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Forward Presence at What Cost?

Rethinking U.S. Armored Brigade Rotations in Europe

 

Lt. Col. Ryan C. Van Wie, U.S. Army

 

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In 2013, the United States deactivated its last permanently based armored brigade combat team (ABCT) in Europe, ending a persistent seventy-year U.S. armored presence on the continent. The withdrawal was short-lived. Following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO concerns over Russian aggression grew, accentuated by an imbalance of forces in the Baltics favoring Russia and wargames that forecasted Russia seizing the Baltics’ capitals within three days of an invasion.¹ To deter Russia and reassure NATO allies, the U.S. military began continually rotating an ABCT and support units to eastern Europe.² As opposed to the permanent ABCTs, these rotational ABCTs and their enablers deployed from their U.S. bases every nine months, bringing seven thousand troops and thousands of vehicles to join the fifty-six thousand U.S. troops still permanently assigned to Europe.³ Following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) expanded these rotations to include a second ABCT, an infantry brigade, a sustainment brigade, and a division headquarters—twenty thousand rotational troops in total.⁴ In 2025, despite significant Russian losses in Ukraine and force ratios that now favor NATO in the Baltics, most of these additional U.S. rotational forces remain in Europe.⁵

After a decade of ABCT rotations in Europe, a debate has emerged over the costs and benefits of rotational forward presence. Justifying their continued need, EUCOM commander Gen. Christopher Cavoli testified to Congress that ABCT rotations are important to deter Russian aggression, reassure vulnerable NATO allies, and enhance NATO interoperability.⁶ Other rotational advocates support this perspective, highlighting how the rotations enhance deploying units’ military readiness and exercise U.S. strategic mobility (i.e., sealift, ports, rail networks).⁷ However, several researchers have challenged some of these claims and instead focus on the ABCT rotations’ significant costs. Recent studies find that rotational forward presence provide limited reassurance for vulnerable allies, do not guarantee U.S. resolve in conflict, have limited deterrent value, cost far more than U.S. forces permanently based abroad, and degrade soldier and family well-being.⁸ These divergent perspectives present a puzzle as to the ultimate utility of EUCOM ABCT rotations.

Do the costs of sustaining rotational forward presence in Europe justify the benefits? I explore this question and seek to accomplish three objectives in this article. First, I survey recent research that demonstrates that U.S. allies are more reassured by permanent, rather than rotational, forward presence. Second, I analyze force ratios in the Baltics using updated assessments on NATO and Russian force posture. These suggest that a Russian invasion of NATO is unlikely in the next few years given its vast losses in Ukraine, calling into question rotational forces’ near-term deterrent value. Third, I evaluate if ABCT rotations enhance rotational unit readiness. Applying U.S. Army readiness standards, I find that ABCT rotations consume deploying units’ operational readiness and reduce U.S. armored structural readiness. These findings show key claims used to justify EUCOM ABCT rotations do not withstand scrutiny, and I close by arguing that an ABCT permanently based in Europe would maximize benefits and minimize costs for the United States. Better understanding the downstream impacts of rotational forward presence provides important insights as the United States rebalances limited means against vast international commitments.⁹

I begin by describing the evolving U.S. force posture that led to ABCT rotations. I next review rotational advocate claims and recent studies that cast doubt on some of those claims. I then analyze two untested claims, that ABCT rotations deter Russia and that they build readiness. I conclude by considering how a permanently based ABCT in Europe would maximize benefits while minimizing costs for the United States.

U.S. Rotational Forward Presence: Background and Competing Perspectives

In the thirty-five years since the Cold War ended, U.S. military end strength (total troops in service), force structure (number of units and capabilities), and permanent overseas presence (number of troops serving abroad) all declined.¹⁰ While the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan brought modest increases to overall end strength and force structure, as these wars wound down, end strength and force structure declines resumed. By 2024, the U.S. military end strength had dropped to 1939 levels.¹¹ Despite these declines, U.S. overseas security commitments expanded, and the U.S. military sought to deter numerous adversaries and reassure vulnerable allies. Lacking the end strength to permanently station large numbers of troops abroad as it had during the Cold War, the United States increasingly relied on deploying rotational forces to vulnerable locations. The figure captures these trends.

As the U.S. military increased its rotational forward presence around the world, demand for U.S. Army ABCTs increased from U.S. geographic combatant commanders. ABCTs have been found to have a stronger deterrent effect compared to infantry brigade combat teams, and other evidence suggests similar trends in terms of reassuring allies.¹² For the last decade, the U.S. Army has provided ABCTs to support three continuous rotations, in Kuwait since 2012 and in Europe and South Korea since in 2015.¹³ The South Korean ABCT requirement was adjusted to a Stryker brigade in 2022, just after the second rotational ABCT was added to EUCOM.¹⁴ Thus, in 2025, there are still three ongoing ABCT rotations (two in Europe and one in Kuwait).

A decade of ABCT rotations in EUCOM has led to divergent perspectives regarding the utility of this policy. Rotational ABCTs are still in Europe due to continuing requests for forces from EUCOM, so reviewing that organizations’ justifications for rotational forward presence is a helpful starting point to capture the advocates’ position. In 2023, Cavoli’s testimony to Congress stated, “The U.S. persistent rotational presence in the Baltic States demonstrates U.S. commitment to defending our Baltic Allies, supports NATO’s deterrence and collective defense posture in the Baltic Sea Region … enhance[s] interoperability, and demonstrate[s] the operational capability of combat credible forces.”¹⁵ Several studies support this perspective, emphasizing rotational forces’ important role in enhancing interoperability across NATO as these deployed units facilitate and participate in a host of collective training exercises with NATO militaries that might not ordinarily train with U.S. troops.¹⁶ Other studies demonstrate how ABCT rotations strengthen both U.S. and European strategic mobility capabilities by routinely exercising these previously underutilized transportation nodes (e.g., strategic sealift, ports, rail networks).¹⁷ Senior EUCOM leaders highlight how ABCT rotations strengthen theater and military readiness by providing EUCOM with fully trained formations that maintain high-level readiness during their nine-month rotations.¹⁸

