

day for Wednesday the 8th. The signals designated were "Dantzig" (attack) or "Augsburg" (wait). On the 7th, Hitler prepared to leave for the front. But the meteorologist said the weather was uncertain. Hitler then notified the armies that he would make his decision before midnight of the 8th. He was very nervous, Jodl tells us. This new delay exasperated Hitler. He feared that the plans would be divulged by the Italian press.

On the 8th, alarming news came from Holland. Leaves were suspended, evacuations ordered, barricades erected, and mobilization measures taken. The OKW wondered whether Holland was carrying on secret negotiations with England. In the meantime, the meteorologist reported a progressive improvement in weather conditions, predicting cloudy skies, however, for a few days. Hitler was greatly agitated. He did not wish to wait any longer. Goering asked Hitler to postpone the attack until the 10th. Keitel insisted on an immediate attack, but Goering finally won out. Hitler agreed—though against his will, he said—to postpone the attack until the 10th, "but not one day longer."

On the morning of the 9th, Hitler de-

ecided that he would be at the front on the 10th. He left at 1700 in the afternoon and received, while en route, the forecasts of the meteorological section, which predicted favorable weather for the following day. At 2100, therefore, Hitler issued the signal, "Dantzig."

It was still night when Hitler's special train arrived at Euskirchen, where the first reports reached him of the success of the initial attacks. At 0520, he was at Felsenest, temporary command post of the supreme chief of the German armies. The alert of the Western Front, decreed in October 1939, had ended with the twelfth of Hitler's attack decisions.

The attack and the maneuver conformed to the rapid and jerky style characteristic of Hitler. It was preceded by bluffs, feints, and deceptive propaganda. For 8 months, Hitler had railed against the weather and other circumstances. One thing is evident: the attack started just as soon as the German tanks were able to move over the terrain. Should we, then, subject Hitler's personal acts to the analysis of the psychiatrist? This self-made man, who bore the marks of mental unbalance, was probably only a conformist.

Two Years of Pakistan Independence

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Major A. J. Wilson in "The Army Quarterly" (Great Britain) October 1949.

THE Dominion of Pakistan began its career as an independent nation on 15 August 1947, beset by great difficulties. There was no established capital nor armed forces headquarters; of the five provinces, two (West Punjab and East Bengal) were in the throes of partition, while the civil servants and service officers required to establish the new nation were scattered all over the sub-continent, many of them still employed in the appointments which they were holding in pre-partition India. To

add to these problems, the holocaust of communal violence which swept the Punjab in September 1947 led to a movement of populations on a scale unprecedented in history, thus facing the country with the task of absorbing and resettling several millions of homeless and utterly helpless refugees.

The story of the first 2 years of Pakistan's national existence has consequently been one of transition from threatened anarchy and chaos to steady development

towards relatively balanced and stable conditions. It would be over-optimistic to maintain that full stability has as yet been achieved. It is, however, undeniable that the progress made has been remarkable, reflecting credit not only on the ministers and administrators responsible, but also on the people of the country as a whole. For perhaps the most striking feature in these first 2 years has been its essential patriotism and unity. This was expressed at first in a deep almost religious devotion to the person of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, coupled with a blind faith in his ability to steer the nation through her initial difficulties with the same unswerving determination he had shown in bringing into being the conception of the state of Pakistan. Since his death on 12 September 1948, these personal feelings have developed progressively into a strong patriotism and sober determination to ensure the national future.

The death of Jinnah has not, as was feared, been a disruptive factor. It has, in fact, tended to draw closer together different elements in the nation. With the help of this popular resolution to establish the country on stable and sound lines, more progress has been made in the civil field than seemed even remotely possible at the end of 1947. The refugee problem, for example, has been largely solved by a resettlement scheme in Upper Sind, distinguished for the administrative skill with which a huge movement program from the West Punjab was conceived and executed.

The central budget, despite heavy calls on it for defense expenditure, has been balanced for 2 successive years; there is a satisfactory balance of payments in overseas trade; plans have been made to provide the necessary electric power, which is required as a first step to any large scale industrialization—these and many other successes stand to the credit of the government. The progress made in the civil field cannot be overlooked in making

any estimate of Pakistan's present strength as a bulwark against the spread of communism into the Indian Ocean area.

Military Situation

In the military sphere, one of the most significant events has been the complete reversal of the Northwest Frontier policy initiated by the old government of India with the occupation of Waziristan in 1924. Shortly after partition, the government of Pakistan decided that the continued occupation of Waziristan would be a strain on the financial resources of the Dominion, which was no longer justified by necessity. It was felt that the tribesmen would not feel the same hostility towards Pakistan as in the past towards the British, since Pakistan would itself be an Islamic state.

Accordingly, in December 1947, Operation *Curzon* was carried out, after which no regular troops remained in Waziristan, the task of maintaining order being left to the political authorities and the Scouts. This policy has so far been justified by events and the frontier has been quieter than at any time in its history. Since the summer of 1948, there has been occasional apprehension but no incident requiring the intervention of the Army.

A recent attempt by the Afghan government to draw the attention of their people away from the serious conditions obtaining inside their own country by attempting to raise again the cry of "Pathanistan" has met with little success. The tribesman has no wish to jeopardize the continued receipt of the subsidies paid by Pakistan to the tribal areas (the same as under British rule) by rash flirtations with the Afghans. The fact that the subsidies paid by Pakistan exceed the total Afghan national income has not escaped the attention of the *Malikis*, whose intelligence in matters of this nature should not be underestimated. In terms of actual force, there is no comparison between the two nations—a fact well understood by the

Pathan, a practical warrior, whose existence has for so long depended on his ability to make military appreciations.

