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An Endurance-Centric Model for the Principles of War

 

Maj. Greg Abt, US Army

 

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The principles of war are a longstanding cornerstone of the Army’s understanding of conflict. As stated in Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, the principles of war “represent the most important factors that affect the conduct of operations” and “capture broad and enduring fundamentals for the employment of forces in combat.”¹ For decades, the Army has used the nine principles of objective, simplicity, unity of command, offensive, maneuver, mass, economy of force, surprise, and security.² However, this list of principles contains a number of shortcomings that impede the proper application of military force. There is a more effective model.

One may question the need to revise such a foundational piece of Army doctrine. However, as the principles of war’s progenitor, J. F. C. Fuller, wrote,

Method creates doctrine, and a common doctrine is the cement which holds an Army together. Though mud is better than no cement, we want the best cement, and we shall never get it unless we can analyze war scientifically and discover its values. This then, is the object of my method – to create a workable piece of mental machinery which will enable the student of war to sort out military values.³

Let us continue striving for the best cement. The object of this article is to formulate an improved method, grounded in explicit parameters, that improves upon the Army’s principles of war. This article highlights issues with their current construction and proposes a revised model for the principles of war, centered on endurance and supported by objective, speed, cohesion, mass, freedom of action, preparation, adaptation, and security.

Origins and Evolution of the Principles of War

The Army’s principles of war are based largely on the works of British theorist J. F. C. Fuller (1878–1966).⁴ Fuller, over the course of his career, composed several formulations of the principles of war, continually making revisions and updates. His most comprehensive explanation of the principles of war is covered in his seminal work, Foundations on the Science of War (1926), though the Army’s principles of war descend from an earlier version contained in the British Field Service Regulations: Operations (1920).⁵ After some relatively minor changes, the Army’s principles of war were firmly established by the end of the 1940s in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations.⁶ Much later, joint doctrine added three additional principles: restraint, resilience, and legitimacy. This was an attempt to make the principles better suited for modern times. Collectively these principles were relabeled as the “principles of joint operations.”⁷ American author Dr. Amos C. Fox derided the addition of these three terms as a “true demonstration of the almost zero analytical rigor being placed behind what is truly meant by principles of war or principles of joint operations,” which “highlights the lack of serosity paid the subject in the post 9/11 period of Western military thinking.”⁸ Table 1 provides a comparison of some of the principles of war over time.⁹ For the purposes of this article, we will focus on the Army’s current list and use the term principles of war.

Principles of War and Combat Power

The principles of war are inextricably tied to the notion of combat power. As discussed in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, “The principles are relevant to how the Armed Forces of the United States use combat power across the competition continuum.”¹⁰ Combat power is “the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time.”¹¹ It is composed of five dynamics: leadership, information, survivability, firepower, and mobility (see figure 1).¹² A more holistic description of combat power is found in British doctrine, where they style it as “fighting power.” Fighting power “determines the ability of our Armed Forces to operate and warfight” and has three components: moral, conceptual, and physical.¹³ This trifecta, fittingly derived from Fuller’s works (depicted in figure 2), better describes the sources of military force in their totality.¹⁴

A Better Explanation of the Principles of War

The issue with current US doctrine is that it does not adequately justify the principles of war or correctly explain the principles’ relationship with each other. Beyond stating that the principles of war are the “most important factors” and mentioning their applicability at all levels of war, FM 3-0 does not provide a rigorous framework nor an underlying logic justifying the inclusion of these nine principles of war as opposed to others. Instead, FM 3-0 appears to legitimize the nine principles of war primarily based on their longevity. These Fuller-derived principles are described as having “essentially remained the same over the last century, standing the test of analysis, experimentation, and practice in war.”¹⁵ However, one should not accept the Army’s current list of the principles of war as holy writ. A better rationale for the principles of war is needed.

