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Distributed Logistics and Deterrence

 

Maj. Christopher M. Salerno, U.S. Army

 

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Distributed logistics across the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) can directly support deterrence efforts and enable the joint force to campaign more effectively within the region. As the National Defense Strategy states, “For logistics and sustainment, we will reinforce our capability to quickly mobilize and deploy forces and to sustain high-intensity joint denial operations despite kinetic and non-kinetic attack and disruption.”¹ First, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to create a contact force within the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) disruption zone demands a resilient sustainment infrastructure, which requires distributing formerly consolidated bulk supplies across the region. Second, this distribution requires a diplomatic effort to gain regional access agreements. Finally, distributed logistics directly enable deterrence by denial and resilience. The National Security Strategy describes how today’s decisions will lay the foundation for the necessary advantages to win in this competitive era.² Establishing a distributed logistical footprint across the USINDOPACOM AOR requires significant investment over the next decade to support U.S. efforts.

Background

Secretary Lloyd Austin’s decision in the spring of 2022 to permanently shut down and drain the Red Hill Underground Fuel Storage Facility in Hawaii presents an opportunity to redesign the United States’ logistical infrastructure within the region.³ Red Hill contained 250 million gallons of fuel across twenty bulk containers underneath a mountain range.⁴ Built in the 1930s, Red Hill was the U.S. government’s initial response to concerns about the vulnerability of above-ground fuel storage facilities, which can be exposed to kinetic and nonkinetic effects across all domains.⁵ They specifically present a risk in the Pacific region as it consists of long sea lines of communication, and depending on a single bulk storage site undermines any sustained U.S. efforts in the region. The Defense Logistics Agency recognizes the dangers inherent in consolidated bulk stores.⁶ In his Red Hill announcement, Austin said, “The distributed and dynamic nature of our force posture in the Indo-Pacific, the sophisticated threats we face, and the technology available to us demand an equally advanced and resilient fueling capability.”⁷ This is true not only for fuel but also for the entire sustainment infrastructure. The decision to build a resilient logistical distributed infrastructure will now form the backbone of the successful U.S. joint operations concept for competing and winning in the region.

Joint Force

The DOD’s efforts to counter the PRC’s antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) within the Pacific require a resilient sustainment infrastructure. Adm. John Aquilino, former USINDOPACOM commander, recognized how the Red Hill crisis provided an opportunity to transition to a distributed sustainment model that is resilient and capable of meeting the force’s needs.⁸ Logistics form the backbone of the joint force and power projection within the USINDOPACOM region, and given its size and the adversary’s capabilities, a distributed logistical infrastructure becomes a fundamental requirement for a successful joint force. Failure to transition to a more distributed logistical infrastructure will weaken U.S. power projection in the Pacific; it will ultimately undermine credibility because all U.S. service operational concepts depend on dispersed operations.

Multidomain operations requires distribution of forces with the massing of effects, a 2023 RAND study on the Army’s role in the Pacific found that “such distribution of combat power will increase and complicate support demands in intra-theater and in-country logistics distribution, air defense, ground security, and allied and partner coordination for RSOI [reception, staging, onward movement, and integration] of incoming forces.”⁹ In 2022, the 8th Theater Sustainment Command drew upon the forward-staged Army Prepositioned Stock 3, a brigade combat team’s worth of equipment in a civilian commercial port in the Philippines, to support rapidly deploying forces from Hawaii.¹⁰ The ability to quickly deploy forces without waiting on shipment across long sea lines of communication directly enables the joint force. Disaggregation only works if the DOD makes critical logistical investments within the region and continues to regularly test that capability as part of joint and combined exercises. The joint force needs a contact force within the disruption zone capable of surviving long enough to help degrade the A2/AD effects to support operations to counter a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. Consolidated shipping across long sea lines of communication is more vulnerable and less agile than prepositioned stocks and distributed bulk stores spread across the region. The agility afforded the joint force from a distributed logistical posture enables U.S. forces to project power to emerging, regional crises.

