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Rethinking the Theory of Victory for the “Next War”

Beyond Lanchester’s Laws and the Modern System

 

Col. Takayasu Iwakami, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

 

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War ought never to occur. However, despite this widely held belief, the use of force continues to shape international politics across Europe, the Middle East, and beyond. Even when one side renounces the intention to employ force, an adversary may still retain—and ultimately use—it, rendering national security unattainable through restraint alone. Thus, while preventing war remains paramount, responsible defense planning requires anticipating unforeseen contingencies and ensuring the ability to prevail should deterrence fail. This raises a fundamental question for any state seeking credible deterrence: What level of relative combat power must be sustained during peacetime to ensure reliable success in wartime?

Nowhere is this challenge more acute than in the Indo-Pacific. Japan confronts a rapidly evolving security environment marked by limited topographical depth, demographic constraints, and increasingly capable adversaries. For a nation that must deter aggression under such structural limitations, the question of force ratios is not abstract but existential. It directly shapes how Japan—and by extension, the US–Japan alliance—must prepare for deterrence and defense in a region where the balance of power is shifting.

History offers enduring insights. Sun Tzu argued that numerical advantage shapes initiative: a ten-to-one advantage allows encirclement, a five-to-one advantage enables attack, and parity permits battle.¹ Centuries later, Soviet general Mikhail Tukhachevskii proposed the now familiar “three to one rule” for offensive operations.² While influential, these ratios rest largely on intuition and experience rather than systematic analysis and offer limited guidance for the complexities of modern, technology-enabled warfare.

The twentieth century introduced more rigorous approaches. Lanchester’s laws sought to model combat outcomes mathematically and were later refined through operations research during World War II. After the Cold War, scholars identified the limitations of mathematics-based assessments. They advanced the concept of the modern system, emphasizing the decisive role of force employment in battlefield performance. These frameworks collectively highlight a central question: How should a modern military conceptualize the relationship among force size, force employment, and victory?

For Japan and its principal ally, the United States, this question is no longer academic. The character of war is changing—driven by unmanned systems, long-range precision fires, cyber and electronic warfare, and the growing importance of information and cognition. As the US Army and US Marine Corps revise their concepts for multidomain operations (MDO) and expeditionary advanced base operations, Japan must likewise reassess how the Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) can achieve victory in a “next war” that will differ fundamentally from past wars.

This article surveys the development of force ratio theory—from classical thought to modern analytical frameworks—examines emerging trends within US joint doctrine, and proposes a theory of victory tailored to the JGSDF. Its purpose is to move beyond traditional discussions of force development and tactics and instead derive strategic insights to inform Japan’s future defense posture in an era of rapidly accelerating change.

Lanchester’s Laws

During World War I, British engineer Frederick W. Lanchester developed a mathematical framework to analyze the relationship between opposing forces and casualties. His work introduced two distinct models: the First Law assumes individual duels between combatants (hereinafter referred to as the “duel model”), and the Second Law reflects large-scale engagements involving advanced weaponry such as indirect fires (hereinafter referred to as the “area-fire model”).³ In the duel model, each combatant can engage only one opponent at a time, making combat power proportional to force size. Assuming equal weapon quality, Lanchester concluded that in the duel model, the difference in force size directly translates to the difference in inflicted damage. In contrast, the area-fire model suggests that the square of the force ratio determines the casualty differential.⁴

This insight led to several strategic implications for numerically inferior forces seeking victory. First, they must deny the adversary the opportunity to fully exploit modern weapon systems. Second, they should avoid dispersing their own troops and instead concentrate them at decisive points. Third, deception—such as feigning dispersion to lure the enemy into misallocation of resources—emerges as a critical tactic.⁵ Further refinement came during World War II through the work of American mathematician B. O. Koopman and his colleagues in operations research. Koopman’s analysis suggested that once a force controls 73.9 percent of the battlefield, the opponent loses the ability to reverse the tide of battle. This threshold—known as Koopman’s criterion—implied that the remaining 26.1 percent represented a tipping point beyond which recovery was stochastically improbable. The ratio of 26.1 to 73.9 (approximately 1:2.83) reportedly influenced US operational planning during the war.⁶ This provided commanders with a quantitative sense of when an offensive had achieved irreversible momentum. Although developed during World War II, the logic of tipping points remains relevant for understanding modern force employment.