However, other research highlights ABCT rotations’ high costs and challenges advocate claims that ABCT rotations reassure allies, deter Russian aggression, and build ABCT readiness. John Deni analyzes ABCT rotations’ financial costs, finding that it costs U.S. taxpayers $70–$135 million more each year to rotate one ABCT to Europe as opposed to permanent basing.¹⁹ In other work, Deni finds the increasing operational tempo imposed by rotating ABCTs has strained the Army’s armored force, harming deploying unit retention, soldier wellness, and military family stability.²⁰ Evidence reaffirming this claim is found in recent media accounts of increased mental health challenges within the Army’s armored force, including statistical analysis finding that ABCTs have the highest suicide rates of any formation in the U.S. Army.²¹ Others challenge the claim that rotations build ABCT readiness and instead argue that these deployments are readiness consumers.²² Researchers employing surveys and elite interviews find that rotational forward presence has limited reassurance value for vulnerable NATO allies who are more reassured by U.S. permanent presence.²³ Finally, others suggest in recent commentary that Russia’s significant losses and ongoing focus on its Ukraine invasion significantly decrease the likelihood of Russia invading NATO in the next few years, calling into question rotational ABCT’s deterrent value.²⁴

In summary, only two of the rotational benefits claimed by advocates enjoy uncontested support—enhanced NATO interoperability and strengthened strategic mobility. Several studies have challenged the claim that rotations reassure vulnerable allies. Advocate claims of strengthened deterrence and ABCT readiness are challenged in commentary, but these propositions remain formally untested, so I proceed by analyzing these claims against available evidence.

Deterring What? Reassessing NATO-Russia Force Ratios in the Baltics

Rotational advocates regularly cite the deterrent value of forward ABCTs to justify their continued presence in Europe. However, evaluating deterrence efficacy is difficult because deterrence occurs in an opponent’s mind, and only access to the most sensitive policy deliberations might provide the necessary insights to measure if deterrent policies were working as intended.²⁵ Lacking access to such evidence in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, it is not possible to directly evaluate how U.S. ABCT rotations in Europe influenced Putin’s thinking. However, leveraging core insights from deterrence research and available data on the current NATO-Russia balance of forces, we can make some limited inferences about rotational ABCTs’ deterrent value.

Credibility and capability are key pillars underpinning deterrence.²⁶ Simply put, a state must have the credibility to follow through on a coercive threat paired with the requisite military capability to back it up. Bypassing the long-running debate over how to best measure the capability needed to deter, I rely here on a simple heuristic known as the “3:1 rule of thumb,” which suggests that a potential attacker can overcome some of the defense’s natural benefits and increase the probability of offensive success by massing forces so that there are three attackers to every one defender.²⁷ Conversely, those seeking to deter a potential attack might ensure they have sufficient forces to deny an aggressor a three-to-one advantage.

Applying this logic, I focus on the NATO-Russia balance of forces in the Baltics because this region has long been the greatest concern for NATO defense planners worried about a rapid Russian fait accompli that might cut the three Baltic states off from the rest of NATO at the forty-mile-wide Suwalki gap.²⁸ Given Moscow’s aggressive foreign policy and reliance on brute force (e.g., Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014), its threats toward NATO are certainly viewed as credible. However, while the pre-2022 imbalance of forces justified the presence of a rotational U.S. ABCT, post-2022 Russian force posture adjustments and its significant losses in Ukraine have led to a more favorable balance for NATO.²⁹ To capture these evolving force postures, the table compares force ratios between NATO and Russian forces in the Baltics before and after the Russian invasion (2021 to 2025).³⁰ In 2021, Russia enjoyed a clear advantage over NATO forces in the Baltics, as highlighted in the red text in the “2021 force ratio” column. Across key land capabilities, NATO faced significant shortcomings, falling far below the levels suggested by the 3:1 rule of thumb, leading to descriptions of NATO’s presence as a threadbare “trip-wire” that would struggle to withstand a Russian invasion.³¹

However, Russia significantly reduced its military capabilities bordering NATO to build its initial invasion forces in 2022.³² These Russian capabilities bordering NATO were further reduced after Russia’s invasion turned into a costly war of attrition.³³ Estimates suggest Russia lost as many as one million troops, four thousand tanks, eight thousand armored personnel carriers, and 1,900 artillery pieces over the last three years.³⁴ As of 2025, approximately six hundred thousand Russian troops are fighting in Ukraine out of a total active military of 1,134,000 troops, or 53 percent of the entire Russian military.³⁵ Recent Finnish and Estonian military intelligence reports provide the latest estimates of Russian military capability in the newly formed Leningrad Military District (which replaced the now-disbanded Western Military District) bordering the Baltics, Poland, and Finland.³⁶

Over the last three years, NATO also significantly expanded its enhanced forward presence (EFP) battlegroups in the Baltics, adding troops and capabilities.³⁷ These revised estimates of reduced Russian military capabilities bordering NATO suggest that the alliance has a significantly stronger position today than it did four years ago. Across measured land capabilities, NATO enjoys sufficient capability to defend itself, and Russia lacks the 3:1 force ratio needed to increase the likelihood of offensive success. Zooming out one level, NATO accessions of Finland and Sweden further complicate Russian aggression.

