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The Agile U.S. Army Division in a Multidomain Environment

 

Col. Walt A. Reed, U.S. Army
Maj. Justin T. DeLeon, U.S. Army

 

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Published in October 2022, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, codified multidomain operations (MDO), maturing it from a warfighting concept into operational and tactical doctrine. It encompasses the Army’s contemporary approach to conducting operations as part of the joint force in times of competition, crisis, and armed conflict (large-scale combat operations, or LSCO).¹ FM 3-0 explains, “Multidomain operations are the combined arms employment of all joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders.”² MDO seeks to establish temporal windows of opportunity by first achieving convergence of effects across multiple domains. These opportunities are then exploited by agile formations, employing depth and operational endurance to achieve success.³

As the U.S. Army continues to develop tactical and operational warfighting skills in support of MDO, an understanding of roles and responsibilities across echelons becomes paramount. Although the lines blur in complex and ambiguous environments, foundational responsibilities will guide Army forces attempting to achieve convergence and exploit subsequent opportunities. FM 3-0 explains that effective convergence requires the integration of capabilities across echelon and the synchronization of military actions and effects appropriate to the situation. When integration and synchronization are conducted effectively, a relative advantage materializes in the form of certain conditions within a domain or across multiple domains. These advantages, relative to an adversary, present exploitable windows of opportunity.⁴

As the division becomes the U.S. Army’s unit of action, it will wrestle with how to effectively integrate organic maneuver elements into the equation.⁵ FM 3-0 explains that the corps is responsible for apportioning and integrating joint capabilities at the appropriate echelon in which their employment will be most effective.⁶ As the corps works to integrate and synchronize joint and organic capabilities across domains, the division echelon integrates its ground scheme of maneuver in concert to exploit or expand the resulting windows of opportunity.

As such, U.S. Army divisions must cultivate agile formations, ready to rapidly exploit fleeting opportunities that materialize when convergence is achieved. Within this effort, divisions must evaluate how they plan and synchronize operations internally and externally as part of the joint force. Determining when and where to employ organic capabilities in relation to episodes of joint convergence brings an added level of complexity to the process. Furthermore, inflexible task organizations and rigid warfighting processes may limit the division’s ability to respond to the fluid nature of the battlefield. Finally, commanders and staffs may have to reevaluate their roles to achieve the organizational agility that this fluid operational environment requires.

Joint Force Convergence and the Division

Division staffs face significant challenges as they seek to plan, resource, and synchronize operations to achieve a desired end state on the contemporary battlefield. Planning challenges are not new to the division-level practitioner. Arranging actions and effects across warfighting functions (command and control, intelligence, sustainment, fires, maneuver, and protection) in time, space, and purpose requires the effective combination of operational art and science.⁷ The challenge compounds during MDO.

The need for convergence in a multidomain construct acknowledges the temporal absence of supremacy in certain domains that the U.S. Army once enjoyed during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and requires a paradigm shift in the cognitive approach to modern warfare. A peer adversary’s employment of highly capable, robust systems at scale will add complexity to the challenge. Army Techniques Publication 5-0.1, Army Design Methodology, defines systems as groups of “interacting, interrelated, and interdependent components that form a complex and unified whole.”⁸ Another definition states that “a system is a network of many variables in causal relationships to one another.”⁹ Effective convergence occurs when friendly forces target relationships between enemy systems through a multidomain approach that overwhelms these systems and exposes vulnerabilities.¹⁰ Increasingly sophisticated and numerous antiaccess/area denial networks, constant surveillance, and the proliferation of autonomous and unmanned systems on the battlefield are just a few of the adversarial capabilities that require this convergence of effects to defeat. Consequently, access to the battlefield is no longer an assumption but at best exists in windows of time when effects surge or optimally align to achieve convergence.

