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Sustaining the Fight

How the 21st TSC Supports Ukraine’s Defense

 

Lt. Col. Ryan P. Hovatter, U.S. Army National Guard

 

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“First in Support” has been the 21st Theater Sustainment Command’s (TSC) motto since its inception at a time when the Soviet Union was not only the greatest threat to peace in Europe but also to American security. The 21st TSC’s primary focus has been supporting U.S. forces in Europe and Africa with secondary support to U.S. operations in the Middle East. After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, supporting the Ukrainian military became the 21st TSC’s top priority. As the war in Ukraine passes its third year, it is worth looking at the initial efforts of the 13,800 soldiers, civilians, local nationals, and contractors that make up the 21st TSC. What follows is an assessment of the successes and lessons learned during the first two years in which the 21st TSC played a vital role in efforts to counter Russia’s challenge to international order.¹

Before Russia launched its attack in February 2022, the 21st TSC had been busy with the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of rotational deploying units, including armor brigade combat teams, a combat aviation brigade, the two Army National Guard brigade combat team headquarters that performed the Kosovo Forces and Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine missions, and the many other companies and detachments that made up Atlantic Resolve’s Sustainment Task Force. The command also supported the summer influx of short-term deployments of units in the Defender-Europe exercises. While these were no easy tasks, all these deployments were planned well in advance, giving the 21st TSC time to coordinate the use of ports, obtain cross-country clearances, and establish life support areas, among other essential tasks.

The 21st TSC also found itself at the center of U.S. Army Europe and Africa support to the two major crises of 2020 and 2021: the COVID-19 pandemic and the fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. As the Department of Defense and the rest of the world dealt with life under COVID-19, the 21st TSC had a significant role in providing guidance and quarantining service members upon arrival in Europe. The virus remained a concern for several years, with German mask mandates on public transportation and medical facilities only being lifted in early 2023.² Beginning in August 2021, the command was nearly stretched to its limit while supporting the sudden arrival of almost thirty-five thousand Afghan refugees to Ramstein Air Base and Rhine Ordnance Barracks.

While the 21st TSC continued the rotation of units for exercises and operations, dealt with COVID, and managed Army support to refugee operations, it also looked toward shaping the future operational environment. Maj. Gen. James M. Smith, the commanding general from June 2021 to June 2023, stated, “We make continued efforts to … set the theater, and ensure that we’ve got the right sustainment capability” where it needs to be.³ Resetting the theater included major efforts like activating an Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) site to store an entire armored brigade combat team’s (ABCT) worth of equipment and a munitions storage area at Powidz, Poland. After nearly three years of construction, the APS site known as the Long-Term Equipment Storage and Maintenance-Complex opened in April 2023.⁴

The 21st TSC considered the observable escalating Russian provocation in its plans to reset the theater and bring in rotational forces. It was in this environment that Russia shook the world with its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine was not a complete surprise to U.S. Army Europe and Africa and the 21st TSC. Instead, the United States and its allies watched as Russia slowly built up its equipment near the border and tested NATO and Ukrainian resolve with large-scale exercises. Western media began covering the Russian military buildup in Crimea and along the Russian and Belorussian borders of Ukraine as early as April 2021, eight months prior to the invasion.⁵ Russian President Vladimir Putin brushed off invasion concerns, expressing that Russia was merely conducting troop exercises. Despite reassurances, Russia continued to leave military equipment in place while only returning troops to their bases away from the Ukrainian border.⁶ By December 2021, Western and Ukrainian officials worried that the buildup was a prelude to invasion.⁷ President Joseph R. Biden vowed on 2 January 2022 that the United States and its allies would act decisively if Russia invaded Ukraine.⁸ The White House also accused Russia of sending saboteurs into Ukraine in the first week of January as they amassed more than one hundred thousand troops along the border.⁹

As most soldiers were about to enjoy their four-day pass for the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday weekend, Smith directed a small element of the staff to prepare a space to conduct prudent planning. It was a premission analysis to determine what tasks the 21st TSC would need to accomplish if Russia invaded Ukraine. Space was already set up in the simulations training building at the 21st TSC headquarters on Panzer Kaserne, Kaiserslautern, Germany, as staff was already preparing to begin mission analysis right after the four-day weekend in preparation for a multinational command post exercise. Over the weekend, the small team prepared the room for a classified setting by running cables, setting up SIPR workstations and printers, and exchanging maps of the exercise area for those of Ukraine, Poland, and Romania.

