essential. The use of a stereoscope is also essential for careful planning. In fact, it is not too much to say that a stereoscopic reconnaissance has to replace a ground reconnaissance in jungle warfare. A ground reconnaissance is usually far beyond the capacity of a battalion commander during jungle operations.

Training Methods

It will be seen, therefore, that training in jungle tactics needs a technique based upon photograph study. Cloth model exercises must also provide exercise in appreciation of the special additional features which jungle growth superimposes upon ground. A well-made cloth model has the special advantage of being convertible to numerous patterns of jungle simply by interchanging sections or turning them around. Its construction should be so planned that the breaks in texture occur at the same distance from the edges of the model on each section. This enables any two sections to be placed side by side so as to produce a continuous sweep of each texture. For training purposes it should be photographed and gridded, so that trainees may be exercised in working from photographs in relation to the model. It may be used in conjunction with radio to perfect control in the jungle when units are working in co-operation, using photographs and radio communication.

The sections which represent a coastline may be used with the sections representing an inland axis which is either a path or road.

Exercises on the model, interspersed with visits to a rain forest which has characteristics similar to the jungle, are useful; but, where the rain forest is not available, very useful training may be undertaken on the model, with a little dramatization.

India and Her Neighbors--A Geopolitical Interpretation

Digested from an article by C. S. Venkatachar in "The Journal of the United Service Institution" (India) April 1954.

FATES were indeed malevolent to the subject known by the German name of Geopolitik. For, no simple basic idea has been twisted and perverted from its original thought as geopolitics. Around the few basic principles of Mackinder has grown a mushroom of false ideas on history and human geography and a spurious literature on the subject of geopolitics. Mackinder is in no way responsible for such intellectual perversities. His perception centered mainly around two ideas. Geography, principally space and the strategic opportunities which physical geography conferred, was the pivot of history of a people or a race and manpower was a measure of physical and national strength of a country—both tremendous realities shifting the balance in the constant duel between land power and sea power in favor of the former. Mackinder also seriously questioned the assumption of the Islanders of the inevitability of sea power, warning them that organization in space and of manpower by the Continentals spelled the doom of the Islanders and their sea power, and what was more serious, the destruction of their democratic way of life.

These somewhat novel ideas of Mackinder attracted little attention in western Europe. European political thought was firmly rooted in the principle of the balance of power whose relation to the new perception of the balancing of areas and populations was not quite apparent. The west European mind was not unduly
obsessed by vastness of territory or teeming populations. Small European countries in the modern world held dominance and sway over large non-European territories and populations. There seemed little virtue in mere size and large backward populations. The western mind was saturated with the Helleno-Roman culture. The greatness of the Greeks lay neither in space nor in numbers. Europe did not realize until the end of World War II that attack on the West would come from within Europe; the West always looked for counterattack from the East. It feared more the recovery of the Asian and other suppressed peoples than the quarrel among the Europeans in Europe.

Mackinder set out his principles from a west European foreground. He had the foresight to see the rivalry between the Teuton and the Slav. Teutonic Germany had no space in the center of Europe. Russia had a vast hinterland in Asia. If Russia and Germany were to combine, they would control a vast area, and as an Islander, Mackinder saw that the sea bases in western Europe would be threatened by the enormous power of the Continentals. Mackinder’s proposition was that the Teuton and the Slav should be separated by interposing between them an effective barrier, a system of three Tier States which are at present included in the Soviet bloc—hence, his emphasis on space and his conception of Heartland. Viewed from the Asian foreground, space and population convey a different meaning. The geopolitical idea arises out of fear of aggression and of the exploitation of strategic ideas by unscrupulous organizers of society with a “ways and means” mind, whereas, at the Asian end the emphasis is on the advancement of civilization. Indeed, the history of China and India proves that the civilization of these two countries survived because of their space and population. Mackinder argued that the attack on the west and on the Mediterranean world was organized from the Heartland although conceding that the attack came from the vacant spaces which had no reservoir of manpower. He, however, did not appreciate the nature of the movement of the nomads in the vacancies of Asia and its relation to the civilization of India and China. His idea of the nomadic movement was one of aggression on the west.