If principles of war exist, they are discerned, not created or invented. They align with the unchanging nature or war, not to the changeable character of war, and therefore are universal. Because of this, the principles of war cannot be a mere list of desired traits. It does not matter whether someone, regardless of their education or military acumen, favors certain aspects over others. The principles of war describe how wars are fought, not how they should be fought. The factors represented by the principles of war are always present. A combatant applies the principles with varying levels of deftness.

The principles of war can only be correctly identified through logical and historical analysis. Along these lines, this article identifies eight distinct criteria, or parameters, that a principle must meet for qualification. A principle must be

1. valid as one of the most important factors in the employment of combat power,
2. valid at all levels of warfare,
3. valid in all methods of warfare,
4. valid in all forms of operations,
5. valid in all domains,
6. valid throughout history,
7. valid in both a physical and nonphysical sense, and
8. valid in the inverse with regards to the enemy.

Parameter 1. As FM 3-0 describes, a principle of war is one of the highest factors influencing operations.¹⁶ By definition, a principle of war should be a broad, expansive concept. As we will see, some of the current principles of war can be nested inside others. If a concept can be reasonably placed inside a larger category, then it is not a principle of war. Now, just because a concept is not a principle of war does not mean that it is not true or useful. Lastly, while not a requirement, it stands to reason that the term for a principle should also not be used for other doctrinal concepts in order to prevent confusion.

Parameter 2. The principles of war transcend the levels of operations. They may be one of the few constants that unify operations from tactical, operational, theater strategic, and national strategic levels. This would also apply to the level of grand strategy. This does not mean the principles function the same at all levels, but they do exist at all levels. Current Army doctrine acknowledges this fact, stating the principles of war “affect the conduct of operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.”¹⁷

Parameter 3. The broad ideas of the principles of war exist regardless of the method of warfare, conventional or irregular.

Parameter 4. The principles of war are present regardless of the form of operations. Offense, defense, and stability operations are all subject to the principles of war.

Parameter 5. The principles of war are also valid regardless of domain or branch of service. There are no separate sets of land, sea, or air principles of war.

Parameter 6. The principles of war are timeless. This is not a given. In the 1990s, Robert R. Leonhard argued for a totally updated set in The Principles of War for the Information Age.¹⁸ However, while the character of war changes, the principles of war are tied to the nature of war and are therefore immutable. Discussions on the changing character of war are useful and necessary but need not involve adulterating the principles of war.

Parameter 7. Each principle of war can be thought of in terms of physical and nonphysical ways. This is due to combat power having physical and nonphysical components.

Parameter 8. Lastly, each principle of war is valid in the inverse with regard to the enemy. This means if a principle has a positive effect on you, it is detrimental to the enemy, and vice versa. For example, one wants to mass on the enemy while preventing the enemy from massing on them. Amos Fox identifies this fact in his proposed list of principles of war and includes a corresponding list of inverse principles.¹⁹ While inversion is a valid quality, one need not list the opposites of the principles of war. Therefore, by acknowledging inversion, we abrogate the need to enumerate a set of inverse principles. As will be discussed, some of the current principles of war have an inverse listed (e.g., surprise and security, mass and economy of force). However, for other principles, their opposite with regard to the enemy is only implied. For example, the other side of the coin for unity of command would be something like “divide the enemy.” We rightly don’t see the necessity to list that while for some reason we do with other principles.

These parameters do not presuppose a specific number of principles of war; there could very well be any number. It is the first parameter more than any other that winnows down the myriad of potential options. It also needs stating that the underlying meaning of a principle of war is what counts, not the specific title of the principle itself. For example, mass and concentration are synonymous. For clarity, this article seeks not to “change happy to glad” and advocates for a new title only when warranted due to significant differences in meaning.

