

Perceptions and Courses of Actions toward Iran

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TAKE THIS QUICK QUIZ: In which Islamic theocracy were there immediate and repeated public outpourings of sympathy for Americans following the 9/11 attacks in 2001? If you did not know about the several candlelight vigils in Iran, you are not alone. In fact, few Americans know that hundreds of Iranians gathered publicly to pay their respects and to show their solidarity with the American people, first on 13 September, then in two other vigils. The crowds chanted “Death to terrorism!” “Death to Bin Laden!” and, “America: condolences, condolences!” Three days after the attacks, a moment of silence for the American tragedy was held before the start of the World Cup-qualifying soccer game, the same day the Tehran Friday prayer leader said the terrorist attacks against America were “heart-rending. . . . Everyone condemns, denounces, and is saddened . . . by it.”¹ While note of the candlelight vigils appeared in some Western papers, *The Wall Street Journal*, for example, Iranian sympathy for the U.S. terrorist tragedy is largely unknown here.²

Because of widespread predetermined and unchallenged assumptions about Iran, these sorts of positive public attitudes are not just unfamiliar but are also nearly inconceivable to many Americans. American misperception and a lack of clear thinking about Iran significantly affect policymaking and unnecessarily close off policy options.

Currently, the United States is grappling with how to respond to suspected Iranian development of a nuclear weapons capability while Iran’s 2005 presidential elections just constituted a conservative monopoly over domestic political institutions. Significant features of Iranian demographics present both an opportunity for a major political breakthrough as well as the conditions for potential serious long-term hostilities with the United States.

Capabilities, Intentions, and Perceptions

“The paradox of Iran is that it just might be the most pro-American or, perhaps, least anti-American, populace in the Muslim world,” says Karim Sadjadpour, an analyst in Tehran for the Interna-

tional Crisis Group.³ That is quite a challenging idea for most Americans, who continue to imagine Iranians chanting “Death to America” and calling us the “Great Satan”—rhetoric that dates from 1979 but is little in play in Iran today. However, conceptions from the hostage-crisis period of that year appear to still dominate American interpretation of current events. That signal event of America held hostage is a collective wound that helps perpetuate certain conceptions about Iranian intentions.

That the hostage-crisis period remains manifest in the American emotional perception of Iran after a quarter century was quickly revealed recently when some of the former hostages mistakenly identified the newly elected Iranian president as one of their captors. Major news sources featured accusatory photos purporting to show Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with blindfolded American hostages. And, although a month later the stories were finally reported as false, the public rehashing of Iran’s flagrant disregard for international law and the reinscribing of the enemy for the American public was easily given major attention using the hostage-crisis fulcrum, which seemed to be a well-timed, politically motivated reaction to the election of a conservative Iranian president.

In 2002, being included in U.S. President George W. Bush’s speech defining the Axis of Evil was an offensive surprise to Iranians who felt their sustained cooperation with U.S. policy in Afghanistan made that designation particularly unjust. Both publicly and privately Iran cooperated with the United States in supporting the Northern Alliance and in establishing the Karzai Government.⁴ Iran was a longstanding opponent of the Taliban, and throughout U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan, Iran has assisted on a range of issues. Linking Iran to Iraq and North Korea, Bush declared that “states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”⁵ Iranians deeply objected that even their cooperative behavior could not overcome America’s expectations of hostile intent. Bush proclaimed, “Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we know their

true nature.”⁶ Americans have difficulty crediting positive Iranian behavior or challenging longstanding patterned expectations about a threatening Iran. This is not to argue that Iranian behavior is unblemished; however, allowing prejudice to guide analysis and interpretation works against good U.S. security policymaking.

Strategists tend to ascribe worst-case hostile intentions to enemies. This is regarded as prudent security planning. We regard capabilities as synonymous with intentions when in fact they are uncertain guides. Worst-case planning is not always most effective. Not only can it be wasteful, it can also create unintended consequences for the adversary’s choices as well as false confidence in our own leaders’ options. Conflating capabilities and intentions without enough regard to the complexities of context reveals the inability to conceive of security requirements from the adversary’s perspective. This is what writer Ken Booth describes as the detriment inherent in culture-bound ethnocentric strategy: “Strategy is a universal preoccupation, but its meaning is always contextual, set by the peculiar problems, perceptions, interests, traditions, and ideologies of those with whom we are dealing. Those cannot be understood without a feeling for cultural relativity.”⁷ This is particularly troubling given our widespread lack of knowledge and understanding of Iran.

Why should it matter if the Bush Administration is not capable of applying relativity to this context or of seeing security through the prism of the Iranians? because we risk misperception and poor policy decisions. Thirty years ago Klaus Knorr argued that “[t]he greatest dangers to realistic threat perception do not inhere in the intellectual difficulties resulting from poor evidence and future uncertainty. . . . The greater danger lies in rigid preconceptions and attitudes of which the perceiver is unaware, or not aware enough. Such preconceptions make him desire to see certain things happen, and to make what he wants to do seem justified. And the push and pull of emotions that are . . . attached also to foreign actors in such forms as hatred and contempt can lead the perceiver astray. These intervening preconceptions and attitudes produce selectivity in the receipt and use of information; they therefore contribute to a distorted image of reality and to false expectations.”⁸ Not unlike the mind’s observable preference for bringing conflicting information and needs into internal consonance (dissonance theory), in strategy there is a tendency to manipulate the interpretation of enemy capabilities to serve one’s own preconceived images. When this occurs, it leads to misperception.

Given the U.S. experience with Iran since the 1978-1979 revolution, it is difficult for U.S. strate-

gists to guard against a distorted image of reality and false expectations of Iranian behavior. We find it all but impossible to apply cultural relativity to consider Iran’s perspective. We risk rationalizing what we want to do instead of making the best choices using the clearest analysis. We do not take seriously the priority Iran places on its perceived independence and international reputation. We do not credit Iran’s legitimate security interests or sovereign national goals to protect itself. We do not empathize with Iran being surrounded by a self-professed antagonist’s forces on two fronts (American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan). Nor do we countenance Iran’s fears of living in a dangerous neighborhood. (Israel, Russia, China, Pakistan, and India all can target Iran with nuclear weapons.) But of more significance, perhaps, is that the United States disregards Iranian security and assumes Iran’s ambitions must be bellicose. U.S. policy discussions about military options against Iran might well create an incentive for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons to deter such an attack.⁹

Furthermore, these public debates take place within the larger context of an explicitly stated U.S. national security strategy of preemptive use of force. U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that assertive force is central to our strategy in the region. The dynamic “security dilemma” means that what the United States does to enhance its own security can inadvertently be a threat to itself by appearing to threaten others. What the United States expects to deter Iranian behavior might have the opposite effect. In this specific context, sticks are more likely to beget sticks.

