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Looking on the Conflict on the Horizon

From “Peace First” to “Be Ready” Perspective

 

Angela Nogueira Neves, PhD
Tassio Franchi, PhD

 

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Europe has lived under the guiding principle of “never again” since the end of World War II. For decades, emphasized by the end of the Cold War, collective memory and institutions like the European Union and NATO have nurtured the belief that peace was the continent’s permanent condition. Yet, in the last decade and since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, European governments have begun to promote the new civic message of “be ready.”

We are witnessing a peculiar movement in Europe. The Council of the European Union emphasized the need to build a “whole-of-society resilience” in 2023, which prepares civil society actors, citizens, and the private sector for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.¹ A year later, Spain registered a 90 percent increase in price consults for bunkers, while Germany began reviving its bunker network.² Also in 2024, Poland’s schoolchildren began mandatory firearms training; and Denmark, Poland, and Sweden launched guides to prepare the population for war and/or major crises, a movement illustrating how governments are reframing resilience as not only a duty of the military but also of every citizen.³ Soon, France will follow the same path.⁴ In addition, the Finnish government launched a website offering practical emergency guidance, while the European Commission began advising its population to stockpile seventy-two hours’ worth of supplies in case of potential attacks or disasters.⁵ Approximately 115,000 persons have taken basic courses in Lithuania to cover practical skills in crisis, such as stockpiling supplies, managing communication, and organizing community responses.⁶ There are many more examples of how ordinary European citizens are facing the threat of war, including the European Union releasing its “White Paper for European Defence—Readiness 2030,” a blueprint to create a more capable European defense by 2030.⁷

This article will try to analyze these movements, particularly in the creation of guides, to support the argument that a mind shift is occurring in Europe from a “peace first” perspective to a “be ready” position in which mobilization for a major conflict is being normalized. To do so, two concepts will be defined and used to understand these events, the Clausewitzian war trinity (politics, army, and people) and European’s historical memory of vulnerability, while also assessing what lessons the U.S. Army can draw from these results. This article will then follow with an analysis of the tone given in the guides distributed among populations and finish with a reflection on the immediate and long-term implications.

Historical Memory and Strategic Culture

Europe left the twentieth century with what might be called societal scars—memories of invasion, occupation, and devastation. Fifty or a hundred years begins to seem like a short time for a society to grapple with wide-scale catastrophe, atrocity, and genocide.⁸ This may be explained by the transgenerational atmosphere of those historical memories, an unconscious way of preserving and transmitting the related experiences, intentionally or because there is no narrative to address it.⁹ These inherited insecurities continue to inform strategic culture today.

For instance, the opening text of Poland’s constitution states, “Aware of the need for cooperation with all countries for the good of the Human Family, Mindful of the bitter experiences of the times when fundamental freedoms and human rights were violated in our Homeland,” making a reference to the collective memory of past subjugations, emphasizing the commitment to preserve the nation’s heritage and independence.¹⁰ Unprocessed/undigested collective traumas could become an instrument for political manipulations in the hands of populist political leaders, as in the case of Russia for example.¹¹

In Germany, there are at least three hundred memorial museums dedicated to the Holocaust.¹² Giving words and shapes to what happened is a therapeutic tool to process the memories of destruction; however, they are also a potential source of retraumatization, a way to keep the chosen trauma alive—especially when guilt and shame are inadvertently fixated in individuals, impeding the processing.¹³ For example, Lithuanians exhibit higher levels of posttraumatic stress disorder, and descendants of Sudeten Germans carry the “chosen trauma” as part of their identity, even after years of political oppression and forced migration.¹⁴ A 2023 survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations suggests that contemporary European voters are divided into distinct groups, each primarily concerned with specific crises such as climate change, immigration, economic instability, the war in Ukraine, and the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁵ These divisions reflect how collective experiences of past and ongoing crises influence political priorities and behaviors, demonstrating the profound impact of historical and recent traumas on the political landscape.

Hard collective experiences, memories, and an unconscious sense of helplessness may be triggered and brought back to the present by “hot spots”—understood to be trigger points around conflict cycles and history repeats.¹⁶ Looking at recent events—the 2008 economic crash, the more than decades-long refugee crises in Europe, the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war—it seems that some could be considered “hot spots,” leading the current European generation to experience the effect of historical memories of European devastation. As such, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has reawakened fears, reinforcing past experiences and making war preparedness a normalized response rather than a fringe concern.

