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The Evolution of Air Defense

Adapting to Emerging Threats

 

Maj. Vincent R. Wiggins, U.S. Army

 

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If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.

—Sun Tzu

 

Warfare is evolving at an unprecedented pace, and nowhere is this more apparent than in the skies. The rapid proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), cruise missiles, and advanced rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft has dramatically increased the complexity of modern battlefields.¹ These threats are no longer confined to peer adversaries; nonstate actors and regional powers now wield sophisticated capabilities that challenge traditional postures.² The Army must recognize that outdated air defense models are ill-suited to countering these emerging threats.³

Despite the urgency of this reality, air defense modernization efforts have been hampered by systemic failures in capability development and force integration. The absence of adaptable air defense solutions, combined with the continued separation of air defense artillery (ADA) from maneuver forces, has created critical vulnerabilities. If the Army does not reevaluate its approach, it risks further fielding systems and structures incapable of responding to the evolving threat landscape.

The Culture of the ADA Community: A Barrier to Tactical Development and Maneuver Integration

The air defense’s organizational isolation began in 2005 when all ADA units were removed from divisions and reaggregated into theater-oriented brigades subordinate to Army air and missile defense commands (AAMDC).⁴ What looked efficient on a PowerPoint slide quickly calcified into a cultural gulf: air defenders no longer shared training calendars or field problems with the combined arms formations they once protected. Over time, the branch’s lexicon and professional education drifted away from the maneuver force, eroding the intuitive understanding of how fires support ground movement.

That erosion is not theoretical. Following a recent Patriot deployment, one senior captain concluded that “the multi-year defense of stationary assets such as air bases has inherently degraded the Patriot Air Defense force’s ability to conduct movement and maneuver on the battlefield.”⁵ His choice of words is telling. Instead of describing how air defense fires enable maneuver, he framed success as the battery’s ability to “conduct movement and maneuver.” The distinction matters: fires formations do not maneuver; they support and complement the maneuver of others.⁶ Yet, air defenders routinely conflate the two terms, revealing a branch-wide blind spot about their role within the fires warfighting function.⁷

Maj. Danny Lee Rumley Jr. noted that when short-range air defense (SHORAD) was removed from division formations in 2005, it severed most maneuver units’ direct connection to the ADA branch; this disconnect has been worsened by ADA’s frequent deployment cycles, which limit relationship building with fires and other combat arms counterparts.⁸ His comments underscore how organizational separation and relentless deployment tempo disrupt informal networks that translate air defense fires into effects to support maneuver and further widen the cultural gap between ADA and the combined arms team.

A follow-up study highlights how removing SHORAD from divisions created a generational gap, leaving air defenders and maneuver commanders with little shared experience—resulting in limited understanding of ADA capabilities across the force.⁹ Their assessment echoes voices across the fires enterprise: as each cohort passes through company and field grade billets without habitual ADA integration, the institutional memory for how to weave surface-to-air fires into maneuver shrinks—and the professional development of future combined arms leaders suffers.

The confusion is reinforced by the operational reality ADA brigades have faced for nearly two decades: an unbroken cycle of theater-level deployments that tie batteries to fixed bases and a command relationship that orbits AAMDCs instead of corps’ headquarters. After an ADA Best Warrior Competition in 2021, one warrant officer admitted, “These warrior tasks and battle drills are things that we don’t do regularly in the Army.”¹⁰ The remark exposes a training diet shaped less by preference than mission demand. When the branch’s main effort is defending airfields, calendars fill with emplacement drills, not rehearsing aerial security operations or cueing engagements while brigade combat teams (BCT) fight through contact.

ADA branch schools devote hundreds of hours to radar theory and missile kinematics, yet allocate almost no time to the doctrinal relationship between fires and maneuver.¹¹ Young officers graduate as experts in sensor coverage diagrams but cannot overlay them with integrated graphic control measures; warrant officers can recite track-correlation algorithms yet struggle to build their sensor network into a division’s main effort.¹² Deprived of habitual exposure to combined arms problems, their technical mastery is offset by a tactical myopia that leaves them ill-prepared for tomorrow’s highly mobile fight—yet these are the very officers drafting capability statements and advising on force design decisions. When maneuver-disconnected air defenders define the requirements, modernization efforts risk producing exquisite technical solutions that fail to satisfy fundamental combined arms principles or counter emerging threats in the close fight.

The Cultural Degradation of Maneuver Competency Reflected in Army Doctrine

Despite Army doctrine centering freedom of maneuver as the decisive idea of land combat, successive ADA doctrinal publications codify a conception of air defense largely divorced from maneuver.¹³ Some indicators are listed below.

Capability vagueness obscuring actual limits. Army SHORAD doctrine claims that “M-SHORADs [now Sgt. Stout] and Avengers are most suited for early engagement of UASs.”¹⁴ Yet, both systems can only defeat Group 3 UAS or larger, leaving maneuver forces misinformed and exposed to waves of smaller drones that dominate the close area.

Missing fire-control connective tissue. Joint doctrine leaves no ambiguity: “An ADAFCO [ADA fire control officer] is required in any area/region/sector AD command in which an Army AMD [air and missile defense] capability is employed.”¹⁵ The Joint Air Ground Integration Center (JAGIC) must coordinate every ADA engagement through the ADAFCO at the division level.¹⁶ Yet, the current structure for newly formed division air defense (DIVAD) battalions and their division headquarters omit ADAFCO billets. Further, Army SHORAD doctrine never references the position.¹⁷ Building SHORAD formations without their mandated liaison guarantees that trigger-pullers remain disconnected from the joint kill chain. Embedding ADAFCOs at every division with a DIVAD—and realigning ADA units under conventional command structures—would restore that connective tissue, create habitual relationships for combined arms training, and unlock innovation.

Guidance that conflicts with joint doctrine. Air defense doctrine emphasizes centralized planning and “decentralized execution” that pushes engagement decisions to crews.¹⁸ But joint doctrine directs that authority for manned aircraft engagements “normally remain at the SADC [sector air defense commander] or higher,” with lower delegation limited to cruise missile and unmanned aircraft.¹⁹ The inconsistency risks tactical confusion and inflated expectations of what SHORAD crews may engage during high-tempo operations.

Outdated reliance on visual aircraft recognition. Maneuver planners habitually exploit darkness to mask movement and gain surprise; yet, ADA doctrine treats daylight, clear-weather visual aircraft recognition (VACR) as a primary identification method. Air defense doctrine admits that during night or inclement weather, “visual detection, identification, and range are difficult, if not impossible,” advising Stinger teams not to fire under such conditions.²⁰ According to a 1990s Army study, even under ideal daylight, it recorded a 37 percent fratricide rate when Stinger crews relied on VACR.²¹ Despite this data, air defense doctrine makes VACR proficiency a training requirement without addressing limited visibility scenarios.²² This daylight-centric planning factor leaves ADA unprepared to support the nocturnal tempo preferred by combined arms formations. It sets the stage for senior leaders to tout VACR as a cure-all—an argument once echoed by a senior doctrine officer.²³

Missing building blocks for maneuver integration. Across air defense doctrine, readers will not find standard staff products—no mission-type tactical tasks, battle position diagrams, or schemes of ADA concept sketches.²⁴ Every other fires- or maneuver-support field manual provides these visual touchstones; their absence denies maneuver staffs a shared lexicon and leaves air defenders without doctrinal templates for integrating surface-to-air fires into an operation.²⁵

Failure to adapt the Army’s security operations framework. Field Manual (FM) 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, lists five fundamentals that guide security operations: provide early warning; provide reaction time and maneuver space; orient on the protected force, area, or facility; perform continuous reconnaissance; and maintain enemy contact.²⁶ ADA inherently performs each of these, from an aerial perspective, every time it defends an asset, yet no ADA manual crosswalks air defense tasks to this well-understood framework. The omission deprives maneuver planners of a familiar construct for integration and blinds air defenders to established techniques for shaping an aerial screen, guard, or cover.

