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Is Russia on the Path to Oblivion?

 

Robert F. Baumann, PhD

 

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Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, eminent Yale historian John Gaddis challenged scholars of political science and international relations. How is it, he wondered, that decades of theoretical study failed to anticipate the abrupt end of the Cold War?¹ Several decades later, we understand that a cluster of factors helped bring down the USSR; however, decline did not necessarily spell imminent demise. It is perfectly plausible to argue that, but for chance events such as the elevation of Mikhail Gorbachev to general secretary of the Communist Party, the Soviet state might have muddled along for many years. Of course, Gorbachev had hoped to revive the USSR, not end it.

As history would reveal, Russia’s 1990s experiment with democracy and market reform self-destructed, falling victim to political chaos, emergence of a kleptocratic oligarchy, rising ethnonationalist consciousness, and revanchist ideological currents aimed at reconsolidation of central authority. As the fifteen constituent republics of the union scattered into fifteen separate states, Boris Yeltsin assumed the presidency of the Russian Federation, which still represented the largest part demographically and territorially. For reasons too numerous and complex to discuss here, the country floundered under Yeltsin who then passed the baton to Vladimir Putin. Philosophically grounded in an almost mystical devotion to Russia’s heritage and authoritarian muscle memory, Putin has cultivated an imperial vision from the misty past predating the revolution of 1917. The project is far from finished, as evidenced in the last decade by efforts to construct an ideology guided by revisionist history, religious revival, and a militarized form of patriotism. Whether this recipe can succeed is unclear.

Russia is again beset by a range of severe problems that call its future into question. To address the Russia’s condition, it is necessary to review the most salient trends that portend trouble for the foreseeable future.

Putin’s War Paradox

A crucial piece of current context is the paradoxical impact of Putin’s war in Ukraine.

The 2022 invasion—still euphemistically referred to as the “special military operation” in Russia—has veered far from its intended course. Losses on both sides have vastly exceeded even the most pessimistic expectations of politicians and analysts.

The paradox facing Putin is that continuous conflict, though potentially ruinous to his country, has helped him cement dictatorial authority and rally at least a solid plurality of public opinion in service of a war the regime still cannot acknowledge as such but, at the same time, hyperbolically describes as an existential struggle to save Russian civilization. In taking this position, Putin has staked his authority on success. Obviously, the maximalist aim of conquering Ukraine now appears unrealistic. Still, prolonging the war can serve Putin’s political interests and offer a model for regime consolidation. To this point, Putin has blended claims of heroic successes with tales of the perpetual threat posed by Russia’s enemies.

In brief, the costs of war are exacerbating Russia’s demographic, cultural, moral, and economic difficulties. Yet, the war itself has become indispensable to Putin’s regime. It facilitates centralization of authority, a militarized economy (possible due to oil and gas revenues), and the cultural isolation of the population. In fact, the war itself has become a vital component in the emerging ideology of the regime.

The sacrifices of the war are obvious. Even before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia already suffered from declining population. Since then, the casualties have been staggering. According to an estimate by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the first four years of combat cost Russia approximately 325,000 soldiers killed and 875,000 wounded.² As reported in the Wall Street Journal, Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, commander in chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, claimed that Russian military recruiters failed to make up for attrition suffered in 2025.³

In late 2022, when it had become apparent that the war would drag on well beyond initial expectations, Putin announced a partial mobilization that sparked an abrupt exodus of combat-age males. Public protests were not widespread, but, by one estimate, roughly eight hundred thousand young men exercised their right to travel outside the country within two weeks of the announcement.⁴ The Caucasus, Central Asia, and even Europe experienced an influx of Russians looking for refuge.

The consequences transcended statistics. Many of the departees belong to the class of technological workers and innovators vitally important to Russia’s future.⁵

Further harm also resulted from the combination of swelling casualty lists and tepid morale. The procurement of domestic replacements for the front demanded huge infusions of cash and other incentives. The government scoured all available sources of manpower, including prisons and foreign migrants, enticing them with extravagant promises.

Estimates vary, but all indicate that a substantial number of foreigners have answered the call. A 2026 BBC analysis pegged the number of noncitizens in the Russian Army at twenty thousand; according to Ukrainian sources, at least eighteen thousand noncitizens have served.⁶ Based on prisoner-of-war data, thirty-seven countries, many from Central Asia, figured into that total.⁷

Even so, the primary source of manpower remained domestic. An unprecedented recruiting campaign bombarded the Moscow public in 2023 with television commercials proclaiming the virtues of military service and pledging exorbitant salaries, equivalent to $2,526 per month, for new recruits.⁸ In addition, bonuses were achievable by means of exceptional battlefield exploits such as destroying enemy weapons and vehicles.⁹ Russia’s bizarre recruiting system operated at both the federal and regional levels with many regions and locales also adding sizable bonuses to induce enlistment to help meet recruiting goals.¹⁰ The lump-sum enlistment payments typically ranged from $15,000 to $30,000, supplemented by hazardous duty pay pegged at about $2,750 per month.¹¹

Even lavish incentives were becoming insufficient by 2025. A system described as “deathonomics” (smertonomika in Russian) was sputtering.¹² This term described Russia’s attempt to balance the human toll of the war against available manpower as a supply versus demand equation. While it worked, “deathonomics” functioned as an efficient marketplace for squeezing recruits out of the population at a high but sustainable cost. Above all, the market kept public discontent at a tolerably low level since the burden of service and attendant risk of death fell upon those who chose to participate. Furthermore, the army was not under pressure to change its tactics to cut casualties. (To be sure, the war has seen many changes in tactics with the addition of drones, artificial intelligence, and so on. The casualty rates, however, have changed little.) In this instance, the system defied normal market trends in which scarce resources—soldiers—would be carefully expended. Instead, the army marched on with shockingly little regard for men at the front, even by Russian historical standards.¹³

For all the patriotic bluster from the government—the innumerable posters, articles, medals, and proclamations—there has been little effort to ensure that their heroes are well-equipped. Reports from Russia assert that amenities are minimal, and that many soldiers have had to purchase their own camouflage or body armor. One internet video advised the purchase of tampons to compress wounds.¹⁴ To add insult, there are reports that some users of dating apps are filtering out fighters from the war with the code words “No Z.”¹⁵ Still, Russia has increased support for returning veterans, in addition to the spouses of those killed in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, by 2025, population groups most likely to yield recruits, such as those with little education or poor employment prospects, were running out of willing candidates, and even prisoners were in short supply.¹⁶ Above all, the suffering outlying regions, which in many cases had yielded recruits at rates exceeding the national average, increasingly became the scene of protest and discontent.

