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Red Skies Ahead

Russia Planning for Its Drone-Driven Army of Tomorrow

Dr. Ian DuPont
Ben Vranian
Bryan Powers

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(AI image by authors)

For the first time in history, tactical drones have rendered individual soldiers capable of delivering the explosive yield of a mortar, at the range of a howitzer, with the precision of a sniper, for the cost of a new Army Service Uniform.

Russia is planning long-term changes based on its experiences employing and defending against small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS; broadly defined as “tactical drones”) in Ukraine. These plans will ultimately result in a more drone-savvy and battlefield-tested, near-peer threat where drone usage is proliferated both horizontally and vertically across any future battlefield scenario involving Russia—where its drone operators will measure in the hundreds of thousands, with a tactical drone inventory that will potentially measure in the tens of millions. Tactical drones have heavily influenced how Russian ground forces have waged war in Ukraine. Given the comparative cost effectiveness to procure, manufacture, and repair; scale of innovation, proliferation, and overall ubiquity; and ease of use, tactical drones have become a mainstay and the ultimate combat enabler of the Russia-Ukraine battlefield.

The literature on sUAS use and applicability has exponentially increased over the last few years as the world watches the “battle lab” that has characterized Russia’s war in Ukraine. It is a topic of discussion across the entirety of the joint force that spans every service, at every echelon, in every theater. This article seeks to articulate the nuance by which Russia is approaching the incorporation of this technology into its ground forces in an effort to highlight its future threat potential. Understanding both Russia’s current battlefield realities and future plans associated with these platforms can provide decision advantages to commanders, planners, and intelligence professionals that seek to better articulate and plan against this threat via the following mechanisms:

• Incorporating and updating war-gaming efforts to more accurately account for sUAS integration and its impact on opposing forces’ unit structure, equipment inventories, capabilities, and performance.
• Modernizing field environments, training centers, and doctrine to account for the scale of sUAS proliferation and impact on other warfighting capabilities; operations; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and specific weapons systems.
• Assisting NATO partners and allies in preparing for future conflict scenarios involving Russia, and the morphing threat its ground forces would bring to bear with this level of sUAS integration.
• Extrapolating this updated threat capability for its applicability, proliferation, and universal appeal to adversaries in other theaters worldwide.

Tactical Drones—What We Mean

Tactical drones herein refer to sUAS commonly found among Russia’s ground forces that notably support its frontline operations. This inventory is primarily composed of Department of Defense (DOD) group 1 and 2-type drones that weigh less than fifty-five pounds, operating below 3,500 feet and less than 250 knots (~288 mph).¹ While not all-inclusive, these drone types largely consist of first-person-view (FPV) hobbyist drones (e.g., Chimera 7 Pro); commercial-off-the-shelf multirotor drones (e.g., DJI Mavic series); smaller fixed-wing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms (e.g., Eleron, Zala series); and loitering munition platforms (e.g., Lancet series).² Absent of this discussion, though still relevant to Russia’s military drone culture writ large, are larger DOD group 3–5 UASs that serve primarily in long-range strike or other strategic capacities beyond the front lines (including Iranian-procured Shahed variants and its indigenously replicated Geran series) and other larger military-grade fixed-wing platforms (e.g., Orion, Altius).³ We acknowledge that the delineation of drone types by tactical, operational, and strategic echelons is often murky, and that further battlefield innovation will likely involve increased incorporation of all types of unmanned systems at Russia’s disposal to improve tactical outcomes in Ukraine.⁴

Tactical Drone Production and Battlefield Impacts

Russia’s integration of tactical drones over the last several years has focused on quantity and adaptability, qualities that have engrained these devices as both stand-alone weapons systems and battlefield enablers throughout virtually every warfighting function. During Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and in operations in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine in 2014, the bulk of Russian ground forces leveraged drones primarily as artillery spotters or generalized reconnaissance, while it experimented with only a handful of UAS-dedicated companies with a total UAS inventory of two hundred platforms.⁵ In 2022, Russia’s preinvasion UAS inventory was roughly two thousand systems—again, predominantly larger, military-grade fixed-wing platforms primarily for ISR. Compare that to its current inventory that is upward of four million with an emphasis on primarily inexpensive and expendable platforms.⁶ Both Russia and Ukraine can produce roughly forty thousand to fifty thousand tactical drones per week, while Ukraine intelligence services note that Russia plans to produce approximately two million FPV drones and twenty thousand longer-range and decoy drones in 2025 for its war in Ukraine.⁷ In December 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defence described how its troops used upward of 3,500 drones daily in Ukraine, while Russian president Vladimir Putin announced in April 2025 that his forces used four thousand FPV drones daily—a quantity he noted as insufficient for Russia’s operational needs.⁸

