Publishing Disclaimer: In all of its publications and products, Military Review presents professional information. However, the views expressed therein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Army University, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. government.

---

 

Bond, Bots, and Bioweapons

“No Time to Die” and the Future of Assassinations, Warfare, and Genocide

 

Grant W. Turner

 

Download the PDF

 

For all their problems, the James Bond films have long made geopolitics digestible, potentially altering the viewers’ understandings of their world.¹ They’ve portrayed power dynamics among corporations, governments, and smaller nonstate actors, the power of the media, space-based technologies, leveraged information, finance, water, oil, and a whole host of other issues.

Unlike previous Bonds, where existing technology was often the threat and potential technology was typically the gimmick, the Daniel Craig era stands out for its focus on the implications of modern power dynamics and real emerging technologies in the hands of governments, corporations, and other nonstate actors. No Time to Die, the twenty-fifth film in the James Bond series, is a fitting conclusion to this theme, highlighting a realm of emerging technology that has been left out of public discourse and somehow left out of the public’s discussion of the film: autonomous bioweapons.²

Central to the film are nanobots programmed to kill individuals or groups based on their DNA. At least some aspects of the means and ends of the technology portrayed are uncomfortably possible in the next century. And yet, very few felt prompted by the film to publicly address this fact, with at least some denying it: “While data breaches and DNA are consistent factors of modern life, that these two things are combined into a targeted killing machine defies reality.”³ There are reasons to believe that this analysis is misguided.

In broad strokes, such weapons like the so-called “ethno-weapons,” are not so far-fetched. Worse, existing technology enables comparatively crude but highly effective automated, remote, and targeted killing based on biological factors. Specifically, lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS, a.k.a. hunter-killer robots) are already operational, and the use of nanobots and biotechnology for increasingly sophisticated operations are readily on the horizon as dual-use technologies advance.⁴ In an era where knowledge and materials are easily obtained, effectively regulating these technologies will be difficult, if not impossible.⁵

Further, this evolving arms race coincides with a worrying global trend of rising ethnonationalism.⁶ Such circumstances demand proactive discussions, policies, and plans for inevitable forms of biological and autonomous weaponry.⁷ Thus, this article aims to help guide this effort by exploring how realistic such a threat is, examining what similar threats may exist, and providing a wealth of citations for further reading.

Ethno-Weapons

As early as the 1940s, ethno-weapons have been discussed in fiction.⁸ There were academic-military discussions as early as 1970 about how genetic differences could be leveraged in war on a targeted basis, whether by disrupting physiology or enabling selective genocide and assassination.⁹ Concerns about such weapons have only increased over time.

By 1997, U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen publicly discussed the need to prepare for such weapons.¹⁰ The British Medical Association released a report in 1999 that ethnic weapons were not possible, but a 2004 follow-up report stated that the world must start preparing for this “approaching reality.”¹¹ The 2004 report was met with skepticism by some, with at least one expert stating, “Because all groups are quite similar you will never get something that is highly selective. The best you would probably do is something that kills 20% of one group and 28% of another.”¹² The International Committee of the Red Cross, in 2002 and 2005, felt that the global community should attempt to coordinate arms controls and contingencies for their eventual use.¹³

The problem is that humans will find a way to crudely or surgically design some sort of bioweapon that targets its victims based on their DNA or other physical factors. Such a weapon will find its targets, either accidentally or intentionally, with the fallout matching its sophistication. Furthermore, history arguably demonstrates that collateral damage from the use of unsophisticated forms of such weapons is considered acceptable, or even advantageous, by many.¹⁴

Consequently, as technology has progressed, various members of security and scientific communities have continued to raise concerns over ethnic weapons. These include geneticists, a former under secretary of defense, the University of Cambridge’s Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, and medical ethicists and experts writing about weapons of mass destruction, and Chinese military documents revealing that they are at least discussing the potential advent of “ethnic-specific genetic bioweapons” and possible applications, including offensive capabilities and “biological deterrence.”¹⁵

How would such weapons work? DNA-based targeting isn’t outside the realm of possibility, but DNA isn’t the only biological factor one could target. While human DNA may be too similar to target without unacceptable blowback, other heritable traits are far more specific. Indeed, such differences are what Carl Larson’s 1970 article highlights.¹⁶ One prominent example referenced was that some populations are somewhat unique possessing (or lack thereof) certain enzymes, which in turn leave them vulnerable to certain chemical or biological attacks.

In rebuttals to a 2022 Russian claim that the United States and Ukraine had developed bioweapons that will only affect ethnic Russians, expert responses ranged from it being impossible to create an ethnically specific genetics-based bioweapon to it being “highly unlikely.”¹⁷ In the latter case, while a bioweapon targeting an ethnicity via DNA was not ruled out, it seemed more likely that methods not focused on genetics may have a higher probability of efficacy. The same was said of methods that are less specific in targeting ethnicities (which are unlikely to be genetically definable) and gene pools larger than the concept (e.g., European).