The opportunity to update U.S. logistical infrastructure within the region is decisive and will better position America over the next few decades. However, logistics distribution within the USINDOPACOM AOR contains two interconnected risks that must be seriously addressed. The first risk is that transferring fuel reserves from sites hardened and secured from a range of multidomain threats outside the adversary’s disruption zone increases the likelihood they can be effectively targeted early in a conflict and deny U.S. force projection. Second, the U.S. lacks a depth of supplies, and without large depots, the remaining supplies will be spread too thin, potentially undermining an extended campaign. Distributing supplies poses too much additional risk if not tied to creating extra depth throughout the supply chain, constructing multidomain hardened facilities within the AOR, and reinvesting in sea and airlift to support the concept. However, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro has stated that the U.S. Navy does not need to construct additional fuel sites and can distribute the fuel from Red Hill to existing locations.¹¹

A multidomain environment presents a series of new adversary capabilities and potential effects that critical infrastructure must be protected against. Scientific advancements will affect logistics for the entire military within a multidomain environment, and it must respond.¹²

The Navy secretary could be correct in that existing facilities will suffice within the region. However, the risk is high that they were built without considering an adversary’s lethal and nonlethal capabilities. Cyber is one example of a vulnerability that needs to be accounted for in the logistical architecture.¹³ These distributed nodes should be built similar to how Red Hill was in response to the adversary’s capabilities; otherwise, the joint force may find itself without the necessary supplies. The dispersal of supplies may be key, but if the critical infrastructure is not developed to support the dispersal of logistics with an eye toward protection against multidomain threats, then it remains vulnerable. If the United States’ sealift suffers, these dispersed nodes may be left isolated and undersupplied. These risks are not insignificant, and the joint force should request the funds to address them properly.

The joint force assumes additional risk if it believes any conflict will be quickly decided and thus underinvests in the necessary logistical depth required to support an extended campaign. U.S. critical supplies lack a depth of quantity and take time to replace, a critical concern that hampers U.S. support to Ukraine.¹⁴ Rep. Rob Wittman of the House Armed Services Committee stated, “In my estimation our mobility and logistics forces are in a clear decline.”¹⁵ These are legitimate concerns that merely distributing supplies do not solve. The intervening years between Red Hill’s construction and the present day have not reduced the logistical demands of large-scale combat between great powers. It will require massive quantities of supplies that will need intermediate staging bases along the sea lines of communication. These concerns must be addressed if the joint force plan to distribute additional supplies further forward is to be a credible deterrent.

These concerns are valid but do not undermine the idea that a distributed logistical footprint forms the backbone of the joint force’s ability to compete with the PRC in the USINDOPACOM region. It enables the joint force to operate sustainably inside the adversary’s disruption zone and better positions U.S. forces to respond to crises as they emerge within the region. The shutdown of Red Hill is not a dire threat to U.S. national security, but it still represents an opportunity to reinvest in the sustainment infrastructure to support regional deterrence better. However, the United States must continue diplomatic efforts to support this change.

Diplomacy

Distributing the U.S. logistical infrastructure is a military effort supporting regional security. U.S. forces must leverage regional partners and allies to effectively counter the PRC’s A2/AD. The 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy states, “Consistent with our broader strategic approach, we will prioritize our single greatest asymmetric strength: our network of security alliances and partnerships.”¹⁶ In a 2022 statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Aquilino highlighted how the PRC has upgraded across all warfighting domains, enabling their A2/AD.¹⁷ China can interdict U.S. forces with kinetic and nonkinetic effects, but it is primarily built to counter air and sea forces.¹⁸ Regional partners and allies remain key to getting the necessary infrastructure staged forward within the AOR. This requires a diplomatic effort that the DOD cannot achieve alone.

This effort necessitates a whole-of-government approach, as it will require diplomatic agreements with allied and regional partners. The U.S. government built its logistical infrastructure in Europe over decades in partnership with allies and partners. This same level of diplomatic effort is required in the Pacific as the foundation for a distributed sustainment infrastructure. A joint force supported by a distributed logistical infrastructure that attains the necessary access agreements is a credible threat to the PRC, ultimately promoting regional deterrence. Maj. Gen. David Wilson, U.S. Army Sustainment Command commander, highlighted that it would require diplomatic effort to gain parity with Europe within the Pacific in “Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements” for U.S. forces.¹⁹ During an interview with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Gen. Charles Flynn, U.S. Army Pacific commander, emphasized recent agreements with the Philippines to enable the joint force.²⁰ These agreements enable effective competition and strengthen regional deterrence and also operations through robust logistics. The day-to-day campaigning is fundamental to integrated deterrence and cannot occur without these prerequisite access agreements.

