Introduction

Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, activity in Eastern Ukraine, saber rattling regarding the Baltics, deployment to Syria, and generally more assertive behavior is often described in the West as “hybrid warfare” or “Russian New Generation Warfare.” Whatever the Russians are doing, and for whatever reasons, it is probably accurate to say that this assertive behavior is simply a Russian application of the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to further Russia’s perceived national interests in the context of the current operating environment. The Russians do not see the current conflict with the United States as primarily a military problem, but instead see the military as a component of the solution. In Russia, strategy is determined at the National Security Council, chaired by President Putin, which consists of various members from the civilian leadership, intelligence/security services, and Ministry of Defense. The Chief of the General Staff is typically always a member, thereby bridging strategy (formed in the council) to operational art (designed and implemented in the Armed Forces).

Since some of Russia’s current ambitions (e.g., maintaining frozen conflicts, destabilizing neighbors, breaking apart NATO, and changing the current balance of European security) are counter to U.S. national interests, these ambitions will likely require a U.S. and Western application of the instruments of national power to counter. Arguably, the U.S. military, especially at echelons corps and below, has little or no control of the diplomatic, informational, and economic facets, as these aspects are often in the purview of our interagency colleagues (e.g., the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury). Therefore, we as military professionals must focus our attention on the military aspect of this effort; namely winning our Nation’s wars.

Although there has been much written about Russia’s application of the instruments of national power, little has been written specifically about what S-2/G-2 staffs should know, and how they should prepare, if military conflict does occur with Russia. The following 11 recommendations provide actionable suggestions for S-2 and G-2 staffs to assist with understanding a potential adversary that we have given little consideration, until relatively recently. I have been interested in the Russian military for over twenty years and have had some experience in both working with and studying the Russian and other post-Soviet militaries. My understanding of what is generally unknown or misunderstood about the Russian Armed Forces by U.S. Army Soldiers, who have been focused on military operations other than war for the last fifteen years, are the basis for these recommendations. All recommendations are solely my opinion, and are by no means authoritative.

Be Aware That the Russian and U.S. Army Military Decision-Making Systems Differ Greatly

In the U.S. Army system, the staff uses direction and guidance from the commander to study the situation and develop courses of action for the commander’s review and approval. In the Russian system, the commander, not the staff, develops the course of action. This difference in planning is very significant, and several aspects of this difference will be explained in detail, but the take-away is that due to this different military decision-making process S-2s should be aware that Russians might develop radically different courses of action than a Western staff would anticipate.

Know That Russians Do Not Think in Terms of Warfighting Functions

Since the Russians use a much different military decision-making process than used in the West, applying the Western concept of warfighting functions (i.e., movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence, sustainment, mission command, and protection) to their tactics and operations is difficult at best. The Russians do not use their staffs to develop “effects-centric” plans based upon the warfighting functions.
Instead, the commander simply considers what capabilities his various troops possess (e.g., motorized rifle, artillery, or electronic warfare), and orders what capabilities he wants, and how he wants them applied. This difference in thinking illustrates how an S-2 cannot simply “put on their red hat” and reasonably expect to ascertain the decisions of their Russian counterparts.²

**Study Doctrinal Templates to Understand Russian Tactics**

In the Russian view, the best military decision-making system should not involve an in-depth staff planning process, but should be a system where the commander has situational understanding and rapidly issues orders to perform standard tactics and/or battle drills adjusted for the enemy, terrain, etc., to influence the outcome of the battle. Russians have developed this system due to previous experience with high-intensity maneuver warfare in the Second World War and beliefs about how to best conduct warfare during the Cold War. The Russian personnel system, which has competent enlisted professionals, but no non-commissioned officer corps (in the Western sense), is designed to complement this system of decision making. In practice, the Russian system of decision making requires a somewhat rigid system of tactics. Russian tactics at battalion level and below can best be described as battle drills that are standardized for Ground Forces, Naval Infantry, and Airborne (VDV) units. In an academic environment, officers study these various tactics (doctrinal templates or DOCTEMPs), their historical employment, and how they should be adjusted for operational variables (situational templates or SITTEMPS). These tactics are then repetitively rehearsal in the field, and explain why brigade and battalion-level staffs are substantially smaller than Western equivalents. In short, a Russian commander prefers to execute a previously rehearsed mission that fulfills the mission requirements adequately, than attempting to plan and execute a custom designed mission that fulfills the mission perfectly.⁵

