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DOCTRINE, NOT DOGMA

See page 11



United States and Brazilian Military Relations

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The United States and Brazil have maintained longstanding military relations. This article reviews historical developments in this area and compares them with conditions existing today. It also points out causes of change in the relationship and considers what the future may hold.

In a world where powers find countless differences, hardly any two major states have seen such generally smooth relations over a long period as the giants of North and South America, which have never seriously quarreled during the entire period of their existence. Their association has occasionally been ruffled, but they have usually assumed that they had much in common. . . .¹

THE foregoing assessment of US-Brazilian relations may be true for the past, but the future holds no guarantee that "generally smooth relations" will continue. To a very great extent, countries forge relationships and alliances, based on their self-interests and the circumstances of the moment. The world is constantly blown by the winds of change, thus requiring states to reassess their ties with each other. As with individuals, international relationships must be continuously cultivated. If close relationships are taken for granted, they will usually wither and die over time; US-Brazilian relations are no exception.

As the largest country in Latin America and the fifth largest country in the world, Brazil plays an increasingly significant role in hemispheric relations and world politics. Its boundaries include approximately one-half of South America, and its population exceeds 120 million. Brazil has become a major agricultural power, as well as being a leading shipbuilder and weapons producer.² In addition, Brazil maintains the second largest military establishment in the Western Hemisphere. It is this Brazilian military establishment and its relationship with the United States that is of particular interest.

US-Brazilian military relations have been complex and ever-changing. Although these military ties represent only one facet of the total equation between the two powers, they have been very important. It appears probable that recent

developments in the South Atlantic will greatly impact on future US-Brazilian military relations.

The intent of this article is to review the historical development of military relations between the United States and Brazil and then to compare that history with the conditions which now exist. This article will also enable us to determine some of the reasons this relationship has changed and to evaluate the possible impact of these changes on future relations.

Foundations for Cooperation

The history of formal US military influence in Brazil dates back to 1922 when the two countries agreed on the establishment of a US naval mission to Brazil.³ This agreement created a framework for closely integrated military cooperation. Similar provisions were later adopted to bind the US Army and Air Force missions to the Brazilian military establishment. The 1922 agreement signified the beginning of a relationship which has since evolved through several important stages, with various levels of cooperation.

During the period from 1920 to about 1939, French doctrine and techniques still dominated the Brazilian army. Only with the increased tensions preceding World War II did the United States begin to take a more active interest in its military relations with Brazil. Early in 1938, a US-Brazilian military assistance program

was initiated, and, by the summer of 1939, cooperation had become reasonably close. This relationship became even stronger following the participation of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy during World War II.

The Brazilian Expeditionary Force was the first military unit in history to leave South America to engage in combat in Europe. It departed Brazil for Italy in July 1944. About 25,000 men participated in the expedition, the principal combat unit being an infantry division. The Brazilian air force was represented by the First Fighter Group. The infantry division entered combat in September 1944 and was engaged in nearly con-

tinuous action for almost 200 days.⁴ During World War II, the Brazilian military worked closely with US officers, in addition to receiving supplies and training from the United States. Brazilian military leaders tended to remain open to cooperation with the United States after World War II, and relations were cordial.

By 1969, Brazil had 30 collective defense arrangements with the United States.⁵ One of the first and most significant of these defense arrangements was the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). It was negotiated at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security which met in Rio

Troops of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy



de Janeiro, Brazil, during August-September 1947.

The Rio Treaty binds Brazil and the United States, as well as other Latin-American states, to the principle of collective security. Although the Rio Treaty predates the legal existence of the Organization of American States (OAS), it provides the basis upon which some of the OAS organs draw their decisional power.⁶

Under the Rio Treaty, the United States and the Latin-American states agreed that an attack against any one of them could be considered an attack against all, and that collective measures could be taken to repel such aggression. However, the Latin-American nations have been generally reluctant to perform security functions collectively. Brazil did not participate in, nor support, US actions during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, but it was the only country to provide a significant number of troops to support US forces after the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965.