Present applications. The Human Genome Project was founded in 1988 with the goal of “the complete mapping and understanding of all the genes of human beings.”¹⁸ Rudimentary gene editing began in the late 1990s, and a new means of gene editing emerged by the late 2000s.¹⁹ Publicly referred to as “CRISPR” (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats, a specific acquired immunity system), and combined with big data projects such as the Human Genome Project, the relatively accessible technique became a global sensation by early 2010s and spurred a wide variety of experiments and new and improved gene-editing techniques (e.g., prime editing, twin prime editing, base editors, and CRISPR-off).²⁰

By 2018, such techniques enabled reliable DNA modification in farm animals and plants, consistently producing desired traits.²¹ The altering of human DNA had also already been achieved by home enthusiasts and scientists alike for purposes ranging from amateur and commercial “biohacking” to clinical trials combating human illnesses.²² Strikingly, countries including the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are either thinking about or perhaps actively trying to create “super soldiers” (increasing strength, stamina, and intelligence) and “cyborgs” (controlling a machine via a genetically altered human body or controlling a genetically altered human body via a machine).²³

Future applications. What may be most important in all these realms over the next century is the combination of quantum computing, artificial intelligence (AI), big data, and the Internet of Things as some key elements of the fourth industrial revolution.²⁴ Each enables unfathomably quick and sophisticated research and development of nano, chemical, robotic, and biological (including neuro) technologies.²⁵ In combination, they develop more rapidly and evolve in new directions, especially as certain forms of these technologies become capable of autonomously researching, designing, programming, manufacturing, assembling, and actively improving both themselves and other end products (for examples of how the technologies discussed thus far can and will be combined to enhance each other).²⁶

While many of these technologies are in their infancy, the fact remains that they were born into this world and are growing fast. The benchmark for a fully developed quantum computer will likely be achieved in thirty years or less, but even less advanced models are already demonstrating their value.²⁷ It should come as no surprise that the combination of the disciplines embodying these technologies were identified in a 2020 report by the U.S. Army War College as yielding “substantial technology convergences … likely to occur that are valuable to the [Army] over the next 15 years.”²⁸

For now, the need for more research, ethical concerns, and murky regulations has limited progress on significant human alterations, at least in countries sensitive to such matters.²⁹ Nonetheless, as data accrues, funds flow in, and technology progresses, it is conceivable that with relatively little effort and funding, a state or nonstate actor could modify the genetics of a specific population, making them vulnerable to a predetermined threat.³⁰ Such modifications could make targets vulnerable to their environment or to factors introduced at the desired moment for a desired effect. It will likely also be possible to introduce disabilities or degenerative diseases, shorten life spans, or render people infertile.

Such attacks could be designed or deployed to prevent ill effects for other populations not of the target group. This could perhaps be achieved via technology akin to a current U.S. research effort to protect soldiers from genetic attacks, and it could also be an effective ethno-weapon.³¹ These scenarios could be done in such a way that makes it is very hard, if not impossible, to trace. Even with advanced medicine it might also be difficult to diagnose and treat. Furthermore, the actors most likely to deploy such technologies effectively—namely authoritarian regimes, terrorists, and failed states—will almost certainly be able to avoid accountability and prevent treatment from reaching victims.

Unfortunately, there are simpler and more readily available ways to kill or incapacitate based on features such as race or ethnicity, with or without genetic markers. This brings us to robotics.

Hunter-Killer Robots

Robots are increasingly capable of autonomously carrying out sophisticated tasks while navigating complex environments (e.g., land, water, air, space, and inside organisms).³² They do so via complex arrays of sensors and communications equipment integrated with AI.³³ They present the easiest means of deploying an ethno-weapon like LAWS. These hunter-killer robots can be given preset commands to identify, track, and kill a target, thus requiring little to no subsequent human oversight.³⁴ There is nothing to stop someone from creating a kill list based on various social categories, physical characteristics, and other programmable distinctions.

You could theoretically program quadcopters or other LAWS to kill a specific person with current sensing technology despite current difficulties in achieving a desirable level of accurate and precise recognition.³⁵ You could also enhance specificity utilizing a wide variety of other data points.³⁶ Sensory data could include eye color, skin color, height, weight, gait, facial features, body temperature, fashion (clothing and accessories), dwellings, transportation, or sounds. Nonsensory driven data could include geographic location (present or historical), income, family records (e.g., legal, historical, DNA, and other forms of tracking lineage), health records, test scores, citizenship, religion, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, gender, political affiliation, occupation or employer, social affiliations, and social media data; just about anything you can think of.

Obviously, almost all these data points need to be associated (in terms of programming) with a specific individual, or at least physical features, so that LAWS can sense and assess. However, more and more of the world is becoming entangled in increasingly unified digital panopticons (e.g., surveillance capitalism and surveillance by extremist and totalitarian governments).³⁷ As the means of collecting, processing, and applying data improves, such programming will become easier and easier.³⁸ In the near term, a person would just need to ensure they’ve collected the desired sensory data on the targets, which can be done with automated or manned surveillance processes. In the long term, data concerning individuals in their totality will be at the disposal of anyone with access to its storage.

In short, it is already possible for just about anyone to target an individual or group, with margins of error that would be acceptable to many actors, and this could occur at incredibly high speeds in terms of travel and coordination. The U.S. military is already concerned that certain forms of LAWS like drone swarms may be too fast to counteract effectively.³⁹ Strikingly, such technology is so readily available that home enthusiasts were already considered a threat by the U.S. military in January 2022.⁴⁰ Conflicts like Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have arguably fast-tracked the emergence of these threats.