These diplomatic efforts are not without risk, specifically complicating a military response when differing regional partners and allies are not connected via a single defense treaty. The Indo-Pacific Strategy highlights the importance of leveraging partners and allies.²¹ These arrangements proved quite durable over the last two administrations, demonstrating an enduring strength; however, the region still lacks a single unifying alliance.²² The dispersal of logistics connects many differing nations, but still, these nations that may not be bound to work together in case of conflict could undermine the United States’ ability to respond. This risk can become minimized with bulk storage stored further along the sea line of communication and should be an impetus for additional efforts to align our partners and allies closer together. As an example, the trilateral summit among South Korea, Japan, and the United States shows the region’s strengthening as demonstrated in a joint statement after a 2023 Camp David meeting: “We are united in a common purpose to strengthen our shared region.”²³ These are separate alliances, but its enhanced coordination helps reduce risk. Seeking to enhance cooperation between other U.S. regional partners and allies within the region will help minimize the risks associated with having a collective security agreement like NATO. These diplomatic efforts, tied with increased interoperability between the militaries of these respective countries, help increase deterrence within the region.

Deterrence

Distributed logistics help form the joint force’s effort to establish a persistent presence in the disruption zone to counter the PRC’s A2/AD systems and to directly support U.S. deterrence in the region. Deterrence is about demonstrating the potential and getting the adversary to believe you are capable and willing to follow through.²⁴ First, distributed logistics support deterrence by denial, demonstrating the logistical credibility underpinning any U.S. challenge to a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. Second, establishing a distributed logistic posture within USINDOPACOM enables deterrence by resilience, as outlined in the 2022 National Defense Strategy. Gen. C. Q. Brown, then–chief of staff of the Air Force, said, “Credible military logistics capability is a key element of integrated deterrence.”²⁵ The decision to invest in a distributed logistical footprint across the USINDOPACOM is a strong signal to the PRC of America’s commitment within the region, its ability to deny a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan, and a quick rebound from a multidomain Chinese attack.

Deterrence by denial. A distributed logistical footprint across the USINDOPACOM AOR directly supports regional deterrence. Thomas Shelling writes about the “latent violence that can influence.”²⁶ This threat of violence must be credible. One can achieve deterrence by demonstrating that the adversary’s actions will not succeed, which is deterrence by denial.²⁷ America aims to deter Chinese aggression, including a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. Logistics underpins any successful operation, and U.S. actions within the First and Second Island Chains are no different. Distributed Maritime Operations, Stand-In Forces, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, and Agile Combat Employment can only succeed if properly sustained. Bulk goods secured in consolidated facilities along long sea lines of communication do not properly support those efforts. U.S. forces must demonstrate the capability to challenge a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan, which requires a distributed logistical footprint to help ensure long-term investments within the region. It will also require substantial funds, diplomatic efforts, and ongoing military engagements with allies and partners, which will increase the credibility of the U.S. threat to deny a cross-strait invasion. A distributed logistical footprint supports deterrence by denial but also supports deterrence by resilience by reducing U.S. vulnerabilities within the region.

Deterrence by resilience. A distributed logistical footprint within the USINDOPACOM AOR directly supports deterrence by resilience. As outlined in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, deterrence by resilience is “the ability to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption.”²⁸ The massive quantity of fuel maintained in a singular location is susceptible to many multidomain threats. U.S. forces cannot access and distribute the fuel rapidly when needed supplies are consolidated in a single location. Replacing a single site with multiple underground sites, above-ground sites, underwater sites, and tankers creates a more resilient infrastructure.²⁹ Red Hill demonstrated the opposite of resilience because it was a single point of failure. A distributed logistical system creates more nodes, and this flexibility creates resilience within the system and directly supports deterrence, as the adversary must account for each point. By doing this, no single action can logistically cripple U.S. efforts within the region, and U.S. forces can quickly adjust to an attack.