As of mid-2025, it is estimated that 70–80 percent of battlefield casualties (killed or wounded in action) for both Russia and Ukraine are inflicted by UAS.⁹ Regarding equipment losses, drone strikes from FPV or drone-dropped munitions accounted for roughly 40 percent of all combat damaged vehicles through 2024, a statistic that has risen to 60–70 percent as of early-2025.¹⁰ In 2023, up to fifty UAS from both sides were operating within any given ten kilometers of frontage in Ukraine, a number that again has almost certainly increased substantially as both Russia and Ukraine vamped up tactical drone production since then.¹¹ As of 2025, a single Russian assault unit on the front lines often involves at least twenty FPVs per attack to support advancing dismounted infantry, often with a 20–40 percent effectiveness rate.¹²

Of equal interest beyond quantities of drones produced or even used is the number of drones lost in combat operations. Ukrainian UAS losses were approximated at ten thousand per month in 2023, a number that again has undoubtedly skyrocketed given the increased scale of drone usage by both sides since 2024.¹³ Similarly, a 2023 Russian military academy publication estimated that 80 percent of ground forces’ combat tasks were accomplished with the help of copter-type sUAS, and that these low-cost systems increased effectiveness at engaging targets by 75 percent.¹⁴

The collective employment of sUAS of all types has created denied access zones (colloquially referred to as gray zones) at increasing depths along the line of contact, increasing the risk to traditional combat systems and vehicles of any kind operating within this area. Ukrainian sources and battlefield footage highlight a proverbial “no-man’s land” within roughly ten kilometers on either side of the front lines in Ukraine that literally buzzes with drone activity, causing both sides to shift toward smaller, dispersed, and more maneuverable tactics in an attempt to counter near-persistent observation and attack by small drones.¹⁵ One defense article coined this area the “drone line,” which effectively pins frontline troops into fixed positions due to the ambiguity of the saturation of overhead drones being friend or foe.¹⁶

A 2025 article from Russia’s Academy of Military Sciences echoes these assessments and adds that tanks, infantry vehicles, and large cargo trucks incur risk of high losses twenty-five to thirty kilometers from the forward line of troops due to UASs and artillery fires.¹⁷ The article also claims that the combination of various attack UASs has changed the employment of combat arms such as a narrowing of the role of tanks to engagements from covered firing positions, a dispersion of artillery to subunits in smaller groups of two versus three or four, and a necessity for more dismounted or rapid movement via motorcycles, buggies, or other light tactical vehicles. The same article postulates that this denied access zone could increase to one hundred kilometers due to the near-persistent drone-saturated battlefield environment.¹⁸

A Russian FPV drone. (Photo courtesy of Russian media)

Russia has also leveraged longer-range FPV drones with extended battery and communication capabilities to attack into Ukraine’s rear area at distances of thirty to forty kilometers from the front lines to threaten logistics, medical assets/casualty care, and command-and-control-related targets.¹⁹ Within this tactical-rear area, Russia also leveraged tactical drones to hinder Ukrainian troop rotations and evacuations from the front lines, and leveraged tactical ISR drones to enable more precise missile strikes on Ukrainian training areas.²⁰

Tactical Drone Incorporation Among Deployed Forces

Tactical drones have been incorporated within all of Russia’s operational grouping of forces in Ukraine and are observed serving in increasingly diverse roles within both frontline and rear-area forces. Preinvasion, Russia’s dedicated UAS echelons within its ground forces were predominantly UAS-dedicated companies holding primarily military-grade drones for reconnaissance support to its artillery and maneuver echelons.²¹ Today, tactical drones have proliferated across nearly all frontline and rear-area forces with the corresponding manufacturing and sustainment requirements to increasingly support a massive quantity of on-hand drones for its troops.²² By late 2024, Russia’s maneuver battalions had UAS platoons consisting of FPV, copter-type, and reconnaissance drone crews, as well as similar UAS platoons incorporated at the company-level for reconnaissance and assault subunits.²³ Russia has also increased its sUAS footprint within artillery units to improve its mass-centric fires, near-real-time battle damage assessments, and counterbattery operations.²⁴ This expansive incorporation highlights sUAS effectiveness not just as a stand-alone type of munition but also in support of and integrated within other warfighting capabilities—most notably fires—to augment and improve sensor-to-shooter timelines.²⁵

The evolution of UAS capabilities within its ground forces is evident within Russian military doctrinal publications and the work of semiofficial Russian civilian groups providing crowdsourced UAS solutions. As FPV-drones became prevalent in 2023 and 2024, Russia’s General Staff (Russia’s most senior central body of its armed forces administration) and its subordinate military services developed doctrinal roles and parameters for their use.²⁶ Concurrently, semiofficial clubs and hobbyist groups provided concrete technical information for developing and evolving UAS capabilities. One such group, Voron FPV, released a manual on the basics of piloting FPV drones in 2023. This publication credited twenty-nine similar groups, represented by Telegram accounts, in helping develop this course curriculum.²⁷

A similar work by “Project Archangel” in 2024 provided similar information focusing on types of drones, their construction, assembly, and practical tactics, techniques, and procedures.²⁸ The same trend applies to the Ufa-based group, “Factory of Specialized Products for the Special Military Operation,” which focuses on electronic warfare-based counter-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities.²⁹ These semiofficial groups essentially serve as a feedback loop to evolve capabilities and address practical tactical and technological issues to support Russia’s war effort.