The argument put forward here is that there are two main traffics in civilization in the history of the peoples of Europe and Asia. The first and the earlier of them is on land from east to west; the second and the modern one is mainly on sea from west to east, and the dividing line between these two traffics is the maritime age of Columbus and Vasco da Gama.

State of Neighbors

Let us for a moment treat all of Asia, Africa, and Europe as one land area and divide this huge space into four or five zones. India, China, and the islands of the Indies can be one zone; let us call it the monsoon land. There is a vast land area from the Pacific to the Baltic. It can be called the Eurasian land mass. Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and the adjacent islands appear from the Asiatic end as a promontory of this vast land mass. We may call it the European coastline. There is a land bridge between Asia and Africa which we may call Arabia or the Fertile Crescent. There is the desert region of the Saharas from the Atlantic to the Nile. Below the Saharas there is a vast continental area.

The monsoon land and the European coastline occupy only one-fifth of the total area of Asia, Africa, and Europe but contain four-fifths of the total world population—a matter of considerable significance. It means the rest of the area is very sparsely populated. This world of ours has vast vacant spaces, with an area of 12 million square miles and a popula-
tion of less than 30 million, or one-seventieth of the population of the globe. It is these vacancies girdling around the earth from the Sahara through Arabia to Central Asia and Siberia which constitute a major break in the social continuity of mankind. They have played a great role in the history and development of civilization of Asia. If you examine a map, you will notice that there is a region of vast forests from the north of Germany through the northern part of the Soviet Union extending to all of Siberia. Below the southern border of this forested area lies a vast open ground, a luscious prairie and as you move southward, the aridity increases and the grass becomes more sparse. This entire grassland, rich, and poor, is called Steppe by the geographers. The Steppe starts from the center of Europe, passes through the southern part of the Soviet Union and enters Asia through the gateway, namely, the gap between the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea. Then the grass zone bends south and continues eastward over the lower level of the Mongolian Upland. It then passes through Altai and Tian Shan Mountains in a narrow gap with the Gobi Desert to the south of it and ends at the less-detached grasslands of a part of Manchuria. This is the longest open passage or corridor in the world. This passage faces India and China and has a system of the mightiest and the most massive barriers in the world. The large population of China and India lies around the eastern and southern slopes of these mighty barriers which include the Himalayas, the Tibetan Plateau, the Karakoram, the Hindukush, and the Tian Shan. These barriers have deflected the traffic of civilization to India and China and the deflected traffics have found their way into China and India, in each case through two highways. The Mongolian Upland is lower than Tibet—and from that area one can reach the Province of Kansu in China, and to the great city of Sian and the other directly southward from Lake Baikal to Pekin. Similarly, in the case of India, these massive heights slope down to the Iranian Upland from which two passages lead to India, one through the Kabul Valley and the Khyber Pass to the Plains of the Punjab, and the other through the Bolan Gorge to the regions of the lower Indus.

This open passage is connected with the Sahara through the land bridge of Arabia. Part of it known as the Fertile Crescent has tracks of ancient fertility.

With the aid of physical geography, we are now in a position to follow the nature of India’s contact with her neighbors. We may consider three factors of contact between India and her neighbors and they are: commerce, religion, and politics.

Commerce

A vast country with monsoon characteristics is bound to develop a peasant society and economy. The Greeks did not know China but Herodotus wrote that of all the countries the ancients knew, India had the largest population. Large areas with vast populations generally tend toward a self-sufficient economy. In such an economy, there is no great impulse for external trade except for the exchange of luxury articles. So in the premaritime age, commerce and trade were not the prime factors in establishing relations with the neighbors.

Religion

A remarkable feature of Indian civilization is that religion was never spread outside India with the help of the secular arm. It spread through the trade routes. The Mahayana form of Buddhism radiated its powerful influence from the northwest part of India through the Central Asian trade routes to China. The Hinayana form of Buddhism and the higher elements of Hinduism and art were carried across the
sea routes to Farther India and the Indies.

