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Restoring Fires and Maneuver

An All-Arms Wave-Based Approach at the Tactical Edge

 

Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Feltey, U.S. Army
Maj. Heath Rosendale, U.S. Army

 

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Fires without movement is indecisive. Exposed movement without fire is disastrous. There must be effective fire combined with skillful movement.

—Infantry in Battle, 1939

 

On the modern battlefield, every movement is exposed and punished by precision fires. Unmanned eyes haunt every contour of the terrain. Fires and maneuver—a cornerstone of warfare—has withered under the weight of constant surveillance and instantaneous lethal actions. The result is attritional, positional warfare: stagnant lines, fortified positions, and a costly grind for every inch of ground. Maneuver is no longer denied by terrain or weather alone but by the sheer destructive capacity of the modern kill chain carried out on a transparent battlefield.

Russia and Ukraine are well aware of these contemporary dynamics. After three and a half years, the two countries remain locked in positional warfare, reminiscent of the early years of World War I. The shift toward positional warfare was not a matter of choice, but rather of necessity; on today’s transparent battlefield, the ubiquitous sensor-to-shooter operational environment has altered the character of war. The two countries are burdened by an inability to conduct combined arms maneuver at scale, resulting in a nondecisive battlefield dominated by static defensive actions.

Consequently, the war has seen little change in the territory held by Russia and Ukraine over the past year and a half, largely due to a breakdown at the tactical level.¹ The consequences of both sides struggling to transition from positional to tactical maneuver warfare have operational and strategic impacts for the U.S. joint force.

The Army is currently developing an Army warfighting concept as a guiding document to drive transformation and address the realities of the emerging operational environment. As the Army evolves the new concept, it must focus on how to avoid stagnant, positional warfare at the tactical level. Through transformation-in-contact initiatives, divisions have the opportunity to test, experiment, and validate new approaches to the combined arms problems observed in the Russia-Ukraine War. These problems must be addressed now.

Any approach must ensure divisions can operate on a fully transparent battlefield while preserving combat power. Divisions must be able to close with and destroy the enemy while employing all-arms maneuver across an expanded battlespace. Success demands adapting tactics, redefining battlefield frameworks, controlling tempo, and suppressing enemy capabilities through the depth and breadth of the battlespace while protecting friendly movement.

Due to its lethality, mobility, and protection, armored formations are ideally positioned to inform ongoing Army efforts to address the essence of this challenge. Armored formations must restore fires and maneuver as a unified function at the tactical level through an all-arms, wave-based approach that integrates layered suppression and protection.

This article will provide a brief history of armored maneuver warfare, discuss the current challenges to tactical maneuver in today’s operational environment, introduce the emerging Army warfighting concept, propose a wave-based approach to restore fires and maneuver, highlight the operational implications of this construct, offer several DOTMLPF-P recommendations to enable the approach, and describe how the 1st Cavalry Division’s transformation initiative, Pegasus Charge, is implementing this concept to lethally employ divisions.²

Armored Maneuver Warfare: A Brief History

At the end of World War I, the introduction of new equipment such as the airplane and primitive tanks and the implementation of combined arms doctrine freed the Allies from the positional warfare that dominated much of the conflict. The resulting Allied offensive, while brief, provided a glimpse of what was to come in World War II.

During the interwar period, military theorists and practitioners sought to advance the brief combined arms maneuver experienced at the end of World War I. In the United States, a decade-long debate ensued over the role of the cavalry, the precursor to today’s armor branch. As military historian Matthew Morton highlights, Gen. John J. Pershing directed an extensive study of World War I, culminating in a Superior Board report that included the anticipated future of the cavalry. Morton states,

The findings of the cavalrymen in their report to the Superior Board predicated their conclusions on how they expected their branch to be used in a “War of Movement,” since a return to trench warfare would also see a return to the role of infantrymen, thus requiring no special modifications to training, doctrine, or organization of the branch.³

The “war of movement” required “more aggressive techniques and called for the concomitant levels of firepower and protection that such techniques demanded.”⁴ Through changes to doctrine and organization, extensive training, and experimentation, the cavalry branch modernized to provide the requisite levels of firepower and protection that enabled swift maneuver.

