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Army Aviation at the Joint Readiness Training Center

A Concept for Optimization

 

Maj. Stephen D. Smallwood, US Army

 

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After the conclusion of over twenty years of counterinsurgency against stateless actors without technological parity, the Aviation Branch experienced atrophy that situated the force in competition for relevance and utility in future warfare. Peer state actors have made significant investments in technology—from autonomous aircraft to small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) and loitering munitions—that have all served to close a half century of upper-tier land-domain dominance.¹ The Army aviation force now finds itself in a significant restructuring event both in human and physical capital in an attempt to maintain pace “in the ‘upper tier’ of the land domain” (otherwise stated, airspace).² The branch is set to reduce the force by roughly 20 percent, eliminating 6,500 active duty positions by 2027, incorporate the MV-75 Long Range Assault Aircraft (LRAA) into its fleet by fiscal year 2028, and further develop and incorporate launched effects in future warfare.³

Clearly influenced by the 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategy and the 2025 Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance, the vision for the future of Army aviation includes a technological pacing focus against peer threats that simultaneously enables regional deterrence.⁴ The size and scope of these transformative efforts are enormous, generational, and in many cases, nascent. They require parallel efforts by tactical leaders and formations to set conditions and prepare for capabilities that strategic decision-makers are accelerating. Often, Army commands receive equipment through a new equipment training and fielding initiative that is short in duration and late in timeline. Those initiatives generally serve a specific technological purpose to serve a specific need. That style of delivery and training is necessary but insufficient for the current dilemma the Army is working to solve, namely aviation’s ability to remain competitive and maintain airspace dominance. While technology is not necessarily available today, the infrastructure exists to set conditions for advancements received in the future.

If Army aviation is fielding the LRAA in 2028, for example, the aviation force should shift its focus to conducting longer-range assaults with legacy aircraft. If the Army is concerned with integrated air defense systems (IADS) and the forces’ ability to penetrate them, aviation should focus its training efforts on exercises that present that dilemma. While it is not impossible to combine multiple high-value and impactful objectives together for a combat aviation brigade (CAB), it is complicated given general operational tempo and ground force availability. Fortunately, centers exist within the Department of War enterprise that are specifically tailored to the execution of training brigade combat teams (BCT) and associated enablers. The combat training centers represent an ideal training ground to set conditions for future technologies, developments, and strategies. The current construct and exercise design of the combat training centers, particularly the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), however, is inefficient and ineffective to meet that goal.

Combat Training Center Utility

JRTC is important because of its reach and its ability to help facilitate and implement senior leader vision. It is uniquely postured within the Department of War enterprise to influence the outcomes of divisions and below. It is this posturing that can, and arguably should, make JRTC the hub in the proverbial hub-and-spoke analogy to implement strategic thought into tactical application. To be clear, this article does not intend to turn JRTC into an offshoot of Project Convergence Capstone.⁵ Rather, the implication made here is JRTC offers a vehicle to prepare for change in a manner that is more direct, implies little to no additive costs, and does not require a long-term contract solution. A small paradigm shift in the base JRTC design and focus can help shift tactical-level outcomes to nest with Army strategy.

Influenced by a recent rotation to JRTC, this article conceptualizes a rotational design that aggregates training objectives across equities to create homogeneous outcomes. It focuses on training and strengthening aviation core competencies and is nested with the Aviation Branch’s strategic vision. The point of departure for this concept is a brief description of current JRTC training conditions that undermine the utility of participation for aviation partners while simultaneously disrupting aviation relevancy and undermining preparatory steps to transition the force to next-generation capabilities.

The JRTC Problem Statement

Presumably, the problem statement JRTC exercise designers are attempting to solve is something like, How does JRTC develop an exercise that maximizes BCT training opportunities to prepare for large-scale combat operations? Notwithstanding the importance and understandable focus on the primary combined arms, close-combat maneuver force, that framing primes designers to think narrowly, perhaps even myopically, to create rotations that offer a polarized utility and value proposition to participants.⁶ More directly, that question necessitates the consumption of nearly all of the exercise designers’ analytical power to focus on BCT objectives. The outcome of that framing is detrimental to both the enabling force and the BCT.

It is necessary to be explicit here: This article does not intend to suggest that the primary training audience should shift from the BCT, nor should such an inference be made. This article does suggest that it is necessary to make a concerted effort to deliberately and fully incorporate aviation training objectives into the base design of JRTC to increase both the value to the BCT and to the aviation force provider. This has the added positive effect of increasing aviation readiness and preparedness for operations today as well as for next-generation aviation technologies while simultaneously mitigating the perceived reduction in aviation relevancy.

