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Are Drones a Maneuver Force?

The Evolving Role of Unmanned Vehicles on the Battlefield

 

Lt. Col. Kenton G. Fasana, U.S. Army, Retired

 

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The ongoing war in Ukraine presents a succession of evolving drone measures and countermeasures. This cycle has seen simple drones countered by electronic warfare (EW), followed by first-person-view drones countered by innovations in EW jamming. Now, wire-guided and AI-guided drones seem impervious to EW.¹ This is not the end of the story. Other technologies such as lasers, acoustics, and microwaves are being examined to knock drones from the sky.² At the same time, drone enthusiasts are experimenting with drone swarms to overwhelm ground forces or other drones. These trends infer an ongoing cycle rather than the eventual dominance of either measure or countermeasure.³

This article examines the implications of this cycle on ground force tactics and operations. The methodology utilizes Stephen Biddle’s modern system of force employment as the analytic framework supported by recent evidence from the war in Ukraine.⁴ The analysis is limited to drones commonly employed against conventional ground forces and assumes that the current cycle of drone measures and countermeasures will continue into the foreseeable future.

Using the modern system, drone effects need to be classified first and then their implications for ground force tactics and operations must be determined. Drones supported by situational awareness/battlefield management systems (SA/BMS) are a form of maneuver (called “quasi-maneuver” in this case). Drone quasi-maneuver will require changes to ground force tactics and operations. Ground force tactics will require armored vehicles that are smaller, more numerous, and dispersed. These vehicles will operate under a new combined arms concept with drones and other SA/BMS-connected systems. Ground operations will require concepts to rapidly concentrate or disperse forces based on conditions of varying predictability. Given the scope of this topic and limited supporting evidence, there is no claim that the results are final, but they are rather useful in providing an azimuth for further study.

Given the continued prominence of drones linked to SA/BMS, this article provides an integrated structure to answer pertinent questions like the following:

• Why are drones so effective against ground forces?
• How can force structure and tactics be harmonized?
• What new operations should be developed?

To make the case, we first describe the modern system and then identify where drones fall into it. Modern-system principles can then be applied to derive insights into ground force tactics and operations.

Overview of the Modern System

The modern system is selected as the analytic framework due to its focus on conventional ground warfare and its linkages between tactics and operations. Both aspects are relevant to the topic.

Using the case study method, Biddle argues that employment of modern-system principles, rather than superior technology or even numerical superiority, is the best predictor of victory in battle.⁵ His claim contrasts with the widespread notion during the 1990s that there was an ongoing revolution in military affairs—the proponents of whom cited the primacy of technological innovation.⁶

Modern-system concepts find expression in offensive tactics and operations. “Key modern-system offensive tactics are cover, concealment, dispersion, small-unit independent maneuver and suppression and combined arms integration.”⁷ These elements work together, allowing small units to advance using the protection of terrain and to use indirect fire to “keep the defenders’ heads down” when they are unprotected.⁸ These attacks are concentrated on a relatively small defensive area, requiring mutual coordination among units and independent maneuver to identify and exploit weakly defended enemy flanks. The main objective of offensive operations is to break through the defense, enabling large exploitation forces to attack and neutralize reserves and command, control, and communications nodes with the goal of unhinging the defense.⁹

 

Likewise, modern-system concepts find expression in defensive tactics and operations. Key defensive tactics are the same as those of the offense. These elements employ a mobile defense in depth, using the same measures as the attack but giving up ground. The main goal of defensive operations is to wear down advancing forces to then counterattack with large reserves.¹⁰

Drones, SA/BMS, and Quasi-Maneuver

This article only considers drones that target conventional ground forces. Examples of these drones include the Bayraktar TB-2; the Russian-made Lancet-3, Lancet-3M, and Kub; as well as the newer first-person-view, wire- and AI-guided drones. In this article, drone does not refer to a disconnected single system but to drones and other systems enabled by SA/BMS. SA/BMSs, such as Ukraine’s Delta, utilize widely distributed networks linked to drones, sensors, fire systems, and command nodes. Delta and like systems provide real-time situational awareness of military activities, facilitating speed and decentralized command and control.