Interpreting Nuclear Intentions

Iran proposes to develop nuclear fuel-cycle technology for civilian energy generation, and a large-scale nuclear power plant is nearing completion in Bushehr. Iran states that its nuclear power will help free up oil and natural gas resources for export to generate necessary hard-currency revenues. Under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which Iran ratified in 1970, it is permitted to have a civilian nuclear-energy program. But because this technology is dual-use, its development can be used to support the view, like that held by the Bush Administration, that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons. Before the U.S. House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, John R. Bolton testified that “[t]he United States strongly believes that Iran has a clandestine program to produce nuclear weapons, and has been warning publicly about Tehran’s weapons ambitions for over a decade.”¹⁰ In this area, assumptions about Iranian behavior influence the interpretation of what evidence is available, and interpretations vary greatly. Iran’s



insistence that it is pursuing only peaceful uses for its nuclear program is on the far end from such alarmist portrayals as “Tehran’s example of using the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to get within weeks of having a large arsenal of nuclear weapons.”¹¹ The new U.S. National Intelligence Estimate projects that Iran is “about a decade” from manufacturing needed nuclear weapon materials, and Israel has recently adjusted its estimates of when it believes Iran will have nuclear weapons to as early as 2008 but, more probably, it will be by 2012.¹²

Since February 1992 Iran has allowed the IAEA to inspect any of its nuclear facilities. Before 2003 no IAEA inspections had reported any Iranian violations of the NPT. The IAEA has since faulted Iranian compliance for some undeclared activities in its nuclear program, while Iran disputes some of the charges.¹³ It has been alleged that Iran violated its formal responsibilities under the NPT by covertly enriching uranium gas. Iran’s consistent claims that uranium-enriched particles found during inspections of its facilities were the result of contaminated equipment it purchased externally have been vindicated by ongoing UN testing. A considerable literature follows the dispute.¹⁴

Iran and the European Union (EU), represented by Britain, France, and Germany, have been negotiating over what Iran sees as its right to have an independent civilian nuclear power program, as guaranteed by the Nonproliferation Treaty. Under international pressure, Iran suspended its nuclear programs in November 2004. In August 2005 Iran informed the UN it would resume producing uranium gas but would continue its voluntary sus-

pension of enrichment activities as long as negotiations with Europe continue.¹⁵ Iran’s resumption of operations to produce uranium gas has revived conjecture about a UN Security Council resolution against Iran’s development program even as EU negotiations are meant to move forward. In September 2005, the IAEA voted to refer Iran to the Security Council for its violations under the NPT. The resolution declares Iran guilty of “many failures and breaches of its obligations.”¹⁶ Both the timing and outcome of bringing Iran’s nuclear program up for sanctions before the Security Council are unclear, particularly given the objections of Russia, China, potentially India, and some other nations. In Iran’s view its pursuit of nuclear energy remains legal and legitimate while this latest effort by the IAEA Board appears more politicized than ever. By way of comparison, last year South Korea was forced to disclose its secret nuclear research program. Subsequently, South Korea was found to have violated nonproliferation obligations when it had conducted chemical uranium enrichment from 1979 to 1981; separated small quantities of plutonium in 1982; experimented with uranium enrichment in 2000; and manufactured depleted uranium munitions from 1983 to 1987. Despite the fact that these violations went unreported to the IAEA, no demands to totally abandon their programs have been made.¹⁷

That Iran has tried to hide any part of its production, no matter the details and their significance, is enough for some to conclude that Iran intends to produce nuclear weapons. Taken alone, Iran’s refusal to disclose every aspect of its activities does not necessarily imply that Iran plans to develop nuclear weapons. To conclude Iran’s guilt on the

basis of its supposed duplicity is an important logical fallacy known as “affirming the consequent.” The logical misstep would be manifested as the following: If Iran were secretly trying to acquire nuclear weapons it would engage in long-lasting, complex negotiations with the IAEA (if A, then B). Since Iran is engaging in long-lasting negotiations with the IAEA, it is secretly trying to acquire nuclear weapons (since B, then A).¹⁸

Preconceived notions of Iranian motives can dominate the interpretation of Iran’s intentions. Looking at the same information, those who are already convinced about the Iranian threat can see no validity in Iran’s claim that its program is consistent with its fossil-fuel resources and that it does not intend to build the bomb. The U.S. Department of State argues: “No comparable oil-rich nation has ever engaged, or would be engaged, in this set of activities—or would pursue them for nearly two decades behind a continuing cloud of secrecy and lies to IAEA inspectors and the international community—unless it was dead set on building nuclear weapons.”¹⁹ In the same article that implies the Iranian bomb is only weeks away, Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson argue: “If Iran wants, it has all that it needs eventually to build a bomb on its own.”²⁰ The Bush Administration said, “Ongoing IAEA investigations confirm many of our most troubling suspicions [that] for at least 18 years, Iran has been in serious violation of its NPT obligations.”²¹

The Nonproliferation Treaty not only legally entitles Iran to produce civilian nuclear power, but during the 1970s the United States vigorously coaxed Iran to opt for nuclear energy and initially favored the Bushehr facility. In fact, the United States perceived Iran’s plans for using civilian nuclear power to enhance its economy as legitimate while the Shah controlled the country. Yet, as the Islamic Republic of Iran has attempted to benefit by restructuring its mix of domestic energy sources, it has faced a far different reaction in the United States.

With Iran’s large population, energy consumption is rising by around 7 percent annually. Iran estimates it might need to generate some 90 gigawatts (GW) by 2020, up from about 31 GW at present. Analyst Pavel Baev agrees: “Despite [Iran’s] being very rich in energy (resources), nuclear energy makes perfect sense.”²² Iran is not the only resource-rich country to diversify its energy needs away from hydrocarbons. Russia, a major oil exporter with huge gas reserves, is a leading nuclear-energy power. OPEC member Venezuela meets more than 70 percent of its electricity needs from hydroelectric power.²³

The Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the British Parliament said in March 2005 that based

on a study it commissioned, “[i]t is clear . . . the arguments as to whether Iran has a genuine requirement for domestically produced nuclear electricity are not all, or even predominantly, on one side.”²⁴ Meanwhile, Iran is attempting to signal that it will be incapable of using its civilian fuel for bombmaking. According to a pact signed in February 2005, Russia will supply the fuel for an Iranian nuclear power plant and Tehran will return the spent fuel. Still, when Iran quickly rejected the European proposal to give up control of its nuclear energy program in exchange for a range of incentives still to be developed, the dispute heated up considerably. To many Westerners, Iran’s refusal to take the deal reinforced assumptions that it is determined to build nuclear weapons. Bush said he was skeptical a diplomatic solution could be found.²⁵ However, to Iran it looked like their undeniable right to autonomy was at stake with too little offered in return.

There are two points here. One is that the United States has trouble assessing Iran’s nuclear capabilities and intentions and could scarcely be persuaded that Iran is not lying. More important is that even if Iran is not to be believed and if there is no doubt about its ambitions to build nuclear weapons, the facts do not change basic U.S. policy options, as discussed below.