Another very important milestone of US-Brazilian military relations was the signing of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. As a result of this legislation, all Rio Treaty signatories were permitted to purchase US military equipment on a reimbursable basis. Brazil was eligible for direct equipment aid under the bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) Agreement of 1953 and became the largest recipient of MDA in Latin America. As an additional part of the Military Assistance Program (MAP), US military advisory missions were established in Brazil at the request of that government.⁷

The MAP eventually became the basic instrument for implementing US military policy in Brazil. The MAP was intended to be administered only when three basic

principles were met: It was in the national self-interest of the United States, the assistance was requested and the receiving country demonstrated the ability and desire to help itself.⁸ Specifically, the objectives of the MAP for Brazil were:

- To assist in developing armed forces which, in conjunction with the civil police and other national security forces, were capable of maintaining the internal security necessary for orderly political, economic and social development.

- To increase the ability of the armed forces to perform civic action.⁹

- To develop selected military units for possible use in carrying out OAS/United Nations peacekeeping assignments.

- To encourage Brazil to relate force levels and defense expenditures to a realistic appraisal of legitimate security needs, national resources and overall development priorities.¹⁰

During the 1960s, military assistance consisted of four activities: equipment grant aid, equipment sales with associated credit provisions, US military missions and training.¹¹

Cooperative Institutions

To help in the coordination of cooperative military activities, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) was established in 1942 at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States and the Latin-American countries. This is the oldest international military body in the free world. It has as its primary purpose "broad planning for hemispheric defense and it also has a voice in determining the type of military aid to Latin countries for use in hemispheric defense."¹² The IADB was made a perma-

ment organization on 2 September 1947 at the time the Rio Treaty was signed. Neither the IADB nor the OAS has any ready forces at its disposal, but each embraces political, economic and cultural fields, as well as military planning and strategic studies.¹³

In addition to the IADB and the OAS, several other special programs were likewise established to facilitate close inter-American military cooperation. For example, 1960 was the beginning of an annual Conference of American Armies which rotated yearly among the Latin-American countries and the United States. Another method of facilitating close inter-American military cooperation was achieved through the establishment of three special training schools in the Canal Zone: the Cartographic School of the Inter-American Geodetic Survey at Fort Clayton, the US Army School of the Americas at Fort Gulic and the Inter-American Air Forces Academy at Albrook Air Force Base.¹⁴

These schools have been augmented by the Inter-American Defense College. The college opened in 1962 at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. It was established for the conduct of advanced studies at the strategic level, with the broad involvement in areas and disciplines particularly related to the hemisphere. The college was designed to advance the professional qualifications of military and civilian government officials and to prepare them for participation in activities associated with international cooperation with the hemisphere and interaction with nations or international organizations outside the hemisphere.

In addition to these already described, there have also been smaller training programs within Brazil specifically intended to help meet the particular needs of that country. These programs have provided

important professional and technical training. Similar schools have been conducted in other Latin-American countries, including instruction in radar maintenance, air traffic control, weapon systems, engineering and construction techniques, and preventive medicine training.

A further example of the type of training which has been provided to Brazil by the United States may be seen within the Brazilian navy. Its navy is perhaps the best in Latin America and is a capable, force of moderate size. It safeguards the 4,600-nautical-mile coastline and patrols the many waterways of the nation. Partly as a result of more than two decades of joint operations with the United States in the South Atlantic and Caribbean, the Brazilian navy today has an anti-submarine warfare force which is in a relatively good state of training and readiness.¹⁵

US-Brazilian military cooperation in the past was such that Brazil historically had the largest number of trainees under US-sponsored programs in Latin America. About one-third of the Brazilian line generals on active duty at the time of the "coup" on 1 April 1964 had received some schooling from or in the United States.¹⁶ By 1970, over 6,350 Brazilian officers and enlisted men had attended US schools, either within the Continental United States or in the Canal Zone.¹⁷

