In the event of an offensive, the Soviets would be faced with the problem of extended lines of communication. The vastness of their territory would be an obstacle, but perhaps they hope to seize the industries of the West intact. The Western powers could probably count more on the population behind the lines for help than could the Soviets.

The Western powers have at their disposal in Europe, at the present time, 25 active divisions, 18 of which are in Germany, for the purpose of forestalling an initial attack by the Soviet. The objective of 25 reserve divisions by the end of 1952 was not realized. The Lisbon conference provided for 96 divisions by 1954 but at the Atlantic Council of December 1952 no objective was established.

A way must be found, using a minimum of forces, to bar the way to the Atlantic to the Soviet after an initial attack until the Western forces can be reinforced progressively. Only power and force can halt Soviet imperialism. The Soviet Union certainly does not desire war as long as it can gain its ends by other means. If these means are not successful, only powerful armed forces will stop it from risking its existence in a world conflict.

The Problem of Civilian Refugees in a European War

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Lieutenant Colonel Oswald Stein, British Army.

This is the second in a series of two articles on this subject. The first article of this series appeared in the February 1953 issue. This part deals with the organization and planning phase.—The Editor.

In the earlier part of this study, the nature of the problem and the general lines of a suggested solution were described. It is now proposed to consider in some detail the organization of a planning team and to draw up a program of work, which should be completed as early as possible.

Organization

The organization of the planning team should be as simple as possible, but plans should be prepared in the minutest detail for the immediate expansion of this team into an executive staff at the moment general mobilization is ordered, or even earlier if it is politically feasible.

It is suggested that the original team should consist of a director, an assistant director (AD), a deputy assistant director (DAD), a stenographer, two general clerks, and a driver and staff car. In the earlier stages of planning, no specialization of duties should be indulged in, but everyone should work on the task of the moment, as allotted by the director; but before long, as the shape of things begins to appear, the duties of the three officers should be somewhat as follows:

Director.—General control and supervision of the work of the team; liaison on policy with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) branches concerned, and with the civil departments and military services of the countries involved; and liaison with voluntary agencies in NATO and other countries in connection with the allocation of resources and personnel.

Assistant director.—Selection of roads (in conjunction with the military authorities); movement control and direction of refugees into selected roads, route dis-
cipline, sign-posting; break-down recovery services; and location of camps. (Note: In the first and last named tasks he will have to consult very closely with the DAD in order to ensure good supply lines.)

Deputy assistant director.—Administration and control of camps, supplies, catering and kitchen services, medical arrangements, and welfare.

Planning

The very first task must obviously be to discover against what possible enemy lines of attack the defense is planning. It is not necessary, or indeed desirable, that the defense plans should be disclosed to the team, nor is it likely that they would be divulged. What must be known, however, is, in the case of each defense plan in existence—what is the location and estimated frontage of assault, what is the likely axis of attack, and what is the expected initial speed of advance, provided such an estimate can be obtained. In addition, it must be known either what roads are to be allotted to refugee movement, or, alternatively, what roads will be forbidden to refugee movement and reserved for military traffic. The latter alternative would be immeasurably the better for our purpose as affording some latitude in the choice of routes.

Having extracted this information, it will be first desirable to estimate the approximate number of refugees likely to be encountered on each line of enemy advance. This will probably best be done by consulting maps, population figures, and other vital statistics. It will then be necessary to start the reconnaissance of the available routes for each plan. At this stage, the various reconnaissances should be made as far as possible by all three officers jointly, in order to get a general idea of the lie of the land and to enable each one to point out his own particular problems. For instance, while the AD would presumably choose reasonably wide, well-surfaced roads, as free as possible from steep gradients, narrow defiles, or precipitous drops on either side, the DAD would be concerned to ensure suitable staging camp sites at appropriate intervals and situated conveniently for access to supply and POL dumps. It is particularly advisable to avoid roads separated from these latter points by main military routes, because the greatest flow of refugees is likely to be coincident with the peak military traffic, and camps might easily be cut off from their supplies.

Another point to be decided during these preliminary surveys is at what point on the selected road will controlled refugee traffic commence. This will be mainly governed by the existence and location of lateral "feeder" roads, by means of which the refugees can be shepherded on to the selected route.

From now on each officer will work on his own problems, while, of course, keeping in close contact with his colleagues. The director must consult the various military authorities concerned to discover what assistance in skilled and unskilled personnel and in material resources he may expect from army sources. This in itself will be no mean task, and will probably involve approaches to the war departments of each NATO country. Having then roughly assessed his deficiencies, appeals will have to be made to the various appropriate voluntary bodies in each country involved and, as stated above, in neutral countries as well. A point to be borne in mind is that, when being promised key personnel, every endeavor should be made to get names actually selected as well as a mere promise of the requisite numbers. This is really essential for prior training and for eventual smooth mobilization. In the same way, the director should try his hardest to ensure that important items of equipment are actually allocated and labeled in storage with their function.
and destination recorded for each defense plan.
Meanwhile, the assistant director will be choosing the location of his various control and recovery posts and staging camps, and calculating the number of police and other personnel whom he will require for each plan. Similarly, the DAD will be working on the lay-out and equipment of his camps, and deciding on the numbers of personnel and amounts of supplies and equipment that will be necessary. He will also have to draw up his supply plans. Both the AD and DAD must bear in mind the necessity for arranging for the accommodation, feeding, and administration of their own employed personnel as well as that of refugees.

When the plans are finally drafted, the time will have arrived for fitting, as far as possible, actual persons, units, items of equipment and supplies from various storage places to specific tasks and locations under each plan. If possible, personnel should be available for training in advance, and dumps and storage places established in places convenient for use under all plans.

The final aim must be that everything is so laid on and organized that on receipt of the order “Put Plan X into operation,” every letter, telegram or telephone message is ready to go out, and every man knows exactly what he has to do.

Once planning has reached this stage for all likely lines of enemy attack, thought can be given to the organization of base camps and dispersal areas, and to the question of welfare, education, rehabilitation, and utilization of labor; but for these problems time should be available even after the initial assault.

One warning, however, must never be forgotten. In the event of an enemy breakthrough, even if only a temporary one, the enemy may well be pounding down the road on the heels of the refugees. Therefore all plans must be flexible, and all camps and installations as mobile as possible.

Trends in Winter Warfare

Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Captain S. Ahnfelt in “Ny Militär Tidskrift” (Sweden) No. 3, 1953.

While the defender, in times past, was apprised by enemy fire that an attack was about to occur, he will, in the future come to perceive nothing, but will remain in the dark until the moment when the tanks erupt into his position. Surprise, which has been of little significance as long as mobility did not keep pace with fire power, now is resuming its old and dominant place in the art of war. — Charles de Gaulle in “Vers l’armée de métier,” 1934.

It may be considered as universally known that the great Finnish marches in the battles between Lake Ladoga and the Arctic Ocean in the winter of 1939-40, were due, among other things, to the mobility and cross-country capabilities in deep snow, and extremely low temperatures of the Finnish units. The Soviet superiority in point of numbers and fire power, never found its full expression. The lack of ski troops and of vehicles capable of traveling in deep snow, and lack of snow plows, compelled the Soviets to operate close to the existing road network.

Finnish Shortages

The winter war revealed a few differences from the general picture which are noteworthy. The Finnish units suffered from lack of skis and sleighs. When General Hägglund with the IV Army Corps began his encirclement operations just north of Lake Ladoga in December 1939, there was lacking in some of the Corps’