Intelligence professionals have had little experience with doctrinal templates for the last fifteen or so years. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS, insurgents, and criminal gangs have
no formalized doctrinal templates, and so a warfighting function model has been applied to better anticipate their actions. In order to understand Russian tactics, threat/adversary overlays (DOCTEMPs and their operational employment [SITTEMPS]) should be studied. This is not to suggest we should abandon what we have learned in the last 15 years. As can be seen in the Ukraine and Syria, Russians are operating in conjunction with entities the United States has labeled terrorists (e.g., Hezbollah), insurgents (e.g., Ukrainian separatists), and even other state actors (e.g., Iran and Syria). It is clear that Russia does not have direct control of these entities, and their ways of fighting are better understood by applying a warfighting function methodology, or may even require new DOCTEMPs in the case of the state actors. Unfortunately, it is a complex environment, and applying both traditional doctrinal templates and warfighting function based methodologies may be required to adequately predict the actions of the various actors on the modern battlefield.

Figure 3. Approximation of the Differences in Thinking Regarding Warfighting Functions.

Do Not Confuse the Way the Russians Fight With the Way the Opposing Force Fights

Intelligence professionals should be careful not to confuse the way the Russians fight with the way the opposing force (OPFOR) fights, as described in the TC 7-100 series of manuals. The OPFOR may have similar tables of organization and equipment as Russian units, but the previously described differences in military decision-making process, concept of warfighting functions, and use of doctrinal templates make the adversary faced in the decisive action training environment and the adversary that could be faced in Eastern Europe, very different. The OPFOR is designed to test all command-desired mission essential task list elements within a constricted timeframe. It does not mimic a particular military or country, but is an amalgam of practices from around the planet. Intelligence professionals should be prepared to fight the OPFOR in training environments, but must be prepared to fight the Russians in the field.

Open and Regularly Use an Open Source Enterprise Account

Military activities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels are often discussed in the Russian mainstream media, and in Russian military academic and trade journals. Contrary to popular belief, the Russians are remarkably open about these activities. New equipment and tactics are often proposed, explained, and debated in the open media long before they reach an initial operational capability. Unlike the United States, the Russians often trumpet the development of new capabilities, with the notable exception of capabilities that could be construed as being in violation of existing treaties. Arguably, the Russians even have a tendency to exaggerate the capabilities and fielding timelines of new equipment. Fortunately, an S-2 does not need to be a Russian linguist, or even spend a lot of time to ac-
cess much of this information. The Open Source Enterprise, formerly known as the Open Source Center and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, translates Russian open source media to include newspaper articles, militarily relevant websites, military journals, and certain grey literature articles (trade show brochures about military equipment). Although the Open Source Enterprise does not have the resources to translate all materials, they do an excellent job of selecting the most relevant materials to the military and intelligence communities. These selections can range from organizational reforms to squad level tactics. This information, when fused with trusted information of higher classifications, can provide background and context to allow an S-2 to more accurately not only answer the “what” questions, but also the inherently more difficult “why” questions.

**Be Cautious With the Term “Near Peer”**

The term “near peer” is now often used to describe Russia as a military adversary comparable to the United States. Although the United States does dwarf the Russian military in almost all metrics, this fact is not particularly relevant concerning likely scenarios where Russia and the United States engage in conflict. This is because the United States and Russian militaries are fundamentally very different. While the U.S. military has a worldwide presence and can project combat power throughout the globe, the Russian military primarily operates within the country’s borders and is not well structured for expeditionary activities. The crux of the problem is that the majority of Russian combat power is near areas where Russia and the United States would likely engage, while the United States has comparatively few assets in these areas. The United States would have to deploy and sustain large forces from thousands of miles away, while the Russians would enjoy operating near their borders and in countries of the former Soviet Union that have robust rail and pipe systems that the Russian military could readily use.

