responsibility for mission success than at any other time in Army history. The nature of modern conflict emphasizes the role of small unit leaders and decentralized operations, and any future conflict--whether another low-intensity war, nation-building, or fighting a near-peer adversary--will require NCOs adept at taking initiative and taking care of soldiers.

Building on two centuries of tradition, the modern NCO remains crucial to the US Army's effectiveness and adaptability in facing new global challenges. NCOs today play a vital role in upholding Army values across all ranks; they are responsible for troop morale, training, welfare, and readiness and now face additional challenges, such as the stresses of war and frequent deployments. The NCO Corps is well-prepared for these demands thanks to educational, professional, and organizational reforms. Although the diversity of roles in today's NCO Corps might surprise Baron von Steuben, he would undoubtedly recognize it as the embodiment of the Army's backbone he envisioned more than two centuries ago.⁷⁷

The evolution of the NCO Corps demonstrates that it is the critical link between the enlisted ranks and the officer corps in an increasingly complex military environment. And yet, today's NCOs are not dissimilar from those of yesteryear. At their core, they must, as Command Sgt. Maj. James A. Johnson puts it, "inspire soldiers to be more than they ever thought they could be."⁷⁸ It is with the sergeant that the proverbial rubber meets the road. They are the pointy end of leadership. The first leader a soldier gets to know is likely the last they will see before they leave the service. War, at its most basic level, is unchanged. Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz writes that war is a contest of will, and the NCO serves as the US Army's unbreakable backbone, sustaining the will to fight over two centuries.⁷⁹

 

 