Selective Perceptions: Assessing Pakistan vs. Iran

In analyzing the distinction between capabilities and intentions and the extent to which the United States might filter its perceptions about Iran, a comparison can help. Consider the three main reasons the United States finds Iran threatening: nuclear weapons, terrorism, and the repressive, authoritarian nature of its regime.

Nuclear weapons. Iran is held to account for what the United States considers defiance of the international community in developing nuclear weapons. If we apply this same violations list to Pakistan, there are commonalities. The United States did not look on with favor as Pakistan developed nuclear weapons, in part clandestinely, but the United States did abandon some initial sanctions, despite the destabilizing effect of Pakistan’s weapons on regional security. The United States also resumed foreign aid to Pakistan, aid unrelated to 9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism.

A national hero in Pakistan, scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, distributed nuclear weapons knowledge, materials, and equipment for two decades using a worldwide network of associates. Khan is classed among the gravest threats to current international security. In an article for *The Washington Quarterly*, David Albright and Corey Hinderstein wrote, “The CIA’s George Tenet reportedly described

Khan as being 'at least as dangerous as Osama bin-Laden.'²⁶ After Khan's nuclear capabilities sales network was exposed in 2003, little was done. (The Pakistani president eventually pardoned Khan, who is sequestered in Pakistan but living in admirable style, and the Pakistan Government will not allow Khan to be interviewed by outsiders.)

Terrorism. Iran has primarily targeted its own dissidents, which presumably the United States cares less about than terrorism toward Americans or their allies. Of more international concern is Iranian support for anti-Israel terrorist groups.²⁷ But to date, in the public domain at least, there is only tenuous evidence of any state-sponsored Iranian connection with al-Qaeda.

For evidence of Pakistan's complicity in terrorism, Khan's nuclear proliferation might suffice. But Bin Laden might also figure in the Pakistani ledger. In the United States, the suspicion is that Pakistan is harboring this "mother of all terrorists." And by its own admission, Pakistan is reluctant to extradite, or even capture, Bin Laden. As recently as July 2005 on primetime American television, Pakistan's president pointedly refused to agree to hand over Bin Laden if he were caught in Pakistan. CIA head Porter Goss has said U.S. intelligence "has an excellent idea of where Bin Laden is but we are probably not going to bring Mr. Bin Laden to justice because (of) very difficult questions dealing with sanctuaries in sovereign states."²⁸ An ABC News interviewer told President General Pervez Musharraf that "most people read this as Pakistan won't [allow the United States to] go in [to] grab him."²⁹ Musharraf did not contradict this statement.

Repressive authoritarian rule. No serious external debate is ongoing as to the repressive, authoritarian character of the Pakistani regime and its abuse of human rights. Factually, there is a strong argument that the flawed Iranian political system is at least no worse than Pakistan's. By the U.S. Government's assessment, Musharraf's consolidation of power was deeply problematic. U.S. Department of State reports describe Pakistan's poor human rights record, citing numerous cases of police abuse and rape of citizens, including killing political detainees and shooting protestors in public.³⁰ Yet, the United States plans to give Pakistan \$3 billion in aid over the next 5 years. Bush accorded Pakistan the status of a major non-NATO ally in 2004, making it one of the few countries (along with South Korea and Israel) entitled to generous deals on U.S. military and financial aid.

Pakistan provides an example where meeting some key threat criteria is not sufficient to invite U.S. policy condemnation or punitive action. Although Pakistan's repressive government has openly produced nuclear weapons, has clandestinely

sold the means to proliferate nuclear weapons, and is under suspicion of harboring the terrorist whom the United States most wants to apprehend, U.S. treatment of Pakistan could hardly be more different than its treatment of Iran. If Pakistani behavior does not warrant U.S. opprobrium, does Iranian behavior? It is useful here to question the role of perception and what Knorr described as the intervening preconceptions and attitudes that produce selectivity in the receipt and use of information.

The Iranian Context

Before moving forward to explicitly consider U.S. policy choices in detail, some background discussion of Iran is necessary. A short overview of key relevant social attitudes, economic issues, current political dynamics, and age demographics provides more of the context of what is ignored when unexamined U.S. preconceptions guide consideration of the political and military environment.

National pride and honor are elements of Iran's political culture, especially as they pertain to relations with outsiders. Since the time when the Persian kings literally "sold out" to Western "buyers," to the perfidious colonial period in the early 20th century, through the painful Cold-War decades of U.S. interventionism that thwarted organic political development, Iran has sought respect, equal regard, and independence from foreign control. Pride, dignity, and the need for autonomy are also reflected in the people's attitude toward attaining a nuclear capability. In an otherwise divided political society, there is a consensus in favor of nuclear power: "From nuclear negotiators to student dissidents, from bazaar merchants to turbaned mullahs, Iranians agree: The right to develop nuclear power is a point of national pride."³¹

Iranians, like many others around the globe, are deeply sensitive to what they perceive as the arrogance of the United States. We appear to reserve for ourselves special rights and privileges to act as we choose while denying others, like Iran, their legitimate rights and autonomy. Iranians bristle at U.S. unilateralism and the disrespect with which we treat them and many other states. Among the first things Ahmadinejad declared after his election was that the United States would not be permitted to dictate Iranian behavior; he warned the United States against issuing demands to his country.³² An activist U.S. antinationalist policy in Iran during the Cold War left major scars on Iranian attitudes toward the United States.

The political structure of the Islamic Republic reserves for its conservative religious leaders the power to avert reforms they do not approve of, even when changes are popular. These conservative arms of the Republic approve laws passed by

Parliament and vet candidates for elections. The Guardian Council (a supra-influential body of mullahs) and the Supreme Leader (vilayet-e faqih [the chief religious leader]) cannot be challenged except by constitutional reform. For nearly a decade, the push by broadly elected, although far from unified, reform politicians was significantly held back by institutionally empowered conservative leaders blocking political and economic reform.³³ In consequence, even when in elected office, reformers failed to deliver many tangible economic or political improvements.

In Iran's 2005 presidential elections, the relative outsider and conservative politician Ahmadinejad won an unexpected victory. But, despite the defeat of the (highly divided) reformist candidates, the 2005 vote was not a major political realignment; the Iranian electorate remains divided. The 17 million votes cast for Ahmadinejad were a decisive electoral victory but accounted for only 36 percent of the electorate. That does not compare well with the previous two elections of the popular reformist President Mohammad Khatami, whose votes represented 57 percent of the electorate in 1997 and 49 percent in 2001. Regarding the 2005 presidential election as a landslide would be a misjudgment. The conservatives might be in office and control political power, but that does not mean they represent the majority or reflect consolidated Iranian public opinion.