Some security experts suggest that NATO forces are qualitatively superior to Russia in terms of training and technology.³⁸ Thus, by not weighting for NATO qualitative advantages, the raw quantitative comparison in the table might be biased in Russia’s favor. Despite this potential bias, these cautious estimates still show a NATO advantage. These findings should lead to skepticism regarding the deterrent claims put forth by rotational advocates. Some suggest that if Russia quickly ends its war in Ukraine, it could quickly reposition forces near the Baltics and take advantage of its wartime economy to rapidly rebuild capabilities.³⁹ However, analyses by Russian security experts suggest that Moscow would likely need several years to rebuild its conventional military before it could again seriously threaten NATO members with a conventional invasion, with most estimates centering around 2028–2030.⁴⁰ Another critique might suggest that removing U.S. rotational forces from the Baltics would significantly disadvantage these NATO force ratios. However, with the enlargement of EFP battlegroups and Baltic militaries, U.S. capabilities make up small portions of each capability, and withdrawing these would not meaningfully drop NATO’s force ratios below the 3:1 ratio in any category. Additionally, the ongoing deployment of a permanent German armored brigade to Lithuania will further strengthen NATO’s denial force posture in the Baltics.⁴¹

None of this analysis suggests that Russia does not pose a serious threat to its NATO neighbors. Russia’s despicable actions in its ongoing invasion of Ukraine showcase Moscow’s brutality and its reliance on military aggression as a key pillar of its foreign policy. Moreover, Russia can be expected to routinely challenge NATO’s collective resolve in the gray zone, as was witnessed with its September 2025 drone incursion into Polish and Romanian airspace, or frequent offensive cyber operations against the alliance.⁴²

However, this analysis does show that the likelihood of a conventional Russian invasion of NATO allies will be quite low in the coming years because Russian simply lacks the capability. With this analysis, it is not totally clear that U.S. rotational forces are needed to deter a Russian land invasion of vulnerable NATO allies, at least in the next several years. I next analyze how U.S. rotational forward presence impacts the readiness of deploying ABCTs.

Building or Consuming Military Readiness?

Rotational advocates claim that EUCOM ABCT deployments build deploying unit readiness through access to enhanced training with NATO allies. While it is undeniable that ABCT rotations provide unique opportunities to enhance NATO interoperability, rigorous analysis has not yet explored how rotations fully impact all dimensions of military readiness. This section considers the distinction between structural and operational readiness and analyzes how ABCT rotations impact both, employing U.S. Army readiness criteria to study how rotations impact deploying ABCT operational readiness and how a decade of rotations has impacted U.S. Army armored structural readiness.

Richard Betts’s 1995 Military Readiness distinguishes between two forms of military readiness: operational and structural readiness.⁴³ Operational readiness is focused on “readiness for when” and a military’s ability to rapidly deploy combat-capable forces. Conversely, structural readiness captures “readiness for what” and is focused on a military’s ability to provide needed forces at scale for a contingency out of its existing force structure.⁴⁴

Applied to this case, ABCTs deploy to EUCOM after completing a preparatory training cycle and remain in Europe for nine months with elevated operational readiness levels. Conversely, a notional ABCT permanently based in Europe would experience cyclical variation in operational readiness, with lower readiness levels as new personnel rotate in at the start of a new training cycle and gradually higher levels thereafter. Therefore, advocates ostensibly endorse EUCOM ABCT rotations for providing forces with high operational readiness levels. However, as will become clear below, EUCOM ABCT rotations negatively impact ABCT structural and operational readiness.

ABCT operational readiness. The U.S. Army measures operational readiness by analyzing every unit’s assigned personnel, equipment maintenance, supply availability, and training readiness and then assigning a numerical score from 1 (most ready) to 5 (least ready) to each category.⁴⁵ Those scores are then aggregated into a composite readiness score (C1 through C5), which measures the operational readiness for U.S. Army units at the battalion-echelon or above. The claim that rotations build readiness is largely focused on deployed ABCT’s enhanced training opportunities. However, all four factors that underpin operational readiness must be assessed to understand if rotations build readiness. As will become apparent, rotational forward presence negatively impacts three of the four factors (maintenance, personnel, and supply) and offers limited benefits for training readiness.

Before delving into the four unit-level factors underpinning U.S. Army operational readiness, it is helpful to consider a typical ABCT calendar for one complete rotation cycle. Most ABCTs will have eighteen months of training at their U.S. bases before deploying to EUCOM for a nine-month rotation.⁴⁶ This training includes a progression from individual, crew, and collective tasks, ultimately culminating with a one-month ABCT rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, where the ABCT becomes “certified” to deploy. Additionally, ABCTs must complete requisite annual and semiannual vehicle services, along with packing and shipping requirements to deploy to and from NTC and Europe. Combined this leads to a twenty-seven-month period for one complete ABCT train-up and rotation.

It typically takes three months to deploy an ABCT from its U.S. base to forward operating sites in EUCOM: one month to pack containers, prepare vehicles for shipment, complete agricultural sanitization requirements; and two months for equipment transit (rail from base to U.S. port, shipping time, rail from European port to base).⁴⁷ Packing and shipping to and from NTC normally requires at least three weeks, both to depart and return to their home base. Thus, in a twenty-seven-month cycle, a conservative estimate suggests that seven to eight months are exclusively consumed by packing and shipping to deploy to and from NTC and Europe. Thus, for 25 percent of the twenty-seven-month calendar, the ABCT is consumed by packing and shipping, and no collective training or maintenance can occur. Further, M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles require five weeks to perform annual services and three weeks for semiannual services. Across two years, this means an ABCT should be performing four months of dedicated maintenance.⁴⁸ According to Army training doctrine, completing an ABCT’s training progression before the NTC rotation requires five months to go through required, individual, crew, and collective tasks (section, platoon, company, and battalion).⁴⁹

• Maintenance: four months (five weeks annual and three weeks semiannual per year)
• NTC rotation: one month
• NTC pack-out and shipping: 1.5 months (three weeks to deploy, three to redeploy)
• ABCT prerotation mandated training: five months
• Annual block leave: two months (thirty days each year)
• EUCOM pack-out and shipping: six months (three months to deploy, three to redeploy)
• EUCOM rotation: nine months (includes one month to pack equipment to redeploy)
• Total: 28.5 months

Thus, only accounting for required maintenance, training, NTC rotations, pack-out and shipping times, and the EUCOM rotation fully requires an ABCT to complete 28.5 months of activities in a complete twenty-seven-month rotation cycle. Because NTC and EUCOM rotations are fixed, along with their supporting deployment requirements, an ABCT’s maintenance, home-station unit training, and soldier down-time (weekends and annual leave) typically suffer.⁵⁰ This calendar alone highlights the severe costs imposed by ABCT rotations.