Reevaluating the Principles of War

With more refined parameters, we can evaluate how the current principles stand up to scrutiny. Analysis shows that some remain valid, some require alterations, and some are best not characterized as principles of war. By coincidence, of the nine current principles of war, three meet all criteria and can remain largely unchanged (objective, mass, and security), three warrant substantial alteration (maneuver to freedom of action, surprise to preparation, unity of command to cohesion), three failed to merit retention (economy of force, offensive, and simplicity), and three new principles need to be added (adaptation, speed, and endurance). Thus, it results in a new principles-of-war list (see table 2).

Retained principles: objective, mass, and security. Using the parameters discussed above, only three of the current principles of war meet all criteria: objective, mass, and security. JP 5-0 describes objective as “a clearly defined and achievable aim toward which an operation is directed.”²⁰ Put simply, an objective is the thing or condition being pursued. It is the goal that combat power is directed toward. One could also style it as the aim or even direction and keep much the same meaning. Objective is applicable to warfare in all domains and present throughout military history. A combatant may select the wrong objective or fail to adequately pursue it, but the concept of objective is ever present.

Mass is to “concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results.”²¹ More broadly put, mass is the concentration of combat power. One can mass almost anything (e.g., forces, effects, resources, analytical, or computer processing power). Mass is a question of allocation. Some, such as Leonhard, thought mass outdated, invalid, and “logically contradictory and inconsistent with the other principles.”²² This is utterly false. The factor of massing forces and effects is just as much a part of war today as in the past. Just because technological or operational developments may make executing mass harder than at certain other times in history does not mean that the concept of mass is less valid.

JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, defines security as “measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness.”²³ Put more succinctly, security is the preservation of the means to employ combat power. It applies to all levels of war and is often executed through the intelligence and protection warfighting functions.

Altered principles: maneuver to freedom of action, surprise to preparation, and unity of command to cohesion. Maneuver, as a principle of war, needs alteration, as it violates the first, second, and seventh parameters. Regarding the first parameter, maneuver is better thought of as a more specific aspect of a larger concept. In doctrine, maneuver is a principle of war and, coupled with movement, also a warfighting function. Moreover, Army doctrine defines maneuver as the combination of fire, itself a warfighting function, and movement.²⁴

Maneuver as a principle is also in violation of the second parameter. While it is easy to conceptualize maneuver in a tactical and operational sense, this becomes more difficult as one ascends into the strategic realm. One might be hard-pressed indeed to determine what would constitute a grand strategic maneuver. Lastly, maneuver, and its associated terms of movement or mobility, are in plain English definitively tied to the physical world. One might maneuver a division toward the enemy, but many would find it awkward to speak of “mentally maneuvering.” Best then we find a term that better captures the underlying meaning, such as freedom of action. Freedom of action is retaining the ability to employ combat power despite constraints. This covers not only the ability to move in a physical sense, like movement, maneuver, or mobility, but also in nonphysical concepts, such as flexibility and the ability to reorganize, reorient, or realign.

Surprise is an extremely important concept and rightly deserves a prominent place in Army doctrine. However, according to the parameters identified above, surprise does not qualify as a principle of war in and of itself due to the first parameter. It would be better to select a higher and broader term as a principle of war, such as preparation. Preparation is the readiness for the employment of combat power. Preparation not only encompasses surprise, but also a range of other important concepts such as training and education. It applies more readily to physical concepts such as rehearsals or even the construction of facilities and the gathering of resources, while surprise is more strictly a nonphysical concept. Equally as important, preparation incorporates a key component to conducting operations—understanding. The intelligence warfighting function pursues understanding as part of the preparation principle of war.

Unity of command likewise violates the first parameter. It is indeed an important and beneficial concept to heed, however, one can easily think of several related notions, such as unity of effort or unity of purpose or even leadership in general. Are these not as valid as unity of command? A different term denoting a higher concept would better serve our purposes. This article proposes cohesion, defined as employing combat power holistically.

