Publishing Disclaimer: In all of its publications and products, Military Review presents professional information. However, the views expressed therein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Army University, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. government.

---

 

A Swift Answer to the Unknown

How the U.S. Army Can Seize a Central Role in Drone Warfare

 

Lt. Col. Michael B. Kim, U.S. Army

 

Download the PDF

 

On 1 June 2025, Ukraine successfully executed “Operation Spider Web,” a coordinated kinetic drone attack that damaged fifteen TU-95 strategic bombers, twenty TU-22 supersonic bombers, and at least one A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft deep in Russian territory.¹ NATO estimates the attack destroyed 34 percent of Russia’s existing missile carriers.² The drone attack was strategically significant and displayed incredible capabilities that the U.S. Army and the joint force will inevitably contend with in its next conflict. While the U.S. Army is heavily investing in drones, its focus is incorporating drones into existing formations and developing counterdrone capabilities. While kinetic drones are an additional tool for combined arms maneuver warfare, merely adding kinetic drones to existing units is insufficient. Training is challenging enough as soldiers struggle to become competent in their warfighting specialty alone; burdening them with additional requirements can have a counterproductive effect. For the U.S. Army to truly integrate kinetic drones in a meaningful way, it must have a robust strategy that transforms force structure and concentrates capabilities for commanders to mass on the battlefield.

In the next war, if the U.S. Army desired to mass five hundred kinetic drones on an objective, what formation would execute the task? The central question is this: What is the best institutional mechanism to meaningfully integrate new kinetic drone technologies at scale? Does the Army continue to integrate drone capabilities into existing warfighting formations or create a new formation or branch (i.e., a drone corps) to effectively adapt to this new type of warfare? The Army possesses an organic formation whose purpose optimally aligns with the unique capabilities of small and medium unmanned aircraft systems (UAS; reconnaissance and kinetic) and can serve as a prototype for a drone corps. Therefore, this article argues that establishing a separate drone corps within the U.S. Army is premature due to numerous unknowns. Instead, it recommends transitioning the division cavalry (DIVCAV) squadron into a drone-centric element capable of supporting both U.S. Army and joint force operations. The unique nature of the historic DIVCAV can seamlessly integrate drones into its warfighting functions, providing a critical capability to both the U.S. Army and the joint force. This article advocates leveraging the DIVCAV as a prototype for a future drone corps, demonstrating its suitability for large-scale drone integration and providing recommendations for force structure and capability development.

Transformation in Contact: DIVCAV versus Drone Corps

Observing the growing prevalence of drones on the modern battlefield and acknowledging the requirement for specialized training, the House Armed Services Committee included a provision in the House-passed H.R. 8070 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025) to establish the “Drone Corps” as a new branch of the U.S. Army.³ The bill focuses on small UAS (those with gross takeoff weight of less than fifty-five pounds) and medium UAS (those weighing between fifty-five and 1,320 pounds).⁴ While the provision did not make it into the final version of the National Defense Authorization Act, it displays a clamoring from senior leaders to meaningfully address this emerging technology. Multiple partner nations, most notably Ukraine, have established drone operations commands and separate branches in their military. The U.S. Army must consider both whether a separate branch is necessary and whether now is the appropriate time for implementation.

Ukraine established their Unmanned Systems Forces in 2024 as a separate military branch to oversee drone strategy and deployment across the armed forces. The Unmanned Systems Forces’ mission is to gather experiences, formalize them into tactical and operational guidelines, and disseminate them across the formation.⁵ It is important to note that the largest drone formations in the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) are battalions and regiments.⁶ A primary example is the Da Vinci Wolves Battalion, a dedicated drone formation deploying new tactics and focused on sharing lessons learned across the UAF. Of note, this battalion works directly with unmanned systems manufacturers, allowing them to iterate and adjust quickly to meet tactical requirements.⁷ It is clear that the UAF established its separate branch to develop drone strategy, effectively deploy drones across their Army, formalize lessons learned for quick dissemination, and integrate and iterate drone technologies quickly to meet tactical requirements. While applicable to other nations, is it the optimal course of action for the U.S. Army?

Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Randy George introduced the “transformation in contact” concept on 5 February 2024, which sets initiatives for the Army to integrate capabilities into formations in less than twenty-four months.⁸ However, the U.S. Army does not need a separate branch at this time to integrate drone emerging technologies at scale. Instead, the Army must create a drone-centric formation that serves as a prototype to meaningfully integrate drones on the battlefield. Several key arguments oppose the immediate establishment of a U.S. Army drone corps. First, unlike many of our partner nations, the U.S. Army already possesses robust institutional mechanisms for research and development, experimentation, and acquisition for drone technologies. Creating a drone branch for this purpose creates overlap and bureaucratic redundancies at great fiscal cost. Second, it is unclear if small and medium drones solely enhance the way the U.S. Army conducts land warfare or if it fundamentally changes the nature of war. In essence, are drones more akin to the machine gun or the bomber? To determine this, it is prudent to test, experiment, and iterate this emerging technology before establishing a separate Army branch. Lastly, the strength of the U.S. Army’s is its ability to conduct combined arms maneuver. The ability to coordinate and synchronize warfighting functions sets the U.S. Army apart from every other military. Drone technologies at the tactical and operational levels are not the be-all and end-all but a component of the combined arms formula. The U.S. Army does not require new concepts or strategies for drones; rather, it needs iterative tactical and operational implementations. The purpose of small and medium UAS is clear: reconnaissance and direct fire. The U.S. Army already possesses an operational force structure specifically focused on these two key tasks—DIVCAV. A drone-integrated DIVCAV provides a force structure to experiment with transformation during operations and serves as a prototype for a potential drone corps.

A Perfect Fit: Why DIVCAV Is the Optimal Drone Force Structure for the U.S. Army and Joint Force

DIVCAV was unique as the only battalion-level structure in the Army with organic air and ground maneuver assets. Air-ground integration is in its DNA. Published in 1996, Field Manual (FM) 17-95, Cavalry Operations, was the central doctrine for DIVCAV squadrons and armored cavalry regiments.⁹ In 2004, the Army initiated the casing of colors for all DIVCAV and armored cavalry regiment units as it shifted from a division-centric model to the brigade. As the Army shifts back to a division-centric model, it has made attempts to bring back the DIVCAV but has struggled to find the exact fit. Historically, the cavalry was created to serve as a “flexible multipurpose force” and to perform long-range reconnaissance and security for commanders.¹⁰ FM 17-95 stated that the “cavalry serves as a catalyst that transforms the concepts of maneuver warfare into a battlefield capability. As maneuver is the essence of U.S. fighting doctrine, for it to be successful, the commander must have a high degree of situation awareness and must reduce the enemy, terrain, and friendly unknowns of the battlefield to fight effectively and to operate within the enemy’s decision cycle.”¹¹ As the U.S. Army continues to integrate drones, it should consider DIVCAV as the primary formation for drone-centric operations.

As the Army focuses on large-scale maneuver and maintaining relevance in the joint force, a drone-integrated DIVCAV serves both operational requirements. Even back in 1996, doctrine specifically stated that the DIVCAV must be capable of supporting a division, corps, or joint task force.¹² To this end, the DIVCAV force structure encompassed organic capabilities for most warfighting functions, particularly sustainment and command and control, making them “ideally suited [for force packaging]” in support of joint task force operations.¹³ The benefits for U.S. Army division are clear—a drone-centric DIVCAV exercises its primary historical roles to provide fresh information (terrain and enemy), provide reaction time and maneuver space (security through direct fire), preserve combat power, restore command and control, facilitate movement, and perform rear operations.¹⁴ Furthermore, a drone-centric DIVCAV can also meet core Army requirements in the joint fight. Former Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth identified five core tasks for the Army in the Indo-Pacific if war were to break out: (1) serve as the “linchpin” service by establishing and protecting staging areas and joint operating bases for air and naval forces, including providing air and missile defense; (2) provide logistics for the joint force, especially in terms of secure communications; (3) provide command-and-control capacity; (4) use ground-based long-range fires to interdict enemy missiles, suppress enemy air defense, and provide counter fires against mobile enemy targets; and (5) provide counterattack capability with ground combat forces.¹⁵ A drone-centric DIVCAV cleanly aligns with these core tasks making them a force multiplier for the joint force. The table depicts the alignment of tasks and roles.

Cavalry organizations in the U.S. Army have transitioned through numerous platforms throughout its history, reflecting technological advancements and evolving battlefield requirements. From the mounted era with horses to the mechanized era with armored platforms and helicopters, the cavalry has served as an integrator of technology to provide effective reconnaissance and direct fire capability to the commander. The DIVCAV can continue this legacy by serving as the primary integrator for unmanned systems.