As with any mathematical model, it is essential to note that these models are based on several idealized assumptions: all combatants possess equal skill and lethality, every soldier participates in combat simultaneously, and the intensity of battle remains constant throughout. These assumptions break down rapidly in environments characterized by dispersed formations, complex terrain, or the multidomain effects that define modern battlefields. Nevertheless, the clarity and simplicity of Lanchester’s laws have made them useful not only in military planning but also in fields such as business strategy and resource allocation.⁷ Their conceptual clarity continues to offer valuable insights for understanding how force ratios shape combat dynamics.

The Modern System: Operational Dynamics Over Numbers

American military historian Stephen D. Biddle has argued that, despite the expansion of military roles in response to technological advancements—such as the revolution in military affairs and the rise of counterterrorism—the fundamental nature of armed warfare has remained essentially unchanged. He further contends that, even when considering frameworks such as Lanchester’s laws, it is historically inaccurate to assess the outcomes of wars solely on quantitative factors. Instead, Biddle emphasizes the decisive role of force employment—the doctrines, tactics, and operational methods by which military forces are utilized—in determining victory in large-scale conventional warfare.⁸ He substantiates this claim through statistical analyses of three major case studies and three comprehensive datasets and further validates his findings using US Army simulation systems.⁹

Biddle refers to the tactical and doctrinal innovations developed during World War I as the foundation of what he terms the modern system. He argues that a military’s ability to adopt and a nation’s ability to institutionalize this system within its broader national defense structure are critical determinants of battlefield success.¹⁰ The modern system is characterized by several key operational principles: cover, concealment, dispersion, small-unit independent maneuver, suppression, and combined arms integration.¹¹ In offensive operations, it emphasizes deep battle, differential concentration of force, disruption of enemy lines of communication, and encirclement.¹² In defensive operations, it involves establishing depth, maintaining substantial reserves, and executing counterattacks.¹³ Biddle stresses that adopting the modern system requires not only doctrinal change but also institutional reforms in training, leadership, and organizational culture. Notably, Biddle asserts that in engagements between forces that employ and those that do not utilize the modern system, the disparity in territorial gains can exceed a ratio of 2,000 to 1; a disparity driven by survivability, dispersion, and combined-arms integration rather than sheer numbers.¹⁴ This disparity is so extreme that it would defy explanation by numbers alone.

This framework emerged in response to the increasing lethality and precision of modern firepower, as well as the growing diversity of weapon systems driven by technological innovation. These developments exposed the limitations of stochastic models in accurately predicting battlefield outcomes. Consequently, Biddle advocates for a broader conceptualization of the battlespace—one that prioritizes qualitative superiority in force employment over mere numerical advantage. However, when both sides employ the modern system, numerical disparities regain importance; even a modest 2:1 advantage can generate disproportionate territorial gains (see the table).¹⁵

Toward a Theory of Victory in the “Next War”

If the modern system represents the most advanced doctrinal framework, its application to the JGSDF yields a clear implication: to avoid defeat in large-scale conventional warfare, Japan must not only adopt the modern system but also maintain at least half the size of its adversary’s force. This aligns with Biddle’s finding that when both sides employ the modern system, numerical disparities regain decisive significance.

