Owning H2F

Why Fitness Must Remain a Leadership Responsibility

By Sgt. Maj. David R. Yates

Transformation Integration Directorate, Fires Center of Excellence

August 28, 2026

Download the PDF

The Army's Holistic Health and Fitness (H2F) initiative implements the most significant changes to physical readiness in decades. It recognizes that fitness extends beyond passing a test and includes strength, conditioning, recovery, nutrition, and injury prevention (Department of the Army [DA], 2025).

By embedding performance and medical professionals into brigades, the Army sought to address uneven leader knowledge, inconsistent programming, and preventable musculoskeletal injuries. Many formations improved the technical quality of their physical training programs under this model.

Research evaluating embedded care shows that H2F professionals treated Soldiers sooner, leading to measurable improvements in rehabilitation outcomes compared to traditional systems (Szymanek et al., 2025). These results confirm that placing strength, conditioning, and medical professionals inside formations improves access to care and speeds recovery.

Structure determines whether those gains last. Army doctrine states that leaders are responsible for establishing a positive climate and setting conditions for success (DA, 2019). However, if leaders interpret this guidance to mean they should merely set the conditions for fitness culture while outsourcing daily execution entirely to civilian experts, they risk losing doctrinal accountability. This interpretation overlooks the structural gaps that limited past internal initiatives like the legacy Master Fitness Trainer (MFT) program.

The Army must evolve H2F into a hybrid model integrating civilian expertise with Soldier-led execution to ensure sustained readiness. By professionalizing uniformed physical training leaders and restoring unit ownership through lessons from the MFT program, the Army can maintain technical proficiency while restoring internal accountability.

Why H2F Adopted a Civilian-Heavy Model

The Army adopted a civilian-heavy model in direct response to what it identified as a readiness crisis driven by inconsistent programming and high rates of musculoskeletal injuries across the force (DA, 2025).

By embedding certified strength and conditioning coaches, the Army sought to inject biomechanical expertise into brigades to standardize training and raise technical proficiency. The model produced measurable results; embedded H2F programs shortened time to care and improved Soldier rehabilitation outcomes (Szymanek et al., 2025).

Furthermore, the H2F staffing model acknowledges that highly specialized domains like clinical physical therapy and performance nutrition require licensed civilian experts (DA, 2025). However, shifting daily programming and assessment outside the chain of command created a new dynamic.

In my observation across multiple formations, while units gained technical support, reliance on external contractors inadvertently incentivized some leaders to adopt a more hands-off approach to their formations' fitness. That potential tradeoff reflects the structural lessons first seen in the legacy MFT program.

The MFT Program: Structural Lessons

The Army's transition to the H2F model was a direct response to the limitations of previous physical readiness systems, shifting the force toward a dedicated, full-time performance model (DA, 2025).

Historically, the Army relied on the legacy MFT program to return educated NCOs to formations as subject-matter experts. However, in my observation across multiple assignments, MFT responsibilities were frequently additional duties, meaning these NCOs lacked the protected time and structural support required to build consistent unit programs.

By introducing embedded H2F teams, the Army structurally solved the need for dedicated focus. I argue that adding civilian professionals to solve this structural problem should not be interpreted as a lack of NCO capability, nor should it replace their doctrinal role as primary trainers.

Rather, it highlights a critical lesson: for internal fitness leaders to succeed, they need to be integrated into the unit's operations process. The lesson is clear. Soldiers can lead physical training effectively when leaders deliberately integrate them into unit systems, but the program will not sustain itself without command emphasis and structural support.

In my experience, units that treated MFT responsibilities as an additional duty saw minimal impact, while units that integrated MFTs into training meetings and planning cycles achieved measurable improvements in physical readiness.

For example, I have seen commanders integrate these roles directly into battle rhythm events, such as the commander's health review. The commander brought in the H2F NCOICs, the medical NCOIC, and the unit physician assistant (PA) to conduct profile analysis and align physical readiness priorities.

Structural alignment determines whether internal models succeed. Without command emphasis, H2F risks following the same path as the MFT program, but at significantly greater cost.

Sustainability Cost

The H2F model depends on sustained contract support and external expertise (DA, 2025). It delivers immediate technical proficiency, but also creates recurring funding requirements. Civilian professionals operate according to contract cycles that rarely align with unit life cycles. They do not deploy with formations, and their rotation depends on staffing and contract timelines rather than operational requirements.