In this article, we assert that drones linked to SA/BMS are a form of maneuver that we classify as quasi-maneuver. Quasi-maneuver means that certain drone effects are similar to ground maneuver force effects. For those who view drones as similar to manned aircraft, this may seem like a strange statement. Despite the obvious operating similarities, we make the case that aircraft and drone effects are remarkably different.

To better understand quasi-maneuver, we examine maneuver characteristics from doctrine and the modern system. U.S. joint doctrine states that forces maneuver to gain a “positional advantage” vis-à-vis an opponent with the goal “to render an enemy incapable of resisting.”¹¹ In addition to the obvious attribute of mobility, the modern system stresses the importance of persistence, surveillance, and engagement for successful ground maneuver.¹² Mobility, persistence, and surveillance provide sustained situational awareness. Engagement enables ground forces to shape the operational environment through a flexible array of options that include seizing and holding terrain, providing fires, and influencing populations. Together, these attributes enable ground forces to engage in successive actions “to render opponents incapable of resisting.”¹³

Drones have maneuver attributes that reflect doctrine and the modern system. They can attain positional advantage over an opponent. Drone operations afford positional advantage along the air-ground littoral—a vertical space between ten and eight thousand meters.¹⁴ Like ground forces, this positional advantage is derived from mobility, persistence, surveillance, and engagement. Mobility along the air-ground littoral enables drones to avoid canalizing terrain. Certain drones can operate for several hours, facilitating some degree of persistence. Multiple drones linked to other sensors through SA/BMS provide real-time surveillance over a broad area. The wide variation in vertical and horizontal mobility allows drones to engage ground targets at advantageous angles or utilize other systems.¹⁵ Together, drones and other SA/BMS-connected systems can develop the situation by coordinating sequential actions over time and space.

Drone quasi-maneuver has two major advantages when compared to ground maneuver forces: attritability and accessibility. George Dougherty declares that drones have attritability because their unmanned, low-cost, and distributed nature enables them to “undergo attrition gracefully.”¹⁶ Refining his idea, attritability drastically lowers the risk threshold for drones relative to manned systems, enabling drones to establish presence in hostile areas. SA/BMS maintains this situational awareness by utilizing multiple drones to maintain coverage despite high attrition. For example, current reports indicate that Ukraine is losing up to ten thousand military drones a month. Yet, it is rushing to replace these losses, testifying to the utility of these craft.¹⁷ The second attribute, accessibility, refers to the ability of drones to rapidly penetrate the front line of opposing forces along the air-ground littoral. Maximilian Bremer and Kelly Grieco touch on this when they write about the drone characteristic of “quickly massing at chosen moments to strike.”¹⁸ Countermeasures usually need to be widely distributed at least prior to a drone attack; in comparison, a ground system’s manned attributes make them less attritable and less accessible.

Despite these two advantages, drones fall short of the full ground maneuver characteristics in many areas. Drone loiter time has time and space limitations. Even if time is extended by cycling fresh drones to replace expiring ones, drone range will remain limited if there is no forward movement of the drone launch point. If these technical limitations are not enough, many drones simply cannot operate in bad weather, constraining their persistence. Drone surveillance (and by extension, engagement) is also limited when compared to ground maneuver systems. Drones cannot detect the full array of ground targets but only those with detectible signatures from the vantage point of the air-ground littoral (called “high signatures” here). Still, even high-signature systems can evade drones using overhead cover and concealment found in complex terrain. Drones have impediments to developing the situation as opportunities arise; as previously noted, limits in range constrain a drone’s ability to fully pursue sequential opportunities. In addition, drones’ repertoire of actions is limited when compared to ground forces. Drones cannot hold terrain or control populations; at best, they can only deny an opponent’s control of terrain. These limitations warrant using the term quasi-maneuver when describing drone characteristics.