Within a couple of decades, the margins of error for identifying, tracking, and attacking targets will be incredibly small, and these robots will be even smaller and more sophisticated.⁴¹ While there may be overly high expectations for LAWS on the battlefield, or even in the scenarios outlined thus far, the enhanced intelligence and targeting capabilities of related suites of robotics, sensors, and AI are still significant, and may be a harbinger of the late-twenty-first century.⁴² If you want a glimpse into the future of LAWS before continuing, I strongly suggest watching the drone swarm attack scene in the 2019 film Angel Has Fallen or the short film Slaughter Bots, as they portray a terrifying future that may soon be the present.⁴³

Nanotech, Neurowarfare, and Cyborgs

Perhaps the most interesting and worrying are the rapidly evolving dual-use technologies that can assess, integrate with, alter, control, disrupt, or destroy brain, mind, and body components.⁴⁴ The PRC and Russia have invested heavily in these realms to catch up with the United States and its partners.⁴⁵

These technologies utilize combinations of nanorobotics (a.k.a. nanobots), technological implants prosthetics or interfaces, genetic engineering, various chemicals, microorganisms, wireless transmissions, and data on biomarkers and persons. These are increasingly capable of targeting highly specific parts of the body and mind, and it is quite conceivable that these and other technologies could be combined so that they at least target a specific individual, if not specified groups.

That is not to say that such technologies are, will be, or need to be capable of identifying a target by their DNA. Rather, DNA or other databases could be cross-referenced to select targets against which people or larger robots could deploy. However, as we shall see, it is also not out of the question that nanobots, chemicals, or microorganisms could be crafted to only impact people with specific biomarkers (perhaps induced), however much collateral there might be.

The U.S. military is racing to find ways to defend individuals against “accidental or intentional genome editing technologies” via “tools and methodologies to control, counter, or even reverse the effects of genome editing.”⁴⁶ To demonstrate the degree to which seemingly science fiction concepts are increasingly becoming reality, let’s briefly examine three examples: the current state of nanobots, the Next-Generation Nonsurgical Neurotechnology (N³) program, and cyborgs.⁴⁷

Nanobots. Nanoscience and nanotechnology concern the study and control of objects that exist roughly in the range of one to one hundred nanometers; this measurement is hard to conceive, so let’s just leave it to things as small as viruses and atoms.⁴⁸ Nanobots are synthetic, biological, and hybrid objects and devices that exist at the nanoscale.⁴⁹ They can be made out of things such as simple molecules (including DNA), viruses, and cells.⁵⁰

Though many are still in the early stages of research and development, nanobots are being created that are self-propelled, self-assembling, or both self-replicating and “programmable.”⁵¹ Current or approaching capabilities include manufacturing molecules, altering DNA, or reacting to your mental state or other biological factors to release targeted medical treatments.⁵²

Additionally, it was announced in 2018 that researchers successfully aerosolized nanobots, raising concerns about how nanobots on the horizon may be deployed.⁵³ Like with the Bond film, nanobots can be absorbed by the body via skin, eyes, nasal passageways, lungs, or mouth. Such noninvasive means of entry bring us to the N³ program, sponsored by the Department of Defense’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.⁵⁴

N³ Program. The N³ program aims to create noninvasive (no surgery or injection) brain-machine interfaces, including the installation of nanomaterials throughout highly specific parts of the brain and body, which can then be used to remotely input and send information.⁵⁵ According to one of the leading dual-use neuroscientists, this technology may be at a “developmental tech readiness level” by 2026.⁵⁶ However, the N³ program is just a tiny sliver of what’s occurring in the realm of neuroscience and neurotechnology (neuro S/T).

Neuro S/T is a rapidly growing industry projected to reach a global market value of $721 billion in revenue by 2026 with a compound annual growth rate of 4.2 percent across segments, according to Deloitte.⁵⁷ This is partially driven by corporate interests and a global arms race.⁵⁸ As stated earlier, this is also significantly boosted by investments and advancements in other emerging technologies like the global biotechnology market, which Grand View Research projects to reach $2.78 trillion at 14 percent compound annual growth rate by 2026.⁵⁹

Cyborgs. Between the size of the industries and the current state of gene editing, nanobots, the ability to remotely control small animals with brain implants, and various human-machine interfaces (e.g., prosthetics and communications systems), it is no wonder that the idea of cyborgs by 2050 was the topic of a 2019 report by the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command’s Chemical Biological Center.⁶⁰ Drawing on current science, the report uses four case studies to outline how a future of scientifically augmented humans that are physically and cognitively integrated with machinery may come into being and what it all means for the military and society.⁶¹

The two most interesting case studies concern restoring, programming, and controlling a human’s muscles via genetic modifications and sensors built into an exoskeleton; and neural implants for brain-computer interfacing.⁶² The technology from the first case study enhances a soldier’s physical performance, allowing them to complete unfamiliar tasks and regain mobility if injured or unconscious. The technology from the second case study will enable soldiers to remotely send and receive data so they can control or gain information from various machines (e.g., drones), and so they could communicate with other humans, with it all coming together “to enhance situational awareness as drone, computational analytical, and human information is related to the operator.”⁶³

The takeaway on nanobots and neurowarfare is that seemingly impossible technologies are already here. Ultimately, scientists, ethicists, governments, and the business class will have the most control over how such technology develops. However, the public needs to be a part of the discourse too; that begins with awareness and brings us back to Bond.

Conclusion

The risks of these technologies being deployed for various purposes will drastically increase over the next century and onward, as Pandora’s box has long been open. When all these known emerging technologies, databases, and potential actors are considered, we are forced to conclude that No Time to Die portrays uncomfortably realistic possibilities, even if the movie gets the details wrong.