The armor branch and the wider military community are engaging in similar debates today about the role of the tank in future conflicts. Some have forecasted the death of the tank based on challenges in the current operational environment. However, those doomsday predictions are shortsighted. Russia and Ukraine intentionally target tanks because when they can maneuver into position, they provide devastating results. As Lt. Gen. Kevin Admiral and Lt. Col. Nicholas Drake stated in a 2025 article, “Armored vehicles’ combination of mobility, protection, firepower, and shock effect restores mobility to static battlefields when they join the infantry and engineers to advance on an enemy entrenched in prepared defenses.”⁵

The answer is not to remove the tank from the battlefield but rather to support the developing Army warfighting concept at the tactical level through a wave-based approach that restores fires and maneuver to ultimately unleash the devastating effects of armored formations.

The Modern Battlefield Challenge

Unfortunately, current and recent conflicts indicate that conducting effective maneuver, especially with armored formations, is extremely challenging. Persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) from a combination of proliferated and redundant ground, aerial, and space-based capabilities has created the so-called transparent battlefield, where the doctrinal synchronization of fires and maneuver is inadequate during offensive operations. Multiple ISR capabilities detected Russia’s massing along the Ukrainian border and initial movements at the start of war, captured missile and artillery launches, and collected communications and electronic intelligence, providing the much smaller Ukrainian military with the ability to establish a defense that halted Russia’s plans for a quick victory.

With the initial assault stymied, Russia incurred severe losses due to its inability to strike high-payoff targets and provide suppression to protect its forces maneuvering through the area of operation. In one instance, on 11 May 2022, the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade sent a battalion-size detachment of approximately 550 soldiers to cross the Siverskyi Donets during Russia’s attempt to encircle Ukrainian forces near the city of Rubizhne.⁶ Lacking sufficient organic fires and support from its higher headquarters, the detachment suffered 485 casualties and 80 lost or damaged pieces of equipment.⁷

 

The Russia-Ukraine War, Israel-Gaza conflict, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have also highlighted how new technologies such as unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and loitering munitions have forced untrained and unsynchronized units into positional warfare. The UAS—stealthy, precise, inexpensive, and ubiquitous—is akin to the devastating use of improvised explosive devices during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Units are unable, and often unwilling, to move or maneuver because the close fight is proliferated with first-person UAS capable of calling for fire, striking in a kamikaze manner, or dropping munitions. To protect soldiers on the ground, units must first suppress threats on the battlefield.

However, tactical units lack adequate suppression assets and rely heavily on indirect fire assets, which are time-consuming, limited by priority of fire, and restricted by controlled supply rates. Additionally, brigades and divisions are often overmatched in quantity and range by near-peer and peer adversaries. As a result, tactical tempo stalls, maneuver is halted, and elements become exposed. Furthermore, suppression arrives late or not at all, units lose the initiative, and vulnerability to enemy fire increases. These challenges force units into positional warfare. To combat these challenges, the Army is developing the Army warfighting concept to enable the force to gain positions of advantage against evolving threats.

The Army Warfighting Concept

The Army warfighting concept, currently in development by Army Futures Command, is a living document based on continuous analysis of the operational environment and the Army’s role in supporting the joint force. In May 2025, Army Futures Command “executed the Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA) Title 10 war game, FSP [Future Study Program] 25-2,” to refine and begin operationalizing the Army warfighting concept.⁸ While still not fully developed doctrine, the war game identified several critical components of the new concept, including command and control (C2) and counter-C2, cross-domain fires, formation-based layered protection, and adaptive sustainment.⁹ The integration of these components through an emerging definition of maneuver, supported by information and intelligence, serves as the foundation for the developing concept. Though focused on long-term solutions, this concept creates requirements in the near- and mid-term for units undergoing continuous transformation.

In the U.S. Army, armored formations are uniquely positioned to complement the emerging warfighting concept at the tactical edge. The concept provides a framework for both commanders and staff to create conditions that enable tactical freedom of maneuver. At the tactical level, synchronized and concentrated cross-domain fires protect friendly forces and suppress adversaries in all domains. This protection and suppression returns advantage to maneuver units and creates an environment conducive to offensive operations. In support of any new Army warfighting concept, armored formations can restore fires and maneuver at the tactical level by implementing a wave-based approach with concentrated effects.