Aviation doctrine shows the template ADA lacks. FM 3-04, Army Aviation, devotes full chapters to security operations, includes detailed graphical concepts for each form of maneuver, and includes a menu of aviation-specific tactical tasks.²⁷ The publication enables aviators and supported units to share a mental model of how rotary-wing fires shape the fight. ADA doctrine offers no comparable road map, perpetuating the cultural and procedural gulf identified throughout this article.

These additional doctrinal inconsistencies reinforce the cultural drift noted earlier: air defenders codify a static, asset-centric worldview and then use that understanding to shape capability requirements. When the manuals themselves confuse fires with self-contained maneuver, omit proven security frameworks, and blur engagement authority, the modernization enterprise naturally produces weapons and organizations optimized for the wrong problem set—further evidence that a maneuver-disconnected ADA culture is steering the Army’s AMD future.

Leadership development shortfalls and command-and-control misconceptions. The doctrinal and cultural gaps described above manifest most acutely in the misunderstandings that ADA leaders carry into field exercises and deployments. Because leader-development venues—from the ADA Basic Officer Leader Course and Captains Career Course to other ADA scholarship—seldom immerse students in a joint fires network, many commanders and staff officers conflate coordinating altitude with engagement authority.²⁸ The result is a tacit belief that anything flying below the coordinating altitude belongs solely to the ground force commander; joint doctrine says otherwise.²⁹

Coordinating altitude is unequal to engagement authority. Army Techniques Publication 3-91.1/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.86, The Joint Air Ground Integration Center—a long-standing Army–Air Force agreement that predates the current DIVAD design—directs divisions to “[coordinate] with the SADC or RADC [regional air defense commander] using the ADAFCO.”³⁰ Army air traffic control agencies manage airspace below the coordinating altitude to prevent in-flight collisions of aircraft and munitions; those clear-airspace authorities emanate from the airspace control authority (ACA), not the air defense command.³¹ Defensive counterair (DCA; the parent of ADA actions), by contrast, is governed by the area air defense commander (AADC), who designates airspace control measures to enable surface-to-air fires.³² Because the ACA and AADC may be different commanders, joint doctrine emphasizes that coupling collision-avoidance control with engagement authority requires close coordination “for unity of effort, prevention of friendly fire incidents, and deconfliction of joint air operations.”³³ Surface-to-air fires are not bound by the coordinating altitude and must still flow through the ADAFCO/JAGIC network for engagement procedures. More plainly, the Army’s airspace control doctrine, FM 3-52, states that coordinating altitude “does not include authorities vested in the area air defense commander.”³⁴ Yet, air defense leaders routinely describe the ADAFCO as a “HIMAD thing” (High to Medium-Range Air Defense) and assume a decentralized, crew-level authority for targets flying below the coordinating altitude.³⁵ Ironically, the ADA branch’s capstone SHORAD doctrine never mentions coordinating altitude, underscoring how the ADA community relies on a concept absent from its manuals.³⁶

The decentralized-control myth persists. Air Defense Artillery Journal commentary from 2024 summarizes the community’s informal rule of thumb: “The United States Army is generally comfortable with High to Medium Air Defense operating under centralized control while Short Range Air Defense operates under decentralized control.”³⁷ This statement, however, conflicts with joint doctrine, which emphasizes that responsibility for engaging manned aircraft typically resides with the SADC or higher, especially for SHORAD forces—while authority to engage is usually only delegated lower for threats like cruise missiles and UASs.³⁸

Patriot-centric view of ADAFCO employment. As two field grade officers explain, “They don’t have Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officers (ADAFCOs) that can bridge the gap between the Army and Air Force because they don’t have Patriot battalions under their command.”³⁹ Supported by gapped Army structure, this perspective reinforces the myth that only HIMAD formations require ADAFCOs, leaving SHORAD task forces—those most closely collocated with maneuver units—without the very liaison designed to knit surface-to-air fires into the joint architecture.

Institutional pushback without a doctrinal basis. Even at the branch’s highest intellectual level, the misunderstanding endures. A senior doctrine ADA officer at the Fires Center of Excellence recently nonconcurred with a proposal to assign ADAFCOs to every division; along with several other objections, he insisting that VACR-certified Stinger teams can identify hostile aircraft.⁴⁰ None of the objections cited an authoritative source, and each contradicted joint and Army doctrine, which mandate ADAFCO integration and centralized engagement authority for manned air threats.⁴¹

Contrast that resistance with the U.S. Marine Corps, which is accelerating its own ADAFCO capability in anticipation of fielding its maneuver SHORAD (M-SHORAD) equivalent.⁴² In 2024, the Marines hosted the Army’s ADAFCO course at Camp Pendleton, California—“a Marine Corps first.”⁴³ Marine leaders called the skillset “critical in the coming years” and intended to make the course a recurring event.⁴⁴

The Marine Corps invests in ADAFCO proficiency for M-SHORAD integration, while the Army’s air defense leaders passively dismiss the idea. This underscores how doctrinal misguidance is now shaping policy. The official rejection perpetuates a leadership paradigm that leaves maneuver commanders without expert air defense counsel even as peer services recognize the need and act on it.

Failure to create permissive engagement conditions. When SHORAD crews assume unilateral authority, they bypass the joint kill chain that validates airspace clearance and identification. Effective tactical air defense hinges on establishing missile engagement zones (MEZ) through the AADC for desired effects and synchronizing them with schemes of maneuver during the supported unit’s targeting cycle, not by defaulting to the ACA’s low-altitude corridors.⁴⁵ Joint Publication 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, reinforces that MEZs are an air defense tool, distinct from air corridors, and ideal for “protection of maneuver units in the forward area.”⁴⁶

These misconceptions reveal how doctrine and professional education gaps produce ill-equipped leaders to translate air defense theory into compliant, integrated practice. Until ADA’s professional military education and field manuals explicitly teach the difference between coordinating measures and engagement authority, and institutionalize ADAFCO employment down to divisions, modernization efforts will continue to be shaped by officers who misunderstand the very architecture they are meant to improve.

Recommendation: Institutionalize Maneuver-Centric ADA Competencies to Support Force Structure and Modernization

To enhance the effectiveness of future force structure and modernization efforts, the Army should establish an additional skill identifier (ASI) for air defenders who possess validated maneuver-centric competencies—such as graduation from the Maneuver Captains Career Course or a Maneuver Center of Excellence accredited “Battle Forge”-like certification—rather than relying solely on the ADA area of concentration.⁴⁷ This ASI would formally distinguish maneuver-qualified ADA officers and should be used to prioritize assignments to emerging formations and modernization initiatives designed to support maneuver units in contested environments.

Modernization projects like M-SHORAD require ADA personnel who can operate fluidly within combined arms teams. Just as the airborne community mandates institutional jumpmaster certification to facilitate airborne operations—beyond simply being a paratrooper—the Army must adopt a similarly discerning standard when placing air defenders in roles that directly influence maneuver unit survivability and lethality.

The ADAFCO model provides a proven precedent: only air defenders who complete institutional certification are eligible due to the complexity and doctrinal precision required to manage joint airspace and manned threat engagements. Assignments that influence the force structure of maneuver-supporting ADA roles must reflect the same rigor. Failure to do so risks placing underprepared personnel into critical billets, undermining the modernization objectives designed to ensure overmatch in multidomain operations.

By codifying maneuver integration as an institutional skill and linking it to a formal ASI, the Army can ensure that modernization is matched by appropriate human capital, reinforcing doctrinal fidelity and operational effectiveness.