The premission analysis began Tuesday, 18 January, with an intelligence brief to the staff. This was the first time the entire staff was brought together for the potential crisis. Mission assumptions came together quickly. Planners believed that before an attack, the 21st TSC would need to move units within theater—including squadrons of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and battalions of the 173rd Airborne Brigade—to forward sites in Poland, Romania, and other countries bordering Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. The command expected to move a rapid reaction force of infantry or armored forces from the United States to Europe to bolster NATO allies and further deter Russian aggression and anticipated the use of APS and supplying Ukraine with arms and ammunition.

The 21st TSC was also expected to support a massive evacuation of noncombatants. At this point, the command had just finished supporting Afghan refugees in the Ramstein/Kaiserslautern area two-and-a-half months prior on 30 October 2021. The thirty-five thousand Afghan refugees who entered Germany through Ramstein Air Base had placed an enormous strain on both the 21st TSC and the U.S. Air Force 86th Airlift Wing.¹⁰ Estimates showed that as many as thirty thousand American citizens were in Ukraine, and although U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken later stated that the United States would not enter Ukraine to evacuate Americans if there was a war, the United States had to prepare to receive refugees in the countries bordering Ukraine.¹¹

The staff developed a concept of sustainment that could enable several presidential options that mainly differed in the number and type of combat troops moving further east to deter Russian aggression against NATO countries. Smith believed that if Russia attacked, then noncombatant evacuation operations would occur quickly. He wanted U.S.-based rapid response forces to land directly in Poland, bypassing Ramstein Air Base and the Army’s Deployment Processing Center in Kaiserslautern.

There was an understandable urgency about the situation. The day after developing the concept of sustainment, Smith briefed Gen. Edward M. Daly, the Army Materiel Command commander, on 24 January about the plan to reset the theater, move and issue APS, and support potential American evacuees. However, an hour before Daly arrived for the situation brief, it was found that some of the planning team tested positive for a variant of COVID-19. With little options to replace individuals, the officers and NCOs coped with sickness and delayed testing before eventually being relieved to quarantine. On the same day, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin placed 8,500 U.S. troops on alert for a rapid deployment to Europe to join the NATO Response Force.¹²

Eight days after placing troops on alert, Biden announced on 2 February that the response force was on their way to Europe to assure allies and deter further Russian aggression. In what became known as Operation European Assure, Deter, and Reinforce, the 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne Division deployed to Poland. Another three hundred troops from the XVIII Airborne Corps, under the command of Lt. Gen. Michael E. Kurilla, deployed to Wiesbaden, Germany, to act as a joint task force headquarters. At the same time, V Corps ordered elements of the Germany-based 2nd Cavalry Regiment to reposition farther east. The 21st TSC supported the movement of a one thousand-soldier task force and its Stryker vehicles to Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.¹³

Within two days, 1,700 airborne reinforcements began arriving at the Rzeszów-Jasionka Airport on 4 February.¹⁴ Another three thousand arrived about ten days later, completing the deployment of the entire 3rd BCT.¹⁵ The 21st TSC received these troops and moved them to their forward operating sites where Area Support Group-Poland, the 191st Regional Support Group (Puerto Rico Army National Guard), and Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) personnel from the 405th Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB) worked together to rapidly develop support areas. Capt. Dennis Kinney, the brigade support officer for the 3rd BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, reflected on LOGCAP support in establishing life support at a military airfield in Mielec, southeastern Poland:

When it came to life support (billeting, laundry services, etc.), the logistics civil augmentation program, more commonly known as LOGCAP, was where we made our money. For the first three to four weeks paratroopers were on ground, it was difficult with unestablished life support, but after becoming fully operational, the life support assets vastly improved the overall quality of life for our paratroopers.¹⁶

While the 405th AFSB’s LOGCAP team was engrossed in establishing life support areas in Poland and Romania, they also had to rapidly set up a headquarters site and living space for the XVIII Airborne Corps in Wiesbaden. The 405th AFSB’s annual report stated that “within days of notification” government contractor KBR established a life support area for 250 soldiers and civilians by refurbishing an old post office building, erecting tents, and installing sixty-eight containerized housing units.¹⁷