The eighteen months of home-station training is not fixed, and some units might enjoy more time (i.e., if a National Guard ABCT assumes a Kuwait rotation, this enables active ABCTs more time between rotations). Unfortunately, there are always many more tasks to accomplish than the baseline requirements highlighted above. For example, months of red-cycle taskings (i.e., installation support during which units are assigned a host of details like base gate-guard duty) and equipment modernization (fielding and training) occur during the eighteen months preceding a EUCOM deployment. Additional iterations of tank and Bradley gunneries must be completed as new crew members arrive later in the training cycle. Moreover, many ABCTs complete two NTC rotations before their EUCOM deployment, adding an extra two months to an already packed calendar. This crushing operations tempo explains an ongoing mental health crisis in which ABCTs suffer from suicide rates that are twice as large as other Army formation types.⁵¹ Beyond those human costs, this tempo consumes ABCT operational readiness across the four criteria measured by the U.S. Army (supply, personnel, maintenance, and training).

Supply. Supply readiness is determined by each unit’s adherence to U.S. Army tables of organization and equipment, which are regularly updated as new equipment is introduced and outdated equipment is retired. To adhere to changes in the tables and ensure the highest supply readiness, units frequently laterally transfer equipment to other units, turn in equipment that is outdated or unserviceable, and receive new equipment. Lateral transfers and turn-ins become increasingly challenging for ABCT’s battalions deployed to forward operating sites in the Baltics and Poland. For example, the rotational battalion in Lithuania is over five hundred miles away from its supporting supply warehouse, requiring a multiday convoy operation with burdensome diplomatic clearances across multiple countries.⁵² Moreover, deployed ABCTs are not authorized to turn in their outdated and unserviceable equipment to European-based warehouses. These realities combine to degrade the supply readiness of deploying ABCTs.

Personnel. ABCTs rarely deploy with their full complement of personnel since soldiers in rotational units must still complete mandatory schools, receive and recover from needed medical care, conduct permanent changes of station, and address family emergencies back home. In fact, most ABCTs arrive in Europe with only 80 percent of their authorized personnel.⁵³ These personnel challenges impact a deployed ABCT’s daily operations, and these shortages directly limit the ABCT’s maintenance and training readiness.

Maintenance. ABCT rotations are detrimental to unit maintenance due to three primary factors: the lengthy process to deploy to and from U.S. bases, disaggregated ABCT operations in Europe that challenge timely parts delivery and equipment repair, and condensed and deferred home-station maintenance. First, it typically takes two months from when an ABCT’s equipment departs its U.S. base until it arrives at its European forward operating site, with similar times for redeployment. This is problematic because these complex vehicles require routine preventive maintenance (normally conducted weekly) and these long shipping times result in degraded maintenance readiness upon delivery, both for deployment and redeployment. Second, EUCOM’s resupply and distribution network is immature where the disaggregated ABCTs’ forward battalions operate, challenging timely equipment repair.⁵⁴ Many of the ABCTs’ battalions are based at austere forward operating sites that lack access to maintenance facilities needed to maintain a fleet for long-term operations.⁵⁵ Because permanent U.S. bases with robust maintenance capabilities and spare parts warehouses are concentrated in Germany, the ABCT battalions operating in Poland and the Baltics face significant challenges in receiving repair parts in a timely manner and in evacuating equipment that require higher-level maintenance support.

Finally, as previously highlighted, annual and semiannual services are often the bill-payers that enable the packed twenty-seven-month training calendar. Personnel shortages often include mechanics, leading to prolonged service windows or underresourced services that are rushed and lack leader focus. A decade’s worth of ABCT rotations and years of rushed and/or deferred maintenance leads to a snowballing effect that challenges ABCT maintenance readiness. This trend was highlighted in a recent Government Accountability Office report investigating declining maintenance readiness rates, finding that “none of the Army vehicles in our review met the mission capable goal of 90% in FY 2024. Five of six selected Army ground combat vehicles did not meet mission capable goals in any fiscal year from 2015-2015.”⁵⁶ While the GAO report does not cover ABCT rotations in its report, considering that five of the six Army vehicles in the review are exclusively in ABCTs, the decade of declining maintenance readiness seems clearly linked with the last decade of rotational ABCT rotations.

Training. Training readiness is touted as the main benefit for rotating ABCTs since units located away from home and families have limited training distractions and excellent opportunities to train with NATO allies.⁵⁷ While this is true, further examination reveals uneven training benefits across a deployed ABCT. First, there are only a limited number of training ranges that facilitate live collective maneuver training in Poland and the Baltics, and there is high intra-NATO competition for those ranges between host-nation forces, NATO EFP battlegroups, and U.S. rotational units.⁵⁸ Second, deployed ABCT personnel shortages hinder training quality since it is impossible for units to attain their highest training proficiency without at least 90 percent of authorized personnel present for training.⁵⁹

Third, Eastern European training ranges suffer from risk-averse policies that prevent U.S. rotational units from meeting the collective live-fire requirements needed to attain the highest readiness ratings. For example, U.S. Army training requirements stipulate that maneuver units (infantry, armor, cavalry, etc.) must complete collective live-fire exercises during day and night.⁶⁰ However, night live-fire range restrictions in Poland and the Baltics often mean that to-standard night live-fire certifications are not possible in accordance with U.S. training standards. Similarly, summer training in these same states is frequently disrupted (and often cancelled) by host-nations’ forest fire mitigation policies. It is worth noting that U.S. training facilities in Germany do not suffer from the shortcomings described above, and rotational battalions deployed there can be expected to attain the highest levels of training readiness. Nevertheless, these training restrictions in the Baltics and Poland (where the majority of rotational ABCT forces are) combine to prevent rotational battalions from building training readiness.

Last and most importantly, the stunning fact remains that deploying ABCTs cannot train with their equipment for seven to eight months in a two-year period due to pack-out and shipping requirements. Combined, these restrictions mean that U.S. rotational units in the Baltics and Poland often cannot attain the same level of training readiness that they would at their U.S. bases. Today’s ABCTs have much more experience packing containers and conducting railway loading operations than conducting live-fire collective maneuver at the company level or above.