A Wave-Based Approach: Concentrated Fires, Protection, and Maneuver

The concept of concentrated effects. Due to the increasingly transparent battlefield, eliminating detection is difficult. To improve survivability, forces must optimize dispersion to avoid exposing themselves to the enemy’s fire systems. During operations, units concentrate effects, not formations, to achieve success in the close fight. When concentrating formations is necessary, units concentrate at the lowest required echelon for the shortest possible time. When optimal dispersion is not realistic, units synchronize sequential and simultaneous effects to impose multiple dilemmas on the enemy. These effects are created by layering fire support from all echelons at the division and below levels. The effects occur in simultaneous waves, suppressing adversaries and exceeding their ability to respond, placing friendly forces in a position of advantage.

The wave-based approach. The 1st Cavalry Division proposes a wave-based approach to restore initiative and tempo on the modern battlefield. This construct synchronizes detection, suppression, precision strike, and maneuver across echelons to ensure continuous pressure on the enemy. Rather than operating in isolated phases, the waves are continuous and overlap in concert with one another to deny the enemy time to react and presents multiple dilemmas.

Wave 1: Detect. The first wave focuses on detecting enemy systems and developing targets. Desired outputs to Wave 1 could include an understanding of the enemy’s collection system, their integrated fires complex, C2 disposition, location of key sustainment nodes, and other critical vulnerabilities. At the division level, the G-2, intelligence and electromagnetic warfare battalion, combat aviation brigade, and division artillery (DIVARTY) will construct a transparent battlefield through access to national technical means, nominations to corps for space and cyber-based operations, ground moving target indicator capabilities, and Group 4 UAS. At lower echelons, units will employ ground scouts, Group 1 and 2 UAS, and Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense to inform commanders in the close area. Incorporation of passive sensors that directly feed into the division air defense battalion network and common air picture enables initial detection and serves as the first line of the defense in depth to inform and defeat enemy capabilities. The outcome of Wave 1, primarily achieved through layered collection means, is the detection and prioritization of targets in preparation for utilizing delivery assets in Wave 2.

Wave 2: Shape and suppress. The second wave focuses on shaping the deep area and immediate suppression in the close area. Division- and brigade-level artillery, aviation, and electromagnetic attacks degrade deep fires complexes while establishing layered protective fires and suppressing near threats. Delivery assets supporting the deep fight include division-level loitering munitions, cannon and rocket artillery, attack aviation, launched effects, and nonlethal fires such as electromagnetic attack. Since a wave-based approach is intentionally executed with respect to specific timing and geographic areas, additional assets from higher echelons would also shape the deep area.

Meanwhile, brigade- and battalion-level cannon artillery, attack aviation, loitering munitions, and mortars provide immediate suppression in the close fight. Layering counter-UAS and short-range air defense capabilities forward denies the adversary’s ability to place effects against friendly formations. The division air defense battalion effectively creates a division version of antiaccess/area denial. Concentration of effects and layered protection create initial conditions for maneuver brigades to close with and engage the enemy. Continuous detection and suppression during Wave 2 ultimately combine with Wave 3 to allow fire and movement by infantry and armor formations.

 

Wave 3: Finishing fires. The third wave focuses on brigade-and-below assets delivering precision strikes in the close fight as Wave 2 fires continue suppression. Precision effects at brigade and below—launched effects, loitering munitions, and drones—destroy critical vulnerabilities and isolate formations. Employment includes company and platoon one-way attack drones, fiber-optic UAS, battalion mortars, and loitering munitions.

Wave 4: Maneuver. The first three waves enable the fourth wave, ultimately resulting in the restoration of fires and maneuver. Wave 4 involves movement in conjunction with offensive and defensive fires to deliver brigade combat teams (BCT) within direct-fire range of enemy maneuver forces. The cavalry squadron, acting as a natural bridge between the first three waves, initiates Wave 4 by informing, protecting, and fighting for the main body. Enabled by sustained suppression, armored BCTs then exploit created windows, restore tempo, and achieve decision through shock and mass. While BCTs close the distance with enemy forces, the division may need to adjust its main effort or objectives during the fight to preserve freedom of maneuver or capitalize on successes.

The wave-based approach restores fires and maneuver as a synchronized, echeloned function, ensuring suppression precedes maneuver and maneuver exploits fires. To maximize the approach’s effectiveness, integrating capabilities at echelon is critical.

Integration across echelons. “Integration is the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole.”¹⁰ Underpinning integration is an echeloned shaping construct informed by the division’s concept of the operation, which outlines assets available in time and space and distributes them accordingly to subordinate forces. The central idea of integration is to concentrate and layer effects (especially fires and protection) across warfighting functions as opposed to piecemealing efforts in isolation. Integration is critical to combined arms operations, as it enables each arm to achieve an effect greater than the sum of its parts and occurs with support across all echelons.

