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Missing the Point

Mao’s Overlooked Lesson for the West

 

Kyle Morgan

 

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As the presence of US military forces increase in Latin America to lead the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition and in the Arabian Gulf to execute Operation Epic Fury, the time is prudent to look critically at recent military history to avoid reliving the mistakes of the past.¹ Recent history has proven that the Iranian regime, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping are quick to foment violence from nonstate actors to achieve their strategic goals. Due to this, US conflict with insurgents, saboteurs, organized crime groups, and similar organizations is inevitable. The trick for the US military will be dealing with these organizations efficiently and effectively.

No group has been more troublesome for US military objectives than insurgents. US counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have raged against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and the Islamic State for decades. These conflicts are characterized by intermittent successes and massive failures like the collapse of the US-backed government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). More recently, the US has been forced to contend with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its insurgent proxies in the form of Houthi and Hezbollah militants who have attacked international trade routes, destabilized international security, and are even responsible for international terrorist attacks.²

Due to the prevalence of insurgent threats, modern COIN is a heavily studied and analyzed topic, with major research conducted since the early 2000s.³ Despite a wealth of available knowledge, military leaders continue to overlook one critical aspect of successful COIN—incentive. The right kind of leadership is required to execute COIN operations effectively. The ability to counter an insurgency while maintaining a host nation’s security incentive is a difficult prospect. There is a delicate balance that must be achieved. Too little COIN support will not produce the desired effects, but too much will make a host nation overly reliant on foreign COIN forces. The leaders best equipped to strike this balance during COIN operations are those who are trained and educated to build insurgencies themselves, those being the leaders within US Special Forces (SF).

The famed eighteenth-century philosopher and economist Adam Smith theorized that the natural economic forces of a free market incentivize and guide members of society, like an invisible hand, toward mutually beneficial social agreements.⁴ This concept transcends economics and applies to national security. Like Adam Smith’s metaphorical invisible hand, security incentive is the force that can guide governmental elites and their citizenry toward a common goal. Thomas Hobbes famously argued that an anarchic state of nature, or a natural state of war, necessitates effective governance from a powerful, Leviathan-like force.⁵ If an outside force, like the US military, controls the anarchic state of nature in conflict zones, that controlling force becomes the de facto government, and the host-nation government loses the incentive to establish a self-sufficient security apparatus. Researchers have pointed out that COIN forces can maintain this security incentive by “retain[ing] leverage over supported governments and elites to encourage sufficient commitment and motivation” and “avoid[ing] creating perverse incentives or dependencies.”⁶ Ultimately, if the Hobbesian state of nature is controlled by an outside force, local governments will not have a security incentive to build their own Leviathan.

COIN experts have identified common aspects associated with successful COIN such as cultural astuteness, measured military response, and the quality of COIN forces.⁷ Most experts include host-nation incentive as a critical factor among these other factors. For instance, the 2015 fall of the Afghan city of Kunduz to the Taliban was credited by a special inspector general as an indication of GIROA’s overreliance on US capabilities.⁸ US airpower ultimately supported the retaking of Kunduz, further weakening GIROA incentive to build organic airpower. Similarly, South Vietnamese officials interviewed after the 1975 collapse of South Vietnam generally attributed failure to a lack of organic capability. Again, with the might of the US military in South Vietnam, there was no incentive to build local capability. Interviewers, likening the South Vietnamese government to a dying medical patient, noted, “The patient [South Vietnam] did not die of the blows he was dealt so much as of his anterior vulnerability to those blows.”⁹

Even though security incentive is included in most COIN-related literature, it is commonly overlooked. This is because most US military units are trained to defeat specific types of adversaries in armed conflict instead of bolstering partner incentive to build their own capability. Military units become hyperfocused on their tasks and overlook the importance of security incentive. Only two types of US military units are specially trained to build host-nation capabilities as opposed to combat a specific capability; these are SF teams and security force assistance brigades. Of these types of units, only SF teams are thoroughly educated and trained in Maoist insurgencies, which are built upon the key concept of incentive. These insurgencies have a history of success due to their systematic nature, robustness, and reliance on grassroots support to build local buy-in. Successful COIN necessitates a thorough understanding of successful insurgencies.

