BASIC PROBLEMS IN SMALL-UNIT LEADERSHIP

Task OFFTRAIN

U. S. Army Infantry Human Research Unit
Fort Benning, Georgia

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By

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HumRRO Division No. 4 (Infantry)
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At the most fundamental level, a leader is a person with influence over other people. This influence may be the result of appointment to a formal position of leadership or of acceptance by a group of persons who then become followers. In both cases, the leader's success is ultimately determined by the performance of those he leads. This performance depends on the quality and nature of his leadership actions as he interacts with his followers. A leader's interactions with his men can inspire their trust, respect, and devotion, their cordial dislike, or any intermediate feeling between those two extremes.

The primary purpose of this text is to help both actual and would-be leaders to acquire effective skills for influencing others, with particular reference to positions of military leadership. An assumption basic to the approach taken is that a leader who acts effectively in his role as a leader will obtain willing obedience, confidence, respect, and loyal cooperation in order to accomplish the mission. Thus, the actual leadership behavior of the military leader will be the central topic of this volume.

Since this material is written primarily for the military leader, it is natural that the question of combat leadership be raised. Is this material primarily relevant to peacetime leadership, to combat leadership, or to both?

This text is concerned primarily with the last of these three alternatives. Skilled combat leadership is obviously the final test of a military leader's training; however, the principles of effective leadership are as applicable to combat leadership as to peacetime leadership. In most respects, a given leadership act should be effective in both combat and peacetime operations.

The primary characteristic of an effective combat unit is its willingness to commit itself to combat, and its desire to meet and defeat the enemy. This, in turn, is a function of:

a. The confidence the members of the unit have in the ability of their leader, and the loyalty they feel for him.

b. Their confidence in their own abilities and the loyalty, or group ties, they feel for one another.

The first of these, the confidence the men have in their leader and the loyalty they feel for him, must develop over a period of time. It cannot develop suddenly, except in those rare cases in which a leader assumes command of a unit during a crisis period, such as combat, and successfully leads his men to victory. When this happens, the leader and his men are welded into a tightly knit unit almost within minutes. However, it is a difficult task for the leader. It is better that he have established, at the minimum, a firm foundation for the loyalty and respect of his men prior to the time his unit is committed to combat. The purpose of this text, and the course of which it is a part, is to provide the leader with the basis for learning how to do this.
Confidence and loyalty are developed by the members of the unit as they observe their leader encountering leadership problems and solving them effectively. As they observe their leader to be effective in problem situations currently faced, they come to expect that he will be effective in meeting future situations. They consequently will depend more and more on him for guidance and direction, expecting that it will enable them to act successfully. This is the meaning of confidence. It is a basic ingredient of loyalty; it will go far toward carrying an unseasoned unit through its first engagement.

Simply stated, the problem of any leader is to inspire his followers to achieve maximum results with minimum friction within the group. He must thus have the ability to plan for the utilization of his human and material resources in the most economical manner possible, and then to be able to interact with his men to motivate them to accomplish assigned tasks as he directs.

The ability to motivate men stems largely from the ability to understand them. That is, the leader must understand the personal values, aspirations, goals, and beliefs of his subordinates before he can understand how best to interact with them in order to motivate them to outstanding performance. This does not mean that he must agree with these values and beliefs, but only that he must understand them; understanding enables him to predict how his men will react to his leadership actions.

The first part of this text will discuss certain important values, aspirations, goals, and beliefs that the leader's subordinates can be expected to have. This material is designed to give the leader better understanding of his subordinates' behavior. This, in turn, will enable him to select leadership actions that will assist in motivating them to outstanding performance.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The task of the small-unit leader in today's Army is complex, and highly demanding. Perhaps most important of all his responsibilities is developing and maintaining a high state of mission readiness in the unit he leads. The responsibility is perhaps more pressing now than at any other time in the nation's history. The spectre of war is continuously present; further, if war comes, it will come more swiftly and lethally than ever before. Precious time required to bring raw units to a state of combat readiness, which has been available before, probably will never exist again.

To compound the problem, the demands that will face small unit in future combat are likely to be greater than ever before. The technical aspects of warfare have changed substantially in recent decades, to produce a perplexing variety of weapons of great effectiveness. Increases in small-unit mobility, and in the need for such mobility, have produced a requirement for small-unit reliability and capability for individual action beyond anything previously experienced. Small-unit failures in future conflicts can be expected to have greater impact on the over-all conduct of a campaign than ever before.

Effective unit performance in combat depends on many things. Among the most important are the confidence the men have in one another, and in their weapons, on the one hand, and their confidence, respect and trust for their leader, on the other hand. In units lacking these critical elements of confidence, performance in combat is likely to be unreliable. The men are likely to be subject to exaggerated fears of both real and imagined dangers, and to be overly concerned for their own personal welfare. Further, they will be less capable of withstanding the stresses of combat. The man who feels psychologically alone on the battlefield, because he has not learned to trust his fellow soldiers and his leader, is likely to feel overwhelmed by the dangers he faces. That is, if he does not feel himself to be a member of a real team, in which each man can count on the support of the others in time of need, he is much more likely to feel that the danger and threat of the forces opposing him are more than he can handle. From such feelings spring despair and psychological defeat. It has been observed that in many of the great historical battles, the defeated Army actually broke before physical contact was made, and suffered the majority of its casualties in the pursuit that followed.

The question, then, is how does the small-unit leader build psychological steel into the spines of his men? How can he produce the inflexible will that leads to domination and subsequent destruction of the enemy?

