Battlefield Now: Emerging Threats and Technologies

Part 2

By Retired Command Sgt. Maj. Dr. Robert Nelson, Sgt. Maj. Danny Del Castillo, Sgt. Maj. Jorge Rivera, Retired Command Sgt. Maj. Richard Adams, Sgt. Maj. Antonio Pires, Brazilian Army, Sgt. Maj. Daniel Shealy, Sgt. Maj. Lisa Walker

Sergeants Major Academy

Feb. 11, 2026

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The evolution of the modern battlefield, as detailed in part 1 of this two-part series, has been profoundly shaped by rapid advancements in military technology and human augmentation, from autonomous drones to exoskeletons.

While these tools revolutionize kinetic combat, the contemporary operational environment is simultaneously expanding into less tangible but equally decisive domains.

Modern war isn’t waged with steel and firepower alone. The following sections explore a battle of information and perception, from the rise of non-state actors leveraging deepfakes and additive manufacturing to the contested frontiers of space and cyberspace, and the complex ethical questions arising from high-casualty attrition warfare.

Social Media as a Weapon in Modern Global Conflicts

By Sgt. Maj. Danny Del Castillo

Social media has evolved into a potent weapon, enabling state and non-state actors to achieve strategic goals through information warfare, intelligence gathering, strategic influence, and psychological operations (PSYOP) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022).

Russia’s disinformation campaigns, like those used during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and China’s “Three Warfare” strategy in the South China Sea exemplify how platforms like X, TikTok, and WeChat shape narratives and destabilize adversaries (Prier, 2017; Morgan et al., 2021; Cook, 2022).

Intelligence gathering through open-source intelligence (OSINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) routinely exploits social media posts to reveal sensitive military details (Rid & Hecker, 2009; Brennan et al., 2023).

Strategic influence, like in Ukraine’s “Ghost of Kyiv” narrative, boosts morale and garners international support (Walker, 2024; Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2024).

PSYOP campaigns, like Russia’s fake surrender announcements in Ukraine, undermine public will (Katikar, 2024). Countering these threats requires enhanced digital literacy, cybersecurity, and international cooperation to regulate malicious use.

Threats in the Final Frontier: The Space Domain

By Sgt. Maj. Jorge Rivera

The space domain, starting at the Kármán line (where Earth’s atmosphere ends and space begins), has shifted from a secure frontier to a contested environment, entering the “Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Age” (Cooper, 2024; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2023).

It faces threats from satellites and infrastructures in its three highly contested segments: land, link, and space (Department of the Army, 2019b, pp. 1-11, 1-12).

The land segment includes ground infrastructure and personnel; the link segment involves electromagnetic data transmission; and the space segment spans satellites from Low Earth Orbit to Highly Elliptical Orbit (Department of the Army, 2019b).

Space is no longer an uncontested sanctuary. Non-kinetic threats like jamming, spoofing, dazzling, and cyber interference by states like China, Russia, and non-state actors dominate, blurring peace and conflict lines (Cooper, 2024).

China’s 2007 and 2013 ASAT tests, 2024 on-orbit maneuvers, and dual-use satellites highlight its capabilities (Burnham, 2025). Its Aerospace Force and 2050 space leadership plan, including lunar bases with Russia, signal their aggressive military ambitions (Shoeman & Liu, 2024). China further seeks to shape cislunar (the moon) norms for strategic dominance.

As offensive tactics in space evolve, they are likely to parallel those employed in terrestrial conflict, including swarming, direct and indirect attacks, cyber intrusions, jamming, dazzling, spoofing, and signal blocking (Cooper, 2024).

Space threats will mirror terrestrial tactics, requiring land forces to understand space dependencies and capabilities (Cooper, 2024).

Commanders must use center of gravity analysis to target enemy vulnerabilities and protect friendly systems. Training for degraded environments, using analog methods or fiber-optic networks, safeguards resilience in other domains (Epstein, 2025).

In addition, the U.S. must bolster land segment defenses, develop non-kinetic countermeasures, and counter China’s cislunar influence to maintain U.S. space superiority.

The Cyber Domain: Emerging Convergence Challenges on the Modern Battlefield

By Retired Command Sgt. Maj. Richard Adams

The cyber domain is critical for achieving convergence, employing synchronized multi-domain capabilities to target decisive points (Department of the Army, 2025).

Treating Department of Defense (DoD) networks and data as foundational weapon systems enhance decision-making and operational effectiveness (Fogarty, 2023). However, achieving convergence requires concerted planning, coordination, and intelligence integration across all U.S. Armed Forces (Brown, 2025).

Challenges include synchronizing complex operations in dynamic OEs and countering sophisticated cyber threats. Robust cybersecurity measures, such as advanced encryption and anomaly detection, are essential to protect networks.

As adversaries exploit cyber vulnerabilities, joint force collaboration and intelligence-driven operations will be crucial to maintain dominance in the cyber domain.

Intelligence and Targeting Analysis in the Contemporary OE

By Sgt. Maj. Antonio Pires, Brazilian Army

Targeting analysis in the modern OE is increasingly complex due to adversaries’ use of advanced technologies like drones, cyber warfare, and electronic warfare (EW) (Rickli & Mantellassi, 2024).

Intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) drives targeting by creating prioritized target lists, updated continuously to reflect enemy movements (Department of the Army, 2019a). Tools like the CARVER matrix, while effective, are time-consuming and require experienced staff members (Department of the Army, 2019a).

AI enhances targeting efficiency by integrating sensor data and providing near-real-time analysis, surpassing human capabilities (Bhattacharjee, 2023; Fazekas, 2022).

As technology inflates the number of targets, AI-driven solutions are critical to maintain lethality and precision, ensuring U.S. forces can effectively counter sophisticated threats in contested environments.

The Transparent Battlespace

By Sgt. Maj. Daniel Shealy

The modern battlespace is increasingly transparent because of pervasive surveillance and advanced sensor technologies, fundamentally challenging traditional principles of war such as mass and surprise.

In May 2022, Ukrainian forces used drone surveillance to devastating effect, annihilating a Russian motorized battalion attempting a river crossing over the Donets River, destroying more than 70 armored vehicles and causing approximately 500 casualties.

This success stemmed from identifying the target location, enabling precise artillery strikes (Garnier & Neron-Bancel, 2024). The proliferation of diverse sensor systems in conflicts like Ukraine highlights the difficulty of concealing troop movements, rendering tactical surprise nearly obsolete (Garnier & Neron-Bancel, 2024).

Battlefield transparency is amplified by technologies such as commercial space platforms, the Internet of Things (the networking capability allowing information to be sent to and received from objects and devices using the Internet), autonomous systems, and real-time data fusion, making it nearly impossible for large formations to remain undetected (Transparency and Training Command [T2COM], 2024, p. 11).

As a result, “if a target can be seen, it can be killed” (T2COM, 2024, p. 11).

Emerging detection methods, including optical, thermal, electronic, acoustic, and even quantum signatures, further erode concealment capabilities (Antal, 2023).

These advancements threaten offensive and defensive operations survivability, particularly at machine speeds, and challenge the effectiveness of traditional cover, concealment, and stealth measures.

To adapt, the U.S. Army is prioritizing concealment strategies and innovative training. Combat training centers at Fort Irwin, California, and Fort Johnson, Louisiana, are developing scenarios that simulate sensing saturation, encouraging commanders to minimize physical and electronic footprints (Cavallaro, 2024).

Modern Soldiers face multi-dimensional threats, including persistent surveillance, unmanned aerial system attacks, EW, and social media-based influence operations. These challenges demand new approaches to operations security, force protection, and training to ensure survivability in a battlespace where constant observation is the norm (Cavallaro, 2024).

The Ethics of Attrition Warfare

By Sgt. Maj. Lisa Walker

Modern warfare has seen a resurgence of attrition-based conflicts, as in the Russia-Ukraine War, which echoes World War II’s high casualty rates.

In 2024, Russia suffered approximately 434,000 casualties, including 150,000 deaths, equivalent to losing seven to nine U.S. Army divisions (The Guardian, 2025; Feickert, 2025).

Ukraine also endured significant losses, underscoring the scale of modern attrition warfare. Unlike the Global War on Terror (GWOT), where the U.S. benefited from air superiority, rapid medical evacuations, and advanced trauma care, resulting in a case fatality rate of 9.4% from 2001 to 2011, today’s contested battlefields feature sophisticated defenses that hinder timely evacuations (Eastridge et al., 2012).

The Army’s Warrior Ethos, which prioritizes never leaving a fallen comrade behind, was feasible during GWOT because of robust evacuation capabilities. However, high-casualty scenarios in modern conflicts challenge this commitment, as rapid rescues are often impossible.

Military leaders must develop ethical frameworks to navigate these dilemmas, balancing operational priorities with moral obligations. Training programs that build resilience and ethical decision-making skills are essential to prepare Soldiers and commanders for the harsh realities of attrition warfare, ensuring both operational success and adherence to ethical standards.

The multi-domain battlefield is a complex and dynamic OE undergoing a profound transformation driven by rapid advancements in technology, pervasive surveillance, and escalating ethical challenges.

From littoral zones to cyberspace, modern warfare is shaped by disruptive innovations such as autonomous drones, hypersonic aircraft, human augmentation, weaponized social media, and transparent battlespaces.

These developments, coupled with the return of high-casualty attrition warfare, challenge recent traditional military doctrines and ethical frameworks, requiring adaptive strategies, robust countermeasures, and international cooperation to maintain strategic superiority.

Conclusion

The world is complex, and the multidomain battlefield is, and will continue to challenge the Army in ways that have yet to be considered. Our adversaries are weaponizing technology to confront our Army and nation with complex dilemmas and emerging challenges.

However, regardless of the challenges that arise, one thing remains true: NCOs will be deeply involved in overcoming them. Are you ready for the challenge?

Authors’ Note

This article provides a cursory analysis of emerging threats, technologies, and ethical dilemmas, while glossing over their implications across multiple domains and offering insights into how the U.S. will fight both now and in the future. The purpose of this piece is to spark curiosity and encourage NCOs to dig deeper and research some of these topics. The original contributions contained in this project have been significantly summarized. The full submissions may be obtained by emailing the authors directly through the “.army.mil” Global Address List.

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