At the strategic level, population totals and capabilities are seriously considered. The ability of the Soviets to reconstitute and field new armies much faster than Nazi Germany was a major contributing factor to the Soviets eventually routing the Nazis. The Russian Federation is not the Soviet Union, and undoubtedly, Russian strategists have postulated that the Russian Federation would be at an almost insurmountable disadvantage against the larger and more economically powerful United States in any long war scenario, especially if NATO were involved. Due to this situation, it is likely that Russia will pursue relatively moderate military objectives (probably not operating much outside the borders of the former Soviet Union), and will not attempt to destroy all United States/NATO forces, just enough to force favor-

able terms. In short, a “winnable” conflict for Russia with the United States/NATO likely involves an exceptionally violent but relatively short conflict (i.e., days, weeks, months). A long conflict is not in the Russian’s favor. Intelligence professionals must be able to accurately describe the scope of the threat as it applies to their commanders.

**Do Not Assume the Russians Will Fight a Peer as They Fight in the Ukraine and Syria**

Most recent studies of Russian tactics have focused on Russian actions in the Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Syria. It is true that Russia is using the Ukraine and Syria to test new equipment and tactics, and their use should be studied. However, just because the Russians apply certain tactics and techniques in one situation does not mean they will do the same thing in another. General Valeriy Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, paraphrases the prominent Russian strategist Major General Alexander Svechin about this situation, “Each war represents an isolated case, requiring an understanding of its own particular logic, its own unique character.” This suggests that Russians would not fight a peer as they fight a lesser adversary. While there has been much discussion in the West about the hybrid threat (criminal gangs, terrorists, insurgents, etc.) and battalion tactical groups (BTGs) there has been little examination of how Russia executes combined arms brigade and division-level operations.

Although the BTG is the instrument of choice for Russian force projection in Eastern Ukraine, the Russians make it very clear that they favor a combination of divisions and brigades as essential for technologically advanced peer-to-peer combat. Given Russian views, policies and laws on rapid reaction forces, personnel staffing levels, prohibitions on the use of conscripts, and past performance, a general idea of a Russian mobilization and deployment to counter a hostile force can be described. During pre-mobilization, conscription tours would be extended to help flesh out units with lower levels of readiness. The first units to deploy would be the rapid reaction forces, the Russian Airborne (VDV), Naval Infantry, and high readiness conventional units, which would deploy en masse to deter or slow the enemy. Individual BTGs from lower level readiness units may deploy to support the efforts of the rapid reaction forces, or they may wait for their parent brigade or division to come to full strength through the reserve mobilization and then deploy to the front. Meanwhile, the strategic reserve would be called to replace losses at the front and reconstitute units in the rear. Russia appears to be developing a scalable and affordable mobilization capability that balances light and mobile rapid reaction forces, combat ready
elements—BTGs—in all maneuver units, lower readiness brigades and divisions, and an operational and strategic reserve. Intelligence professionals must be able to prioritize threats in relation to these capabilities. Criminal gangs, terrorists, and insurgents may be able to prevent a commander from achieving their objective(s), but these entities generally cannot destroy brigades. This is not the case with the fires-heavy Russian conventional forces. Therefore, S-2s should not fixate on how Russia has fought in the Ukraine and Syria against lesser opponents, but should instead focus on formations and capabilities the Russians are developing, and how these entities are being used in training to fight peer-level adversaries.

**Be Prepared to Fight in Nuclear or Nuclear Threatened Conditions**

Russia is very critical of the role the United States plays in the global order, and is challenging the United States through various multilateral and unilateral means. Russia believes that her most important means of resisting this perceived U.S. hegemony is through the strategic deterrence that her nuclear weapons provide. Russia’s theory of global deterrence is based upon the premise that the threat of a mass employment of primarily strategic nuclear forces will cause such an amount of damage to an aggressor’s military and economic potential that the cost of the endeavor will be unacceptable to the aggressor. In a similar fashion, Russia’s theory of regional deterrence is based upon the premise that the threat of a mass employment of nonstrategic nuclear forces and/or strategic nonnuclear forces against an aggressor’s assault force or economy will be sufficient to deter any aggression. Russia believes these deterrence capabilities are essential, due to the United States’ well-refined ability to conduct actions during the “initial period of war”—a reference to how the United States has used air power to shape operations by destroying enemy command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Clearly, the Russians see a need to retain an up-to-date nuclear force, and train for nuclear war. Russian force modernization includes a rigorous program to modernize and improve tactical, operational, and strategic nuclear weapons and their associated delivery systems. Nuclear, biological, and chemical defense units are well-equipped and an integral part of maneuver brigades. Russian wargames and major field exercises frequently include nuclear strikes and their aftermath, and unlike in the United States, tactical nuclear strikes happen in the middle of Russian wargames, not at the end. Intelligence professionals must advise commanders and staffs of Russian views regarding fighting in nuclear or nuclear threatened conditions. Russians dislike the idea of full-scale nuclear war as much as we do, but using tactical nuclear strikes or threatening nuclear war is seen as legitimate if it fulfills national objectives that would otherwise not be accomplished. Commanders must know that Russian nuclear weapons and the threat of their use will likely prevent many courses of action.