Removed principles: economy of force, offensive, and simplicity. Economy of force is defined as expending “minimum-essential combat power on secondary efforts to allocate the maximum possible combat power on the main effort.”²⁵ While a sound concept, economy of force is essentially the inverse of the principle of mass. Retaining economy of force would entail having inverses of all the other principles. However, as covered in parameter 8, the inverse nature of all principles is inherent. Therefore, listing economy of force is unnecessary, as mass safely encompasses economy of force. Granted, one could argue that mass could be encompassed within economy of force, but this article favors mass as it is the more active and decisive aspect.

Though offensive has long been listed as a principle of war, there are several issues with considering it as such. First, let’s look at what the principle of offensive entails. Offensive is defined as to “seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.”²⁶ So the purpose of offensive is to possess the initiative. Why not just label the principle as initiative? Initiative itself is not a defined term, but Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations, describes operational initiative as “the setting of tempo and terms of action throughout an operation.”²⁷ A common definition of initiate is to “set going.”²⁸ In other words, offensive is important for maintaining the initiative in order to control operations. This is a true and important aspect of war but lies within the previously discussed principle of freedom of action. It is also true that one must normally, although perhaps not always, go on the offensive to achieve the objective. In this sense though, offensive is also subordinate to objective. Moreover, offensive is already correctly identified as a type of operation, along with defense and stability.²⁹ In short, offensive, important as it is, better fits as a type of operation and not a principle and lies within other principles of war, such as objective and freedom of action.

As stated in FM 3-0, the purpose of simplicity is to “increase the probability that plans can be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and orders.”³⁰ Simplicity is an admirable quality, but it does not qualify as a principle of war by failing to meet the first and eighth parameters. Simplicity is not an end in and of itself. As stated in its definition, simplicity’s purpose is to aid in executing plans. Simplicity does this by enabling cohesion among one’s forces. Therefore, cohesion is the principle being described. Lastly, one can easily talk of preserving one’s own cohesion when degrading the enemy’s cohesion. It would be nonsensical to talk of degrading the enemy’s simplicity.

Additional principles: adaptation, speed, and endurance. The principles of war should collectively encompass all significant aspects of war. This means that each of the concepts pertaining to the conduct of operations in war should reasonably fall under at least one of the principles. Hitherto, we have identified six principles of war based on our established parameters: objective, mass, security, freedom of action, preparation, and cohesion. Common reasoning, informed by history, dictates that these six principles do not cover all required areas. These gaps need to be identified and the corresponding principle described.

Throughout history, war has been in an ever-changing state of flux, with commanders and their staffs endeavoring to keep up. This is done in a variety of ways. In recent times we may phrase this as updating tactics, techniques, and procedures; or developing new capabilities using the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) framework. Change, and the race to adapt to change, is endemic to war. Therefore, this article proposes that the term adaptation, the modification of combat power for optimization, warrants inclusion as a principle of war.

A glaring gap in the existing principles of war is that none clearly deals with time. Time is the fourth dimension, and one could easily argue that it should be included along with physical, human, and information as a dimension of the operational environment in multidomain operations. Army doctrine does acknowledge tempo, “the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy,” but an overarching temporal principle is needed.³¹ Indeed, Leonhard in Fighting by Minutes states, “The most effective way to perceive, interpret, and plan military operations is in terms of time, rather than space.”³² Speed, the rapidity of employing combat power, meets this requirement. Speed applies to a wide variety of activities across the spectrum (e.g., munition production rates, commander decision cycles, rates of march).

The single greatest oversight in the current principles of war is the improper categorization of endurance. The Army acknowledges the concept of endurance, defining it in FM 3-0 as “the ability to persevere over time throughout the depth of an operational environment.”³³ However, FM 3-0 categories endurance as one of the four tenets of operations along with agility, convergence, and depth. The tenets of operations are “desirable attributes that should be built into all plans and operations, and they are directly related to how the Army’s operational concept should be employed.”³⁴ In other words, endurance as a tenet is specifically tied to multidomain operations. In addition, endurance can seem similar to the principle of joint operations of resilience. JP 1, Joint Warfighting, describes resilience as a quality that “enables forces to recover from loss or setback.”³⁵ However, endurance is a broader concept that can encompass resilience.