In Mao Tse-Tung’s insurgent handbook On Guerrilla Warfare, he outlines key insurgent roles that tie an insurgency’s objectives to individuals throughout society, effectively spreading insurgent incentive.¹⁰ Traditional US military units are neither trained nor equipped to combat these nuanced areas of an insurgency. US irregular warfare (IW) activities, in this case COIN, must be led by SF leaders. Modern COIN doctrine places a premium on joint capabilities and in doing so it has failed to place SF capabilities in the lead where they can be leveraged to conduct effective and efficient COIN.

The Invisible Hand

On my first deployment to Afghanistan as a psychological operations officer, I arrived for a meeting and saw a mission unfolding on the commander’s computer screens. The mood was tense, and each staff member’s desk hosted a concoction of caffeine in preparation for a long night. After the meeting, I went to the adjoining Afghan operations center. I expected to experience a similarly chaotic environment, but there was an air of calmness instead. I sat down to discover they were not focused on the ongoing mission. Instead, they were watching an Indian soap opera. In that moment, I realized it was not an Afghan war we were fighting but rather a Western one. With the full might of the West’s military-industrial complex present, there was little incentive to exert local energy. The Western mission was off the rails.

Years prior, a mentor encouraged me to read an early version of Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, the latest doctrine at the time, to combat insurgencies at scale.¹¹ The new COIN doctrine seemed to be what was needed to combat insurgent threats. The strategy’s acknowledgment of cultural complexities and its call for joint operations appeared to be the right ingredients to combat insurgencies.¹² It seemed logical that a ragtag insurgent could not defeat “culturally astute leaders” and modern forces.¹³ Also, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were still fresh in the minds of most US citizens. As such, it was politically popular to quickly bring those responsible to justice. The ability to rapidly deploy large amounts of combat power to conduct COIN activities seemed like a logical decision to many.

I was then encouraged to read John Steinbeck’s The Moon Is Down.¹⁴ In it, an occupying military takes control of a town with minimal bloodshed. Despite little violence and even some cooperation, the local population ultimately resists occupation. In the story, an accident and other events ultimately bring conflict to the occupied town. The townspeople, enduring hardship imposed by the outsiders, make the rational decision to oust their oppressors. Steinbeck’s simple lesson was that military occupation naturally incentivizes rebellion. His story illustrates the fact that foreign occupation or even the presence of foreign forces by invitation can naturally lead local populations to seek ways to secure themselves from a perceived foreign threat.

My mentor shared Steinbeck’s opinion. I was surprised to learn that some opposed the established dogma. I was also struck by the cognitive dissonance I experienced. I wanted to believe that the full might of the US military could create stability and bring justice to those responsible for the September 11 attacks. Despite this, I realized that a focus on conventional military capabilities to conduct COIN was illogical. Early and modern COIN doctrine emphasizes joint capabilities. When applied without Mao’s lessons in mind, these capabilities result in large, joint operations which require overt foreign occupation. For the ousted Taliban and their al-Qaida comrades, this type of occupation was the very thing that motivated their violent ideology.

Unfortunately, I saw Steinbeck’s lesson unfold in Afghanistan. Despite the West’s close ties to the GIROA and even with some support from regular Afghan citizens, the Taliban, al-Qaida, and the Islamic State were able to recruit fighters and oppose Western influence and the established government. This phenomenon is not unique to Afghanistan. After decades of COIN and COIN-like activities, criminal organizations and authoritarian proxies continue to disrupt global security. Mexico’s cartels spread narcoterrorism and facilitate People’s Republic of China covert activities in the Western Hemisphere.¹⁵ Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-backed violent extremist organizations (VEO) project Iranian influence throughout the Middle East.¹⁶ Russian-backed insurgents destabilize former Soviet satellite states.¹⁷ Even China has a long history of using zealous communist militias to project influence throughout Southeast Asia.¹⁸ Unfortunately, global security will be disrupted by small-scale conflict for the foreseeable future.