In a LSCO environment, U.S. Army operations will often depend on the effective integration of joint capabilities and effects for these windows of opportunity. Reliance on joint partners in this environment is not a revolutionary concept, yet it requires deeper consideration when conducting operations against a peer adversary. As the joint force prioritizes requirements across domains, it must make difficult compromises about where and when to employ finite capabilities. Doctrinally, the corps is the Army echelon that secures, apportions, and integrates joint capabilities into tactical operations.¹¹

In a perfect world, operations are seamlessly aligned from the joint force down to the U.S. Army team leader on the ground. However, finite resources and the complexities inherent in operating across five domains simultaneously will severely strain the ability of the joint force to fully synchronize its effects. As a result, subordinate elements utilize these effects in concert with organic capabilities according to their unique operational environment. A scenario in an archipelagic environment helps illuminate this point. In this environment, the corps’ multidomain area of operations may be noncontiguous or nonlinear. In an island campaign, one division may be conducting a decisive offensive operation on one island (or series of islands), while another unit conducts defensive operations to consolidate gains on another island. Both may experience windows of opportunity provided by joint force effects but will have to utilize them in completely different ways.

Moreover, at the tactical level, restrictive authorities, classification levels, and a lack of understanding of capabilities add complexity to the division’s planning and operations. The division warfighter may be told that “effects” are in place with limited clarity on what the effect is achieving, where it originates from, and how long it can be expected to remain. This friction may be most pronounced when windows of opportunity are generated by actions in the space and cyber domains. The division will have to rapidly gain awareness, assess risk, and then work to exploit the window of opportunity presented.

Division Staff Planning and Synchronization

Divisions must develop flexible plans that can rapidly adjust appropriately to harness or optimize joint capabilities employed within the operating environment. Much like traversing the water using a sailboat, the sailor has no control over wind speed or direction and may be surprised by a large gust of wind that materializes unexpectedly. Nonetheless, the expert sailor meticulously sets the course, prepares the crew, and readies the vessel to maximize the opportunity provided by the changing conditions, aligning the sails to make use of the wind most effectively. Similarly, the division’s responsibility is twofold. First, the division must identify and recognize the opportunity at hand. This is no easy task as many opportunities that arise are unforeseen.¹² Once the opportunity is identified, the division must optimize the effects employed by the joint force despite the inability to control them.

As windows of opportunity open, the division must remain flexible and adaptable to exploit and expand. FM 3-0 uses the tenet known as “agility” to describe this requirement in a multidomain framework. “Agility is the ability to move forces and adjust their dispositions and activities more rapidly than the enemy.”¹³ This becomes vital as surges in joint effects become episodic, and windows of opportunity are temporal. If the division is not prepared to exploit foreseen or unforeseen opportunities, it may miss the chance to employ decisive actions on the battlefield.

Another important aspect of division-level planning and synchronization becomes crafting what organic capabilities or effects to utilize in relation to the joint force. The term “convergence” can often be misused or misunderstood. To some, convergence may imply the massing of capabilities at a specific point in time and space. However, this oversimplifies the concept, similar to the Jominian way of thought, which asserts that victory rests in an Army’s ability to simply exert the mass of its force upon a decisive point on the physical battlefield.¹⁴ Massing at a specific point may achieve convergence, but effects can be organized to be enduring, simultaneous, or sequential as well.¹⁵ This provides the joint force options to overwhelm enemy systems or disrupt/degrade them in detail and episodically to open windows of opportunity at the tactical level.

As such, the division has the option to employ organic capabilities alongside the joint force, creating a surge and adding depth to certain effects. Or, the division can offset organic capabilities and preserve them for periods, like consolidation, when the joint force effects may be allocated elsewhere. The division may also elect to surge simultaneous effects in certain domains while offsetting the employment of organic effects in other domains. The correct blend of simultaneous and sequential effects will result in the appropriate level of endurance and depth (see figure 1). To illuminate, the joint force may surge effects in the space domain that degrade an adversary’s integrated air defense system for several hours. This enables division rotary-wing aircraft and fires, which in turn enables ground maneuver. In a compounding effort, the division may also choose to surge its own electronic warfare capabilities in conjunction with joint capabilities, rendering a specific adversarial system completely ineffective. Using simultaneous effects in this instance may produce a prolonged impact on enemy systems providing a more pronounced opportunity to exploit.