Napoleon, after Waterloo, was observed to have said that he lost primarily because his men had not eaten bread together often enough prior to the battle. Said another way, they had not learned to trust and depend on one another; they
had not yet become effective units. They had not yet become willing to suffer injury or death rather than see their units beaten. They did not have the psychological steel of will that sustains men in combat. This kind of stamina is no less important today than it was in Napoleon's day. Nor is it any easier to develop.

Similarly, the ability, as a leader, to develop individual soldiers rugged enough to withstand combat, and to weld them into effective units, is not easily gained. Such an ability perhaps can be compared with that of the rare mechanic who can tune a Grand Prix racing car to the point that it yields the extra power to produce a winner. Such a man is highly sensitive to the state of the machinery with which he works. When he listens, he hears sounds that others do not hear -- because they have not learned to hear them -- and distinguishes those sounds that are meaningful from the background din of sounds that mean nothing. In the same way, when the leader "tunes" his unit for outstanding combat performance, he must watch and listen for those things that are meaningful, disregarding those things that mean nothing.

Analysis of the leadership abilities of successful leaders leads to the conclusion that they have learned what to listen for, and the actions to take for each meaningful sound. Unsuccessful leaders, for one reason or another, have not.

A vital next question is how the leader gets this ability. Are some men born with it? Or can all men learn it, given an opportunity? Unfortunately, no one can answer these questions with any absolute degree of certainty. The outstandingly effective leader may well have been born with a particular combination of physical characteristics that enable him as he grows older to learn to lead others as he does. On the other hand, this may not be true. Careful analysis of the characteristics of great leaders has failed to identify consistent dramatic characteristics that are typical of all great leaders, and not typical of all other persons. Each had his own particular brand of greatness, which was composed of a unique balance of personal characteristics. On the other hand, there is little question that each of these men was able to rise to the demands of crisis situations, both to solve the technical problems confronting them, and to inspire their subordinates to work together to achieve necessary objectives. Fortunately, these are skills that can be learned by most, if not all, who aspire to become effective leaders.

Of these two skills, the ability to solve technical problems, and to inspire subordinates to achieve objectives, the second will be the primary concern of this text. It perhaps is the more difficult to learn.

The basis for this skill is the ability to understand the motivations, beliefs, desires, and even fears of one's subordinates. The leader must know the reasons for the actions his men take, why they behave as they do. He must understand why some of his men readily develop a wide circle of friends and others do not; why some of his men seem willing to try anything, while others fear to try the easy; why some of his men will do a good job of anything they try and why others will be satisfied with the least effort they are allowed to get by with.
In short, a basic understanding of human behavior and motivational factors is essential to one who aspires to be a successful leader.

There are laws that govern the behavior of men when they interact. One squad member does not start from scratch when he begins to interact with another squad member on the day he joins the squad. Nor does he start from scratch when he first reports to his platoon leader. Though much learning will happen from this first day on, the learning that occurs will be built on a foundation of prior experience. For example, the child has learned much from his parents and other adults, both in the home and in school, about how he can and should react to those who have authority over him. He has developed attitudes toward authority figures, as well as toward persons he regards as his equal. These attitudes will determine, in large part, how he behaves toward such persons. If the small-unit leader recognizes and understands these and other kinds of attitudes, he will be much better able to "tune" his subordinate to work effectively as the member of a true team, a unit with high esprit.

In addition to an understanding of the attitudes, beliefs and values of his subordinates, the effective leader must also understand his role within his unit. He must understand what his men expect of him as a leader, and why. This implies more than simply understanding one's subordinates. Units have leaders for important reasons. That is, leaders serve important functions for the units they lead. Understanding and acceptance of these functions, or responsibilities, are essential to success as a leader. Careful study and analysis of the actions of successful and unsuccessful leaders have led to many conclusions about the functions leaders must serve in small military units, and how these diverse functions might best be served. In later sections, this will be called the functional role of the military leader.

The remaining chapters of this text will be concerned with giving the leader-to-be an understanding of the men he subsequently will be called upon to lead, and of the functional role he must serve as the leader of his unit. The main emphasis will be on specific kinds of leadership actions, the purposes they serve, and why they are effective in serving these purposes. Analysis of effective leadership will be in terms of how the actions of the effective leader affect the performance and morale of his men. Knowledge thus gained, when related to practical leadership problem situations, will serve as the basis for the development of effective leadership skills that can be used to produce effective combat-ready units with the psychological will to meet and defeat the enemy.
In the last chapter, a great deal of emphasis was given to the desirability of being able to predict the behavior of subordinates, and the advantage such skills give the leader. In this chapter, the value of these skills will be further emphasized, after which there will be an introduction to some of the characteristics of groups that lead group members to behave as they do. For the leader, this knowledge is one of the first steps that lead to thorough understanding of his subordinates, and the ability to predict their actions.

PREDICTION OF BEHAVIOR

It is reasonable to wonder why the ability to predict the behavior of others is either useful or essential to a leader. In the typical small military unit, it would seem on the surface that the leader merely needs to analyze the military situation he faces, determine the best solution, and then tell his men what to do. However, things are rarely quite this simple. Individual morale and unit esprit de corps play an important role in determining how well and how reliably assigned duties are accomplished; morale and esprit de corps, in turn, are affected in a major way by the manner in which the leader interacts with his unit. Thus, the leader must always keep two things in mind. One is giving orders, guidance, and instructions in such a manner that members of his unit clearly know what is desired, and how to do it. This is the technical part of his job. The second is making his actions positively affect the morale of his men, and their motivation to accomplish assigned duties.

