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How the US Army Uses Noncommissioned Officers

 

Sgt. Maj. of the Army Kenneth O. Preston, US Army, Retired
Kate Dahlstrand, PhD

 

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The following essay is condensed from the introductory chapter from Army University Press’s forthcoming title, The Noncommissioned Officer: A Primer, written by Command Sgt. Maj. (Ret.) Robert Nelson, EdD, and Sgt. Maj. (Ret.) Richard Russell.

In a 2007 US Army news bulletin out of Grafenwöhr, Germany, Sgt. Aimee Millham reported on the first-ever meeting of the Conference of European Armies for Noncommissioned Officers (NCO). Years into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) with two active combat zones and no clear end in sight for either one, the US Army still had crucial lessons to share with international allies and peers: namely, how to empower NCOs “to make the immediate, on-the-ground decisions that affect front-line Soldiers in battle.”¹ The US military and their treatment, investment, training, and development of enlisted and noncommissioned personnel has created an all-volunteer force that understands their roles and their responsibilities, and has a vested interest in mission accomplishment. As a result, the US Army NCO Corps is a trusted institution admired by many nations around the world. At that 2007 conference, thirty sergeants major representing nations throughout Europe and Eurasia gathered to learn, mirror, and apply US Army lessons and models developed over centuries of trial and error.²

When defining and describing informal leadership, US Army doctrine highlights the role of the NCO as a critical part of the informal network. Cohesive teams are built by leaders who understand that informal and formal channels, networks, and structures facilitate success. Traditional chain of command, technical channels, and standard operating procedures within an organization represent formal networks in the US Army. Informal networks, however, can hardly be described without acknowledging the weight and impact NCOs play in facilitating the success of a mission or directive.³ The US Army NCO is responsible for building “cohesive teams that are highly trained, disciplined, and fit,” qualified to serve in the profession of arms.⁴

The NCO Corps has a long history of managing, training, and leading soldiers. Empathetic leadership, situational awareness, and understanding how the soldiers on an NCO’s team can develop into their fullest potential are enduring hallmarks of the NCO’s contribution to maintaining a fighting force. A strong NCO corps is a definitive combat multiplier because of the assurance of mission command that inherently develops when US Army NCOs are provided the time, training, and opportunities to exceed expectations based on commander’s intent.

Working within formal networks, NCOs in the US Army can solve soldier and soldiering problems quickly and decisively. Within the chain of command, NCOs bring transparency to leadership on daily activities, training, and personnel issues. They are the link between junior soldiers and officers. They are the communicator and the facilitator of objectives as outlined by leadership. NCOs receive and disseminate information in both directions, to commanders and to subordinates, providing the trust necessary to undergird the modern Army doctrinal principal of “mission command.”⁵

The NCO support channel, the enlisted leadership chain that parallels and complements the chain of command, assists leaders with the distribution of guidance from the command sergeant major to the first sergeant and then down through other NCOs and enlisted personnel. It is the daily routines performed in garrison that are transferred to all aspects of mission accomplishment. In garrison, training, and combat theater, “train as you fight” becomes critical to mission success. Families are cared for; military customs, courtesies, and traditions are taught; and organizational culture is reinforced through the NCO support channel. The professional Army ethic is fostered through deliberate and thoughtful training developed, transmitted, and instilled by NCOs.⁶

This is a system, a methodology, and it is cyclical. Because of this, NCOs must establish standards and grow leaders in the Army. There are three steps involved in growing leaders: establishing a standard, putting someone in charge of that standard, and enforcing those standards. Standards can come in the form of expectations, measurable entities, or policies and regulations. The Army is full of standards. As an example, Army Regulation (AR) 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia, addresses how soldiers wear all the different issued uniforms, authorized boots, grooming standards, and more.⁷ All soldiers in the Army do this; within the regular Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve, all uniforms the same. Name tags are all in the same place as is the location of our rank. But AR 670-1 does not address how to wear field equipment. These standards are learned within the unit and sometimes published in unit standard operating procedures. Verbal standards issued as orders take place when an NCO takes a squad of soldiers out to police the unit parking lot after the first sergeant says, “Pick up all trash and debris.”