On the other hand, the division may choose to employ certain organic capabilities once a joint surge in effects is complete. Synchronizing these capabilities sequentially might allow the division to maintain freedom of maneuver or reduce risk to ground or rotary-wing elements outside of joint convergence. This may create an overall enduring effect that achieves a relative advantage appropriate to the situation.¹⁶ Furthermore, if the adversary defeats a sufficient number of joint force effects, or if the advantage produced by those effects is short-lived relative to the division’s needs, it may be prudent for the division to retain the ability to employ its own effects offset from the joint force.

To illustrate, during a joint forcible entry operation (JFEO), the division may elect to surge internal capabilities with the joint force across echelons and domains, achieve convergence, and enter an opposed environment. Following the initial stages of a joint forcible entry operation however, the joint force may need to consolidate to reengage later. This may require Army units at the corps and division levels to use a more sequential approach when using their organic capabilities. By surging organic capabilities in an offset manner, the division may limit an adversary’s opportunity to exploit episodic gaps in joint effects employed on the battlefield. The same concept may apply to a large-scale wet gap crossing, where formations will have to synchronize simultaneous and sequential effects appropriate to the situation.

The takeaway for the division is the requirement to understand the joint force effects that the corps or higher is resourcing and synchronizing. Moreover, the division has the additional responsibility to balance the risk in employing organic assets to achieve multidomain effects outside of episodic joint force support. As the first tactical warfighting echelon, the division must optimize the employment provided by joint multidomain effects, but it also must balance the risk/opportunity calculus of employing organic or internal capabilities separate from the joint force (see figure 2).

Divisions must also be ready to conduct operations outside windows of opportunity provided by the joint force. Furthermore, they must be ready and able to manage the transition between surges in joint effects and periods of joint force consolidation. Developing a “dependency” on joint convergence may result in formations unprepared for the harsh realities of contemporary war against a peer adversary. FM 3-0 states that “Army forces must be prepared to conduct operations when some or all joint capabilities are unavailable to support mission accomplishment.”¹⁷ This becomes paramount as the United States prepares to conduct LSCOs in a multidomain environment. Many factors (including adversary actions) will determine the level of joint force support, but the division must be trained and organized to transition rapidly and maximize fleeting windows of opportunity that are determined by factors outside of its control (see figure 3).

Task Organization and Force Structure Considerations

Task organization and force structure design remain an important aspect of staff planning and synchronization. Transitions on the battlefield (especially unforeseen transitions) increase risk. However, they also bring opportunities to those who can reorganize or shift priorities rapidly to seize the initiative. An agile division builds flexible task organizations and can rapidly realign capabilities appropriate to the ever-changing environment.

Similar to a football quarterback shifting from a single back formation to a shotgun formation, Army divisions must be ready to rapidly shift units and capabilities as operations progress. Moreover, the division must be ready to adjust command relationships and rapidly disseminate the information. In certain situations, the ability to divest or reorganize capabilities rapidly may become more important than the plan itself.

Agile formations also build task organizations that can execute more than one specific operation or mission set. If an organization’s task organization or force structure is only designed to accomplish one specific task, it may not have the inherent flexibility to adjust or exploit unforeseen opportunities when they arise. For example, defensive operations may present perishable windows of opportunity for counteroffensives that may disappear rapidly if an organization does not have the assets or capabilities required to exploit. This requires division planners to develop foresight and anticipate what opportunities may materialize from joint convergence or actions on the battlefield. A flexible task organization is not a new requirement, but the challenge and importance of it has increased. Probably most important when changing task organization is the employment in certain domains of capabilities like electronic warfare, information operations, or the small but extant cyber capabilities at the division level.

Conceptual branch and sequel planning assist with this anticipation.¹⁸ As ADP 5-0 explains, “effective plans include sufficient branches and sequels to account for the nonlinear nature of events.”¹⁹ Time often limits the planner’s ability to build full branches and sequels at the division level, but that is not always the point. Purely identifying what outcomes could arise based on episodic convergence and other operational variables brings insight into potential risks and opportunities associated. These are typically best identified during course-of-action analysis or war gaming. The flexible plans that arise from this analysis drive the division to then build a proper task organization; one that is ready to blunt certain risks and exploit potential opportunities.