Uninformed Advice and Misaligned Modernization

No one expects maneuver commanders to master the nuances of air defense integration, but Army air defense professionals must—or else defer when the topic exceeds their competence. The service’s recent modernization trajectory shows what happens when that expectation is unmet. Tactical air defense gaps are being defined and resourced by leaders who remain disconnected from maneuver culture, resulting in solutions that look logical on PowerPoint but fail in the combined arms arena.

The root cause is structural. Since ADA brigades were lifted out of corps formations, most air defenders have spent their careers under theater-oriented headquarters where the daily rhythm is base defense, not fire and maneuver.⁴⁸ Isolated from the Army’s warfighting culture, they have insufficient touchpoints with maneuver commanders and little incentive to experiment with mobility, modularity, or tactical integration. The consequence is a capability development cycle driven by asset-centric thinking—protect the thing in place—rather than maneuver-centric effects—enable the force to seize key terrain.

The Army’s capability statement accurately frames a core requirement: “Brigade Combat Teams lack the ability to detect, identify, and engage threat UAS, rotary wing, and fixed wing aircraft while conducting combined arms maneuver, leaving forces vulnerable to surveillance and attack from air threats.”⁴⁹ Yet, the solutions intended to meet this demand—most notably M-SHORAD and its Sgt. Stout variant—fail to deliver against that full spectrum. Sgt. Stout does not defeat the proliferating range of UASs nor does it meaningfully extend standoff against rotary- or fixed-wing threats with respect to its legacy predecessor, the Avenger. These shortfalls undermine critical elements of combined arms planning, where tempo, protection, and fires depend on the ability to contest the air domain. The gap between the Army’s stated need and what is being fielded reflects poor tactical guidance—shaped by air defenders who lack the maneuver understanding required to design integrated, adaptive solutions for the battlefield. As noted below, the formal capability statements that underpin M-SHORAD confirm the pattern.

Capability statement 1: Platform inflexibility. The requirement calls for a SHORAD platform that supports every BCT, but the chosen design—Sgt. Stout on a Stryker chassis—fits doctrinally only inside a Stryker BCT.⁵⁰ Other brigade types must field a visually distinct vehicle in their formations, increasing survivability risks from enemy targeting. A modular launcher package for tactical vehicles in infantry BCTs or Bradley hulls in armored BCTs would preserve camouflage and maintenance commonality.

Capability statement 2: Sensors without a growth path. The statement demands onboard sensors for aerial surveillance yet omits the ability to process and fuse track data for future radar-guided interceptors.⁵¹ Absent that functionality, the force is locked into electro-optical cueing when the threat now requires digital hand-offs to weapons with longer reach and harsher kinematics.

Capability statement 3: Legacy interceptors masquerading as leap-ahead. By centering the solution on line-of-sight Stinger and Hellfire missiles, the Army gains no new defeat mechanism against next-generation drones and loitering munitions, saturation attacks, or standoff air threats.⁵² Without a road map to integrate radar-guided missiles for increased engagement range, the fleet will struggle to overmatch anything beyond low and close flying Group 3 UASs in the near-future battlespace.

Capability statement 4: Direct-fire drone defeat is still analog. The requirement envisions gunners defeating Groups 1–2 drones with surface guns but offers no advanced target acquisition suite.⁵³ Without this capability, gunners use digital interfaces for basic control but manually estimate lead to engage drones with suppressive barrage fire—yielding inconsistent results, increased risk of fratricide from stray rounds, and higher ammunition consumption.

Collectively, these shortfalls reaffirm how a maneuver-disconnected ADA culture drafts requirements that look adequate in isolation yet fail the adaptability and lethality tests demanded by combined arms warfare. Worse, many requirement documents still conflate movement (changing location) with maneuver (gaining relative advantage with fires), implying that ADA units must “maneuver” like tanks instead of orchestrating fires to unlock maneuver for others.⁵⁴

When modernization guidance is drafted by officers who equate VACR with combat identification, treat ADAFCOs as a Patriot luxury, or regard coordinating altitude as a hand-railing AMD engagement authority, the resulting force design carries those misconceptions forward. The Army is therefore fielding DIVAD battalions without the liaison billets joint doctrine demands, radars that can’t extend standoff, and launchers locked to a single missile family—all because an ADA culture shaped the underlying requirements, estranged from the formations it protects.

Reembedding ADA units inside corps formations, establishing habitual relationships, and complying with ADAFCO standards are prerequisite steps to breaking this cycle. Only then will air defense advisers possess the contextual understanding to offer grounded, maneuver-relevant counsel, and only then will modernization efforts yield systems that deliver the effects commanders expect on tomorrow’s battlefield.

The Limitations of Sgt. Stout

Sgt. Stout, formally known as M-SHORAD and the Army’s primary SHORAD enabler, was designed to protect maneuvering units from fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and medium-sized UASs.⁵⁵ However, its limited payload capacity—carrying only four Stinger missiles—significantly constrains its operational effectiveness. Unlike the Avenger, which still fields and carries eight Stinger missiles, Sgt. Stout’s payload reduction diminishes its engagement capacity.⁵⁶

Additionally, Sgt. Stout’s reliance on line-of-sight missiles presents another challenge. The system’s detection capability does not significantly increase its standoff range or target acquisition efficiency. In comparison, the Army plans to equip the system with a second Avenger-modified Stinger pod starting in 2026.⁵⁷ This modification only matches the intercept capability of the legacy Avenger system without addressing fundamental limitations in flexibility or range.

Sgt. Stout’s original concept included the integration of Longbow Hellfire missiles alongside Stingers. The Hellfire payload was limited to two at a time, resulting in a total interceptor payload of six missiles—two Hellfire and four Stinger—compared to the Avenger’s eight Stinger missiles.⁵⁸ However, the Hellfire, including the Sgt. Stout’s “Precision Incarnate” variant, relied on missile-organic seekers and radar cueing, similar to the Avenger’s “Slew-to-Cue” capability for Stinger.⁵⁹ This offered only a marginal tactical advantage over Stingers while reducing the overall missile payload. The opportunity cost of the Hellfire component was not worth the effort, as it complicated logistical support and offered only a limited improvement in engagement capability. These drawbacks were evident even before safety concerns led the Army to halt Hellfire fielding in 2024.⁶⁰ The result was a system that remained fundamentally constrained in its ability to counter the evolving threat.

The Counter-UAS Missile and the Need for a Modular Approach

The Coyote missile, developed by Raytheon, is a versatile interceptor designed to counter UAS, including more minor drone threats that have become prevalent on modern battlefields.⁶¹ Notably, Coyote was in production before the Army formally defined the requirement for Sgt. Stout, demonstrating that concerns regarding the full spectrum of UAS threats were already recognized.⁶² However, this capability being omitted from Sgt. Stout’s development reflects a failure to address a broader scope of aerial threats despite the opportunity to do so. This omission reinforces the theme that maneuver-ignorant air defense advisors influenced capability decisions, resulting in a system that failed to address the full range of aerial threats.⁶³ This misalignment further underscores the need to integrate all air defense formations within the broader Army structure to ensure informed, maneuver-centric capability development.

The multimission Avenger was a proposal from Boeing as early as 2010 to modernize the existing Avenger system, offering a cost-effective and efficient means of addressing future threats.⁶⁴ By leveraging the Avenger’s proven mobility and firepower, Boeing sought to enhance its capability through modularity, enabling the integration of various interceptors and sensors tailored to evolving battlefield conditions. This modernization effort was intended to provide a more adaptable and responsive air defense solution without requiring a complete system overhaul.