Echeloned support ensures nested and concentrated support—each echelon fights with and for the next echelon down. First, divisions do not fight alone. Corps-level indirect fires, air interdiction, close air support, electromagnetic warfare, intelligence, and influence operations are integral to division combat power. Effective fires and maneuver concepts require explicit planning assumptions about what higher echelons provide to shape the division’s fight.

After accounting for vital higher echelon support, division capabilities are distributed to support brigades, balancing shaping in the deep area with immediate suppression in the close area while sustaining operations in the rear area. Similar to divisions planning for corps-and-above effects, companies and battalions must also plan with awareness of available support two echelons up. A company conducting the main effort for the battalion should anticipate and integrate brigade-level combat support into its scheme of maneuver. Layering fires and protection across echelons provides coverage across various warfighting functions, ranging from localized antiaccess/area denial through active air defense and counter-UAS to division-level command post coverage, as well as fires from rockets and artillery, lethal unmanned systems, and 120 mm mortars.

Layering capabilities ensure that all echelons receive support while denying the enemy the ability to exploit time and geographically based seams in coverage. The concentrated and focused wave-based approach enables echeloned support. When successful, each maneuver unit can operate within a layered suppression framework, maximizing tempo, enhancing protection, and supporting the tactical role of armored formations in emerging warfighting concepts.

How a Wave-Based Approach Complements a New Army Warfighting Concept at the Tactical Echelon

When units have continuous, synchronized suppression created by a wave-based approach, commanders can optimize dispersion while maintaining lethality. Increased dispersion and lethality create multiple dilemmas for the enemy, as they must expose more assets to achieve their desired effects. Successful fires fix the enemy and facilitate maneuver. Similarly, successful maneuver causes the enemy to react, exposing himself to fires. Exposing assets enables deliberate and dynamic targeting, further exacerbating the enemy’s dilemmas.

As the enemy is defeated in detail, forces can more freely maneuver because suppressive fires precede their movement. Freedom of maneuver enables a unit to control the tempo, allowing friendly forces to enter the enemy commander’s decision-making cycle while limiting an adversary’s options. As the U.S. Army further develops its warfighting concept, armored formations employing a wave-based approach can contribute meaningfully to the construct. In doing so, adversaries will struggle to understand the situation, make rushed decisions, change disposition to respond, and experience difficulty in coordinating efforts. With fires and maneuver restored as a unified function, any Army warfighting concept becomes both a more feasible and viable defeat mechanism.

DOTMLPF-P Implications for Force Design and Training

The Army’s ability to restore fires and maneuver as a unified function depends on deliberate changes in force structure, training, C2, and doctrine. The Army cannot achieve this approach without deliberate adjustments across DOTMLPF-P.

Force structure. Currently, divisions lack adequate detection and delivery systems to sense and suppress the enemy. At each echelon, units require organic ISR capabilities, including UAS and electromagnetic support platforms, while maintaining the capability to leverage national technical means such as space-based ISR capabilities augmented through artificial intelligence and machine learning. Increased sensing will enable detection as described in Wave 1, set conditions for shaping and suppression as described in Wave 2, and precisely focus finishing fires as described in Wave 3.

The Army must equip brigades and battalions with organic ISR, counter-UAS, mortars, loitering munitions, precision strike systems, and layered defensive fires. Divisions should integrate defensive fires and layered protection into centralized artillery and aviation planning to shield maneuver forces during suppression and maneuver phases. Additionally, brigades and divisions will need Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems to enable precision strikes and provide extended range fires.

Finally, the Army must field AI-enabled C2 networks to accelerate sensor-to-shooter timelines, provide assured commander’s dialogue, and manage tempo across domains. The increased capabilities for Waves 2 and 3 will enable suppression, ultimately enabling maneuver as described in Wave 4.

 

Training. As the Army implements organizational changes and develops materiel solutions, units must train leaders at every echelon on how to plan and execute the wave-based approach. Units must shift training emphasis to creating layered protection and suppression across echelons. Training must include

• detecting enemy capabilities through lethal and nonlethal sensors and rapidly passing information—not just data—to appropriate echelons as part of deliberately planned intelligence handoff,
• incorporating deep shaping and immediate suppressions (e.g., rockets and loitering munitions) while enabling lower echelons’ suppression efforts through integrating processes such as airspace management and risk management,
• providing precision strikes in danger-close situations,
• maneuvering during windows of opportunity created by the first three waves, and
• executing a combined arms breach.