In the second step of growing leaders, NCOs are empowered to oversee standards. They enforce compliance with established standards. The enforcement of standards by first-line leaders is what develops and reinforces discipline at the small-unit level. NCOs at that level are responsible for training, correcting mistakes, and maintaining adherence to those exact standards established at all levels of command from the Department of the Army to the platoon and squad. That’s a significant responsibility for a new sergeant and it requires commitment. This is where the corporal and sergeant come into their roles as they are responsible for being, knowing, and doing the standard.

The third step is to hold the sergeant accountable for enforcing the standards. This is where NCOs who are senior to the one enforcing standards will come into play. When Pvt. Snuffy’s appearance is substandard or if Snuffy is acting inappropriately, it is Sgt. Jones who holds ultimate responsibility for Snuffy’s appearance or conduct. Everything in the Army has a standard. The US Army is a standards-based organization.

These three fundamentals (establishing a standard, putting someone in charge of that standard, and enforcing those standards) became increasingly important throughout GWOT. In a garrison environment, leaders trend toward immediate and on-the-spot corrections where minor issues are fixed quickly. In a deployed environment, however, with a unit spread across the battlefield, tactical leaders must have absolute trust in the ability of those first-line supervisors to operate independently and without supervision to meet their commanders’ intent and accomplish the mission. The emphasis on continually enforcing standards is tied to the discipline of the unit. Sergeants who fulfill their roles and responsibilities in the absence of senior leadership in garrison can be trusted when deployed in an operational theater and scattered across a battlefield. That battlefield is not the time to play catch up and train NCOs into being leaders.

A seasoned NCO can tell within five minutes of walking into a unit if that unit has established standards, if they have empowered someone to enforce them, and if the more senior leadership is holding them accountable. Walk into a motor pool shop office for example. If the place is a mess, that is a reflection on the leadership team. Walk through barracks and open a mop closet in the hallway. If all the brooms and mops fall on the floor, that reflects on leadership. Enforce the standards of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS). When we perform PMCS on our assigned vehicles, equipment, or weapons, we follow the step-by-step process outlined in the operator’s manual. When we clear a weapon coming off the range, we perform that function as part of a step-by-step process. These are examples of standards that must be trained and enforced by the soldier’s first-line supervisor. What you do in a garrison environment must be done the same in combat. Train as you fight.

Candor and the NCO

In Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession, the term “candor” is defined as “being frank, honest, and sincere with others.”⁸ Throughout literature developed for NCOs, candor is often grouped with other words (competence, character, and commitment), however, when examining this article’s title “How the US Army Uses NCOs,” the specific word “candor” becomes a critical asset. It is a skill that can develop under strong leadership, or it can wither on the vine when an enlisted soldier enters a hostile or intimidating workplace environment. The Noncommissioned Officer Guide offers an extended definition, calling the attribute “carefully considered professional judgment offered to subordinates, peers, and superiors.”⁹ With these working definitions in mind and the role of the NCO in today’s US Army, candor warrants further examination.

When employed effectively, candor strengthens an organization and its ability to accomplish any mission successfully. The ability to speak candidly is a skill that must be developed at the squad level. Environments that enforce standards through fear, threats, and intimidation do not allow for the free exchange of ideas. Mission success is a collaborative effort. Leaders need transparent feedback to make informed decisions in the absence of orders. As a practice, candor should come from a place that seeks to improve a situation. The NCO with candor has observed the situation and assessed the functions and processes for places where improvements could be made. They have thought through what they’ve observed, gathered evidence and intelligence on the issue, and developed solutions to any problems identified. Exemplary candor in action improves a situation, provides evidence and subject-matter expertise to leaders and subordinates alike, and creates a prepared army of practice and improvement.

Candor is fostered when leaders recognize the contributions that subordinates can bring to decisions. But because it is a trait that grows within an individual NCO throughout their military career, candor also requires some internal development and self-reflection. Candor also grows as an NCO develops in their career and is promoted to positions of greater responsibility.