Figure 5. Russian Depiction of a Tactical Nuclear Strike on a Reserve.
Become accustomed to disabled or degraded global positioning system navigation and communications

One area that Russian Ground Forces are significantly ahead of the U.S. Army is electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. This is no accident; the Russian military is very impressed with the U.S. capability to perform precision strikes and fears how this capability could be used against them. In addition, the Russians are keenly aware that U.S. maneuver brigades have literally thousands of pieces of gear that are dependent upon precision navigation and timing that is serviced through the global positioning system (GPS). In order to counter the U.S.’s precision strike capability and target a perceived general dependency upon GPS and satellite communications (SATCOM) technologies, the Russians have invested heavily in EW. In practice, the Russian Ground Forces, and to a lesser extent Airborne (VDV) and Naval Infantry, have dedicated EW companies, battalions, and brigades. (The Russian Ground Forces even appear to be EW’s main proponent in the Russian Armed Forces.) While the EW brigades are capable of fulfilling operational and strategic objectives, each Russian maneuver brigade has a dedicated EW company with tactical capabilities. On order, these EW companies are capable of jamming communications (R-934B/R-378B/ R-330B Mandat/Borisoglebsk-2), interfering with radio controlled artillery fuses (SPR-2 Rtut), and jamming GPS and SATCOM signals that are essential for precision weapons (R-330ZH Zhitel/Borisoglebsk-2). In addition to the dedicated EW units, EW capabilities are often incorporated into other assets, such as unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) and as payloads on multiple rocket launcher system projectiles.

The Russians believe that if there is conflict with a peer, no party will have access to satellite navigation. Hence, Russia is developing UAS navigation systems based upon terrain recognition technologies, still fielding inertial navigation systems on short-range ballistic missiles and ground launched cruise missiles, and is maintaining the ability to deploy massed fires instead of relying on precision strikes. Intelligence professionals must prepare for degraded communications with their collection assets, and prepare PACE (primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency) plans, as appropriate. In addition, they must be aware of Russian EW capabilities and be able to communicate this threat to their commanders and the relevant subject matter experts on the staff (e.g., S-6, electronic warfare specialists, and space cadre) and advise them that the Russian capability to degrade or prevent GPS usage will likely significantly slow operational tempos.

Be aware that Russian elite units are not necessarily special operations forces

In the West, the terms “spetsnaz” and “special operations” are used synonymously. In Russia, these terms are related but different terms. The word spetsnaz [спецназ] is a Russian abbreviation of the words spetsialnovo naznacheniya [специального назначения], a term which can roughly be translated as “special designation” referring to troops with a special purpose. The word “special” is used in a very broad way that can indicate that the unit has a very narrow area of specialization, such as signals intelligence, engineering, reconnaissance, etc.; or the unit is experimental or temporary in nature; or the unit conducts tasks of special importance such as sensitive political or clandestine operations. This broad usage of the term means that “spetsnaz” cannot be thought of as equating to the Western concept of special operation forces (SOF).

Perhaps the biggest difference between American/Western SOF and Russian Spetsnaz, referring specifically to personnel serving in the GRU Spetsnaz brigades, is the perception of these forces as elites. In the United States, SOF have the highest prestige, and are considered the crème de la crème of trigger pullers. This is in marked contrast to the Russian system, where the true elite “trigger pullers” are members of the Russian Airborne (VDV). One of the best examples of how Russia values these units is in terms of manning. In the Russian system, units are manned with a
combination of officers, contract soldiers, and conscripts. The more elite the unit, the higher percentage of contract personnel compared to conscripts. Currently, the Russian VDV is manned with approximately 80 percent contract personnel; a far higher percentage than the GRU Spetnaz. Intelligence professionals must be able to explain to their commanders how very different the Russian spetsnaz system is, and how Russian elite (and sometimes not-so-elite) conventional units often perform many missions that we would only entrust SOF units to perform.