In the autumn of 2022, the North Caucasus, particularly Dagestan, stood out as a region that balked at mobilization. Chechnya, which has in recent years enjoyed a comfortable coexistence with Moscow, witnessed small but very public antiwar rallies led by women. Similarly, protests occurred in neighboring Dagestan and Kalmykia, where the number of recruits reportedly reached 2.5 percent of age-eligible males.¹⁷ Discontent also rapidly surfaced in Bashkortostan where, among other things, residents complained that the army had mobilized men with chronic diseases.¹⁸ In economically depressed areas, military service presented an acceptable employment option, but before long, news of high casualties altered the cost-benefit analysis for many prospective soldiers.¹⁹

Protesters in Buryatia would reach that conclusion. Across the federation, minority activists sensed that racism was a factor in disproportional military recruitment.²⁰ Buryats could be excused for the perception that their recruitment has been disproportionately high; data from mid-2025 indicated that nineteen Buryats had earned the Hero of Russia medal.²¹ This exceeded the number from any other federal region. The Transbaikal Krai stood second with sixteen, followed by the minority republics of Dagestan and Sakha with fifteen.²²

Sergei Medvedev, a war historian at the University of Helsinki, observes that the Crimean Tatars, whose homeland was seized by Russia in 2014, faced an extremely high conscription rate among combat-age males, 90 percent according to one observer, as a penalty for opposing Moscow.²³ Their plight conforms to the pattern of making the periphery of the federation bear the greatest burden of the war. By comparison, the mobilization plan for Moscow early in the war was to call up sixteen thousand out of a population of fifteen million, representing a modest rate of 0.1 percent.²⁴

The Regions as a Fault Line of the Russian Federation

Issues involving Russia’s regions are crucial in any projection about Russia’s future. The term “region” applies to republics that typically associate with one or more minority populations as well as designated geographic or economic territories that make up the Russian Federation. Two of these regions are the cities of Saint Petersburg and Moscow, and in all, there are eighty-nine such constituent parts within the borders claimed by the Russian Federation.²⁵

The relationship between Moscow and the regions has evolved toward greater centralization since the 1990s, a change generally unwelcome in the latter. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Yeltsin negotiated a loose arrangement between the Kremlin and the regions. Some ethnic minority republics elected presidents and spoke in terms of their own sovereignty. Chechnya was the only one that attempted to break away altogether and waged two separatist wars with Russia before finally accepting a deal for limited autonomy.²⁶

Meanwhile, from the start of the post-Soviet era, republics such as Bashkortostan and Tatarstan successfully negotiated for broad control over their own banking, commercial arrangements, and even foreign relations (other than issues of war and peace).²⁷ The history of these two republics and their relationship with Moscow reveals much about the issues challenging the federation today.

For almost a decade, they operated with few constraints. However, at the end of 1999, Putin emerged as Yeltsin’s handpicked successor and sought to recentralize political power. This was referred to as vertical power with Moscow and Putin at the top.²⁸ In 2000, the initial step was to divide the federation into seven federal administrative districts above republics and regions in an effort to reign in local prerogatives. A new law in 2004 gave Putin a central role in determining the presidents and governors of the republics and regions.²⁹ This legislation, which contradicted the federal constitution, went forward with the public support of the presidents, such as the Republic of Bashkortostan’s Murtaza Rakhimov, who apparently did not perceive it as an immediate threat to their own positions.

Moscow also established tougher criteria for regional political parties to meet to win seats in the Duma (the federal legislature).³⁰ In 2017, the Russian Federation eliminated a another vestige of sovereignty by ending treaty relationships between Moscow and republics like Tatarstan or Bashkortostan.³¹ A 2021 law marked the final step in centralization with the elimination of the last republican presidencies. Tatarstan was the last to change its constitution to comply.³²

Yet, even as the federation extinguished most aspects of independence within the regions, it has not snuffed out ethnonationalist sentiments. The vastness of the federation, combined with bureaucratic inefficiencies, continues to make it difficult for Moscow to completely curb local initiative. Therefore, any discussion about a possible future disintegration of the Russian Federation must necessarily account for developments away from the center.

Bashkortostan remains among the most interesting of the ethnic regions. The Russian Empire began its absorption of the Bashkir tribes in the mid-sixteenth century following the conquest of the independent Tatar state Kazan in 1552.³³ Even so, the Bashkirs remained restless subjects as evidenced by participation in massive rebellions into the late eighteenth century. In 1798, the Bashkirs agreed to a deal to formally submit to the tsar while providing Russia with light irregular cavalry in exchange for broad social autonomy.³⁴ The Bashkir cavalry performed so well that they played a significant role in driving Napoleon out of the empire following his 1812 invasion.³⁵ The tradition of the Bashkirs’ military service has extended from the Great Patriotic War to the present war in Ukraine.³⁶

Although they are the titular nationality of Bashkortostan, the Bashkirs constitute only the second-largest nationality at 29 percent behind Russians at 36 percent and only slightly ahead of Tatars at 25 percent.³⁷ This is a function of Stalinist gerrymandering in 1922 that sought to avoid large ethnic concentrations. In a similar fashion, the official borders of Tatarstan excluded a significant portion of the Tatar population. In any case, Bashkortostan serves as a reasonably good case on which to base projections about the future of the federation. Its capital, Ufa, lies about 750 miles southeast of Moscow. Bashkortostan’s southern border is only about fifty miles from the Russian Federation’s southern international border with Kazakhstan. In a way, Bashkortostan belongs both to the center and the periphery of the federation. Similarly, the Bashkirs occupy a middle position in their political relationship with Moscow; they are loyal but with an independent streak.

In recent years, a controversy arose in Bashkortostan that ostensibly is about environmentalism but, in the view of the authorities in Moscow, smacks of something more sinister. That said, like the USSR, the Russian Federation distrusts any nonconformity. The confrontation began with a licensing agreement in 2018 between the Bashkir Soda Company and the state to permit mining at Mount Kushtau, one of four small limestone mountains distinctive to the region and replete with symbolism for the Bashkirs. Concerned environmental activists had ample reason to be concerned. One of the four “shihans” had already been reduced to a vast crater. Despite an official information blackout, intended to suppress public knowledge of ongoing events, the issue of protecting Kushtau from ecological damage became a cause célèbre. Activists began a campaign to inform the public, attract media attention, and organize peaceful rallies.³⁸

Central to the protests was Bashqort, an environmental group banned in May 2020 for alleged extremism. Tensions rose after the Bashkir Soda Company hired a private security group to pressure protestors to depart. Backed by military police deployed by the government, security forces violently broke up the encampment and numerous protestors were injured in the resulting fracas.³⁹ As a result, on 15 August 2020, eighty protestors were arrested; however, droves of freshly energized activists, many of them Russian, Ukrainian, or Tatar, congregated to take their places.⁴⁰ On 16 August, the protests shifted focus to the governor of Bashkortostan, Radii Khabirov, who had approved the licensing agreement. Surprising to some, Khabirov arrived and pledged to seek a compromise if protestors would disperse.⁴¹ Subsequently, as promised, he staged public meetings in Ufa; however, it did not include representatives of the former Bashqort. About thirty of the arrested protestors were sentenced to a brief fifteen-day prison term, including the former head of Bashqort, Fayil Alsynov, whose subsequent incarceration in 2024 fueled new protests.⁴²

Two surprising developments followed. On 26 August, in a televised statement Putin himself weighed in and suggested that the activists’ concerns were legitimate and called for dialog. Then, on 2 September, the government of Bashkortostan conferred protected status on Kushtau, marking a stunning success for the activists.⁴³ The fact that the protest evolved into an effective multiethnic coalition and drew from supporters of various causes was remarkable.

A subsequent round of protests in Baymak centered on Alsynov, whom the government charged with inciting anti-Russian hatred in 2023 in associated with large anti-gold-mining protests in southeast Bashkortostan.⁴⁴ This pretext for arrest has become a “go-to” play for the government to sideline social activists, as a court in 2024 sentenced him to four years in a penal institution. Khabirov publicly accused Alsynov of being a traitor by impersonating an activist and said the real intent of the protests was to incite guerrilla war.⁴⁵ As controversy grew, the courthouse in Baymak, Bashkortostan, became the scene of new, larger protests. Following a violent clash in January 2024, the court had seventy-one additional defendants to prosecute.