When holistically reviewing all four factors that underpin the U.S. Army’s operational readiness along with impacts on training calendars, it becomes clear that ABCT rotations in Europe are readiness consumers, not builders. Moreover, a decade of EUCOM ABCT rotations has created some snowballing effects that can endure for years in the same unit, like deferred modernization and maintenance. Beyond these operational readiness costs, the structural readiness of the U.S. Army’s armored force is also negatively impacted by EUCOM ABCT rotations.

ABCT structural readiness. Beyond operational readiness, one must also consider how ABCT rotations impact the U.S. armored force’s structural readiness, a factor that is largely neglected from rotational advocates’ arguments.⁶¹ Since 2019, the U.S. Army has fielded eleven active-duty ABCTs and five in the National Guard.⁶² To sustain a single, continuous “heel-to-toe” ABCT rotation (i.e., no breaks in rotational coverage), three ABCTs are required: one forward deployed, one training to deploy, and one recently returned from deployment and undergoing reset and recovery. With this three-to-make-one force generation process, sustaining the existing three ABCT rotations (two in Europe, one in Kuwait) requires nine total ABCTs. Therefore, rotational forward presence consumes 81 percent of the active ABCTs, and the remaining two active ABCTs not committed to rotations are typically fully consumed by modernization windows that can take up to a year.⁶³

This is the great irony of rotational ABCTs in EUCOM: A policy that was initially developed to provide a flexible force posture became entrenched and has since limited the U.S. Army’s ability to provide armored units to the U.S. joint force. This degraded U.S. armored structural readiness is problematic for U.S. national security and limits U.S. crisis response options.⁶⁴ Some security analysts are concerned about increasing cooperation between U.S. adversaries and the increasing risks of the “simultaneity problem,” where multiple crises exceed the capability of the U.S. military structured for one major conflict.⁶⁵ If a future crisis (or crises) requires the unplanned deployment of ABCTs, the U.S. military would be left with three poor choices: mobilize National Guard ABCTs (optimistically fifty days.); curtail an ongoing or future ABCT rotation, likely undermining U.S. reassurance; or deploy an unready ABCT that recently returned from a rotation, potentially endangering deploying troops.⁶⁶

Broader U.S. military force structure changes exacerbate these vulnerabilities. Because the U.S. Marine Corps divested its tank force as part of Force Design 2030, the ABCT is now the only formation in the U.S. military with tanks.⁶⁷ One might remember that during the August 1990 Desert Shield deployments, the first sizeable U.S. armored element to arrive in Saudi Arabia were tanks from a Marine expeditionary brigade.⁶⁸ Moreover, 2025 U.S. Army force structure adjustments will further strain armored structural readiness as three of the five National Guard ABCTs are converted to infantry brigade combat teams, further depleting ABCT depth.⁶⁹ If a future crisis required the rapid deployment of U.S. armored forces, and the U.S. Army is now the sole force provider, its armored force’s degraded structural readiness represents an alarming vulnerability. Having analyzed how EUCOM ABCT rotations impact operational and structural readiness, I proceed by reassessing the claims made by rotational advocates and concluding with policy recommendations.

Conclusion: Reassessing the Debate After Ten Years of ABCT Rotations

After weighing rotational advocates’ claims against available evidence, we can now assess the relative strength of claims used to justify ongoing ABCT rotations in Europe. To review, advocates support EUCOM ABCT rotations for their role in deterring Russia, reassuring NATO allies, enhancing alliance interoperability, strengthening strategic mobility, and building deploying unit readiness. However, only two of these five claims are uncontested: that rotations enhance NATO interoperability and strengthen U.S. strategic mobility.

The remaining three claims are challenged. First, research finds ABCT rotations have limited reassurance value for vulnerable NATO allies, who would much prefer a permanent U.S. armored presence. Second, given Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and its significant losses there, revised force ratios in the Baltics suggest a Russian invasion of NATO is unlikely in the coming years, calling into question rotational ABCT’s deterrent value. Finally, EUCOM rotations consume the operational readiness of deploying ABCTs and strain the U.S. armored force’s structural readiness. On balance, this analysis suggests that U.S. policymakers need to consider if these narrower benefits are worth the large costs.

EUCOM ABCT rotations do bring real benefits regarding enhanced NATO interoperability and U.S. strategic mobility. The twenty thousand rotational troops in Europe are critical to enabling a robust NATO exercise calendar that enhances interoperability across the alliance’s militaries. U.S. military combat units, logistics, command and control, and training resources are likely the only ones in NATO capable of facilitating these exercises at their current scope and scale.⁷⁰ Moreover, it is possible that some European NATO members may eventually support a postwar “reassurance force” in Ukraine, straining their already limited capacity.⁷¹ With these considerations in mind, a decrease in permanent U.S. troops in Europe is not warranted. Instead, U.S. defense policymakers should consider how to maximize the U.S. contribution to NATO using permanent forces while finding ways to reduce the high costs of rotational forward presence.

A modest shift from rotational to permanent forward presence can maximize benefits for the U.S. government and its allies and minimize costs for U.S. troops and taxpayers. Instead of rotating two ABCTs to Europe, a single ABCT permanently assigned in Germany or Poland would offer a helpful solution.⁷² A permanent ABCT would bring significant fiscal savings, better reassure vulnerable allies, maintain the NATO interoperability gains, improve the U.S. armored force’s structural and operational readiness, and improve ABCT soldier and family well-being. Considering the “three to make one” requirement to sustain indefinite ABCT rotations, replacing the two EUCOM ABCT rotations with one permanent ABCT would consequently free five ABCTs from their rotational commitments, enhancing structural readiness by providing a deeper ready bench of U.S.-based ABCTs, which could respond to future crises in Europe or elsewhere. While it is possible that U.S. strategic mobility assets might suffer from a reduced demand, congressional appropriations could mandate a certain readiness-level to prevent atrophy. In this vein, occasional battalion-size deployments from U.S.-based ABCTs might deploy to Europe for shorter-term rotations to continue exercising strategic mobility assets, more akin to the Pacific Pathways exercise series in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

This theater-specific analysis narrowly considered the utility of ABCT rotations in eastern Europe. Given U.S. Central Command’s distinct operating environment, I avoid making generalization about ongoing ABCT rotations in Kuwait and leave that work for others with more regional expertise. Beyond exploring other theaters, future research investigating the utility of U.S. rotational forward presence might further study if these dynamics hold for other U.S. units that frequently undergo enduring rotations like Army rocket artillery, sustainment brigades, air defense units, or Marine expeditionary units.