Highlighting the combined arms breach training requirement illustrates the functionality of the wave-based approach. “A breach is a synchronized combined arms activity under the control of the maneuver commander conducted to allow maneuver through an obstacle.”¹¹ During its 2023 counteroffensive, Ukraine struggled to conduct a breach near the village of Novodarivka. The commander of the 47th Mechanized Brigade stated, “Judging by the ac¬tions taken on 4 June 2023, the breach force maneuvered to the point of breach shrouded by the fog of war.”¹² This “fog of war” represents a lack of detailed intelligence, the first tenet of breaching. Training on Wave 1 (Detect) will teach leaders and soldiers how to request and incorporate layered collection capabilities to identify the composition and disposition of obstacles. Detection helps to determine the necessary reduction techniques that minimize risk to the breaching force.¹³

After multiple failed attempts, Ukraine secured Novodarivka and turned its focus to the city of Rivnopil, also defended by a Russian obstacle belt. This time, Ukraine achieved success, largely due to its efforts in applying suppression as part of SOSRA (suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault), the second tenet of breaching. Additionally, the Ukrainians’ success was due to their efforts in shaping, including targeting Russian lines of communications.¹⁴ Training on Wave 2 (Shape and suppress) and Wave 3 (Finishing fires) will teach units how to deliver lethal and nonlethal effects throughout the depth of the battlefield to set conditions for subordinate units to operate.

While Ukraine achieved success at Rivnopil, it failed to break through the enemy’s defensive layers because the assault forces could not maneuver fast enough to conduct subsequent breaches. Using a wave-based approach, in concert with current breaching tenets, would have enabled Wave 4 (Maneuver) for the Ukrainians.

Command-and-control systems. The rapid shifting of support between echelons and the creation of a layered approach requires improved C2 systems. As the battlefield becomes more transparent, analysts and their systems become inundated with data. Artificial intelligence and machine learning will enable units to rapidly analyze and disseminate this data to platforms, creating digital kill chains that pass information from sensors to shooters. Improved line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight communication platforms, both at the halt and on the move, will enable distributed rehearsals, commander and staff update assessments, dynamic targeting, and deconfliction across domains. Most importantly, effective communication systems will enable commanders’ dialogue during a rapidly evolving operational environment. Given the nature of the future battlefield, commanders will need a means to iteratively refine the plan, address challenges, and coordinate unified action.

The Army is already addressing this problem set. In April 2025, the Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) became an official program office, focusing on enabling commanders to make “more, better, and faster decisions.”¹⁵ The systems of record, prototypes, designs, concepts, and experimentation emerging from NGC2 are crucial to delivering communication and virtual war gaming and rehearsal platforms to armored formations, enabling them to plan, rehearse, and execute C2 of the wave-based approach at distance.

Doctrine. Future doctrine should integrate wave-based fires and maneuver planning as the standard within maneuver frameworks, ensuring units can maneuver protected, even across dispersed battlespaces. While doctrine is only “a way,” it serves as a common language that will help train leaders of today and tomorrow as well as enabling coordination among services, allies, and partners. One recent example is the U.S. Army’s shift in its cavalry squadron doctrine from a focus on reconnaissance and security to one that emphasizes informing, protecting, and fighting for the main body. In this example, doctrine could augment this shift to describe how the cavalry squadron’s new focus supports Wave 4 and serves as a bridge between the waves.

Pegasus Charge: Proof in Action

These transformations are not theoretical. The 1st Cavalry Division is operationalizing these ideas through Pegasus Charge, its internal transformation initiative under Army transformation in contact. Pegasus Charge is a holistic, DOTMLPF-P approach to reorganize and reorient the 1st Cavalry Division to fight as a division, integrating fires, ISR, maneuver, electromagnetic warfare, and sustainment into coherent, agile formations. The intent is not only to transform the 1st Cavalry Division but also to inform the Army on recommended force design updates that will enable maneuver and fires down to the lowest echelon.