As the Russian invasion seemed imminent, Austin ordered the evacuation of nearly all U.S. personnel within Ukraine. The major element there was a detachment of the 53rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, a Florida Army National Guard unit performing the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine mission. The 21st TSC contracted commercial trucks and buses to move the unit’s 160 soldiers and equipment from Yavoriv military base in western Ukraine to Grafenwoehr, Germany.¹⁸ They hastily evacuated along with Canadian troops just days before the Russian invasion. The urgency is illustrated by the fact that Russia struck the training base with some thirty cruise missiles, killing at least thirty-five Ukrainian military personnel on 13 March, just weeks after U.S. and Canadian trainers had left.¹⁹

As soon as Russia launched its attack on 24 February, Austin ordered another seven thousand U.S. troops to Europe.²⁰ A majority of those soldiers included the entire 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 3rd Infantry Division (ID), which deployed to Grafenwoehr.²¹ The advanced party arrived on 28 February, and the trail party on 5 March. This unscheduled ABCT deployed to Europe within ten days.²²

To expedite the unit’s deployment, the 405th AFSB issued an entire ABCT’s worth of equipment from APS out of the Coleman worksite at Mannheim and Dülmen, Germany. By June 2023, the Army Field Support Battalion-Mannheim would issue over five thousand pieces of equipment in support of Operation European Assure, Deter, and Reinforce.²³

Forward sites like the Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area (DPTA) expanded temporary living quarters to house the incoming armor formations. DPTA went from about five hundred to six hundred soldiers to more than four thousand at a given time. Life support at DPTA was managed by a four-soldier team from the 191st Regional Support Group. Sgt. 1st Class Omar Cruz, the mayor of the U.S. support area, recalled, “The LSAs had to be ready for the soldiers with all of their equipment. We’re talking about an armored brigade combat team coming out here and their equipment, they need tents for troops to sleep in, a dining facility, recreation areas, motor pools, and maintenance bays ready. We literally had [only] a month and a half to have everything ready.”²⁴

Biden again increased the U.S. troop deployment by another five hundred soldiers on 5 March, bringing the total of U.S. military in Europe to one hundred thousand.²⁵ By the end of March, the 21st TSC had facilitated the reception, staging, and onward movement of another armored brigade, the 3rd ABCT, 4th ID. Unlike the hastily alerted 1st ABCT, 3rd ID, this brigade was part of the preplanned nine-month rotational Atlantic Resolve mission and brought its equipment from the United States. Over two thousand equipment items were offloaded at ports in Greece, Denmark, and the Netherlands before consolidating at Grafenwoehr. This marked the first time that Europe had three U.S. armored brigades since 2007.²⁶ By this point, at the end of March 2022, U.S. Army combat brigades in Europe included the 1st ABCT, 1st ID; 1st ABCT, 3rd ID; 3rd ABCT, 4th ID; and 3rd BCT, 82nd Airborne Division; in addition to the permanently stationed 2nd Cavalry Regiment and 173rd Airborne Brigade.

In addition to increasing the U.S. troop presence in Europe, Biden issued a military assistance package for Ukraine immediately after the Russian invasion under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). Although Biden had issued two PDAs prior to the Russian invasion in August and December 2021, the pace of PDAs increased with such speed that there was an average of one PDA every two weeks over the next two years. By the end of 2023, Biden had issued fifty-four PDAs, totaling nearly $24 billion in aid.²⁷

This presented a challenge for the 21st TSC, who had to receive, stage, and transport the PDA equipment and ammunition from stockpiles in the United States and Europe to its transfer points along the borders of Ukraine. PDA tracking remained a preeminent task for the 21st TSC throughout those two years. The equipment to be delivered in each PDA was urgently needed for Ukraine’s defense, and early in the war, antitank missiles were among the most important. The United States committed to delivering more strategic assets as the war continued. The first HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems) were transferred to Ukraine in June 2022, and later, combat vehicles like tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers took precedence.

Just as the 21st TSC began to adjust to the new operational tempo, the command had to manage another major movement of troops and equipment. The division headquarters and two BCTs that were deployed for the Ukraine crisis in February and March were set to rotate back to the United States while an equal number of troops were deployed to take over responsibilities in the summer of 2022. This movement aligned with the ABCT and combat aviation brigade rotations supporting Atlantic Resolve. In just a few months, during the summer of 2023, the 21st TSC moved 21,400 soldiers between the United States and Europe and transferred more than a division’s worth of equipment.²⁸