A year after the calamity at Baymak, Ramil Rakhmatov, commenting on the Ufa news site Prufy.ru, referred to Baymak as a “bloody wound in the soul of the people.”⁴⁶ One reason was that the republic, in particular its media and government, had not faced the truth of the episode. In contrast, the dubious official narrative held that those who left the country, such as writer/designated foreign agent Ruslan Gabbasov, were puppets of extremists, nationalists, and social media.⁴⁷

As this article goes to press, two points about the conflict in Bashkortostan stand out. First, Bashkir civil society has indeed been wounded, and a series of events that might have ended in a more conciliatory fashion appears to have triggered a governmental overreaction complete with exaggerated accusations of extremism. Second, the republic’s leadership is not prepared to face this reality, even to restore civil harmony.

Bashkortostan may not be typical, but neither is it atypical. Numerous Russian regions are suffering socially and economically. Putin’s Russia has been searching for ideological guideposts for almost a decade to guide its path forward. In similar fashion, some regions and republics have done the same.

Given the changes in federal structure, it is not surprising that in late 2020, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan published developmental strategy documents to effectively navigate the new decade.⁴⁸ The Russian Federation followed with its own strategy document in 2024. Called the “Strategy for Spatial Development of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2030 with a Forecast up to 2036,” this document outlines a scheme for federation-wide economic development with an eye toward integration among the regions and strengthening Russian civic identity.⁴⁹

In December 2020, the Bashkirs staged their sixth so-called World Kurultai, a popular ethnic congress representing all regions of the federation and fifteen foreign countries.⁵⁰ The purpose was both celebratory and strategic. The first kurultai was held in Ufa in 1995 and featured cultural events and public discussions of matters of historical, cultural, and social relevance. (I was privileged to be invited to the inaugural kurultai and found it to be an extraordinary experience.)

The sixth kurultai produced a “Strategy for the Development of the Bashkir People for 2021-2031.”⁵¹ The timing was not a coincidence in the wake of years of intermittent protests and diminishing economic and political autonomy. Moreover, the first two years of the war in Ukraine were particularly hard on Bashkortostan, which many residents believed bore more than its fair share of the burden.⁵²

Although not an official state function, the kurultai sought to establish a trajectory for the future. The nurturing of the Bashkir language, culture, and history was a point of particular emphasis. Not only are the Bashkirs a minority in their own republic, but relatively few Bashkirs are also able even to speak the Bashkir language. Accordingly, the program called for dual-language education to ensure that young Bashkirs have ample opportunity to learn their own language as well as Russian, which has long been the most widely used language of the republic.⁵³

Of course, the strategy also addressed the place of the Bashkirs within the republic and the importance of building interethnic harmony, strengthening national self-consciousness, and establishing a more effective working relationship with the Central Military District (one of five administrative regions for military affairs) concerning matters such as military recruitment.⁵⁴ This is noteworthy since some observers believe that the Bashkirs quietly identify with Ukrainians, although it is a difficult claim to substantiate.⁵⁵

Comparison of the Bashkir strategy document with that of its sister republic of Tatarstan, also published in 2020, is instructive as both have a history of independent aspirations and overlapping ethnic populations.⁵⁶ Not only do Bashkortostan and Tatarstan share a border, but the core populations are also close cousins—so close in fact, that after the fall of the Soviet Union, some Tatar nationalists were claiming that the Bashkirs were not a genuine nationality but rather just “country bumpkin” Tatars who didn’t understand their roots. The closeness of the languages reinforces such perceptions. (The author collected these observations during numerous trips to Bashkortostan in the 1990s and early 2000s.)

Possessing a distinguished history as a regional center of Islamic learning, Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, punches above its weight class in terms of political, technical, and economic influence within the Russian Federation.⁵⁷ One rare bright spot in Russian innovation is a privately organized, student-driven military technology development center situated in Yelabuga near Kazan.⁵⁸ Historically, the Tatars contributed many noted officers to the army; although the overall population is probably not as inclined toward military service as the Bashkirs. Many Moscow ministries include high-ranking Tatar officials, but historical lineage provides a partial explanation. The Tatars were among the very first major ethnic groups absorbed by Moscow in the sixteenth century. Many Tatar nobles found high positions in Russian society, and Tatars take pride in their role in building the Russian civilization.

In contrast to the Bashkir strategy, the Tatar “Strategy for Action” was an official position paper as written by the International Union of the All-World Congress of Tatars.⁵⁹ Not surprisingly, the Tatar strategy of 2020 highlighted the power of technological and economic innovation in the new political climate. A special urgency resulted from the fact that Tatarstan realized it would relinquish the title president for head of the republic in 2022. As with Bashkortostan, this signified an unmistakable diminution in status.

However, there is also considerable emphasis on the shared identity of Tatars inside and outside the republic based on their common historical-cultural heritage. As the strategy states, “We are the creators of our future. On each of us depends that which will glorify Tatar culture in the future, and which lessons we will leave for our children.”⁶⁰ It also stresses their shared intellectual tradition: “The synthesis of Arab-Moslem traditions with the ideas of European modernization gave birth to the phenomenon of Tatar philosophical thought, bridging the XIX-XX centuries as a lighthouse for the rest of the Moslem world.”⁶¹

In sum, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan reflect two different scenarios, but both put supreme focus on the preservation of their national identities in the face of new centralizing and homogenizing pressure from Moscow. Russia’s efforts to shut down nationalist expression reflect a deep-seated concern that potentially separatist forces could emerge amidst a general devolution of conditions in the federation.

The Undermining of Popular Culture

Russian popular culture has suffered immeasurably during the special military operation in Ukraine. In hard times, like those Russia is currently experiencing, popular forms of entertainment do much to maintain a sense of normalcy, boost morale, and provide an escape from grim reality. One cause of decline has been the Putin government’s attempts to snuff out any flicker of public opposition or criticism. The other has been the array of sanctions from foreign nations and international organizations forestalling Russian participation in sporting and cultural events.

On the domestic front, the first months after the invasion of Ukraine triggered vocal protests from many leaders of the cultural sphere, particularly musicians, writers, and intellectuals. Iconic rock bands such as Bi-2 (pronounced simply B2), whose fan base spanned the length and breadth of the Russian global diaspora, immediately expressed disapproval.⁶² For this, the band essentially forfeited its opportunities to perform in the Russian Federation. Instead, they toured Russian expatriate enclaves from Tashkent to Erevan and even New York to Los Angeles. Their protest ballad, “Kolybel’naia” (Lullaby), debuted in Tashkent just months after the war began and became a hit with live audiences.⁶³

Problems continue, as many young artists find themselves constrained by official policy. Recently, in late 2025, an antiwar Russian street band called Stoptime drew the regime’s wrath in Saint Petersburg after being officially charged with blocking an entrance to a metro station.⁶⁴ However, their arrests prompted other small-time musicians to follow with the same music. Meanwhile, almost the moment Stoptime was released from custody in December, the musicians departed Russia for Armenia.⁶⁵ Signs of creeping dissent continue despite strenuous government attempts to stifle all protest.