A modular approach to air defense such as the multimission Avenger allows the Army to adapt more effectively to unforeseen threats. The Avenger system that has historically provided mobile, SHORAD capability was previously examined in “Balancing Air and Missile Defense to Better Support Maneuver.”⁶⁵ That analysis highlighted the gap left by the Army’s prioritization of static engagement over highly mobile air defense assets. The multimission Avenger concept improves upon its predecessor by integrating interchangeable payload pods, allowing for greater flexibility against diverse threats.⁶⁶

A system featuring interchangeable pods would enable the Army to tailor its payload based on mission requirements. In contrast to a modular system, the Army currently must field Sgt. Stout for one category of threats while relying on a separate Coyote-firing platform for the broader UAS spectrum.⁶⁷ This bifurcated approach requires additional crews, vehicles, training, and financial resources, increasing operational complexity.

A modular system would consolidate these capabilities, reducing logistical burdens while enhancing flexibility in combat scenarios. For example, swapping a dual Stinger for a Coyote missile pod would allow a single platform to counter rotary-wing, fixed-wing, and all groups of UAS. Future configurations could incorporate radar-guided missiles capable of intercepting cruise missiles and other advanced air threats with much better standoff.

By integrating modular architecture, the Army can ensure that its air defense capabilities remain agile and responsive to the rapidly changing battlefield.

Advanced Target Acquisition Capability

Smart Shooter, an example of advanced target acquisition capability, is a sophisticated fire control system designed to enhance rifle accuracy against aerial and ground targets.⁶⁸ This technology utilizes complex trace algorithms, artificial intelligence, and image-processing to improve target acquisition, tracking, and firing accuracy.⁶⁹ Its flagship product, SMASH 2000, enables users to lock onto targets, track their movement, and fire at the optimal moment for maximum accuracy.⁷⁰

The Army has already purchased and issued SMASH fire control devices to tactical units for limited fielding.⁷¹ This advanced capability enables a rifleman to effectively engage small, fast-moving aerial threats like drones. By using a computerized optic, the system calculates the precise lead time required to strike a moving target. This capability represents a substantial leap in counter-UAS effectiveness.

Beyond its use in dismounted operations, integrating this advanced target acquisition concept into SHORAD systems would provide significant advantages. When applied to the Avenger’s .50 caliber coaxial machine gun and Sgt. Stout’s 30 mm automated cannon, this technology would enable these platforms to engage drones and other aerial threats with unprecedented accuracy, efficiency, and speed.

Currently, gunners must semimanually track and engage drones using a barrage of fire, mainly relying on their skill, with only basic dashboard visual aids available. This approach often results in excessive ammunition expenditure and inconsistent effectiveness. When describing the Sgt. Stout direct fire system against UASs, one knowledgeable lieutenant states that “it takes a lot of skill with judging flight path and a lot more luck.”⁷²

With advanced target acquisition capability, the Avenger and Sgt. Stout could fire missiles against more significant air threats and seamlessly pivot to rapid, one-shot defeat of clustered and swarm UASs. These systems could quickly neutralize multiple drones with minimal ammunition expenditure and less fratricide risk to adjacent units by ensuring precise targeting and engagement at the optimal moment. This shift in capability would transform how air defense platforms engage aerial threats, providing a faster, more efficient, and cost-effective solution to countering the growing drone threat.

Restructuring Air Defense Command

The lack of multiechelon training with adjacent Army formations has hindered the development of integrated competencies within air defense. Specifically, ADA brigades do not participate in combat training center (CTC) rotations—events that, according to Army Forces Command, give units “a crucible experience … in a complex and highly realistic DATE [Decisive Action Training Environment] under the most adverse conditions possible.”⁷³ Instead of a true CTC crucible, the branch relies on “Roving Sands,” an exercise run by the 32nd AAMDC that advertises it as “the opportunity to execute individual and collective tasks within the LSCO framework” for air defense formations.⁷⁴

From 1989 to 2005, Roving Sands was hailed as “the premier Air and Missile Defense exercise in the world”; yet, the modern construct unfolds inside an ADA-only bubble.⁷⁵ While Roving Sands strives to re-create the stressors of large-scale combat operations (LSCO), it lacks maneuver brigades, division and corps staff, and the robust observer-controller enterprise that makes a CTC rotation the Army’s gold standard. Ironically, the tactical scenario places a training ADA brigade under the simulated command of a corps headquarters.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, air defenders rehearse tasks for one another rather than with an actual combined arms team they are meant to shield, reinforcing an institutional echo chamber instead of building integration fluency.

Embedding ADA brigades in CTC rotations would collapse this insularity. Corps headquarters—already seasoned in synchronizing joint fires and overseeing dozens of CTC participants yearly—are better suited than standalone AAMDCs to hold Training and Readiness Authority (TRA) for these functions. Integrating ADA into the CTC scenario would give maneuver commanders repeated exposure to the capabilities and limitations of their protective umbrella, while granting air defense leaders the repetitions required to blend fires, logistics, and survivability at the tempo of decisive action.

The current posture places all six ADA brigades under three active AAMDCs, with one disproportionately managing four.⁷⁷ Additionally, the recently introduced DIVAD formations are assigned within corps headquarters but lack oversight from an AAMDC, leaving them without specialized air defense expertise.⁷⁸ This misalignment creates inefficiencies.

To modernize air defense command structures, the Army should adopt an approach similar to sustainment commands, which effectively manage logistics at both the theater and corps levels (see figure). Each campaign area has a theater sustainment command responsible for overseeing large-scale sustainment. Each corps, in turn, has an expeditionary sustainment command that deploys and integrates with theater sustainment commands while providing direct logistical support to maneuver forces. This model ensures that sustainment efforts are incorporated at all levels. Air defense should follow a similar structure, with AAMDCs functioning as two-star theater-level headquarters, while newly established expeditionary AMD commands (EAMDCs) provide corps-level air defense integration and execution.

EAMDCs are a proposed concept designed to bridge the gap between strategic and operational air defense planning. Unlike AAMDCs, which focus on theater-level missile defense, EAMDCs would serve as corps-level one-star headquarters, ensuring that air defense capabilities are effectively integrated through the operations of their respective corps. This structure would provide direct oversight of ADA units at all levels while maintaining alignment with the Army’s broader operational framework.

As ADA units realign under EAMDCs across the three corps in Army Forces Command, the active AAMDCs would remain aligned under a theater Army Service component command, focusing on strategic missile defense. Meanwhile, EAMDCs would integrate with corps headquarters, providing a dedicated command structure for air defense forces’ tactical and operational employment. This restructuring balances the ADA brigade distribution, assigning two brigades to each EAMDC and ensuring proper oversight for DIVAD formations within the corps framework.⁷⁹ Aligning air defense forces across all echelons enhances operational flexibility and readiness.

The Army’s current air defense force structure limits its ability to integrate seamlessly with maneuver forces. In contrast, EAMDCs would

• enhance coordination and planning of air defense operations,
• improve integration between separate ADA brigades and DIVAD formations, and
• streamline professional development and crossfunctional training.

Currently, AAMDCs operate at the theater level, overseeing strategic missile defense operations while also exercising TRA over ADA brigades.⁸⁰ However, these brigades are isolated from the corps structure, creating a disconnect between their operational employment and their training oversight.

The current model ties strategic responsibilities with TRA functions, limiting flexibility in developing ADA formations. ADA brigades are structured to support theater-level air defense but are not inherently aligned with Army corps. This separation results in challenges such as

• Lack of integration with maneuver forces. The lack of integration with maneuver forces severely degrades the air defense community’s ability to speak the Army’s operational language, limiting its effectiveness in combined arms.⁸¹ Air defenders lose proficiency in doctrinal terminology, symbology, and frameworks without routine interaction, weakening their ability to articulate air defense considerations within the Army’s decision-making processes.