The psychological mindset of “be ready” for the European society is a need to avoid the vortices of collective despair and fear. By reframing historical trauma—a psychological reaction to a traumatic event affecting an entire society by being not merely the reflection of a historical fact—as strategic memory, European states translate the past into resilience practices.¹⁷ Hence, emphasis should not be on mourning but on readiness: ensuring populations know how to act in crises, resist disinformation, and sustain critical infrastructure under pressure.

Clausewitz’s War Trinity: Government, Army, and the People

Carl von Clausewitz argues that war is characterized by a dynamic interplay among rational and irrational forces, material and immaterial dimensions, strategic planning, operational control, and the ever-present influences of uncertainty, friction, and chance; in sum, hostility, chance, and policy/reason.¹⁸ This framework is considered timeless as it encompasses the full spectrum of warfare’s complexity, integrating elements that are both complementary and, at times, seemingly contradictory.¹⁹

Clausewitz’s trinity summarizes this framework, being a central concept to understand the nature of war. According to the Prussian general, war is constituted by a primordial element of violence, hatred, and enmity, understood as a blind natural force that is primarily rooted in the passions of the people. A second component of war resides in the play of chance and probability, which gives space to the creative and adaptive spirit of the commander and the army operating under conditions of uncertainty. The third element concerns the subordination of war as an instrument of policy, representing its rational and intellectual dimension, which is ultimately directed and constrained by the government.²⁰ The relationship of these three components is dynamic rather than static and varies according to the type of war.

An army’s effectiveness hinges on its training, discipline, leadership, and adaptability to changing circumstances. The government represents the rational, strategic, and political objectives that drive a conflict. It sets the goals of the war, allocates resources, and seeks to translate military successes into political gains. The government must maintain a clear understanding of its interests, weigh the costs and benefits of different courses of action, and ensure that the war remains aligned with its overall policy objectives. The army embodies the operational and tactical dimensions of war, characterized by uncertainty, chance, and the play of probabilities.²¹ People represent the raw emotions, passions, and inherent violence within a population that can be ignited by war. Here, violence is not primarily physical but violent emotion. The people’s willingness to endure hardship, hatred of the enemy, and the overall commitment to the cause directly affect a nation’s ability to sustain a war effort. Those hostile feelings seem to be critically important in any war theory.²²

If we combine both frameworks—historical memory and Clausewitz’s trinity—we see a gradual normalization of war preparation. In other words, looking at the actual scenario in Europe, we may find a “negative peace” dynamic interplay among hostility, chance, and policy. Governments are not just increasing military budgets but are actively involving civilians in war readiness (e.g., Sweden’s reintroduction of conscription, Poland and Denmark publishing war guides for the public, Finland arming civilians with early exposure to military culture reinforcing a total defense doctrine)—a concept popular in the Cold War but largely absent in Western Europe for decades. Militaries functioned separately from civilian life traditionally. However, we may see an increased focus on local defense (e.g., volunteer-based resistance groups, territorial defense units in Poland and the Baltics) with civilians being encouraged to think in terms of crisis survival (e.g., Spain, Denmark, Sweden) and being trained for combat (e.g., Finland).

And what about the people (the emotions)? Fueled by uncertainty, the feeling of insecurity, and possibly facing collective trauma war triggers, are people assuming an active position to take responsibility for their own defense? Evidence in this direction may be found in guides published in Denmark, Poland, Finland, and Sweden to prepare their populations for war and/or major crises. Germany and the Netherlands also published guides, but they were not made for their citizens; hence, they are out of scope of this analysis.

The Shift from “Never Again” to “Be Ready”

Focusing on the published guides, we made a content analysis of each website and its introductions, which is where tone is established and given to people.

The Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency’s “In Case of Crisis or War” states,

War is being waged in our corner of the world and the security situation is the most serious since the Second World War. Terrorist threats, cyber attacks and misleading information are being used to harm and influence us. An armed attack against Sweden cannot be ruled out. The realisation of this seriousness needs to reach more people. This is why the government commissioned MSB last winter to produce a new version of the brochure In case of crisis or war. The brochure advises the population on how they can prepare—in the event of a crisis or war—to increase the population’s ability, resilience and willingness to defend themselves. A resilient population is an important part of Swedish total defence.