In 1970, professional and technical training accounted for 60 percent of the total training funds allocated for Brazil, but it accounted for only 15 percent of the students coming to the United States. Eighty-five percent of the Brazilian military who came to the United States under MAP training were on orientation tours.¹⁸

The long association of Brazilian and US military in training programs has con-

siderably helped the Brazilian armed forces develop their own educational and training system which is considered excellent in relation to other Latin-American countries. Most of the Brazilian service schools were patterned after US schools, and, in many cases, the instructors in these institutions were trained under US programs. Tri-service schools include the *Escola Superior de Guerra* (National War College) and the Brazilian Army Command and Staff School.

Grants, Loans and Sales

The 1960s marked a period of particularly close US-Brazilian military relations. This was perhaps nowhere better exemplified than in Brazil's desire to acquire military materiel. Most of the equipment obtained by Brazil in this period was for use by the army and air force. Several submarines were received by the navy during this period, but no

surface warships were acquired until Fiscal Year 1966. Most of the military equipment purchases were either from Great Britain or the United States. Some of the US hardware included 110 armored personnel carriers, 60 helicopters, 70 M41 tanks, five C130 transport planes, 30 T28 piston-engined trainer aircraft, and 70 T33 and T37 jet trainers.¹⁹ Partially as a result of these weapon purchases, Brazil had a \$1.6 billion debt to the United States by 1967.

To help discourage unnecessary military spending on costly prestige weapons which were neither required to maintain internal stability nor necessary to cope with any threat of insurgency, an agreement was reached at the 1967 Punta del Este summit meeting. This agreement stated that all Latin-American countries would eliminate extravagant military purchases of sophisticated weapons such as jet planes, tanks and warships.²⁰ In addition to the Punta del Este Agreement, the US Congress included in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 a similar prohibition on the use of military

US Military Group in Brazil

Year	Officers	Enlisted	Civilians	Locals
1961	44	43	10	42
1962	44	47	10	44
1963	45	48	11	46
1964	46	49	11	46
1965	48	51	13	49
1966	52	49	13	49
1968	51	52	43	49

Note. A significant reduction in military group personnel began after 1968, largely due to a declining need on the part of Brazil for such assistance.

Source: Senator Allen J. Ellender, "U.S. Government Operations in Latin America," Report to the Senate Committee on Appropriations, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1966, p 355.

Table 1

assistance funds for prestige weapons unless the president determined that this was important to the national security of the United States and so reported to Congress.²¹

The United States had a particularly difficult time maintaining this policy toward Brazil where there was a growing interest in non-US sophisticated military equipment. This was especially true in the purchase of jet aircraft. For example, in January 1968, the Ministry recommended that Brazil buy one squadron of 18 French *Mirage III* aircraft rather than US *F5s*.²² French conditions of payment were easier, and French industry was considering establishing factories in Brazil. On 15 May 1970, the US Department of State announced it was finally willing to sell military jet aircraft to Brazil if a formal request was submitted.²³ But, later that month, Brazil signed an agreement with France for 16 *Mirage IIIE-B* jet aircraft for interceptor and training purposes. According to a 1968 report by a special congressional committee:

The United States is reluctant to sell aircraft to Latin America and is becoming non-competitive with foreign suppliers. The once dominant and influential position of the U.S. Air Force in relation to Latin American air force equipment may now be in real jeopardy. This trend to third-country suppliers of aircraft results from a number of factors. Although Latin American military personnel are U.S. oriented, and would prefer to remain so, their governments are influenced by the more favorable purchase arrangements elsewhere. Possibly more important to Latin America are the growing restrictions and inflexibility of the U.S. toward military sales and the imminent and announced phaseout of grant aid equipment. One other significant factor is the upsurge in anti-U.S. nationalism, coupled