Drones (as defined in this article) fall short of manned military aircraft in several important respects. Although drones typically cost less than manned aircraft, they are slower, have more limited payloads, and generally possess inferior optics. Some manned aircraft have radar-absorbing aspects, making detection extremely difficult even in comparison to small drones.

 

Despite these advantages, manned aircraft’s limitations in persistence and surveillance impede their attaining a quasi-maneuver capability. The modern system describes manned aircraft as transient observers that “patrol intermittently or respond to calls from others’ target acquisition.”¹⁹ The latter quality is due to a lack of situational awareness of ground operations due to their fast pace and limited loiter time. These constraints prevent manned aircraft from maintaining a “continuous presence over the entire battlefield”; consequently, the sky is free of aircraft for significant periods.²⁰ Persistence and surveillance are further hampered by manned aircraft needing to protect their human operators while generating their desired effects. This imperative precludes manned aircraft from loitering for long periods where countermeasures exist. In contrast, drone attritability, augmented by SA/BMS, facilitates continued presence in hostile areas.

Impact on Ground Force Tactics

Conventional ground tactics have struggled against drone quasi-maneuver. Since 2023, both Ukraine and Russia have experienced difficulties in the maneuver of ground forces due to the drone threat.²¹ Further, the logistics necessary for sustaining maneuver has been disrupted by drones.

The problem is not with modern-system principles but in its application. Using the modern system, ground force tactics can be adapted to a drone quasi-maneuver environment. As review, modern-system tactics for ground forces include utilization of cover and concealment, dispersion and small-unit independent maneuver, intermittent suppression of hostile fires, and employment of combined arms.²² We will see that adaptation will require changes to force structure and tactical procedures.

The drone quasi-maneuver threat requires ground systems to utilize cover and concealment in three dimensions. Biddle, commenting on the ample availability of cover and concealment, noted that 65 percent of the transitable North German Plain had sufficient irregular terrain to protect soldiers or vehicles from direct-fire weapons.²³ Ground forces now face a new threat—persistent surveillance and engagement at overhead angles; thereby, reducing the global set of protective terrain.

Conventional ground systems are not well designed to utilize three-dimensional cover and concealment. Prior to the drone age, the thinking was that maneuver was primarily a two-dimensional ground-bound affair with nonmaneuver aircraft an intermittent threat. For this reason, most vehicle armor was—and is—found on the front and sides. Under this construct, these systems were not only survivable but also large enough to integrate movement, observation, communications, target acquisition, engagement, and protective measures on a single platform. Multitask platforms were preferred due to the challenges of splitting related time-dependent tasks among different ground systems—specifically, technical constraints in rapidly coordinating these tasks and the tendency of irregular terrain to canalize ground systems, undermining coordination.

These conventional ground systems are now vulnerable to drone quasi-maneuver. This vulnerability stems from a large size and weight (e.g., tanks and logistics nodes), electromagnetic waves (e.g., radar and communications assets), and/or weapons employment (e.g., direct and indirect fire systems). These characteristics are readily noticed by drones and targeted through SA/BMS by fires. Recent operations in Ukraine suggest that the drone threat is persistent fifteen kilometers from the front line into the rear area, threatening both ground combat and logistics assets.²⁴

Fortunately, the same drone-SA/BMS-fires chain that threatens conventional ground systems is also the source of a solution. Drones can now conduct many tasks formerly integrated into a single ground platform. In many cases, the drone vantage point from the air-land littoral is superior for surveillance, targeting, and engagement than that from ground vehicles. Drone attritibility and accessibility attributes enable rapid support to ground forces even when enemy countermeasures are strong. The time to integrate tasks on different platforms is remarkably short. Recent dispatches from the war in Ukraine indicate that the drone-SA/BMS-artillery kill chain is three to five minutes from target detection.²⁵