Restricted from within, Russian popular culture also faces challenges from the outside world.⁶⁶ Exclusion from the 2026 Winter Olympics prevented a powerful hockey-loving nation from competing. To make matters worse, most of Russia’s best players compete in North America’s National Hockey League, and as a result, superstars like all-time leading goal scorer Alexander Ovechkin perform chiefly for audiences in Russia’s most reviled adversary, the United States. Although the Russian government continues to enlarge restrictions on access to the global internet, avid fans are still able to follow the exploits of their players online and through the domestic sports press. Meanwhile, individual countries can allow Russian athletes to perform in exhibitions or in domestic professional leagues at their own discretion. For example, Russian figure skaters, regular contenders for world and Olympic medals, also find themselves on the outside looking in. Following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the country’s top performers were disinvited from the global touring ensembles of Olympic stars. As a result, Russia’s top coach of female skaters, Eteri Tuberidze, took her pupils on a separate tour to venues such as Tashkent, where the diaspora gave them a warm reception.⁶⁷

Assessing Russia’s Prospects

There is reason to believe that even if the Russian Federation becomes some kind of failed state, Russian civilization, understood as a Eurasian sphere of strong Russian cultural and political influence, would probably continue in a restructured form. Still, despite its risk-filled pursuit of the territorial restoration of the old empire, the Putin government has weakened the federation in many ways. Its global influence has declined overall, although this has not been a monolithic decline as oil and gas remain important. The government has demonstrated in Ukraine that it can also threaten its neighbors and can engage in conflict with ferocity that reflects indifference to costs and suffering. This menacing behavior itself can be a source of political influence; however, the war has left federation weaker demographically, economically, culturally, and psychologically.

As noted, the demographic decline is severe and bodes poorly for the future. The population, especially the ethnic Russian population, is shrinking at a shocking rate. The fertility rate has never been lower; it was recently reported to be only 1.3 compared to a replacement level of 2.2.⁶⁸ Widely circulated entreaties in social media and elsewhere to urge diaspora members to return are not attracting a powerful response. One poll indicated that 61 percent of respondents believe that no change will occur in the birth rate until the problem of housing is resolved.⁶⁹ The current trend is not sustainable, and the most immediate effects will be felt in the economy. Even sales of oil and gas cannot compensate for general stagnation and a tragic lack of innovation.

Equally concerning is that Russia’s global standing in innovation is falling. In its current predicament, innovation is crucial if there is to be any hope of building or sustaining an advanced society. A 2025 ranking of the four hundred top global universities for innovation did not list its first institution from Russia until the eightieth position—Bauman Moscow State Technical University. This university is arguably Russia’s answer to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which ranked fifth on the list for comparison.⁷⁰ Similarly, a global ranking of collective universities by country conducted in 2025–2026 puts Russian higher-education establishments in twenty-first place.⁷¹ Employing a methodology that establishes what percentage of the world’s top 2,250 universities can be found in any given country, Russia’s contribution amounted to 1.16 percent of the total, right behind Egypt (1.20), Saudi Arabia (1.29), and Pakistan (1.42).⁷² At the high end, China accounted for 17.64 percent of the world’s top universities and the United States at 12.44 percent.⁷³ A solid second tier included India (5.42), Japan (4.62), and the United Kingdom (4.13).⁷⁴ Put simply, there is no reason to expect that Russia will be a global leader based on the quality of its higher educational opportunities.

Even further indication is data indicating that since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russian filings for new patents have fallen by 25 percent.⁷⁵ According to commentary from Krizis-Kopilka, “The quantity of innovations and know-how generated by Russian science continues to fall despite the demand by authorities to replace foreign technology in the shortest possible time and establish ‘technological sovereignty.’”⁷⁶ It is noteworthy, however, that to a remarkable degree Russia’s military innovation is continuing via diffuse, private initiatives. (Whether any of this helps Russia outside the domain of military affairs remains to be seen.) To make matters worse, Russia is sending fewer students to top universities in the West, in part for ideological reasons. A list of American institutions classified as “undesirable” since the legal designation was founded in 2015 has expanded to nineteen and now includes Yale University, the University of California Berkeley, Stanford University, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.⁷⁷ Students attending these institutions risk criminal penalties upon their return to Russia. One inspiration for the law was Alexander Navalny, the late Russian human rights activist, who accepted a scholarship to Yale in 2010 in order to participate in a World Fellow program.⁷⁸

The advent of artificial intelligence (AI) as a driving force in future development offers little good news for Russia outside of purely military applications, where there is some evidence of progress during the war in Ukraine. According to data collected by the World Bank, as of 2025, Russia had only one notable AI model compared to the thirty-nine models for the United States and twenty-eight for China. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom could claim eight models and Saudi Arabia three.⁷⁹ Since Russian investment in AI is so heavily concentrated on the military, development outside that domain has slowed.⁸⁰

Repression of civil society in Russia increasingly extends to the digital realm. Internet disruptions, off-and-on bans against messaging app Telegram, and content restrictions have left the public feeling isolated. This, of course, is by design but comes with undesirable side effects; relations with the younger generation have suffered. Film director Alexander Sokurov commented, “If Russia doesn’t change how it works with young people, it faces a dead end.”⁸¹ In any case, it is unlikely that a new 2026 requirement that schoolchildren will be graded on their ideological compliance will improve the situation.⁸²

Without a doubt, corruption is one of the most corrosive factors plaguing Russian development. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index tabulated by Transparency International, Russia has a miserable score of 22 out of a possible 100 and ranks 157th out of 182 countries on the list.⁸³ By comparison, Denmark ranks first with a score of 89, and the United States ranks 29th with a score of 64.⁸⁴ Corruption certainly played a large role in the unraveling of the Soviet Union and could well do so again in the Russian Federation. Corruption reduces incentives to innovate, deeply discourages foreign investment, and has a serious demoralizing effect on society at large. Indeed, it magnifies the negative trends described above in this article.

Even more problematic is that the public actions ostensibly intended to fight corruption seem to be instruments of corruption. According to Riddle commentator Andrey Pertsev, there is widespread confusion about what is or is not legal. “New rules remain undefined,” he writes, “breeding uncertainty that disorients the elite. Recruitment for gubernatorial posts falters amid mass arrests and regional budget shortages … The vertical, reliant on regional/municipal bureaucracy and loyal local business (including election mobilization), is devouring itself.”⁸⁵

In medical terms, the general health of the country is deplorable. The spread of HIV is so pervasive that the World Health Organization reported in 2025 that more than 1 percent of pregnant women were infected over a three-year period, and antiretroviral drug supplies were insufficient to meet current needs.⁸⁶ Alcoholism also remains widespread. Life expectancy in the Russian Federation ranks 142nd in the world at 73.7 years, a mark placing it just a little below North Korea.⁸⁷ By comparison, expectancy in the United States is 79.6, which is still less than sixty-three other countries.⁸⁸ It should be noted that infant mortality in Russia has improved and now compares favorably with the United States.⁸⁹

Overall, conditions are so bad that Russia’s relentless propaganda machine can hardly keep up. Current propaganda centers the war in the context of a historical sense of national purpose. Led by the Society for Military History, Russians daily imbibe endless exhortations to patriotic sacrifice through their media. Youth organizations glorify the war, schools have unveiled new curricula describing the special military operation in Ukraine as a watershed event of existential importance, and new churches and mosques honor fallen warriors.⁹⁰ Museums dedicated to the special military operation are also opening across the country, many of them in schools.⁹¹