**Politics**

This term is not used to connote international relations in the modern sense. It would be more appropriate to indicate the phases of India's contact with the outer world. Along the course of the traffic from east to west, we may locate three centers of civilization, namely the Chinese, the Indian, and the Graeco-Roman world. But they were not neighbors in the geographical sense, although they had intermittent contacts. Their neighbors were the nomads and the barbarians. It is to the vacant spaces to which a reference has been made previously that we must look for the movements of the nomads. If we people the vacant open passage, call history to our aid, and follow their movements, we see then the politics of the three civilized regions in the premaritime age was determined by the physical geography of Asia and the historical dynamism in the open corridor.

**Traffic in Civilization**

From the dawn of history, the direction of the nomadic movement is from the Steppe to the Sown. In the prehistoric phase of the movement, Indo-European peoples are said to have wandered away from the Steppe to Iran, India, the Aegean, and Italy. In the same direction, the drift continued in the historical period up to the maritime age. Our knowledge about the nomads is meager but some material has been gathered by historians to attempt certain conclusions. From European, Chinese, and other sources, we know that the nomads under different names were the tenants of the open corridor. There is a stage in which the nomads were peaceful. At any rate, the civilized people do not hear anything about them. As a pastoral people, the nomads are mobile and their mobility is due to their taming of the horse in some remote period of antiquity. On the grassy lands they follow the pastures and travel long distances. When they quarrel among themselves, sections of them get pushed along the passage. At other times, the ambitious among the nomads weld groups into a strong society and the nomadic region acquires power and movements are set on foot which affect the civilized or settled regions on the borderland of the nomads. On other occasions, a great ruler or leader rises whose actions and conquests spread beyond the confines of the seat of power of the nomads. When their activities are less warlike, the nomads come to agricultural areas as peaceful settlers and become absorbed in the local population. All these factors have come into operation in the movements of the nomads.

It would be convenient to view this traffic from the Chinese end. China always showed awareness of the existence of the nomads on her northern borders. A major event in the Chinese history is the prolonged duel with the northern barbarians. Chinese chronicles mention the Hiang-Nu who harried the Chinese a great deal. These are no other than the Huns of European history, and the Hunas of Indian tradition. The Chinese knew also another branch of the nomads, the Yue-Chi who had been displaced by the Hiang-Nu. From the 10th to the 12th century the Chinese were again very much harassed by the barbarians and their capital had to be shifted to the southern province of China. China took the weight of the attack of the Mongols over Europe by accepting Kublai Khan as the Emperor of China. These Mongols were overthrown after 90 years. The Manchus, again northern barbarians, displaced the Mings who had succeeded the Mongols.

The effect of these great activities of the Chinese civilization can be seen in certain events of Indian history. Yue-Chi, who had been displaced by Hiang-Nu, pushed the people known as the Sakas who
had settled in the corridor somewhere between Iaxartes and Lake Issyk Kul and further displaced the Bactrian Greeks who were ruling in the areas to the north of the Hindu Kush with the result that the displaced Greeks moved on to the Kabul valley and from there figured for some time as the rulers of the West Punjab. The Sakas had to get around Herat and appeared in Baluchistan and Sind and later in Western India as the Indo-Scythians. The nomadic flood carried the streams of the Huns to the farthest extent. The Huns under their great leader Attila made a three-pronged attack of Europe and dealt a fatal blow to the Roman Empire. One of the streams of the Huns came to India and its leader was defeated. Another branch of Hiang-Nu, called Asena, is referred to in Chinese chronicles as Turks, derived from a word meaning helmet and applied to a helmet-shaped mountain. These Turks figure in the Tang dynasty and Chinese diplomacy was busy in breaking up the solidarity of these barbarians. Although the vast empire of the Turks collapsed by 582 A.D., they again attain prominence in the history of Asia and Europe after the 10th century. Even such fragments of a few facts illuminate the transmission of impulses in the corridor traversing vast stretches of territory.