As a result, ground systems can improve their survivability by outsourcing portions of their physical, electromagnetic, and kinetic signatures.²⁶ Squad-sized armored personal carriers can downsize and have personnel distributed onto multiple vehicles. Logistics conducted in drone threat areas can also be placed on smaller and more numerous armored vehicles. These smaller systems not only display a lower physical signature but will also better navigate vegetation and man-made structures to access three-dimensional cover and concealment. Concurrently, some vehicle electromagnetic and kinetic tasks can be outsourced to drones and other SA/BMS-connected systems. We see this preference for smaller and more numerous armored vehicles in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Reports reveal a need for simpler armored vehicles, noting that conventional vehicles are too complex for their performed tasks.²⁷ Acquisition efforts have also focused on military vehicles with lower signatures and the ability to operate off-road.²⁸

Since drone capabilities can be degraded under certain conditions (e.g., poor weather and complex terrain), ground vehicles will need to balance the advantages of outsourcing with the need to operate without drones at certain times. This appears to be a classic trade-off: too many tasks integrated into a single vehicle risk detection and destruction by drone quasi-maneuver. Too few capabilities integrated into vehicles risk its vulnerability during periods of drone degradation. One solution is to determine an optimum balance between ground vehicle survivability and capability. Another approach is to have one vehicle fleet optimized for complex terrain and another optimized for open terrain. These choices will need to be carefully weighed.

Unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) and decoy vehicles can offset the need to retain some integrated capabilities on ground systems. UGVs can further distribute the signatures of their manned counterparts and also perform some logistics functions. Since UGV navigation is not currently sophisticated, their capabilities should have broad area effects (e.g., radars and communication emitters). UGV prototypes are leaning in this direction performing logistics, surveillance, and communication functions.²⁹ To further improve ground system survivability, vehicle decoys should be utilized—a trend seen in Ukraine.³⁰ This panoply of multiple manned, unmanned, and decoy vehicles will complicate an opponent’s engagement calculus. An opponent will need to more carefully consider the benefits of engaging these platforms against the cost of exposing their own systems to detection and counterfires.

 

Ground forces will also need to employ greater dispersion. This is necessary due to the drone accessibility attribute. Drones can suddenly appear out to their range limits. From this vantage point, a single drone can observe and engage many systems arrayed in close order. The Russian use of glide bombs on Ukrainian defenses further emphasizes the need for dispersion. These aircraft-launched bombs weigh up to 1.5 tons and are guided by satellite to their target.³¹ Their accuracy combined with a large explosion radius has been devastating to defenses.³² To mitigate these vulnerabilities, ground forces will need to be widely dispersed, and we can see these trends in Ukraine. An infantry section can cover an area of seventy by two hundred meters with individual fighting positions separated by fifty meters.³³ Further, the use of decoys and alternate positions is commonplace to deceive the enemy as to the location of forward defenses. This dispersed front is compensated by deep defensive sectors so units can absorb an attack and employ over the line-of-sight fires.³⁴ Such separation may seem odd; however, greater dispersion has been a trend in warfare from antiquity to modern times.³⁵

These widely dispersed forces will require new means of small-unit independent maneuver and protection. The friendly drone-SA/BMS-fires chain comes to the fore. SA/BMS will not only maintain situational awareness among widely dispersed ground forces but will also enable dispersed units to conduct the mutual coordination essential to small-unit independent maneuver. To prevent defeat in detail or infiltration, these dispersed ground forces can employ friendly drones to screen their flanks and provide early warning.

Another modern-system tactical principle is that ground forces need a means to suppress hostile fires when protective terrain cannot mask their maneuver. When Biddle conceived of his modern system in the 1990s, this principle meant keep your opponents’ “heads down” through the application of indirect fires. Given its prominence in recent operations, the equivalent today would be to suppress or disrupt an opponent’s drone-SA/BMS-fires chain.