Another area of attention is university students, often acknowledged as being less committed to the goals of the current regime than other elements of society. The Kremlin has resolved to build what it calls a “patriotic intelligentsia” (educational elites) as part of an effort to save a lost generation. The mission to achieve this lofty end belongs to political scientist Andrei Polosin, who took on the task of developing a course in 2023 on the “fundamentals of Russian statehood.”⁹² Some describe the new subject as an updated version of something out of the Soviet past—“scientific communism,” which was a staple of higher education curricula.⁹³ Polosin has gradually evolved into a regime ideologue. He has focused on students and professors since 2022, seeking those who are inclined to cooperate with the regime. A key portion of his program focuses on the “Russian Worldview and the Values of Russian Civilization” and aligns well with articles published in the journal Ideology of the Future. These emphasize collectivism, a distinctive path, freedom and will, spirituality, and pioneering attitude, or pervoprokhodchestvo.⁹⁴

Another individual promoting “Putinism” is Aleksandr Kharichev, who leads the ideological administration for monitoring social processes. Beyond traditional values outlined in the journal Notebook of Civic Education, he stresses the defense of official values that include unity of authority and “sacralization,” or unquestioning submission to power.⁹⁵

Compass Heading for the Future

Putin has staked his leadership reputation on the special military operation in Ukraine. He urgently wants to succeed, but at least one analyst believes that defeat would not spell the fall of his regime. Mariya Omelicheva, a professor of political science at the National Defense University, has argued that a redundant system of state security bodies, political measures that mitigate the impact of the war, and domination in the domestic information arena make regime collapse unlikely.⁹⁶ She contends that past defeats help illustrate the point. For instance, Omelicheva asserts that the Soviet-Afghan War’s “role in triggering the collapse of the Soviet Union is massively overstated.”⁹⁷

This author concurs that the Soviet war in Afghanistan was only one of a complex mixture of factors, such as corruption, ideological enfeeblement, communist party gerontocracy, and economic stagnation, that contributed to regime failure. Still, analogy with the war in Ukraine requires note of a couple of significant differences. First, whereas the Soviet government did relatively little to mobilize public opinion for the Afghan war, preferring to focus attention on other topics like the 1980 Summer Olympic games, Putin took the opposite approach. (The author was in residence at Moscow University throughout the first six months of the Afghan War and in residence in Uzbekistan with extensive access to Russian media during the first year of the Ukraine war. Therefore, it was possible to directly observe the information campaigns of each regime.) After the initial invasion of Ukraine stalled, Russia’s propaganda machine quickly characterized the war as an existential struggle and a watershed event in history. Indeed, the war in Ukraine became deeply interwoven with an emerging, patriotic, history-based ideological campaign.⁹⁸ Second, Putin personally took the lead in advocating for the war, choosing not to hide behind decisions of a collective leadership. As a result, the stakes are higher for Putin than they were for Leonid Brezhnev and his successors.

An additional challenge arising from Putin’s special military operation is that the economy is now so heavily invested in the military that an end to the war could cause severe economic disruption. According to Alexander Kolyander of the Center for European Policy Analysis, “It is absolutely imperative for Russia to rely on military industry, because it [has] become the driver of economic growth.”⁹⁹ Some of the country’s poorer regions have grown dependent on income derived from the war.

As for the multilayered system of mechanisms to ensure Putin’s continuation in power, there is little doubt that no single event is likely to bring the leader down. However, one could equally argue that as the federation creeps toward exhaustion, the authoritarian system could go on without Putin. In short, defeat would probably not bring immediate regime change but might spell trouble for Putin as the principal author of failure. Yet, what’s good for Putin today might not be good for Russian governance in the long run. As outlined above, a weak center following Putin’s departure could find itself less able to command the length and breadth of the country for a variety of reasons.

A plausible scenario could be that the brittle regime is unable to hold onto the country. The Ukraine war is not the only factor pointing to regime unsustainability. Corruption, demographic decline, economic stagnation, lack of innovation (at least outside the military domain), and a war of exhaustion collectively subvert the power “vertical,” thereby, rendering the regime vulnerable to inexorable decay. Alternatively, the power structure could survive, but if it does, Russia might increasingly resemble the hermetically sealed country of North Korea or perhaps an Iranian-style theocracy.

If, as Putin constantly reminds us, Moscow’s goal is the preservation of Russia’s Eurasian civilization far into the future, emulating features of North Korea or perhaps Iran is not a viable formula. Russia’s civilizational essence cannot be found in the strongman regime or the trappings of empire but rather exists outside it. This is perhaps less well understood in the Kremlin today due to constant rewriting of history to fit the political requirements of the moment. In other words, Russians may be losing an understanding of the civilization that the regime claims to be reviving.

In the current environment, xenophobic narratives of historical grievance and struggle ever more drown out the genuine achievements of Russian civilization. Among the latest illustrations of this trend is the closure of the Gulag History Museum, which confronted the extraordinary brutality of Joseph Stalin’s purges and prison camps. In its place, the freshly minted Genocide of the Soviet People Museum that debuted in late 2024 instead focuses on national victimization by foreign enemies.¹⁰⁰ In parallel, public attacks on Nikita Khrushchev’s famous 1956 “Secret Speech” criticizing Stalin at the 20th Communist Party Congress imply that one should never criticize the head of state.¹⁰¹

Ironically, many great writers in Russian history (such as Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Ivan Krylov, Ivan Turgenev, Alexander Pushkin from the tsar’s regime and Yevgeny Zamyatin, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Mikhail Bulgakov, Anna Akhmatova, Boris Pasternak, Vasilii Grossman, and Isaac Babel from the Soviet period, to name only some) produced their finest works despite the stifling policies of the regime, whether tsarist or Soviet. Consequently, the more comprehensive authoritarian regime model to which the current Russian government aspires could in time sap the country of all cultural as well as economic vitality. The federal regions could passively resist centralizing pressure, exposing fault lines along which gradual disintegration of the federation could occur. One prediction offered by émigré journalist Alexander Nemets suggests that three viable regional agglomerations could operate independently of the center: a Volga-Urals cluster including Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, a Siberian cluster, and a Far Eastern one.¹⁰²

One of the realities exposed by Soviet collapse was that Russians living outside Russia learned to be content outside its borders. Many discovered they could experience the benefits of being Russian without the stifling atmosphere of Russian rule.¹⁰³ It is possible that Russian civilization and the current regime are not actually compatible and that the former will carry on outside the current federation framework.

Ultimately, Russia’s unhealthy state is evident in subtle ways. Anyone who surfs the internet looking at Russian news and entertainment websites will notice the constant ads beckoning Russian speakers to return to the homeland. The promise of citizenship and ready support bolsters the allure of heritage; yet, there is scant evidence that many have answered the call.

The author would like to thank Bill Bassett and Alexander DeLaRiva for reading advance drafts of this article and offering their thoughts. My thanks to Military Review’s Jeffrey Buczkowski and Beth Warrington, whose input significantly improved this article’s clarity and overall quality.

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Notes

• Editor’s note: In general, transliteration of Russian words will adhere to the Library of Congress spellings. However, where other conventional spellings are already established, those will appear in the text. In addition, Russian URLs reflect their system of transliteration.