However, even as conventional warfare remains relevant, the battlespace of modern conflict has expanded dramatically. Contemporary warfare now encompasses unrestricted warfare, hybrid warfare, and MDO, spanning not only land, sea, and air but also outer space, cyberspace, and the cognitive domain. The temporal dimension has likewise shifted. The advent of cyber capabilities, hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, and big data demands near-real-time decision-making and action. The range of actors involved in conflict has also diversified: beyond regular armed forces, militias, private military companies, and instruments of diplomacy, intelligence, and economics increasingly shape outcomes. The means of engagement have evolved to include unmanned systems and nonkinetic operations such as cyber, electronic, psychological, and cognitive warfare. These developments compress decision cycles and elevate the premium on speed. In this expanded battlespace, military organizations must operate across broader domains, respond within compressed time frames, and contend with nontraditional actors and methods—including nonmilitary warfare or activities previously categorized as military operations other than war.¹⁶ In this sense, the “next war” can be defined as a political struggle or conflict in which diverse actors compete within an expanded battlespace, employing a wide array of means through increasingly complex methods under a compressed time frame.

Given this complexity, it is evident that while adopting the modern system is essential, it alone is insufficient to secure victory in the “next war.” Designed for conventional warfare, the modern system does not fully address other forms of warfare. New frameworks are therefore required to define victory conditions across diverse domains. This process begins by identifying, through relevant academic disciplines and engineering methodologies, what constitutes “victory” in each domain: diplomatic, informational, military, economic, unmanned systems, cyber, electronic, psychological, and cognitive. It then requires designing systems capable of achieving those outcomes. These systems must be validated through scenario-based simulations and refined through daily drills, cross-functional training, and joint and combined exercises. Integrating these efforts with routine missions; domestic operations such as disaster relief; and overseas missions such as capacity-building assistance, counterpiracy operations, and international peace operations can further accelerate effectiveness. A comprehensive review that eliminates redundancies and enhances complementarities will improve both feasibility and operational impact.

At the same time, unforeseen contingencies are best prevented altogether. Thus, while revising the conduct of large-scale conventional warfare, it is equally essential to strengthen preventive measures, including training and exercises, defense cooperation and exchanges, capacity-building assistance, maritime security, and international peace operations. Moreover, given the enduring reality of nuclear-armed states, enhancing the effectiveness of deterrence strategies to prevent any contingency from escalating into nuclear war is an urgent priority.

Finally, it must be recognized that the “next war” is, at its core, a conceptual construct. Actual contingencies are unlikely to unfold exactly as envisioned. Reality emerges from the complex interaction of multiple factors, making significant divergence far more likely. Accordingly, we must not only set complex objectives—victory in contemporary warfare as well as in large-scale conventional warfare—and devise strategies to achieve them but also maintain the agility to reassess both objectives and methods as the character of warfare continues to evolve. In this sense, adaptability is not merely desirable but indispensable. This adaptability itself will be a core requirement for victory in the “next war.”

Institutional Transformation in the US Military

In 2020, the US Army Futures Command introduced the AimPoint Force Structure Initiative, a comprehensive reorganization plan targeting division- and corps-level formations.¹⁷ At the heart of this initiative lies the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), which the Army has designated as a central component of its future force structure.¹⁸ The MDTF is designed to conduct operations across all domains—land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum—against adversary antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) networks.¹⁹ Its mission is to enable joint force commanders to execute operational plans by integrating effects across domains. While the full composition of the MDTF remains classified, publicly available information indicates that its core elements include a Multi-Domain Effects Battalion (MDEB) responsible for information, space, cyber, and electronic warfare; a Strategic Fires Battalion equipped with mid- and long-range precision fires and hypersonic missiles; an Air Defense Battalion; and sustainment units. The MDTF’s structure is designed to be modular and adaptable to the specific requirements of joint force commanders.²⁰

In anticipation of future contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region, the first operational MDTF was established at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, in 2017.²¹ Since 2020, the US Army has conducted a series of specialized exercises to validate and refine the MDTF concept within the MDO framework.²² These exercises aim to enhance capabilities through iterative experimentation and feedback. Despite these efforts, MDO has faced criticism both within and outside the military. Detractors question whether MDO constitutes a genuinely novel concept, how it differs from traditional joint operations, whether it overly presumes adversary behavior, and whether it places excessive emphasis on nonmilitary responses.²³