There are many ways to disrupt this chain. Perhaps the most notable are EW systems that can jam signals from satellite transmissions, radio communications, and data links.³⁶ There are also kinetic and physical means of disruption. Drones can be countered by traditional air defense systems and obscurants that mask ground forces. In Ukraine, vehicle-mounted turrets with automated guns have proven successful against drones.³⁷ With regard to disrupting fires, the widespread use of counterfires have forced artillery to disperse, dig-in, and employ decoys.³⁸

Redundancies in the drone-SA/BMS-fires chain suggest that one approach for intermittent suppression is a convergence of effects across many domains (i.e., electromagnetic, cyber, and physical).³⁹ In Ukraine, drone-SA/BMS-fire redundancies are found in the numerous drones operating on the battlefield, the many network routing options found in Delta’s Starlink backbone, and the multiple firing systems usually available to engage targets.⁴⁰ To cover the exposed maneuver of ground forces, multiple synchronized effects (e.g., EW, counterfire, and counterdrone) will likely be required to suppress this chain. The concentration of these means will need to be masked from an opponent so as not to give advanced warning of suppression efforts. In this regard, the use of deception and decoys could be particularly effective.

What emerges is from these adaptations is a combined arms force that is more survivable, mobile, and able to suppress opposing capabilities. Armored combat and logistics vehicles will be found in areas where the drone threat is persistent. These vehicles will not be the multifunctional behemoths of today but smaller and more numerous. The electromagnetic and kinetic signatures of these smaller vehicles will be reduced by outsourcing tasks to drones, UGVs, and fires. SA/BMS will facilitate integration of these multiplatform tasks and enable small-unit independent maneuver under conditions of greater dispersion. These means will enhance ground force survivability from drone attack and facilitate maneuver using three-dimensional cover and concealment. When exposed, these forces will be able to maneuver by employing converging effects to suppress the opposing drone-SA/BMS-fires chain. Decoy vehicles will be a key enabler by drawing the attention of opposing systems.

Impact on Ground Force Operations

Conventional ground operations have, likewise, struggled against drone quasi-maneuver, especially offensive operations. Since 2023, Ukraine and Russia have conducted offensive operations that have been characterized by small gains at high cost.

Modern-system principles can also be adapted to solve operational challenges in the drone age. To recap, modern-system offensive operations stress maneuver to create a breech in an opponent’s defenses to pass through large exploitation forces. These forces will unhinge a defense by disrupting key elements in the rear area. Defensive operations employ a mobile defense to wear down an opponent’s advance. The defender will then counterattack with large reserves.

While maneuver can occur using tactics from the previous section, the challenge is how to employ a concentrated exploitation/reserve given the conflicting requirement for greater dispersion. We see this problem in recent Russian ground operations against Ukrainian defenses. These attacks often consist of a light infantry section (eight to fifteen personnel) with one or two vehicles in support.⁴¹ The purpose of these operations is to identify frontline defenses for drone and artillery attack—no exploitation forces are involved.⁴² Offensive gains under this concept have been limited.

Concentration of exploitation/reserve forces can be accomplished when drone quasi-maneuver is passively and/or actively degraded. Regarding passive degradation, it’s been noted that many natural factors can disrupt drone quasi-maneuver: weather, terrain, and limited visibility. When these conditions occur, exploitation and reserve forces can more easily concentrate. Some of these conditions are predictable (terrain) and others less predictable (weather). The relatively easy identification of complex terrain enables forces to develop deliberate plans to concentrate in these areas. The weather provides less predictable opportunities, necessitating concentration on short notice.