1. John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992-1993): 5–58, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539129.
2. Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe, “Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine: Massive Losses and Tiny Gains for a Declining Power,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 27 January 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-grinding-war-ukraine.
3. James Marson and Alistair MacDonald, “As War Enters Fifth Year, Ukraine Shows Russian Victory Is Anything but Inevitable,” Wall Street Journal, 24 February 2026, https://www.wsj.com/world/as-war-enters-fifth-year-ukraine-shows-russian-victory-is-anything-but-inevitable-7898d921?.
4. Sergei Medvedev, A War Made in Russia, trans. Stephen Dalziel (Polity, 2023), 141. A later report on unrest in the regions suggested that protests may have been more significant than initially perceived. See Verstka Editorial Staff, “RANXIGS zaiavil o ‘informatsionnom davlenii’ na 45 regionov” [Russian Academy of Science announced “external information pressure” on young people in 45 regions], Verstka, 9 March 2026, https://verstka.media/v-ranhigs-zayavili-o-vneshnem-informaczionnom-davlenii-na-molodyozh-v-45-regionah.
5. Emil Kamalov et al., On the Move: Mobility, Integration, and Dynamics of Russian Emigration in 2022–2024 (OutRush, 2025), 5, https://outrush.io/report_march_2025_eng. These researchers project that up to 41 percent of the departed men worked in IT and related fields, and 7 percent started businesses in their new countries.
6. Anna Yaryna and Iryna Balachuk, “Russia Has Recruited 18,000 Foreign Nationals from 128 Countries to Fight Against Ukraine,” Ukrainska Pravda, 19 November 2025, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/11/19/8008018/.
7. Eilish Hart, “Russia Is Filling Its Ranks with Foreign Fighters and Treating Them as ‘Disposable Soldiers,’” Meduza, 22 January 2026, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2026/01/22/russia-is-filling-its-ranks-with-foreign-fighters-and-treating-them-as-disposable-soldiers.
8. Anastasia Tenisheva, “Russia’s Massive Army Recruitment Drive Appears to Deliver Few Soldiers,” Moscow Times, 8 June 2023, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/06/08/russias-massive-army-recruitment-drive-appears-to-deliver-few-soldiers-a81436.
9. Tenisheva, “Russia’s Massive Army Recruitment Drive.” Still, two and a half years later, Russia struggled to replenish its combat losses.
10. Moscow Times Reporter, “Putin’s Warrior Middle Class: How Sustainable Is Russia’s Cash-for-Recruitment Tactic?,” Moscow Times, 27 November 2024, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/11/27/putins-warrior-middle-class-how-sustainable-is-russias-cash-for-recruitment-tactic-a87149.
11. Paul Goble, “Kremlin’s Use of Monetary Stimuli to Get Russians to Serve in Ukraine No Longer Working as Well as It Did, Inozemtsev Say,” Window on Eurasia—New Series, 5 March 2026, https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/03/kremlins-use-of-monetary-stimuli-to-get.html.
12. Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Deathonomics 2.0: Why the System Is Starting to Stall,” Riddle Russia, 5 March 2026, https://ridl.io/deathonomics-2-0-why-the-system-is-starting-to-stall/.
13. Inozemtsev, “Deathonomics 2.0.”
14. Medvedev, A War Made in Russia, 140.
15. Anton Danilov, “‘No Z.’ Disappearing Filters. Soldiers in Uniform. Code Words. ‘Traditional Values.’ How War Transformed Dating in Russia,” Meduza, 17 February 2026, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2026/02/17/no-z-disappearing-filters-soldiers-in-uniform-code-words-traditional-values-how-war-transformed-dating-in-russia.
16. Inozemtsev, “Deathonomics 2.0.”
17. Marat Iliyasov and Jean-François Ratelle, “Military Mobilization in Russia’s Regions: From Protests to Submission,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 929 (Program on New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia [PONARS Eurasia], March 2025), 2, https://www.ponarseurasia.org/military-mobilization-in-russias-regions-from-protests-to-submission/.
18. Kristina Ivanova, “Kakie problemy s mobilizatsiei est’ v Bashkirii: smotrim istorii v sotssetakh [What mobilization issues exist in Bashkiria? A look at stories on social media],” Prufy.ru, 5 October 2022, https://prufy.ru/news/society/130345-zhenshchiny_obrishilis_v_sotssetyakh_na_Khabirova_iz_za_prizyva_na_mobilizatsiu_ikh_synovey_i_muzhe/. See also Anna Kuzmina, “’Ona khotela chtoby ia mobilizovalsia.’ Muzh podal na razvod iz-za pozitsii suprugi” [’She wanted me to be mobilized.’ Husband files for divorce his wife’s opinion.], Prufy.ru, 1 December 2022, https://prufy.ru/news/society/131934-ona_khotela_chtoby_ya_mobilizovalsya_muzh_podal_na_razvod_iz_za_pozitsii_zheny/.
19. Iliyasov and Ratelle, “Military Mobilization in Russia’s Regions,” 2.
20. Leyla Latypova, “Regions Calling: Why a Buryat Woman Stood Up to Russia’s Police Racism,” Moscow Times, 23 January 2026, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/01/23/regions-calling-why-a-buryat-woman-stood-up-to-russias-police-racism-a91754.
21. Paul Goble, “More Buryats Have Become Heroes of Russia in Putin’s War than Men from Any Other Federal Subject,” Window on Eurasia—New Series, 24 July 2025, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/more-buryats-have-become-heroes-of.html.
22. Goble, “More Buryats Have Become Heroes of Russia”; “Buriatia – lider strany po kolichestvu geroev rossii za period SVO” [Buryatia is the country’s leader in the number of Heroes of Russia during the Second World War], Vostok Today, 22 July 2025, https://vostok.today/53724-burjatija-lider-strany-po-kolichestvu-geroev-rossii-za-period-svo.html.
23. Medvedev, A War Made in Russia, 139.
24. Medvedev, A War Made in Russia, 139.
25. Vladimir Lysenko, “Elections Abolished for Russian Governors,” Federations 4, no. 3 (March 2005): 14, https://www.forumfed.org/pubs/V4N3.pdf. Because six of the regions, such as Crimea, are part of territory seized from Ukraine, the United States and NATO countries recognize only eighty-three regions as legitimately belonging to the federation. A modest number of countries recognize eighty-five regions based on the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Russia claims eighty-nine, although even within the Russian list some districts have disappeared and others added as part of administrative reorganization since 2005.
26. For further context, see Mark Galleoti, Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine (Osprey, 2022).
27. This observation is based on the author’s experiences and research consultations in Bashkortostan between 1991 and 2008.
28. See Nikolai Petrov, “Federalizm po-rossiiski” [Federalism: The Russian way], Pro et Contra, no. 5 (Winter 2000): 7–33.
29. Vitalii Ivanov, Putin i regiony: tsentralizatsiia rossii [Putin and the regions: The centralization of Russia] (Evropa, 2006), 199–231. For an in-depth look at the politics between Moscow and Bashkortostan from the fall of the USSR to 2005, see Ildar Gabdrafikov and Henry Hale, “Bashkortostan’s Democratic Moment? Patronal Presidentialism, Regional Regime Change, and Identity in Russia,” in Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds, ed. Osamu Ieda and Uyama Tomohiko (Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2006), 75–102, https://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no10_ses/04_gab_hale.pdf.
30. Lysenko, “Elections Abolished for Russian Governors,” 14.