These debates cannot be understood in isolation; they reflect nearly three decades of US Army deliberation over the nature of future warfare. Following the Gulf War, the perceived likelihood of conventional warfare declined, while threats diversified to include terrorism, insurgency, and civil conflict. In response, the Army expanded its role to encompass operations other than war, including counterterrorism, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping.²⁴ These missions were formally incorporated into joint doctrine in 1995 under the term “military operations other than war.”²⁵ However, the strategic environment shifted again with the resurgence of China and Russia. The 2018 National Defense Strategy marked a return to great power competition.²⁶ In alignment with this shift, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the National Military Strategy that same year, identifying “competing below the level of armed conflict” as a core military mission.²⁷

It was within this strategic recalibration that the US Army articulated the MDO concept (see figure 1).²⁸ The underlying premise is that adversaries now contest the United States across all domains. US dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum and information environment can no longer be assumed. Modern battlefields are increasingly characterized by dispersed, small-unit operations. Moreover, adversaries are focusing on the “competition phase”—the gray zone below the threshold of armed conflict—where deterrence is more challenging to apply. The Army also recognizes that future operations are likely to unfold in highly urbanized environments, further complicating traditional operational paradigms.²⁹ Additionally, the Army assesses that competitors such as China and Russia deliberately blur the lines between war and peace, seeking to expand their freedom of action into strategic support areas, including space, cyberspace, and even the US homeland.³⁰

To counter these challenges, the Army envisions MDO as a continuous campaign conducted across the full spectrum of conflict—from competition to armed conflict and back again—as part of the joint force. In peacetime, forward-deployed Army forces, Marine expeditionary units, and allied forces are postured to deter adversary fait accompli campaigns through presence, force distribution, and integrated operations. In crisis or conflict, the Army aims to establish a resilient posture by employing semi-independent maneuver across the physical, virtual, and cognitive dimensions of battlespace. When necessary, Army forces will integrate capabilities to penetrate or neutralize enemy A2/AD systems, secure freedom of maneuver, and restore favorable conditions.³¹

In parallel, the US Marine Corps developed its own concept in February 2021, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations. Rather than focusing solely on expeditionary assault, the Marine Corps emphasized the importance of building capabilities that allow forces to persist and operate forward as integral components of naval campaigns.³² This shift reflects a recognition that traditional Marine expeditionary operations have assumed uncontested sea control, air superiority, and secure maritime lines of communication—assumptions that no longer hold in the face of adversaries with global long-range strike capabilities. These adversaries seek to ensure their own security while eroding US influence and driving wedges between the United States and its allies. The Marine Corps concluded that such challenges cannot be met through incremental improvements in existing force employment.³³ While the United States may counter with superior long-range strike capabilities, overreliance on standoff operations risks increasing physical and operational distance from allies, thereby undermining coalition cohesion.³⁴ To mitigate this, the Marine Corps has adopted a posture of persistent forward presence. Units are deployed in peacetime to maintain relationships with host nations, collect targeting information, and conduct denial operations in contested maritime regions to support sea control.³⁵

These forward-deployed units are referred to as stand-in forces (SIF).³⁶ SIF is tasked with shaping the future operational environment during the competition phase by maintaining close ties with allies and partners. In crisis or conflict, they operate autonomously and in a distributed manner within adversary weapons engagement zones, enabling joint force access and engagement. Their presence complicates adversary targeting and imposes high costs on attempts to strike dispersed US forces.³⁷ For example, if an adversary seeks to target US naval assets from long range, the dispersed nature of SIF can disrupt targeting and force the adversary to expend disproportionate resources. SIF’s logic implies that allies must also maintain forward, resilient, and distributed forces.