The 21st TSC learned a great deal in the first months of Operation European Assure, Deter, and Reinforce. Lt. Col. Oliver Stolley, the 21st TSC Distribution Integration Branch (DIB) chief, and Capt. Daniel McCall noted the significant changes the rapid deployments spurred in the 21st TSC. Before the war, continental U.S.-based BCTs deployed on a predictable schedule with as much as a year to prepare. Stolley and the DIB realized they had to communicate real-time information to facilitate rapid deployment of units. His branch created an “RSOI suite of tools,” using Microsoft Teams to share the 21st TSC concept of sustainment, an RSOI handbook, contact rosters, and other resources with alerted units. Among the tools were even a draft sustainment plan (titled “Annex F”) for units to use for their deployment operation orders. The DIB began sharing the RSOI suite with incoming units in April 2022. One year later, the DIB reported they had shared the information via Teams pages with eleven brigades, and the resulting collaboration and better awareness proved its effectiveness.²⁹

By the end of the summer of 2022, the 21st TSC had adapted to the new operational environment. The movement of PDAs, although remaining strategically important, had become a routine series of coordinated tasks. While supporting the PDA movements to Ukraine and the frequent BCT and combat aviation brigade rotations, the 21st TSC worked toward other means of using the sustainment warfighting function to assure allies and deter Russian aggression.

Throughout 2022 and 2023, the 21st TSC tested sustainment nodes and expanded its lines-of-communication network.³⁰ The command used ports all over Europe to disembark equipment for deploying units. Some examples show the diverse ports selected. The 21st TSC moved more than 2,400 armored vehicles and major pieces of equipment belonging to 2nd ABCT, 1st ID through the ports of Thessaloniki and Alexandroupoli, Greece, and Gdynia, Poland, to forward operating sites in Poland in November 2022.³¹ Throughout late March and early April 2023, nearly two thousand pieces of equipment from the 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade entered Europe through the ports at Esbjerg, Denmark; Riga, Latvia; and Thessaloniki, Greece.³² Both of these operations exercised and validated the lines of communication stretching from Greece to Poland through the Carpathian Mountains and the tried-and-true ports in the North and Black Seas closer to Poland where the majority of U.S. forces were deployed.

Other movements through the ports of Bar, Montenegro, and Koper, Slovenia, were intended to open new options and encourage better port, rail, and road investment by the host countries.³³ In December 2023, the 21st TSC redeployed five hundred equipment items belonging to 1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, from their forward operating site in Estonia to the port of Setubal, Portugal, which marked the U.S. military’s first use of the port and tested the 21st TSC’s ability to change rail gages upon entering the Iberian peninsula.³⁴

Moving units into Europe is a massive effort for the 21st TSC. Smith described the synchronization it takes for “thousands and thousands” of soldiers, civilians, and contractors from the U.S. military and host nations “to receive equipment at a certain port, to load the equipment on a certain conveyance, and then to move the equipment to its final destination.”³⁵ The typical RSOI involved the following:

• The 598th Transportation Brigade (Surface Deployment and Distribution Command) coordinated the movement of equipment by ship to European ports, where the 21st TSC was responsible for receiving vehicles, equipment, and containers from vessels and then staging and transporting these to forward operating sites across Europe.
• The 267th Theater Movement Control Element managed transportation via rail, line haul, or barge.
• Security teams from the 16th Sustainment Brigade and the 18th Military Police Brigade provided escorts for sensitive equipment.
• Personnel from incoming units flew into Ramstein or another airport where human resources, medical, and financial management elements from the 21st TSC accounted for and assisted arriving soldiers.
• The 409th Contracting Support Brigade provided crucial contracts with local vendors and support groups in the Balkans, Black Sea, and Poland, and the LOGCAP professionals provided life support to troops and units once they arrived at their forward operating sites.³⁶

Nearly one and a half years into the operation, Smith turned the command of the 21st TSC over to Brig. Gen. Ronald Ragin on 7 June 2023. Ragin, who was soon after promoted to major general, had been closely involved in Ukraine support while serving as the deputy commanding general for support in the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine.³⁷ 

The challenges met over these two years were not done without fault. Vehicle accidents spiked after the invasion as the increased equipment and ammunition movements demanded soldier escorts of sensitive equipment and ammunition. Coordinating convoy security proved more difficult than anticipated. Because there was not a dedicated element to provide security escort, a rotating roster of soldiers from different units created confusion and frustration. Adding to the confusion were the multiple layers of communication from the 21st TSC headquarters and the 267th Theater Movement Coordination Center through the brigades down to the escort teams. The communication problems were not just from the 21st TSC headquarters down to the team sergeant, there were many delays in getting the contracted transports moving and also frequent language and communication barriers between contracted truck drivers and the soldier escorts. To add to the complexity, many convoys started from Mannheim or Miesau with the soldier details frequently coming from Baumholder or Grafenwoehr. This meant the security teams had already driven two to five hours before even linking up with the convoy. To make matters more dangerous, the convoys had to drive at night. Delayed timetables or even an error in the reporting time could cause soldiers to stay awake for twenty-four hours.