GIROA’s collapse proved that COIN is ineffective when there is little incentive for the host-nation government to oppose the insurgency. Military action that leverages the principles taught by Mao can be used to incentivize self-reliance. In Afghanistan, the United States deployed highly trained and well-equipped units. It even leveraged measured military activity to avoid the negative impact that commonly accompanies a heavy-handed strategy. Both approaches are considered by experts to be critical components of a successful COIN strategy.¹⁹ Despite this, the US strategy did not build an Afghan incentive to oppose the Taliban. Controlling the incentive to support an established government is a critically important component of a successful COIN strategy. Unfortunately, it continues to be overlooked. Understanding incentive on the modern battlefield is key to succeed at small-scale conflict and at thwarting “gray zone” activities like insurgent warfare.²⁰

An Afghan Lesson in Chinese Strategy

Joint doctrine defines IW as an umbrella term that includes multiple “asymmetric activities” or “methods other than military domination of an adversary,” which include, but are not limited to, COIN, unconventional warfare (UW), and foreign internal defense (FID).²¹ The distinction between these activities is made based on where they take place and their overall scale. Current doctrine states that UW takes place within a hostile nation and COIN and FID take place within permissive environments.²²

The distinction between COIN and FID is a bit more esoteric. Joint doctrine provides nearly synonymous definitions for the two activities.²³ The distinction is made based on their historical application and the scale allowed by their individual doctrine. Specifically, COIN doctrine champions the capabilities of a jointly integrated force. This is exemplified by the large forward operating bases of the Global War on Terrorism, capable of simultaneously launching airstrikes, artillery barrages, and surgical special operations raids. It’s worth noting that early and modern COIN doctrine also includes considerations for important Maoist concepts, but these considerations amount to lip service thanks to the disincentivizing effects associated with overly effective joint operations. In comparison, FID focuses on integrating US forces into “the action programs taken by another government.”²⁴ Emphasis is placed on bolstering the existing capabilities of partnered governments instead of leveraging the full might of US capabilities.

UW is the inverse activity of COIN and FID. It is essentially the opposite perspective of insurgent warfare, specifically the insurgent’s perspective. COIN and FID are insurgent warfare from the perspective of the established government. Unlike FID, COIN is often looked to as the optimal strategy over FID when host-nation governance is especially weak. Current COIN doctrine leaves room for significant conventional force participation, giving these large and overt units important roles in countering insurgencies.²⁵ On the other hand, UW doctrine highlights the importance of local forces and resources due to its limited use of conventional capabilities and focus on partner capabilities.²⁶ UW is defined as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”²⁷ UW is built upon Mao’s lessons. Specifically, UW’s focus on local capabilities and resources ensures US presence does not rob insurgents of their security incentive. This is a critically important consideration for effective COIN as well. The joint US capabilities used in the COIN and COIN-like approaches to combat the Vietcong and the Taliban insurgencies were needed because of the outside support these insurgencies received and the weakness of the US-backed governments, but joint US support was overpowered and smothered local incentive. COIN doctrine ought to take some considerations from UW. This can be accomplished if COIN is led by SF leaders who can ensure local security incentive is maintained in the face of conventional US occupation.

The overt use of conventional forces during COIN activities detracts from the legitimacy of the supported government. This ultimately fuels the same insurgency that the COIN activities are intended to combat. Maoist-centric COIN on the other hand requires local capabilities, only augmented by US capabilities, to succeed. Despite the atrocities connected to his name, Mao is quoted in US joint special operations doctrine for his groundbreaking work on guerrilla warfare and the critical role played by a local population in supporting an insurgency. This simple fact was forgotten during the US occupation of Afghanistan and can even be quantified using the results from surveys disseminated by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

UNICEF surveys are conducted throughout the world, including within Afghanistan.²⁸ UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster surveys include questions to measure governmental effectiveness. A percentage score is used to compare participating countries. Countries with the least effective governments, as perceived by local citizens, score in the lower percentile ranges.²⁹ This metric, along with US troop counts and monetary figures, can be used to perform correlation analysis that highlights the downfall of the Western strategy in Afghanistan. US troop counts and monetary figures are important because as they rise, Afghan incentive to oppose the Taliban can be assumed to decline. This inverse relationship is corroborated by the governmental effectiveness score.