This isolation stifles critical thinking on evolving air threat challenges, leading to a narrow focus on strategic-level solutions while neglecting the echelons where maneuver forces operate. As a result, the air defense community remains an insular force, unable to effectively contribute to the Army’s broader problem-solving efforts in multidomain operations.

• Training, readiness, and developmental gaps. The segregation of air defense units from corps formations isolates air defenders within their community and limits exposure to joint and combined arms exercises (e.g., CTCs). This insular training environment prevents external observation and critique, reinforcing a self-referential approach to warfighting that contradicts the Army’s principles of integration and multidomain preparedness.

While technical air defense competencies may remain intact, the broader impact on soldier skills, tactical comprehension, and warfighting adaptability is severe. Air defenders struggle to develop the integration mindset necessary to operate effectively alongside traditional formations without regular engagement in maneuver-centric exercises. This stifles their warrior spirit, weakens their ability to communicate concerns in operational terms, and leaves them professionally out of place in combined arms discussions. Consequently, those raised in ADA brigade environments become ill-equipped to translate their expertise into solutions that inform and enhance the wider Army warfighting community.

As a proposed concept, EAMDCs would decouple theater-level responsibilities from TRA, allowing AAMDCs to focus exclusively on strategic missile defense. In contrast, EAMDCs would facilitate TRA from within a corps headquarters. This shift would streamline training oversight, doctrinal development, and resource allocation, ensuring ADA units are better prepared for multitiered missions.

The introduction of EAMDCs would not alter the nature of ADA units supporting theater-level operations, such as Patriot formations, which remain aligned with AAMDCs. Typically, Army corps already serve as the deployment-pushing headquarters for ADA units performing these missions. However, integration into the corps would provide a dedicated three-star headquarters as an advocate for ADA units, ensuring streamlined operational resources inherent to the corps, such as robust logistics, intelligence capabilities, and command support.

An Army corps employs divisions, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades (e.g., ADA) to achieve objectives on land.⁸² While it is organized as a tactical formation, the corps may become a joint or multinational headquarters for conducting operations.⁸³ This grants the corps the competency to provide TRA over ADA units, which have missions that fluctuate among theater, operational, and tactical levels.

By aligning ADA formations with corps-level commands, the Army ensures that air defense capabilities remain fully integrated with maneuver forces, enhancing overall effectiveness and responsiveness. The proximity of ADA units to tactical formations within a corps headquarters would facilitate the cross-pollination of expertise and enhance shared understanding between the air defense and maneuver communities. This integration would improve professional development, doctrinal alignment, and operational effectiveness, and promote a more traditional warrior culture, ensuring air defense formations are better prepared to support the dynamic requirements of LSCO.

By restructuring air defense to include EAMDCs at the corps level, the Army would improve its ability to integrate air defense assets directly into maneuver warfare concepts, ensuring a more responsive and adaptable approach to emerging air threats and modernization.

The Way Forward: A Unified Vision for Air Defense Modernization

As the Army transitions into modern LSCO, a comprehensive and modular air defense solution must converge multiple defeat mechanisms across the fewest number of platforms. Future capability statements should reflect the following priorities:

• A modular approach. Design systems with interchangeable launcher pods and adaptable chassis integration for M-SHORAD enablers to match supported BCT platforms, enhancing survivability and operational cohesion.
• Advanced target acquisition. Employ AI-driven fire control and image-processing technologies to improve precision for direct fire systems while incorporating radar-guided missile options for greater engagement flexibility and range.
• Enhance counter-UAS effectiveness. Develop AI-enabled track discrimination capabilities using flight pattern analysis to reduce false alarms, accurately identify air-breathing threats, and improve response in cluttered airspace.
• Institutionalize corps-level integration. Establish EAMDCs to streamline ADA command structures, reinforce maneuver integration, and cultivate crossfunctional relationships essential to a unified warfighting culture.

Conclusion

The evolution of air threats demands a corresponding transformation in air defense strategy. The presence of capability statements that poorly address emerging air threats at the tactical level reveals a troubling trend: non-maneuver-savvy air defenders are influencing the Army’s air defense strategy to support maneuver.

If the Army is to succeed in contested environments, it must ensure that its tactical ADA solutions are informed by those who understand the demands of maneuver operations and can drive capability development that supports the fight at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.

In contrast, by embracing modularity, integrating emerging technologies, and restructuring command elements, the Army can significantly enhance its air defense capabilities to better defend the Nation’s interests now and into the future.

 

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Notes

• Epigraph. Lionel Giles, trans., “Attack by Stratagem,” chap. 3 in Sun Tzu on the Art of War (Allandale Online Publishing, 1910), accessed 30 June 2025, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/132/132-h/132-h.htm.