Despite being OPEC's second largest oil producer, Iran is not a wealthy country. Forty percent of its population is below the poverty line and, officially, 15 million people are in the so-called "vulnerable strata." In 2004 the CIA estimated the Iranian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to be the equivalent of \$7,700 per capita, but that figure disguises the fact that typical salaries are \$300 a month. Iran ranks in the middle internationally. The World Bank estimates Iran's inflation rate at 16 percent with unemployment officially at 15 percent. (Unofficially, unemployment might be as high as 30 percent.) Iran announced an average of 6 percent rate of real economic growth during the past 3 years, but some of this success is explained by high world oil prices. In a recent interview, Iran's Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, Mohammad Khazaiee, warned that the number of jobless will reach more than 5 million and that the balance of trade will be negative \$20 billion over the next 15 years.³⁴

Economics played a key role in Ahmadinejad's electoral success. By campaigning on the economic justice themes of

closing the gap between rich and poor and curbing corruption, Ahmadinejad tapped into economic burdens borne by many constituents, particularly the urban poor, who were unmoved by other presidential candidates. He promised to redistribute wealth, hold down prices, and raise salaries. In the first round of voting, fraud likely accounted for the defeat of a reformist candidate who made the popular promise to distribute the equivalent of \$60 to each Iranian family if he were elected.³⁵

Categorical and sustained conflicts in economic policymaking have beset the entire record of the Islamic Republic because of the entrenchment of the public sector (including oil) and the Bonyads, or "foundations" (well-funded fiefdoms run by leading clerics), and because of fundamental divisions over the State's role versus market forces in the economy. The relatively inexperienced Ahmadinejad regime is not likely to resolve this. Receptivity to increased privatization might be a feature of the new cabinet; at least some of the president's advisers support a strong market economy.

A monumentally important reality about Iran is a demographic one: Iran's population is disproportionately young. About two-thirds of its nearly 70 million people are less than 30 years old. Table 1 depicts Iran's current age structure. Table 2 shows comparable 2004 U.S. figures. Clearly the Iranian population is far less evenly distributed over each age group than the U.S. population. In Table 1, the significantly higher numbers at the lower levels of the pyramid graphically demonstrate that the majority of Iranians are currently well under 30

Iranian Population in Millions, 2004




Table 1

U.S. Population in Millions, 2004




Table 2

years of age. In fact, unlike in the United States, the Iranian population quantitatively dwindles after the age of 40. The numerical spikes from early teens to mid-20s constitute the Iranian youth bulge. The economic and social, if not political, implications of these figures are nothing short of dramatic. In the starkest terms, young people strain Iran's already burdened economic resources because 18- to 29-year-olds particularly need education, employment, and housing.

Given the understanding of facts on the ground in Iran and the context of political factors affecting Iranian choices, it is possible to consider a set of three broad courses of action available to the United States in dealing with Iran. These are preemptive military options, patient noninterference, and rapprochement through trade.

COA 1: Preemptive Military Options

It is highly unlikely that military force can change the Iranian regime. The country has four times the territory of Iraq, and the population is three times larger (with a predominance of available fighting-age males). Given Iran's popular consensus around nationalism, its ability to coalesce to resist an invader and/or occupier, and its proven ability to fight and sustain great losses in defense of its homeland, U.S. or U.S.-led coalition forces do not have the resources or the long-term commitment required to replace the Iranian regime by force. Similarly, military options cannot prevent a would-be determined Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. U.S. military action can at best delay and complicate Iran's potential bid for nuclear status and hope to forestall weapons capability until the nation is governed by leaders who choose to forego them.

Observers who believe Iran's nuclear-weapon capability is imminent are likely to wish to see it destroyed through military action. The formulation runs along the lines of one described in an opinion piece in *The New York Times*: "The U.S. may wind up facing in Iran the choice our intelligence agencies told us we faced in Iraq: between military action against a rogue regime or allowing that regime to assemble an arsenal of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction."³⁶

Because the United States and Iran are not at war, a surgical strike on Iran's facilities would be considered a preventive action by the United States. Proponents of such a strike frequently cite the 1981 Israeli attack on inchoate Iraqi nuclear facilities at Osiraq as a model for an attack against the Iranian program. But technically, the Iranian context does not quite match conditions found in the Osiraq strike. Unlike the surprise dramatic targeting of a single facility by Israel, Iran's program is dispersed

and is considered partly hardened and buried. To strike effectively would require difficult-to-acquire targeting intelligence for multiple simultaneous strikes against several sites using large-yield penetration munitions.³⁷ However, technical issues are not the main ones here.

Worth noting is that precision nuclear strikes against Iran probably are and should be outside all consideration. Aside from obvious humanitarian issues and concerns about collateral damage to allies, a U.S. nuclear strike on Iran would be absolutely unacceptable to China, Russia, much of Europe, and the entire Islamic world. The Chinese alone could significantly harm the U.S. economy by disinvesting major amounts of U.S. debt they hold. In the region, local antagonism would likely bring down both the Iraqi Shi'ite and Afghan Governments, given how closely they are tied to the United States.

Some have suggested proxy or covert means of attack on Iranian facilities as the most politically expedient way for the United States to disrupt Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program.³⁸ The technical feasibility of these ventures falls under the purview of military specialists, but several conditions make the success of a proxy or covert attack unlikely. One is that the Iranian nuclear program is homegrown; foreigners do not have access to it, which complicates the use of proxies. Another condition is that the United States would need to attack multiple, dispersed reprocessing facilities, which would likely require sustained covert action over time, increasing the likelihood of discovery. And finally, because American, Middle Eastern, and Western international media have been speculating for some time about the potential for U.S. or U.S.-backed military actions against Iranian nuclear sites, the United States would have a hard time achieving plausible deniability following proxy or covert actions. Whether it attacks directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, the United States will be blamed not just by Iran, but by regional and international actors as well. The repercussions would vary by country, but they cannot be dismissed. Preemptively attacking Iran would damage political and economic relationships with China, Russia, and several of the United States' European partners. One can easily imagine the Islamic world's response to such an attack.³⁹

Even if the United States could find a way to attack Iran successfully, military action is still a bad choice among better options. The unwanted consequences of a military attack would be too significant and the benefits likely short-lived; moreover, while an assumed Iranian effort to build a nuclear weapon would certainly be set back, it would not be prevented. Following an attack on its nuclear facilities, Iran should be expected to move

Soccer fans after an Iranian victory qualified them for World Cup competition in 2005. (Inset) A Nike ad in Iran.

from a potential nuclear proliferate to an active one motivated by a perceived need for self-defense and wanting the weapon for its deterrent value. Iran would certainly abrogate the Nonproliferation Treaty and expel its monitoring regime, thereby increasing pressure on Israel to be explicit about its nuclear deterrent. These dynamics could possibly spur other regional states to proliferate and would, in general, degrade security in the entire area.



Even if Iran has an imminent nuclear-weapons program, military attacks would not assuredly prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Once Iran becomes highly motivated to acquire a bomb following what it (and the Islamic world) would perceive as unlawful, arrogant, imperious aggression, Iran might be able to constitute or reconstitute (depending on one's perception) its program relatively quickly via the international black market.