JRTC Design and Aviation Training Outcome Incongruence

Current aviation operations suffer from an exercise design that is disaggregated from the primary training audience, the BCT. While missions do occur proximally to the ground force, they are often not in direct support of the BCT, nor is there a clear supporting effort that maximizes their success. For example, a deep attack to destroy a command-and-control facility may occur proximately to a maneuver force’s movement in zone, but the latter is not aware of the former—at least not any meaningful way—and the former knows the value of the attack to the ground maneuver element is dubious. These types of operations are generally in support of a division target, but because they are not fully integrated into the design, or at least that is how they are perceived, the effect of their incorporation is minimal and disaggregated.

In many ways, this situation is an artifact of the limited JRTC staff at both the division and CAB level to create and nest missions that are mutually beneficial to both training audiences. The 21 CAB is essentially a headquarters in name alone, for example. There is no acrimony in the statement but rather an observation of the limited staff capability at the CAB level and the corresponding expectation of output. It is axiomatic that a unit’s higher headquarters should set conditions for the success of the lower element, but in JRTC’s case, the skeleton crew assigned to serve in multiple positions within the enterprise results in an experience where desks are manned by individuals either unauthorized to make a decision or not informed well enough to facilitate one.

This issue has compounding effects and is perhaps best explained by anecdote. JRTC intends to use a version of the Global Area Reference System (GARS), but the current process for management in near-real time is limited and entirely reliant on Range Control procedures (the GARS is comprised of keypads, which is an airspace management technique to tie airspace to a geographic location using some type of numbering system).⁷ No obvious near-real-time system exists to determine reserved, occupied, or closed keypads either by red forces or blue forces, and while the tactical airspace integration system can show activated airspace, this does not solve the airspace demand issue relative to opposing forces, nor is the tactical airspace integration system useful if not fully incorporated into JRTC.

For example, the airspace control order and the air tasking order, at least in the rotational example, were not readily available via program-of-record systems to the end user. The integration and utility of the division’s airspace element was not obvious, and several aviation missions in support of the BCT were affected by keypad closures without a clear culprit. For the latter, the Operations Group insisted the closure was because of red air, the observer coach/trainer aircraft was insistent the issue was the BCT, and for their part, the BCT was emphatic that they did not have any active keypads nor sUAS in flight.

The net result was a desynchronized mission, loss of critical aviation support, and a lack of a coherent airspace control plan. Additionally, the current approach to airspace management and control confuses and complicates the ability for the ground force to synchronize their internal airspace user requirements with their enabler airspace needs. But perhaps the bigger issue is not the problem experienced during this anecdote but the implications these complications have for future operations. The proliferation of sUAS, launched effects, autonomous aircraft, and LRAA represent a significant and consequential increase in airspace user demand, but the current process is neither prepared nor effectually designed to manage the increase.

A Pathway to Amelioration

The aforementioned issues are provided to elucidate key areas that will magnify as next-generation capabilities are fielded, and while these anecdotes may be more akin to statistical noise than empirical data, these areas are historically complex and often underrepresented throughout the enterprise. The integration of the aviation force into JRTC must be sustained. This, at least from the author’s point of view, is self-evident. Equally as axiomatic is the requirement to refine, define, and streamline the use of aviation. This starts with short-duration, focused, and high-value and high-impact missions aligned against specific dilemmas that layer training objectives and aggregate combat outcomes.

Air superiority or supremacy against an adversary who maintains technological and human capital parity is highly unlikely. By extrapolation, the design of a scenario intended to train the force should incorporate an air threat that presents a true obstacle to the aviation force. The supposition that echelons above brigade neutralized the IADS and enabled some semblance of air supremacy is disingenuous. The design should include a requirement for the aviation unit to navigate and mitigate an air threat that is degraded but still capable.

The war of the future will likely necessitate decentralized and distributed operations with windows of opportunity to infiltrate an assault force or conduct an attack. Airspace superiority or supremacy will almost certainly be unattainable, and both ground and aviation forces will need to navigate a complex and multifaceted environment. Key to success will likely be found not in singular ground assaults from multiple avenues of approach but instead in posing multiple dilemmas for enemy commanders to consider that consume both airspace and land. While it is not possible to design a singular exercise based on the unique capabilities of each division, it is possible for architects to design a purposeful exercise designed specifically to meet the requirements of each division. In this way, JRTC’s playbook should include a modular but off-the-shelf baseline design capable of meeting the requirements of the end user.

A design for the 82nd Airborne Division, for example, must incorporate their joint forcible entry (JFE)-airborne mandate but stopping there ignores the arguably more likely air assault infiltration. While the last airborne assault was more than thirty-five years ago in Panama, soldiers have spent literal thousands of hours in the back of helicopters en route to destroy enemy combatants and seize key terrain.⁸ Designers ought not ignore that historical fact and should focus efforts on crafting a dilemma that necessitates both modes of entry either consecutively or concurrently.