In one tragic mishap from the first months of Ukraine war support, a soldier—having just finished escorting a convoy in Germany and likely awake for nearly twenty-four hours—crashed into another vehicle outside of Grafenwoehr, killing a local German driver.³⁸ In another instance, a soldier team escorted a convoy hauling M1 Abrams to Grafenwoehr to be delivered to the 1st ABCT, 3rd ID during the middle of the night. A German police officer stopped the convoy near a bridge and told them they needed to cross one transport at a time.³⁹ The escort team consisted of only two soldiers who needed to secure both sides of the bridge but only had one vehicle. When the contracted truck drivers offered to take one of the soldiers across the bridge, the young male sergeant refused to place the female specialist with any of the truck drivers out of concern for her safety; it was dark, the convoy was long, and the sergeant did not know the foreign truck drivers. The 21st TSC battle major pleaded with the sergeant and the German police officer to solve the problem and get the convoy moving before daylight, but it failed to change the situation. The convoy was grounded until another security team arrived to assist the next evening.⁴⁰

Some security details even became separated from their convoys because they lacked communication with the contracted truck drivers. While security escort procedures have improved, there is still work to do. After realizing how far the escort teams were traveling to and from their details, temporary barracks were set aside for teams to stay overnight; this ensured the teams were better rested before their missions. Furthermore, when Ragin assumed command, he made improving the operations center with revised processes and system upgrades to better track assets and movements as one of his top priorities.

Poor processes and procedures across the command were quickly brought to light after the Russian invasion. Another major issue was with the APS issue to the 1st ABCT, 3rd ID. The APS draw for an entire ABCT was unprecedented although imperfect. A Department of Defense inspector general report found several major areas of concern: less than 90 percent of equipment was fully mission capable and 20 percent of equipment was missing crucial basic issue items.⁴¹

While the 405th AFSB issued equipment at a rapid pace, nine days ahead of Army Materiel Command’s forty-five-day requirement, the problems with equipment readiness exposed issues with long-term storage where everything from flat tires, fluid leaks, and rodent infestations could deadline a vehicle. The report found that inspections, preventative maintenance, and exercising equipment had not been done according to regulations. The report also found that there were no clear equipment drawing procedures, and the 405th AFSB and the 1st ABCT had not coordinated procedures and timelines in advance. The inspector general recommended the 405th AFSB develop or update maintenance processes, including ways to exercise equipment, and provide guidance to receiving units.⁴² The 405th AFSB used these lessons and recommendations to develop an “APS-2 Equipment Issue and Turn-In Standard Operating Procedure” by the end of 2023.⁴³ Despite these issues, leaders in the 1st ABCT told investigators that “the 405th AFSB workforce aggressively worked to fix vehicle faults during issuance.”⁴⁴

There is no doubt that the war shook the dust from where it had collected. As Smith stated, the war in Ukraine “allowed us to see ourselves and help capitalize on some of the lessons learned.”⁴⁵ The 21st TSC used these lessons to fix processes, better share information, and collaborate with incoming and outgoing units, as evidenced by the DIB’s and 405th AFSB’s efforts.

The 21st TSC staff not only learned from their successes and failures in providing support to Ukraine and conducting RSOI of a substantial number of units but has also been able to observe lessons from the war in Ukraine. The 21st TSC expanded sustainment node options and partnerships with allies and continued to use the sustainment warfighting function as a deterrent. The command’s ability to provide humanitarian assistance has drastically improved while the scale has drawn down. The 21st TSC continues executing mission command of operational sustainment across the European theater while increasing its abilities to project power in a contested environment. At the time of this writing, the 21st TSC continues to manage refugee operations and support Ukraine in its defense against Russia.