**Know That the Russians Are Well Suited to Operations in the “Grey Zone”**

Due to the Russian Federation’s Tsarist/Soviet past, Russia, and by inheritance the Russian military, has developed a nuanced view towards corruption, which makes its eradication difficult. In the Russian system, personal connections and loyalties often trump institutional governance. The Russian military justice system has been amended to allow some crimes that once required dismissal from service to now allow lesser punishments. (There was a concern that the previous regulation was weeding out too many good officers with some ethical problems.) In general, due to historical reasons, Russians do not always clearly discern the differences between legally and morally right. These two concepts are very different in the West, but in Russia, whatever is considered “morally right” is usually interpreted to be “legally right.” This can be seen in state asset seizures of wealthy oligarchs’ property, the annexation of the Crimea, and the conduct of an undeclared war in Eastern Ukraine (in order to destabilize the Ukrainian government, a government which Russia perceives to be illegitimate and installed by the United States). Furthermore, there is no staff judge advocate advising the commander, or legislative oversight in the Russian system. Russian commanders interpret the law and make decisions as they see fit, and are seldom criticized when successful. In sum, the tendency is to interpret morally right as legally right, and the Russian legal system makes the Russian Armed Forces, intelligence, and security services well suited to operating in the ambiguous “Grey Zone” where many operations will occur. Russian commanders are not as constrained as their American counterparts are.

**Conclusion**

Russia is an important power with modernized Armed Forces and nuclear arsenal. Intelligence professionals should avoid mirror-imaging Russian thinking, warfighting, and desired end states. Given the significance of Russia, intelligence professionals need to understand how a resurgent Russia is asserting itself through Russian New Generation Warfare, or through the application of the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Specifically, military professionals should focus on the military aspect and understand how Russian capabilities and differences in warfighting will affect them and their commanders. Commanders must also know that the Russian military is planning to fight a peer adversary in a much different way than we are currently observing the Russians fight in Eastern Ukraine and Syria.

Intelligence professionals will add great value to their units by working diligently at two things. First, understanding the difference between the counterinsurgency the United States has fought over the last 15 years and the direct action peer versus peer fight a conflict with Russia would entail, and second, by becoming knowledgeable about the Russian way of war. Fortunately, many resources can be queried. The National Ground Intelligence Center produces a variety of vetted and in-depth intelligence products that provide not only detailed order of battle information, but also a systemic understanding of how the Russian Ground Forces operate. Theater-level organizations, such as the U.S. Army Europe G-2 and the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade also have a wealth of useful knowledge. The Defense Intelligence Agency creates a variety of products concerning critical infrastructure and transportation networks vital to the understanding of logistical support. Although not intelligence organizations, the Center for Army Lessons Learned and Asymmetric Warfare Group do periodically produce Russia related reports. Perhaps some of the best resources can be found via open sources. As previously mentioned, the Open Source Enterprise should be the first stop to find translated open source information. For S-2s interested in the specifics of Russian tactics, the journal Army Digest [Армейский Сборник] is recommended. Army Digest provides a wealth of information about current and proposed tactics and capabilities on a monthly basis. For those interested in Russian operational art, the book *Strategy*, by General Alexander Svechin is recommended. Despite the title and being written in the 1930s, *Strategy* is often quoted by the Russian military and is the cornerstone of current Russian military thinking about contemporary operational doctrine and how it would be applied in any confrontation with the West. Finally, the Foreign Military Studies Office does translate and provide analysis of various Russian tactical sources for publication as publicly available articles and books.

**Endnotes**

2. Grau and Bartles, 55-56.
4. This approximation of the Russian military decision-making process is in no way “Russian doctrine,” and is only intended to illustrate the differences between the Russian decision-making process and the U.S. Army process described in ADRP 5-0.
5. Ibid, 51.

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