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Notes

1. Ernest F. Fisher, Guardians of the Republic: A History of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps of the U.S. Army (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2001), 5-6.
2. Fisher, 7.
3. Fisher, 31-32.
4. Fisher, 31-32.
5. For more on frontier militias, see John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
6. David W. Hogan Jr., Arnold G. Fisch Jr., and Robert K. Wright Jr., eds., The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps: The Backbone of the Army (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2007), 21-22.
7. Baron von Steuben, Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States (Philadelphia: 1779); and Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 35-35.
8. Fisher, 36.
9. For more, see Leroy V. Eid, "American Military Leadership: St. Clair's 1791 Defeat," Journal of Military History 57, no. 1 (January 1993): 71-88; and Colin G. Calloway, The Victory with No Name: The Native American Defeat of the First American Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
10. Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 51-53; and Gordon Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 130-131; For more, see Mary Stockwell, Unlikely General: "Mad" Anthony Wayne and the Battle for America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018); and John Winkler, Fallen Timbers 1794: The U.S. Army's First Victory (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013).
11. Stephen E. Ambrose, Undaunted Courage: Meriwether Lewis, Thomas Jefferson, and the Opening of the American West (New York: Touchstone Books, 1996), 160.
12. Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 56-63.
13. Robert Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army & The Indian, 1848-1865 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 19.
14. Utley, 45; and Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 93-97.
15. Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 207.
16. For more on the development of skirmishing in the Fifteenth Army Corps in the Western theater, see Eric Michael Burke, Soldiers from Experience: The Forging of Sherman's Fifteenth Army Corps (Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Press, 2022); and Earl Hess, The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and Myth (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008).
17. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 30.
18. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, 30; Winfield Scott, Infantry Tactics or Rules for the Exercise of Manoeuvres of the United States Infantry (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1854); William J. Hardee, Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics: For the Exercise and Manoeuvres of Troops When Acting as Light Infantry or Riflemen (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1855); and Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, Infantry Tactics for the Instruction, Exercise, and Maneuvers of The Soldier, A Company, Line of Skirmishers, Battalion, Brigade, or Corps D'Armee, vol. I-III (New York: Van Nostrand, 1862).
19. Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 119-20; and Casey, Infantry Tactics vol. I, 112.
20. Fisher, 109-10.
21. Fisher, 128.
22. Robert Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (Lincoln, NC: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 23-24; and August V. Kautz, Customs of Service for Non-Commissioned Officers and Soldiers as Derived from Laws and Regulations and Practised in the Army of the United States (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1865), 101.
23. John A. English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Infantry, revised edition (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 6, 121.
24. Utley, Frontier Regulars, 25.
25. Perry D. Jamison, Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States Army Tactics, 1865-1899 (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1994), 62-64; for more on the problems of doctrine in this period, see Utley, 44-58.
26. Don Rickey Jr., Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), 58-59.
27. Douglas C. McChristian, Regular Army O!: Soldiering on the Western Frontier, 1865-1891 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2019), 146.
28. McChristian, 152, 154.
29. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 30.
30. Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 156-66.
31. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 31; and Fisher, 148-54; for more on the US Army in the Spanish-American War, see Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1998).
32. Fisher, 179-81.
33. Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941 (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 104-5.
34. War Department, A Manual for Noncommissioned Officers and Privates of Infantry of the Army of the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1917); and Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 186.
35. Fisher, 196-98.
36. Cable 952, General Headquarters, A.E.F., 19 April 1918, General John J. Pershing to Adjutant General, Series: Confidential Cablegrams sent from Pershing to AG, 1917-1919, RG 120: Records of the American Expeditionary Forces (World War I), National Archives and Records Administration; and Fisher, 199.
37. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 37-38.
38. Brittany Crocker, "Remembering World War I Hero Alvin C. York," Knox News, 5 April 2017, https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/2017/04/05/remembering-wwi-hero-alvin-c-york/100072326/; for more on Alvin York, see Alvin York and Tom Skeyhill, Sergeant York: His Own Life Story and War Diary (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, and Company, 1928); James Carl Nelson, The York Patrol: The Real Story of Alvin York and the Unsung Heroes Who Made Him World War I's Most Famous Soldier (New York: Morrow, 2021); and James P. Gregory Jr., Unraveling the Myth of Sgt. Alvin York: The Other Sixteen (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2022).
39. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 37-38.
40. Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 204-12. For more on the development of the Army during the interwar years, see William J. Woolley, Creating the Modern Army: Citizen-Soldiers and the American Way of War, 1919-1939 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2022).
41. Fisher, 244.
42. Fisher, 249; and Russel F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 428.
43. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 38; for some examples of NCOs in action in the 23rd Infantry Regiment during World War II, see the classic memoir Charles B. Macdonald, Company Commander: The Classic Infantry Memoir of World War II--From the Battle of the Bulge to the Crossing of the Rhine (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1947); for a case study of the 22nd Infantry Regiment written by a retired Command Sergeant Major, see Robert Sterling Rush, Hell in Hürtgen Forest: The Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001).
44. Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 252.
45. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 39.
46. Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 239.
47. Fisher, 257.
48. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 40.
49. Daniel Elder, Educating Noncommissioned Officers: A Chronology of Educational Programs for the American Noncommissioned Officer (Killeen, TX: NCO Historical Society, 2020), 14-16, 25-35.
50. Thomas E. Hanson, Combat Ready?: The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 77.
51. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 40.
52. The Noncommissioned Officer Guide, T.C. 7-22.7, H.Q., Department of the Army, 1 January 2020, 1-12.
53. Hanson, Combat Ready? , 34, 113.
54. Hanson, 58, 87.
55. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 41; and William M. Donnelly, "'The Best Army That Can Be Put in the Field in the Circumstances': The U.S. Army, July 1951-July 1953," Journal of Military History 71, no. 3 (2007): 823-25.
56. Donnelly, 823-25.
57. Elder, Educating Noncommissioned Officers, 17; and Department of the Army, Education and Training: Noncommissioned Officer Academies, Army Regulation 350-90 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957).
58. Elder, 52-60; and Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 42.
59. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 615-15, Separation of Noncommissioned Officers from Specialists (Washington, DC: July 1954) in Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 190-92.
60. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, 41.
61. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, 41; for more on the Pentomic Army and its effect on personnel requirements, see Brian McAllister Linn, Elvis's Army: Cold War G.I.s and the Atomic Battlefield (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).
62. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, 43-44; see also Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 191-99.
63. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, 45-46; and Beth Bailey, America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap Press, 2009).
64. Dan Elder, "'Shake 'N Bake' Sergeants: How the Army Trained New Officers for The Vietnam War, Fast," History Net, 21 September 2001, https://www.historynet.com/shake-n-bake-sergeants/; Elder, Educating Noncommissioned Officers, 60-73; and Brian Trask, Denver Horn, and Jim "Dave" Pace, Oral History Interview, interviewed by David Siry,13 June 2023, West Point Center for Oral History, https://www.westpointcoh.org/interviews/we-knew-where-we-were-going-shake-and-bake-ncos-in-vietnam.
65. Elder, Educating Noncommissioned Officers, 82-86; and Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 48-49.
66. The Noncommissioned Officer Guide, 1-18.
67. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 51-53; for more on the US Army and the creation of the all-volunteer force, see Beth Bailey, America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap Press, 2009); and Beth Bailey, An Army Afire: How the U.S. Army Confronted Its Racial Crisis in the Vietnam Era (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2023).
68. Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 404-6.
69. "The History of the NCO Creed," Association of the United States Army, accessed 28 May 2025, https://www.ausa.org/history-nco-creed; Dan Elder and Felix Sanches, "The Origins of the Creed of the Noncommissioned Officer," US Army Sergeants Major Academy, 3 May 1998, https://ncohistory.com/history-of-the-nco-creed/; and Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 22-600-20, The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986).
70. James P. Henson Jr., "Getting There Was Half the Battle, Part I," Army Sustainment Magazine 46, no. 2 (March-April 2014): 54.
71. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 54-55; for more on the 1990s US Army, see John Sloan Brown, Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the United States Army 1989-2005 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2012); and David Fitzgerald, Uncertain Warriors: The United States Army Between the Cold War and the War on Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2024).
72. Hogan, Fisch, and Wright, 56-57.
73. Salvatore Giunta with Joe Layden, Living with Honor (New York: Threshold Editions, 2012), 244-52; and Wesley Morgan, The Hardest Place: The American Military Adrift in Afghanistan's Pech Valley (New York: Random House, 2021), 213-14.
74. The Noncommissioned Officer Guide, 1-18.
75. US Army Training and Doctrine Command, NCO 2020 Strategy: NCOs Operating in a Complex World, 4 December 2015, https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/NCO2020.pdf; and The Noncommissioned Officer Guide, 1-19.
76. The Noncommissioned Officer Guide, 2-2; US Army Training and Doctrine Command, NCO Century Strategy: NCOs Operating in a Complex World, 4 December 2015, 5-7; and Noncommissioned Officer Leadership Center of Excellent Bulletin 1-19, "NCO Common Core Competencies (NCO C3)," n.d., https://www.ncolcoe.army.mil/Portals/71/publications/ref/1-19-NCOC3.pdf?ver=2020-03-09-111137-160.
77. The Noncommissioned Officer Guide, 1-20, 1-21.
78. The Noncommissioned Officer Guide, 2-2.
79. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 75.

 

 

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