When personnel transition, continuity suffers and units must rebuild systems instead of refining them. Sustainability requires more than funding. It requires institutional control and expertise continuity.

The Army already provides tuition assistance and credentialing assistance programs that develop internal capability (DA, 2026). Internal development strengthens resilience and reduces dependence on external civilian professionals over time. It also allows trained Soldiers to deploy with their units, maintaining continuity when civilian H2F personnel cannot.

Cost alone does not determine effectiveness. Sustainability, continuity, and ownership influence long-term readiness just as much as funding. Execution models shape whether leaders retain responsibility for physical readiness or defer it. That decision affects professional development as well as budgeting. Building internal expertise strengthens readiness and leader competence at the same time.

Ultimately, the argument for developing internal expertise transcends logistical sustainability and continuity; it strikes directly at the core of military leadership and unit culture.

Ownership and Fitness Culture

Army doctrine assigns responsibility for training readiness directly to commanders and NCOs (DA, 2019). Physical training provides one of the most visible daily expressions of that responsibility. Army doctrine reinforces that leadership presence and engagement directly influence standards, discipline, and performance (DA, 2024). Physical training provides one of the most consistent opportunities for leaders to apply those principles.

When leaders remain actively involved in planning and execution, they reinforce standards while developing their ability to assess readiness and manage risk. When they disengage, even with expert support present, opportunities for leader development diminish. Beyond just setting conditions, leadership presence during physical training serves as a primary mechanism for reinforcing standards, discipline, and accountability across the formation.

Execution models directly influence leader behavior. When expertise resides primarily outside the formation, leaders naturally defer to specialists. If leaders merely set the training schedule and allow civilians to execute all programming without oversight, they risk stripping NCOs of their doctrinal accountability.

In the H2F context, accountability means leaders are not just responsible for ensuring Soldiers show up to physical training but are intimately responsible for understanding how it translates to lethality and survivability in combat.

Furthermore, outsourcing removes a vital crucible for leader development. Planning and executing physical training require leaders to practice risk management and evaluate their unit's physical limits (DA, 2024).

When NCOs write and lead physical training plans, they must actively analyze whether the conditioning event's intensity will cause injury before a field problem. If leaders delegate this responsibility entirely to civilians, they lose the repetitions necessary to build that professional competence. Leaders cannot effectively own their unit's fitness culture if they completely divorce themselves from its daily execution.

Proof of Feasibility: Soldier-Led Fitness in Practice

Yes, civilian professionals improve technical proficiency. But the more important question is whether Soldier-led models function effectively across different formations.

Unit-level experience demonstrates that Soldier-trainers can effectively manage readiness when leaders deliberately integrate them into established command systems.

For example, in a military intelligence detachment I observed, a junior NCO designed and monitored the physical training program. She tracked strength progression, recorded sprint times, consolidated performance data, and briefed results to leadership regularly.

Leaders reviewed those metrics and adjusted programming deliberately. The unit integrated physical readiness into its command processes rather than outsourcing it. Clear expectations and command support sustained the model over time.

In a field artillery unit headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB) preparing for a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation and deployment, operational tempo increased significantly. The formation was larger and training density was higher than in the detachment example.

As the battery's only H2F-trained leader, I ensured platoon leaders understood movement standards and intended training stimulus. They tracked injuries, performance scores, and profile status daily and briefed those metrics during training meetings.

Leaders maintained ownership despite competing demands, reinforcing doctrinal readiness responsibility (DA, 2019). Different formations require different depths, but responsibility must remain inside them to sustain effectiveness.

A Hybrid Model that Preserves Strength and Ownership

The Army does not need to choose between civilian expertise and Soldier ownership. A hybrid model can preserve technical standards while restoring internal accountability. While regulations such as Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, and Field Manual (FM) 7-22, Holistic Health and Fitness, already direct the appointment of unit fitness leaders, commanders must move beyond nominal designations.

To make a hybrid model effective, leaders must explicitly integrate these designated trainers into the unit's training management cycles.

Consistent with FM 7-0, Training, commanders must use their published training guidance to codify protected development time for these leaders, insulating physical readiness planning from competing administrative distractors (DA, 2021).