Recommendations

Recommendation #1: Establish a drone-centric DIVCAV. To effectively implement this critical capability, the U.S. Army should concentrate its efforts on integrating drones at scale, iterating quickly, and innovating rapidly. A battalion-sized element represents the optimal institutional mechanism for executing this strategy while minimizing costs to the force. One can take a historic task organization of a DIVCAV and replace the air cavalry elements with drone entities (see figure 1).

The cavalry troops have the capabilities to conduct reconnaissance and security operations and integrate drone assets. They possess armored platforms with sufficient firepower to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. Cavalry troops are the eyes and ears of the commander, able to operate in any weather condition, 24-7. The drone troops will be comprised of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and attack drone platoons. These platoons include carrier platforms and operators. They will provide a robust drone capability that can be massed on the battlefield. The support and headquarter troops will provide command and control and logistics to sustain operations. The integration of technologies will be critical: hybrid-electric engines for stealth, firepower to win the close fight against enemy armor, integration of artificial intelligence, unmanned combat platforms, and unmanned carrier platforms (both ground and air). The DIVCAV can serve both the U.S. Army and the joint force as a force package that can link strategic and operational fights.

Recommendation #2: Use DIVCAV as the prototype for the drone corps. The use of kinetic drones in Ukraine and the Gaza strip demonstrates the need for expert operators. The use of drones, particularly kinetic drones, requires a special skill set that must be trained at all echelons. In order to create a drone-centric DIVCAV, the Armor Branch should establish the 19X military occupational specialty (drone operator). The Armor Branch has processes built within its institution to serve as a prototype for the drone corps. Figure 2 provides a construct through the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) framework to recommend a course of action.

• For doctrine, the Maneuver Center of Excellence can update the DIVCAV field manual for a drone-centric fight, keeping the key objectives of the DIVCAV mission set.
• For organization, the DIVCAV can serve in a light, medium, or heavy capacity, providing drone capabilities to all divisions.
• For training, current training areas and gunnery ranges (which accommodate both armored platforms and attack aviation) can be utilized to train DIVCAV formations.
• Materiel solutions can be sourced through the Transformation and Training Command and the acquisition process. A close relationship between DIVCAV and these entities provides an effective process to iterate and innovate at tactical and operational levels. DIVCAV can become the formation in which “transformation in contact” is implemented.
• For leadership and education, like the Scout Leaders Course, a Drone Leaders Course can be created to provide training to junior officers. Furthermore, drone capabilities can be introduced in Basic Officer Leaders Course and Maneuver Captain’s Career Course. The Army can continue to train cavalry leaders in its core functions of reconnaissance and security. There is little difference between what the U.S. Army would demand from a cavalry officer and what it would demand of a drone officer. The reconnaissance and security mission, supplemented with drone capabilities, is no different. Leaders must understand combined arms maneuver and how they set conditions for ground maneuver forces.
• For personnel, the Armor Branch can create a new 19X military occupational specialty to fill DIVCAV requirements. The institutional mechanism and schoolhouse exist to integrate new soldiers into the DIVCAV formation. 19Xs would go through Maneuver Basic Training and then transition to a 19X-specific AIT focused on drone warfare and concepts.
• Lastly, the Armor Branch and Maneuver Center of Excellence can transition facilities to create space in their existing institutions to accommodate this new initiative.

Recommendation #3: DIVCAV as an essential joint force multiplier. The Indo-Pacific is primarily a maritime theater. To that end, the Navy and Air Force have the largest roles to play in the region. With the joint force focused on the Pacific, the U.S. Army’s role is focused on establishing and protecting bases, providing theater-level logistics support, and integrating command-and-control functions. The two specific roles in an Indo-Pacific conflict would be to provide logistics and air defense for forward airfields and to provide shore-based antiaccess capabilities.¹⁶ Lt. Gen. J. B. Vowell, former U.S. Forces Japan commander, postulated a question in 2023: Who “gains and maintains contact” in the first island chain?¹⁷ He postulates that it is not the Navy or Air Force:

The PRC’s sophisticated munitions and deep magazines represent a grave threat to locally based maritime and air assets, whose best defense is dispersal beyond weapons engagement range before the missiles start flying. The Marine Corps, while a highly capable tactical ground combat force, will certainly be challenged by any scenario in the theater to command and control at scale, project deep fires, protect joint force formations, and manage the significant sustainment activity that any expanded confrontation would require. Only the Army has these capabilities, plus the “staying power” that comes with man-made cover, underground facilities, and modern concealment techniques.¹⁸

