

Military Review

U. S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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December 65

Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

FORTY-THREE YEARS OF MILITARY SERVICE

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VOL XLV

DEC 1965

NO 12

The Military Review, a publication of the UNITED STATES ARMY, provides a forum for the expression of military thought with emphasis on doctrine concerning the division and higher levels of command.

The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not necessarily those of the US Army or the Command and General Staff College.

INDIA

and the Bomb

Dr. Raj Krishna

This is a significant discussion of three major Indian alternatives to the Communist Chinese nuclear threat, and a proposal for a limited but independent nuclear capability.
—Editor.

THE nature of the present regime in Red China and its international conduct in the past few years make it necessary for India to try to counterbalance its power.

Like all good concepts, that of the balance of power has been and can be abused. Nevertheless, the concept has a valid hard core. The unchecked power of an expansionist nation is a

real menace to which a genuinely defensive counterbalance is the only answer in the absence of an internationalization of all power.

This article examines the implications of the three major alternative policies being proposed by different sections of opinion in India and indicates a fourth course that I would prefer. The three major alternatives discussed are: the present policy, alignment, and the acquisition of an independent deterrent. The real alternatives available to India today differ only in regard to the means to be adopted for balancing the power of Red China.



The advantage of the present non-alignment policy is simply that it facilitates a buildup of our conventional force with aid from many quarters. This was not the most important original intention of the policy of non-alignment, but it is now its most important advantage.

Military Disadvantage

A military disadvantage of non-alignment is that everyone who favors it relies on the forces of some other powers to aid India if she is threatened either by conventional forces in excess of her own defensive capacity or by nuclear blackmail or attack.

Nonalignment, in reality, is an informal, unstated, unilateral alignment with unnamed powers. Many nations and many Indian rulers in history have followed such a policy willingly or unwillingly, and we might do so again. But it cannot be described as an adequate policy for balancing the power of China at different levels. And a state of such inarticulate but real dependence on unknown powers can never be boasted of as a state of independence.

Regarding our effort to mobilize world opinion against Chinese policy, we can, perhaps, get some vague and general resolutions passed in various international gatherings. But it would be folly to believe that these resolutions will alter the basic Chinese policy, which is the only thing that really matters for our security. Passing res-

olutions will not alter the facts of power. Nations which subscribe to the resolutions will maintain their basic respect for the power of China and try to come to terms with it in their own separate ways. For in international relations, power commands much more respect than mere virtue.

Similar reasoning applies to China's entry into the United Nations. We should not object to her entry, but I have never been sure whether China is as keen to enter the UN as her sponsors assume. By remaining out, she has enjoyed an enormous freedom of action and has built up considerable power and prestige for herself. It should not be assumed that mere entry to the UN will change her behavior; she may only use the UN as one more instrument of her national policy, as Stalin did.

Alignment With US

Let us consider next the alternative of alignment with the United States proposed by some people. Its proponents assume that the United States is prepared to enter into any commitment for our defense only if we indicate our willingness to enter into an alliance with her. But no one seems to have found out exactly what the Americans are able and willing to do for us in different contingencies.

The publicly known facts indicate a rather cheerless situation for the believers in alignment. The simple fact is that presently Americans have no clear-cut China policy at all.

Conventional Chinese military doctrine is that Americans should be challenged at levels of warfare in which the Americans are relatively weak and not at levels of warfare where they are strong. The Chinese also exploit the fact that it is not easy for the Americans to raise the level

This article was digested from the original, published in CURRENT EVENTS (India) February 1965.

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of warfare in Asia by their own choice, for they are much more afraid of escalation than are the Chinese.

The experiences of South Korea and South Vietnam have demonstrated the effectiveness of Chinese strategy. So long as the Chinese concentrate on infantry and guerrilla warfare, it is always possible for them to get the defenders into a long battle of attrition. The alternative is a full-scale

prospect which evokes infinite horror in the Western mind.

Nor is it easy for the United States to respond to infantry and guerrilla actions with massive air bombing of the Chinese mainland when American territory, lives, and interests are not directly threatened. It is difficult to visualize Americans, or Europeans, for that matter, bombing China just for the sake of a few thousand south



Information Service of India

Americans can do little more than give us hardware for fighting the mass of Chinese infantry with our own

war with China, starting with a bombardment of bases, sanctuaries, and supply lines. But getting into full-scale war with the Chinese has never been and will never be an easy decision for the United States, for it involves, among other things, the commitment of masses of infantry against the floods of Chinese infantry—a

Asian lives or a few thousand kilometers of south Asian territory.

Extending the logic of the conventional Chinese military doctrine to the nuclear level, it seems that the Chinese are bound to concentrate in the near future more on the development of nuclear artillery weapons than on long-range delivery. The reason is that

the limitations which now apply to a US response to infantry action will apply to a US response to nuclear artillery action. While any intermediate-range delivery of nuclear weapons from aircraft or missiles may evoke a corresponding US response, the use of tactical nuclear weapons in field warfare against a third country may present the United States with the usual dilemma: full escalation or partial acquiescence in a Chinese advance.

Contingencies

The upshot of these considerations is that the naval, air, and nuclear power of the United States is by itself no answer to subversion or guerrilla warfare; no answer to an infantry push by the Chinese; no answer to a limited use of tactical nuclear weapons by the Chinese artillery; no answer to scare raids (without bombing); and no answer to blackmail or demoralization of the defenders based on the mere threat that the Chinese can deliver nuclear devices over short distances. But these are precisely the contingencies which the Chinese are likely to create in the near future. They will not create contingencies in which US power is a relevant deterrent—namely, naval action, air action, or nuclear action.