To build this internal capacity, leaders should deliberately incentivize Federal Tuition Assistance (TA) and Army Credentialing Assistance (CA) programs so Soldiers can pursue strength and conditioning certifications (DA, 2026).

Speaking from personal experience, leveraging these civilian credentialing opportunities directly enhances leader competence.

By obtaining external coaching certifications, I developed a precise understanding of the biomechanics behind complex movements like the deadlift and power clean. This technical knowledge allows me to actively coach and correct Soldiers during physical training, transforming me from a passive observer into an effective facilitator.

When NCOs can confidently teach technical movements and prevent injuries, they reinforce their doctrinal role as primary trainers. Units must deliberately develop depth to sustain this capability during personnel transitions.

Under this hybrid approach, civilian professionals should mentor and review programs rather than execute daily physical training. Commanders should incorporate fitness metrics into training meetings and readiness briefs so the data contributes to broader readiness decisions. This model preserves H2F technical proficiency while strengthening continuity and leader development.

Civilian expertise remains valuable, but leader responsibility is central to sustaining readiness over time. Structural alignment ensures that physical readiness is an organic capability in formations and not dependent on external systems.

Limitations and Realities

Operational demands vary across formations, and any model must account for those realities. Combat arms units often operate under compressed timelines, competing requirements, and unpredictable schedules that limit the time available for deliberate physical training (DA, 2024).

During high operational tempo periods such as CTC rotations or deployment preparation, leaders often prioritize collective training over structured fitness development. In those environments, even well-designed programs degrade without leader emphasis and if they're not deliberately integrated into training plans.

Adopting internal fitness development programs also depends on leader buy-in and available time for education. While TA and CA programs provide pathways to build expertise, participation remains uneven due to competing priorities and limited awareness.

In some units, leaders still view physical training as an executable task rather than a developed system. In my experience, formations that treat H2F as a function handed to civilian professionals showed less leader engagement and reduced long-term continuity.

These constraints do not invalidate a Soldier-led approach, but they reinforce the requirement for command emphasis and execution flexibility.

A hybrid model must account for operational demands, leader development timelines, and varying levels of internal expertise. Units will not implement identical programs, but they must maintain the same principle: responsibility for physical readiness remains within the formation.

Conclusion

Physical readiness is a command responsibility that directly drives combat effectiveness. H2F has improved technical proficiency and injury prevention by embedding civilian expertise in formations. Those gains are real, but structure determines whether they endure.

The now defunct MFT program demonstrates that structural alignment and command emphasis, not Soldier capability, determines whether internal fitness programs succeed.

Reliance on civilian execution introduces challenges in continuity, cost, and long-term sustainability that require deliberate mitigation. Execution models must reinforce leader ownership rather than replace it.

A hybrid model provides the most effective path forward. By developing certified Soldiers to plan, execute, and assess physical training while leveraging civilian professionals as mentors and quality control, the Army can preserve technical standards while building internal capability.

This approach strengthens continuity, reduces dependence on external expertise, and reinforces leader development through daily training engagement. Leaders must treat physical readiness as a core responsibility, not a supported function. When they own fitness, readiness becomes sustainable, adaptive, and embedded in the formation. That ownership is what ensures H2F remains effective over time.

---

References

Department of the Army. (2019). Army leadership and the profession (ADP 6-22). https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN42975-ADP_6-22-002-WEB-8.pdf

Department of the Army. (2025). Holistic health and fitness (FM 7-22). https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN44522-FM_7-22-002-WEB-7.pdf

Department of the Army. (2021). Training (FM 7-0). https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN35076-FM_7-0-000-WEB-1.pdf

Department of the Army. (2026, March 19). Army continuing education system (AR 621-5). https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN43979-AR_621-5-000-WEB-1.pdf

Department of the Army. (2025, June 1). Army training and leader development (AR 350-1). https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN44161-AR_350-1-001-WEB-2.pdf

Szymanek, E., Jones, M., Clark, R., Robertson, M., Hatler, B., & Goss, D. (2025). Musculoskeletal care within the holistic health and fitness team: A 12-month retrospective review. Military Medicine, 190(9-10), e1992-e1998. https://doi.org/10.1093/milmed/usaf042

Bio

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the NCO Journal, the U.S. Army, or the U.S. Department of War.

Back to Top