*with a growing desire on the part of Latin Americans to express themselves as individuals and sovereign nations by disassociating themselves from traditional U.S. arms suppliers.*²⁴

The subject of the sale of sophisticated weapon systems, such as jet aircraft, to Brazil indeed aroused much controversy. The United States could easily say that Brazil did not need modern jet fighters to satisfy its defense needs and national pride (even though the Brazilian air force, relying principally on *F80* aircraft, had no planes in its inventory in 1970 which could even catch a *Boeing 707* passenger airplane).²⁵ However, the decision to buy this type of hardware usually had already been made, and it was just a question of which country made the sale.

This realization forced the United States to reappraise its position in then early 1970s. As a result, the policy limiting the sale of advanced weapons was largely reserved. An example of this was seen in the Brazilian decision to order 36 US Air Force *F5E Tiger II* fighters and six *F5B* two-seat trainers. These aircraft were first ordered during 1973 and were scheduled for initial delivery in early 1975. They were ordered under the US foreign military sales program and represented a major breakthrough in US policy.²⁶

US Military Grants and Sales to Brazil (in millions of dollars)

	Grants	Sales	Total
1960-69	12.3	61.9	74.2
1970-76	11.8	143.4	155.2

Source: Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor Jr., *American National Security: Policy and Process*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md., 1981, p. 458.

Table 2

A Turning Point

The history of US-Brazilian military relations has seen several important turning points. These include the 1922 agreement establishing a US naval mission, the experience of World War II, the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the Brazilian Democratic Revolution of 1964 and, more recently, the cooling of relations during the Carter administration.

By the beginning of the 1970s, US-Brazilian military relations were already showing signs of weakening. Two factors contributing to the change were the declining image of the United States in world affairs and Brazil's growing economic-political-military position in the international community. An increasing sense of independence and *grandeza* (greatness) were emerging in this period, and US attempts to regulate Brazilian military policies through the MAP were viewed in Brazil as an affront to the national spirit. This sense of independence was expressed by former President Emilio Garrastazú Medici in 1970 when he said:

*Our country refuses to believe that history necessarily develops in favor of some countries and to the prejudice of others; it does not accept that power is the source of irremovable positions; and it reaffirms the right to forge, within its frontiers, its own destiny and to choose, outside its frontiers, its own allies and its own courses.*²¹

Recognizing this shift in Brazilian attitude, the Ford administration attempted in the mid-1970s to strengthen the "special relationship" which had traditionally existed with Brazil as the first-among-equals in Latin-American politics.

In February 1976, Secretary of State

Henry A. Kissinger concluded a memorandum of understanding with Brazil which promised that the two countries would collaborate broadly, consult on all important issues of mutual concern and hold semiannual meetings.²⁸ In a sense, the United States recognized Brazil as a major ally. However, the memorandum was more style than substance.

With the incoming Carter administration in 1977, relations took a marked change for the worse. President Jimmy Carter's criticism of human rights violations in Brazil and his attempt to restrict Brazilian nuclear power developments finally led to a break in formal military relations. Brazil canceled the military agreement in effect since 1952 and, in September 1977, terminated the US Naval Mission Agreement and the US-Brazil Joint Military Commission left over from World War II.²⁹ In 1978, Brazil further "underlined its independence by failing to send a single student to the officer's school at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone, breaking a 30-year tradition."³⁰ Cooperation continued, however, through the chiefs of staff and some joint military exercises.³¹

Modernization and Export

While the human rights and nuclear-power issues brought on new ramifications in US-Brazilian relations, the Brazilian government gave considerable attention to the status of its armed forces. It should be noted that, before Brazil broke its military ties with the United States, modernization and rearmament programs for all branches of the military had been contemplated by the general staff. The Carter initiatives only exacerbated the situation. Within Brazil, there

were renewed outcries by some hard-line strategists at the National War College that the development of an indigenous defense capability had not progressed fast enough. As one official put it:

*Any country which wants to think in terms of being independent must be self-sufficient in war material and have a minimum to maintain its security. . . . Where it manufactures for itself it must think about selling. . . .*³²

Within this context, Brazil began to place greater emphasis on the development of an arms industry and the creation of high-technology research centers. It became Brazilian policy that an indigenous arms industry could compete with the United States in Latin America, as well as enter the international market. At the same time, a shift in doctrine called for the transformation of the Brazilian military from a traditional internal police organization to a broader national defense force capable of dealing with external threats.³³

Key to Brazil's policy was the development of a "step-by-step procedure" to move the country's arms industry "from the simple to more complex technology."³⁴ To facilitate this program, the government began to place heavy pressure on its newly formed war materials industry company—IMBEL. This state-owned company was charged with the task of procuring foreign partners whose trading policies would ensure high-technology transfers and domestic participation of state and private enterprises.³⁵ In addition, Brazil's mobilization law (still in effect) was to continue to control production lines, specify items to be manufactured and restrict certain imports.³⁶ The Brazilian president even decreed the importation of raw materials or components for military industry as tax-exempt.³⁷

Under these policies, Brazil's primary source of sophisticated technology and major component parts (through commercial export licenses) became Western Europe. With the decline of US arms sales and high-technology exports, Brazil's industrial, and military leadership formed a partnership. Both state and private enterprise entered a market heretofore dominated by the United States. The prosperity, direction and diversification of their efforts gave a new stimulus to its embryonic arms industry and a boost to its economy.

A study of Brazil's entire military-industrial complex is beyond the scope of this article. However, the progress of three companies should be noted: ENGESA, the specialized engineer and armored vehicles industry; EMBRAER, the state-owned aircraft industry; and AVIBRAS, the aerospace industry.

ENGESA is the largest of the three. It employs some 200 engineers who have received training in Brazil and Western Europe.³⁸ Since the early 1970s, this company's light armored wheeled vehicles have achieved international recognition. Through a policy of lateral procurement, ENGESA has been able to lower production costs and offer a more competitive weapon system. For example, the company's *EE9 Cascavel* armored reconnaissance vehicle and the *EE11 Urutu* amphibious armored personnel carrier may now be purchased with such equipment as passive night vision devices, antitank missiles and sophisticated communications equipment.

To further add to their competitiveness, ENGESA has "manufactured combat vehicles adopted to the developing country's needs."³⁹ Consequently, ENGESA has found markets in Iraq, Libya, Qatar and 27 other Middle Eastern, African and Latin-American states.

Many of the company's vehicles have been battle-tested and have proven their effectiveness in recent Middle East conflicts.⁴⁰


With such success, ENGESA is now concentrating its efforts on production of the *X30* medium tank for the Brazilian army. Such a project would undoubtedly incorporate the most sophisticated technology in the field of combat armor vehicles. For instance, the electronic and power systems similar to the German *Leopard* tank and the suspension system used in the *M1 Abrams* (US) main battle tank are often mentioned. The *X30*'s armament will include a 105mm main gun, a NATO 7.62mm coaxial machine-gun and an anti-aircraft gun in the turret. If accepted by the Brazilian army, such a project would expand ENGESA into the field of tracked combat vehicles. Most significantly, however, Brazilian authorities are demanding that 80 to 90 percent

of the major components be produced domestically.⁴¹

EMBRAER's aeronautical expansion has also placed Brazil in a more independent position. It is pursuing the broadest and most proven mechanisms for replacing Brazilian air force equipment with materiel produced by national technology. As with ENGESA, EMBRAER was formed in 1970. Initially, the company produced small agricultural aircraft for Brazil and neighboring countries. Over an eight-year period, EMBRAER expanded its production to nearly 50 different models for agricultural, passenger and limited military use. By late 1976, the government's restrictive finance interest rates curtailed EMBRAER's sales.