Another factor which has combined with the withdrawal from Waziristan greatly to increase the striking power of the Army has been the absence of the need to employ troops in support of the civil power. The almost complete evacuation of the Hindu and Sikh minority from the Northwest Frontier and West Punjab has meant that communal trouble, except for one "flare up" in Karachi in January 1948 quickly brought under control, has become a thing of the past. It has consequently been possible to organize and train the Army in mobile formations poised and disposed for active operations. The old district and sub-area headquarters, except for three lines of communication sub-areas designed to free formation commanders from details of local administration, have thus disappeared, leaving behind an Army far less static in outlook than the pre-1939 army in India, inevitably preoccupied as it was with problems of local administration and internal security.

The Kashmir operations and the regretably troubled relations with the sister Dominion of India have resulted in high military expenditure and entailed a considerable increase in the size of the armed forces. While it is too early yet to attempt an estimate of the final result of this enforced expansion, the ultimate effort cannot be expected to be wholly satisfactory. There is, of course, no lack of suitable military manpower in the country; the available resources of officer material are, however, very limited, and there is practically no reserve. Consequently, the production in war of adequate officer replacements for these expanded forces would present great difficulties. It follows that improved relations with India are essential, both in order to cut down expenditure on defense and so that integrated and bal-

anced Indo-Pakistan armed forces, capable of ensuring the security of India as a whole, can be developed. The sub-continent, despite its political partition, remains a geographical and strategic whole and cannot be defended satisfactorily in the absence of cooperation between its two component parts.

Relations with Britain

Pakistan's relations with Britain and with the Commonwealth as a whole are matters of considerable moment and are at present broadly satisfactory. It cannot be denied that at the outset there existed in certain quarters a feeling of bitterness towards Britain as a result of the breakneck speed with which the decision to partition India was executed. The haste, both in the transfer of power itself and the division of military assets, undoubtedly benefited India at the expense of Pakistan, since the former possessed an established capital and administrative organization, while the majority of service installations were located in her territory. There were unquestionably sound reasons for the speed with which Lord Mountbatten decided to act. It was perhaps inevitable, however, that those Pakistanis who suffered severely in the troubles of the autumn of 1947 should see only the unfortunate consequences to themselves and their country. Feelings of this sort have now largely died down, and there is among many Pakistanis a genuine desire for continued friendship and association with Britain.

Summary

Pakistan's prospects are relatively bright. That there are still many difficulties to overcome, no Pakistani would deny. It is essential to obtain a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute which will satisfy the people of that unhappy state and leave no room for recurring bitterness between India and Pakistan. The standard of living of the ordinary man must be raised

if the country is to play its full part in checking the spread of Soviet ideas and propaganda. While there is at present little overt communism, such doctrines could easily come across the frontier from either India or Burma and any undue complacency would be dangerous. The civil administration must be greatly improved, the political life of the country purified and its basis broadened, and a proper educational system introduced—all these and many other problems call urgently for solution.

The country has many assets—a virile and patriotic people, in normal years an exportable food surplus, a large proportion of the world's jute, and relatively stable conditions for further development. Given normal times and settled world con-

ditions, she could with reason anticipate an assured and prosperous future. Situated, however, at the crossroads between East and West and with neighboring states whose stability is less certain than her own, Pakistan's main preoccupation at present is to ensure her own security and integrity. Whatever her ultimate constitutional position, it is probable that she will find it convenient to be closely associated in this task with Britain and other Commonwealth countries. Certainly all who have served in Northern India will congratulate the new nation of Pakistan on the courage and determination she has displayed in the first 2 years of her independence, and they will wish her well in facing the trials and troubles that lie ahead.

German Close-Support Aviation at Night

Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Lieutenant H. H. Külle, of the former German Luftwaffe, in "Flugwehr und -Technik" (Switzerland) October 1949.

DURING World War II, it was shown that the available heavy night-bombing and night-fighter formations of the German Air Force were not capable of fulfilling their desired missions. Particularly lacking were measures in the immediate vicinity of the front that could make it difficult for the Allies to move supplies forward and organize assembly positions during hours of darkness. Although German long-range artillery was adequate for this purpose in many cases, combat situations often arose in which visual observation could not be used in determining targets.

In 1943, fast combat formations were developed for use in those combat areas where there were strong Allied ground and air defenses. Since the Allies' defenses, especially in the vicinity of the British Isles, progressively stiffened as the War progressed, the German Air Force was forced to place more and more emphasis on

these fast combat formations. This was the case, too, with the fast fighter wings equipped with *FW-190s* and *Me-410s*, which were the only planes capable of attacking the London areas during the months preceding the invasion. The employment of large formations led to such heavy losses at this time that their employment was progressively restricted.

With the beginning of the Allied invasion of Europe, the operational area of the German fast-fighter formations was more and more confined to the immediate front and to attacking naval targets. Their mission became increasingly that of night combat. Allied ground targets in close proximity to the front were attacked by day in very bad weather and by night in almost all kinds of weather. The rapid-fighter formations thus became night-fighter formations, and their strength was increased. In addition to night-fighter for-