Another likely important result of any military action against Iran is that it would engender dedicated, determined hostility against the United States. Despite internal political divisions, Iranians should be expected to reject any use of U.S. force as unprovoked aggression and an attempt to impose the United States' will on the country. Iran's capacity to retaliate against American and Western interests is considerable: It could disrupt oil exports and other critical Persian Gulf shipping, attack vulnerable U.S. military forces in the area, attack Americans and/or other foreigners anywhere in the world, and destabilize the fledgling and tenuous Iraqi State.

Iranians are fierce defenders of their homeland: In the 1980-1988 war with Iraq, they suffered more than 200,000 military casualties and weathered urban chemical-weapons attacks. Some analysts think the United States could win Iranian hearts and minds in the midst of military action. A regional specialist for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty proposes that "[t]he United States could mitigate the impact of any military action against

Iran by persuading Iranians beforehand of its positive intentions toward them."⁴⁰ But that would be a hard sell, if not an impossible one.

Iranians overwhelmingly support and take pride in their nation's efforts to achieve nuclear-energy generation. Furthermore, they would be particularly skeptical of the motives behind a U.S. attack. Staunch Iranian nationalism is built partly on an awareness of U.S. opposition to the highly popular nationalization of oil and the closely related CIA- and British-backed coup that deposed the popular Mohammed Mossadegh and returned the Shah to the throne in 1953. The United States also—

- Helped form SAVAK, the Shah's repressive secret security force.
- Was largely credited with keeping the unpopular Shah in power for 25 years.
- Contemplated another coup in 1978, during the Iranian revolution.
- Permitted the Shah to enter the country for medical treatment in 1979 after he had fled Iran, which touched off the events that led to hostage-taking at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.⁴¹

Given the U.S. record of interventionism, Iranians would likely support retaliation after an attack.

An additional and less apparent argument against the military course of action is that a U.S. strike would poison the Iranian youth bubble with anti-Americanism. As noted, Iran's population is disproportionately young, with over two-thirds of its 70 million people less than 30 years old. A preemptive attack on Iran would not just provoke contempt for the United States, it would do so among current youth—people now in their early teens to mid-20s who will form the bulk of the politically active population for the next several decades. Alienating this group would squander the reservoir of sympathy for Americans generated by

9/11. These young people favor talks and repaired relations with the United States. Depending on the extent of U.S. military action against Iranian targets, long-term anger and hatred would likely influence Iranian foreign and national security policymaking and could seriously complicate United States and regional security.

The United States does not adequately appreciate the extent to which Iranians support their perceived legitimate right to nuclear technology and resent efforts, particularly by the United States, to prevent legal acquisition of such technology. Military action against Iranian nuclear facilities would be, at best, a short-term palliative that risks reducing the security of the United States and others. Such degraded security could take the form of determined proliferation, Iranian retaliation, and the likely promotion of serious, sustained, hostile Iranian attitudes where they currently do not exist. Such actions would damage U.S. policy over the long term.

COA 2: Patient Noninterference

Internal evolutions are underway in Iran that need no U.S. meddling to come to fruition. If we manage to be patient, dynamics in Iran will eventually take care of themselves and redress the nuclear-proliferation problem. Patient noninterference requires the United States to avoid statements and actions that help justify hard-line Iranian positions.⁴² The United States should also not do anything that might undermine ongoing efforts by the European Union and others to negotiate agreements with Iran. Despite the conservatives' ascendance to power, political divisions rife among Iranians will result in political changes, formally or informally. Since 1997 the political pressure for reform has been expressing itself within the Iranian system. Only one-third of the electorate brought the conservative president into office in 2005, and the reformers remain very much part of the political landscape.

While favored by many, the liberal reforms advanced during Khatami's administration were rejected by some during the 2005 elections. The future, however, bodes well for liberalization. Looking around Tehran, it is hard to distinguish some young Iranians from youth anywhere. Iran's young people want the usual things: having choices in education, jobs, and housing. That the majority of Iranians are young is important because they are amenable to change and will eventually constitute the largest bloc of voting citizens. Also, Iranians are resourceful, persevering, and hardworking. They will continue to make progress. The economy and politics will continue to improve.

Without aggressive provocation, most Iranians will continue to be far from preoccupied with contesting U.S. security interests. Iranians are concerned with their own domestic issues. The country's internal economic and political drives will shift the country's attitudes over time. Whether this change occurs quickly or continues gradually depends on many variables, including external investments, but direct U.S. interference, prodding, and hostility make positive change more difficult.⁴³

Keeping quiet is important in this course of action. Name-calling, like implicating Iran in the Axis of Evil, is inflammatory and works against us. We do not seem to recognize that what we say and do appears unjust to Iranians and provokes them. Constant U.S. invective against Iran is counterproductive: Iranians perceive our contempt as a lack of respect, and they see a predilection for unequal, unlawful treatment in an American attitude they reject as imperious and offensive. U.S. condemnation, vilification, and lack of respect do not shore up support against hard-line conservatives; such actions only make it more difficult for moderates and reformers to call for improved relations.

A strategy of patient noninterference would be a struggle for the United States, which typically prefers a more proactive approach to security, especially if a nuclear threat appears imminent. A policy based on the assumption through knowledgeable assessment that Iran will straighten itself out would also be difficult for the Israelis to accept. They live much closer to the potential Iranian nuclear threat.⁴⁴ Indeed, U.S. courses of action routinely include efforts to gain Israeli cooperation while reassuring it of our commitment to its security. But in general terms, current international regimes do not prevent nuclear proliferation, nor do military attacks, except potentially in the short term. Therefore, Israel and the United States would be better served by a policy that promotes moderating Iranian shifts that would, by themselves, create more reassurance.

COA 3: Rapprochement through Trade

Even if successful in the short run, military action toward Iran would likely degrade security over time. The middle course, to stay quiet and wait while Iran shifts internally, is viable. However, the United States could take the fastest route toward positive change in Iran if we could abandon some of our longstanding notions of Iranian intentions.

Formal U.S. ties with Iran were broken during the hostage crisis in 1978 and have not been restored. Since 1984 the United States has gradually implemented restrictions on U.S. exports to Iran,

U.S. Air Force C-130 crewmembers and Iranian soldiers offload 20,000 pounds of medical supplies two days after a devastating 2003 earthquake in Iran.



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and in late 1987 it banned most imports from Iran. The 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act supplemented the ban on almost all bilateral trade, adding restrictions on foreign companies that invested in new Iranian oilfields worth more than \$40 million.⁴⁵ While the United States formally abjures economic warfare, its focused, unyielding economic-punishment policy can hardly be interpreted otherwise by Iranians. Sanctions against Iran have constituted a persistent economic hardship.⁴⁶ By actively blocking any economic aid for Iran, the United States implemented a sustained anti-Marshall Plan against a large Islamic country—a major regional state—situated astride the world's energy supplies.⁴⁷ If sanctions were intended to “break the will of the enemy,” change the Iranian regime, or cause it to renounce unwanted behavior, then sanctions have not worked. If sanctions were intended to keep Iran underperforming so it cannot create the capabilities to reduce U.S. security (that is, produce nuclear weapons), then according to the Bush Administration's own assessment, sanctions are not working.