Concentration of reserves and exploitation forces can also occur when quasi-maneuver is actively degraded. Two forms of active degradation are suppression and deception. Suppression of the drone-SA/BMS-fires chain permits the concentration of exploitation/reserve forces. This is similar to tactical suppression discussed in the previous section, but on a much larger scale. Employment of deception can also support employment of reserves and exploitation forces. Such deception will need to be elaborate given drone quasi-maneuver capabilities. One possibility is the mass use of decoys to confuse the enemy as to the true location of exploitation/reserve forces. This is an application of Sun Tzu’s emphasis on deception to achieve concentration relative to an opponent.⁴³

 

The possibility that drone quasi-maneuver can degrade over a large area has implications for the entire force. If a campaign enters terrain where drones struggle to operate, the side that can concentrate their force faster will be able to defeat their opponent in detail. Poor weather will provide a similar situation where rapid concentration is advantageous; the converse is also true. If a campaign transitions from complex terrain to more open terrain, then the ground force that disperses faster will have an advantage in survivability. Likewise, if poor weather ends, the force that can disperse faster will be less vulnerable to drone quasi-maneuver. As mentioned previously, uncertain conditions (like the weather) will require that operations be executed on short notice. We see forms of this principle in the war in Ukraine. Weather conditions are closely monitored by both sides. In conditions of fog, heavy rain, or limited visibility, forces on both sides have massed—mainly to support resupply or casualty evacuation.⁴⁴

Militaries will need to develop ground operations to rapidly concentrate or disperse in response to changes in the drone quasi-maneuver threat. In short, when the drone threat is strong—disperse, and when degraded—concentrate. This transition from dispersion to concentration (and vice versa) can be accomplished in a multitude of ways. For example, units could be arrayed in narrow but deep zones/sectors—as seen in Ukraine—to concentrate forward or disperse rearward. Another option is for units to have two sets of sectors/zones—one for concentration, another for dispersion—to be executed according to established procedure. Most likely, the choice between these and other options will be dependent on a myriad of circumstances common to operations. These techniques will require careful study, experimentation, and development of procedures and control measures.

Conclusion

Recent evidence suggests that the cycle of drone measures and countermeasures will continue. In response, militaries will need to give serious thought on how this new status quo impacts ground force tactics and operations.

This article used Biddle’s widely accepted modern-system model as a framework to understand the impact of drone quasi-maneuver on ground force tactics and operations. The findings are that both tactics and operations will need to undergo significant changes. Recent dispatches from the war in Ukraine provide support for these changes; however, the subject requires further study. The risks of delaying the process of analysis and innovation could be dire if one’s competitors perfect these forms first.

David A. Engel, Alec C. Wahlman, Brian Q. Rieksts, and Russell Jones from the Institute for Defense Analyses reviewed and provided useful comments on earlier versions of this article. Any errors and omissions are my own.

 