Evolving Force Structure

It’s important to note that building the correct task organization is likely to become more challenging for division-level practitioners in the coming years. U.S. Army leadership has now begun to label the division as the Army’s “unit of action.”²⁰ This signifies a transition from the brigade combat team (BCT), which served as the Army’s unit of action during the GWOT.²¹

Much debate has ensued over which capabilities should consolidate at the division level and which should remain with the BCT. Gen. (ret.) Robert Abrams has publicly stated that removing capabilities from the BCT level may degrade the overall lethality of the organization.²² Others assert that larger and more competent staffs at the division level enable decision-makers to better employ finite capabilities. Gen. Andrew Poppas, commander of U.S. Army Forces Command, explains, “The capacity and the capability to shape the conditions for the future fight … that’s why the division as the unit of action moved up from the brigade because they’ve got a much greater capacity, in terms of warfighting capabilities, in their fires, their range, their visibility, every unit can’t do the same thing.”²³

Despite the open debate among U.S. Army leaders, in February 2024, the Department of the Army released a white paper detailing force structure transformations to expect in the coming years. The white paper indicates several changes that can be expected at the division level. Divisions and corps should expect to receive increased air defense capabilities. These will come in the form of indirect fire protection capability battalions, counter-small unmanned aircraft system batteries, and maneuver short range air defense battalions. The white paper also calls for engineer assets to be reallocated from BCTs to the division level, providing division commanders the flexibility to concentrate these capabilities at the time and place of their choosing.²⁴ Finally, the plan removes cavalry squadrons from Stryker and infantry BCTs. The white paper asserts that all force structure transformation optimizes the U.S. Army’s fighting formations for MDO rather than counterinsurgency operations.²⁵

As stated earlier, the upcoming transformation of U.S. Army force structure brings the division new challenges when building an agile plan and task organization. The removal of engineer and reconnaissance assets at the BCT level reduces the BCT’s inherent flexibility and lethality. Instead, divisions will have to apportion certain capabilities appropriate to the situation. With fewer assets and capabilities to go around, BCTs will naturally become less capable of organically exploiting opportunities that arise on the fluid battlefield. This emphasizes the need for the division to develop foresight to drive the apportionment of assets across BCTs and division-enabling brigades. Again, an archipelagic scenario illuminates the importance of these decisions. In a nonlinear fight across island chains, the limited organic mobility of assets at all echelons and reliance on the joint force for maritime security will severely challenge the division’s ability to realign assets. BCTs may have to operate with the capabilities that are assigned to them for extended time periods.

Effective foresight and anticipation also inform which assets should be held at the division ready to surge at a critical time and place. Establishing systems, processes, triggers, etc. to enable the rapid realignment of exquisite assets and capabilities becomes critical on a fluid battlefield. This allows the division to rapidly reorganize to seize fleeting or perishable opportunities (foreseen and unforeseen). It also enables the division to execute transitions more effectively in relation to its adversary.

Warfighting Systems and Processes

As the division seeks to optimize agility, it should consider risks and opportunities associated with traditional warfighting processes. Rigid battle rhythms may increase internal synchronization but may also result in an organization that is less able to adapt in a timely manner. A chaotic and fluid operating environment may require the division to become more comfortable outside of a traditional twenty-four-hour battle rhythm. This may also require warfighting systems and processes to be more commander driven than the tactical echelon has grown accustomed to.

The average battle rhythm includes countless meetings or engagements across all warfighting functions. Again, these events improve synchronization across the force, but they build a system that may not be adequately responsive during LSCO. For example, the traditional division targeting process may prove to be too slow in a conflict with a peer adversary. Planning fires for the next ninety-six hours in the targeting working group and then gaining approval from a commander in the decision board takes a considerable amount of time and energy across the staff. By the time the day’s actions are complete, the environment may have utterly changed. Due to changing conditions on the battlefield, the group of sleepy-eyed staff officers may now have to rapidly plan fires for defensive operations rather than offensive as previously expected.