At this juncture, then, what is the utility of U.S.-led sanctions compared to the potential value in lifting them? The “thunder run to Tehran” can occur via instituting the good old American way: better jobs, goods, and investment. Ahmadinejad's main goal appears to be to improve living conditions in Iran. Iran needs jobs, trade, and economic growth. Demographic pressures mean Iran must create 800,000 to 1 million new jobs each year just to stand still. The country badly needs investment in the primary sector of its economy, the oil fields. These are potent opportunities, and there are clear resources on which to draw.

Iranians want foreign policy reform and rapprochement with the United States. A 2002 opinion poll in Tehran found that almost three-quarters of the population favor the resumption of direct U.S.-Iran talks. Many of the approximately 2 million Iranians in the United States, the majority of whom are in regular contact with home, could be a ready platform to encourage improved U.S.-Iranian political and economic relations. The United States should end the web of major sanctions

and encourage private investment in Iran.⁴⁸

The need to restructure Iran's oil industry and “bring it into line with world petroleum market forces” is vital for the country.⁴⁹ Iran's oil production capacity is stagnant, despite goals to substantially increase production. For many years Iran has needed foreign capital and technology to modernize and further develop its oil industry. U.S.-led international sanctions have prevented investments that would otherwise have been made and have helped deprive this sector of needed capital. The oil sector's share of the GDP has declined from 30 to 40 percent in the 1970s to 10 to 20 percent today, mainly as a result of OPEC output ceilings and war damage to production facilities. (Iranian output still stands below its prewar highs.)

Iranian energy industry executive Narsi Ghorban warns: “Huge investment in the development of new fields and gas injection are required to keep Iran's share of OPEC and world production intact.”⁵⁰ The need for future investments presents a useful opportunity to contribute to Iranian economic growth. Given U.S. oil consumption,

improving Iranian oil production for the world market is clearly a win-win option. Instead of sustaining trade sanctions that do not adequately succeed, the United States could partake in, if not lead, the international investment that revitalizes the Iranian oil and gas industry. Once the floodgates open, U.S. and international trade would pour into an industrious country (and a large market) of 70 million people. Major trading networks and increased economic development comprise the formula on which we have most relied to lead to political stability elsewhere. We can apply the same sound formula in Iran.

The United States does not control all the reins of international trade; it would behoove us, in economic interests alone, to integrate Iran into the Western market. During the summer of 2005, Iran participated for the first time in a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This nascent alliance, led by China and Russia (who, with four Central Asian republics, comprise the current SCO), is seeking expansion. The SCO wants to develop more economic, political, cultural, and military ties between member states who now occupy about three-fifths the territory of Eurasia and about one-quarter of the world's population. As a prospective member, Iran has an Eastward option.

When it comes to Iran, the United States continues to operate from entrenched assumptions informed by a 25-year-old emotional trauma. We can see this in a comparison with Vietnam. The United States resumed relations with the Vietnamese in 1995, offered them a trade agreement within a year, and signed a formal bilateral agreement in 2000, less than 25 years after the end of a war in which more than 55,000 American lives were lost. How can the United States have formally recovered from this staggering loss—by making peace—more quickly than it has recovered from the foreign policy crisis with Iran in 1979-1981 in which not one hostage died?⁵¹ No open conflict was ever declared between Iran and the United States (although the United States did provide military assistance to Iraq during its war with Iran). U.S. allegations implicating Iran in the Saudi Khobar Towers attack remain unsubstantiated.⁵²

After the significant losses of the Vietnam War, why is it easier for the United States to restore relations with Vietnam (which had and still has an unrepresentative government and has engaged in significant aggression against its neighbors) than it is to do so with Iran? U.S. disdain for the Iranian regime's ideology and, indeed, the Iranian policy record, does not seem sufficient to explain the U.S. attitude. One part of the answer apparently lies in the brutalizing effect the hostage assault seems to

have had on Americans; it seems to have created a contempt that continues to cloud policy judgment. Such preconceptions should be eliminated to make the better course of action available.

Significantly beneficial relations can function as an informal nonaggression pact. Some will object to opening U.S. trade on the grounds that it appears to reward undeserving Iranian behavior. Others will insist on a grand Iranian quid pro quo in exchange for this U.S. carrot, but that would be counterproductive. Instead, our eyes must be on the prize of ultimate security and economic benefits. The United States should not appear to impose behavior on Iran. Iranians are highly sensitive to that formulation. The issue of external humiliation and imposed will has historical "legs" for Iranians, something Americans find difficult to understand, but it can be seen in historical analogies used in internal Iranian discussions. For example, the Iranians referenced the humiliating 1828 Treaty of Turkmanchai (which followed Iran's defeat by Imperial Russia) when describing the recent inchoate European offer of economic inducements in exchange for Iran giving up autonomy over its nuclear-energy program. We must avoid setting perceived unfair preconditions and impositions on sovereignty if we want success in negotiations with Iran.

Respecting Iran's rights while shifting to intrinsic shared interests would be more productive for both sides. For example, Iran and the United States clearly share safety and environmental concerns about locating nuclear materials near Iran's oil production and export facilities. Iran's economy, as well as to some extent the health of the U.S. economy and those of its closest partners, relies on exported oil. Approaching Iran on the basis of the common interest of not jeopardizing shipping in that vital area would benefit everyone without deliberately triggering conditionality.

It would be the work of the best diplomacy (and potentially third-party pre-negotiation and choreography), out of the glare of public scrutiny, to end sanctions and resume U.S.-Iranian relations. With proper motivation, a new U.S. policy direction could be sold. Increased trade with Iran could change U.S. attitudes at home. Research finds an observable correlation between trade relations and improved warmth of feeling.⁵³ Objections notwithstanding, the fastest, most effective way for the United States to moderate dynamics inside Iran and eventually allay fears about Iranian intentions is by presiding over a flood of trade into Iran.

Ending sanctions against Iran would be a major policy departure and a bold political step. It is certainly possible to be daring here; such has been done under harder circumstances. In 1972, during the midst of the Cold War, U.S. President Richard

Nixon made dramatic overtures to Communist China. Formal relations were restored by 1979 without a regime change (and with the Tiananmen Square democracy movement still 10 years off). Bush could select a desired level of drama for a policy shift on Iran. It is certainly possible to achieve transformation because, to an important extent, the United States controls the flow of trade and investment into Iran. We can open that spigot and use the tools and values we most often support: thriving market economies that create their own inducements for nonaggression and political stability. We need the latter from Iran, however it structures itself internally. In other cases and over time, the United States has strongly supported these principles. Equal results are attainable in Iran.