How did India respond to the movement of the nomads? Where the Chinese showed awareness and resorted to military and diplomatic measures, the Indian attitude seems to have been to tackle the problem as it arose, when the entrance to India was pierced and the nomads actually reached Indian territory. India, unfortunately, did not think dynamically of her frontiers. Physical barriers may be static but the minds of men behind them are not. It is the movement of men and ideas behind the barriers which matters. In the absence of pasture, the nomads could not wander about aimlessly on the roof of the world. Physical geography to some extent was responsible for Indian complacency. The main direction of the flood of the movement of the nomads was through the Asiatic gateway to Europe. A portion of the stream descended cascade-like over the Iranian Upland into the Fertile Crescent. It was always a very small element which pierced the Hindu Kush and thrust into the Gangetic Valley. Nevertheless, the movement had been of sufficient frequency to have roused the consciousness of India. Alexander the Great established that once the Hindu Kush was crossed, passage to the plains of Punjab was possible unless there was a strong barrier in the north to overthrow the invader. The divide between the northwestern plains of Hindustan and the Central Asian regions was the Hindu Kush Mountains. A movement to the north of Hindu Kush caused no seismic tremor in the plains of the Punjab. When the southern slope of the Hindu Kush was occupied, then the security of the northern Indian plains was definitely threatened. Indian civilization dealt with two types of nomadic movement. One is the folk migration of peaceful pastorals who were absorbed in the Hindu fold. The other established its political rule on the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush and penetrated into the Gangetic plain. Before the Islamic period, these nomads were either overthrown or they were thoroughly Indianized. The later Islamized Turkish marauders who founded their principalities in Delhi soon cut themselves away from the main traffic of civilization in Central Asia. They became local Indian rulers and the most illustrious of them, Babar and his descendants, attempted to establish a national state in India.

The nomads were people on the march. History wrongly represents them as world conquerors; they belonged to no state.

As long as nomadism existed, the gravitational pull was from the Steppe to
the Sown. The nomads had as much right to march into the cultivated agricultural areas as the Europeans in their trans-marine movement to occupy the vacant spaces of the world. The nomads could not have been left in a state of perpetual motion and mobility. They had to be absorbed by the higher civilization or their societies transformed into civilized ones. India and China, with their ancient civilization and traditional societies, were cast into the role of the tamers and civilizers of the nomads. They were also the shock absorbers for nomadic eruptions. Thus, space and large population far from having an aggressive function were the historic contributors to the advancement of civilization.

This aspect has not received sufficient attention in the west and its inadequate appreciation has led to some misinformed generalizations of Asian history. The nomads did not set out to destroy the superior civilization of Rome. The barbarian attack would in any case gain weight and massiveness in its passage in the corridor—the full brunt of which was to be expected at its terminal end. The nomadic attack was not launched by any organized state; neither was it organized warfare. There was a collision of people leading to the coalescing of cultures. The Huns did not destroy the Roman Empire. The barbarians became part of it. Only the Roman mansion became an apartment house with some new and socially undesirable tenants. The Saracens in less than half a century overran the vacancies from Gibraltar to Transoxiana. It was as though an electric current had been switched off from a powerhouse in Arabia. The European mind long confused the movement of the nomads with the politics of Islam which aggressively and defiantly confronted western Christendom.

The onslaught of the nomads did not lead to the collapse of India and China. Modifications were no doubt made in their internal social structure. The political shape of Europe was altered. The axis of power was shifted from the Mediterranean to the north. Unlike the land masses of China and India, the Mediterranean world was a small area, and on its collapse it was politically fragmented. The people inhabiting the European coastline, to which the main energies of the European people were now shifted, felt a sense of confinement in a narrow space. For a long time they had to tolerate the barbarians. They had to struggle to save their nascent Christianity from the attacks of the infidels. The marshy lands of eastern and central Europe had to be drained and populated and here civilized life came later into existence. The Saracens, under the banner of Islam, stood poised on a strategic arc and held western Christendom at bay, and the Mongols delivered hammer blows on parts of Europe, the last of the great movements in the corridor. The pressure exerted on the rear, an unknown and unchartered sea in front, the need for trade and commerce and economic expansion—these in one way or another were responsible in releasing the hidden springs of energy of the western people which ultimately led to the extension of the power of the European countries over the seas.