The value of high morale cannot be overemphasized. Though it is influential in determining the extent to which men will do a good job on any assigned mission, its importance as a factor in unit performance increases under stressful conditions. It also affects esprit, and the degree to which the leader can rely on his men to continue working toward accomplishment of the mission if something happens to prevent him from further supervising the unit's work. As experienced leaders well know, in some units the loss of the leader sometimes results in a complete loss of direction and effort. In other units, loss of the leader has much less effect on the desire of the unit to achieve its objective. While morale and esprit de corps are not the only differences between such units, they are major factors. This, in turn, is largely a result of how the leader typically has interacted with his men in the past.

Most of the leader's interactions with his men concern their performance on previously assigned duties, and the duties they must perform in the future.
That is, most of the time he is talking with his subordinates, he will be talking about matters relating to assigned duties, that is, about things they must do, are doing, or have done. The way he interacts with his men on such matters, and, of course, their reactions to his manner, will have a substantial effect on the extent to which he can rely on them to do good work without close supervision.

At the risk of oversimplifying the problem of effective senior-subordinate interaction, this is simply the question of how leadership behavior affects the motivation of subordinates.

Few leaders can say that there has never been a time that they wished they could unsay something just said. In the heat of an argument, in the midst of a crisis situation, or when smarting from a stinging rebuke from one's own senior, it is the rare leader who never says something that insults, offends, or downgrades his own subordinates. Again, it is reasonable to ask just how important this is in a military unit. What difference does it make that his men are insulted, offended or downgraded? Can't he just order them to do a good job anyway on the next assignment? The answer to this one is pretty clear. Even if given a direct order, how much a man actually wants to do a good job is going to have a lot to do with how well the job is done. Since the leader's behavior toward his men has a lot to do with their motivation, it will also have a lot to do with how hard they try to do well on assigned duties. Thus, the leader must be concerned with how his actions affect his men and their motivation to do good work.

One caution here, though, is that this does not mean that he should try to be popular with his men. Nothing could be worse.

This should illustrate in part why the ability of the leader to predict the behavior of his men accurately is an important asset. One of the main things he will be predicting is their reaction to his leadership. If he can predict accurately, and if the prediction for a given situation is that they will react in an undesirable manner, he then can change his plan. Sometimes, of course, there is no easy way out of a situation. If so, the leader has no choice but to put the mission first and take the result as best he can. However, most of the time, if he can think ahead and predict accurately, he will be much better able to control the reactions of his men, by controlling his own behavior and the situation.

However, predicting the reactions of his men is only a part of the problem, though it is a major part. The second part is predicting his own reactions, both to situations and to subordinates. A third part is predicting their reactions to other members of the unit, and to problem situations they encounter.

Little will be said about the second of these two, beyond its importance. It is clear that in many of the cases in which the leader literally could "bite off his tongue" because of something he said, he simply did not think ahead far enough to see the consequences. In many of these cases, thinking about
the situation and his own personality characteristics might have enabled him to predict accurately what his own behavior likely would be. If done far enough ahead, such thinking might enable him to avoid the situation, or change it before it developed to the critical point of saying or doing the wrong thing.

The third of the points above, predicting reactions of subordinates to other members of the unit and to situations, will receive a good deal of treatment. This is, among other things, the ability to anticipate the actions of his men in difficult situations, or to orders that they may receive. The advantage in being able to predict such actions is that the leader often can take action to better control his men at such times, to help them keep out of trouble, and even to change their reactions to orders and situations they otherwise would dislike very much.

A simple example will illustrate how a leader can anticipate such a situation and thus modify it to produce a greater desire to accomplish necessary missions. Normal reassignment policies result in fairly frequent changes in company commanders. Suppose a platoon leader learns that his present company commander is being reassigned, and also learns who will take his place. It, of course, is standard practice under these conditions to try to "G-2" the situation, that is, to try to learn something about the new commander in order to be better able to accomplish his desires when he assumes command. What is often forgotten is that platoon members have a similar need but, sometimes, fewer sources of such information. Suppose the platoon leader learns that the new company commander is a real "bug" on field training, has in the past always been able to persuade his seniors to allow company training to be modified in this direction, and probably will do the same thing when assuming command of the present company.

The platoon leader thus has two choices. He can wait until the situation matures and it is announced as a policy, or he can inform his men that it probably will become policy and take any steps necessary to better prepare the platoon for the change.

On the surface, it may appear that there is no clear choice between these two alternatives, and, indeed, there are realistic "pros and cons" for both. However, if the platoon leader knows his men, he may well realize that a major change in policy often is disliked if it is a surprise, but that it can easily be grudgingly accepted, or in some cases perhaps even liked, if given with enough prior warning. Of course, prior warning is not the only needed part of the preparation. However, if the platoon leader is not alert to the psychological needs of his men, and to the need to predict their reactions, he could simply fail to keep them informed in such situations. By anticipating, he can go a long way toward actually controlling their actions in future situations.

It should be clear that a central theme in this discussion is that the ability to predict enables the leader to remove the element of surprise from
leadership problem situations. Surprise is no less important in these situations than in tactical situations when confronting an enemy force. Tactically, the offense carries the initiative because, if properly executed, it carries the element of surprise. The unexpected is effective not only because it masses the attacking force, while the defender must distribute his force by guess, but also because it carries an unnerving quality that limits the ability of the defender to reply effectively with the force he has. In contrast, if the attacker's intentions are known ahead of time, thus depriving him of the element of surprise, the defensive force often will gain the upper hand by a decisive margin.