As demonstrated, there are already many ways to combine biological data and traits with constructs of race, ethnicity, identity, class, or other data points for the sake of targeted killing or disruption. There are also a variety of seemingly impossible, ethically questionable, or repugnant technologies that either already exist in one form or another—or will within the next few decades. One final thing worth mentioning but not discussed is good, old-fashioned social manipulation.⁶⁴

Throughout history, motivated individuals and groups with the crudest of tools have been capable of driving societies to view the world differently; to behave differently; to vote differently; and to dehumanize, discriminate, torture, murder, and commit genocide.⁶⁵ As we learn more about how individuals and groups perceive, think, feel, and act, we become more capable of manipulating and weaponizing them. Combined with the rising ethnonationalism of the PRC, Russia, and among the so-called West and their partners, urgent action is needed.⁶⁶

While the bulk of the international community’s focus appears to be on LAWS, more scientists and policymakers are gradually participating in legal and ethical discussions of “neurorights,” military uses of genetic enhancements and attacks, and weaponized nanotechnology.⁶⁷ Sadly, even with a radical intensification of efforts to address these threats, we can only hope that the efficacy of social control via the then-new technologies and techniques in the twentieth century, and the horrors that accompanied them, are not made quaint by the methods of the twenty-first century.⁶⁸

 