Conceptually, for the 82nd Airborne Division, a design could include a JFE-airborne simultaneous to a JFE-assault. In this construct, echelons above brigade conduct joint suppression of enemy air defense on targets to neutralize IADS but are incapable of destroying all air defense systems. This design could require the subsequent use of Army attack aviation to attack to destroy systems that were along the route of the assault force that could affect the forcible entry but not robust enough to prevent it. Here, Army attack aviation ingresses forward of the assault force to create a flight corridor and window of opportunity, while the airborne force is en route to the primary airfield. This construct is not artificial, it’s practical. Neutralizing the IADS in a geographic area enables entry, but it is not practical to assume the ability to destroy all systems.

There are myriad other options available to exercise planners to meet this aim, from a concurrent design that incorporates the aforementioned air assault in conjunction with an airborne entry to a consecutive operation that clearly builds on the success of the other. An air assault can be planned to forward stage a reserve component on key terrain simultaneously to an airborne assault, which has the added benefit of dispersion of forces. A sequential operation can be employed that necessitates an offset airborne mission via rotary wing to insert a multifunctional reconnaissance team followed by the execution of a deep attack on a target observed by that team. Both missions could happen in advance of the primary airborne assault to set conditions for an airfield seizure.

Distance Maximizes Training Outcomes

To further nest with the Aviation Branch’s strategic vision, the air assault should replicate the complexities of a long-range fight, which is realistic and technically complicated. In future conflict with a peer adversary, a distance problem will likely materialize, and training against that today will serve to close the gap in the future. That is, the ability to launch aircraft from forward operating bases emplaced throughout the battlespace to offer two-hour flights throughout the area of operations is unrealistic. A more probable outcome is the requirement to launch operations from intermediate staging bases outside an enemy force’s ability to directly affect coalition forces but close enough in proximity to allow a reasonable logistical train.

Although the LRAA offers advancements in both duration and range, warfighter comfort and fatigue must also be considered. Intermediate stops with remain-over-day designs account for warfighter fatigue and comfort and provide an opportunity to secure a tactical assembly area en route to the objective location. The current fleet’s need for the establishment of forward arming and refueling points (FARP) to facilitate a long-range assault adds a level of complexity that is owed to the aviation force to reinforce its warfighting capability and to prepare for dispersed operations throughout the battlespace in the future.

The problem JRTC must replicate here is distance, which can either be constructed through flights from the training audiences’ home bases or via time. The ideal design incorporates an actual distance problem that requires en route military planned and manned FARPs and requires troops onboard aircraft. This design accomplishes two purposes. First, it replicates the complexities of long-range flight and the logistical problems presented therein, and two, it necessitates ground force considerations that will otherwise be overlooked by both the aviation force and the ground force.

Distance can also be replicated by time, where the aviation force is required to fly a specific amount of time and must visit specific FARPs in sequence to replicate distance. The imperative here is to require the same time of flight commensurate with the true distance. That is, requiring a three-hour flight for a distance that would take ten hours undermines the point and the training value. An example to achieve this end would involve an intermediate staging base and a specified route that included several overnight tactical assembly areas and distributed FARPs. If, for example, a distance of roughly one thousand nautical miles would require approximately four fuel stops and over eight hours of uninterrupted flight; that would likely equate to a two-day en route movement. That distance could easily be replicated with specified routing, time of flight, and mandatory tactical assembly area locations.

Whether true distance is employed or replicated by time, the net result is roughly the same. It forces realism, presents logistical challenges, and enables a design that truly incorporates both the ground and aviation force. It necessitates creativity from considerations for “fat cows” (short-duration FARPs from CH-47 aircraft) to low-cost, low altitude parachute drops, to rethinking the utility of the airborne FARP. Perhaps most importantly, it requires cooperation and synchronization. Critical to this construct is the incorporation of ground forces from departure through assault, and implicit therein is to ensure the logistical apparatus is exercised and the soldiers onboard the aircraft are employed in meaningful ways. Whatever the design may be, the value proposition must be clear, the mission nested, and the operation clearly supporting the campaign. Ultimately, the operative aspect is aviation and ground force synergy.

Convergence Windows Maximize Lethality

The need to reconsider the base design of the JRTC exercise does not end with forcible entry. The disaggregated aviation missions and outcomes that are prevalent in the current design can be assuaged by a meaningful incorporation of missions in phase. In particular, exercise designers should apply significant consideration to convergence windows and ensure correlation of forces and means are weighted toward friendly forces. One clear way of facilitating an overmatch is through the application of attack aviation in phase and against an aggressor.