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Notes

1. “Many Ukrainian Drones Have Been Disabled by Russian Jamming,” Economist, 29 May 2024, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2024/05/29/many-ukrainian-drones-have-been-disabled-by-russian-jamming.
2. “Fine-Tunned Acoustic Waves Can Knock Drones Out of the Sky,” Economist, 5 February 2025, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2025/02/05/fine-tuned-acoustic-waves-can-knock-drones-out-of-the-sky; “Microwave Blasters Can Down Even Jam-Proof Drones,” Economist, 11 June 2025, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2025/06/11/microwave-blasters-can-down-even-jam-proof-drones.
3. Antonio Calcara et al., “Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War: The Enduring Hider-Finder Competition in Air Warfare,” International Security 46, no. 4 (Spring 2022): 132–34, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00431.
4. Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton University Press, 2004); Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo-Ukrainian War (Royal United Services Institute, 2025), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/tactical-developments-during-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war; Kateryna Bondar, Ukraine’s Future Vision and Current Capabilities for Waging AI-Enabled Autonomous Warfare (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2025), https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-future-vision-and-current-capabilities-waging-ai-enabled-autonomous-warfare.
5. Biddle, Military Power, 14–27, 30–35.
6. Daniel Gouré, “Is There a Military-Technical Revolution in America’s Future?,” Washington Quarterly 16, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 175–92, https://doi.org/10.1080/016366093094777729.
7. Biddle, Military Power, 35.
8. Biddle, Military Power, 37.
9. Offense operations explained in Biddle, Military Power, 39–44.
10. Defensive tactics and operations explained in Biddle, Military Power, 44–48.
11. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations (U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 18 June 2022), III-37–III-39.
12. Biddle, Military Power, 37, 57.
13. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1984), 79; Field Manual (FM) 3-90, Tactics (U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2023), 1-12–1-15.
14. The air-ground littoral (also called the “air littoral”) is defined in Maximilian Bremer and Kelly Grieco, “The Air Littoral: Another Look,” Parameters 51, no. 4 (Winter 2021–22): 68, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/7/.
15. George Dougherty, “Ground Combat Overmatch Through Control of the Atmospheric Littoral,” Joint Force Quarterly 94, no. 3 (July 2019): 65–66, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1913099/ground-combat-overmatch-through-control-of-the-atmospheric-littoral/.
16. Dougherty, “Ground Combat Overmatch Through Control of the Atmospheric Littoral,” 67.
17. “Warfare After Ukraine – Battlefield Lessons,” Economist, special report, 8 July 2023, 6.
18. Bremer and Grieco, “The Air Littoral,” 71.
19. Biddle, Military Power, 57.
20. Biddle, Military Power, 57.
21. “Warfare After Ukraine,” 3–5.
22. Biddle, Military Power, 35–38.
23. Biddle, Military Power, 36.
24. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 15.
25. Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi et al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022 (Royal United Services Institute, 2022), 38, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022.
26. Outsourcing target recognition function found in Bondar, Ukraine’s Future Vision and Current Capabilities for Waging AI-Enabled Autonomous Warfare, 22–27.
27. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 21.
28. Dominic Minadeo, “GM Defense Prototype Reflects Army’s Posture Toward Light Vehicles,” Inside the Army, 14 October 2024, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/gm-defense-prototype-reflects-armys-posture-toward-light-vehicles.
29. Hope Hodge Seck, “The Marines’ Unmanned Ground Vehicle Will Look a Lot like the Army’s,” Defense News, 1 May 2025, https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2025/05/01/the-marines-unmanned-ground-vehicle-will-look-a-lot-like-the-armys/.
30. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 9.
31. Michael Peck, “Glide Bombs: The Russian Wonder Weapon?,” Center for European Policy Analysis, 9 April 2024, https://cepa.org/article/glide-bombs-the-russian-wonder-weapon/.
32. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 7.
33. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 9.
34. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 9.
35. Trevor N. DuPuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (Da Capo Press, 1984), 312.
36. Abdujalil Abdurasulov, “Ukraine’s Invisible Battle to Jam Russian Weapons,” BBC News, 3 August 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66279650.
37. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 33.
38. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 12.
39. Sean Carberry, “Special Report: Army’s Project Convergence Goes on the Offensive,” National Defense, 18 March 2024, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2024/3/18/armys-project-convergence-goes-on-the-offensive.
40. Stella Linkson, “Starlink Ground Stations: What They Are and How They Work,” Starlink Info, updated 21 March 2025, https://www.starlinkinfo.com/starlink-ground-stations; Kateryna Bondar, Does Ukraine Already Have Functional CJADC2 Technology? (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024), https://www.csis.org/analysis/does-ukraine-already-have-functional-cjadc2-technology.
41. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 8
42. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 8.
43. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford University Press, 1963), 69, 98.
44. Watling and Reynolds, Tactical Developments, 8, 16.

 

Lt. Col. Kenton G. Fasana, U.S. Army, retired, is a research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). At IDA, he has led defense institutional capacity building teams in West Africa and Southeast Asia, and has led studies on the defense industrial base. He holds a BS from the U.S. Military Academy and an MBA from the Wharton School of Business. As a U.S. Army infantry officer, Fasana served in light, mechanized, and air assault infantry battalions. He also taught economics at the U.S. Military Academy.

 

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