While the Marine Corps encourages allies and partners to assume similar roles, it has also developed its own dedicated formation—the Marine littoral regiment (MLR)—to fulfill SIF missions (see figure 2). Although full details remain classified, the MLR is publicly known to include approximately eight hundred personnel organized into littoral combat teams, capable of autonomous intelligence collection, targeting, and fires; littoral anti-air battalions responsible for air defense, air traffic control, and aviation refueling; and support for logistics elements.³⁸

The development of these capabilities began in 2019, before the formalization of the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept, including experimental exercises involving the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit based in Okinawa.³⁹ Shortly after the concept was adopted, the first dedicated MLR—the 3rd MLR—was activated at Marine Corps Base Fort Shafter in March 2022.⁴⁰ They have established two MLRs in III Marine Expeditionary Force—3rd MLR and 12th MLR. 3rd MLR achieved initial operating capability in December 2023, and 12th MLR is projected to reach initial operating capability in 2026.⁴¹ Nevertheless, challenges remain. The Marine Corps commandant has acknowledged that internal consensus on the MLR’s role is still evolving.⁴² Operating in a dispersed manner under adversary influence raises concerns regarding command and control, sustainment, and the need to enhance tactical commanders’ capabilities. These challenges remain subjects of ongoing debate and refinement, and these issues continue to be subjects of internal discussion and refinement.⁴³

Both concepts seek to counter A2/AD, but the Army emphasizes cross-domain integration while the Marine Corps emphasizes forward persistence.

The JGSDF for the “Next War”

Because the “next war” will differ significantly from past wars, achieving victory in any contingency requires a concrete definition of the war itself. As long as the objective remains vague, preparations and responses are unlikely to be effective. Once defined, we must establish the conditions for victory and design the organizational structures, processes, and methods capable of achieving them, drawing upon military theory and related disciplines. These must be refined and institutionalized through daily duties, training, and practice in parallel. It goes without saying that such contingencies are best avoided altogether. Therefore, strengthening not only deterrence but also preventive frameworks must proceed in parallel.

As the pace of change accelerates, the gap between the capabilities the JGSDF must maintain in the future and its current posture will only widen. Moreover, specific structures and functions may exceed the JGSDF’s capacity alone or may not be appropriate for the JGSDF to undertake independently. Accordingly, the JGSDF will increasingly need to engage in discussions on integration, joint operations, and comprehensive cooperation with the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the Air Self-Defense Force, the forces of the US and like-minded countries, other government ministries and agencies, and even the private sector. At the same time, such a transformation cannot succeed without the understanding and trust of the Japanese people. Looking ahead, unprecedented challenges will require equally unprecedented concepts, organizational reforms, and cross-domain integration—from the employment of unmanned systems to cognitive resilience. Therefore, effective and continuous communication—both within the organization and to external audiences—regarding the nature of the “next war” and the JGSDF’s responses to it is indispensable. The JGSDF must commit to communicating these realities consistently and effectively in a sustained and impactful manner.

However, the changing character of warfare is so profound that the current JGSDF cannot adequately respond, making mission accomplishment increasingly uncertain. In such an environment, inaction itself becomes a strategic risk. Therefore, the JGSDF must undertake reforms within its own capacity and adopt a posture of steadily building results through routine duties. In other words, alongside broader communication on transformation, the JGSDF must demonstrate initiative and proactivity by implementing reforms wherever possible. Put differently, each JGSDF member, in the course of fulfilling their primary mission, must continually assess themselves against the anticipated character of the “next war” and pursue daily improvement—an effort synonymous with ongoing education, training, and practical duties. In this sense, reflecting on the theory of victory in the “next war” is inseparable from the discipline and practice required for accomplishing core missions and is essentially identical to the daily act of “defending Japan to safeguard its peace, independence, and national security.”⁴⁴