The congressional appointed, bipartisan National Commission on the Future of the Army, which investigated “how the Army should best organize and employ its [force] in a time of declining resources,” first recommended a permanent ABCT in Europe in lieu of a rotational ABCT just two years after Operation Atlantic Resolve began.⁷³ Several others have made similar recommendations since.⁷⁴ The 2022 addition of a second EUCOM rotational ABCT, paired with the aggregated impacts of a decade’s worth of rotations, has significantly increased the costs of rotational forward presence. While it would be important to orchestrate and implement this adjustment in close coordination with our NATO allies, this policy change offers a cost-effective way to prioritize limited U.S. means, which are increasingly stretched thin in this era of strategic competition.

Thanks to Jay Ireland, John Deni, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Alexandra Sukalo, and Samuel Seitz for helpful feedback that improved this article. The research is the author’s alone and does not reflect any official U.S. government policy.

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Notes

1. David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics (RAND Corporation, 2016), 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html.
2. Matt Millham, “Army Bears Brunt of DOD’s Reductions in Europe,” Stars and Stripes, 29 December 2013, https://www.stripes.com/news/2013-12-29/army-bears-brunt-of-dods-reductions-in-europe-1828691.html; “Fact Sheet: Atlantic Resolve,” U.S. Army Europe Public Affairs Office, 6 November 2018, https://www.eucom.mil/document/39920/operation-atlantic-resolve-fact-sheet.
3. Michael Allen et al., “US Global Military Deployments, 1950–2020,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 39, no. 3 (May 2022): 351–70.
4. “Fact Sheet: U.S. Defense Contributions to Europe,” U.S. Department of War, 29 June 2022, https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/article/3078056/fact-sheet-us-defense-contributions-to-europe/.
5. Nikki Wentling, “Top General Recommends US Maintain Current Troop Levels in Europe,” Army Times, 9 April 2025, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-military/2025/04/08/top-general-recommends-us-maintain-current-troop-levels-in-europe/.
6. U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in Europe: Hearings on H.A.S.C. No. 118-30 Before the House Armed Services Committee, 118th Cong. (26 April 2023) (statement of Gen. Christopher Cavoli, Commander, U.S. European Command), 93, https://www.congress.gov/event/118th-congress/house-event/LC72759/text; To Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States European Command and United States Transportation Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2025 and the Future Years Defense Program Before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 118th Cong. (11 April 2024) (statement of Gen. Christopher Cavoli, Commander, U.S. European Command), 4, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/41124fulltranscript.pdf.
7. Dan Hodermarsky et al., “Regionally Aligned Forces Europe Produce Long-Term Readiness,” Armor 133, no. 1 (Winter 2020): 5–8; Chad Foster, “Readiness and Interoperability in Operation Atlantic Resolve,” Military Review 98, no. 1 (January-February 2018): 92–101; Andrew Gregory, “Maintaining a Deep Bench: Why Armored BCT Rotations in Europe and Korea Are Best for America’s Global Security Requirements,” Modern Warfare Institute, 31 July 2017, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/maintaining-deep-bench-armored-bct-rotations-europe-korea-best-americas-global-security-requirements/.
8. Brian Blankenship and Erik Lin-Greenberg, “Trivial Tripwires? Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance,” Security Studies 31, no. 1 (2022): 92–117; Paul Musgrave and Steven Ward, “The Tripwire Effect: Experimental Evidence Regarding U.S. Public Opinion,” Foreign Policy Analysis 19, no. 4 (2023): 1–25; Christoper Chivvis, “How U.S. Forces Should Leave Europe: And Why Trump Should Start the Process Now,” Foreign Affairs, 23 July 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-us-forces-should-leave-europe; John Deni, “It’s (Still) More Expensive to Rotate Military Forces Overseas Than Base Them There,” Atlantic Council, 18 December 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/its-still-more-expensive-to-rotate-military-forces-overseas-than-base-them-there/; John Deni, Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing: How Can the Army Achieve Assurance and Deterrence Efficiently and Effectively? (U.S. Army War College Press, 2017); Davis Winkie, “Broken Track: How Army Times Discovered High Tank Unit Suicide Rates,” Army Times, 11 March 2024, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2024/03/11/broken-track-how-army-times-discovered-high-tank-unit-suicide-rates/; Davis Winkie, “Broken Track: Suicides & Suffering In Army’s Exhausted Armor Community,” Army Times, 11 March 2024, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2024/03/11/broken-track-suicides-suffering-in-armys-exhausted-armor-community/.
9. Hal Brands and Evan Braden Montgomery, “One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition,” Texas National Security Review 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 80–92; A. Wess Mitchell, “America Is Overextended. Here’s a Better Way Forward,” Washington Post, 2 July 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/02/middle-east-sequencing-strategy-china/; Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press, “Strategies of Prioritization,” Foreign Affairs 104, no. 4 (June 2025), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/strategies-prioritization-lind-press.
10. Christopher Griffin, “Dilemmas of Dominance: America Strategy from George H.W. Bush to Barack Obama,” in The New Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton University Press, 2023), 873–75.
11. Davis Winkie, “Army Numbers Smallest Since WWII — What Units Face Cuts in 2024?,” Army Times, 28 December 2023, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2023/12/28/army-numbers-smallest-since-wwii-what-units-face-cuts-in-2024/.
12. Bryan Frederick et al., Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces (RAND Corporation, 4 February 2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2533.html; Blankenship and Lin-Greenberg, “Trivial Tripwires?”; Zoya Shegtaovich, “US Considering Building ‘Fort Trump’ in Poland,” Politico, 19 September 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-wants-to-build-fort-trump-andrzej-duda/.