Expanding Tactical Drone Utility

Russia’s ground forces are also expanding the utility of tactical drones for a variety of battlefield functions. Russian ground forces’ chemical troops use small drones to drop both military-grade and homemade chemical munitions on Ukrainian troop clusters and trenches, while Russian engineers leverage drones to detect and deliver antipersonnel mines.³⁰ SUASs are also increasingly used as aerial mines and for intercepting larger UAVs, while small UAVs equipped with thermal imaging have improved Russia’s threshold for moving troops or otherwise fighting at night.³¹ Russia is also experimenting with larger UAVs serving as motherships to carry FPVs—either singular or multiple—farther than their traditionally short ranges.³² Small drones also support Russian logistics to its front lines by delivering rations, medicine, ammunition, small parts, and other supplies.³³

Additionally, Russia’s use of FPV drones as “sleeper drones” has increased since its scaled incorporation of fiberoptic or tethered UAVs in late 2024, where FPVs can essentially lie in a dormant or standby mode within the battlefield environment for several days, if not weeks, until activated either by the operator or external stimulus.³⁴ Similarly, multiple FPV drones can be preplaced by “diversionary-reconnaissance groups” nearby a target area such as an enemy airfield and be cued to attack targets based on preloaded coordinates using mobile cellular networks.³⁵

Dedicated Drone Troops

Beyond the proliferation of UASs within its ground forces, in late 2024, Russia announced the forthcoming establishment of a separate branch dedicated wholly to unmanned systems: the Unmanned Systems Troops. With its establishment in November 2025, this new troop branch provides oversight, integration, and standardization of Russia’s use of uncrewed systems in all domains across its armed forces.³⁶ This effort toward standardization is important considering the disparate development of capabilities during the Ukraine conflict. The Unmanned Systems Troops’ first drone regiment was highlighted in the Moscow Victory Day parade in May 2025 and is reported to incorporate over one hundred tactical UAS crews for a variety of reconnaissance and strike capabilities.³⁷ The trajectory of Russia’s Unmanned Systems Troops is to recruit 210,000 personnel by 2030.³⁸ U.S. Army Transformation and Training Command analysis reveals that the establishment of this branch means that unmanned vehicles will have dedicated training, sustainment, and representation within the Russian General Staff. This representation will enhance unmanned vehicle training and doctrine, future capability development, and integration within the armed forces branches.³⁹

A montage of Ukrainian and Russian drone testing and fielding initiatives highlights the breadth of utility that these platforms can bring to bear on the battlefield. (Photos courtesy of Wikimedia Commons and Russian media)

The Russian Ministry of Defence also established the Rubicon (alternatively, Rubikon) Center of Advanced Unmanned Technologies in late 2024, which serves as a combat test bed for new drone tactics and technology.⁴⁰ Rubicon operates at least seven specialist detachments to carry out complex, decentralized drone missions consisting largely of FPVs focusing on targeting high-value Western-supplied systems in Ukraine and playing a large part in Russia’s push to oust Ukraine from its occupied territory in Kursk since early 2025.⁴¹ Additionally, Rubicon was reportedly responsible for destroying a U.S.-supplied HIMARS in eastern Ukraine in April 2025 with a fiberoptic-controlled FPV drone.⁴²

Inculcating Drone Culture—A Whole-of-Government/Society Approach

Russia has enacted long-term solutions to develop both the current and next generation of Russian drone operators and savants. It has established thousands of specialized drone training facilities, is planning to train over 1.5 million drone operators, and is growing training cadre to over forty-two thousand drone instructors by 2030.⁴³ The majority of Russia’s private schools now receive government funding to develop curriculum to teach UAS familiarization and operations—often taught by Russian military veterans. Integrating children into drone training supports Russia’s military assimilation strategy, as many of these training sites have sprouted in Russian occupied territory in Ukraine.⁴⁴ Other educational programs inculcate school-age children as early as middle school with textbooks, simulators, and hands-on practice in drone assembly and operations, which extends into engineering schools and other technology-aligned universities within Russia.⁴⁵ As of early 2025, Russia has announced plans to establish forty-eight drone production centers by 2035 to account for its future drone requirements, with fifteen centers already operational.⁴⁶ This plan involves over four hundred domestic companies that incorporate academia, civil aviation, science and technology, and manufacturing entities to singularly focus on mass production as Russia looks to domesticize much of this process to support its future UAV production requirements.⁴⁷ This effort follows Putin’s announcement that ten times more drones were delivered to Russian troops in 2024 than the year prior.⁴⁸ There has also been a pull from private, academic, industrial, and social sectors within Russia to facilitate drone components, training, and knowledge-sharing to its frontline forces.⁴⁹

