Reviving Army Amphibious Capabilities in the Indo-Pacific

By Sgt. Maj. Leon P. Nelson

U.S. Army NCO Academy Parks

June 8, 2026

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As tensions escalate across the Indo-Pacific, the threat of conflict looms larger than at any time in recent history. China’s aggressive posture toward Taiwan, its militarization of the South China Sea, and its expanding influence over regional economies and security networks demand a decisive and unified response.

As a result, the U.S. has strengthened its forward presence, conducting major joint exercises like Balikatan with the Philippine military, reinforcing vital logistical hubs such as Guam, and enhancing defense cooperation with Taiwan.

In this rapidly evolving security environment, the U.S. Army’s role must evolve beyond traditional land-centric operations to embrace a critical mission set long neglected — amphibious warfare.

The Army’s contribution to joint maritime operations will be essential for securing U.S. interests, supporting allies, and enabling multi-domain campaigns across contested island-based environments.

Deterrence, and if necessary, victory in the Indo-Pacific will depend on the Army’s ability to apply the hard lessons of the past, refine amphibious capabilities for modern operations, and address current shortfalls through deliberate and urgent force development efforts.

Historical Context

During World War II (WWII), the Army’s development and proficient use of amphibious tactics were crucial to U.S. success in the Pacific and European theaters. Therefore, it’s important for the Army to continue developing the doctrinal requirements and resources for amphibious tactic deployment in multi-domain operations (MDO).

In 58 of 61 amphibious operations conducted by the U.S. during wartime, the U.S. Army engaged in either the assault or support stages (Greenwood, 1993). The U.S. Army and Navy performed 39 major amphibious operations employing a regimental combat team (RCT) or larger element in the Pacific theater.

The last major U.S. Army amphibious operations took place during WWII — during the invasion of Normandy and throughout the Pacific theater — using the “island hopping” concept.

According to Greenwood (1993), when the U.S. and its allies were rethinking plans for the European conflict, the Army realized it needed to fight its way onto the European continent using large-scale amphibious operations before it could decisively confront the German Army.

This strategic outlook led the U.S. War Department to mandate amphibious training for the U.S. Army’s 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions (Greenwood, 1993). Amphibious tactics helped the Army gain a foothold and continue the advance into Germany. These new tactics were successfully used against the Japanese in the Pacific and proved decisive against Nazi Germany.

The Army also turned to the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps for usable tactical doctrine during Pacific operations. Between the world wars, the Marines and Navy developed an amphibious warfare concept centered on an island-hopping naval battle against Japan in the Pacific (Greenwood, 1993).

For the first time since WWII, isolated islands may again become strategic strong points for the U.S. military’s push across the Pacific Ocean in a potential future war with China.

Challenges

Modern amphibious operations demand domain integration. Although Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations provides a foundation, current Army proficiency in amphibious warfare is limited. China’s advancements, including increased air and naval exercises near Taiwan, highlight the urgency for the Army to close capability gaps and enhance joint operational readiness.

Solution

Using doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) to define and address the Army’s amphibious capability gaps will be crucial to its effectiveness in completing its wartime mission in the Indo-Pacific region, and important to resolving the overall operational problem.

Ongoing analysis of DOTMLPF-P principles will help identify critical shortfalls in the Army’s amphibious capabilities prior to a conflict with a near-peer adversary that will likely present complex challenges not seen since WWII.

The Army must doctrinally capture and account for all aspects of MDO affecting maritime operations in a joint operational area (JOA) and be able to nest their operational approach with the joint forces commander (JFC) (Department of Defense, 2022).

Doctrine

U.S. Army doctrine must reflect how resources and joint coordination are used during large-scale maritime operations demanding cooperative U.S. Navy and Army planning efforts to achieve logistical objectives.

Unlike the Marines and Navy, the Army conducts operations with a follow-on objective and requires additional resources to sustain forces in large-scale combat operations (LSCO).

Conducting LSCO in the Indo-Pacific will require the Army to look at reorganizing its force structure to support large troop and equipment movement from one island to the next. It must also revise doctrine to integrate lessons from Balikatan 2025, emphasizing joint interoperability, rapid deployment, and sustained operations in littoral zones, parts of the ocean close to the shore.

Organization

The Army must establish specialized amphibious units capable of operating jointly with naval and air force elements, modeled after historical shore regiments but modernized for today’s threats.

Using an engineer shore regiment of three battalions to operate the near and far shores in WWII proved effective in supporting the U.S. Army’s array of amphibious operations (Greenwood, 1993).

To provide this organic logistical support in today’s amphibious operations will increase effectiveness and relieve the logistical strain it would place on the Navy or Marines.

Establishing a joint services training program for newly structured amphibious units will also increase overall maritime warfare readiness and joint operability.

Training

Establishing an amphibious training center (ATC) will allow U.S. Army units to train with their Navy and Marine counterparts. Joint ATCs in places such as Hawaii, Okinawa, Philippines, and Guam will place joint maritime exercises in the operational environment (OE) in which they must operate and test interoperability.