The implication of this reasoning is that the faith of the alignmentists in the US capacity to defend us in all contingencies is dangerously superficial. In fact, on the basis of the present thinking, the Americans can do little more than give us hardware for fighting the mass of Chinese infantry with our own infantry, if we have the will, and keep their ultimate strategic powder dry. This is what they are already doing, and no alliance is necessary for them to continue.

There has been much loose talk in

India about an independent deterrent. It is loose because it is not based on any conception of the total defense system that we need now. The possession of nuclear weapons makes sense only as a part of a total defense system, and only if it is shown that there will be a real and serious gap in our apparatus of deterrence which mere alignment cannot fill. If an independent deterrent means total nuclear capability, strategic as well as tactical, it is absolutely beyond our capacity.

But on the other hand, as we have seen, total dependence on the West and the USSR will be hopelessly inefficient. It will leave dangerous gaps in our defense against many real contingencies which the Chinese are likely to create.

Optimum Defense Policy

The only real choice, therefore, is for the West and the USSR to provide strategic long-range cover—which they alone can do—and for us to have a tactical, short-range capability to match a similar Chinese capability.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization powers and the USSR must carry the burden of strategic nuclear deterrence and strategic naval and air deterrence. But the burden of defense against tactical and short-range nuclear warfare on land and in the air must be regionalized as soon as possible.

Such a division of labor in deterrence is what we must work for and persuade the West as well as the USSR to accept and implement it. It will complete the structure of defense in Asia without placing an excessive burden on them or on us, and without linking total escalation with every limited engagement.

What is required is not full align-

ment with anybody, but the negotiation of a series of limited agreements for getting short-run cover and aid of specified kinds from the USSR and the West.

In the field of conventional armaments, we are already making such agreements. But now it is necessary that these agreements include technical help to enable us to acquire some independent nuclear capability to match Chinese tactical nuclear weapons and to have a small stockpile and an aircraft delivery system.

Such limited capability will establish a regional diplomatic and tactical balance. It will protect us against blackmail, and give us a genuine right to be a participant in all the deliberations of the nuclear powers affecting our security.

Those who say that we should not try to have any nuclear capability seem to be asking not only for strategic abstention but also for tactical abstention; not only for short-run dependence on the West but also for long-run dependence. I am, on the other hand, suggesting* that, while we may practice nuclear strategic abstention even in the long run, we need not practice tactical abstention.

It is necessary to emphasize the time factor in this connection. The acquisition of even a tactical nuclear capability is bound to take at least three to five years. Therefore, those who refuse to launch any program to develop a nuclear military capacity are, in fact, denying even limited nu-

clear independence to India, even in the long run. Conversely, if we want a certain military capacity in five years, now is the time to make firm decisions and allocate resources for building it. The need for advance planning is much more imperative in the military field than in the economic field.

Thanks to the facilities already created for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in India, for which financial resources have already been allocated, we will soon have enough plutonium to produce at least 50 plutonium bombs a year. But for the kind of limited capability we need, we should also have a gaseous diffusion plant to produce more uranium; we must redesign and acquire suitable bombers; and we must acquire some technical knowledge of missile systems.

Foreign objections to a limited nuclear program can be overcome if we have the will to make and execute our own policy. The situation has been changed by the nuclear tests at Lop-Nor, and all agreements restricting us can be renegotiated. No objections or agreements are absolutely final in diplomacy.

Like other nations we must work for disarmament in the long run, but, until it comes, the responsibility to defend ourselves is strictly ours, and we must measure up to it.

History has excused our rulers for neglecting this responsibility once. It may not do so again.

The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.—Editor.

ACROSS the pages of history, the governments of all major nations have grappled with the "guns versus butter" controversy: How much should be expended for armaments and how much for the welfare of their citizens? That this question is paramount today should be no surprise to historians. That the answer is vital to our future history as a world power does need some examination and subsequent action.

Those in military uniform are

National power can be stated as the ability of a state to influence and control actions of other states and to achieve national objectives. Such power is acquired through effective development and use of those resources which a nation has or can obtain. It is the sum of a number of inter-related and interdependent factors that continually change in relation to one another. Although the designation of these factors may vary, the economic factor in one form or another is always included.

Today, the United States is the dominant economic power in the world. But this is not to say that future problems do not exist. For example, we are most concerned with shortages in strategic materials, an un-

BUTTER for the GUNS

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick W. Powers, *United States Army*

keenly aware of the essential nature of armaments to our national posture, but the role of the economy is not so well known or appreciated. Economic growth and stability are necessary to political, technological, and social progress as well as to military strength. Fundamentally, any major power must be able to produce an ample food supply, provide raw materials for industry, manufacture items required for civil and military purposes, and provide surpluses for international trade. While economic considerations are essential to national power, it should be emphasized that they comprise only one of several factors of national power.

favorable balance of payments position, barriers to international trade, and the need for coordinated economic planning at the national level.

We are also concerned with the changing power relationships among the world's nations. Mass communications and social upheavals—both induced by the technological age—will give the political process a new orientation and enhance the role of political ideas. Ideology will continue to be a significant factor in international relations.

The character of these political ideas, their purposes and their images, will affect relations between states and become the basis for either conflict