U.S. military action, even within logistics, could cause PRC escalation within the region. A 2023 RAND study found six triggers in the U.S. military that may cause PRC escalation: “threats to physical or regime security; U.S., allied, or partner hostile intent; threats to regime legitimacy; threats to PRC economic development; threats to PRC regional influence; and weak U.S. commitment to the defense of allies and partners.”³⁰ Distributing logistics increases the joint force’s resilience and signals a strong commitment to the region; however, the PRC may see this as a “threat to PRC regional influence.”³¹ This may cause escalation within the region, the exact thing investments are attempting to deter. This risk is real but ultimately associated with any military action. It is not exclusive to the decision to distribute logistics within the region, but the DOD and U.S. government must decide if the benefits gained from distributing logistics outweigh the potential escalation costs.

A distributed logistical footprint is a tangible investment in deterrence. This effort supports the four elements of deterrence highlighted by Flynn in 2021: “capabilities, posturing, signaling, and will.”³² It demonstrates U.S. resolve within the region through investments in the necessary critical infrastructure and that U.S. joint operational concepts have the necessary logistics to counter China’s A2/AD operations. It builds the necessary resilience within the system to enable U.S. survivability in case of hostilities.

Recommendations

The DOD needs to outline a way forward that prioritizes building the necessary distributed logistical infrastructure within the USINDOPACOM. Infrastructure investments provide an opportunity to leverage the information element of national power. The distributed logistical infrastructure directly supports U.S. priorities in the region and invests in U.S. regional partners and allies, whose economies can benefit.³³ This should be connected to a messaging campaign focusing on the region’s priorities as it builds resilience and aids in security. Free and open sea lines of communication connect nations, raise prosperity for all, and help maintain a free and open world. Messaging the benefits of the rules-based order should not be reactive but proactive against PRC aggression. Information activities within the DOD and across the entirety of the U.S. government should continue to support a unified messaging campaign for the region. Logistical infrastructure investments are a small part of any information campaign. They demonstrate capability to the adversary, which the joint force should message at every opportunity.

Conclusion

The National Security Strategy says we are in a “decisive decade,” as investments made now in a distributed logistical infrastructure support better posturing of U.S. forces over the next ten years.³⁴ The joint force requires a sustainment infrastructure to support operations within the disruption zone and respond to crises as they emerge. Distributed logistical infrastructure cannot be built overnight but requires continued investment and diplomatic support. This committed investment within the USINDOPACOM ultimately builds resilience within the system and signals credibility to the adversary necessary for deterrence. This entails risk, but the risk associated with not updating the USINDOPACOM’s logistical footprint remains greater. The United States must continue making the necessary regional investments while working with partners and allies to secure the future.

 