Similarly, the ability to anticipate, and predict accurately the behavior of others will enable the leader to remove the element of surprise from their reactions to him and to leadership situations of which they are a part. By being prepared for their reactions, the leader not only can control his own behavior better, but also can better control the behavior of his men as he interacts with them.

As the previous chapter indicates, an essential element that precedes the ability to predict the actions of others is understanding of their beliefs, attitudes, motives, and so on. Said another way, this is the ability of the leader to put himself in the place of his subordinate and then accurately estimate how his subordinate is reacting; it is the ability to see the situation as his subordinate does. Given this, he can make some pretty good guesses as to what his subordinate thinks about the situation, and how he will react.

As an example of one bit of information the leader must have, to do this, and the advantage served by doing it, consider the earlier statement that the leader should not try to be popular with his men. Many inexperienced leaders make the mistake of trying to be popular. One of the most used ways of attempting to be popular is to "go easy" on enforcing proper standards of excellence for the performance of the unit. The inevitable outcome is that the leader's own senior eventually will note the lowered unit performance, with the result that the unit will lose privileges, or worse, and the leader will be reprimanded, or worse. Thus, a leader's easygoing treatment of his men will backfire, and hurt both. When his men get hurt, they will blame him for the hurt, and distrust his leadership. The result will be that he not only will not be popular, but also will have lost the respect of his men.

This illustrates the fact that many aspects of small-unit leadership need careful thought, plus understanding of the men in the unit. A great deal of this understanding depends on knowledge of how group, or unit, membership affects the behavior of the individuals that the leader must interact with. In the remainder of this chapter, a number of characteristics of groups will be discussed as they affect leadership practice.
GROUP INFLUENCES ON LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

The various kinds of groups that have leaders can be categorized into two types, on the basis of how the leader comes to have leadership status within the group. In one type, the leader emerges from within the group. In the other type, he is appointed by someone outside the group. It is important to distinguish between these two types of groups because the leader actions that are effective in one type may not be, and often are not, the kind of leader action that is effective in the other. Most junior officers will have had a lot more experience with emergent-leader groups than with appointed-leader groups, and thus will have learned many leadership techniques that will prove ineffective if used in appointed-leader groups, such as platoons. Thus, it is important to explore the differences between these types of groups, especially from the viewpoint of being able to understand the motivations, etc., of the group members. As was said earlier, this understanding is an essential element in the prediction and subsequent better control of subordinates.

There are several critical dimensions of difference between emergent-leader groups, and appointed-leader groups. Of these, three of the most important are the source of the leader's authority, the role of the group and the group member within the larger organization, and the role of the leader within the group. Each of these will be discussed in turn.

THE SOURCE OF THE LEADER'S AUTHORITY

In the emergent-leader group, the leader at one time was one of the group. At some subsequent time during the life of the group, he then emerged as an accepted source of influence within the group. That is, over a period of time, sometimes a short time, he became more and more influential within the group until he finally was either one of the most influential group members or the most influential group member. By influential is meant that if he suggests or asks or tells another group member to do something, it will be done; if he proposes a course of action to the group, it will be approved by the group; if a group member is at a loss as to how to proceed, he will usually ask the leader, though he may sometimes ask someone else. Thus, the leader is the one group member who is most able to influence others.

However, in emergent-leader groups this may or may not be a stable condition. Usually, there will be other group members who are also high on influence within the group. In some groups they compete with the leader for acceptance by other group members and influence over them. In these groups, the leader is given no choice but to enter the competition; his leadership thus is less stable, or permanent, because he will remain the leader only so long as he is able to survive the competition, and retain the support of the majority of group members. Even so, it is possible for cliques to form, in which "defeated" competitors still have more influence over a minority subgroup than does the leader himself. In
such cases, where the "defeated" competitor retains a small but permanent base of influence and support, the leader must "run scared." If he falters, the competitor always stands ready to capitalize on errors and make another bid to unseat the established leader.

The key underlying variable in this description of emergent leadership is the fact that the leader remains the leader only as long as he has influence over the majority of other group members. He can be superseded at any time that another group member accumulates a greater base of influence and support within the group. Thus, the leader in an emergent situation must continuously seek to retain his base of support and acceptance within the group. This, interestingly, gives group members a substantial degree of influence over the leader.

Situations of this sort are quite commonplace. A fraternity group is an excellent example. The role played by an elected official in government is another. A senator, for example, must run for re-election periodically. If his record during the period of his tenure is judged desirable by the electorate, his chances for re-election are good. If, on the other hand, he has displeased a significant part of his constituency, or if another candidate is able to run against him and obtain a greater degree of support, he may well be replaced. Support in this case may be based on many things, from perceived competence to accomplish the responsibilities of office to "personal magnetism." Not at all infrequently, a highly competent office seeker will lose because his opponent makes a better personal appeal to the voters. Similarly, in a fraternity group, the highly competent "cold fish" will probably have little chance against a perhaps less competent opponent who has the skills required to become highly popular within the fraternity. Indeed, in most emergent situations, the leader owes his continued position of influence in part to his popularity with his supporters. Even if this is not the case, the leader owes his position of leadership to the group in some other way.

The situation in which the leader is appointed, in contrast, is quite different. In most appointed leadership situations, the group is a part of a hierarchical organization, i.e., an organization that has many different levels within itself. The leader of such a group is always chosen to be the leader by someone, or some group of persons, who are higher in the organization than the group concerned. In most cases, this person, or these persons, then are a source of authority to which the leader is responsible. The leader may or may not have been a member of the group before he was chosen to lead it. In either case, the group members will probably have little to say about his being chosen as the group leader, and they will have little power to have him replaced if they do not "like" him.