Sweden has a tradition of communicating with its population about crisis and war. This is the fifth version of the brochure sent out to the Swedish public. Previous brochures have been sent out in 1943, 1952, 1961 and 2018. The first three brochures were entitled If war comes. (emphasis added by authors)²³

The tone is direct and clear, not only identifying imminent threats but also sharing the responsibility with the ordinary citizen in dealing with them. In a less emphatic way, the Danish Emergency Management Agency calls on its citizens to take care of themselves and not burden the governmental services. It points out,

If you can manage on your own for three days in case of a crisis, the authorities can focus on stabilising the situation and helping where the need is greatest. ... The threat of man-made incidents, such as cyber attacks and sabotage, is serious due to the deteriorating security situation in Europe. Finally, accidents, technical issues or other incidents with a wide impact on society can occur. ...

... By following some simple advice, you can manage on your own if a crisis situation arises. We recommend that you and your household should be able to manage for three days. That will give the authorities time to stabilise the situation and help where the need is greatest. (emphasis added by authors)²⁴

Poland’s Government Centre for Security, on the other hand, has a lower tone regarding an imminent conflict. Not only in war will those abilities be needed but also during natural disasters or industrial accidents as well, and it prioritizes the individual’s ability to take care of themselves for their own safety:

Being prepared is essential. Knowing the meaning of alarm sounds and how to respond is crucial.

The guide is divided into two sections: the first covers essential preparation steps, and the second provides action tips during a crisis. Topics include family resilience building to enhance safety, protection from disinformation to avoid panic, understanding alarm signals, evacuation preparation, behavior in contaminated areas, power outages, hostage situations, and first aid instructions. (emphasis added by authors)²⁵

Finland’s guide is not a brochure but rather a website. It is part of a broader communication package on individual emergency planning. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the main goal is to strengthen the population’s competence in preparedness by means such as guidance and advice. Its contents provide general information about crisis and readiness, covering situations such as epidemics and pandemics, cyberattacks, natural phenomena, disruptions in the payment system, power outages, water outages and contamination, disruptions in communications infrastructure, military conflict, and terrorism.²⁶ This first section ends with coping-mechanism orientations in long-term crisis and incidents. Its main tone is a shared responsibility of the authorities and citizens: “The authorities cannot do everything alone. This makes it important that everyone contributes to preparedness.”²⁷

Specifically regarding the military conflict scenario, the call for a shared responsibility for Finnish defense is clear: “All Finnish citizens have a national defence obligation, and everyone plays an important role in defending Finland.”²⁸ The guide gives directions for evacuation and shelters, and clarifies the possible role citizens may have during war times:

Civilians would have more responsibility for caring for more disadvantaged groups. In society, healthcare and care resources must be allocated to the most critical areas, which means that families would have more responsibility for caring for children and older people, for example.

Everyone aged 18 or over but under 68 living in Finland is obliged to participate in rescue, first aid, maintenance and clearing tasks or other civil defence tasks.²⁹

A second section details preparedness and cooperation. It emphasizes the protection role of citizens regarding disadvantaged groups (e.g., children, elderly, persons with disabilities) during the crisis of conflict. The general tone is instructional, sharing responsibility of government institutions with civilians during crisis and war, preserving the main conduct role and guidance with the first. Looking at this under the Clausewitz’s trinity, we may say that on these negative peace times, people in Finland are being called to endure hardship and be committed to the country authority’s effort, taking care of themselves and the vulnerable ones, to collaborate with the nation’s ability to sustain a war and crisis effort.

Sweden, “In Case of Crisis or War.” In Sweden’s “In Case of Crisis or War,” the introduction sets an urgent yet empowering tone. It clearly states that “if Sweden is attacked, everyone must do their part to defend Sweden’s independence—and our democracy.”³⁰ Citizens are urged to understand that peace cannot be taken for granted and that everyone has a duty to contribute to Sweden’s defense and resilience. This framing explicitly expands Clausewitz’s trinity: not only must the government and army remain vigilant, but the population itself is also formally enlisted as a core component of its national security strategy.