The political events of 1977, however, sparked a renewed interest in the "Brazilianization" of the aircraft industry. The government imposed stiff import restrictions on all foreign aircraft and

ENGESA EE11 Urutu fitted with ENGESA ET90 turret armed with ENGESA EC90 90mm gun



Jones's Armour and Artillery, 1984 82

their component parts. Greater emphasis was placed on expansion of the Brazilian aircraft industry and diversifying its export market.⁴³ At the same time, production facilities for the manufacture of spare parts for Brazilian (French) *Mirage* and (US) *F5E* aircraft were constructed.⁴⁴

EMBRAER's best export aircraft is the *Bandeirante* which has both civilian and military applications. Likewise, the company's *Xavante* fighter-trainer is fast replacing outdated US aircraft in the Brazilian air force and has recently been purchased by several Latin-American and African states.⁴⁵

The company's most ambitious project to date is the *AMX* fighter. Under a joint memorandum, Italian and Brazilian assembly plants are scheduled to deliver 144 aircraft to the Brazilian air force during the period 1984-89. Since January 1981, Italy and Brazil have been conducting developmental tests and designs. The *AMX* will be a subsonic, highly acrobatic, fighter plane capable of carrying more than 8,000 pounds of external weapon stores a distance of 2,000 kilometers.

Planned armament for the *AMX* includes *Sidewinder*-type air-to-air missiles, rocket launchers, a 20mm cannon and air-to-surface antiship weapons. It will also incorporate the latest in avionics technology. Current design calls for an active and passive electronic countermeasure device, a headup weapon/navigation data display and an air data computer. At \$7 million a copy, Brazil will undercut the price of any comparable top-of-the-line fighter on today's market.⁴⁶

To complement Brazil's new family of armored vehicles and jet aircraft, AVIBRAS is devoting its research to the development of solid-propellant rockets, telemetry systems and advanced electronics. The company has an ambitious


schedule of expansion that extends to the end of the decade. This includes building one of the world's largest rocket factories, as well as production facilities for the construction of satellite transmitting stations and communication satellites.⁴⁷ AVIBRAS currently manufactures the *Sonda*-series rockets for the Space Activities Institute as part of the Brazilian Aerospace program. These small and medium-sized rockets have proven to be an excellent investment.

Since the *Sonda* is relatively inexpensive, it is widely exported for use in "experimental and operational tests on equipment and instruments planned for larger vehicles" by foreign countries.⁴⁸ This, in turn, has placed Brazil in the advantageous position of gaining access to an experience in foreign space programs. For example, the French are installing a satellite tracking station in Barreira do Inferno in Brazil. Instead of paying for this privilege, France has agreed to transfer possession of all of their equipment to Brazil following a two-year utilization and training period.⁴⁹

The derivatives of AVIBRAS' space program have also placed the company at the forefront of Brazil's tactical rocket and missile production. A 70mm air-to-surface missile is already being manufactured. With some modification, it is being exported to several Arab states for deployment on Soviet-made aircraft. The propellant was engineered by AVIBRAS and is considered to be one of the best in the world.⁵⁰

More recently, the company's *AV/XI* wire-guided antitank missile entered the production line. It is similar to the US *TOW* or Soviet *Sagger* antitank missile and can be deployed from armored vehicles or from the ground by one soldier.⁵¹ Future weapon designs include an antitank unguided rocket launcher, an

EMBRAER



Xavante fighter-trainer

air-to-surface missile guided by television, an air-to-air missile (similar to the US Sidewinder, called the *Piranha*) and a medium-range tactical missile of the US *Pershing II* class.⁵²

The production of all of these weapon systems by Brazilian industry is of significant importance to the military. As one general pointed out, it:

moves the country from being a mere manufacturer of ballistic rockets to the restricted level occupied by nations which possess the process for making highly accurate missiles.