---

Notes

1. Eric Deggans, “Coming to Terms with James Bond’s Flawed Past—as a Fan and as a Critic,” NPR, 9 October 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/10/09/1044352399/coming-to-terms-with-james-bonds-flawed-past-as-a-fan-and-as-a-critic.
2. No Time to Die, directed by Cary Joji Fukunaga (Universal Pictures, 2021).
3. Brandon Valeriano, “James Bond Made Redundant,” Duck of Minerva, 19 October 2021, https://www.duckofminerva.com/2021/10/james-bond-made-redundant.html.
4. “What Are the Dangers of Autonomous Weapons?,” posted 1 December 2021 by International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8GwBTFRFlzA; Peter Apps, “New Era of Robot War May Be Underway Unnoticed: Peter Apps,” Reuters, 10 June 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/apps-drones/column-new-era-of-robot-war-may-be-underway-unnoticed-peter-apps-idUSL5N2NS2E8; Marcello Ienca and Effy Vayena, “Dual Use in the 21st Century: Emerging Risks and Global Governance,” Swiss Medical Weekly 148, no. 4748 (2018): w14688, https://doi.org/10.4414/smw.2018.14688.
5. “The Ethics of Autonomous Weapons Systems: Background Readings, November 21–22, 2014,” Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law, University of Pennsylvania, archived 1 August 2021 at https://web.archive.org/web/20210801075545/https://archive.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/ethicsofweapons/background-readings.php; Frank Sauer, “Stepping Back from the Brink: Why Multilateral Regulation of Autonomy in Weapons Systems Is Difficult, Yet Imperative and Feasible,” International Review of the Red Cross, no. 913 (March 2021), https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/stepping-back-from-brink-regulation-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-913.
6. Jocelyne Cesari et al., “The Rise of Ethnonationalism and the Future of Liberal Democracy,” posted 24 May 2017 by Council on Foreign Relations, YouTube, https://youtu.be/rMNP3_WtqQE; Jade McGlynn and Kirill Shamiev, “The Return of Russian Ethnonationalism Chauvinism Under—and After—Putin,” Foreign Affairs, 17 August 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/return-russian-ethnonationalism; Hu YanWenan, “The Rising Tide of ‘Imperial Han’ Nationalism in China,” The Diplomat, 2 December 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/the-rising-tide-of-imperial-han-nationalism-in-china/.
7. Andrea Howard, “The Pandemic and America’s Response to Future Bioweapons,” War on the Rocks, 1 May 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/the-pandemic-and-americas-response-to-future-bioweapons/; Douglas Barrie et al., Armed Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles and the Challenges of Autonomy (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 21 December 2021), https://www.iiss.org/research-paper//2021/12/armed-uninhabited-aerial-vehicles-and-the-challenges-of-autonomy.
8. Wikipedia, “Sixth Column,” last modified 29 March 2025, 11:45 (UTC), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sixth_Column.
9. Carl A. Larson, “Ethnic Weapons,” Military Review 50, no. 11 (November 1970): 3–11, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Directors-Select-Articles/Ethnic-Weapons/.
10. “DoD News Briefing: Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 28 April 1997, archived 18 November 2004 at https://web.archive.org/web/20041118074748/http:/www.defense.gov/transcripts/1997/t042897_t0428coh.html.
11. David Adam, “Could You Make a Genetically Targeted Weapon?,” The Guardian, 28 October 2004, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2004/oct/28/thisweekssciencequestions.weaponstechnology.
12. Adam, “Could You Make a Genetically Targeted Weapon?”
13. ICRC, Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity: An Informal Meeting of Government and Independent Experts, Montreux, Switzerland, 23-24 September 2002 (ICRC, 2002), https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/external/doc/en/assets/files/other/montreux_report.pdf; Jacques Forster, “Preventing the Use of Biological and Chemical Weapons: 80 Years On,” speech presented at International Seminar on the Biological and Chemical Weapons Threat, Geneva, 10 June 2005, archived 10 May 2012 at https://web.archive.org/web/20120510003456/http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/gas-protocol-100605.htm.
14. Adam, “Could You Make a Genetically Targeted Weapon?” History has made it abundantly clear that many find collateral damage—even among their own people—acceptable, especially in times of war. Furthermore, objectives such as fear, hatred, chaos, and a variety of ideological ends can encourage the use of autonomous bioweapons, dealing with a distinction of 20 percent versus 28 percent.
15. Andrew Hessel et al., “Hacking the President’s DNA,” The Atlantic, November 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/hacking-the-presidents-dna/309147/?single_page=true; Rosa Brooks, “Can There Be War Without Soldiers?,” Foreign Policy, 15 March 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/15/can-there-be-war-without-soldiers-weapons-cyberwarfare/; Sarah Knapton, “World Must Prepare for Biological Weapons that Target Ethnic Groups Based on Genetics, Says Cambridge University,” The Telegraph, 12 August 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2019/08/12/world-must-prepare-biological-weapons-target-ethnic-groups-based/; Joseph DeFranco et al., “Redefining Neuroweapons: Emerging Capabilities in Neuroscience and Neurotechnology,” PRISM 3, no. 8 (9 January 2020): 49–63, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2053388/redefining-neuroweapons-emerging-capabilities-in-neuroscience-and-neurotechnolo/; Elsa B. Kania, “Minds at War: China’s Pursuit of Military Advantage Through Cognitive Science and Biotechnology,” PRISM 3, no. 8 (9 January 2020): 83–101, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2053585/minds-at-war-chinas-pursuit-of-military-advantage-through-cognitive-science-and/.
16. Larson, “Ethnic Weapons.”
17. Aristos Georgiou, “Russian Claim Ukraine Making Ethno-Specific Bioweapons Is ‘Science Fiction,’” Newsweek, 11 March 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-claim-ukraine-making-ethnic-specific-bioweapons-science-fiction-united-states-1687219.
18. “The Fact Sheet: Human Genome Project,” National Human Genome Research Institute, last modified 13 June 2024, https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/educational-resources/fact-sheets/human-genome-project.