The guide demonstrates that the population is effectively positioned closer to the military sphere with a deliberate fusion of Clausewitz’s trinity elements by asking citizens to stockpile essentials, identify emergency shelters, resist disinformation, and prepare mentally for crisis. The call for active psychological and logistical readiness signifies a shift from the traditional division between civilians and combatants—a clear evolution of Clausewitz’s triad in contemporary democracies facing hybrid threats. For instance, under the total defense topic, it clarifies to civilians that they may assume two different roles during a war or the threat of a war: military or civil defense service (designated to the citizen by authorities) or general national service (remain at work as usual or carry out other tasks in support of Sweden’s total defense system).³¹ The guide’s general content immediately shifts responsibility onto civilians for their own safety as well for the safety of Sweden. The language is inclusive but also carries a sense of duty.

Through the lens of historical memory, the guide draws heavily on Sweden’s historical memory, particularly the precarious neutrality during World War II and Cold War anxieties. The underlying message is that complacency can be fatal, a theme deeply embedded in nations that remember near-catastrophic vulnerability. The guide activates these memories without naming them directly, embedding historical trauma into a narrative of preparedness rather than fear. However, as with Denmark, this strategy carries the dual potential to either foster resilience or deepen societal anxiety, depending on how citizens internalize the message.

Denmark, “Be Prepared for a Crisis.” The Danish guide sets a calm, direct, and serious tone, inviting citizens to be mentally and practically prepared. It stresses that Denmark is a safe country but also vulnerable, notable mentions include terror attacks, information technology breakdowns, climate-related disasters, and situations in the international environment, a veiled reference to war or geopolitical conflict. The guide is focused on giving direct instructions for packing seventy-two hours’ worth of supplies, first aid, warnings, and alarms with a final checklist.³²

The introduction of the guide strikes a balance between reassurance and sober warning: while emphasizing that “Denmark is fundamentally a safe and secure country,” it nonetheless urges citizens to prepare for scenarios ranging from cyberattacks to international crises.³³ This approach subtly reallocates part of the national security responsibility to the civilian population, thereby reshaping the traditional Clausewitzian dynamic. In this emerging structure, the population is no longer a passive subject but an active pillar supporting governmental resilience, freeing up military and emergency services to focus on strategic priorities during a crisis. Explicitly linking psychological readiness with national resilience efforts, the guide notes, “If you are prepared and able to take care of yourself and your loved ones, the authorities can focus their efforts where the need is greatest and work to stabilize the situation.”³⁴ This reveals a strategic shift toward empowering civilians not only materially but also emotionally, fostering a form of societal “precombatant readiness” without direct militarization.

From the perspective of historical memory, the guide taps into Europe’s deep-seated historical memories of war, occupation, and systemic collapse. Rather than allowing these traumas to remain dormant, Denmark’s government transforms them into a mobilizing narrative, encouraging preparation as a form of psychological empowerment.

Poland, “Get Ready! Guide for Crisis and War.” Poland’s “Get Ready! Guide for Crisis and War” adopts a direct and militarized tone, immediately presenting crises and war not as distant possibilities but as active threats, despite the abundant use of figures to balance the tone. Citizens are therefore expected not only to prepare logistically through evacuation kits, safe shelters, and survival strategies but also to remain mentally alert and resist manipulation and foreign occupation, embodying a highly engaged civic defense posture.

Here, the government acts primarily as a coordinator, providing instructions and tools, while the population is explicitly tasked with maintaining societal function and resisting disinformation and occupation. The army remains critical but is almost treated as a background presence, supporting the idea that survival and resilience are duties of the entire society. The explicit instructions on dealing with foreign soldiers, handling hostage situations, and behaving during armed attacks reflect a de facto integration of civilians into national defense doctrine, even in noncombat roles. In general, the instructions were given to preserve individual safety, stating clearly, “You have one goal—to stay alive. Accept the situation you are in and prepare to wait.”³⁵ This guide’s tone is for the individual safety.

The Polish guide resonates profoundly with Poland’s historical memory: repeated invasions, occupations, and betrayals throughout the twentieth century. The trauma of sudden foreign domination (especially World War II and Soviet control) seems embedded in its structure, particularly in sections such as “Foreign Soldiers and Temporary Occupation.”³⁶ Rather than allowing historical fears to paralyze society, the guide channels these collective memories into practical, actionable behaviors. Nevertheless, the heavy emphasis on self-defense and constant vigilance could risk reinforcing a siege mentality.