Sea Power

The highway of traffic changed over from land to sea with the direction reversed from west to east. This traffic fell into two component parts. There was the movement of people across the seas in numbers larger than that of the nomads. It has been estimated that in the 19th century, nearly 40 million Europeans were transported across the seas, principally to the Americas. The other aspect is the organization of power on the seas. The Indian Ocean basin is a strategic theater for the organization of sea power. It has exterior and interior aspects. In strategic thinking both the exterior and interior
parts are complementary. Two special features of the Indian Ocean are organization of land power based on India and its protection from penetration or thrust by a hostile power by way of land from the north or from either side of the Indian Ocean—from the Middle East and the African Continent as well as from the Far East. In such a strategic conception, the neighbors of India acquired a new meaning. The historical neighbor state of India remained the same as in the premaritime age. Their power to extend their influence to India was nonexistent by the 18th century but they became potential threats to the safety of India for reasons which lay altogether outside Asia. Their neighborhood attained a new significance because of the rivalry of the European powers in Europe. “Except for the sake of Indian security,” asks an English writer, “what interest would Great Britain have had in the Persian Gulf, Tibet, or Sinkiang, in all of whose affairs it began to intervene?” This is both perversion and inversion of history. British power had to be extended far beyond the borders of India in order to meet the threat from Europe into the Indian Ocean. To protect the maritime road to the ocean, India’s neighbors had to be defended. The Empire had to be defended not on Indian but upon British needs in the west.

The first 2½ centuries of the contact of the west with Asia was not of much consequence. During this period the rival European powers were contending for the command of the seas and their trading activities had not penetrated deep into the interior of the Asian countries. Sea power was felt after the industrial revolution in Europe. Industrialization and democracy were both held in an explosive mixture in the container of nationalism. This development in Europe started acutely the rivalries among the European states in the 19th century and the duel between the two parts of Europe—the east and the west.

East-West Europe Duel

The effect of the continental duel on the seas was not apparent and remained unnoticed throughout the 19th century. There was a particular reason for this. The development of naval power owed its initiative to England and to her favorable position as an island base. English imperialism accepted the new conception of several contending states. This allowed room for the balancing of different national interests. Balance of power was a major factor in international relations. England’s maritime expansion was not based on the glorification of the state power but on individual initiative backed by political power. The exercise of sea power was, however, spectacular. It appeared to be awe-inspiring, all-pervasive, and inescapable. It could put on a “squeeze” over territories ranging from a petty desert Sheikhdom to the Celestial Empire. It was ubiquitous. Great Britain used sea power in a very deft manner in close association with skilled diplomacy. Throughout the 19th century there were many wars in Europe and Asia directly as a result of the rivalries of European states. They were localized and a cordon sanitaire drawn so as to prevent conflict from penetrating into the strategic theaters which meant the oceanic regions. This localization of conflict among the European powers gave them added strength for the pursuit of their imperialistic activities in Asia and Africa. The pattern of the duel between sea and land power was established accordingly; it can be seen in action today. The two world wars were direct attempts to straddle sea power from land bases. Once such a move is made, the present organization of forces in the world leads immediately to a world-wide conflict.