The Army must expand joint exercises like Balikatan, focusing on amphibious operations, rapid response, and interoperability. Increased training with countries in the Indo-Pacific region will test and advance mutual lines of effort in logistics and future structural development in naval ports that will lead to improved sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

Along with doctrinal refinement and adequate training for future Army amphibious operations, the proper use of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) will identify the materiel needed for warfighting.

Materiel

Developing a materiel solution to the Army’s amphibious tactical shortfalls will require JCIDS, which will help the Army identify current and future requirements and capability shortfalls that assist units in accomplishing their mission (Department of Defense, 2021).

Operating in austere jungle environments while conducting maritime operations in the Indo-Pacific will present new challenges in technology and define how the Army conducts joint operations with U.S. and host nation forces.

Deploying systems like the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) during recent exercises highlights the need for advanced, mobile, and adaptable platforms.

Developing new Army amphibious vehicles for future maritime operations will sustain and move warfighters into tactical areas of operation that will challenge Army leaders to prepare their Soldiers for the next maritime fight.

Leadership and Education

Leadership and education for individual Soldiers and joint leaders will enhance interoperability in a joint OE.

Planning considerations in the joint maritime domain are complex in today’s OE. Joint maritime forces have many variables to consider such as technological advances in communications, intelligence collection systems, improved weapons capabilities, and how multinational forces organize, train, equip, and conduct operations (Department of Defense, 2021).

Success in amphibious operations will require Army leaders to train with their joint counterparts and educate the force on how to operate in unfamiliar OEs and implement complex joint maritime tactics.

Incorporating amphibious warfare modules into the professional military education curriculum ensures leaders at all levels understand the complexities of joint maritime operations.

Personnel

Developing strategic personnel is the key to the Army’s joint amphibious operations success. Assigning logistics personnel to the joint task force will allow the Army to synchronize lines of effort with the Navy and Air Force to provide long-term sustainment through established SLOCs.

Army units, down to the battalion level, must have trained personnel familiar with U.S. Navy, Marine, and Air Force capabilities who can leverage tactical knowledge, resources, and logistics skills to move and sustain Army equipment in a maritime OE.

Joint capability knowledge by planning officers and senior enlisted leaders will encourage facilities to develop in support of training and prepare the Army for future amphibious operations.

Facilities

Existing shore-based infrastructure may not adequately support units afloat and ashore due to increased operational tempo (Joint Chief of Staff, 2021).

Working with host nations and establishing strong diplomatic relations through joint exercises will enable the Army to test and integrate its tactical systems while also addressing infrastructure shortfalls.

Established relationships with foreign countries will allow for port facility improvements that integrate Army prepositioned stock and personnel. Policy development will be tied to doctrinal training, individual Soldier development, and the Army’s need for materiel to support amphibious operations.

Policy

Policy changes made in the national security strategy (NSS), including specific messaging addressing the U.S. security commitment to foreign countries in the Indo-Pacific region, will allow the Army to nest its joint maritime training initiatives with host nation forces.

Once Indo-Pacific theater strategies are refined, the Army can develop new amphibious tactics. Policy changes made at this level will allow combatant commanders to synchronize with partner nations and employ all elements of national power to support the national strategy (Department of Defense, 2022).

With the NSS acting as a deterrent to Chinese aggression in the region, U.S. commitment to its allies will strengthen the Army’s resolve to accomplish the wartime mission and justify funding that supports Army strategic initiatives.

Conclusion

The U.S. Army’s current shortfall in amphibious proficiency presents a significant operational risk in any future potential conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific region. The complex terrain, maritime dispersion, and joint operational nature in this theater demand a renewed focus on Army amphibious capabilities.

Drawing from the hard-earned WWII lessons, the Army must reinvigorate its ability to conduct LSCO in coordination with joint and multinational partners.

By leveraging the DOTMLPF-P framework and investing in doctrinal refinement, force structure, interoperability, and technology, the Army can close critical capability gaps. Enhancing joint training and operational integration will ensure the Army is prepared to execute decisive actions across distributed and contested environments.

Ultimately, regaining amphibious competency is not only about restoring a lost skill set, but also about positioning the Army to succeed in the next multi-domain fight and secure U.S. strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region.

References

Department of the Army. (2021). How the Army runs: A senior leader reference handbook 2021-2022. U.S. Army War College. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021-2022_HTAR.pdf

Department of the Army. (2022). Operations (FM 3-0). https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN43326-FM_3-0-000-WEB-1.pdf

Greenwood, J. T. (1993). The U.S. Army and Amphibious Warfare During World War II. Army History, 27, 1–13. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26304100

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2021). Joint Maritime Operations (JP 3-32). https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_32ch1.pdf

Knighton, A. (2016). Operation Iceberg, the largest amphibious invasion in the Pacific. War History Online. https://www.warhistoryonline.com/featured/operation-iceberg-the-largest-amphibious-invasion-in-the-pacific.html?chrome=1

Schogol, J. (2022). Inside the US military’s modern ‘island hopping’ campaign to take on China. Task and Purpose. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/military-china-taiwan-world-war-ii-pacific

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the NCO Journal, the U.S. Army, or the U.S. Department of War.

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