1. Witold Materak, “The Evolution of Air Threats in Future Conflicts,” Safety & Defense 9, no. 1 (September 2023), https://doi.org/10.37105/sd.196.
2. “Between 2016 and 2020, researchers documented 440 cases of non-state actors using weaponized UAVs. Groups like the Houthis and Hezbollah have demonstrated sophisticated drone attack capabilities against state actors.” Lam Tran, “YL Blog # 90 – Leveling the Battlefield: AI-Enabled Technology in the Hands of Non-State Actors,” Young Leaders Blog, Pacific Forum, 28 November 2024, https://pacforum.org/publications/yl-blog-90-leveling-the-battlefield-ai-enabled-technology-in-the-hands-of-non-state-actors/.
3. “The Army’s inventory of antiaircraft weapons is badly in need of updating. As small drones proliferate rapidly on the modern battlefield, the service does not have enough of the right systems to defend against them.” Peter Mitchell and Benjamin Phocas, “Closing the Army’s Tactical Air Defense Gap,” Modern War Institute at West Point, 14 June 2024, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/closing-the-armys-tactical-air-defense-gap/.
4. “Short-range air defense artillery units were historically embedded in Army divisions, providing them with an organic capability to protect their critical assets against fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. However, in the early 2000s, these ADA [air defense artillery] units were divested from the Army to meet force demands deemed more critical at that time … Thus, the short-range ADA force post-2005 was reduced to two battalions of active component Avenger and counter-rocket, artillery and mortar batteries and seven National Guard Avenger battalions; none of which are organic divisional elements. Defense against air threats in maneuver forces is currently limited to that provided by organic weapons and maneuver personnel.” Randall McIntire, “The Return of Army Short-Range Air Defense in a Changing Environment,” Fires (November-December 2017): 5, https://tradocfcoeccafcoepfwprod.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/fires-bulletin-archive/2017/nov-dec/nov-dec.pdf.
5. Mike McEunn and Pete Bier, “Preparation for Roving Sands 22 – Back to the Future,” Air Defense Artillery Journal, no. 1 (2022): 34–37, https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/64918. The authors further revealed a misunderstanding of key concepts by equating “movement and maneuver” with regaining convoy operation skills, conflating logistical movement with tactical maneuver.
6. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-19, Fires (U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], July 2019), v.
7. Ian Murren, “Air Defenders are Force Protectors: Rediscovering and Returning to Short Range Air Defense Historical Force Protection Role,” Air Defense Artillery Journal, no. 1 (2023): 34–39, https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/67760. Murren demonstrates a doctrinal misunderstanding by misclassifying air defense operations under the protection warfighting function while misattributing the use of ADA direct fire weapons against ground threats as part of the fires warfighting function. He states that short-range air defense (SHORAD) cannons—described as having “the three highs” (high caliber, high velocity, high rate of fire)—should be used within the fires function to destroy enemy ground targets. However, this misrepresents doctrinal roles. According to ADP 3-19, Fires (U.S. GPO, July 2019), 1-1, direct fire systems are not categorized under the fires function, which encompasses only surface-to-surface fires, surface-to-air fires, air-to-surface fires, and nonlethal effects. This confusion further reflects the broader issue of air defenders applying technical capabilities without proper alignment to doctrinal employment frameworks. Paul Spikes and Pete Bier, “Air and Missile Defense Modernization Well-Suited for Future LSCO Operations,” Air Defense Artillery Journal, no. 3 (2021): 43, https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/61816. Spikes and Bier misrepresent Patriot’s role in support of maneuver by conflating tactical maneuver with mobility, stating that its lack of a “shoot-on-the-move” capability limits its impact on maneuvering forces. However, this interpretation misunderstands doctrinal employment. Fires are defined by their intended effects—not by the platform’s mobility—making the argument irrelevant to the system’s contribution to shaping and protecting the battlefield.
8. Danny Lee Rumley Jr., “ADA Struggles Within the JAGIC,” Air Defense Artillery Journal, no. 1 (2021): 25, https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/59025.
9. Patrick Lowry et al., “Defeating the Aerial Threat in Warfighter Exercises,” Air Defense Artillery Journal, no. 3 (2020): 16, https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/59026.
10. Ian Vega-Cerezo, “Blackjack Warrior Competition 2021,” Air Defense Artillery Journal, no. 2 (2021): 6, https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/58982.
11. Fires Center of Excellence, “ADA BOLC-B: Individual Student Assessment Plan (ISAP)” (Fires Center of Excellence, December 2022), https://tradocfcoeccafcoepfwprod.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/30-ada-bde/bolcb/doc/ISAP.pdf.
12. “There is currently a huge knowledge and experience gap within the ADA community of how to operate within maneuver units in every echelon. Therefore, we don’t have enough leaders and Soldiers that could effectively fulfill their role because of the sheer lack of opportunities presented to them.” David Lara, “The Future of Air Defense Artillery,” Air Defense Artillery Journal, no. 2 (2020): 37, https://d34w7g4gy10iej.cloudfront.net/pubs/pdf_59027.pdf.
13. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (U.S. GPO, March 2025), 3. Army doctrine emphasizes targeting as a critical process for synchronizing warfighting functions in support of multidomain operations, with freedom of maneuver as a central objective. It prioritizes key capabilities like fires and intelligence to dismantle enemy systems, enabling positional advantage and integrating joint force depth to protect friendly formations.
14. FM 3-01.44, Short-Range Air Defense Operations (U.S. GPO, July 2022), 6-6.
15. Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats (U.S. GPO, April 2023), II-15. Doctrine aligns the ADA fire control officer (ADAFCO) requirement with ADA units operating within the area air defense commander’s (AADC) designated zone of responsibility. The AADC—usually an Air Force component and not the Army—may, with the joint force commander’s approval, subdivide this area into regions (regional air defense commander, or RADC) and sectors (sector air defense commander, or SADC). ADAFCOs provide the critical link between ADA units and joint engagement authorities within these zones, ensuring proper integration and centralized control.
16. “When a threat or unknown aircraft is detected, both the AMD officer and NCO in the JAGIC are notified. These individuals ensure the air defense artillery fire control officer (ADAFCO) is co-located with the SADC or RADC, and is aware of the threat. The ADAFCO is responsible for updating the SADC or RADC, as required.” Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-91.1/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.86, The Joint Air Ground Integration Center (U.S. GPO, April 2019), A-13.
17. FM 3-01.44, Short-Range Air Defense Operations.
18. FM 3-01.44, Short-Range Air Defense Operations, 2-6.
19. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, V-12.
20. ATP 3-01.18, Stinger Team Techniques (U.S. GPO, August 2017), 2-8.
21. David M. Johnson and Joan Dietrich Silver, Stinger Team Performance During Engagement Operations in a Chemical Environment: The Effect of Experience, Research Report 1638 (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, June 1993), 24, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA268952.pdf. While the source research dates to the 1990s, the core principles governing the employment and identification limitations of man-portable Stinger teams remain consistent in today’s operational environment. For the purposes of this article, the author referenced data from table 13, “Percent Fratricide by Conditions,” using only the figures from MOPP0 (mission-oriented protective posture)—standard battle dress uniform without protective gear—to represent the baseline performance environment. Results from MOPP4 were excluded to maintain focus on conditions most representative of typical field operations.
22. Training Circular 3-01.18, Stinger Team Gunnery Program (U.S. GPO, October 2017), 2-1–2-5.
23. Email message to author, 24 September 2024, from an Army ADA officer serving as chief of doctrine for the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Fires Center of Excellence. The officer declined consent for personal attribution (email in author’s possession); Rumley, “ADA Struggles Within the JAGIC.” Rumley highlights ADAFCO training as one of the premier institutional programs at the ADA Fires Center of Excellence, grouping it alongside Patriot Top Gun and Master Gunner schools. He characterizes these courses as producing expert air defense planners and tacticians, reinforcing ADAFCO as a core competency critical to advanced ADA integration and operational effectiveness.
24. FM 3-01, U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations (U.S. GPO, December 2020); FM 3-01.44, Short-Range Air Defense Operations; ATP 3-01.15/MCTP 10-10B/NTTP 3-01.8/AFTTP 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air and Missile Defense (U.S. GPO, April 2023); ATP 3-01.64, Avenger Battalion and Battery Techniques (U.S. GPO, March 2016); ATP 3-01.85, Patriot Battalion Techniques (January 2019); ATP 3-01.87, Patriot Battery Techniques (U.S. GPO, August 2018); ATP 3-01.94, Army Air and Missile Defense Command Operations (U.S. GPO, April 2016).