An Azimuth Check for the U.S. Army Regarding the Impact and Necessity of Drones

Ukrainian forces undergoing U.S. and NATO-supported training have repeatedly highlighted Western tactical UAS training efforts as being behind the power curve and not representative of operational realities—specifically in bottom-up adaptations and fielding initiatives, large quantities used, willingness or appetite for loss, and a lack of urgency regarding the impact UAVs are having on the front lines in Ukraine.⁵⁰ This trend seems to be changing, given a June 2025 executive order seeking to establish U.S. “drone dominance”—resembling a whole-of-government approach to leverage the transformative nature of drones.⁵¹ This order specifically states that “the Department of Defense must be able to procure, integrate, and train using low-cost, high-performing drones manufactured in the United States,” further emphasizing the speed at which this development needs to take place to ensure this dominance.⁵² Following this executive order, the DOD furthered this initiative in July by describing new policy for how combat units will be given authority to purchase, test, train, and operate small UAVs to be enacted through 2026–2027.⁵³ This announcement emphasized local innovation and organic 3D-printing capabilities within combat formations, while reclassifying these devices as consumable commodities rather than durable property.

This sentiment has resonated throughout multiple operational and strategic circles. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, Supreme Allied Commander Europe and U.S. European Command commander, acknowledged in late July that low-cost drones, loitering munitions, and combat robots are setting new standards for military operations and innovation; specifically at a pace of battlefield adaptation, development, and fielding that is measured in days.⁵⁴ Grynkewich further stated that unmanned systems are a cost-effective way to build mass on the modern battlefield and are essential to future European security that will face mass in terms of the Russian threat.⁵⁵ Similarly, drone technology iterates every two to three weeks on the Russia-Ukraine front lines compared to NATO procurement efforts that highlight more expensive end items that take years if not decades to develop, test, and field at a scale insufficient for future conflict.⁵⁶

In May 2025, Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Randy George highlighted how the speed at which technology is changing the battlefield is outpacing our large, slow, and overly bureaucratic capabilities development, procurement, and planning processes. Specifically regarding drones, the U.S. Army’s transformation in contact highlights an effort to improve this agility by injecting emerging capabilities into units to experiment with during training, exercises, and deployments.⁵⁷ Collectively, transformation-in-contact unit performance at training centers and during field exercises through 2025 highlights increased sUAS incorporation down to tactical echelons. We would argue that there is always room for improving and expanding the scale and application of these devices to better replicate assessed future conflict scenarios that the U.S. Army may find itself in—one that, regardless of location, will undoubtedly involve drones flooding the skies.⁵⁸

Conclusion—Red Skies Ahead

We need to understand these sUAS-centric battlefield realities regardless of the ongoing debates of drones impacting the evolutionary versus revolutionary character of warfare.⁵⁹ Russia, as a strategic, near-peer competitor is already expeditiously incorporating numerous lessons learned from the impact of tactical drones and is planning for its drone-supported Army of the future now.⁶⁰ The current reality and foreseeable future of sUAS technological advancements including artificial intelligence and machine learning integration, fiberoptic control, swarming, autonomy, and target identification (and their evolving counter-UAS responses and overall psychological impact on the battlefield) are all critical components to understand how the battlefield of today will evolve into the battlefield of tomorrow.⁶¹

At the root of this current reality of tactical drone usage is a fundamental understanding of their benefits being that they are comparatively cheap and dispensable; easier to scale and operate than larger weapons systems; augment and improve a myriad of other warfighting capabilities; and are easy to procure, repair, and adapt at the tactical edge.⁶² Expensive, elaborate, and niche tactical drone solutions need to be weighed against this battlefield reality in any future scenario involving Russia, where drones will be as ubiquitous as crew-served infantry weapons across its ground forces, proliferated at a scale that we are currently woefully underprepared to either envision or counter.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of War, or the U.S. government.