Great Britain’s sea power enveloped three quarters of the world thus preventing
all conflict on the waters. On the seas there was the effective voice of only one nation. A view from the oceanic side unfolded the nature of the duel on land. The ambition of Napoleon to unite Europe was the starting point of this duel. Napoleon tried to unite Europe from the west. He told his captors in Saint Helena: “I wanted to unite all peoples into one strong national body. When this was done, people could devote themselves to the realization of their dream. Then there would be no more vicissitudes to fear, for there would be one set of laws, one kind of opinion, one view, one interest—the interest of mankind.” In this enterprise he was balked by Great Britain. She cut off France from her maritime communications with her overseas colonies which were seized; defeated the French Fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar; broke through the stranglehold of Napoleon by defeating him in Egypt; and finally she headed a continental alliance against Napoleon. The three countries of eastern Europe, namely, Russia, Austria, and Prussia had to be brought in to defeat the attempt of Napoleon to dominate Europe just as in the 20th century the New World had to be brought in to redress the balance in the Old.

After the defeat of Napoleon, the duel was taken up by east Europe. A place had to be found for Russia in the system of European balance of power if a civil war were to be avoided in Europe. Russia then started probing for strategical positions as a land power. In this career her European ally was Prussia before the latter united Germany into a powerful state. Three times Great Britain intervened in support of Turkey, not for any love for Turkey, but to contain Russia and prevent her from extending her power into the strategical theaters of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Whenever Russia’s ambition was thwarted in Europe, her answer was a movement in the vast vacant spaces of Central Asia and of Siberia. That was her answer to the challenge of the maritime powers. This also explains the development of two power lines emanating from Europe, one on land and the other on sea. The latter ran through the front door of the non-European world. Russian land power, which now penetrated the open corridor—for long the home of the nomads—passed through the back door of the Asian countries. The people at the front door were sensitive to the knocking of the intruder at the back door. All this was not quite so apparent in the 19th century, although England, because of her hold on India, was always jittery over the movement of the Cossack horsemen on the Steppe of Central Asia. The year 1878 marks a further stage in the accentuation of this duel, now taken up with greater strength and earnestness by Germany. Unlike Russia, Germany did not have a vast hinterland of space. She utilized her great skill in organization, technique of science, and industrialization in building up her manpower for the pursuit of her antagonism toward the west. Bismarch’s policy was to have a weakened west and an ineffective Russia so that Germany might exploit her strategic position in Central Europe. She twice attempted to overthrow the west with disastrous results to herself and to the world.

Land versus Sea Power
The duel between sea and land power and the duel between east and west Europe are both tremendous realities. In certain areas of the world, sea power has gone over to the defensive. Power organized over a vast land space exerts continuous pressure from its periphery on the marginal areas. As against it, sea power can only be selective since it operates on a rimland area which largely lies across the seas. The picture therefore we have is that the contests of the 19th century continues very much in the same form with the rivalries accentuated; pres-
sure exercised with greater aggressiveness and the strategical ambitions pursued under the guise of ideological warfare.

History is replete with instances of the attempted outflanking of sea and land power, and the lessons of history cannot be ignored. The Persian Xerxes, the Carthaginian Hannibal, the Christian crusaders, and the European world conquerors of the 19th and 20th centuries—all attempted to outflank sea power. The Romans in the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D. and the Portuguese in the 15th century outflanked land power by the discovery of new trade routes in pursuit of economic power.

Heartland

Mackinder’s concept of Heartland exercised an alluring influence over the Germans who derived their gospel of living space from it. For the purposes of strategical thinking of Heartland, Mackinder included “the Baltic Sea, the navigable Middle and Lower Danube, the Black Sea, Asia Minor, Armenia, Persia, Tibet, and Mongolia. Within it, therefore, were Brandenberg-Russia, Austria-Hungary, as well as Russia, a vast triple basis of manpower, which was lacking to the horse riders of history.” This area was not accessible to sea power. It could be organized into a great land fortress which would then make a bid for world power. He feared that from this area, all the sea bases would be occupied and a naval counterthrust organized against sea power. This would bring about the collapse of America which was only a small island in comparison to the greater world island consisting of the land areas of Europe, Asia, and Africa. As against this line of thought, three considerations may be put forward. First, Mackinder thinking in the maritime age, could not have brought to reckoning the potentialities of air power which he thought was an ally of land power. This is by no means conclusive. He had no prevision of the atomic power. We cannot here venture into the relative balance of air power in the hands of either land power or sea power. All that can be said is that it is not the final and decisive ally of land power. Second, Mackinder perhaps over exaggerated the capacity of the landsman to organize naval power if he overran the land areas on the sea margins. Sea power is based on certain national characteristics and long tradition. It is not possible to imagine that any and every people on the land surface would become effective masters of this instrument of power. Third, there is the lesson of the old story of the fight between Goliath and David. Size may be very impressive but the contents of power are not always in proportion to size. Size alone will not confer an absolute superiority. Areas smaller in size may have other attributes—material, moral, and spiritual—which may tip the balance.