The advantage of a drone-centric self-contained DIVCAV is its ability to be organic to division operations but also to integrate seamlessly under a joint force land component commander or as an entity whose capabilities are directly integrated by the joint fires element. DIVCAV can significantly contribute to the U.S. Army’s objective of serving as the joint force’s primary “contact layer.” To remain relevant in the Indo-Pacific theater, the U.S. Army should leverage its unique capabilities to organically integrate air-ground maneuver through this drone-centric warfighting element. The joint force does not possess this capability. Any combined arms maneuver soldier knows that integrating an “attached” capability or tool is difficult and cannot be done on the fly. The advantage of a drone-centric DIVCAV is the organic relationships, partnerships, and training that exist in the organization. The simple diagram in figure 3 depicts capabilities a drone-centric DIVCAV can provide to joint operations.

The joint force faces unique strategic challenges across the Indo-Pacific, primarily geographic challenges to force projection (time, distance, and limited land areas from which to operate) and challenges from peer adversaries. In this context, the DIVCAV can provide unique, supporting, and reinforcing contributions to the joint fight.

Recommendation #4: Establish DIVCAV as the primary partner for allied kinetic drone integration. The joint force will likely fight its next conflict alongside allies, many of whom are rapidly developing drone-centric formations. The U.S. Army can leverage DIVCAV in combined training and operations as a dedicated hub for drone-related collaboration. The People’s Liberation Army’s investment in drones is well documented. Drone technology in general is proliferating at incredible scale—one can observe the immense capabilities during holiday celebrations where drone formations fill the sky in perfect unison. U.S. allies are also investing prolifically, integrating lessons learned from the Ukrainian conflict.

The Republic of Korea Army has established a drone operations command and provides a contrasting study on implementation to that of the U.S. Army. “Before our drone operations command was established, each branch of our armed forces had their own individual drone units,” Maj. Gen. Lee Bo-Hyung said during a panel at the 2024 Unmanned System Exhibition and Conference in the United Arab Emirates. “However, since every branch has their own area of responsibility, when it came to operational and strategic deployments, there were some limits as to how we conducted our missions,” he added.¹⁹ The Drone Operations Command is based in Pocheon, near the inter-Korean border, and falls under the control of the Defense Ministry and the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman. It is their first joint combat unit to be composed of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel.²⁰ The Polish Ministry of National Defense launched three initiatives to integrate drones into its armed forces: (1) establishing the Unmanned Aerial Systems Forces on 1 January 2025 to oversee their strategy; (2) creating a central drone center at the Air Force Institute of Technology, codenamed “Szerszen”; and (3) pledging nearly $55 million (USD) to accelerate these efforts.²¹

In May 2025, the British Army presented its new doctrine, described as the “20-40-40” strategy with a shift from heavy mechanized forces to flexible drone warfare-oriented formations.²² Based on lessons from the Ukrainian conflict, the new concept proposes to turn the British Army into an unmanned, autonomous structure, where 80 percent of operations is by drones.²³ Israel is a pioneer of drone technology and has been using them extensively (both intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and kinetic) in the Gaza Strip.²⁴ Combined drone training is being conducted with allied nations (as recently observed during Freedom Shield 2025 between the United States and the Republic of Korea).²⁵ With both drone technology and drone carrier (air, land, and sea) technologies growing at a rapid pace, DIVCAV can serve as the primary interface with partner nations.

Conclusion

While selecting the right drones to integrate into the Army is important, the decision on how they will be massed on the battlefield is even more significant. The U.S. Army force structure requires a dedicated unit to concentrate drone capabilities. It must shift from an additive approach to one that is concentrated, agile, and sustainable. The DIVCAV construct provides a unique framework for the Army to rapidly integrate, iterate, and innovate in this area. A drone-centric DIVCAV—a mobile and flexible organic drone-ground element capable of operating in all weather and terrain—represents a unique warfighting capability that can seamlessly support both division and joint task force operations. This force element is more than capable of massing “five hundred kinetic drones on an objective.”