Notes

1. Daniel M. Gettinger, “Defense Primer: Categories of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems” (Congressional Research Service, 25 October 2024), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12797.
2. Andrii Kharuk, “Opinion: A Look at the Drone Arsenal Russia Uses Against Ukraine,” Kyiv Independent, 16 April 2024, https://kyivindependent.com/opinion-a-look-at-the-drone-arsenal-russia-uses-against-ukraine/.
3. Benjamin Jensen and Yasir Atalan, “Drone Saturation: Russia’s Shahed Campaign,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 13 May 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/drone-saturation-russias-shahed-campaign; “Russian Drone Force,” Warpower Russia, accessed 24 November 2025, https://www.warpowerrussia.com/droneforce.php.
4. Michael Marrow, “The Army’s ‘Most Challenging’ Unmanned Threat? Group 3 Drones,” Breaking Defense, 17 October 2024, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/10/the-armys-most-challenging-unmanned-threat-group-3-drones/.
5. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, The Russia Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf.
6. “The Russia-Ukraine Drone War: Innovation on the Frontlines and Beyond,” posted 28 May 2025 by CSIS, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WvSY973xWig; Valentyna Romanenko, “Putin Admits Shortage of FPV Drones Despite Daily Frontline Deliveries,” Ukrainska Pravda, 23 April 2025, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/04/23/7508798/.
7. “Why This Russian Drone Developer Isn’t Impressed by U.S. Tech,” posted May 2025 by Real Reporter, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RmfNUM2CbbM (site unavailable); David Kirichenko, “Drone Superpower: Ukrainian Wartime Innovation Offers Lessons for NATO,” UkraineAlert (blog), Atlantic Council, 13 May 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/drone-superpower-ukrainian-wartime-innovation-offers-lessons-for-nato/; Tim Zadorozhnyy, “Russia Plans to Produce 2 Million FPV Drones in 2025, Ukrainian Intelligence Says,” Kyiv Independent, 5 June 2025, https://kyivindependent.com/russia-aims-to-produce-2-million-fpv-drones-in-2025-ukrainian-intelligence-says/.
8. Charles K. Bartles, “The Evolution of Russian Unmanned Vehicle Doctrine in Ukraine,” TRADOC G-2, 17 April 2024, https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/the-evolution-of-russian-unmanned-vehicle-doctrine-in-ukraine/; Romanenko, “Putin Admits Shortage of FPV Drones.”
9. “Drones Became Dominant Killer of Russians in Ukraine: 8 Out of 10 Soldiers Killed or Wounded by UAVs,” posted 15 April 2025 by Kanal13, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fqw-C6WO3QI; Kirichenko, “Drone Superpower”; Antonio Salinas and Jason P. Levay, “Military Revolutions from the Spanish Tercio to First-Person View Drones,” War on the Rocks, 15 May 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/05/military-revolutions-from-the-spanish-tercio-to-first-person-view-drones/.
10. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo–Ukrainian War (Royal United Services Institute [RUSI], February 2025), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/tactical-developments-during-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war; Aliaksandr Kudrytski et al., “How Ukraine’s Drone Arsenal Shocked Russia and Changed Modern Warfare,” Bloomberg, 2 June 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2025-ukraine-drones-explainer/.
11. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine (RUSI, 19 May 2023), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/meatgrinder-russian-tactics-second-year-its-invasion-ukraine; Kirichenko, “Drone Superpower.”
12. Chloe Anderson, “Russian Troops Deploy New FPV Drone Swarms at Frontline,” Defense Feeds, 10 March 2025, https://defensefeeds.com/news/army-news/russian-new-fpv-drone-swarms/.
13. Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder.
14. A. V. Anan’ev et al., E”kspultatiia i primenenie belspilotnykh letatel’nykh apparatov (FPV-dronov) [Operation and use of unmanned aerial vehicles (FPV drones)] (Voenno-uchebno-nauchnyy tsentr VVS [Russian Air Force Military Educational and Scientific Center], 2023), 7
15. Max Hunder et al., “Enter the Kill Zone: Ukraine’s Drone-Infested Front Slows Russian Advance,” Reuters, 17 June 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/enter-kill-zone-ukraines-drone-infested-front-slows-russian-advance-2025-07-17/; Ukraine–Combat Footage Archive (@Bobde6), “A Ukrainian fighter from the 35th Marine Brigade shows us what it looks like to advance toward forward positions. Just minutes after disembarking from the armored vehicle, the group comes under fire from Russian FPV drones and artillery. The fighters were forced to cover several kilometers on foot under constant threat. June or early July, 2025,” X (formerly Twitter), 22 July 2022, https://x.com/Bodbe6/status/1947672094860358031.