31. During the period between 1991 and 2014, the author made numerous trips to the Russian Federation where he became fully acquainted with these issues. For more detailed background, see Alexander Nikitin, “Russian Foreign Policy in the Fragmented Post-Soviet Space,” International Journal on World Peace 25, no. 2 (2008): 7–31, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20752831; Edith W. Clowes, “Introduction: Centrifugal Forces? Russia’s Regional Identities and Initiatives,” Region 5, no. 2 (2016): 117–25, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24896623.
32. “Russia Moves to Abolish Regional ‘Presidency,’” Moscow Times, 15 December 2021, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/12/15/russia-moves-to-abolish-regional-presidency-a75821.
33. See Robert Baumann, “Subject Nationalities in the Service of the Tsar: The Case of the Bashkirs,” Slavic Review 46, no. 3 (Autumn-Winter 1987): 489–502, https://doi.org/10.2307/2498099. Within a few years Russia reached an understanding with Bashkir tribal leaders. Resistance would follow down the road as Russia encroached on traditional Bashkir lands. For the full story, see Alton Donnely, The Russian Conquest of Bashkiria, 1552–1740: A Case Study in Imperialism (Yale University Press, 1968). According to the official Russian statistics agency, Rosstat, Tatars are the second largest population group in the federation at 4.7 million and Bashkirs are fourth at 1.6 million. In both cases, far from all live within their respective titular republic. Also, census counts are imprecise because individuals can self-identify with one group or another for a variety of reasons. For a history of Islam in Bashkortostan, see A. B. Iunusova, Islam v Bashkortostane [Islam in Bashkortostan] (Ufimskii poligrafkombinat 1999).
34. Baumann, “Subject Nationalities in the Service of the Tsar.”
35. Baumann, “Subject Nationalities in the Service of the Tsar.”
36. For a case in point, see the interview with Col. Nikolai Tulinov at “V Bashkortostane sluzhbu uvazhaiut” [In Bashkortostan they respect service], Krasnaia Zvezda [Red star], 22 May 1998.
37. See Velvl Chernin, Bashkir-Tatar Relations Against the Background of Protests in Bashkortostan, PSCRP-BESA Reports No. 31 (Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 26 January 2024), https://besacenter.org/bashkir-tatar-relations-against-the-background-of-protests-in-bashkortostan/.
38. Karina Gorbacheva, “What Lessons Bashkiria Learnt from Kushtau?,” Realnoe Vremya, 16 September 2020, https://realnoevremya.com/articles/4765-what-lessons-bashkiria-learnt-from-kushtau; Chernin, Bashkir-Tatar Relations Against the Background of Protests in Bashkortostan.
39. Leyla Latypova, “‘Intoxicating Victory’: How Bashkir Activists Led a Historic Protest Movement at Kushtau,” Moscow Times, 16 August 2025, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/08/16/intoxicating-victory-how-bashkir-activists-led-a-historic-protest-movement-at-kushtau-a90208.
40. Latypova, “Intoxicating Victory.”
41. Latypova, “Intoxicating Victory.”
42. Latypova, “Intoxicating Victory.”
43. Latypova, “Intoxicating Victory”; Vusala Abbasova, “Russia’s Kushtau Mountain Gets Protected Status,” Caspian News, 6 September 2020, https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/russias-kushtau-mountain-gets-protected-status-2020-9-3-41/.
44. Mark Trevelyan, “Head of Russian Region Denounces ‘Traitors’ After Rare Protest,” Reuters, 18 January 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/head-russian-region-denounces-traitors-after-rare-protest-2024-01-18/; see also Leyla Latypova, “The Baymak Case: Russia’s Largest Modern Political Trial,” Moscow Times, 26 December 2024, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/12/26/the-baymak-case-modern-russias-largest-political-trial-a87355.
45. Trevelyan, “Head of Russian Region Denounces ‘Traitors’ After Rare Protest.”
46. Ramil Rakhmatov, “Baymak ostaetsia krovavoi ranoi v dushe Naroda – mnenie” [Baimak remains a bleeding wound in the soul of the people], Prufy.ru, 24 January 2025, https://prufy.ru/news/novosti/163405-baymak_ostaetsya_krovavoy_ranoy_v_dushe_naroda/.
47. Rakhmatov, “Baymak ostaetsia krovavoi ranoi v dushe Naroda.”
48. Pravitel’stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 28 dekabrya 2024 g. № 4146-r, “Strategiya prostranstvennogo razvitiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii na period do 2030 goda s prognozom do 2036 goda” [Government of the Russian Federation of December 28, 2024, No. 4146-r, “Strategy for spatial development of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2030 with a forecast up to 2036”], accessed 5 May 2026, http://static.government.ru/media/files/ttXJCZ4PNa7bmTrRgcuPwoIQA8SYR91B.pdf.
49. Pravitel’stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 28 dekabrya 2024 g. № 4146-r.
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52. Chernin, Bashkir-Tatar Relations Against the Background of Protests in Bashkortostan.
53. “Strategiia razvitiia bashkirskogo Naroda na 2021-2031 gg.” [Development strategy for the Bashkir people for 2021-2031], Vsemirnyy kurultay (kongress) bashkir [World congress of Bashkirs], 27 January 2021, https://kurultai.ru/ru/content/1898-na-sajte-vsemirnogo-kurultaya-bashkir-opublikovana-strategiya-razvitiya-bashkirskogo-naroda/.
54. “Strategiia razvitiia bashkirskogo Naroda na 2021-2031 gg.”
55. Chernin, Bashkir-Tatar Relations Against the Background of Protests in Bashkortostan.
56. “Татары: Стратегия Действия” [Tatars: Strategy of action], World Congress of Tatars, 11 January 2021, https://tatar-congress.org/ru/blog/export-blog/tatary-strategiya-deystviya/.
57. Alexei Mukhin, “V Moskve vse familii izvestnykh tatarstanskikh upravlentsev na slukhu” [In Moscow the names of Tatar families in government service are known], interview by Realnoe Vremya, 13 November 2020, https://realnoevremya.ru/articles/193598-v-moskve-vse-familii-izvestnykh-tatarstanskikh-upravlentsev-na-sluhu; Idel.Realii [Idel.Realities], “‘Tatarskoe lobbi’ v rossii: Predeli loial’nosti is samostoiatel’nosti” [Tatar lobby in Russia: The limits of loyalty and independence], Idel.Realii, 30 March 2026, https://www.idelreal.org/a/tatarskoe-lobbi-i-predely-loyalnosti-gotova-li-kazan-k-samostoyatelnosti/33714210.html; Chernin, Bashkir-Tatar Relations Against the Background of Protests in Bashkortostan.
58. Kateryna Bondar, “Russia Is Building Tomorrow’s War Machine,” New York Times, 21 April 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/21/opinion/russia-drones-putin-ukraine-war.html.
59. “Татары.”
60. “Татары.”
61. “Татары.”
62. Robert Baumann, “Russian Antiwar Music in American Perspective,” Military Review Online Exclusive, 3 March 2023, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/military-review/online-exclusive/2023-ole/baumann/.
63. Baumann, “Russian Antiwar Music in American Perspective.”
64. Francesca Ebel, “As Russia’s War Grinds On, Its Society Is Fraying,” Washington Post, 30 December 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/12/30/russia-war-ukraine-society-dissent/.
65. Ebel, “As Russia’s War Grinds On.”
66. For a good review of the responses of sports federations and the imposition of sanctions against Russia, see Jans Weinreich, “Most Olympic Federations Suspend Russian Athletes, but Officials Go Free,” Play the Game, 4 May 2022, https://www.playthegame.org/news/most-olympic-federations-suspend-russian-athletes-but-officials-go-free/.
67. The author attended this performance in fall 2022.