If not coupled with the offering of potential solutions or tactics to correct an identified issue, then it is not useful. It’s welcome when the person expressing it has a solid understanding of the situation being commented on, and the invitation to be candid will solidify as an NCO practices it with the goal of improving a situation or process. An NCO who deliberately fosters curiosity about their circumstances and the people around them will not only develop candor that is welcomed by leadership, but will also provide the transparency needed to keep soldiers mission ready.

In a 2024 Muddy Boots article for the NCO Journal, Michael R. Weimer, the seventeenth sergeant major of the Army, thoughtfully articulated how readiness can be ruined by a basic lack of discipline or accountability when executing the simplest of tasks. The threat of meeting a “near-peer enemy is too high to allow only a veneer of readiness.”¹⁰ He went on to highlight the necessity of a readiness that is “tangible, concrete, and stubborn, driven by disciplined leaders at echelon who understand the consequence of facing a lethal enemy with artificial readiness.”¹¹ Similarly, Command Sgt. Maj. Kirk R. Coley makes a compelling argument that once an enlisted soldier earns the “hard stripes,” that should also imply they “made a deliberate decision to embrace their job as a profession.”¹² But embracing the profession alone is not enough to transform a capable junior enlisted soldier into a contributing member of NCO Corps. Nor are the various schoolhouses or professional military education institutions. Command Sgt. Maj. Alexander Kupratty extends this line of thinking, identifying the onus of effective leader development at three different levels: the institutional, operational, and self-development domains.¹³ Only the first one encompasses formal training and educational environments. Leader development in the operational domain takes place in real-world assignments, on-the-job training, and mentorship.¹⁴ Leadership developed through individual initiative in search for “continuous learning and personal growth” involves reflection, fostering one’s curiosity and actively pursuing paths to greater professional opportunities.¹⁵ In a unit that disregards these internal developments, candor cannot exist when it is most crucial. As a quality in an NCO, the trait ought to be aspirational for all enlisted. It is earned through a demonstrated history of deservedness and trust.

NCOs at all levels of responsibility must be approachable and encourage candor from their subordinates. Sometimes the greatest ideas come from the ranks below. Encourage soldiers and their families to speak and ask questions about policy and procedures. Soldier’s perceptions are truth until they engage in a dialogue with senior leaders to understand the bigger picture.

Cold War Encounters with Allied NCOs

It’s the fall of 1978, and I (SMA Preston) was stationed in Gelnhausen, Germany. I served as the gunner on the company commander’s tank in B Company, 1st Battalion, 33rd Armor, 2nd Brigade, 3rd Armored Division. My platoon is selected to participate in a joint training event with a platoon from our sister German tank company.

In Germany during the Cold War, German and American units partnered together as sister units for training and exchange events. It’s required, and I’m part of training that the world determined necessary. We are 100 percent manned and a part of NATO forces. Our training prepares us for potential threats that might come out of the Warsaw Pact.

My platoon’s sister unit is based out of Koblenz, Germany, and one of their tanks is short a gunner. They had deployed to Bergen-Hohne training area for tank gunnery and maneuver training. I see my opportunity to join a team for their training exercise and volunteered for the duration of the training exercise. We had a great time training and sharing equipment.

Our tanks are similar and we use the same 105 mm main gun and tank ammunition. We take turns as gunners and shoot targets on the range with each other’s tanks.

We eat together. We hang out together. We live together for a week before departing back to my home station. All the German soldiers spoke enough English to help with translations but on some level that never mattered.

We built community.

US and German soldiers had more in common than different. Rank structure, opportunities for progression, and the roles of NCOs as platoon sergeants and tank commanders all translated to the US Army I served. Their lieutenants were very knowledgeable about their role within the platoon and the necessity of their relationship with their platoon sergeants. Standards and discipline work together with each other. The US Army is a standards-based organization. In assessing my experiences with German soldiers, I observed a military where they did not demand the same attention to detail as their American counterparts. Beards and hair length were superficial indicators that revealed a broader tolerance in what was authorized. Their equipment was clean and functional but not as well organized. The authority of their officers and NCOs was very similar to US Army standards, and it was the responsibility of German NCOs to teach, train, professionally develop, and mentor their soldiers.