16. Mark Cazalet, “Beyond the Drone Line: Lessons from the Drone War in Ukraine,” European Security and Defence, 9 June 2025, https://euro-sd.com/2025/06/articles/44741/beyond-the-drone-line-lessons-from-the-drone-war-in-ukraine/.
17. V. V. Selivanov, “Horizons for the Targeted Development of Military Robotics for the Period Up To 2040,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk [Bulletin of the Academy of Military Sciences] 91, no. 2 (May 2025): 176.
18. Selivanov, “Horizons for the Targeted Development of Military Robotics,” 175.
19. David Kirichenko, “Combat Medicine: A New Era in Ukraine,” Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), 16 July 2025, https://cepa.org/article/combat-medicine-a-new-era-in-ukraine/; Oleksandr Zalata, “Weapons of Terror: How the Russians Are Attacking with New Long-Range FPV Drones and Why the Armed Forces of Ukraine Cannot Respond” [in Ukrainian], Focus, 28 May 2025, https://focus.ua/uk/digital/707908-dalekobiyni-fpv-droni-u-tilu-yak-dolitayut-i-chim-zahishchatisya-zsu.
20. Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russian Drone Innovations Are Likely Achieving Effects of Battlefield Air Interdiction in Ukraine,” Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 7 August 2025, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction.
21. Grau and Bartles, The Russia Way of War.
22. Kateryna Stepanenko et al., “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, 29 November 2025,” ISW, 29 November 2025, https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025; Tsiporah Fried, “The Impact of Drones the Battlefield: Lessons of the Russia-Ukraine War from a French Perspective,” Hudson Institute, 13 November 2025, https://www.hudson.org/missile-defense/impact-drones-battlefield-lessons-russian-ukraine-war-french-perspective-tsiporah-fried.
23. V. A. Maksimov et al., Boevoe primenenie shtumovoy roty (gruppy) v nastuplenii [Combat employment of an assault company (or group) in the offense] (Komandovanie Vozduzhno-desantnykh voysk [Command of airborne troops], 2024); Album, “New FPV and Copter Type Unmanned Systems Sections.”
24. “Exclusive: Russia Combines 2S7M Malka Most Powerful 203mm Howitzer and Drones in Ukraine Combat Debut,” Army Recognition Group, 24 April 2025, https://armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/russia-ukraine-war-2022/exclusive-russia-combines-2s7m-malka-most-powerful-203mm-howitzer-and-drones-in-ukraine-combat-debut.
25. Bill Murray, “Beyond the Hype: Why Drones Cannot Replace Artillery,” Small Wars Journal, 5 May 2025, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/05/beyond-the-hype-why-drones-cannot-replace-artillery/.
26. Anan’ev et al., E”kspultatiia i primenenie belspilotnykh letatel’nykh apparatov (FPV-dronov), 7; General Staff of the Russian Federation, Pamyatka po primeneniiu FPV-dronov [A guide to using FPV drones] (General Staff of the Russian Federation, 2024), 5–19.
27. Voron FPV, “Bazovyy kurs FPV-pilotirovaniia” [Basic FPV piloting course], in Uchebnyy Kurs podgotovki po teme BPLA i pilotorovaniia FPV-dronov [Training course of UAVs and FPV drone piloting] (Voron FPV, 2023), 103.
28. Proekt Arkhangel [Project Archangel], Metodichka: vidy dronov | ustroystvo | sborka [Manual: Types of drones, design, assembly] (Proekt Arkhangel, 2024), 1.
29. V. Leronovich, REB: (Radioelectronnaia bor’ba): pamiatka voluteru i boytsu ot eksperta artillerskogo divisiona po voposam REB [EW (Electronic warfare): Guide for the volunteer and fighter from an expert of an artillery battalion on EW issues] (Fabrika Spetsizdeliy dlya SVO [Special products manufacturer for the special military operation], December 2024), 33; V. Leronovich, REB: (Radioelectronnaia bor’ba)- obnaruzhenie i padavlenie BPLA: Pamiatka-uchebnik  volunteru i boytsu ot eksperta artillerskogo divisiona po voposam REB [EW (Electronic warfare)- Detection and suppression of UAVs: Guide-textbook for the volunteer and fighter from an expert of an artillery battalion on EW issues] (Fabrika Spetsizdeliy dlya SVO, January 2025), 25.
30. Mykhailo Liuksikov, “Russians Start Using Homemade Chemical Munitions for UAVs,” 1 April 2025, Militarnyi, https://militarnyi.com/en/news/russians-start-using-homemade-chemical-munitions-for-uavs/; Mary Wareham, “Russia’s Drone-Dropped Landmines Threaten Human Lives and Hard-Won Humanitarian Protections,” Human Rights Watch, 10 June 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/10/russias-drone-dropped-landmines-threaten-human-lives-and-hard-won-humanitarian.