13. Raymond Drumsta, “Training Milestone Solidifies Kuwait-U.S. Partnership,” U.S. Army, 18 May 2012, https://www.army.mil/article/80094/training_milestone_solidifies_kuwait_u_s_partnership; Samuel Northrup, “Iron Brigade to Be Replaced by Rotational Unit on Korean Peninsula,” U.S. Army, 3 February 2015, https://www.army.mil/article/142042/iron_brigade_to_be_replaced_by_rotational_unit_on_korean_peninsula; Davis Winkie, “Army Will No Longer Rotate Tank Units to Korea – But the Tanks Are Staying,” Army Times, 1 July 2022, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2022/07/01/army-will-no-longer-rotate-tank-units-to-korea-but-the-tanks-are-staying/.
14. Todd South, “Army Reviewing What Types of Units the Service Deploys and Where They Go,” Army Times, 31 March 2022, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2022/03/31/army-reviewing-what-types-of-units-the-service-deploys-and-where-they-go/.
15. Cavoli, U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in Europe, 93.
16. Alexandra Chinchilla et al., “US Preponderance in NATO: The Role of Logistics, Intelligence, Training, Cyber, and Coordination,” paper presented at the annual European Initiative for Security Studies conference, Barcelona Institute of International Studies, Barcelona, Spain, 30 June 2023; Foster, “Readiness and Interoperability in Operation Atlantic Resolve.”
17. Chris Johnson, “Mobility Challenges in the European Theater,” Army Sustainment 50, no. 4 (July-August 2018): 58–61; Curtis Scaparrotti and Colleen Bell, Moving Out: A Comprehensive Assessment of European Military Mobility (Atlantic Council, 2020), 10–15, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/moving-out-a-comprehensive-assessment-of-european-military-mobility/.
18. Deni, Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing, 26–30; Hodermarsky et al., “Regionally Aligned Forces Europe Produce Long-Term Readiness”; Gregory, “Maintaining a Deep Bench.”
19. Deni, “It’s (Still) More Expensive to Rotate Military Forces Overseas Than Base Them There.”
20. Deni, Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing.
21. Winkie, “How Army Times Discovered High Tank Unit Suicide Rates.”
22. Ryan Van Wie, “Bring the Tanks Back: It Is Time to Put a U.S. Armored Brigade in Germany,” War on the Rocks, 6 November 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/11/bring-the-tanks-back-it-is-time-to-put-a-u-s-armored-brigade-in-germany/.
23. Musgrave and Ward, “The Tripwire Effect”; Blankenship and Lin-Greenberg, “Trivial Tripwires?”
24. Chivvis, “How U.S. Forces Should Leave Europe.”
25. Robert Jervis et al., Psychology and Deterrence (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 2–5.
26. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 2008), 78.
27. John Mearsheimer, “Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics,” International Security 13, no. 4 (1989): 54.
28. David Shlapak and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank (RAND Corporation, 2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html.
29. John Gilliam and Ryan Van Wie, Feasible Steps to Strengthen NATO Deterrence in the Baltics and Poland (Brookings Institution, March 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/feasible-us-steps-to-strengthen-nato-deterrence-in-the-baltics-and-poland/.
30. 2021 figures here from Gilliam and Van Wie, Feasible Steps to Strengthen NATO Deterrence in the Baltics and Poland, 8; NATO figures derived from International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance (IISS, 2025), 85–86, 110–11, 121–24; Russian figures from Juha Kukkola, The Leningrad Military District: The Past and Future of the Northwestern Direction, Research Report No. 35 (Finnish National Defence University, 2024), 59. While Russian equipment numbers were not listed in the report, revised numbers were calculated by applying the percentage change in personnel to equipment.
31. Scott Boston et al., Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe: Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority (RAND Corporation, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2402.html; Dan Reiter and Paul Poast, “The Truth About Tripwires: Why Small Force Deployments Do Not Deter Aggression,” Texas National Security Review 4, no. 3 (Summer 2021): 33–53, https://tnsr.org/2021/06/the-truth-about-tripwires-why-small-force-deployments-do-not-deter-aggression/.
32. Seth Jones, “Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 1 June 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare.
33. Karolina Hird, “Russia Military Restructuring and Expansion Hindered by the Ukraine War,” Institute for the Study of War, 12 November 2023, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia’s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war/.
34. Helene Cooper, “Troop Casualties in Ukraine War Near 1.4 Million, Study Finds,” New York Times, 3 June 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/03/us/politics/russia-ukraine-troop-casualties.html; Seth Jones and Riley McCabe, “Russia’s Battlefield Woes in Ukraine,” CSIS, 3 June 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-battlefield-woes-ukraine; Jakub Janovsky et al., “Attack on Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” Oryx, accessed 1 July 2025, https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html.
35. Yurri Clavilier and Michaekl Gjerstad, “Combat Losses and Manpower Challenges Underscore the Importance of ‘Mass’ in Ukraine,” IISS, 10 February 2025, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/02/combat-losses-and-manpower-challenges-underscore-the-importance-of-mass-in-ukraine/.
36. Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, International Security and Estonia 2024 (Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, 2024), 16, https://raport.valisluureamet.ee/2024/en/; Kukkola, The Leningrad Military District, 59.
37. Maria Malksoo, “NATO’s New Front: Deterrence Moves Eastward,” International Affairs 100, no. 2 (2024): 531–47.
38. Seth Jones and Seamus Daniels, “Deterring Russia: US Military Posture in Europe,” CSIS, 27 January 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/deterring-russia-us-military-posture-europe.
39. Andrew Michta and Joslyn Brodfuehrer, NATO-Russia Dynamics: Prospects for Reconstitution of Russian Military Power (Atlantic Council, 19 September 2024), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/nato-russia-dynamics-prospects-for-reconstitution-of-russian-military-power/.