FM 17-95’s description of DIVCAV’s role in joint task force operations, written twenty-eight years ago, can be copied and pasted to current doctrine: “Cavalry units, during war or stability and support operations, may operate as part of a joint task force to conduct reconnaissance and security missions. The combined arms nature and command-and-control structure inherent to cavalry organizations make them ideally suited to force packaging in support of various types of operations ranging from nation assistance to peacekeeping and peace enforcement.”²⁶ The DIVCAV construct provides a unique framework in which the U.S. Army can integrate, iterate, and innovate rapidly. A drone-centric DIVCAV, as a mobile and flexible organic drone-ground entity that can provide capabilities in all-weather and all-terrain, is a unique warfighting capability that can seamlessly support division and joint task force operations.

---

Notes

1. Serhiy Sydorenko and Valentyna Romanenko, “NATO Official Hails Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web as Highly Successful and Estimates Russian Aircraft Losses,” Pravda Ukraine, 4 June 2025, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/06/4/7515618/.
2. Sydorenko and Romanenko, “NATO Official Hails Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web.” 
3. Andrew Feikert and Daniel M. Gettinger, “The U.S. Army’s Modernization Strategy: Background and Issues for Congress,” Insight No. IN12382 (Congressional Research Service, 18 June 2024), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12382.
4. Feickert and Gettinger, Proposal to Create a U.S. Army Drone Corps, 2.
5. Kateryna Bondar, “Why Ukraine Is Establishing Unmanned Forces Across Its Defense Sector and What the United States Can Learn from It,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 19 November 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-ukraine-establishing-unmanned-forces.
6. Neil Hollenbeck, “Transform for Drones,” War Room, 9 January 2025, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/transform-for-drones/.
7. Bondar, “Why Ukraine Is Establishing Unmanned Forces.”
8. James E. Rainey, “Continuous Transformation: Transformation in Contact,” Military Review Online Exclusive, 22 August 2024, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2024-OLE/Transformation-in-Contact/.
9. Field Manual (FM) 17-95, Cavalry Operations (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996 [obsolete]).
10. FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, 1-2.
11. FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, 1-2.
12. FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, 1-15.
13. FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, 1-15.
14. FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, 1-4.
15. C. Todd Lopez, “For Contingencies in Indo–Pacom, Army Will Serve as ‘Linchpin’ for Joint Force,” U.S. Department of Defense, 12 January 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2858596/for-contingencies-in-indo-pacom-army-will-serve-as-linchpin-for-joint-force/.
16. Wilson Beaver, The Army’s Role in the Indo–Pacific (Heritage Foundation, 12 March 2024), https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-armys-role-the-indo-pacific.
17. J. B. Vowell and Kevin Joyce, “The U.S. Army Can Be the Joint Force’s Contact Layer in the Pacific,” U.S. Army Pacific, 12 January 2023, https://www.usarpac.army.mil/Our-Story/Our-News/Article-Display/Article/3267143/the-us-army-can-be-the-joint-forces-contact-layer-in-the-pacific/.
18. Vowell and Joyce, “The U.S. Army Can Be the Joint Force’s Contact Layer in the Pacific.”
19. Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo, “South Korean Official Touts Fledgling Drone Command as Global Model,” Defense News, 22 January 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2024/01/22/south-korean-official-touts-fledgling-drone-command-as-global-model/.
20. Gosselin-Malo, “South Korean Official Touts Fledgling Drone Command.”
21. “Poland Unveils $55M Drone Warfare Push Amid Russian Threat,” Defense Mirror, 23 July 2023, https://www.defensemirror.com/news/39911/Poland_Unveils__55M_Drone_Warfare_Push_amid_Russian_Threat.
22. “Drones as 80% of the Army: UK Is Radically Changing Its Military Doctrine Based on Ukraine’s Experience,” Defense Express, 28 May 2025, https://en.defence-ua.com/events/drones_as_80_of_the_army_uk_is_radically_changing_its_military_doctrine_based_on_ukraines_experience-14666.html.
23. “Drones as 80% of the Army.”
24. Kerry Chávez and Ori Swed, “A Case Study on Integrating Tactical Drones: Israel,” Modern War Institute at West Point, 28 June 2024, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/a-case-study-on-integrating-tactical-drones-israel/.
25. “Freedom Shield: Drones,” U.S. Forces Korea, accessed 19 September 2025, https://www.usfk.mil/What-We-Do/Exercises/Freedom-Shield/videoid/965539/dvpTag/drones/.
26. FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, 1-15.

 

 

 

Back to Top

March-April 2026