Thus, in such groups, the leader owes his position of influence to someone or to some group higher in the organization. If one speaks of the leader's source of authority, it is clear that this source for the appointed leader is someone
who is his "boss," and, indeed, the organization, itself. This is in sharp contrast to the source of authority in emergent groups, which is the group itself. Thus, if the problem of retaining the position of leadership is posed as who the leader must "please," it is clear that the emergent leader must "please" the group itself; this he does by behaving in accordance with the expectations of a majority of the members of the group, who then continue to support his leadership.

In sharp contrast, the appointed leader must "please" the organization, for this is his source of continued authority. This he does by discharging the responsibilities given him by the organization as the formal leader of the group. Put another way, and this will be covered in greater detail later, the group to which he was appointed leader typically exists within the organization because it serves a purpose essential to the larger purposes of the organization as a whole. The appointed leader is the personal representative in the group of higher levels within the organization; his purpose is to ensure that the group fulfills its part of the over-all objective of the organization, by giving technical information and guidance where necessary to influence the ability of his subordinates, and by using the rewards and punishments placed at his disposal by the organization to influence motivation.

As an example of appointive leadership to provide a contrast with the example of elective office given previously to illustrate emergent leadership, consider the head of a major governmental department. Such department heads typically are chosen by the head of the governmental body itself, who is elected, and who has major policies he wishes to have implemented. His choice for head of a given department is based on his estimate both of a given candidate’s technical competence and of his loyalty to the policies that must be implemented. That is, given the executive policies that are to be implemented, can candidate "A" handle the job of running the department, and, given this, will he push the department toward implementing the policies of the executive. If both answers are affirmative, "A" may well be selected to head the department. If not, he will be dismissed from consideration. Further, if the answers were initially affirmative, but the executive who appointed "A" later judges that "A" is falling down on the job in either respect, it will only be a matter of time until "A" is replaced, unless "A" rectifies his mistakes.

This, of course, is a somewhat oversimplified picture of leadership in both emergent and appointive situations. However, it does make clear a critical point of distinction between emergent and appointive leadership. The leader’s source of authority is different in these two kinds of situations. There must be a resulting critical difference in the over-all mode of approach the leader makes toward the leadership role. The kinds of things these two kinds of leaders do to be "successful" can, and in most cases are, quite different.

It is emphasized at this point that Army small-unit leadership is appointive leadership. The platoon leader is chosen by higher authority to be the representative of that authority within the platoon. The platoon leader thus owes his
own authority to higher authority and to the organization itself, that is, to the Army, and not to the group (the platoon) he leads. The platoon leader, to be successful, must behave as an appointed leader, and not as an emergent leader. Specifically, his primary responsibility is to ensure that his group, the platoon, fulfills its organizational responsibility. He has other responsibilities, of course, but this is paramount. Succeeding in this and failing in all others, he has some small chance of being declared a "successful leader." However, succeeding in all others but failing in this, he has almost no chance of being perceived a "success." The rationale for these statements is found in an examination of the role played by the group in the organization as a whole.

THE ROLE OF THE GROUP AND THE GROUP MEMBER IN THE ORGANIZATION

There almost always are substantial differences in purpose between groups that have emergent leaders and groups that have appointed leaders. There are corresponding differences in the motives of group members, that is, their reasons for belonging to the group.

Most groups that have emergent leaders not only choose their own leaders but also choose their own group goals. In many cases, of course, broad outlines for such goals already exist, as in a fraternity, or bowling team, and the individual group member "chooses" the broad group goals only in the sense that he chooses to join, or try to join, the group. However, given a group with broad group goals already defined, the majority of group members will typically decide on specific goals within the broad outlines, and, indeed, may eventually change even the outlines. If the group is a part of a larger organization, the larger organization typically will be loosely structured, decentralized and relatively powerless to make and enforce decisions that impact on the subordinate group. Often, such "higher organizations" are made up in part of representatives of lower groups and serve merely to reflect majority opinions of representatives of the lower groups. Thus, the lower groups in most cases are being served by the higher organization.

The situation is just reversed in groups with appointed leaders. Such groups almost always are parts of larger organizations. The birth of the organization will have preceded the formation of at least a few and perhaps many of the smaller groups. An organization purpose, goal, or objective typically will exist. That is, the organization exists to do something. Typically, the smaller group will have an integral part to play in the over-all plan. If it plays this part well, the organization can succeed in its larger plan; if not, the organization may fail, at least to some degree. This, of course, is why the organization appoints a leader within the group responsible to itself, rather than having a leader emerge, and then using that leader. The organization will have a limited ability to tolerate the failure of one of the smaller groups of which it is composed. Thus, it must have a representative within the group whose primary loyalty is to the organization, rather than to the group. By
ensuring itself of the loyalty of the group leader, the organization thus can ensure, to a large extent, that the group will perform as desired in furthering the over-all plan of the organization.

This should not be taken to mean that the appointed leader's loyalties go solely to the organization; in actual practice, the appointed leader will, if successful, have the respect and loyalty of his group members. There is an obligation to return this loyalty. However, the primary loyalty of the leader must be to the organization and its defined objectives. It is for this reason that for the platoon leader the mission must come first. If it does not, there is really no justifiable reason for either the platoon's existence, or his as its leader. Beyond this, he is responsible for taking care of his men, and owes them loyalty in this regard if they do their work well. However, if there is a conflict between these loyalties, loyalty to the command of which the platoon is a part must take precedence over loyalty to the men of whom the platoon is composed.