Moreover, Brazil is convinced that the "prospects of selling the AV/X-1 [and other items] on the international market are immense."⁵³

Irrespective of this analysis, we must not overlook the fact that the expansion of Brazil's arms industry complements force development plans as directed by the general staff. The army is already in the process of converting the majority of its divisions to mechanized infantry and armor forces.⁵⁴ The navy is pressing hard to modernize and expand the fleet "using" Brazilian industry and limited foreign assistance.⁵⁵ This includes incorporating Brazil's atomic power program to

build nuclear-propelled submarines by the 1990s.⁵⁶

At each phase of industrial development, the military ensures its involvement by requiring special training programs for its officer and enlisted personnel. For example, the army has created a new technology center and several specialized training schools. There are also plans to establish an Industrial Development Institute and an Institute of Standards and Data Processing. In addition, IMBEL is responsible for maintaining a link between private firms and the military through a variety of cooperative exchange programs.⁵⁷

Economically, the expansion of Brazil's arms industry has generated investment, technology transfers and a new source of revenue. There are 350 firms and 55 organizations involved directly or indirectly with weapons production. This military-industrial complex has created more than 25,000 jobs and accounted for \$1.2 billion in exports during 1981. At the same time, the Brazilian government can boast of having one of the lowest military expenditures of any country in Latin America—1 percent of the gross national product.⁵⁸

Against this background, there is little wonder why Brazil is forming joint ventures, consortia and research institutes at such a rapid rate. Moreover, Brazil sees the opportunity to export military hardware not only as a matter of economics but also as a means to broaden its influence and international esteem. Brazilian armored vehicle sales to Libya signals that Brazil is entering the arms race in the Middle East and "may even exert influence on the armament balance in the region."⁵⁹ This may be an exaggeration, but it is a matter for future consideration.

Conclusion

At present, Brazil is not an autonomous military power. Significant portions of the major components for new weapon systems are still under foreign license. Future expansion of the arms industry will be hampered by economic problems due to a huge national debt and balance of payment deficits resulting from oil imports. Thus, in the foreseeable future,

Brazil will be dependent to some extent on foreign military assistance.

On the other hand, this does not mean Brazil will rely on the United States as it has in the past. We must not underestimate Brazilian national interest and national pride. Brazil will attempt to pursue a course which it deems to be in its self-interest, even if this means opposition to traditional US policies. Termination of the 1952 military agreement was one example; the search for new suppliers of technology and armament is another. It is imperative to our policy formulation that we understand that the Brazilian government supports its right to self-determination more emphatically every day.

One would hope that an increased understanding of the various pressures and trends influencing US-Brazilian military relations may enable both countries to better cope with the needs and desires of the other. In this way, Brazil and the United States may be able to maintain a cooperative relationship which reflects the realities of the present and yet is capable of responding to the dynamics of changing international conditions.

NOTES

1 Robert Wesson, *The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence* (Praeger Publishers, N.Y. 1981) p. 11.

2 Jay Mallin, *Brazil: Next World Superpower?* *Reader's Digest* September 1981 p. 93 and John Hoyl Williams, *Brazil: Giant of the Southern Hemisphere* *National Defense* October 1982, pp. 40-43 and 57 and November 1982, pp. 16-20 and 47. Despite the fact that Brazil has the world's seventh largest economy, it is currently experiencing serious economic conditions. See Albert Fishlow, *The United States and Brazil: The Case of the Missing Relationship* *Foreign Affairs* Volume 60 Number 4 Spring 1982 pp. 908-13.