US occupation had the express purpose of eliminating VEOs.³⁰ Presumably, the goal in establishing a legitimate GIROA was to fill the power vacuum before the Taliban were able to retake control. This power vacuum was created by the initial Western UW strategy that resulted in the overthrow of the Taliban. The subsequent COIN strategy failed to incentivize GIROA to oppose the Taliban after the West withdrew. As a result, the Taliban overthrew GIROA and reestablished its own style of government. Due to this, Afghanistan continues to be a haven for VEOs capable of global atrocities.³¹ Interestingly though, a fledgling GIROA had rising effectiveness scores. Those scores rose as the US military conducted SF-led UW and bolstered local incentive to oppose the Taliban.³² The scores subsequently dropped with the adoption of a COIN strategy led by non-SF leaders.³³ Figure 1 depicts spikes in governmental effectiveness when fewer US resources were expended.³⁴

The Northern Alliance, along with support from SF teams and close air support (CAS), are credited with liberating Afghanistan from the Taliban within a span of only weeks in late 2001.³⁵ Following this success, the government effectiveness scores soared, theoretically around the same time Afghan incentive to oppose the Taliban was at its highest. Despite this, US strategy shifted to a COIN strategy led by non-SF leaders and failed to establish what Mao identified as the first phase of guerrilla warfare, characterized by “organization, consolidation and preservation of regional base areas.”³⁶ This is an important shortcoming because it calls attention to how local, specifically rural, incentive to support GIROA was never solidified.

This highlights the gray area that exists between UW and COIN. It also illustrates the reason Maoist concepts are important to both. As insurgents gain legitimacy and governments devolve into insurgent groups, doctrine can become muddied, but Mao’s lessons ring true on both sides of the spectrum. Mao’s first phase is a critical step for establishing a lasting incentive to support a revolutionary government like the fledgling GIROA. According to Mao, an insurgent underground and auxiliary supporters are foundational components for a revolutionary government. These local supporters have a vested interest in the new government. Insurgencies survive on “conspiratorial, clandestine” activities like training, indoctrination, unconventional logistics, and communication networks, all of which occur in the rural periphery by local citizens.³⁷ Western involvement in Afghanistan had the opposite effect. After 2001, Western resources flowed into urban centers, leaving little benefit for rural Afghans and removing the incentive to establish organic resourcing.³⁸ Any trace of an insurgent underground was quickly crushed under the weight of Western aid. The presence of these overwhelming resources generated the opposite of intended effects. With large amounts of Western resources flowing into the country, there was little incentive to bring an end to the conflict.

This fact can be quantified using UNICEF’s survey results. As the number of US troops increased, the perception of a strong Afghan government decreased.³⁹ This negative relationship is illustrated by figure 2, which depicts a decline in effectiveness scores as the number of US troops increase.⁴⁰ The model’s coefficient of determination score, represented as r², is extremely low, which indicates that specific troop values cannot predict specific scores, but there is negative correlation that is worthy of consideration. The effectiveness scores are not a perfect representation of local incentive to oppose VEOs. Warfare is a highly complex issue with multiple affecting factors, but in the complex social environment of the region, this may be the best method to generate a quantifiable estimate of incentive.

This trend is even more evident when compared to monetary assistance. With 41 percent less statistical variance, as monetary aid increased, the perception of governmental effectiveness once again decreased.⁴¹ Like the model depicted in figure 2, figure 3 represents a model with a low r² score.⁴² This low score only suggests that effectiveness scores cannot be directly predicted by monetary assistance values. Like figure 2, the negative relationship between effectiveness scores and monetary assistance is worthy of consideration and ought to highlight the importance within COIN strategy of building host-nation and local incentives to pursue organic defense capabilities.

From the perspective of an effective COIN strategy, UNICEF’s Afghan surveys emphasize the importance of a host nation’s governmental incentive and the incentive of its citizens to oppose the insurgent movement. After 2004, this data shows the conflict in Afghanistan clearly shifted into a Western war. The data represented in figures 1–3 may even represent lagging indicators, which could reflect social shifts months or even years before the UNICEF surveys recorded those shifts. If that is the case, the data may show that the conflict shifted from an Afghan conflict to a Western one immediately after the SF-led UW strategy was abandoned. Overall, Western occupation did not cull insurgent activities; instead, it incentivized VEOs to start their own resistance efforts.

COIN and UW are two sides of the same social conflict. Whether US objectives support or oppose an insurgent movement, experts trained and educated in this type of social phenomenon ought to be at the forefront of designing an effective strategy and implementing that strategy. The same argument is true for that of FID activities. It is time to emphasize SF capabilities within COIN doctrine. Joint capabilities should continue to be included in this doctrine but only in supporting roles that adhere to Mao’s lessons. SF detachments proved in Afghanistan that joint capabilities can be effectively leveraged in modern UW, although their successes were only a step in the right direction. To capitalize on these successes, military leaders, confronted with emerging nonstate threats, must commit to Mao-inspired strategies.