The Relevance for U.S. Army and the Department of War

The Danish, Swedish, and Polish guides all exemplify Europe’s shift toward civilian-based resilience, but they differ markedly in tone: Denmark focuses on calm preparedness, Sweden on patriotic duty, while Poland draws heavily on collective trauma to prepare citizens for direct confrontation with existential threats.

The Danish guide balances reassurance with a sober warning, presenting preparedness as an ordinary civic responsibility. Citizens are encouraged to keep supplies, follow official channel, and avoid panic. The tone is calm but the subtext is clear: resilience is the new baseline for national security. For the United States, this might be an example of actions to be followed to prepare the American citizens to respond cooperatively in time of crisis.

The Swedish guide invokes a patriotic duty. It emphasizes endurance, community, solidarity, and resistance, directing mobilizing citizens as a line of defense. Its cultural memory of neutrality and past vulnerability is reframed into proactive resilience. This line of action provides the U.S. Army insight into how they achieve integrate psychological readiness into total defense.

Poland’s guide is strikingly direct and militarizing. Citizens are instructed not only in evacuation and supplies but also in how to behave under foreign occupation and in contact with enemy soldiers. For the U.S. Army, it highlights how frontline NATO allies cultivate a civilian mindset that assume high-intensity conflict is possible and imminent.

We may point out that these guides emphasize the civilians’ role as participants in defense, not just bystanders. Together, these cases show a spectrum of preparedness that U.S. forces must understand when working with European partners. Each guide illustrates how Clausewitz’s trinity is evolving: governments provide guidance, the military secures borders, but population themselves are tasked with resilience, and even resistance.

In a low-to-medium-time perspective, this could lead to a “constant low-medium level mobilization,” where populations live with a crisis-ready mindset, shifting toward a resilient society model in which every citizen plays a role in national security—even in peacetime.

For the U.S. Army, the relevance of the European preparedness may be threefold: (1) civilian mobilization and interoperability, (2) strategic communication models, and (3) deterrence by resilience. Civilians being mobilized as partners of the government and military bring consideration to U.S. personnel about interoperability and coalition operations. Civilian readiness creates operational environments where U.S. forces may find themselves working alongside mobilized citizens rather than passive populations. This might require not only doctrinal flexibility but also an understanding of how civilian actions may affect troop movements, rules of engagement, force protection, and the broader coalition effort. Soldiers may need to operate alongside civilians in logistics, information-sharing, resistance activities, and cyber defense and may need to be trained to integrate these civilian frameworks into joint planning. The lack of integration could put personnel and tactics at risk; if civilians are high mobilized but not fully coordinated with military plans, it could produce friction (e.g., duplication of effort, confusion regarding chains of command, or even unintended escalation). Also, civilians engaged in resistance may blur lines between combatants and noncombatants, thus complicating U.S. adherence to international law.

Strategic communication models in these guides serve as case studies in strategic communication under hybrid threat. Each provides a tested model of how allied governments communicate with their population in ways that build resilience, counter disinformation, and reassure without inducing panic. For the U.S. Army, which conducts information and psychological operations, these guides can be taken as examples of preventive messaging that may foster trust, empower citizens, and deny adversaries information space. Communicating effectively from direct threat may prevent the effects of adversary disinformation once under attack. The U.S. Army may improve this tool, strengthening its own approach to resilience building in U.S. homeland contexts.

With respect to deterrence by resilience, a population conditioned to endure hardship, resist manipulation, and continue functioning under crisis presents a more difficult target to adversaries. Knowledge is definitely power. For the U.S. Army, this highlights the importance of resilience as a dimension of deterrence—one that complements force posture. Understanding how allies incorporate civilians into deterrence strategies may inform U.S. homeland defense and strengthen NATO cohesion by demonstrating that resilience is as much a shared deterrence posture as armored brigades or air defenses.

Conclusion

Europe’s postwar identity was anchored in the motto “never again,” expressing a collective resolve to prevent conflict through unity, diplomacy, and shared prosperity. Today, these preparedness guides reveal a cultural and strategic pivot toward “be ready.”