31. Dylan Malyasov, “Russia Develops New High-Speed Drone Interceptor,” Defence Blog, 19 March 2025, https://defence-blog.com/russia-develops-new-high-speed-drone-interceptor/; “Frontline Report: Ukraine’s Elite Forces Vanish from Russia’s Thermal Drones in Rainy, Haunting Belgorod Forests,” Euromaidan Press, 18 May 2025, https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/05/18/frontline-report-ukraines-elite-forces-vanish-from-russias-thermal-drones-in-rainy-haunting-belgorod-forests/.
32. David Axe, “Kyiv, We Have a Problem: Russia Just Reverse-Engineered Ukraine’s Drone Motherships,” Euromaidan Press, 6 May 2025, https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/06/05/molniya-drone-mothership/; Doug Richardson, “Dawn of the Drone Wars,” European Security and Defence, 19 February 2025, https://euro-sd.com/2025/02/articles/42681/dawn-of-the-drone-wars/.
33. David Hambling, “Fast Food: Russians Fly Rations into Chasiv Yar on FPV Drones,” Forbes, 27 June 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/06/27/fast-food-russians-fly-rations-into-chasiv-yar-on-fpv-drones/; Selivanov, “Horizons for the Targeted Development of Military Robotics,” 176.
34. Ivan Khomenko, “What Are Russia’s ‘Sleeper Drones’—and Why They Pose a Growing Threat to Ukraine,” United24 Media, 18 June 2025, https://united24media.com/latest-news/what-are-russias-sleeper-drones-and-why-they-pose-a-growing-threat-to-ukraine-9236; David Hambling, “Russian Pop-up Ambush Drone Tactics Could Change Warfare,” Forbes, 6 December 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/12/06/russian-pop-up-ambush-drones-use-a-tactic-that-could-change-warfare/.
35. Dobrovol’tsy [Volunteers], Spravochnik. Taktika primeneniya protivnikom FPV-dronov (v skhemakh) i sposoby protivodeystviya [Handbook on tactics of using FPV drones by the enemy (in diagrams) and methods of counteraction] (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2024), 19.
36. Kirill Rybov, “Voyska bespilotnykh sistem, ikh potential i perspectivy” [Unmanned Systems Troops: Their Potential and Perspectives], Voennoye Obzoreniya [Military review], 14 November 2025, https://topwar.ru/273641-vojska-bespilotnyh-sistem-ih-potencial-i-perspektivy.html.
37. Dmytro Shumlianskyi, “Russians Completes Formation of First UAV Regiment, Presents It at May 9 Parade,” Militarnyi, 11 May 2025, https://militarnyi.com/en/news/russians-completes-formation-of-first-uav-regiment-presents-it-at-may-9-parade/.
38. Tim Zadorozhnyy, “Russia to Recruit 210,000 Personnel for Drone Forces by 2030, Syrskyi Says,” Kyiv Independent, 6 February 2025, https://kyivindependent.com/russia-to-recruit-210-000-personnel-for-unmanned-systems-forces-by-2030-syrskyi-reports/.
39. Bartles, “The Evolution of Russian Unmanned Vehicle Doctrine in Ukraine.”
40. Daphne Wesdorp, “Russia’s New Deadly Rubikon Unit Escalates Drone War Against Ukrainian Civilians,” United24 Media, 16 July 2025, https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/russias-new-deadly-rubicon-unit-escalates-drone-war-against-ukrainian-civilians-9916.
41. Yevheniia Martyniuk, “Russia Deploys Elite Rubicon Drone Unit and Fresh North Koreans to Cut Ukraine’s Supply Lines in Kursk,” Euromaidan Press, 9 March 2025, https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/03/09/forbes-russia-deploys-elite-rubicon-drone-unit-and-fresh-north-koreans-to-cut-ukraines-supply-lines-in-kursk/.
42. Kieran Kelly, “Russia’s Elite Drone Unit Destroying Ukraine’s Precious Himars Launchers,” Yahoo News, 21 March 2025, https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-elite-drone-unit-destroying-050000889.html.
43. Elena Teslova, “Putin Says Russia Delivered over 1.5m Drones to Zone of Ukrainian Conflict Last Year,” Anadolu Agency, 23 April 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/putin-says-russia-delivered-over-15m-drones-to-zone-of-ukrainian-conflict-last-year/3546427; Sergeii Kostezh, “Russia to Train 1.5 Million Drone Operators Over 5 Years, Will Use Kids to Build Them,” Kyiv Post, 25 March 2025, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/49543.
44. Kostezh, “Russia to Train 1.5 Million Drone Operators Over 5 Years.”
45. Kostezh, “Russia to Train 1.5 Million Drone Operators Over 5 Years.”
46. “Discover How Russia Is Accelerating Its Drone Production to Intensify Its Strikes Against Ukraine,” Army Recognition Group, 30 January 2025, https://armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/russia-ukraine-war-2022/focus-discover-how-russia-is-accelerating-its-drone-production-to-intensify-its-strikes-against-ukraine.
47. “Russia to Produce over 32,000 Drones Each Year by 2030, TASS Reports,” Reuters, 6 January 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-produce-over-32000-drones-each-year-by-2030-tass-2024-01-06/; Real Reporter, “Why This Russian Drone Developer Isn’t Impressed by U.S. Tech.”