The biggest hurdle to be overcome is that of military branch and unit fiefdoms. Non-SF units won dominance over specific regions and missions within Afghanistan. These individual fiefdoms then became breeding grounds for the next generation of leaders within each fiefdom. Military units specially trained and equipped to combat specific threats cannot also specialize in Mao-inspired military strategy. This is a resource intensive endeavor reserved specifically for SF units due to its heavy resource requirements. High quality, non-SF units have a place to support the execution of a COIN strategy, but they ought to do so in a way that augments SF efforts, all while adhering to Mao’s lessons. Only SF leaders are specially trained to ensure adherence to these lessons.

Due to existing cross-training and education in Mao’s lessons, non-SF special operations forces (SOF) ought to be the first line of augmenting forces to support SF-led COIN. Only in extreme cases of governmental failure should larger military units be deployed in support of COIN activities. Small, cross-functional SOF units are optimal for COIN activities due to their efficacy and efficiency. Like the inverse of the Jedburgh teams of the Second World War, cross-functional SF units can be capable of identifying and opposing covertly built resistance movements.⁴³ A preferably small, SOF approach is necessary to avoid the delegitimizing effect caused by large-scale operations. This achieves multiple requirements experts have identified as key to successful COIN, like the establishment of quality host-nation forces, measured military action, and most importantly, enforcement of positive incentives.⁴⁴ SOF reliance on local resources enforces the achievement of these COIN goals.

Psychological operations soldiers, educated in marketing strategy and analytics, should support partner forces in their efforts to influence favorable behaviors from local populations. These soldiers need to be trained to apply collegiate-level marketing and analytic knowledge in austere conditions to recruit and motivate counterinsurgents and their various support networks.⁴⁵ Civil affairs soldiers ought to train and advise auxiliary and public components to execute logistics for counterinsurgent activities and to bolster legitimate governance.⁴⁶ Finally, SF soldiers should train and advise each component of COIN to build combat power until the government is capable of defeating insurgents. SF units should avoid assisting counterinsurgents to preserve their security incentive, but assisting counterinsurgents in their fight against insurgent forces may be required. In cases involving weak partner forces or severe cases of nearly defeated partner forces, kinetically focused SOF units like Ranger platoons or even larger conventional forces could be deployed in support of SF train-advise-assist activities. The decision to do so must be made with Mao’s lessons in mind to avoid incentivizing dependence on US capabilities.

Just as joint doctrine states that UW is a “national strategic undertaking” that is not executed unilaterally, COIN strategies cannot be expected to defeat insurgencies without interagency and conventional military support.⁴⁷ Despite this fact, it is extremely important that conventional force commanders provide support to the SF mission, ideally in a secret or obfuscated manner. Air mobility and CAS capabilities provided to SF teams and their Northern Alliance partners in the early days of the war in Afghanistan are great examples of conventional capability applied during guerrilla warfare.⁴⁸ SF teams infiltrated the Taliban-controlled country via a US logistics hub located across the international border in Uzbekistan, and supporting CAS was controlled from a combined-air operations center located in Saudi Arabia.⁴⁹ The cross-border and over-the-horizon nature of this support enabled the leaders of the Northern Alliance to be the face of the insurgency. Similarly, COIN activities should be focused on bolstering the legitimacy of a host-nation government. Any US involvement must be minimized as much as possible.

Countering an Insurgency

Mao’s phases and the seven phases of UW are not irrelevant to COIN.⁵⁰ The later phases can be leveraged within partner countries with well-established governments. Counterinsurgents, whether they be well established government forces or regionally focused militias, can be used to execute the final phase of a Maoist strategy or the final “employment” and “transition” phases of UW to counter insurgencies.⁵¹ This can be accomplished by leveraging established governmental capabilities as though they are part of a resistance force.

The best example of this was the US program “Plan Colombia,” which must be considered when planning to combat adversaries located in friendly countries like the cartels in Mexico. Today, it is estimated that Mexico’s cartels control nearly a third of the country’s territory, effectively making the cartels an occupying force or even the legitimate local government in many areas of Mexico.⁵² This similar problem existed within Colombia and has been nearly irradicated thanks in large part to small contingents of US forces along with their Colombian counterparts.