68. Elena Rychkova, “Demograficheskaia iama stanovitsia vse glubzhe” [The demographic pit is getting still deeper], Nakanune.ru, 3 March 2026, https://www.nakanune.ru/articles/124407/.
69. Rychkova, “Demograficheskaia iama stanovitsia vse glubzhe.”
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74. Morse and Wellington, “Frequently Asked Questions.”
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78. Trefilova, “Admission Is Now a One-Way”; “Russia Designates Stanford University as ‘Undesirable.’”
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80. See Bondar, “Russia Is Building Tomorrow’s War Machine.”
81. See Ebel, “As Russia’s War Grinds On”; for more on Sokurov and his views on censorship, see Tom Masters, “Film Director Alexander Sokurov Criticises Russian Censorship in Rare Public Rebuke to Putin,” Novaya Gazeta (Europe), 10 December 2025, https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/12/10/film-director-alexander-sokurov-criticises-russian-censorship-in-rare-public-rebuke-to-putin-en-news.
82. See “Russia’s Schools Are Introducing a Grade for Behavior—Obedience and Ideological Conformity Included,” Meduza, 22 January 2026, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2026/01/22/russia-s-schools-are-introducing-a-grade-for-behavior-obedience-and-ideological-conformity-included.
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84. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2025.”
85. Andrey Pertsev, “The Vertical Under Attack: Repression, Nationalization, and the End of Loyalty Guarantees,” Riddle Russia, 30 December 2025, https://ridl.io/ru/vertikal-pod-udarom-repressii-natsionalizatsiya-i-konets-garantij-loyalnosti/; see also Paul Goble, “Russian Elites Increasing Under Threat from Above and Below, Pertsev Says,” Window on Eurasia—New Series, 2 January 2026, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/01/russian-elites-increasing-under-threat.html; Maria Erlikh, “V 2025 godu v Rossii arrestovano 155 vysokopostavlennykh chinovnikov” [In 2025 in Russia 155 highly placed bureaucrats arrested], Novaya Gazeta (Europe), 16 October 2025, https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/2025/10/16/y-2025-godu-v-rossii-arestovano-155-vysokopostavlennykh-chinovnikov.
86. Paul Goble, “Spread of HIV in Russia Now So Widespread Makes Threat of New Outbreaks Exist in Ever Increasing Number of Country’s Federal Subjects,” Window on Eurasia—New Series, 30 May 2025, https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/05/spread-of-hiv-in-russia-now-so.html.
87. “List of Countries by Life Expectancy,” Statistics Times, 18 February 2026, https://statisticstimes.com/demographics/countries-by-life-expectancy.php.
88. “List of Countries by Life Expectancy.”
89. “Maternal Mortality Rate by Country 2026,” World Population Review, accessed 5 May 2026, https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/maternal-mortality-rate-by-country; see also Hannah Ritchie, “Russia Country Profile: Health,” Our World in Data, accessed 5 May 2026, https://ourworldindata.org/profile/health/russia.
90. “Putin’s ‘Temple of War’ Was Just the Beginning. Russia Is Building Churches, Mosques, and Even Underground Chapels to Convince the Nation That the Invasion of Ukraine Is Sacred, Meduza, 13 February 2026, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2026/02/13/putin-s-temple-of-war-was-just-the-beginning-russia-is-building-churches-mosques-and-even-underground-chapels-to-convince-the-nation-that-the-invasion-of-ukraine-is-sacred.
91. Angelina Trefilova, “‘The Real Truth’: Schools Across Russia Open Ukraine War Museums,” Moscow Times, 5 February 2025, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/02/05/the-real-truth-schools-across-russia-open-ukraine-war-museums-a87787.
92. “Spasti poteriannoe pokolenie. Poznakom’tes’ s Andreem Polosinym—politekhnologom, kotoromu Kreml’ poruchil prevratit’ rossiiskikh studentov v ‘patrioticheskuiu intelligentsiiu’” [Save the lost generation. Get to know Andrei Polosin—the political scientist, who the Kremlin entrusted to transform Russia’s students into a “patriotic intelligentsia”], Meduza, 22 May 2023, https://meduza.io/feature/2023/05/22/spasti-poteryannoe-pokolenie
93. “Spasti poteriannoe pokolenie.”
94. “Spasti poteriannoe pokolenie”; see also “An ‘Experienced Strategist’: The Man Behind Russia’s New Ideological Course for University Students,” Meduza, 9 June 2023, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2023/06/10/an-experienced-strategist; Verstka Editorial Staff, “RANXIGS zaiavil o ‘informatsionnom davlenii’ na 45 regiono”; see also Olga Voronova, “Obraz budushchego Rossii v kontekste prioritetov gosudarstvennoi politiki” [The image of Russia’s future in the context of new priorities of state policy], Ideologiia budushchego [Ideology of the future] 4, no. 19 (December 2025): 16–24, https://history.ru/files/journals/ideologiya-budushchego_19.pdf.
95. Andrey Pertsev, “A Blueprint for Building Putinism,” Meduza, 18 April 2025, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/04/19/a-blueprint-for-building-putinism.
96. Mariya Omelicheva, “Putin Is Not Trapped: Why Regime Survival Does Not Depend on Victory,” War on the Rocks, 30 March 2026, https://warontherocks.com/putin-is-not-trapped-why-regime-survival-does-not-depend-on-victory/.
97. Omelicheva, “Putin Is Not Trapped.”
98. See Robert Baumann, “Russians Are Busy Hammering Out Their ‘Ideology of the Future,’” Military Review 103, no. 5 (September-October 2023): 73–86, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2023/Ideology-of-the-Future/.
99. Alexander Kolyander, Addicted to War: Undermining Russia’s Economy (CEPA [Center for European Policy Analysis], February 2025), https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/addicted-to-war-undermining-russias-economy/; see also Thomas Grove, “Putin Has Retooled Russia’s Economy to Focus Only on War,” Wall Street Journal, 27 May 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-putin-ukraine-war-economy-7e410058?.
100. “‘Soviet Genocide’ Museum to Replace Shuttered Gulag History Museum in Moscow,” Moscow Times, 20 February 2026, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/20/soviet-genocide-museum-to-replace-shuttered-gulag-history-museum-in-moscow-a92007.
101. Paul Goble, “Putin Allies’ Attacks on Khrushchev’s Secret Speech Open the Way to Criminalization of Those Who Backed the End of the USSR, Tsipko Warns,” Window on Eurasia—New Series, 19 September 2025, https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/09/putin-allies-attacks-on-khrushchevs.html.
102. Aleksandr Nemets, “Kak zhe obstoiat seichas dela v ekonomike I finansakh RF?” [How do affairs stand in economics and finance in the RF?], Kasparov.ru, updated 17 May 2026, https://kasparov.org/material.php?id=6A06EFA1B2BB4. Originally from Russia, Nemets is a frequent contributor to the Kasparov.ru site run by former World Chess champion Gary Kasparov.
103. Paul Goble, “Kremlin Fails to Understand Ethnic Russians in Baltic Countries Won’t Move to Russia for Money Alone, ‘Kris Kopilla’ Portal Says,” Window on Eurasia—New Series, 19 September 2025, https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/09/kremlin-fails-to-understand-ethnic.html?m=0; see also The Guardian, “Балтийский парадокс: почему русские не хотят возвращаться домой даже за деньги” [The Baltic paradox: Why Russians don’t want to return home—even for money], Krizis-Kopilka, 15 September 2025, https://krizis-kopilka.ru/archives/104598.

 

 

 

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