Pegasus Charge emphasizes division-level enabling fires extending down to the company level, ensuring units have the necessary suppression and protection to maneuver effectively. The field artillery battalions recently completed an internal reorganization under the DIVARTY, providing a centralized capability for offensive and defensive fires and effects until future materiel solutions are delivered. Meanwhile, the DIVARTY and the combat aviation brigade are conducting simulation exercises to test various future capabilities such as the Long-Range Precision Strike Missile and launched effects.

Experiments include sequenced fires planning, ISR integration down to the company level, and wave-based maneuver execution. Pegasus Charge is also experimenting with layered defensive fires, from counter-UAS bubbles to DIVARTY counterbattery capabilities, to ensure maneuver formations remain protected while advancing. These experiments are informing capability gaps and driving further DOTMLPF-P approaches and innovation.

Recent Pegasus Charge exercises have included wave-based fires and maneuver sequencing, kill-chain integration from division to platoon, and rehearsals of division-level fires directly supporting maneuver. The division will thoroughly test these efforts in simulation and field training exercises. These actions demonstrate that restoring fires and maneuver is possible today.

Conclusion

Peer adversaries will deny maneuver and impose positional warfare if left uncontested. The Army must adopt the wave-based approach now to restore initiative, preserve tempo, and impose multiple dilemmas on adversaries.

We cannot wait for the next war to solve this problem; we must act now, aligned with the Army Transformation Initiative and transformation-in-contact efforts. The 1st Cavalry Division, through Pegasus Charge, is demonstrating how to implement changes in real time, addressing capability gaps across the DOTMLPF-P framework.

Maneuver remains decisive—but only achievable when integrated with suppression and layered protection to enable the division across echelons. Institutionalizing the wave-based approach and restoring fires and maneuver as a unified function ensures divisions can break positional warfare and achieve decision in the next fight.

The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions to this article of Lt. Gen. Kevin Admiral, Brig. Gen. Chad Chalfont, Brig. Gen. Peter Glass, Col. Brian Ducote, Col Nicholas Dvonch, Lt. Col. Jay Ireland, Lt. Col. John Dolan, Lt. Col. Lawrence Richardson, and Chief Warrant Officer Two Trenton Huntsinger. Special thanks to Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Leonard Holder.

 

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Notes

• Epigraph. Charles T. Lanham, ed., Infantry in Battle (Infantry Journal, 1939), 223, https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16040coll3/id/146/.

1. Nicole Wolkov et al., “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 31, 2023,” Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 31 December 2023, https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_31-7/; ISW, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 1, 2025,” ISW, 1 September 2025, https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2025/.
2. Department of Defense (DOD), DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (DOD, March 2017), 287. DOTMLPF-P stands for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.
3. Matthew Darlington Morton, Men on Iron Ponies: The Death and Rebirth of the Modern U.S. Cavalry (Northern Illinois University Press, 2009), 10.
4. Morton, Men on Iron Ponies, 25.
5. Kevin D. Admiral and Nicholas Drake, “Steel in the Storm: Recent Wars as Guides for Armor Transformation,” War on the Rocks, 21 July 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/07/steel-in-the-storm-recent-wars-as-guides-for-armor-transformation/.
6. Kateryna Stepanenko and Frederick W. Kragan, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 14,” ISW, 14 May 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20220515002447/https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14.
7. Stepanenko and Kragan, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 14.”
8. David Hodne, memorandum, “Future Studies Program (FSP) 25-2 Final Report,” Futures and Concepts Center, 2025, 2.
9. Hodne, “FSP 25-2 Final Report,” 8–9.
10. Field Manual 3–0, Operations (U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2025), 50–51.
11. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3–90.4, Combined Arms Mobility (U.S. GPO, 2022 [CAC required]), 3-1.
12. Austin Bajc, “Blocked and Bloodied: Lessons from the Combined Arms Breach During the 2023 Ukrainian Counter-Offensive,” U.S. Army, 8 July 2021, https://www.army.mil/article/286857/blocked_and_bloodied_lessons_from_the_combined_arms_breach_during_the_2023_ukranian_counter_offensive.
13. ATP 3–90.4, Combined Arms Mobility, 3-7.
14. Bajc, “Blocked and Bloodied.”
15. Danielle Kress, “Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) Becomes Official Program Office at PEO C3N,” Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications, and Network (PEO C3N) Public Communications Defense, 16 April 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/284669/next_generation_command_and_control_ngc2_becomes_official_program_office_at_peo_c3n.

 

 

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