The war in Ukraine shattered Europe’s assumptions about peace being stable and permanent. Russia demonstrated that a full conventional invasion in Europe is not a relic of the twentieth century—it is happening now. Hybrid threats (e.g., cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation, drone warfare) are happening daily, especially in countries like Poland, Lithuania, and Sweden. A structural, long-term insecurity has returned to Europe after decades of peace. In a world where threats are increasingly hybrid and unpredictable, the guiding principle is no longer merely to avoid war; it is to be ready for it. This emerging “be ready” paradigm reflects a profound transformation: Europe is not abandoning its memories but rather repurposing them to foster societal resilience in an era of strategic uncertainty.

Europe’s civilian preparedness movement signals not only a geopolitical adjustment but also a profound cultural reckoning: the continent that once vowed “never again” is now teaching its people to be ready—not because it desires war but because it dares to survive it. This is more than a regional adjustment, it reflects how the United States’ European allies mobilize their population, how historical memory translates into strategic culture, and how deterrence increasingly depends on resilience at every level of society. For the U.S. Army, studying these developments is not an academic exercise. It is a way to understand partners, anticipate coalition dynamics, and adapt to an era in which civilian resilience is inseparable from military power. This is a return to a historical model of total defense in a modern geopolitical context where hybrid warfare (e.g., cyber, propaganda, irregular resistance) makes civilian involvement essential.

 