Space

This leads to a further consideration about space. Mackinder drew attention with perspicacity to the existence of the land vacancies. The question of space has to be viewed in relation to his own conception of Heartland. He pointed out very clearly the geographical perspective of Russia in Europe. If a line on the map were to be drawn from Leningrad eastward along the Upper Volga to the great bend of the river at Kazan and then southeast along the Middle Volga to the second great bend at Stalingrad and finally southeast along the lower Don River to Rosta and the Sea of Azov, we have an area in which live a great majority of the Russians. In the Siberian stretches, principally along the railway line, there are at least 20 million Russians settled as plowmen. In the various intervening vacancies live more millions. Our conception of the Soviet Union should be in relation to this geographical reality and it should not be unduly distended or mag-
nified by calling in the huge vacancies of Asia. There are other vacancies in the world which also may come into reckoning although not at the present time. Outside the Eurasian vacancies there are the spaces of South Africa and South America. They yet await being subdued to agriculture and inhabited with the present density of population of tropical areas such as the Indies. They may sustain in course of time even a thousand million people.

The European perspective must adjust itself to large areas and populations. Its evolution has been through small areas and sparse populations. For example, the area of the Greek world, that is to say, the area where Greek thought and life were practiced was considerably smaller than England. The male adult population of Attica, of which Athens was the capital, was not more than 45,000. This tradition of the Graeco-Roman world was carried on by the city states of Italy. At the end of the medieval period, these city states were overshadowed by the rise of the nation states on the Atlantic seaboard. As Toynbee has recently pointed out, these European states have now been overshadowed by the rise of America and the Soviet Union. It is somewhat too late in the day to be afraid of space and manpower of different areas. The freedom of men and the freedom of nations will have to be controlled by the spirit of men; none of the physical factors are by themselves final and decisive.

**Spirit of Europe**

Consequently, a final view toward geopolitics will have to be approached from that of spirit of man. The split in the spirit of Europe is the most important underlying cause of the rivalries of the western people. The chism in the European soul arose out of the split in the Latin Christianity of Rome. Western Christianity advanced the civilization of west Europe and parts of Central Europe; on the other hand, Russia took over the eastern Christianity of Byzantium. Western Europe after passing through a phase of pagan classical period and early Christianity renewed itself through such changes as Protestantism, Renaissance, and Enlightenment. No such corresponding change took place in the eastern parts of Europe. The medieval idea of world empire exercised a fascinating influence on Moscow and later on Germany. In Russia, the secular and spiritual empires were fused. State power in east Europe came to be based on military science, manpower, and knowledge of the technique of the manipulation of the deep cleavage in the soul of Europe. The split in the spirit of Europe, coincides with the geographical and hence, the strategical division of Europe between east and west. The result is that the east has denounced the cosmopolitan liberalism of the west, individualism, and rational approach to human problems. The east has tried to overthrow the west and it is this disturbing factor which has its repercussions over the entire globe. Europe will have to realize that the spirit of man is eternal and the civilization of India and China, although often accused of having neglected the material side of life, pinned its faith in the ultimate triumph of man's spirit. Europe will have to unite her divided soul and when she does that, the present conflict in the world will assume a sensible and meaningful proportion and dimension. Happen what may, the world will stubbornly refuse to balance itself on a mechanistic conception of space and population.