A second occasion brought me back, this time as Staff Sgt. Preston, to the German platoon in Koblenz and I noted another difference.

Many of the junior enlisted soldiers and most of the NCOs were married and lived in the communities where they served in the German Army.

Health and welfare checks are of paramount importance in the US Army, where first-line leaders are expected to visit and check in on the soldiers living off a military base.

NCOs are expected to know their soldiers, their relative safety after hours, and their quality of life.

It seemed as if, after talking to many of the German NCOs in Koblenz, that when the duty day was done, all the soldiers went their own separate ways.

The Bundeswehr (German armed forces) depended upon compulsory military service to fulfill the troop numbers required by NATO. In 1956, the German Bundestag (Federal Assembly) mandated compulsory military service effective as of 1 April 1957. Every male German citizen would be required to serve in the military unless registered as conscientious objectors. Conscientious objectors were required to perform alternative service to their country.¹⁶ The Korean War had created an environment in Germany that spurred rearmament as parallels between the Korean and German situations were highlighted in German media.¹⁷ By the late 1970s, the German Army was experiencing 20–25 percent battalion strength losses four times a year as compulsory service contracts ended and new men were sent for training at the basic unit level. Initial training for newly entered soldiers took place in a concentrated company within a battalion. That company would be “marginally combat-ready” for months at a time and offered a stark contrast to the means with which American soldiers were trained.¹⁸ US soldiers received basic training at dedicated training centers—units outside the working system of combat-ready forces.¹⁹

The very real need to develop NCOs and junior officers within the Bundeswehr suffered as a result of the localized military entry training. In the most severe examples, up to one-third of unit professional leadership might be required to attend temporary education assignments, while the tasks and deadlines for those remaining behind stayed the same. My experiences highlight Cold War armies struggling to balance global security requirements against a diminished population of soldiers compelled into service. By the time I set foot on German soil in 1978, a shortfall of regular army enlistments, long-term career soldiers who joined willingly and remained in service long enough to be promoted into an NCO role or position, created an NCO shortage for the Bundeswehr extensive enough that some technical position vacancies were studied to determine if civilian substitutes would be a viable alternative.²⁰

The role of British NCOs is very similar to their US counterparts.

I spent two years as a staff sergeant in an instructor position as part of an exchange with the British Army from October 1983 to October 1985, leaving that assignment as a sergeant first class.

Acting as an exchange instructor and teaching at the Royal Armoured Corps Gunnery School in Lulworth, England, I worked for a British major and sergeant major. I taught British and foreign military students on seven different platforms: Chieftain and Challenger main battle tanks; Scorpion, Scimitar, and Fox reconnaissance vehicles; and the Striker and FV 438 guided missile vehicles.

I lived the first three months of my assignment with an operational tank company. I lived in their billets, dined in their mess, and participated in their field exercises.

Some similarities became evident: the British Army is disciplined and fit.

They do not sing cadences when they run, but they offered to let me sing if I wanted to keep them entertained.

When I arrived at the Royal Armoured Corps Gunnery School, the British enlisted soldiers had already demonstrated their capabilities, not only in traditional combat missions but also in peacekeeping missions that built relationships. When Israel invaded southern Lebanon in June 1982, British soldiers joined American, French, and Italian forces in sending forces into the region to restore peace.²¹ British NCOs were thoroughly trained in routinely revised British Army doctrine throughout the 1980s; however, the connecting thread in all iterations stressed the importance of mission command.²² Decades prior to having instant access to a global internet of information inside one’s mobile telephone, for the British soldiers of the 1980s as well as for the Germans and Americans, the key to success in mission command came through being an army in constant practice. The ethos of mission command within an organization required a constant state of cultivation, not just in tactical or operational situations but in peacetime and in the barracks. When soldiers stay ready, it does not take much for them to get ready.