This raises some very legitimate questions regarding the motives of the members of these two different types of groups, and the source of the leader's power to influence them. These questions are easily answered for members of groups with emergent leaders, but not so easily for appointed-leader groups.

The members of emergent-leader groups are fairly obviously serving their own ends by means of their group membership. A man belongs to a bowling team because he likes to bowl, and his membership facilitates his pursuit of this activity. A college freshman joins a fraternity for many reasons. The prestige of fraternity membership is one; however, there are others. For example, membership permits participation in a wider range of social affairs than would otherwise be accessible. Typically, membership in such groups is voluntary, and serves individual interests and needs in that the goals of the group typically correspond to the goals of the individual.

In most appointed-leader groups, in contrast, there almost never is this kind of direct correspondence between group goal and individual goals. It would be the rare assembly line worker in an automobile factory who has a deep-seated desire to build automobiles. Further, it is the rare soldier who joins the Army to be a machine-gunner, to select just one task at random. This does not mean that either man either especially likes or dislikes what he eventually is assigned to do, merely that it is likely that neither man, when he joined the organization, had a very good idea where he would eventually be assigned. The assembly line foreman, on the one hand, and the soldier's eventual company commander, on the other hand, decided that the man was needed in a particular capacity and assigned him to that task. The question then is, why did the man decide to join the organization, and, more important, why does he decide to remain in it?

In common sense terms, the answer here is simple enough. The worker, and the soldier, at least the career soldier, both have needs that must be
satisfied. They need to earn a living, to "get ahead," and to do work that is meaningful and worthwhile. Each man tries, in his selection of a career, to achieve these, and other goals to the maximum extent he can through the choice of the vocational organization to which he belongs. Thus, while the members of appointed-leader groups serve individual needs through group membership, these needs are served indirectly, rather than directly as is the case with members of emergent leader groups. Satisfaction of these needs, which will be examined more fully in the next chapter, is the factor that holds the member of an appointed-leader group to the group.

The role of the group and the group member within the organization thus can be explained in terms of what each does for the other. The organization needs the group and the group member to perform certain functions that are essential to the over-all plan of the organization itself. The group member needs to belong to the group so that his own needs will be satisfied by the organization in return for his part in satisfying its needs. The better each satisfies the needs of the other, the tighter the bonds that hold the two together will be.

THE ROLE OF THE LEADER

The role of the leader in these two different kinds of groups is determined by group goals, group member goals, and his own source of authority and influence within the group. The emergent leader owes his authority and influence to a majority of the members of the group. He is responsible to them, and must please them in order to retain his influence. The key variable in pleasing group members typically is his ability to manage the resources of the group in order to further the individual goals of the group members.

The appointed leader, on the other hand, owes his authority to the organization. However, the source of his ability to influence group members is somewhat more complex than is the case for the emergent leader's. Influence does not follow simply because the organization appoints him to a position of leadership, though this has a lot to do with his having influence. The actual source of his influence stems from his success in mediating between the organization and the members of the group. On the one hand, he must manage the resources of the group to accomplish in the most efficient manner possible the mission or goal assigned to the group; and, on the other hand, he must obtain for individuals within the group rewards from the organization that are commensurate with their contribution to achievement of group goals.

Since group members must accomplish assigned missions and goals before their own needs are satisfied, the group needs a leader who (a) can tell group members what they are expected to do, how well it must be done, when it must be finished, etc., and (b) then can guide their actions so that goals and missions are achieved most efficiently. The group will give its loyalty to and will be influenced by the leader who can do this well, and who, further, can both obtain needed support as necessary to facilitate mission
accomplishment and see that the individual group member's own efforts are then amply rewarded by the organization.

In an organization like the Army, the situation is made more complex by the existence of punishments that can be invoked, if necessary, to ensure that each unit member contributes toward mission accomplishment. However, the basic elements in small-unit leadership still consist of: defining performance expectations, motivating performance, utilizing subordinate leaders, and providing support for both individuals and the group as a whole, as needed, when extraneous influences threaten to disrupt unit performance.

A TWO DIRECTION PATH OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MILITARY LEADER

These basic generalizations determine, in large part, the specifics of the functional role of the military leader. The military leader must actually discharge responsibilities in two directions. One, of course, is to the organization (for the small-unit leader, this means battalion or company, as represented by his commanding officers). The other is to the unit itself. The unit constitutes a second direction of responsibility because the leader is the person best able to make judgments as to which group members have or have not earned various rewards that the organization can give. If these rewards are to be given on the basis of quality of performance—and they must be so given if quality performance is a desired group goal—then he must be responsible for giving information to his seniors that will result in appropriate distribution of the fruits of his subordinates' work.

THE TWO GENERAL FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY LEADER

The leader's actions thus must accomplish two general functions. One—and this must be of first priority—is to ensure that his unit achieves objectives set for it by his senior officers; if these objectives are not attained, his unit may be or become a weak link that jeopardizes Army attainment of over-all goals. Of next importance, he must ensure that the needs of his men are met; if they are not met, the Army will cease to be attractive as a career, and the resulting loss of potential career personnel will decrease operating efficiency and combat readiness. The leader, of course, has many other functions, but these must be considered the two primary responsibilities of the military leader.¹

¹ Although leadership skills which are effective in peacetime will generally also be effective in combat, this and subsequent discussions will be restricted to peacetime leadership because (a) the opportunity for extensive self-improvement generally is not available in combat to nearly the same extent as in peace, and (b) the leader who through the development and use of sound leadership skills gains the loyalty, respect, confidence, and willing obedience of his men in peacetime will generally have a substantial advantage in initial unit combat effectiveness over the leader who has not developed these skills in peacetime.
Table I lists many of the goals considered desirable by a platoon leader's subordinates, on the one hand, and by his seniors, on the other hand. Of course, this list should not be regarded as comprehensive. Other things might well have been included. The listed items are not necessarily in the correct order of importance. Different persons will have varying opinions as to which goals are more important. Further, this grouping of personal need satisfiers is arbitrary. Other writers may prefer a different system of classification.