25. FM 3-04, Army Aviation (U.S. GPO, March 2025), 73; FM 3-09, Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations (U.S. GPO, August 2024), 6-36; FM 4-0, Sustainment Operations (U.S. GPO, August 2024), 103. A significant gap in Army air defense doctrine is its failure to incorporate standard military graphics, tactical tasks, and concept sketches—tools consistently used in other combat support fields like aviation, artillery, and sustainment. This absence of shared visual language and doctrinal planning templates impedes integration with maneuver forces and deprives junior air defenders of essential resources for effective mission planning. Bridging this gap is vital to enhancing interoperability and operational clarity.
26. FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations (U.S. GPO, January 2023), 5-2.
27. FM 3-04, Army Aviation.
28. Maj. Michael Nizolak, “Big Sky, Little Bullet? Air Defense Artillery Airspace Coordinating Measures Save Lives,” Air Defense Artillery Journal, no. 2 (2021): 40, https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/58982. Nizolak’s assertion that “Army-managed airspace resides underneath the coordinating altitude and within the Fire Support Coordination Line” illustrates a common misinterpretation within the air defense community. By linking engagement authority to airspace coordination measures, the statement risks misrepresenting how maneuver SHORAD (M-SHORAD) forces integrate into combined arms operations. This reflects a broader trend where ADA professionals incorrectly treat “coordinating altitude” as a determinant of air defense engagement authority. FM 3-52, Airspace Control (U.S. GPO, October 2016), para. 3-20. However, FM 3-52 clearly states that coordinating altitude does not confer air defense authorities. This misunderstanding can result in misleading guidance to maneuver commanders and weakens joint integration efforts.
29. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control (U.S. GPO, May 2010 [obsolete]), II-3, https://www.kadena.af.mil/Portals/40/documents/AFD-130514-110.pdf. The 2022 edition of doctrine retains the same language as the 2010 version, though the latter is referenced in this article for its open-source accessibility. The doctrine clearly states that the AADC is responsible for defensive counterair operations, encompassing both air and missile threats as well as the integration of air and missile defense (AMD) systems. The AADC also determines airspace control requirements to support defensive counterair, including airspace control measures, air defense measures, and procedures for conducting AMD operations within the airspace control system.
30. ATP 3-91.1/AFTTP 3-2.86, The Joint Air Ground Integration Center, A-13.
31. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, II-2, II-3, III-6, III-7.
32. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, II-3.
33. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, II-1, II-2. The doctrine further states that “the ACA does not have the authority to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations.”
34. FM 3-52, Airspace Control, 3-4.
35. Pete Bier and Garrett O’Leary, “The Case for Multi-National Air Defense Brigades in NATO,” Air Defense Artillery Journal, no. 1 (2024): 18, https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/71414. The authors extend their high-to-medium-range air defense (HIMAD)-centric view of ADAFCO roles into the multinational domain, asserting that NATO forces lack ADAFCOs capable of bridging Army and Air Force coordination due to the absence of Patriot battalions under their command. This statement further reinforces a narrow interpretation of the ADAFCO role, suggesting its relevance is limited to HIMAD and high-altitude operations, rather than recognizing its broader applicability across SHORAD and joint airspace integration, regardless of altitude.
36. FM 3-01.44, Short-Range Air Defense Operations.
37. Bier and O’Leary, “The Case for Multi-National Air Defense Brigades in NATO,” 18.
38. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, V-12.
39. Bier and O’Leary, “The Case for Multi-National Air Defense Brigades in NATO,” 18.
40. Email message to author, 24 September 2024.
41. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, II-15.
42. Jennifer Sanchez, “U.S. Marines Host U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officer Course for the First Time,” 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, 15 August 2024, https://www.3rdmaw.marines.mil/Media-Room/Stories/News-Article-Display/Article/3874866/us-marines-host-us-army-air-defense-artillery-fire-control-officer-course-for-t/.
43. Sanchez, “U.S. Marines Host U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery.”
44. Sanchez, “U.S. Marines Host U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery.”
45. FM 3-60, Army Targeting (U.S. GPO, August 2023), 4-3. Doctrine identifies targeting as the function that “synchronizes desired effects with the scheme of maneuver,” accurately capturing how surface-to-air fires should be integrated within a maneuver framework. This reinforces that air defense effects must align with maneuver objectives, not operate independently of them.
46. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, III-9.
47. Peter C. Shull, memorandum, “Active Component Maneuver Captains Career Course Policy Memorandum and Individual Student Assessment Plan (ISAP),” 1 October 2019, 3, https://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/199th/CATD/MCCC/content/pdf/ISAP_AC_MCCC%20Policy%20Memo.pdf; Milton Mariani Rodriguez, “Battle Force Exercise,” U.S. Army, 4 June 2021, https://www.army.mil/article/247223/battle_forge_exercise. Battle Forge is a culminating, pass/fail operations order (OPORD) event for Maneuver Captains Career Course students. The exercise begins with a review of U.S. doctrine, then progresses through troop leading procedures training while students develop OPORD products. Students plan and present an OPORD for various organizations—infantry, armor, and Stryker—simulating roles as company commanders in both offensive and defensive scenarios.
48. McEunn and Bier, “Preparation for Roving Sands 22,” 34. In discussing preparation for a tactical training exercise, the authors note that “Roving Sands was designed to exercise those once prevalent skills in Air Defense units that had degraded over more than 15 years of steady-state AMD operations on hardened sites.” This reflects a recognition that prolonged static deployments eroded essential expeditionary and maneuver-relevant competencies within the ADA force.
49. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Budget Estimates: Justification Book of Missile Procurement, Army (Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 2018), 155, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2019/Base%20Budget/Justification%20Book/Missiles.pdf.
50. FM 3-96, Brigade Combat Teams (U.S. GPO, January 2021), 1-1, 1-11. Army doctrine differentiates among infantry, Stryker, and armored brigade combat teams (BCT) to guide planning and tactical integration. It describes the IBCT as an expeditionary formation optimized for dismounted operations in complex terrain; the SBCT as capable of effective operations across most terrain and weather conditions; and the ABCT as a heavy combined arms formation composed of armor and mechanized infantry battalions. These distinctions are essential for aligning air defense support with the operational needs and mobility profiles of each BCT type.
51. Andrew Feickert, U.S. Army Short-Range Air Defense Force Structure and Selected Programs: Background and Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service [CRS], July 2020), 9, https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R46463/R46463.2.pdf.
52. Feickert, U.S. Army Short-Range Air Defense.
53. Feickert, U.S. Army Short-Range Air Defense.
54. Feickert, U.S. Army Short-Range Air Defense.
55. Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), “Army Programs: Initial Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense,” in FY20 Annual Report (DOT&E, January 2021), 85, https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2020/army/2020im-shorad.pdf.
56. Jen Judson, “Interim Short-Range Air Defense Solution to be Stryker-Based,” Defense News, 1 March 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/03/01/interim-short-range-air-defense-solution-will-be-stryker-based/. The author highlights the Army’s active efforts to field Avenger systems and establish new formations, citing Lt. Gen. James Dickinson’s 2018 statement as head of Army Space and Missile Defense Command. Dickinson reported that the Army was ahead of schedule in delivering two Avenger battalion-equipping sets to Europe in support of the European Deterrence Initiative, with plans to establish an active component Avenger battalion the following year, including the necessary personnel and infrastructure.
57. Ashley Roque, “Army ‘Prohibited’ Soldiers from Using Hellfire with M-SHORAD on Strykers Due to Safety Concerns,” Breaking Defense, 18 June 2024, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/06/army-prohibited-soldiers-from-using-longbow-hellfire-with-m-shorad-on-strykers-due-to-safety-concerns/. Roque explains that the current plan is to retrofit existing M-SHORAD platforms by replacing the Hellfire launcher with a second Stinger pod, effectively doubling the Stinger loadout to eight rounds per vehicle. However, implementation depends on procuring additional Stinger Vehicle Universal Launchers, which is included in the fiscal year 2025 budget request. According to then–Brig. Gen. Frank Lozano’s office, if the plan proceeds as expected, upgrades will begin in late fiscal year 2026.
58. Andrew Feickert, U.S. Army’s Initial Maneuver, Short-Range Air Defense (IM-SHORAD) System, CRS Insight (CRS, July 2018), 2, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN10931.
59. “Why Does the US M SHORAD Stryker Use Both Stinger and Hellfire Missiles?,” posted 3 January 2024 by Defense News, YouTube, 4:10, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CpPgYIciilw; Boeing, “The Boeing Company Awarded Avenger Slew-To-Cue Upgrade Contract,” news release, 25 March 1998, https://boeing.mediaroom.com/1998-03-25-The-Boeing-Company-Awarded-Avenger-Slew-To-Cue-Upgrade-Contract. The Slew-to-Cue system, introduced as a Boeing modification kit roughly a decade after the Avenger’s initial fielding, exemplifies the Army’s historical use of incremental upgrades to enhance system agility and adaptability in response to evolving threat environments. This approach allowed for targeted capability improvements without requiring full system replacement.