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Notes

1. Council of the European Union, “Society Actors, Citizens and Private Sector for Preparedness Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats,” press release, 8 June 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/06/08/council-vows-better-civil-protection-preparedness-against-chemical-biological-radiological-and-nuclear-threats/.
2. Lucila Runnacles, “O País da Europa Onde Procura por Bunkers Antibombas Cresceu 90%” [The country in Europe where the demand for bomb shelters has grown by 90%], BBC News Brazil, 4 December 2024, https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/articles/crmzg0rm43vo; Gerda Krivaite and Kristiana Nitisa, “Northern Citizens Gear Up for Resilience,” European Correspondent, 12 March 2025, https://www.europeancorrespondent.com/r/northern-citizens-gear-up-for-resilience.
3. Axel Rowohlt, “Poland Has Made Firearms Lessons Compulsory for Primary Schoolchildren in Preparation of a Potential Russian Attack,” DW, 12 December 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/polands-schoolchildren-take-mandatory-firearms-lessons/video-70987861.
4. Lisa Klaassen, “France to Distribute ‘Survival Manual’ to Prepare Households for Emergencies – Including Armed Conflict,” CNN World, 19 March 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/19/europe/france-survival-manual-scli-intl.
5. Krivaite and Nitisa, “Northern Citizens Gear Up for Resilience”; Jennifer Rankin, “Stockpile 72 Hours of Supplies in Case of Disaster or Attack, EU Tells Citizens,” Guardian, 26 March 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/26/stockpile-supplies-72-hours-disasters-attack-eu-tells-citizens.
6. Krivaite and Nitisa, “Northern Citizens Gear Up for Resilience.”
7. European Commission, “White Paper for European Defence—Readiness 2030” (European Commission, 19 March 2025), https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/white-paper-for-european-defence-readiness-2030_en.
8. Arlene Audergon, “Collective Trauma: The Nightmare of History,” Psychotherapy and Politics International 2, no. 1 (2004): 16–31, https://doi.org/10.1002/ppi.67.
9. Tihamér Bakó and Katalin Zana, Transgenerational Trauma and Therapy: The Transgenerational Atmosphere (Routledge, 2020).
10. Tekst Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej ogłoszono w Dz.U. 1997 [The text of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland was published in the Journal of Laws of 1997], NR 78 poz. 483, preamble, https://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm; Gad Yair, “Cultural Trauma and Constitution: Precursors of Political Traditions and Collective Identities,” European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology 11, no. 1 (2024): 44–66, https://doi.org/10.1080/23254823.2023.2219334.
11. Vamik D. Volkan, “Large-Group Identity, Who Are We Now? Leader-Follower Relationships and Societal-Political Divisions,” American Journal of Psychoanalysis 79, no. 2 (2019): 139–55, https://doi.org/10.1057/s11231-019-09186-2.
12. “Remembering the Holocaust: Awareness, Museums, and Memorials,” Holocaust Explained, accessed 21 November 2025, https://www.theholocaustexplained.org/survival-and-legacy/legacy-and-memory/museums/.
13. Dori Laub and Andreas Hamburger, eds., Psychoanalysis and Holocaust Testimony: Unwanted Memories of Social Trauma (Routledge, 2017); Rony Alfandary and Judith Tydor Baumel-Schwartz, eds., Psychoanalytic and Cultural Aspects of Trauma and the Holocaust (Routledge, 2023); Ruth Leys, From Guilt to Shame: Auschwitz and After (Princeton University Press, 2007).
14. Evaldas Kazlauskas et al., “Intergenerational Transmission of Resilience? Sense of Coherence Is Associated Between Lithuanian Survivors of Political Violence and Their Adult Offspring,” Frontiers in Psychology 8 (2017): 1677, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01677; Sandra Kreisslová and Jana Nosková, “Transgenerational Trauma and Family Memory? The Legacy of Sudeten German Expulsion After World War II,” Slovenský Národopis [Slovak ethnology] 72, no. 3 (2024): 344–61, https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/10211940SN_2024_3_27.pdf.
15. Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, A Crisis of One’s Own: The Politics of Trauma in Europe’s Election Year (European Council on Foreign Relations, 17 January 2024), https://ecfr.eu/publication/a-crisis-of-ones-own-the-politics-of-trauma-in-europes-election-year/.
16. Audergon, “Collective Trauma.”
17. Gilad Hirschberger, “Collective Trauma and the Social Construction of Meaning,” Frontiers in Psychology 9 (2018): 1441, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01441.
18. Colin M. Fleming, Clausewitz’s Timeless Trinity: A Framework for Modern War (Routledge, 2016).
19. Michael I. Handel, “Who Is Afraid of Carl von Clausewitz? A Guide to the Perplexed,” in Strategic Studies: A Reader, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2014), 53–75.
20. Carl von Clausewitz, Da Guerra [On war] (WMF Martins Fontes, 2017).
21. Thomas Waldman, War, Clausewitz and the Trinity (Routledge, 2016); Caesar Wu et al., “Strategic Decisions: Survey, Taxonomy, and Future Directions from Artificial Intelligence Perspective,” ACM Computing Surveys 55, no. 12 (2023): 1–30, https://doi.org/10.1145/3571807.
22. Fleming, Clausewitz’s Timeless Trinity.
23. “In Case of Crisis or War,” Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency (MCF), accessed 21 November 2025, https://www.mcf.se/en/advice-for-individuals/the-brochure-in-case-of-crisis-or-war/download-and-order-the-brochure-in-case-of-crisis-or-war/.
24. “Prepared for Crises,” Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA), accessed 9 December 2025, https://www.brs.dk/en/prepared/.
25. “Crisis and War Guide,” Government Centre for Security (GCS), accessed 21 November 2025, https://www.gov.pl/web/rcb-en/crisis-and-war-guide.
26. “What Do I Do? Preparing for Incidents and Crises,” Finland Ministry of the Interior, accessed 29 December 2025, https://www.suomi.fi/guides/preparedness.
27. “Why Is Preparedness Important?,” Finland Ministry of the Interior, accessed 21 November 2025, https://www.suomi.fi/guides/preparedness/how-to-prepare-for-incidents-and-crises/why-is-preparedness-important.
28. “Military Conflicts and Civil Defence: National Defence Belongs to Everyone,” Finland Ministry of the Interior, accessed 21 November 2025, https://www.suomi.fi/guides/preparedness/how-do-i-prepare-for-incidents-and-crises/military-conflict.
29. “Military Conflicts and Civil Defence: What Do Civilians Do During a War?,” Finland Ministry of the Interior, accessed 21 November 2025, https://www.suomi.fi/guides/preparedness/how-do-i-prepare-for-incidents-and-crises/military-conflict.
30. MCF, “In Case of Crisis or War” (MCF, November 2024), 3.
31. MCF, “In Case of Crisis or War,” 9.
32. DEMA, “Be Prepared for a Crisis.”
33. DEMA, “Be Prepared for a Crisis,” 1.
34. DEMA, “Be Prepared for a Crisis,” 1.
35. GCS, “Get Ready! Guide for Crisis and War” (GCS, 2022), 30.
36. GCS, “Get Ready! Guide for Crisis and War,” 28–29.

 

 

 

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