The current usages of endurance as a tenet of operation and resilience as a principle of joint operations do not optimally capture the importance of this key concept. Endurance should be expanded upon and elevated to a principle of war. A broader definition for the principle of endurance is the continued employment of combat power. As Carl von Clausewitz phrased it, “endurance refers to prolonged resistance.”³⁶ Formulaically, endurance is the ability to employ combat power over time (see figure 3).

The Relation of the Principles of War to Each Other

As discussed, objective, mass, security, freedom of action, preparation, cohesion, adaptation, speed, and endurance meet all parameters and holistically cover all areas of wartime operations. Of equal importance to the underlying meaning of these principles is how they interact with each other. Analysis reveals three key facts. First, the principles of war not only strengthen each other, but can also be in tension. Second, endurance occupies a prime and central position within the principles that distinguishes it from the other principles of war. Third, endurance is the prime principle of war.

While each principle of war is distinct, they can strengthen or reinforce each other in a number of ways. Fuller acknowledges this point, stating, “It is not possible correctly to apply any one of the principles of war without reference to the remainder.”³⁷ For example, the adoption of faster modes of travel can improve speed. Greater cohesion can increase one’s ability to mass forces or effects, etc. However, the principles of war can also be an impediment to each other. Each principle of war, with the notable exception of endurance, has one principle of war in particular, more so than others, that can often degrade it. For example, speed can reduce the time for preparation, massing troops for an attack can degrade security by showing the enemy where an attack is to be conducted, and focusing on a particular objective can reduce one’s freedom of movement to pursue other options. Figure 4 highlights this fact by depicting principles in tension with each other on opposite sides. To be clear, this is not to say that this is always the case. While it seems that each principle, except for endurance, is often in tension with one other principle, there are exceptions. For example, the adoption of a new command structure would likely reduce a unit’s cohesion, at least in the short term. However, the adoption of new radio systems, if properly tested and integrated, would improve cohesion in a unit through better communications. Understanding this tension and the inherent trade-offs between the principles of war is a key factor in the science and art of war.

The second key point in the relation between the principles of war is the centrality of endurance. As discussed, endurance is in a central position in that unlike the other principles, it is in less inherent tension with other principles. Endurance underpins all other principles of war.

The third key point is that endurance is the most important principle for the simple fact that a combatant can still be successful if the enemy is superior in all other principles except for endurance. One can win if the enemy is better prepared or has greater speed, but if your endurance gives out before the enemy’s, you will lose. This is true at every level of warfare from tactical to national strategic. If the defenders of a bunker can endure the attacks, they will win regardless of any other advantage. The same applies to a contest of nations. The side that can endure the longest will be victorious, not the side that better maneuvers, possesses better technology, or has greater operational acumen.

It may seem far from self-evident that endurance should occupy the prime position among the principles of war. Objective has always been listed first in Army doctrine. The British likewise have objective, styled as “selection and maintenance of the aim,” as the “master principle of war.”³⁸ However, objective, important as it is, does not supersede endurance. One can normally continue to endure and carry on the fight even if a particular objective is not accomplished. However, if endurance fails, the objective cannot be accomplished. In other words, an objective that does not degrade the enemy’s endurance more than your own is an objective not worth pursuing. This fact may seem banal, but an endurance-centric model has important advantages over a model that places objective first. It focuses the mind of planners, commanders, and policy makers on the crux of warfighting: outenduring the enemy.

None of this should be construed to say that achieving objectives does not matter, but instead that time and time again throughout history, endurance has been the ultimate decider. In The Allure of Battle, author Cathal Nolan states, “Exhaustion of morale and materiel rather than finality through battle marks the endgame of many wars. Even of most wars. Almost always of war among the major power in any era.”³⁹ This is true at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. By putting endurance front and center of the principles of war, the US Army will better remember this fundamental truth.