60. “The reason? After greenlighting M-SHORAD production, the service discovered that sticking the higher-tech weapon on the side of the vehicle created wear and tear on the missile, leading to ‘potential’ safety concerns, Bush said.” Roque, “Army ‘Prohibited’ Soldiers.”
61. Raytheon, “Meet the US Army’s LIDS: A sure shot against drones,” news release, 8 February 2024, https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/news/2024/02/08/meet-lids-a-sure-shot-against-drones. The Low, Slow, Small, Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System is a layered defense solution designed to counter small to medium-sized unmanned aircraft systems (Groups 1–3 UAS). It integrates both kinetic effects, such as the Coyote interceptor missile, and nonkinetic effects like electronic warfare and jamming, to detect, track, identify, and neutralize drone threats across multiple domains.
62. Raytheon, “Meet the US Army’s LIDS.” In 2016, Raytheon started developing Coyote in response to a joint urgent operational needs statement. Army Futures Command, “M-SHORAD Units Arrive to 5-4th ADA,” Air Defense Artillery Journal, no. 1 (2021): 11, https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/59025. In 2021, Army Futures Command characterized the fielding of M-SHORAD (now Sgt. Stout) as a solution to defend maneuvering forces against unmanned aircraft systems, rotary-wing, and fixed-wing threats. However, this statement lacked critical caveats regarding its limited effectiveness against Group 1 and 2 UASs. This omission contributed to unrealistic expectations among maneuver units, especially given the widespread proliferation of low-cost, small drones that remain a significant battlefield threat today.
63. Joshua Urness, “Learning to Speak Maneuver,” Fires (July-August 2018): 7–9, https://tradocfcoeccafcoepfwprod.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/fires-bulletin-archive/2018/jul-aug/jul-aug.pdf. As early as 2018, experienced ADA officers were already identifying a core barrier to successful integration with maneuver forces: an inability within the ADA community to even “speak the language” of the broader Army. One officer likened the experience of joining a Patriot unit to a nonmechanic trying to follow “car talk”—eyes glazing over from a foreign vocabulary and culture. This analogy underscores a deeper institutional disconnect: ADA personnel, having spent years detached from maneuver fundamentals, often lacked fluency in the doctrine, terminology, and culture of their supported formations. Brig. Gen. Randall McIntire’s SHORAD vision signaled a pivotal shift back toward maneuver integration, but the foundational challenge of communicative and conceptual fluency persists. Without institutionalized preparation to bridge this language gap—through education, doctrinal inclusion, and immersion—air defenders will continue to operate as technical specialists isolated from the maneuver ecosystem they are meant to support. This gap remains a critical vulnerability in the Army’s tactical air defense strategy and must be addressed as urgently as materiel shortfalls.
64. Association of the United States Army, “Boeing Has Expanded Avenger Capabilities That Provide Adaptive Force Protection Solution,” Army Recognition Group, 18 October 2014, https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/army-news-2014/boeing-avenger-ausa-2014-press-release-18-october-2014-uk.
65. Vincent Wiggins, “Balancing Air and Missile Defense to Better Support Maneuver,” Military Review 95, no. 6 (November/December 2015): 55–63, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20151231_art011.pdf.
66. Jen Judson, “’80s Flashback: Boeing Soups up Old Avenger for Short-Range Air Defense Gap,” Defense News, 14 March 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/global-force-symposium/2017/03/14/80s-flashback-boeing-soups-up-old-avenger-for-short-range-air-defense-gap/.
67. DOT&E, “Initial Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense,” 85.
68. “Smart-Shooter,” SmartShooter Precise Technological Solutions, accessed 27 June 2025, https://www.smart-shooter.com/.
69. Josh Luckenbaugh, “Army Purchases Fire Control System to Counter Small Drones,” National Defense, 2 December 2022, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/12/2/army-purchases-fire-control-system-to-counter-small-drones.
70. “SMASH 3000: Fire Control System for Small Arms,” SmartShooter Precise Technological Solutions, accessed 27 June 2025, https://www.smart-shooter.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/SMASH-3000.pdf.
71. Sam Skove, “Army Aims to Equip a Division with Hand-Held Counter-Drone Gear,” Defense One, 18 March 2024, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2024/03/army-seeking-divisions-worth-hand-held-counter-drone-equipment-fy25-budget/395030/.
72. Stephen Hansmann (first lieutenant, U.S. Army), email to author, 26 March 2025. Hansmann, a Sgt. Stout platoon leader, highlights significant limitations of the M-SHORAD’s 30 mm cannon when engaging drones such as the Outlaw. Based on operational experience, successful engagements are rare—estimated at only a 10 percent kill rate—and typically require the drone to fly slowly and directly at the vehicle. Accuracy is hampered by issues with optics and potential zeroing discrepancies. The absence of 30 mm airburst munitions, not expected until FY 2028, forces gunners to expend large volumes of ammunition with limited effect, rendering the 30 mm and M240 less effective against small, fast-moving UASs than other available options. “How to Fire Anti Aircraft Gun | M2 Browning & Zu-23,” posted 21 May 2025 by AiTelly, YouTube, 12:24, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FGsCBlbtdMc. This video illustrates the use of barrage fire tactics to engage aerial threats using direct fire weapon systems—an outdated approach where shooters saturate airspace based on predicted flight paths rather than precision tracking. The inclusion of the Avenger’s .50 caliber machine gun highlights how legacy systems still reflect this archaic methodology. In contrast, modern AMD strategy emphasizes advanced target acquisition technologies—such as AI-assisted fire control, radar cueing, and image-processing sensors—that enable precision engagement, reduce ammunition waste, and enhance lethality in complex threat environments. The video underscores the doctrinal and technological gap between historical engagement techniques and contemporary AMD capabilities discussed in the article.
73. U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), “Army Combat Training Centers,” STAND-TO!, 22 January 2019, https://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2019/01/22/.
74. Judson Gillet et al. “Training the Shield Arm: How U.S. Army Air Defense Forces Are Embracing Field Manual 3-0 and Preparing for Large-Scale Ground Combat,” Military Review 100, no. 3 (May-June 2020), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2020/Gillett-Training-the-Shield/.
75. McEunn and Bier, “Preparation for Roving Sands 22,” 34.
76. Gillet et al. “Training the Shield Arm.”
77. AMD Integration Division, Army Air and Missile Defense 2028 (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command, March 2019), 21, https://www.smdc.army.mil/Portals/38/Documents/Publications/Publications/SMDC_0120_AMD-BOOK_Finalv2.pdf.
78. “FORSCOM Major Subordinate Commands (Including Corps, Divisions, and Brigade Combat Teams [BCTs]),” FORSCOM, accessed 27 June 2025, https://www.forscom.army.mil/About/. FORSCOM does not assign any ADA brigades or higher echelon commands within its major subordinate corps, where division air defense units are located. This structural gap illustrates how most ADA forces remain isolated from traditional maneuver formations, while others lack direct linkage to a branch-specific higher headquarters, undermining both integration and institutional support across the operational force.
79. Gillett et al., “Training the Shield Arm.” The idea of aligning ADA commands within a corps structure is not a novel concept but a refinement of previous practice. During the 1990s, the Army routinely aligned ADA brigades with corps-level headquarters. By 1996, for example, the 108th ADA Brigade supported XVIII Airborne Corps, the 69th with V Corps, the 35th with I Corps, and the 31st with III Corps. Only the 11th ADA Brigade was reserved for echelons-above-corps missions. This historical structure provided corps commanders with dedicated air defense capabilities to protect key battlefield assets against an increasingly advanced and widespread air threat.
80. “The AAMDC projects its ADA forces to theater to support the [joint force commander] priorities based on METT-TC [mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations]. This includes all aspects of mobilization and pre-deployment operations, deployment and entry operations, employment and sustainment, and redeployment, as well as the responsibility for training and certifying its task organized forces.” FM 3-01, U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations, 5-4; Glenn A. Henke, “Spinning Plates: Air Defense Brigade Staffs and the Theater Fight,” Air Defense Artillery Journal, no. 2 (2021): 20–23, https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/58982. Henke clearly outlines the three primary roles historically performed by Army AMD commands in theater: deputy area air defense commander, theater army air and missile defense coordinator, and senior army ADA commander—serving as the training and readiness authority for ADA forces. These functions are formally defined in ATP 3-01.94, Army Air and Missile Defense Command Operations, and represent the institutional framework through which Army AMD commands integrate, coordinate, and oversee theater-level AMD operations.
81. Urness, “Learning to Speak Maneuver,” 7–9.
82. FM 3-94, Armies, Corps, and Division Operations (U.S. GPO, July 2021), 4-2, 4-9.
83. FM 3-94, Armies, Corps, and Division Operations, 4-1.

 

 

 

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September-October 2025