### Table I

#### PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL NEED SATISFIERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONAL GOAL SATISFIERS</th>
<th>ORGANIZATIONAL GOAL SATISFIERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Primary</strong>—those variables relating to satisfaction of basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, and &quot;necessary&quot; luxuries</td>
<td><strong>A. Primary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Salary</td>
<td>1. High state of training and readiness for combat, in terms of training schedules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Job security</td>
<td>2. Rapid accomplishment of assigned tasks, according to stated standards of excellence, and with a minimum expenditure of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Advancement opportunity</td>
<td>3. High standing of the command in relation to other commands in achieving objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Fringe—those variables which relate, but less directly, to satisfaction of basic needs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Retirement plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hospitalization plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Secondary—those variables important in increasing intrinsic interest in the job and decreasing stresses normally associated with work activity</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Good supervision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Compatible co-workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pleasant physical work environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. High status of own job with respect to other jobs which might be obtained</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. High status within own work group</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The next two chapters will be devoted to a deeper analysis of the factors that motivate group member performance. Subsequent chapters will then deal in turn with other basic elements in small-unit leadership.

SUMMARY

In summary, there is a clear-cut distinction between the **emergent** leader, who owes his position of influence to the group he leads, and the **appointed** leader, who is placed in a position of responsibility and authority by the organization of which the group is a part. The appointed leader owes his authority to those superior to himself in authority, and is responsible to them for the efficient management of resources placed at his disposal to accomplish assigned missions. His primary responsibility thus is to obtain effective group performance in the accomplishment of such missions. A second responsibility is to obtain for the members of his group the rewards they have earned for effective performance. Both functions must be done well if his leadership is to be successful. Following chapters will discuss at greater length the ways in which the military leader, who is an **appointed** leader, can satisfy the requirements implied in this general concept of leadership.
Chapter 3
SETTING PLATOON GOALS AND STANDARDS

COMPANY ORGANIZATION AND THE PLATOON LEADER

The platoon leader's importance as a source of guidance and direction for his platoon is determined in very large part by how he fits within the company command structure. While company commanders differ a great deal in the way they distribute responsibility, most use the informal company-platoon relationship shown below:

![Company Organization Diagram]

In this, the link from the first sergeant to the platoon sergeant is concerned with details of company administration, such as providing men for company level details. These matters do not require the platoon leader's participation and, indeed, would be a waste of his time. He, therefore, is rarely made aware of them except in summary form at some prescribed time during the work day. The link from the company commander through the platoon leader to the platoon NCO's is normally used for nonadministrative platoon assignments with which the company commander is personally concerned. In this kind of company organization, the platoon leader is very important to his men because, for many matters, he is their only communication link with the company commander, and vice versa. His importance in this respect is derived from the basic differences between the goals of his men, on the one hand, and those of his seniors, on the other hand.
TWO BELIEFS TO BE DEVELOPED

In earlier introductory discussion, it was concluded that people belong to groups in order to attain certain individual goals. This is true even though different persons may have different goals. For example, draftees and careerists have fundamentally different orientations toward what they want from the service, but they both want something. However, these individual goals exist as only one part of a two-way bargain; the other part is satisfaction of organizational needs and goals.

These considerations lead to the very important conclusion that workers may not actually be interested in their work activities, per se. It should be evident that the next logical conclusion is that, if they actually are not interested in their work activities, per se, there will be a strong tendency for them to satisfy, if they can, their individual needs without fulfilling their part of the two-way bargain; that is, without helping do the work the organization requires of the group. Whether or not this should be the case is a matter of social ethics and, consequently, is not a proper topic to discuss in the present context. However, the general fact--there are, of course, exceptions--that this tendency often exists, especially at the level of enlisted rifle platoon members, has important implications. It indicates the necessity of developing in them two "beliefs": (a) that if they want to attain individual goals they really have no choice but to help achieve organizational goals, and (b) that their platoon leader is a competent source of guidance in helping them do this.

LEADER'S GUIDANCE FUNCTION

The importance of the platoon leader's role in guiding and structuring his platoon's activities also follows from these arguments. For the reasons discussed earlier, his men generally will be interested in the easiest, fastest, most economical way of meeting organizational requirements. The man who can structure and organize the platoon's activities so that organizational goals are successfully met with a minimum of effort, sweat, and friction will, in general, be highly valued by the platoon members.

The working of a football squad will serve to illustrate the guidance function of the platoon leader. In a game, the quarterback is generally the leader of the offensive team. This does not necessarily mean that he is a person of great personal magnetism, or a man of sterling character, etc., but rather that he is the man the coach decided could best guide the team effort, and to whom he consequently gave "skull" practice on team plays. All the other men on the team know the plays, but only the quarterback has been given the extra preparation required to enable him to fit the plays to the actual situation on the playing field. This is the major distinction between him and the nonleader. How well he actually performs in this role will determine how long he remains the leader.

The platoon leader, of course, has much the same role to play. He must translate the more general guidance given by higher authority into guidance, at the action level, that can be understood by his subordinates.
Table II shows a gross breakdown of the platoon leader's functional role as it relates, among other things, to his responsibilities for organizing and directing platoon activities.