48. “Putin Says Russia Is Ramping up Drone Production Tenfold,” Reuters, 19 September 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-drone-supplies-russian-army-increase-tenfold-2024-2024-09-19/.
49. CSIS, “The Russia-Ukraine Drone War.”
50. Jamie Dettmer, “Ukraine’s Forces Say NATO Trained Them for Wrong Fight,” Politico, 22 September 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-war-army-nato-trained-them-wrong-fight/; Tyler Hacker, “How the US Army Can Close Its Dangerous—and Growing—Small Drone Gap,” Modern War Institute, 3 June 2024, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/how-the-us-army-can-close-its-dangerous-and-growing-small-drone-gap/; Jahara Matisek and William Reno, “It’s Time to Ukrainify US Military Assistance,” Modern War Institute, 10 November 2023, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/its-time-to-ukrainify-us-military-assistance/.
51. Exec. Order No. 14307, 90 Fed. Reg. 24727 (6 June 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/06/unleashing-american-drone-dominance/.
52. Exec. Order No. 14307.
53. “Inspired by Ukraine, Pentagon Turns to Mass-Produced, Low-Cost Drones for Every Unit,” Defense Express, 12 July 2025, https://en.defence-ua.com/news/inspired_by_ukraine_pentagon_turns_to_mass_produced_low_cost_drones_for_every_unit-15117.html.
54. “U.S. Supreme Allied Commander Europe Urges NATO to Adopt Ukraine Style Battlefield Innovation,” Army Recognition Group, 25 July 2025, https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2025/u-s-supreme-allied-commander-europe-urges-nato-to-adopt-ukraine-style-battlefield-innovations.
55. Frank Wolfe, “Grynkewich: Autonomous Drones, Mass ‘Essential to European Security,’” Avionics International, 10 July 2025, https://www.aviationtoday.com/2025/07/10/grynkewich-autonomous-drones-mass-essential-to-european-security/.
56. Sinéad Baker, “Drones in Ukraine Show the Way Western Militaries Are Run Is ‘Outdated,’ UK Warns,” Yahoo News, 30 May 2025, https://www.yahoo.com/news/drones-ukraine-show-way-western-155636548.html.
57. Mark Pomerleau, “U.S. Army Is Already Taking Lessons from Ukraine’s Drone Attack on Russia’s Strategic Bombers,” Defense Scoop, 2 June 2025, https://defensescoop.com/2025/06/02/ukraine-drone-attack-russia-strategic-bombers-lessons-us-army/.
58. Michael B. Kim, Full Speed Ahead: Integrating Kinetic Drones into the Combined-Arms Battalion, Land Warfare Paper No. 166 (Association of the United States Army, February 2025), https://www.ausa.org/publications/land-warfare-paper/full-speed-ahead#_edn1.
59. Kim, Full Speed Ahead; Baker, “Drones in Ukraine Show the Way”; Stacie Pettyjohn, Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine (Center for New American Security, 8 February 2024), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/evolution-not-revolution; Jakub Jajcay, “I Fought in Ukraine and Here’s Why FPV Drones Kind of Suck,” War on the Rocks, 26 June 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/i-fought-in-ukraine-and-heres-why-fpv-drones-kind-of-suck/.
60. Hacker, “How the US Army Can Close Its Dangerous—and Growing—Small Drone Gap”; Mariano Zafra et al., “How Drone Combat in Ukraine Is Changing Warfare,” Reuters, 26 March 2024, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/.
61. Cheryl Marino, “Send in the Drones,” Army Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology Magazine (Fall 2024), https://www.army.mil/article/280609/send_in_the_drones; David Kirichenko, “Ukraine’s Drone Front,” CEPA, 6 June 2024, https://cepa.org/article/ukraines-drone-front/; Francis Farrell, “As Russia’s Fiber Optic Drones Flood the Battlefield, Ukraine Is Racing to Catch Up,” Kyiv Independent, 20 May 2025, https://kyivindependent.com/as-russias-fiber-optic-drones-flood-the-battlefield-ukraine-is-racing-to-catch-up/; Kateryna Stepanenko, “The Battlefield AI Revolution Is Not Here Yet: The Status of Current Russian and Ukrainian AI Drone Efforts,” ISW, 2 June 2025, https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/battlefield-ai-revolution-not-here-yet-status-current-russian-and-ukrainian-ai-drone; CSIS, “The Russia-Ukraine Drone War”; Anthony Pino and Scott Pettigrew, “Drones Having Psychological Impact on Soldiers,” TRADOC G-2, 11 December 2024, https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/drones-having-psychological-impact-on-soldiers/.
62. Kirichenko, “Drone Superpower”; Zafra et al., “How Drone Combat in Ukraine Is Changing Warfare”; Baker, “Drones in Ukraine Show the Way”; Neil Hollenbeck et al., “Calculating the Cost-Effectiveness of Russia’s Drone Strikes,” CSIS, 19 February 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/calculating-cost-effectiveness-russias-drone-strikes; Murray, “Beyond the Hype.”

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January-February 2026