This is not to say that the current targeting process does not work, only that it may not keep pace in a LSCO environment over time. The dilemma exists across all warfighting functions, where meetings and engagements in the name of synchronization may hinder the division’s responsiveness to changing conditions on the battlefield.²⁶ Instead, developing systems and processes that enable dynamic action and decision-making may be necessary. Moreover, identifying time-sensitive ways of achieving an appropriate level of synchronization should be explored. This may translate to combining events to the essential few or increased presence from all warfighting functions at critical synchronization meetings where actionable guidance is provided by the commander and decision-makers.²⁷

This discussion centers around risk acceptance during LSCO. Methodical and somewhat rigid processes reduce the risk of operations becoming desynchronized in time and space. However, the challenge on the modern battlefield is that these time-intensive processes incur additional risk by being predictable and resource intensive. These predictable meetings may develop signature emission patterns through physical presence or in the electromagnetic spectrum. Becoming more agile must be accompanied by some level of risk acceptance by commanders trading synchronization for adaptability and survivability.

Commander Role during LSCO

For division-level operations to become more dynamic, commanders across tactical formations may need to become more involved in certain operational aspects than they grew accustomed to during the GWOT. The linear process of conducting analysis and bringing several options to the commander for decision works when time is set aside in a controlled environment. However, once LSCO begins, the fluid nature of the battlefield may require commanders to be present for more “storming,” or for lack of a better term, “sausage making,” than has traditionally been accepted. This will allow them to provide immediate guidance and direction, likely saving vast amounts of time, energy, and bandwidth within their respective staffs and subordinate elements. Moreover, it may require commanders to become more active in current operations, ready to read the battle and make timely decisions for their respective organizations.

In a 1995 letter, Col. John P. Abizaid (an outgoing brigade commander at the Joint Readiness Training Center) addresses Lt. Gen. (ret.) Frederic J. Brown discussing a similar topic. Abizaid critiques that the Army of the 1990s had developed an obsession with planning and product production. Much of this was due to a lack of commander experience in a fluid operating environment.²⁸ “Most commanders do not know how to ‘read the battle.’ This is perhaps why staffs work so hard. Staffs work hard to solve their commander’s inability to read the enemy, terrain, and friendly forces.”²⁹ Abizaid goes on to discuss methods he used at the Joint Readiness Training Center to train commanders to be more comfortable operating in a fluid maneuver fight. Forbidding certain fighting product production and encouraging active commander-to-commander dialogue are included in his approach to remedying the problem.³⁰ Moreover, Abizaid preached that deliberate repetition and training for commanders is vital.

The reference to Abizaid’s letter is not meant to be an indictment of commanders in the contemporary U.S. Army. However, it does illuminate enduring challenges that tactical formations are likely to face in a fluid operating environment. It’s worth noting that chaotic and fluid environments may require formations to reframe the roles that staffs and commanders play. Ultimately, tactical formations may need commanders to become more involved in planning and current operations during LSCO. This can save or better direct staff energy and will likely make the organization more responsive to the ever-changing conditions on the battlefield. Certainly, rapid decision-making can at times disrupt synchronization. However, time-intensive planning methods and battle rhythms quickly become irrelevant if staffs and commanders cannot keep pace with the environment.

Although commander involvement may increase agility, it does not dismiss the need for divisions to embrace a mission command culture when conducting MDO.³¹ It’s become clear that the adoption of mission command has been a significant contributor to Ukraine’s success against Russian forces. At the tactical level, hierarchical Russian units that stifle initiative and creativity struggle to combat Ukrainian forces who are given agency and liberal decision-making authorities.³²

However, mission command cannot simply be turned off or on based on the situation. It’s a culture that the U.S. Army must fully embrace.³³ Empowering leaders and staffs builds trust in an organization and increases responsiveness and agility to the environment. ADP 6-0, Mission Command, explains, “No plan can account for every possibility, and most plans must change rapidly during execution to account for changes in the situation.”³⁴ In the commander’s absence, subordinate commanders and staff members must be empowered to exercise disciplined initiative in planning and operations.³⁵ The desire to control the chaos of war and impose order on the battlefield continues to be futile.³⁶ Chance alterations to the operational environment will force subordinates to make opportune decisions that are unforeseen in time and space.