Recommendations and Conclusion

As George E. P. Box and Norman R. Draper say in Empirical Model-Building and Response Surfaces, “All models are wrong, but some are useful.”⁴⁰ One can go further and add that some models are more useful than others. Despite the longevity of the Army’s current principles of war, this article has shown there is room for improvement. The proposed principles of war have several advantages. First, by offering a distinct set of parameters, the principles of war are better identified and defined. The proposed model encompasses a wider array of topics while not increasing the overall number of principles. It reduces potential confusion in doctrine by no longer listing maneuver as both a principle and warfighting function and offensive as both a principle of war and type of operation. It elevates endurance from a mere tenet of operations to its rightful place. The proposed model highlights the relationship between the principles of war with the centrality of endurance and the tension between certain principles. The Army should consider incorporating the components of British fighting power as outlined in Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine, into US doctrine. Lastly it should be noted that having separate principles of war for the Army and principles of joint operations at the joint level makes little sense and can only cloud the matter. It is advisable that a single term and list is established and used throughout the joint force. In conclusion, the adoption of the endurance-centric model outlined in this article would reinforce the Army’s renewed focus on lethality and large-scale combat operations by better focusing its attention on an eternal reality of war: vincit qui patitur, he who endures conquers.

 

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Notes

1. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (US Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2025), 7.
2. John I. Alger, The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War (Greenwood Press, 1982), 253–55.
3. J. F. C. Fuller, Foundations on the Science of War (Hutchinson, 1926), 35.
4. FM 3-0, Operations, 205.
5. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War; General Staff, War Office, Field Serve Regulations: Operations, vol. II (His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1920).
6. FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (US Government Printing Office, 1944).
7. Joint Publication (JP) 1 Joint Warfighting, vol. 1 (US GPO, 2023), viii.
8. Amos C. Fox, Conflict Realism: Understanding the Causal Logic of Modern War and Warfare (Howgate, 2024), 8.
9. Alger, The Quest for Victory, 124, 240–55.
10. JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations (US GPO, 2022), A-1.
11. JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, GL-8.
12. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Operations (US GPO, 2025), 2-25, fig. 2-1.
13. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine, 6th ed. (Ministry of Defence, 2022), 24.
14. JDP 0-01, UK Defense Doctrine, 24, fig. 2.2.
15. FM 3-0, Operations, 205.
16. FM 3-0, Operations, 205.
17. FM 3-0, Operations, 205.
18. Robert R. Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Information Age (Ballantine Books, 1998), ix.
19. Fox, Conflict Realism, 71.
20. JP 5-0, Joint Planning (GPO, 2025), GL-8.
21. FM 3-0, Operations, 8, table 1-1.
22. Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Information Age, x.
23. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater (US GPO, 2019), GL-5
24. FM 3-0, Operations, A-11.
25. FM 3-0, Operations, 8, table 1-1.
26. FM 3-0, Operations, 8, table 1-1.
27. ADP 3-0, Operations, 3-12.
28. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “initiate,” last updated 5 April 2026, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/initiate.
29. ADP 3-0, Operations, 2.
30. FM 3-0, Operations, 8, table 1-1.
31. ADP 3-0, Operations, 35.
32. Robert R. Leonhard, Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War (CreateSpace, 2017) xii.
33. ADP 3-0, Operations, 28.
34. FM 3-0, Operations, 48.
35. JP 1, Joint Warfighting, vol. 1, II-15.
36. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 122.
37. Fuller, Foundations on the Science of War, 252.
38. JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine, 19.
39. Cathal J. Nolan, The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost (Oxford University Press, 2017), 3.
40. George E. P. Box and Norman R. Draper, Empirical Model-Building and Response Surfaces (John Wiley & Sons, 1987), 424.

 

 

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