A Better Vision

The military destruction of Iran's suspected nuclear facilities would provoke, in the short run, Iran's determination to stand up to the international community, abrogate international treaties, and retaliate against the United States. Even if U.S. accusations are correct and Iran does intend to develop nuclear weapons, we would be better off standing back while Iranians reform their own system. Unprovoked, Iran does not have a record of external aggression. Internal change will produce its own forms of internationally reassuring behavior. There is, however, a proactive course of action: that is, to narrowly avert or mitigate a potential Iranian nuclear threat and, more broadly, allay fears about hostile Iranian intentions by using what people want from us and what we know works—our goods and our investment capital.

When choosing courses of action, it is useful to ask: How does the course of action rate compared to what we are presently doing? Sanctions are not garnering their expected political and security results. Our vilification and perpetual presump-

tion of hostile intentions harden Iranian resolve. How good are the long-term vehicles of nuclear nonproliferation likely to be? Our best option is to create relations such that Iran will not consider developing or using capabilities against us. If we can live with Pakistan, it is plausible to imagine attaining stable conditions with the Islamic Republic of Iran. A deluge of job-creating trade and foreign investment can transform Iran nearly irrespective of its governmental structure.

Thirty years ago, Princeton's strategic thinker Klaus Knorr might have been anticipating the U.S.-Iranian debacle when he wrote, "Man, it seems, not only tends to be a prisoner of his perceptions, his perceptions are slaves to his preconceptions."⁵⁴ Is the United States predisposed against perceiving its best interests when dealing with Iran? Are we, ironically, hostage to our own misconceptions? The United States does not have to continue its current policy of assuming threat based on blinkered demonization. We can cease picking at the scars of a trauma that dates back so many years and look at Iran with fewer biased filters. The wisdom in this is not new: In his farewell address, George Washington warned that "the nation which indulges towards another a habitual hatred . . . is a slave to . . . animosity [that can] lead it astray from its duty and its interest. . . . The Nation, prompted by ill-will and resentment, sometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best calculations of policy."⁵⁵

We take pride in being the unchallenged world superpower. That power gives us the strength and prerogative to boldly pursue change using the tools we have had great success with elsewhere. We have the opportunity to succeed in Iran if we approach it from that perspective. Iran is an auspicious case for a nonmilitary U.S. approach to security: proactively going full tilt "the American Way" to change the dynamics in Tehran through increased mutual prosperity. *MR*

NOTES

1. Afshin Molavi, "A New Day in Iran," *Smithsonian Magazine* (1 March 2005).
2. Richard Minitzer, "Muslims for Liberty," *The Wall Street Journal*, 1 October 2001.
3. Karim Sadjadpour, quoted in Afshin Molavi.
4. U.S. Congress, House, Gary Sick, "U.S. Policy toward Iran," statement before the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 16 February 2005.
5. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, Washington, D.C., 29 January 2001, on-line at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/20020129-11.html>, accessed 23 August 2005.
6. *Ibid.*
7. In *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979), 15, Ken Booth says: "Being culture-bound refers to the inability of an individual or group to see the world through the eyes of a different national or ethnic group: it is the inability to put aside one's own cultural attitudes and imaginatively recreate the world from the perspective of those belonging to a different group."
8. Klaus Knorr, ed., "Threat Perception," in *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence, KS: Allen Press, 1976), 85.
9. BBC News, "Bush Warns Iran on Nuclear Plans," 13 August 2005, on-line at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/middle_east/4147892.stm>, accessed 23 August 2005. The article says, "US President George W. Bush says he still has not ruled out the option of using force against Iran, after it resumed work on its nuclear programme." More detailed examples include Michael Klare's discussion of U.S. plans for an attack on Iran in "The Iran War Buildup," *The Nation*, 21 July 2005,

- on-line at <www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20050801&s=klare>, accessed 23 August 2005, and in Seymour Hersh, "The Coming Wars," *The New Yorker*, 24 January 2005, on-line at <www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?050124fa_fact>, accessed 23 August 2005.
10. John R. Bolton, "Iran's Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," testimony before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Washington, D.C., 24 June 2004.
 11. Henry Sokolski, "Introduction," in *Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions*, eds., Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College (AWC), Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), January 2004), ix. Sokolski means to draw from their chapter 2. However, Victor Gilinsky's reference in "Iran's 'Legal' Paths to the Bomb," in Sokolski and Clawson, citing the 2001 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) "Safeguards Glossary," 22, on-line at <www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3_scr.pdf>, accessed 23 August 2005, is to the generic: "The IAEA estimates that once in possession of the explosive material, a country that is so inclined and has made the necessary preparation in design and manufacturing capability can produce bombs in a week or two. . . . See www.iaea.org."
 12. Orly Halpern, "New Estimates on Iranian Nukes," *Jerusalem Post*, 1 August 2005, on-line at <www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1122776414371&p=1101615860782>, accessed 1 August 2005.
 13. Iran argues it was not obliged to disclose all the details of its program in accordance with its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. See verbal note 350-1-17/928 (English version), Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA Secretariat, Vienna, 1 August 2005,

on-line at <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infircs/2005/infirc648.pdf>, accessed 2 August 2005.

14. For discussions of the test results, see Gordon Fairclough and David Crawford, "Iran, Supported by IAEA Tests, Rejects Nuke Deal," *Wall Street Journal*, 8 August 2005; Dafna Linzer, "Findings Could Hurt U.S. Effort On Iran: U.N. Traces Uranium To Tainted Equipment," *Washington Post*, 11 August 2004, A16, on-line at <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54948-2004Aug10.html>, accessed 23 August 2005. For the wider dispute, see for example Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Proliferation News and Resources, on-line at <www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/>, accessed 23 August 2005, and John Pike, "Iran Special Weapons Guide," on-line at <www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/>, accessed 23 August 2005.

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17. Jungin Kang, Peter Hayes, Li Bin, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Richard Tanter, "South Korea's Nuclear Surprise," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (January/February 2005): 40-49, on-line at <www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=jf05kang>, accessed 28 September 2005.

18. I am indebted to Cyrus Safdari for this elaboration of logic.

19. Bolton testimony.

20. Sokolski and Clawson, eds.

21. John S. Wolf, *Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, U.S. Department of State, May 2004, on-line at <www.state.gov/np/rls/rm/32293.htm>, accessed 23 August 2005.

22. Pavel Baev, quoted in Paul Hughes, "Iran's Arguments for Nuclear Power Make Some Sense," *Reuters News*, 2 March 2005.

23. Hughes.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Bush, "Bush Warns Iran."

26. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks," *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring 2005): 111-28. Albright and Hinderstein also say: "Despite a wide range of hints and leads, the United States and its allies failed to thwart this network throughout the 1980s and 1990s as it sold the equipment and expertise needed to produce nuclear weapons to major U.S. enemies including Iran, Libya, and North Korea."