Where Peer Threats Fall Short

Peer threats in the global race toward influence and power, like Russia and China, have long witnessed how enlisted personnel contribute to American successes. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 demonstrated to US military leaders the stagnation and shortcomings of a peer threat’s operational abilities. The Russian army has history of success without a strong NCO corps, but the successes rely on Russian officers, their personality, and their performance. At the tactical level and in situations where mission command requires agility, Russian hierarchal and top-heavy structure of military forces does not allow for delegating authority and trust. Defense analyst Michael Kofman has highlighted how the Russian military is generally considered “rigid at the tactical level and flexible only at the strategic operational level,” creating a vacuum of “ownership and independent thinkers” that makes American military doctrinal concepts like mission command impossible.²³ The Russian forces maintain a hybrid system of conscription and contract service as a means to supplement the numbers needed for combat operations across the Russia-Ukraine border. Leadership development, planning, training, and disciplinary actions are carried out by Russian lieutenants, leaving little vested interest for enlisted soldiers to hold in mission success.

Moreso than the structural barriers that prevent enlisted buy-in of military service, however, are the informal traditions that create hostility. Dedovschina (translated to “rule of grandfathers”), a system of hazing developed among the conscripts, is when second-year conscripts exert their limited seniority and power in the form of physical violence, harassment, humiliation, and theft on those more junior.²⁴ The shift from conscript service time from two years to one year of mandatory military service in 2007 was partially intended to slow the practice; however, as recently as 2023, global news outlets have highlighted how torture and humiliation continue within the enlisted ranks. Recent efforts to improve enlisted soldier’s quality of life have included creating paths to continued government service beyond the compulsory military year.²⁵

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fields a large suite of military weapons and equipment. Their ability to translate materiel power into proven combat effectiveness, however, remains to be seen.²⁶ The PLA has witnessed the Russian military flounder when it comes to developing a strong NCO corps and is taking stock of how the US military uses its NCOs. China is working to develop its own NCO corps as part of a deliberate effort to make the PLA a “world-class military by 2049.”²⁷ One of the primary challenges to surface has been internal personnel issues. As with the Russian military, China’s junior officers are handed the same responsibilities that the US expects NCOs to handle. But “pushing authority down to the lowest possible tactical level” is not a part of the PLA culture.²⁸ They exist in a “very vertical and stove-piped command-and-control system” that does not translate into agility or create situations where mission command is possible.²⁹

Contemporary Issues and Persisting Lessons

The commandant for the NCO Academy, Command Sgt. Maj. Tammy Everette, points to the power of consistency when looking at how the NCO Corps has evolved since she earned her sergeant stripes in 1999. “The core mission of the NCO Corps has remained the same,” she argues, which is “accomplishment of the mission and the welfare of Soldiers.”³⁰ The environment in which soldiers operate, however, is different, and the way soldiers communicate has certainly evolved. In 1999, a young NCO could make mistakes that could be contained to the squad or local area. Soldiers could learn from it and move on, but today a mistake can be instantly shared across the force and live on the internet forever.

Weimer also highlights how things have changed since the turn of the twenty-first century, pointing out that with the renewed emphasis on preparing for large-scale combat operations (LSCO), “none of our current military leadership has experience in LSCO. While Desert Storm and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 are the closest in recent history, the near-peer factor was still missing.”³¹ NCOs, then, become the linchpin to success in the way they enforce readiness in an army in a constant state of transformation. Commanders can only expect subordinates to fulfill their intent and exercise their authority placed upon them under mission command if this is an ingrained value and norm, a part of the unit’s culture in all environments. This requires immense levels of trust earned through consistent performance and embodiment of the Army Values. NCOs, as outlined in The Noncommissioned Officer Guide, “must be comfortable in exercising initiative to make decisions and act.”³² Transparency, actively practicing and developing technical skills, and a commitment to understanding the people performing the work as it relates to the greater mission being served are all integral.³³