 

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Notes

1. Ryan P. Hovatter, ed., “Biannual Command History for Calendar Years 2022 and 2023, 21st Theater Sustainment Command,” unpublished report, 20 June 2023. Most of this article comes from this unpublished report. Where no source is listed, the information is from the notes and recollection of the author, then–Maj. Hovatter, who led the 21st Theater Sustainment Command’s (TSC) planning team in January and February 2022.
2. “COVID: Germany Ends Obligatory Masks for Public Transit,” Deutsche Welle, 2 February 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/covid-germany-ends-obligatory-masks-for-public-transit/a-64587973.
3. U.S. Army Public Affairs, “Transcript: ACOET Media Roundtable with 21st TSC, May 19, 2023,” U.S. Army, 23 May 2023, https://www.army.mil/article/266929.
4. Cameron Porter, “Army’s Top Two Uniformed Leaders Visit New APS-2 Storage, Maintenance Complex in Poland,” Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS), 28 August 2023, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/452251/armys-top-two-uniformed-leaders-visit-new-aps-2-storage-maintenance-complex-poland; “Munition Storage Area for the Allied Forces Is Being Built in Powidz,” Ministry of National Defence for the Republic of Poland, 6 February 2022, https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/munition-storage-area-for-the-allied-forces-is-being-built-in-powidz.
5. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia Orders Troop Pullback but Keeps Weapons near Ukraine,” Valley Morning Star, 23 April 2021, A25.
6. Isachenkov, “Russia Orders Troop Pullback but Keeps Weapons near Ukraine,” A25.
7. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Is Russia Going to Invade Ukraine?,” Beaver Dam Daily Citizen, 6 December 2021, A10.
8. Aamer Madhani, “Biden Vows U.S. Will Act Decisively If Crisis Occurs,” Portland Press Herald, 3 January 2022, A3.
9. Trudy Rubin, “More Fake Exercises,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 19 January 2022, A11.
10. Ridge Miller, “Ramstein Completes Role in Historic Humanitarian Airlift,” Ramstein Air Base, 2 November 2021, https://www.ramstein.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2829699/ramstein-completes-role-in-historic-humanitarian-airlift/.
11. “U.S. Orders Employees to Leave Embassy in Kyiv Ahead of Potential Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” CBS Saturday Morning, 12 February 2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-orders-employees-to-leave-embassy-in-kyiv-potential-russian-invasion-ukraine/.
12. Robert Burns and Lorne Cook, “U.S. Orders 8,500 Troops on Heightened Alert amid Tension with Russia,” Miami Herald, 25 January 2022, A7.
13. Robert Burns, Lolita Baldor, and Aamer Madhami, “Biden Adds Troops to Eastern Europe,” South Florida Sun Sentinel, 3 February 2022, A1–A2; Robert Burns, “Biden Orders 3,000 More Troops to Poland,” Indianapolis Star, 12 February 2022, A9; “Factsheet: Posture Updates in Support of Allies in Europe,” U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), 25 February 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/25/2002945659/-1/-1/0/FACTSHEET-POSTURE-UPDATE-IN-SUPPORT-OF-ALLIES-IN-EUROPE.PDF.
14. Kuba Stezycki, “U.S. Deploys Troops to Back NATO’s Defence of Ukraine,” Province (Vancouver), 6 February 2022, A20.
15. Burns, “Biden Orders 3,000 More Troops to Poland.”
16. Daniel Kinney, “Paratroopers in Poland: Lessons from the 82nd Airborne Division’s Deployment to Europe,” Modern War Institute, 13 April 2023, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/paratroopers-in-poland-lessons-from-the-82nd-airborne-divisions-deployment-to-europe/.
17. 405th Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB), Annual Command History for Fiscal Year 2022 (405th AFSB, n.d.), 23.
18. Howard Altman, “Florida National Guard Troops Ordered Out of Ukraine by SECDEF,” Military Times, 12 February 2022, https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2022/02/12/florida-national-guard-troops-ordered-out-of-ukraine-by-secdef/.
19. Hugo Bachega, “Ukraine War: ‘Sky Turned Red’ as Missiles Hit Lviv Military Base,” BBC News, 13 March 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60728208.
20. Jim Garamone, “Austin Orders Fort Stewart Armored Brigade Combat Team to Europe,” DOD News, 24 February 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2945855/austin-orders-fort-stewart-armored-brigade-combat-team-to-europe/.
21. Garamone, “Austin Orders Fort Stewart Armored Brigade Combat Team to Europe.”