19. “What Is Genome Editing?,” National Human Genome Research Institute, last modified 15 August 2019, https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/policy-issues/what-is-Genome-Editing; Yoshizumi Ishino et al., “History of CRISPR-Cas from Encounter with a Mysterious Repeated Sequence to Genome Editing Technology,” Journal of Bacteriology 200, no. 7 (2018): e00580-17, https://doi.org/10.1128/JB.00580-17.
20. “What Are Genome Editing and CRISPR-Cas9?,” MedlinePlus, last modified 22 March 2022, https://medlineplus.gov/genetics/understanding/genomicresearch/genomeediting/; Heidi Ledford and Ewen Callaway, “Pioneers of Revolutionary CRISPR Gene Editing Win Chemistry Nobel,” Nature, 7 October 2020, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02765-9; Heidi Ledford, “Super-Precise New CRISPR Tool Could Tackle a Plethora of Genetic Diseases,” Nature, 6 November 2019, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03164-5; Yahya Chaudhry, “Twin Gene-Editing System Gives Twice the Efficiency,” Harvard Gazette, 17 December 2021, https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2021/12/new-technique-enables-manipulation-of-large-dna-segments/; “New Gene-Editing Technique Offers Scientists Ability to ‘Turn On’ Enzymes That Cause DNA Base Mutations,” Penn Medicine News, 28 October 2021, https://www.pennmedicine.org/news/news-releases/2021/october/new-gene-editing-technique-offers-scientists-ability-to-turn-on-enzymes-that-cause-dna-mutations; Eva Frederick, “An On-Off Switch for Gene Editing,” MIT News, 14 April 2021, https://news.mit.edu/2021/switch-crispr-gene-editing-0414.
21. “The Ultimate Life Hacker,” Foreign Affairs, 16 April 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/interviews/2018-04-16/ultimate-life-hacker.
22. Patrick Griffin, “Edit Thyself: Biohacking in the Age of CRISPR,” Harvard University, 18 December 2018, https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2018/edit-thyself-biohacking-age-crispr/; Matthew P. Hirakawa et al., “Gene Editing and CRISPR in the Clinic: Current and Future Perspectives,” Bioscience Reports 40, no. 4 (2020): BSR20200127, https://doi.org/10.1042%2FBSR20200127.
23. Adam Gabbatt, “China Conducting Biological Tests to Create Super Soldiers, US Spy Chief Says,” The Guardian, 4 December 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/04/china-super-soldiers-biologically-enhanced-john-ratcliffe; Peter Emanuel et al., Cyborg Soldier 2050: Human/Machine Fusion and the Implications for the Future of the DOD (U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Chemical Biological Center, October 2019), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1083010.pdf.
24. “What Are Industry 4.0, the Fourth Industrial Revolution, and 4IR?,” McKinsey, 17 August 2022, https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/mckinsey-explainers/what-are-industry-4-0-the-fourth-industrial-revolution-and-4ir.
25. “Materials for Precision Medicine,” special issue, Advanced Materials 32, no. 13 (2020), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/15214095/2020/32/13; Jeannette Garcia, “How Quantum Computing Could Remake Chemistry,” Scientific American, 15 March 2021, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-quantum-computing-could-remake-chemistry/; Dhruva Nathan et al., “Si-Based Self-Programming Neuromorphic Integrated Circuits for Intelligent Morphing Wings,” Journal of Composite Materials 56, no. 30 (2022): 4561–75, https://doi.org/10.1177/00219983221134929; Carolina van Weerd and Deborah Lassche, National Security Implications of Quantum Technology and Biotechnology (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, October 2021), https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Strategic-Alert-Quantum-Technology-HCSS-TNO-2021-2.pdf; Gabriel A. Silva, “Large-Scale Simulations of the Brain May Need to Wait for Quantum Computers,” Forbes, 2 September 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/gabrielasilva/2021/09/02/large-scale-simulations-of-the-brain-may-need-to-wait-for-quantum-computers/?sh=5d78fce07254.
26. Matthew Hutson, “AI Learns to Write Computer Code in ‘Stunning’ Advance,” Science, 8 December 2022, https://www.science.org/content/article/ai-learns-write-computer-code-stunning-advance; Craig R. Carignan et al., “Editorial: Robotic In-Situ Servicing, Assembly and Manufacturing,” Front Robot AI 9 (2022), https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2022.887506; Amira Abdel-Rahman et al., “Self-Replicating Hierarchical Modular Robotic Swarms,” Communications Engineering 1, no. 1 (2022): 35, https://www.nature.com/articles/s44172-022-00034-3; Jacky Liang et al., “Robots That Write Their Own Code,” ArXiv, 19 September 2022, https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2209.07753; Giovanni Finocchio et al., “Roadmap for Unconventional Computing with Nanotechnology,” ArXiv, 17 January 2023, https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2301.06727; Taha Basheer Taha et al., “Nanotechnology and Computer Science: Trends and Advances,” Memories – Materials, Devices, Circuits, and Systems 2 (2022): 100011, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.memori.2022.100011; Jeff Hecht, “Nanomaterials Pave the Way for the Next Computing Generation,” Nature 608, no. S2-S3 (2022), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-02147-3; “Quantum Nanoscience,” Nature Nanotechnology 16, no. 12 (2021): 1293, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41565-021-01058-0; Keith A. Brown et al., “Machine Learning in Nanoscience: Big Data at Small Scales,” Nano Letters 20, no. 1 (2020): 2–10, https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.nanolett.9b04090; Yang Yang and Pengcheng Jiao, “Nanomaterials and Nanotechnology for Biomedical Soft Robots,” Materials Today Advances 17 (2023): 100338, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mtadv.2022.100338; David A. Winkler, “Role of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Nanosafety,” Small 16, no. 36 (2020): 2001883, https://doi.org/10.1002/smll.202001883; Katherine E. Dunn and Alistair Elfick, “Harnessing DNA Nanotechnology and Chemistry for Applications in Photonics and Electronics,” Bioconjugate Chemistry 34, no. 1 (2023): 97–104, https://pubs.acs.org/doi/full/10.1021/acs.bioconjchem.2c00286; Joshua Moser et al., “An Autonomous Task Assignment Paradigm for Autonomous Robotic In-Space Assembly,” Frontiers in Robotics and AI 9 (2022), https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2022.709905.
27. Michele Mosca and Marco Piani, 2021 Quantum Threat Timeline Report: Global Risk Institute (Global Risk Institute, January 2022), https://globalriskinstitute.org/publication/2021-quantum-threat-timeline-report-global-risk-institute-global-risk-institute/.