NCOs who internalize this professional approach have a lasting impact on the soldiers they encounter throughout their career. When I (SMA Preston) arrived at Fort Hood, Texas, as a young private, I was married with a newborn daughter. Soldiers in the rank of specialist and below were not authorized to live in on-base housing. I found an apartment off base and settled my family prior to signing into the reception station in the 1st Cavalry Division. Before the Army had family readiness groups or sponsorship programs, my new squad leader, Sgt. Dale Stark, and his wife looked out for us, ensuring we were living in a decent neighborhood and that we had everything we needed. I always remember how they treated us, and those lessons would come into play later in my career as a first sergeant and command sergeant major.

My company commander and first sergeant in Gelnhausen, Germany, were great role models, and I captured many lessons that would set me up for success as a senior NCO. I watched them as a new command team change a tank company from a low performing unit to one of the top companies in all of Europe. While the commander was focused on training crews and platoons, the first sergeant focused on NCO development. With a very full training schedule, 1st Sgt. Gary P. Pastine carved out one hour per week for NCO professional development. He personally taught every class and would never farm the class out to an outside source. He was the subject-matter expert. He taught a blend of field training tasks as well as garrison duties and responsibilities. He taught us what “right” looked like and held us accountable.

Just as the officers had additional duties, Pastine also developed additional duties for the NCOs. I had two—the drug and alcohol education specialist who managed the urinalysis program for the company and the map custodian to maintain basic issues of maps for each vehicle in the company. Every tank, truck, and jeep had a map canister with a basic load of maps that covered our general defensive positions. Both programs were inspected formally each year.

I learned that attention to detail and high standards contributed heavily to all successes—not just for promotion or some self-fulfilling ideal but for developing high morale, cohesiveness, pride among soldiers in their unit, and education. The tank company when I arrived had low morale, no pride or cohesiveness, and very few mentors. Pastine arrived at the same time as I did, and the company commander arrived six months later in the fall of 1978. I was serving as the gunner on the commander’s tank. We had just finished thirty days in the field doing a REFORGER (REturn of FORces to GERmany) exercise when Capt. James E. Bessler arrived. With less than ninety days, which included Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays, the training focus was preparation for and rail-load deployment to Level 2 tank gunnery qualification at Grafenwöhr Training Area. As a new tank crew, we spent what seemed like hundreds of hours practicing crew drills in the motor pool until we achieved a standard that far exceeded average performance. We achieved the second highest score in the battalion during Level 2 gunnery in the winter of 1978. Learning what it took to achieve excellence, the sacrifices made, the time committed, a standard based on perfection and speed, and the success we enjoyed changed the trajectory of my career and life forever. The next two years were fun and exciting for the entire company.

All these lessons as a young NCO shaped my outlook as I moved to positions of increased responsibility.

The individual concerns of the US Army in 1978 have certainly changed from those in a post-GWOT military.

Physical maps have been replaced by various iterations of satellite-based global positioning software.

Issues that used to be dependent upon an active informal network of families and spouses at the unit level can now be facilitated through well-resourced army organizations trained and prepared to offer information and assistance.

Technologies and processes are more streamlined.

The human factor, however, remains the key to success.

When enlisted soldiers recognize the community they joined when they raised their right hand, they become invested in it. NCOs build that community.

 