27. "Teheran continued to encourage anti-Israel activities, both operationally and rhetorically, providing logistic support and training to Lebanese Hizballah and a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups," Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism-2003*, U.S. Department of State (DOS) April 2004, on-line at <www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgrtrpt/2003/31644.htm>, accessed, 23 August 2005. See also Gary Sick, "Iran: Confronting Terrorism," *The Washington Quarterly*, 26, 4 (Autumn 2003): 83-98. "Iran's promotion of violence seems to be increasingly focused on support for radical anti-Israeli groups in Palestine rather than hostage-taking or targeted assassinations."

28. Porter Goss, quoted in "Pakistani Leader Takes on Blair: Highlights from Cynthia McFadden's Interview with Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf," ABC News, 21 July 2005, on-line at <<http://abcnews.com/GMA/story?id=963951&page=1>>, accessed 23 August 2005. The porous Pakistani border with Afghanistan and the radical Islamic elements operating from Pakistani bases, as well as the murderers of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl, should also be on Pakistan's list of contributions to terrorism.

29. *Ibid.*

30. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2004," Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, DOS, 28 February 2005, on-line at <www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41743.htm>, accessed 23 August 2005. The report says: "In 2002, citizens participated in national government elections, although many observers found serious flaws in their legal framework. Local police used excessive force and committed or failed to prevent extrajudicial killings. Sectarian killings continued to be a problem. Prison conditions remained extremely poor, and police arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. Some political leaders remained imprisoned or in exile abroad. Case backlogs led to long delays in trials, and lengthy pretrial detention was common. The judiciary was subject to executive and other outside influence. Corruption and inefficiency remained severe problems. The Government violated due process and infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The press was partly free and in some instances, the Government took retaliatory actions against media outlets and journalists; however, media criticism of security forces and the Government continued to increase during the year. The Government imposed some limits on freedom of association, religion, and movement. Governmental and societal discrimination against religious minorities remained a problem. Domestic violence against women, rape, and abuse of children remained serious problems. Trafficking in women and children for the purposes of forced prostitution and bonded labor, and the use of child labor remained widespread." See also Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, "State of Human Rights in 2004," on-line at <www.hrcp-web.org/ar_home_2004.cfm>, accessed 23 August 2005, and Human Rights Watch, "Human Rights Overview: Pakistan," on-line at <<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/12/14/pakistan9852.htm>>, accessed 25 August 2005.

31. Neil MacFarquar, "Across Iran, Nuclear Power Is a Matter of Pride," *New York Times*, 29 May 2005.

32. In "Iranian President Warns West Not to Behave Like Landlords," *The Guardian*, 12 July 2005, Nasser Karimi says, "They (the West) still think like landlords of a century ago. Landlords expected their peasants just to listen to their words. But the period of one-sided decision-making is over. Our nation does not accept imposed relations."

33. In addition to vetting approved legislation and disqualifying candidates for election, conservative-appointed governmental bodies have for years repressed the reformist media, and prosecuted, arrested, and at times violently attacked, political activists.

34. "5m Jobless in Next 15 Years: Oil Money Cannot Ensure Welfare," *Iran Daily*, 16 July 2005.

35. Fraud was not, however, a significant factor in the second and definitive round of voting when Ahmadinejad won handily against a longtime regime insider, and seemingly unpopular former president of the Islamic Republic, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani.

36. Walter Russell Mead, "A Darker Shadow Than Iraq," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 July 2004.

37. For an elaborated discussion, see Michael Eisenstein, "The Challenges of U.S. Preventive Military Action," in *Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions*, eds., Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (Carlisle, PA: AWC, SSI, January 2004).

38. *Ibid.*

39. The blame the United States would have to bear if it were to target Iran cannot be dismissed, nor can the fact that the preemptive use of force by the United States would create many more international enemies, some appearing in the form of terrorists.

40. Abbas William Samii, "Winning Iranian Hearts and Minds," in Sokolski and Clawson, chap. 3.

41. The Shah was permitted a brief visit for cancer treatment, partly because of pressure applied by David Rockefeller and Chase Manhattan Bank, which had substantial Pahlavi family holdings at stake. However, we can understand that it looked to many Iranians like the Shah's admission could be yet another staging for U.S. interventionism.

42. American statements are frequently counterproductive. Bush's denunciation just before Iran's presidential elections of its "electoral process that ignores the basic requirements of democracy" was seen by some to increase Iranian voter turnout. See Robin Wright and Michael A. Fletcher, "Bush Denounces Iran's Election," *Washington Post*, 17 June 2005, A18.

43. A complex understanding of Iranian culture probably leads to conclusions at odds with current U.S. policy. In a recent poll of Middle East area studies academics, most thought the Bush Administration should accept tightly monitored Iranian civilian nuclear-power generation. For more information, see Institute for Research: Middle East Policy, *Middle East Academic Survey Research Exposition*, July 2005.

44. U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney (radio interview), reported in David E. Sanger, "Cheney Says Israel Might 'Act First' on Iran," *New York Times*, 21 January 2005. Cheney said: "The Israelis might well decide to act first and let the rest of the world worry about cleaning up the diplomatic mess afterwards."

45. U.S. Congress, House, Jeffrey J. Schott, "The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996: Results to Date," testimony before the Committee on International Relations, Washington, D.C., 23 July 1997. Schott said: "Overall, the US sanctions have been costly to both Iran and the United States, but have generated few concrete benefits . . . and induced no significant change in Iranian policy."

46. Bruce Odessey, "One Analyst Views US Sanctions Against Iran As a Success," on-line at <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/1996/960429-434662.htm>, accessed 23 August 2005. cites Patrick Clawson in 1996, when Clawson was at the U.S. Department of Defense Institute for National Strategic Studies. Clawson estimated that sanctions cost Iran 10 percent of its foreign-exchange receipts in the first year.

47. The phraseology of the sentence used here is courtesy of Shahram Mostarshad.

48. In 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton and his administration removed certain commodities from the sanctions, notably Persian carpets and pistachios. U.S. antidumping regulations were not removed on pistachios, so the 300 percent duty on them remains.

49. Narsi Ghorban, "The Need to Restructure Iran's Petroleum Industry," *Middle East Economic Survey* (13 June 2005): 48:24. See also data from the *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 14 April 2004.

50. *Ibid.*

51. Eight U.S. soldiers were killed in April 1980 trying to rescue the American hostages, but this occurred in a military accident after the mission had been aborted.

52. From the Iranian perspective, in terms of recent past wrongs, more Iranian civilians died at American hands during shooting down of the civilian airliner by the USS *Vincennes* in 1988, an accident that killed nearly 300 passengers.

53. Marcus Noland in "Affinity and International Trade," Working Paper 05-3, Institute for International Economics (IIE), Washington, D.C., June 2005, and "Popular Attitudes, Globalization, and Risk," Working Paper 04-2, IIE, Washington, D.C., 2004. Noland says: "Warmer attitudes are associated with more trade."

54. Knorr, 97.

55. George Washington, "Farewell Address to the People of the United States," Richmond, Virginia, 26 September 1796, on-line at <www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/farewell/text.html>, accessed 23 August 2005.

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