These forces were able to start resistance activities at the fifth phase of UW, the “buildup” phase.⁵³ They did this by recruiting, training, and advising new Colombian police and military forces in areas that were not governed by the Colombian government but were instead controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).⁵⁴ Like the insurgents of a revolutionary government, these new Colombian forces expanded governmental legitimacy into FARC territory until the FARC lost control in those regions.⁵⁵ Had large numbers of US forces systematically cleared FARC territory, not only would the Colombian government had lost the incentive to build their own capability to do so, but the simple presence of US troops would have also fueled the FARC’s far-left ideology and recruitment.

An Appropriate Response

COIN’s biggest flaw as a military activity is the time and patience required to see it through successfully. As previously highlighted, certain political conditions may exist within the United States that make the rapid and overt capabilities of large conventional forces attractive to senior military leaders. It is important to keep in mind that COIN is a losing strategy with significantly negative political repercussions when applied in any way other than through a Maoist lens. As advisors to the democratically elected civilian leadership of the United States, senior commanders and strategists must understand these facts, which is why they should be SF leaders. The political benefits associated with Mao-inspired COIN activities outweigh the short-term political benefits of conventional military action. Senior military leaders who can articulate this distinction will be able to avoid future quagmires and ultimately save lives.

Western voters are calling for reduced defense spending. Serendipitously, the strength in Mao-inspired IW comes from its reliance on grassroot support. The most important lessons from Colombia and Afghanistan prove that excessive Western resources and blood are not required to oppose nonstate actors like those of the FARC, the overthrown Taliban, or even current nonstate actors like the pro-Russian pseudo governments in eastern Ukraine.⁵⁶ The world cannot ignore lawlessness, but the efforts of Putin and Xi to manufacture other Afghan-like quagmires cannot succeed as well. Mao-inspired IW activities can enable the United States to maintain the global order effectively and efficiently.