The Way Ahead

The division must train as it fights. There is no substitute for division-level operations in the dirt. Shaping, synchronizing, and sustaining LSCO allows the division to experience the fluid nature of war in a multidomain environment. Consequently, the division then gains the opportunity to refine its systems, processes, and culture to optimize agility on the battlefield. Furthermore, these situations force the division to deal with complex problems sets in a combined and joint environment.

The Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center enables division headquarters to command and control joint and combined operations.³⁷ During these exercises, division headquarters serves as the higher command for every rotation. In this position, the division works closely with the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center and its higher headquarters to develop, refine, and execute training across terrain that realistically replicates an area of responsibility while integrating joint capabilities.

Now U.S. Army Forces Command is following suit. The U.S. Army is making strides by beginning to deploy division headquarters to provide command and control for brigade combat teams at combat training center (CTC) rotations. Gen. Andrew Poppas explains that he is focusing on training divisions at CTC rotations “because we know that if that’s the unit of action, then they’ve got to be at a level of competency and proficiency to support and set conditions for these lower echelons.”³⁸ Poppas rightly concludes that there’s no better instructor than experience. “You can read about it, but until you see them [space and cyber capabilities] in real life and you synchronize them in the fight in time and space, then you’re not going to be effective. That’s what that training does and that’s what we’re bringing to bear.”³⁹ The bottom line is every CTC rotation that does not leverage a division headquarters is an opportunity lost.

Most importantly, deploying a division headquarters to a CTC rotation provides the organization a realistic training repetition to establish its tactical communications architecture up, down, and across the fighting force. This becomes paramount as the U.S. Army seeks to establish redundant communications and a common operating picture across the joint and combined force to enable interoperability. To be frank, all warfighting systems and processes become irrelevant if the division cannot talk internally and externally. This becomes increasingly challenging when barriers to information sharing often stand in the way.⁴⁰

Transitioning communications to a secure but unclassified-encrypted network is the answer according to Maj. Gen. Anthony Potts, program executive officer for Command, Control, Communications-Tactical. Potts explains, “We will never fight alone, so it’s imperative that we find ways to communicate with our partners.”⁴¹ This new network service is used in experimentation across the U.S. Army, and initial feedback indicates that the demand is rapidly increasing.⁴² Nevertheless, experimenting with a secure but unclassified-encrypted enclave at scale during CTC rotations is crucial to validate its effectiveness across the joint and combined force.

Concluding Thoughts

The world feels chaotic and the future is uncertain. The land war in Europe and ongoing instability in the Middle East are quickly breeding a sense of urgency in the West. All the while, allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific have made significant strides in standing up to China’s coercive actions. However, an economically weaker, diplomatically isolated, and demographically challenged China may prove to make the region less stable in the future. As policymakers wrestle with how to manage the global geopolitical environment, the U.S. Army readies itself to deploy, fight, and win in a multidomain environment against a peer adversary.

As the U.S. Army’s unit of action, which seeks to identify, exploit, and expand fleeting opportunities during LSCO, divisions must maintain a flexible and ready posture at all times. Joint convergence may become difficult to predict or control. This requires the division to deliberately foster an agile culture within its formation, one that develops warfighting systems and processes that enable rapid transitions and the synchronization of operations. Considerations in flexible planning, task organization, and the empowerment of subordinate commanders and staffs are essential. Additionally, commanders may need to become more comfortable actively planning with the team while preparing to “read the battle” and make timely decisions in a chaotic environment.

In an effort to ready itself and attain an agile culture, the division must seek out opportunities to practice LSCO in realistic conditions (such as CTC rotations). Realistic conditions will drive the need for agility and enable the division to work through the complexity of synchronizing operations with the combined and joint force in multiple domains.

Commanders and staffs must embrace the fluid nature of maneuver warfare. Joint effects will almost certainly be episodic, leaving U.S. Army forces with only organic capabilities for certain periods of time. The division’s ability to synchronize operations in concert with joint convergence and maintain the initiative during periods of joint consolidation becomes essential. Furthermore, the ability to rapidly and effectively transition between the two may be the deciding factor on the future battlefield. .