28. Nicholas Delcour et al., Estimation of Technology Convergence by 2035 (U.S. Army War College, 1 August 2020), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1109853.pdf.
29. Patricia J. Zettler et al., “Regulating Genetic Biohacking,” Science 365, no. 6448 (2019): 34–36, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aax3248.
30. Jon Cohen and Nirja Desai, “With Its CRISPR Revolution, China Becomes a World Leader in Genome Editing,” Science, 2 August 2019, https://science.org/content/article/its-crispr-revolution-china-becomes-world-leader-genome-editing.
31. Anne Cheever, “Safe Genes,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), accessed 30 April 2025, https://www.darpa.mil/program/safe-genes.
32. Bartlett Russell, “Urban Reconnaissance Through Supervised Autonomy (URSA),” DARPA, accessed 30 April 2025, https://www.darpa.mil/research/programs/urban-reconnaissance-through-supervised-autonomy; “The Evolution of Boston Dynamics,” posted 30 December 2020 by 11 Network Australia, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D_Vc_yDvU24; Ryan Fedasiuk, “How China Is Militarizing Autonomous Underwater Vehicle Technology,” Maritime Executive, 22 August 2021, https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/how-china-is-militarizing-autonomous-underwater-vehicle-technology; “Advanced AI Drones Being Used by Police Agencies,” posted 10 March 2021 by CBS News, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=54QdlwsZATE; Sita Sonty et al., “Op-ed: Automation a Key Enabler of the Future Space Economy,” Space News, 6 October 2021, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-automation-a-key-enabler-of-the-future-space-economy/; Carlos De Rojas, “Arming Biological Nanobots to Deliver Drugs Inside Our Bodies,” Labiotech.eu, last updated 25 June 2022, https://labiotech.eu/in-depth/nanobots-drug-delivery/.
33. “How AI Is Driving a Future of Autonomous Warfare,” posted 25 June 2021 by DW News, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NpwHszy7bMk.
34. “Warfare Is Going Autonomous and Robotic,” posted 7 March 2021 by CaspianReport, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iC1ygtfAKZE.
35. James Andrew Lewis and William Crumpler, “How Does Facial Recognition Work?” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 June 2021), https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-does-facial-recognition-work.
36. “A.I. Is Making It Easier to Kill (You). Here’s How,” posted 13 December 2019 by The New York Times, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GFD_Cgr2zho.
37. “Ethics Explainer: The Panopticon,” The Ethics Centre, 18 July 2017, https://ethics.org.au/ethics-explainer-panopticon-what-is-the-panopticon-effect/; Shoshana Zuboff, “You Are Now Remotely Controlled,” New York Times, 24 January 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/opinion/sunday/surveillance-capitalism.html; Francesco Ragazzi et al., Biometric and Behavioural Mass Surveillance in EU Member States (Greens/EFA in the European Parliament, 1 October 2021), https://www.greens-efa.eu/biometricsurveillance/; Ross Andersen, “The Panapticon Is Already Here,” The Atlantic, September 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/china-ai-surveillance/614197/.
38. The New York Times, “A.I. Is Making It Easier to Kill (You).”
39. “What Are Robotic Swarms? An Overview,” posted 9 April 2020 by United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V5UGHixAjLE; David Hambling, “Drone Swarms Are Getting Too Fast for Humans to Fight, U.S. General Warns,” Forbes, 27 January 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2021/01/27/drone-swarms-are-getting-too-fast-for-humans-too-fight-us-general-warns/?sh=4d128a09372c.
40. James Marson and Stephen Kalin, “The Military’s New Challenge: Defeating Cheap Hobbyist Drones,” Wall Street Journal, 5 January 2022, https://wsj.com/articles/the-militarys-new-challenge-defeating-cheap-hobbyist-drones-11641401270.
41. “10 TINY Micro Robots and Nano Drones,” posted 31 July 2020 by DailyTop20s, YouTube, archived 22 February 2021 at https://web.archive.org/web/20210222140659/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j_Nws3R4fsA; Ronald Polcawich, “Short-Range Independent Microrobotic Platforms (SHRIMP),” DARPA, archived 11 May 2020 at https://web.archive.org/web/20200511123626/https://www.darpa.mil/program/short-range-independent-microrobotic-platforms.
42. Anthony King, “Digital Targeting: Artificial Intelligence, Data, and Military Intelligence,” Journal of Global Security Studies 9, no. 2 (2024): ogae009, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogae009.
43. “Angel Has Fallen || Drones Attack Scene in HD,” posted 13 November 2019 by Kim Chua, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aYywnZFPe6g; “Horror Short Film ‘Slaughterbots,’” posted 17 January 2019 by ALTER, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fa9lVwHHqg.
44. James Giordano and Diane DiEuliis, Emerging Neuroscience and Technology (NeuroS/T): Current and Near-Term Risks and Threats to US—and Global—Biosecurity (NSI, May 2021), https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/SMA-Invited-Perspective_Emerging-NeuroST_Giordano-and-DiEuliis_FINAL.pdf; “Dr. James Giordano: Battlescape Brain: Military and Intelligence Use of Neurocognitive Science,” posted 23 November 2020 by The Stockdale Center, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Zp8nHYegqI&t=7s.
45. Margaret Kosal and Joy Putney, “Neurotechnology and International Security: Predicting Commercial and Military Adoption of Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) in the United States and China,” Politics and the Life Sciences 42, no. 1 (2023): 81–103, https://doi.org/10.1017/pls.2022.2; Margaret Kosal, Military Applications of Nanotechnology: Implications for Strategic Security I (Georgia Institute of Technology, December 2014), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA619702.pdf; “Globalization, Brain Science, and the Need for a Cosmopolitan Neuroethics - James Giordano,” posted 14 May 2021 by Center for Advanced Studies – Eurac Research, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7PkV25ZzwTo&t=159s.
46. Cheever, “Safe Genes.”
47. Gopal Sarma, “Next-Generation Nonsurgical Neurotechnology,” DARPA, accessed 30 April 2025, https://www.darpa.mil/program/next-generation-nonsurgical-neurotechnology; Emanuel et al., Cyborg Soldier 2050.
48. “What Is Nanotechnology?,” National Nanotechnology Initiative, archived 1 October 2022 at https://web.archive.org/web/20221001011932/https://www.nano.gov/nanotech-101/what/definition; “Size of the Nanoscale,” National Nanotechnology Initiative, accessed 30 April 2025, https://www.nano.gov/nanotech-101/what/nano-size.