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Notes

1. Donald J. Trump, “Commitment to Countering Cartel Criminal Activity,” The White House, 2026, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/03/commitment-to-countering-cartel-criminal-activity/; “Operation Epic Fury,” US Central Command, 2026, https://www.centcom.mil/OPERATIONS-AND-EXERCISES/EPIC-FURY/.
2. Congressional Research Service (CRS), “Iran-Supported Groups in the Middle East and U.S. Policy,” CRS Report No. IF12587 (CRS, 26 September 2024), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12587.
3. Christopher Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies (RAND National Security Research Division, 2013), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR291z1.html; Daniel Marston et al., Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Osprey Publishing, 2010).
4. Encyclopedia Britannica, “invisible hand,” by F. Eugene Heath, accessed 6 May 2026, https://www.britannica.com/money/invisible-hand.
5. Thomas Hobbes, “Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Their Felicity and Misery,” chap. VIII in The Leviathan [Selections on the State of Nature, State of War and formation of the State] (Malmesbury, 1651), https://courses.washington.edu/hsteu302/Hobbes%20selections%20(edited).htm.
6. Paul et al., Paths to Victory, xxxv.
7. Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (US Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2018), III-30–III-31, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf.
8. Assessing the Capabilities and Effectiveness of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, 114th Cong. (12 February 2016) (statement of John Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction [SIGAR]), 13, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS06/20160212/104380/HHRG-114-AS06-Wstate-SopkoJ-20160212.pdf.
9. Stephen T. Hosmer et al., The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders, R-2208-OSD (RAND Corporation, 1978), xviii, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2208.pdf.
10. Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Pickle Partners Publishing, 2014), 7, 13, 39–46.
11. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (US Government Printing Office, 2006), https://iccforum.com/media/background/sanctions/2006-12-15-US_Army_Field_Manual-Counterinsurgency.pdf.
12. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-10, 1-22.
13. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, foreword.
14. John Steinbeck, The Moon Is Down (Pan Books, 1958).
15. Center for Preventive Action, “Criminal Violence in Mexico,” Council on Foreign Relations, updated 24 February 2026, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/criminal-violence-mexico.
16. Zachary Folk, “Iran’s Connection to Hamas, Hezbollah, The Houthis—And Now 3 U.S. Soldier Deaths,” Forbes, 28 January 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/zacharyfolk/2024/01/28/irans-connection-to-hamas-hezbollah-the-houthis-and-now-3-us-soldier-deaths/?sh=33c597ef5758.
17. Christian Edwards et al., “A Breakaway Region in Europe Is Asking Russia for Protection. Here’s What to Know,” CNN, 29 February 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/28/europe/transnistria-russia-protection-moldova-intl/index.html.
18. Song Danyang, “What Role Did China Play in a Rebel Group’s Victory in Northern Myanmar?,” Radio Free Asia, 16 January 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/conflict-01162024171117.html.
19. Paul et al., Paths to Victory, xxviii, xxix–xxxi.
20. National Intelligence Council, “Updated IC Gray Zone Lexicon: Key Terms and Definitions,” NIC-SG-2024-20319-A (National Intelligence Council, July 2024), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIC-Unclassified-Updated-IC-Gray-Zone-Lexicon-July2024.pdf.
21. “Irregular Warfare Definitions,” Irregular Warfare Proponent at United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, accessed 6 May 2026, https://www.swcs.mil/Irregular-Warfare/.
22. JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (US GPO, May 2025), II-3, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=2.
23. “Irregular Warfare Definitions.”
24. “Irregular Warfare Definitions.”
25. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, III-30, III-31; National Intelligence Council, “Updated IC Gray Zone Lexicon.”
26. JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, II-9.
27. JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, II-7.
28. “About MICS [Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys],” United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), accessed 6 May 2026, https://mics.unicef.org/about.
29. “Surveys: Afghanistan, MICS4, MICS6” Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), UNICEF, accessed 6 May 2026, https://mics.unicef.org/surveys?display=card&keys=Afghanistan.
30. Jim Garamone, “Defense Officials Explain U.S. Policy, Strategy in Afghanistan,” US Department of Defense, 12 May 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2605090/defense-officials-explain-us-policy-strategy-in-afghanistan/.
31. “What Is ISIS-K and Why Would It Attack a Moscow Concert Hall?,” Reuters, 25 March 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/why-did-isis-k-attack-moscow-theater-2024-03-23/.
32. “Surveys: Afghanistan, MICS 4, MICS6.”
33. “U.S. Foreign Assistance by Country: Afghanistan,” ForeignAssistance.gov, updated 30 April 2026, https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/afghanistan/.
34. SIGAR, What We Need to Learn: Lessons from Twenty Years of Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR, August 2021), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-S-PURL-gpo159506/pdf/GOVPUB-S-PURL-gpo159506.pdf.
35. Elizabeth M. Collins, “First to Go: Green Berets Remember Earliest Mission in Afghanistan,” US Army, 8 February 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/181582/first_to_go_green_berets_remember_earliest_mission_in_afghanistan.
36. Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 15.
37. Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 15.
38. “Poverty Reduction in Afghanistan: Despite Economic Growth, Widening Inequality,” World Bank, accessed 7 May 2026, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/publication/poverty-reduction-in-afghanistan-despite-economic-growth-widening-inequality.
39. “Surveys: Afghanistan, MICS4, MICS6.”
40. SIGAR, What We Need to Learn.
41. “Surveys: Afghanistan, MICS4, MICS6.”
42. “U.S. Foreign Assistance by Country: Afghanistan.”
43. “Jedburghs,” Office of Strategic Services, archived 9 March 2025 at https://web.archive.org/web/20250309021534/https://www.soc.mil/OSS/jedburghs.html.
44. Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 188–90.
45. JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, B-3.
46. JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, B-3.
47. JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, B-4.
48. Collins, “First to Go.”
49. Gregory Ball, “2001 – Operation Enduring Freedom,” Air Force Historical Support Division, US Air Force, 2025, https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458975/2001-operation-enduring-freedom/.
50. JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, B-6.
51. JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, B-6.
52. Center for Preventive Action, “Criminal Violence in Mexico.”
53. JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, B-6.
54. June S. Beittel, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report No. R43813 (Congressional Research Service [CRS], 2021), 29, 38–39, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43813.
55. Beittel, Colombia, 28–29.
56. Antony Blinken, “Russian Duma Resolution on Eastern Ukraine,” US Department of State, 16 February 2022, https://2021-2025.state.gov/russian-duma-resolution-on-eastern-ukraine/.

 

 

 

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July-August 2026