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Notes

1. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2022), 1-14.
2. Ibid., 3-1.
3. Ibid., 3-2–3-4.
4. Ibid., 1-3.
5. Mark Pomerleau, “Division Headquarters Will Now Accompany Brigades to Combat Training Center Rotations,” DefenseScoop, 13 February 2023, https://defensescoop.com/2023/02/13/division-headquarters-will-now-accompany-brigades-to-combat-training-center-rotations/.
6. FM 3-0, Operations, 3-6.
7. Wilson C. Blythe Jr., “A History of Operational Art,” Military Review 98, no. 6 (November-December 2018): 47, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2018/Blythe-Operational-Art/.
8. Army Techniques Publication 5-0.1, Army Design Methodology (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2015), 1-7.
9. Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 73.
10. FM 3-0, Operations, 3-4.
11. Ibid., 3-6.
12. Ibid., 1-3.
13. Ibid., 3-3.
14. Antoine Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G. H. Mendel and W. P. Craighill (Kingston, ON: Legacy Press, 2008), 70–73.
15. FM 3-0, Operations, 3-5.
16. Ibid., 3-6.
17. Ibid., 1-3.
18. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2019), 2-23.
19. Ibid., 2-26.
20. Pomerleau, “Division Headquarters Will Now Accompany Brigades.”
21. Jesse L. Skates, “Multi Domain Operations at Division and Below,” Military Review 101, no. 1 (January-February 2021): 74, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2021/Skates-Multi-Domain-Ops/.
22. Adrian Bonenberger, “Army Shift from Brigades Back to Divisions Raises Concerns among Retired Generals,” Military.com, 17 July 2023, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2023/07/17/army-shift-brigades-back-divisions-raises-concerns-among-retired-generals.html.
23. Pomerleau, “Division Headquarters Will Now Accompany Brigades.”
24. Andrew Feickert, The 2024 Army Force Structure Transformation Initiative, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report No. R47985 (Washington, DC: CRS, 30 April 2024), 7, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47985.
25. Ibid., 8.
26. Matthew Prescott, “Improving the Battle Rhythm to Operate at the Speed of Relevance,” Joint Force Quarterly 102 (3rd Quarter, 2021): 19, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2679728/improving-the-battle-rhythm-to-operate-at-the-speed-of-relevance/.
27. David Spangenberg, “Battle Rhythms: Challenges, Considerations, and Recommendations from Warfighter Exercises,” no. 22-659 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, November 2021), 5, https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/11/18/2e1fcd8b/21-659.pdf.
28. Col. John P. Abizaid, letter to Lt. Gen. (ret.) Frederic J. Brown, 25 July 1995.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. FM 3-0, Operations, 3-2.
32. “What Is Mission Command?,” Economist (website), 25 July 2022, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/07/25/what-is-mission-command.
33. Joe Junguzza and Kelly Lelito, “What National Culture Teaches Us about Mission Command,” Small Wars Journal, 4 March 2024, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-national-culture-teaches-us-about-mission-command.
34. ADP 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2019), 1-3.
35. Ibid., 1-11–1-13.
36. Thomas Rebuck, “Mission Command and Mental Block: Why the Army Won’t Adapt a True Mission Command Philosophy,” in Mission Command: The Who, What, Where, When, and Why, ed. Donald Vandergriff and Stephen Webber (self-pub., CreateSpace, 2017), 88.
37. Sarah Yamanaka,” 25th Infantry Division Taking Part in Military Exercise,” Spectrum News, 31 October 2023, https://spectrumlocalnews.com/hi/hawaii/news/2023/10/30/25th-infantry-division-taking-part-in-military-exercise.
38. Pomerleau, “Division Headquarters Will Now Accompany Brigades.”
39. Ibid.
40. John Vandiver, “Classifying Information for No Good Reason Is Hurting Military Effectiveness Report Warns,” Stars and Stripes (website), 29 March 2023, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2023-03-29/military-classified-documents-9639844.html.
41. Kathryn Bailey, “Network Design for the Army of 2030 and Beyond,” Army.mil, 9 May 2023, https://www.army.mil/article/266490/network_design_for_the_army_of_2030_and_beyond.
42. Ibid.

 

 

 

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