In conclusion, this article contributes to ongoing debates by linking classical force ratio theory with contemporary multidomain requirements. It also emphasizes that the JGSDF must, in the future, not only adopt modern systems in preparation for large-scale conventional warfare but also be ready to respond to a broader spectrum of warfare that now extends into the cyber, space, information, and cognitive domains—while working in coordination not only with the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces and the US and like-minded countries military but also with relevant government ministries and agencies and the private sector. Victory in the “next war” will depend on redefining the conditions for success across these domains and integrating insights from Lanchester’s laws, modern systems research, and the reforms undertaken by the US Army and Marine Corps. By strengthening interoperability with US forces, expanding bilateral joint and combined exercises, and pursuing innovative reforms at both individual and institutional levels, Japan can ensure the credibility and adaptability of its defense posture. Ultimately, the pursuit of a theory of victory for the “next war” is, in essence, identical to the daily mission of safeguarding Japan’s peace, independence, and security.

A Vision for the Future of US–Japan Bilateral Relations

The US Army and Marine Corps are exploring changes to their force structures in response to the evolving character of contemporary warfare. For example, the US Army revised Field Manual 3-90, Tactics, in May 2023, its first update since March 2013, and thus the first in about a decade.⁴⁵ How this revision is reflected within the Army will likely be observable in future US–Japan bilateral exercises. By studying the revision and confirming its field application, one can assess how quickly US forces adapt. This process also deepens understanding of our counterparts in bilateral operations. Moreover, some JGSDF personnel may find doctrinal study insufficient and seek to clarify questions directly during exercises. Naturally, this reflects not only the attitude of JGSDF personnel toward their US counterparts but also the reciprocal attitude of American soldiers toward the JGSDF. Such engagement directly enhances interoperability at the operational and tactical levels.

Furthermore, US–Japan bilateral cooperation is now a fundamental premise of national defense. Deepening understanding of counterparts, addressing questions that emerge in the process, and enhancing interoperability at the field level are themselves integral to achieving national defense and directly strengthen its effectiveness. In this sense, observing and engaging with US forces in bilateral exercises is not merely a learning opportunity; it is itself an act of national defense. In other words, reflecting on the “next war” while observing these developments in practice means that such actions themselves constitute part of national defense and enhance its credibility. If this article can serve as a step toward a deeper understanding of the JGSDF, toward even stronger US–Japan cooperation, and, above all, toward a contribution to world peace, it will have fulfilled its purpose.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the official positions, policies, or doctrinal views of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, the Ministry of Defense, or the government of Japan. This study is an academic and professional analysis intended to contribute to broader discussions on contemporary warfare, military theory, and US–Japan defense cooperation. Any references to US or Japanese doctrine, organizational structures, or operational concepts are used exclusively for analytical purposes and should not be interpreted as policy recommendations or official interpretations.

Portions of this manuscript were refined with the assistance of Copilot and Grammarly, both AI-based language tools. All interpretations, arguments, and conclusions remain solely those of the author.