3 Reports on the Special Study Mission to Latin America on (1) Military Assistance Training and (2) Developmental Television House of Representatives 915: Congress Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development, Committee on Foreign Affairs 7 May 1970 pp. 4-5. The 1922 agreement on the US naval mission contained these terms: (a) Transportation from the United States to Brazil and return upon completion of a tour of duty was provided the accredited US naval officer or enlisted man and his dependents by the government of Brazil. In addition on the cost of transportation for his household goods, excess baggage and personal automobile to Brazil and back was borne by the Brazilian government. (b) All US Navy officers who were assigned to the naval mission served in the rank they held but at the same time were senior to all Brazilian naval officers of the same rank. (c) Each

member of the naval mission originally received an agreed amount of compensation directly from the Brazilian government. However, in later years this was shifted over and directly to the US Treasury. Members of the naval mission were granted free entry for articles for their personal use and that of their families. The chief of the naval mission was provided an automobile and a driver for use on official business by the Brazilian government. Thomas E. Wolf, et al., *Area Handbook for Brazil*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1971 p. 569.

5 *Military Assistance Facts* Department of Defense Washington, D.C. 1.

6 Jack Vincent, *Handbook of International Relations* Barron's Educational Series, N.Y. 1969 p. 249.

7 Senator Allen J. Fendler, "US Government Operations in Latin America," report to the Senate Committee on Appropriations US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1966, pp. 355.

8 Lieutenant Colonel Victor A. Rawlins, "The Role of United States Military Assistance in Brazil," *Air War College/Air University Report* Number 36 9 Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. May 1968, p. 26.

9 Civic action and counterinsurgency programs received special attention in Brazil during the late 1960s and early 1970s. This was largely due to the activity of urban based guerrilla groups such as the *Alaçaõ Libertadora Nacional* which was led by Carlos

Marighella, a former member of the Brazilian Congress. Marighella was killed in a shoot out with police in São Paulo in 1969.

10 Rawlins, *op cit* p 26/27
11 Group Study *United States Military Assistance to Latin America* Naval War College, Annapolis, Md 1969, p 59
12 Rawlins *op cit*, p 16

13 Colonel Francis H. Weiland, "The Inter American Defense Board," *Air University Review* November-December 1971d

14 Dr. A. Glenn Morton, "The Inter American Air Force Academy," *Air University Review* November-December 1966, p 20

15 "Reports on the Special Study Mission to Latin America on (1) Military Assistance Training and (2) Developmental Television," *op cit*, p 5

16 Wesson, *op cit*, p 40
17 "Reports on the Special Study Mission to Latin America on (1) Military Assistance Training and (2) Developmental Television," *op cit*, p 4

18 *Ibid*, p 7
19 Geoffrey Kemp, "Some Relationships Between US Military Training in Latin America and Weapons Acquisitions Pattern 1959-1969," Arms Control Project, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass 2 February 1970, pp 26 and 29

20 Colonel John N. Bonini, "United States Strategy Toward Brazil," *Air War College/Air University*, Report Number 3721, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. April 1969, p 71

21 *Ibid*, p 72
22 World News Digest, "Facts on File," Facts on File, N.Y. 1968, p 39D1

23 World News Digest, "Facts on File," Facts on File, N.Y. 1970, p 497A1

24 Review of US Military Commitments Abroad, Phase III—Rio and ANZUS Pacts, Report of the Special Subcommittee on National Defense Posture of the Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives 90th Congress, 31 December 1968, p 11

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54 As late as 1977, Brazil's army consisted of seven infantry divisions and four mechanized divisions. Today the army has eight divisions, each with up to four armored or mechanized infantry brigades. See *The Military Balance, 1978-1979*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Engd 1979, p 72

55 Great Britain and West Germany have both signed agreements with Brazil on the construction of naval vessels, including providing technical assistance, materials and loans. See JPRS, 17 June 1982, p 65, FBIS, 30 June 1981, p D2, and FBIS, 13 July 1981, p J3

56 Since 1975, Brazil has contemplated building its own nuclear submarines but has often denied the rumors. By 1979 the naval minister openly asserted Brazil's plans to build nuclear sub marines. See JPRS, 16 September 1979, pp 21/25 and JPRS, 25 February 1976, p 15, also see FBIS, 7 November 1979, p D2, and FBIS, 30 June 1981, p D2

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