Often at JRTC, Army attack aviation is withheld to the division level, and BCT requests are denied based on division priorities or competing demands. The issue here is that the missions assigned to the aviation force in lieu of supporting the BCT are disaggregated from the primary training audience, and the perceived outcome of the operation is wholly inconsequential to the battle unfolding. Division assigned missions not in support of the BCT present no obvious value proposition, and because the only true operation unfolding is the BCT’s problem set, the return on investment of these competing priorities is in doubt. There is certainly no malice in the architects’ design, but this decision is particularly insidious because of the duality of negative outcomes. First, it degrades synchronization and negates complex condition-based decisions, and second, it reinforces general trends and beliefs that the aviation force is too complicated to work with and too regulated to employ.

It is not sufficient to deny a request for a division asset because it is conducting division targeting if the perceived value of those targets appear more space filler than target rich and the refusal presumably based on an attempt to constrain resources. The latter is problematic because it undermines the training value to the BCT by reducing their ability to set conditions for their main effort, and to the aviation force provider who is tasked against a problem-set whose higher headquarters, based on manning constraints, lacks the analytical staff horsepower to effectively plan, manage, and execute the operation in phase. The current design of the exercise certainly creates a convergence window—that much is not in dispute—but what is missing from that convergence is deliberate incorporation of attack aviation into the base design.

JRTC should focus efforts on developing a scenario that deliberately aligns attack aviation to deliberately crafted convergence windows both for realism and for the intrinsic training value to both the ground force and the aviation force provider. JRTC should weight blue forces’ efforts during a convergence window by assigning attack aviation in direct support to the BCT convergence and then reinforce this alignment by insisting upon intelligence assessments that predict the windows and plans that layer the most casualty-producing weapon system at the convergence. The key here is not to allow a struggling BCT to learn a hard lesson but instead to insist on a framework that facilitates a change in correlation of forces and means and encourages success. It cannot be stated enough: the critical part to this is the aggregation of the aviation operation with the ground operation to create a clear value proposition to both the aviation force and the ground force.

The theme here is timing, an underlying theme throughout this article, and one that is fully expected to be exacerbated in the future as peer threats gain parity in warfare and battlefields become more complicated. The addition of aviation that is incorporated into the base design of the JRTC exercise promotes better synergy and sets strategic conditions for future technologies that include air-delivered launched effects and systems that mitigate weather-based degraded visual environments.⁹

Conclusion

Emerging technologies will fill tactical gaps, improve infiltration techniques, and offer greater range and duration. JRTC is ideally situated to accelerate proficiency in future technologies and has an opportunity to facilitate senior leader strategy by designing an exercise that nods to technological advancements. The BCT must remain the main effort for the design, but the supporting exercise architecture cannot be insufficiently developed to fully incorporate, challenge, and nest objectives with the aviation force. Future warfare will remain challenging, and it’s clear that peer threats will continue to seek technological and capability parity. Conditions can be set today to facilitate adoption of future technologies, and marginal shifts in design and focus can provide a significant return on investment to the collective force.

The future of warfare demands a purposefully built JRTC with an aviation scenario that is complex, layered, and thoughtful. Disaggregated outcomes and airspace issues are ameliorated through a design that is specifically developed to incorporate BCT and enabler core competencies. Future units equipped with emergent capabilities can enjoy the fruits of a foundation laid through a design that serves as a more realistic replication of large-scale combat operations. Perhaps a better version of a problem statement for JRTC exercise designers is something attuned to, How does JRTC design an exercise that leverages multidomain operations to fight and win in large-scale combat operations?

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Notes

1. Clair Gill, “The Army Aviation Branch Vision,” Army Aviation Magazine 74, no. 8 & 9 (August/September 2025): 12–14, https://armyaviationmagazine.com/archive/back-issues/?y=2025.
2. Gill, “The Army Aviation Branch Vision.”
3. Matthew Burke, “Army Aviation to Shed 6,500 Positions to Make Way for Rise of Drone Operations,” Stars and Stripes, 22 September 2025, https://www.stripes.com/branches/army/2025-09-22/army-cuts-aviation-positions-drones-19182478.html; Jennifer DiMascio, “Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA)” (Congressional Research Service, updated 29 January 2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12771/IF12771.4.pdf; Gill, “The Army Aviation Branch Vision.”
4. US Department of Defense (DOD), Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (US DOD, 2018); US DOD, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (US DOD, October 2022); US Department of War (DoW), 2025 Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance (US DoW, 2025).
5. “Project Convergence,” DoW, accessed 4 February 2026, https://www.war.gov/Spotlights/Project-Convergence/.
6. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (US Government Publishing Office [GPO], March 2025), 44.
7. FM 3-52, Airspace Control (US GPO), B-25.
8. “Division History,” 82D Airborne Division War Memorial Museum, accessed 4 February 2026, https://www.82ndairbornedivisionmuseum.com/history-of-the-division/.
9. Gill, “The Army Aviation Branch Vision.”

 

 

 

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May-June 2026