22. Oliver Stolley and Daniel McCall, “RSOI Suite of Tools: Delivering Logistics, Lethality to Europe,” Army Sustainment 55, no. 3 (Summer 2023): 23, https://asu.army.mil/alog/ARCHIVE/PB7002303FULL.pdf.
23. Cameron Porter, “Battalion That Made History Issuing an Entire ABCT APS-2 Equipment Set Changes Leadership,” DVIDS, 27 June 2023, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/448047/battalion-made-history-issuing-entire-abct-aps-2-equipment-set-changes-leadership.
24. Tara F. Arteaga, “Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area Expands Under Puerto Rico National Guard Leadership,” DVIDS, 28 June 2022, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/425359/drawsko-pomorskie-training-area-expands-under-puerto-rico-national-guard-leadership.
25. “Russian War in Ukraine Timeline,” DOD, accessed 13 May 2025, https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/Support-for-Ukraine/Timeline/.
26. Alvin Reeves, “Colorado-Based Armored Brigade Arrives in Europe,” U.S. Army, 23 March 2022, https://www.army.mil/article/254955/colorado_based_armored_brigade_arrives_in_europe.
27. DOD, “Russian War in Ukraine Timeline”; DOD, “Department of Defense Statement on Additional Military Assistance for Ukraine,” press release, 26 February 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2947554/department-of-defense-statement-on-additional-military-assistance-for-ukraine/.
28. “Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing,” U.S. DOD, 13 May 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3031879/pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-kirby-holds-a-press-briefing/.
29. Stolley and McCall, “RSOI Suite of Tools,” 23.
30. A node is a fixed point in a logistical system. This includes airports, seaports, warehouses, or maintenance facilities, among others.
31. Eleanor Prohoska, “U.S. Army Equipment Arrives with Economic Opportunity in Greece,” DVIDS, 14 December 2022, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/435159/us-army-equipment-arrives-with-economic-opportunity-greece.
32. U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “21st TSC Sets the Theater for Atlantic Resolve Through Ports in Denmark, Latvia, and Greece,” press release, 22 March 2023, https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/ArticleViewPressRelease/Article/3337304/press-release-21st-tsc-sets-the-theater-for-atlantic-resolve-through-ports-in-d/.
33. Eleanor Prohaska, “21st TSC Change of Command Highlights Accomplishments Under Maj. Gen. James Smith’s Leadership and Welcomes Brig. Gen. Ronald Ragin,” DVIDS, 7 June 2023, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/446401/21st-tsc-change-command-highlights-accomplishments-under-maj-gen-james-smiths-leadership-and-welcomes-brig-gen-ronald-ragin.
34. Andrew Jo, “21st Theater Sustainment Command Supports First Port Operation in Portugal,” DVIDS, 7 December 2023, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/459622/21st-theater-sustainment-command-supports-first-port-operation-portugal.
35. U.S. Army Public Affairs, “ACOET Media Roundtable with 21st TSC.”
36. The support groups consisted of a rotational deployed regional support group, Area Support Group-Black Sea, and Area Support Group-Balkans. The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Professionals were mainly Reserve Component soldiers on voluntary Active Duty for Operational Support orders.
37. Prohaska, “21st TSC Change of Command.” Note that Gen. Darryl A. Williams promoted Ragin to major general on 5 January 2024.
38. Hovatter, “Biannual Command History for Calendar Years 2022 and 2023,” 24–25.
39. Hovatter, “Biannual Command History for Calendar Years 2022 and 2023,” 24–25.
40. This happened while this author was leading the night shift. Maj. Robert “Bob” McDonough relieved me at around 2 a.m. as the situation was unfolding. It was McDonough who spoke to the police officer.
41. U.S. DOD Office of Inspector General (DODIG), Evaluation of Army Pre-Positioned Equipment Issued in Response to Ukraine and the NATO Defense Forces, DODIG-2023-053 (DODIG, 27 February 2023), https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/3311904/evaluation-of-army-pre-positioned-equipment-issued-in-response-to-ukraine-and-t/.
42. DODIG, Evaluation of Army Pre-Positioned Equipment Issued.
43. Michael P. Liles, “405th AFSB APS-2 Equipment Issue and Turn-in Standard Operating Procedure” (405th AFSB, 18 December 2023).
44. DODIG, Evaluation of Army Pre-Positioned Equipment Issued.
45. U.S. Army Public Affairs, “ACOET Media Roundtable with 21st TSC.”

 

 

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September-October 2025