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Notes

1. Office of the Secretary of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (U.S. Department of Defense [DOD], 2022), 17, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.
2. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The White House, 2022), 24, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
3. Mike Ives, “Pentagon Will Close Hawaii Fuel Depot That Leaked Petroleum,” New York Times, 8 March 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/08/us/hawaii-navy-water.html.
4. “About the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, last updated 3 April 2025, https://www.epa.gov/red-hill/what-red-hill-bulk-fuel-storage-facility.
5. “About Red Hill,” Commander, Navy Region Hawaii, accessed 6 June 2025, https://cnrh.cnic.navy.mil/Operations-and-Management/Red-Hill/About-Red-Hill/.
6. Beth Recce, “DLA Assesses Future U.S. Logistics Needs for INDO-PACIFIC During Talisman Sabre,” Defense Logistics Agency, 3 August 2023, https://www.dla.mil/About-DLA/News/News-Article-View/Article/3481491/dla-assesses-future-us-logistics-needs-for-indo-pacific-during-talisman-sabre/.
7. “Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on the Closure of the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility,” DOD, 7 March 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2957825/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-the-closure-of-the-red/.
8. Richard R. Burgess, “Aquilino: Fuel Logistics to be Dispersed in Wake of Red Hill Closure,” Sea Power, 9 March 2022, https://seapowermagazine.org/aquilino-fuel-logistics-to-be-dispersed-in-wake-of-red-hill-closure/.
9. Abby Doll et al., The Backbone of U.S. Joint Operations: Army Roles in Indo-Pacific (RAND, 2023), 86, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1784-1.html.
10. Katie Nelson, “Theater Army Employs Army Prepositioned Stock Afloat for First Time in Indo-Pacific,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, 11 May 2022, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3028351/theater-army-employs-army-prepositioned-stock-afloat-for-first-time-in-indo-pac/.
11. Heather Mongilio, “SECNAV Del Toro: Navy Will Not Need to Build Fuel Facilities to Replace Red Hill Fuel Depot,” U.S. Naval Institute News, 11 March 2022, https://news.usni.org/2022/03/11/secnav-del-toro-navy-will-not-need-to-build-fuel-facilities-to-replace-red-hill-fuel-depot.
12. Bryan Quinn, “Sustaining Multidomain Operations: The Logistical Challenge Facing the Army’s Operating Concept,” Military Review 103, no. 2 (March-April 2023): 128–38, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/March-April-2023/Multidomain-Operations/.
13. Marcos A. Melendez III, Michael E. O’Hanlon, and Jason Wolff, America Can’t Afford to Ignore the Logistics Triad (Brookings Institution, July 2023), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/america-cant-afford-to-ignore-the-logistics-triad/.
14. Michael Brenes, “How America Broke Its War Machine: Privatization and the Hollowing Out of the U.S. Defense Industry,” Foreign Affairs, 3 July 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-america-broke-its-war-machine.
15. Rob Wittman, “Wittman Opening Statement at Hearing on Posture and Readiness of Mobility Enterprise,” press release, 30 March 2022, https://wittman.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=4089.
16. The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States of America (The White House, 2022), 12, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.
17. To Receive Testimony on the Posture of the United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services Committee, 117th Cong. (2022) (statement of Adm. John C. Aquilino, commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command), 5, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/INDOPACOM%20Statement%20(ADM%20Aquilino)%20_SASC2.PDF.
18. “Strategic Landpower Dialogue: A Conversation with General Charles Flynn,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 12 October 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategic-landpower-dialogue-conversation-general-charles-flynn.
19. Sam Skove, “Army Faces Logistics, Alliance Hurdles in the Pacific,” Defense One, 19 October 2023, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/10/army-faces-logistics-alliance-hurdles-pacific/391365/.
20. CSIS, “Strategic Landpower Dialogue.”
21. White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy, 12.
22. Derek Grossman, “America’s Indo-Pacific Alliances Are Astonishingly Strong,” Foreign Policy, 5 December 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/05/us-china-alliances-allies-geopolitics-balance-power-asia-india-taiwan-japan-south-korea-quad-aukus/.
23. The White House, “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States,” press release, 18 August 2023, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/.
24. Liam Collins and Lionel Beehner, “Thomas Schelling’s Theories on Strategy and War Will Live On,” Modern War Institute, 16 December 2016, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/thomas-schellings-theories-strategy-war-will-live/.
25. Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “Air Force Senior Leaders Hold Contested Logistics Tabletop Exercise,” press release, 22 June 2023, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3436101/air-force-senior-leaders-hold-contested-logistics-table-top-exercise/.
26. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 2020), 3, ProQuest eBook Central.
27. Tami Biddle, “Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners,” Texas National Security Review 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 94–109, http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/8864.
28. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022), 8, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/NMS%202022%20_%20Signed.pdf.
29. Timothy A. Walton, “Resilient Refueling Beyond Red Hill,” Hudson Institute, 14 March 2022, https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/resilient-refueling-beyond-red-hill.
30. Bryan Frederick et al., Managing the Escalation Risks of U.S. Military Activities in the Indo-Pacific (RAND, 2023), 3, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA972-1.html.
31. Frederick et al, Managing the Escalation Risks, 3.
32. Greg Baumann, “General Charles Flynn Says the Army Has a Crucial Role in the Pacific Theater,” RAND, 13 October 2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/articles/2021/gen-charles-flynn-says-army-has-crucial-role-in-the.html.
33. Luke A. Nicastro, U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R47589 (Congressional Research Service [CRS], 2023), 9, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47589.
34. White House, National Security Strategy, 1.

 

 

 

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