40. Simon Saradzhyan, “Would Russia Attack NATO and, If So, When?,” Russia Matters, 5 June 2025, https://www.russiamatters.org/blog/would-russia-attack-nato-and-if-so-when. Saradzhyan’s summary of the analysis shows thirteen expert references to 2030, twelve to 2029, and ten to 2028.
41. Andrius Sytas, “German Brigade to Be Combat Ready in Lithuania, on Russian Border, in 2027,” Reuters, 18 December 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-brigade-be-combat-ready-lithuania-russian-border-2027-2023-12-18/.
42. Jin Yu Young and Anton Troianovski, “Romania Says Russian Drone Entered Its Airspace,” New York Times, 14 September 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/14/world/europe/romania-drone-russia-ukraine.html.
43. Richard Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Brookings Institution Press, 1995).
44. Betts, Military Readiness, 46–59.
45. Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration-Consolidated Policies (U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2022), 20–23.
46. Kurt Ryan and Jin Pak, “Operationalizing ReARMM: A Sustainment Perspective,” U.S. Army, 11 August 2021, https://www.army.mil/article/249275/operationalizing_rearmm_a_sustainment_perspective.
47. Scott Russell, “US Army Force Projection,” Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, 10 April 2025, https://chacr.org.uk/2025/04/10/us-army-force-projection/.
48. Service times vary based on a host of factors that include working day hours and assigned mechanics. Listed services times assume a full complement of authorized mechanics. Above mentioned personnel shortages include mechanics, which can lead to prolonged services windows.
49. Training Circular (TC) 3-20.0, Integrated Weapons Training Strategy (IWTS) (U.S. GPO, 2019).
50. Training and maintenance are the only two factors that incorporate weekends in these calculations. Using IWTS to calculate minimum training requirements returns 102 workdays and forty weekend days to complete all training requirements (142 days ≈ five months).
51. Winkie, “How Army Times Discovered High Tank Unit Suicides.”
52. Darren Pitts, “Maximizing Operational Readiness on EUCOM Rotation,” Armor 135, no. 4 (Fall 2023): 50, https://www.benning.army.mil/Armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2023/Fall/ARMOR%20Fall%202023.pdf.
53. Thomas Spoehr, “U.S. Army,” in An Assessment of U.S. Military Power (Heritage Foundation, 2024), 410–11; Christopher Dempsey, The End of Readiness (School of Advanced Military Studies, 2021), 26–27; Davis Winkie, “Army May Restructure Brigade Combat Teams Amid Recruiting Woes,” Army Times, 29 July 2022, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2022/07/29/army-may-restructure-brigade-combat-teams-amid-recruiting-woes/.
54. Ben Kenneaster, “Tactical Sustainment Challenges in the Baltics,” Army Sustainment (Winter 2024): 59–62, https://asu.army.mil/alog/ARCHIVE/PB7002401FULL.pdf.
55. Pitts, “Maximizing Operational Readiness on EUCOM Rotation,” 52–55.
56. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Weapon System Sustainment: Various Challenges Affect Ground Vehicles Availability for Missions, GAO-25-108679 (U.S. GAO, September 2025), 9, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-108679.
57. Deni, Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing, 26–30.
58. These observations are based on the author’s two armored brigade combat team rotations in Europe in 2017 and 2023.
59. AR 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration-Consolidated Policies, 39.
60. TC 3-20.0, Integrated Weapons Training Strategy.
61. Hodermarsky et al., “Regionally Aligned Forces Europe Produce Long-Term Readiness”; Foster, “Readiness and Interoperability in Operation Atlantic Resolve”; Gregory, “Maintaining a Deep Bench.”
62. Barbara Salazar Torreon and Andrew Feickert, “Defense Primer: Organization of U.S. Ground Forces” (Congressional Research Service [CRS], 21 November 2022), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2022-11-21_IF10571_76ede371164ff6362a95a61f359737379384ad8d.pdf.
63. Michael Linick et al., Addressing the Friction Between the Army’s People First Initiatives and Its Force Generation Process (RAND Corporation, 2023), 17.
64. Ryan Van Wie, “Are We There Yet? US Military Readiness and Crisis Rapid Reinforcement,” paper presented at the Social Sciences Security Seminar, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, 6 February 2025.
65. Philip Zelikow, “Confronting Another Axis? History, Humility, and Wishful Thinking,” Texas National Security Review 7, no. 3 (Summer 2024): 80–99; Brands and Montgomery, “One War Is Not Enough.”
66. Charles Kemper and Jessica Haugaard, “Armory to Port: The Challenges of Deploying an Army National Guard Division,” Military Review Online Exclusive, 13 November 2024, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2024-OLE/Armory-to-Port/.
67. Andrew Feickert, U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R47614 (CRS, October 2024), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47614.
68. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Pete Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (Bantam Books, 1993), 397–98.
69. Steve Beynon, “Here Are All the Big Cuts and Changes Coming to the Army,” Military.com, 22 May 2025, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/05/22/here-are-all-big-cuts-and-changes-coming-army.html.
70. Hugo Meijer and Stephen Brooks, “Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back,” International Security 45, no. 4 (2021): 7–43.
71. Jack Watling and Michael Kofman, “Willpower, Not Manpower Is Europe’s Main Limitation for a Force in Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, 3 March 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/03/willpower-not-manpower-is-europes-main-limitation-for-a-force-in-ukraine/.
72. Gilliam and Van Wie, “Feasible Steps to Strengthen NATO Deterrence in the Baltics and Poland.”
73. National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA), Report to the President and the Congress of the United States, January 28, 2016 (NCFA, January 2016), 13, https://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Documents/ARNGpdfs/ncfa/NCFA-Full-Final-Report.pdf.
74. Deni, “It’s (Still) More Expensive to Rotate Military Forces Overseas Than Base Them There”; Deni, Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing; Davis Winkie, “Army Should Permanently Station Armor Brigade in Poland, Report Argues,” Army Times, 13 March 2024, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2024/03/13/army-should-permanently-station-armor-brigade-in-poland-report-argues/; Jones and Daniels, “Deterring Russia.”

 

 

 

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