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Notes

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles (Wisehouse, 2016), 13.
2. Kazumi Kuzuhara, Armored Warfare [in Japanese] (Sakuhin-sha, 2021), 61.
3. F. W. Lanchester, Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm (Constable and Company, 1916).
4. Lanchester, Aircraft in Warfare, 39–53.
5. Nobuo Taoka, Introduction to Lanchester’s Laws [in Japanese] (Business-sha, 1977), 22–23.
6. Taoka, Introduction to Lanchester’s Laws, 32–39.
7. Taoka, Introduction to Lanchester’s Laws, 30–31.
8. Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Manas, 2016), 28–35.
9. Biddle, Military Power, 1–13.
10. Biddle, Military Power, 48–51.
11. Biddle, Military Power, 30–35.
12. Biddle, Military Power, 35–44.
13. Biddle, Military Power, 44–48.
14. Biddle, Military Power, 73.
15. Biddle, Military Power, 78.
16. Takayasu Iwakami, “An Operational Concept for Japan Ground Self Defense Force 2022–2040: On Employment of Neo-Operational Unit Based Upon the ‘Next War’ Conception [in Japanese],” Journal of Strategic Studies 31 (2022): 116–18.
17. Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s AimPoint and Army 2030 Force Structure Initiative,” In Focus 11542 (Congressional Research Service [CRS], updated 31 January 2022), 1, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11542.
18. Feickert, “The Army’s AimPoint and Army 2030 Force Structure Initiative,” 1–2.
19. James C. McConville, Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Chief of Staff Paper #1 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 16 March 2021), 12.
20. Charles McEnany, “Multi-Domain Task Forces: A Glimpse at the Army of 2035,” Spotlight 22-2 (Association of the United States Army, March 2022), 4, https://www.ausa.org/publications/multi-domain-task-forces-glimpse-army-2035.
21. McEnany, “Multi-Domain Task Forces,” 3.
22. Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s Project Convergence,” In Focus 11654 (CRS, updated 2 June 2022), 1–2.
23. Stephen Townsend, “Accelerating Multi-Domain Operations: Evolution of an Idea,” Military Review Online Exclusive, 8 August 2018, 2, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2018-OLE/Aug/Accelerating-MD/; János Csengeri, “Multi-Domain Operations: A New Approach in Warfare?,” International Scientific Journal Security & Future 5, no. 3 (2021): 3, https://stumejournals.com/journals/confsec/2021/3/78; Dariusz Król and Tomasz Wójtowicz, “Multi-Domain Battle: New Doctrine of the United States Armed Forces,” Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Sztuki Wojennej [Scientific Journal of the War Studies University] 3, no. 112 (2018): 75, http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0013.0879.
24. Field Manual 100-5, Operations (US Government Printing Office [GPO], 1993 [obsolete]), 2-0–2-1.
25. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (US GPO, 1993 [obsolete]), V-1–V-16.
26. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (US Department of Defense, 2018), https://media.defense.gov/2020/May/18/2002302061/-1/-1/1/2018-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-SUMMARY.PDF.
27. Joint Staff, Description of the National Military Strategy 2018 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019), 3, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf.
28. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, Army Futures Command Concept for Maneuver in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (TRADOC, 2020).
29. TP 525-3-1, Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (TRADOC, 2018), vi.
30. TP 525-3-1, Multi-Domain Operations 2028, vi.
31. TP 525-3-1, Multi-Domain Operations 2028, 15–23.
32. US Marine Corps (USMC), Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (Headquarters, USMC, 2021), I-1–I-2, https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/TM-EABO-First-Edition-1.pdf.
33. USMC, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, I-2.
34. USMC, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, I-2.
35. USMC, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, I-3–I-4.
36. USMC, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, I-4–I-5.
37. USMC, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, 2nd ed. (Headquarters, USMC, 2023), I-3–I-5, https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Docs/230509-Tentative-Manual-For-Expeditionary-Advanced-Base-Operations-2nd-Edition.pdf.
38. USMC, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, 2nd ed., A-1–A-5; USMC, Force Design 2030: Annual Update (Headquarters, USMC, May 2022), 4, https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Docs/Force_Design_2030_Annual_Update_May_2022.pdf.
39. USMC, Force Design 2030, 5–6.
40. “Redesignated: 3rd Marine Regiment Becomes 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment,” US Marine Corps, 3 March 2022, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2965735/redesignated-3rd-marine-regiment-becomes-3rd-marine-littoral-regiment.
41. USMC, Force Design: Annual Update (Headquarters, USMC, October 2025), 4, https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Docs/Force_Design_Update-October_2025.pdf.
42. USMC, Force Design 2030, 4–5.
43. Nicholas R. Bolvin, “Logistics in the Littorals: Designing the Future Tactical-Level LCE,” Marine Corps Gazette (March 2022): WE27–WE28.
44. Jieitai Hō [Self-Defense Forces Act], Law No. 165 of 1954 (Shugiin), art. 3, para. 1 (Japan).
45. Field Manual 3-90, Tactics (US Government Publishing Office, May 2023).

 

 

 

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