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Notes

1. Aimee Millham, “Conference Empowers NCOs from European, Eurasian Nations,” US Army, 28 June 2007, https://www.army.mil/article/3834/conference_empowers_ncos_from_european_eurasian_nations.
2. Millham, “Conference Empowers NCOs.”
3. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession (US Government Publication Office [GPO], July 2019), para. 1-99.
4. Headquarters, Department of the Army, NCO Strategy: Preparing Squads for Multi-Domain, Large Scale Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2021), 2, https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2022/02/09/709a27ee/fy22-army-nco-strategy.pdf.
5. “AR 600-20, Army Command Policy,” NCO History, accessed 20 April 2026, https://ncohistory.com/ar-600-20/.
6. “AR 600-20, Army Command Policy.”
7. Army Regulation 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia (US GPO, January 2021), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN30302-AR_670-1-001-WEB-3.pdf.
8. ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession, para. 2-13.
9. Training Circular (TC) 7-22.7, The Noncommissioned Officer Guide (US GPO, August 2025), 101, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN44634-TC_7-22.7-000-WEB-2.pdf.
10. Michael R. Weimer, “Combat Doesn’t Care: How Ready Are You?,” Muddy Boots, NCO Journal, 14 October 2024, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Muddy-Boots/Combat-Doesnt-Care-Weimer/.
11. Weimer, “Combat Doesn’t Care.”
12. Kirk R. Coley, “Competence Is My Watchword: The Key to Being Ready,” Muddy Boots, NCO Journal, 10 March 2025, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2025/March/Competence-is-My-Watchword2/.
13. Alexander Kupratty, “Whose Job Is It Anyway? Understanding and Applying All Learning Domains,” Muddy Boots, NCO Journal, 28 July 2025, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Muddy-BootS/Whose-Job-Is-It/.
14. Kupratty, “Whose Job Is It Anyway?”
15. Kupratty, “Whose Job Is It Anyway?”
16. “The Bundeswehr in the Cold War,” Bundeswehr, accessed 20 April 2026, https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/about-bundeswehr/history/cold-war.
17. Stanley M. Kanarowski, The German Army and NATO Strategy (National Defense University Press, 1982), 20, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA122372.pdf.
18. Kanarowski, The German Army and NATO Strategy, 73.
19. Kanarowski, The German Army and NATO Strategy, 73.
20. Kanarowski, The German Army and NATO Strategy, 75–76.
21. Jarod Perkioniemi, “Army NCO History (Part 8): Post Vietnam, 1980s and 90s,” US Army, 11 March 2009, https://www.army.mil/article/18050/army_nco_history_part_8_post_vietnam_1980s_and_90s.
22. Dean Canham, introduction to Mission Command and Leadership on Operations Since 1991, ed. Linda Risso (Centre for Army Leadership, 2024), 4, https://www.army.mod.uk/media/25267/cal-mission-command-and-leadership-on-operations-2024-final-v2.pdf.
23. Caitlin M. Kenney, “NCOs: America Has Them, China Wants Them, Russia Is Struggling Without Them,” Defense One, 5 May 2022, https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/05/ncos-america-has-them-china-wants-them-russia-struggling-without-them/366586/.
24. Charles K. Bartles, “Russian Armed Forces: Enlisted Professionals,” NCO Journal, 11 March 2019, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2019/March/Russian-ncos/.
25. Weisshorn3920, “Dedovshchina: How Russia Creates Soldiers Who Think Nothing of Committing War Crimes,” Daily Kos, 3 January 2023, https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/1/3/2138904/-Dedovshchina-How-Russia-Creates-Soldiers-who-think-nothing-of-Committing-War-Crimes; Alexey Zhabin, “More Than a Decade After Military Reform, Hazing Still Plagues the Russian Army,” The Moscow Times, 17 February 2020, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/02/17/decade-after-military-reform-hazing-plagues-russian-army-a69309; Andrew Roth, “Russian Army’s Hazing Culture Drove Son to Kill Soldiers, Says Father,” The Guardian, 6 November 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/06/russian-armys-hazing-culture-drove-son-ramil-shamsutdinov-to-kill-soldiers-says-father; Bartles, “Russian Armed Forces.”
26. Timothy R. Heath, “The Chinese Military’s Doubtful Combat Readiness” (RAND Corporation, January 2025), 2, https://doi.org/10.7249/PEA830-1.
27. Kenney, “NCOs.”
28. Kenney, “NCOs.”
29. Kenney, “NCOs.”
30. Tammy Everette, email message to Dahlstrand, 2 July 2025.
31. Weimer, “Combat Doesn’t Care.”
32. TC 7-22.7, The Noncommissioned Officer Guide, 53.
33. TC 7-22.7, The Noncommissioned Officer Guide, 53.

 

 

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