49. Natalie Grover, “Q&A: Nanobots Could Explore Human Cells – But Their Size Is an Engineering Challenge,” Horizon, 3 May 2021, https://projects.research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/en/horizon-magazine/qa-nanobots-could-explore-human-cells-their-size-engineering-challenge.
50. Quentin Vincentini et al., “The Perspective for Nano-Sized DNA Robots” (DNA-Robotics, 11 November 2021), archived 24 March 2024 at https://web.archive.org/web/20230324115937/https://dna-robotics.eu/2021/11/29/the-perspective-for-nano-sized-dna-robots/.
51. Cordelia Sealy, “Enzyme-Powered Nanorobots Behave like a Swarm,” Nano Today 38 (2021): 101168, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nantod.2021.101168; Isabelle Dubach, “DNA Nanobots Build Themselves: How Can We Help Them Grow the Right Way?,” Phys.org, 4 December 2020, https://phys.org/news/2020-12-dna-nanobots.html; Simon Coghlan and Kobi Leins, “Not Bot, Not Beast: Scientists Create First Ever Living, Programmable Organism,” Phys.org, 20 January 2020, https://phys.org/news/2020-01-bot-beast-scientists-programmable.html.
52. Philip Perry, “The World’s 1st Molecular Robot Has Just Been Created by UK Scientists,” Big Think, 1 October 2017, https://bigthink.com/hard-science/the-worlds-1st-molecular-robot-has-been-created-by-uk-scientists/; Anne Trafton, “CRISPR-Carrying Nanoparticles Edit the Genome,” MIT News, 13 November 2017, https://news.mit.edu/2017/crispr-carrying-nanoparticles-edit-genome-1113; Helen Thomson, “Mind-Controlled Nanobots Could Release Drugs Inside Your Brain,” New Scientist, 25 August 2016, https://www.newscientist.com/article/2102463-mind-controlled-nanobots-could-release-drugs-inside-your-brain/; De Rojas, “Arming Biological Nanobots.”
53. Kristin Houser, “MIT Researchers Create an Aerosol Spray Loaded with Nanobots,” The Byte, 23 July 2018, https://futurism.com/the-byte/nanobots-aerosol-mit; Jennifer Snow and James Giordano, “Aerosolized Nanobots: Parsing Fact from Fiction for Health Security—a Dialectical View,” Health Security 17, no. 1 (2019): 77–79, https://doi.org/10.1089%2Fhs.2018.0087.
54. “Our Research,” DARPA, 11 February 2022, https://www.darpa.mil/our-research.
55. “Six Paths to the Nonsurgical Future of Brain-Machine Interfaces,” DARPA, 20 May 2019, https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2019-05-20.
56. The Stockdale Center, “Dr. James Giordano.”
57. Center for Advanced Studies – Eurac Research, “Globalization, Brain Science, and the Need for a Cosmopolitan Neuroethics”; Álvaro Nuno Perez et al., “Sizing the Brain: Segmentation and Growth Factors of the Global Neuroscience Market,” Deloitte Insights, 14 February 2023, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/health-care/global-neuroscience-market-investment-report.html.
58. Grant W. Turner, “The Unspoken Arms Race: Neurowarfare,” University of Cincinnati, 2 October 2021, https://doi.org/10.7945/avgf-j937.
59. “Global Biotechnology Market Size & Outlook, 2023-2030,” Grand View Research, accessed 30 April 2025, https://www.grandviewresearch.com/horizon/outlook/biotechnology-market-size/global.
60. Shaomin Zhang et al., “Human Mind Control of Rat Cyborg’s Continuous Locomotion with Wireless Brain-to-Brain Interface,” Scientific Reports 9, no. 1 (2019): 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-36885-0; Vincent Horiuchi, “Prosthetic Arm Can Move and Feel,” University of Utah News, 24 July 2019, https://unews.utah.edu/star-wars-inspired-arm/; Linxing Jiang et al., “BrainNet: A Multi-Person Brain-to-Brain Interface for Direct Collaboration Between Brains,” Scientific Reports 9, no. 1 (2019): 1–11, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-41895-7; Emanuel et al., Cyborg Soldier 2050.
61. Emanuel et al., Cyborg Soldier 2050, 3–9.
62. Emanuel et al., Cyborg Soldier 2050, 5, 7–9.
63. Emanuel et al., Cyborg Soldier 2050, 7.
64. “Noam Chomsky - The Political Economy of the Mass Media - Part 1,” posted 25 April 2011 by pdxjustice Media Productions, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f6JqFtDWfxI&t=124s.
65. Anita Pisch, “The Phenomenon of the Personality Cult: A Historical Perspective,” in The Personality Cult of Stalin in Soviet Posters, 1929–1953: Archetypes, Inventions and Fabrications (ANU Press, 2016), 49–86, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1q1crzp.7.
66. Kate McNeil, “Modern Propaganda: Researching Cambridge Analytica,” Partnership for Conflict, Crime, and Security Research, accessed 30 April 2025, https://www.paccsresearch.org.uk/blog/modern-propaganda-researching-cambridge-analytica/; Ellen J. Kennedy, “Genocide by Social Media Posts: Will Facebook Be Held Accountable?,” MinnPost, 3 January 2022, https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2022/01/genocide-by-social-media-posts-will-facebook-be-held-accountable/; Edward Vickers, “Towards National Socialism with Chinese Characteristics?,” chap. 3 in World Yearbook of Education 2022 (Routledge, 2021), https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003137801-5/towards-national-socialism-chinese-characteristics-edward-vickers; “The Rise of Ethnonationalism and the Future of Liberal Democracy,” Council on Foreign Relations, 24 May 2017, https://www.cfr.org/event/rise-ethnonationalism-and-future-liberal-democracy.
67. “Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS),” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, accessed 30 April 2025, https://www.un.org/disarmament/the-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons/background-on-laws-in-the-ccw/; Marcello Ienca, “On Neurorights,” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 15 (2021), https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2021.701258; Morial Shah, “Genetic Warfare: Super Humans and the Law Genetic Warfare: Super Humans and the Law,” North Carolina Central University Science & Intellectual Property Law Review 12, no. 1 (2019), https://archives.law.nccu.edu/siplr/vol12/iss1/2; Yelena Biberman, “The Technologies and International Politics of Genetic Warfare,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 15, no. 3 (2021): 6–33, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48618294; Lucas Drayton Bradley, “Regulating Weaponized Nanotechnology: How the International Criminal Court Offers a Way Forward,” Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 41, no. 3 (2013): 723–45, https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/gjicl/vol41/iss3/9.
68. “Hitler: The Power of Manipulation | Hitler’s Propaganda Machine | Timeline,” posted 17 September 2020 by Timeline – World History Documentaries, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vIu3k1hmfGc.

 

 

 

Back to Top

November-December 2025