IMPORTANCE OF ACCURATE AND CLEAR GUIDANCE

When the platoon leader is the main link between the company commander and the platoon, the accuracy and clarity with which he provides guidance for the platoon is critically important. Especially in the Army, which has the authority to punish poor performance if this is necessary in order to achieve stated goals, satisfactory work performance is a very important goal for the men. If their work meets required standards, they get the rewards offered for this good work; if, on the other hand, their performance is poor, some or many of these rewards will be denied. In addition, the men may run the risk of being disciplined for not meeting standards. If, for example, the company commander announces an inspection, and one of his platoon leaders fails to tell his platoon all the requirements for the inspection, that platoon is liable to score low, regardless of how hard the men work preparing for it. Only a few such experiences are needed to kill the platoon's motivation. The men then will tend not to expend a lot of effort on assignments because of a lack of confidence that they can succeed, regardless of how hard they try.

TWO RESPONSIBILITIES IN EVALUATING WORK

Once the goals and standards of the platoon have been clearly and accurately set, the platoon leader must then fulfill two responsibilities related to accurate evaluation of ongoing and completed work in terms of stated expectations. One responsibility is to his own seniors. The work must be done as assigned, at least as well as he knows his company commander wants. The platoon leader must ensure that his platoon lives up to the expectations of higher commanders. The second responsibility is to give feedback to his men regarding how well they do in comparison with the standards set previously for them. It is important that this guidance be given both during ongoing work (when it is appropriate to do so) and after the work is completed. Guidance which is given during the accomplishment of an assignment is especially valuable, because it provides an opportunity for the men to correct errors before they are called to account for them.

One obvious requirement in this respect is technical competence. The platoon leader will have a difficult task of evaluating ongoing and completed work, and of offering guidance, if he, himself, does not know what is supposed to be done, and how to do it. For the new platoon leader, this presents formidable problems, which will be discussed later in two separate sections. One will be oriented toward NCO use and support, and the other toward specific problems of the new platoon leader.

Once performance deficiencies are identified, the ability of the platoon leader to communicate information regarding these deficiencies to his men is extremely important. Assuming the deficiencies resulted from a lack of knowledge or ability to do the job correctly, the platoon leader's objective should be to remove the ability block to good performance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Higher Levels of Command</th>
<th>Platoon Leader Level of Command</th>
<th>Platoon Member Level of Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Platoon assignments, standards, SOP's.</td>
<td>Platoon member assignments. Training. Explanations of how to do what is expected. Statement of standards of excellence for assigned tasks, etc. Explanation of why unusual actions are taken. Information on matters of importance to platoon members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Check of ongoing activity to ensure that standards and goals are being met.</td>
<td>Check of ongoing work if deficient. Praise of ongoing work if well done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Report, if necessary, on status of ongoing work.</td>
<td>Report on status of completed tasks as necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Check of completed work to ensure that standards of excellence were met.</td>
<td>Critique of completed work. Instruction if work is unsatisfactory. Check of reasons for failure if failure occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Request for promotions or strong disciplinary actions as a function of platoon member compliance to performance standards.</td>
<td>Praise and reward for good work or initiation of disciplinary action as required for poor work. Initiation of more substantial rewards (e.g., promotions for good work), or disciplinary actions (such as Article 15, if appropriate) for failure to meet assigned standards. In all cases, connection of reward/discipline to the extent to which performance standards were met.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE DEFICIENCIES

In analyzing inability to perform a task, the platoon leader's first step should be to determine whether the man understood what he was supposed to do. If not, the remedy is additional explanation, simplified and in greater detail. If the task was understood originally, and the failure was physical in nature, the remedy is supervised practice. Such practice should, at least at the beginning, be accompanied by informal, unemotional, and objective critiquing, with careful explanations as to why the work was wrong, and how to do it right. If a man has innocently done a job wrong, although he was trying to do it right, it does no good at all to berate him for having done poor work. If he actually was trying to do it right in the first place, it is quite safe to assume that he will continue trying to do it right, even though he must make corrections, provided he is given the information he needs to make his work come up to standards.

MAKING GROUP OPERATION AUTOMATIC

The platoon leader will generally have another important goal in view as he guides platoon activities. The leader of any work group, platoons included, should always attempt to make the operation of his group more and more automatic. That is, he should attempt to train the group so that it can function as well without him as with him.

The football team serves again as a fine example of this point. At the first of the season, when the coach develops the new plays for the year, backfield practice is likely to be rough, indeed. There will be many errors, and many times he or the quarterback will be required to "spell out" a play for someone before it can be run. As the season progresses, however, and the plays become familiar, all the quarterback needs to say is something like, "O.K., let's do 28 this time, on three." These code words spell out the entire sequence of the play for all the team members. Similarly, the platoon leader should aim toward the same level of familiarity with rules and procedures in his platoon. Such familiarity is necessary for smooth and effective functioning both when the platoon leader is absent and when time pressures prevent "spelling out" desired activity.

The platoon leader can achieve this end in several ways. By consistently stating clearly what is expected, how it is to be done—if this is not already known—and how well it is to be done, he builds up in his platoon a familiarity with standard approaches to given assignments. However, this generally is not sufficient. An additional area of importance is explaining reasons why things are done, why certain actions must be taken, and so on.

PURPOSES OF EXPLANATIONS

Explanations actually serve two purposes. One is to increase the motivation of men to do well on "explained" assignments, because the explanations indicate to the subordinate that the leader considers him sufficiently important to know the reasons. Explanations also increase motivation by making clear the logical basis for given actions, assuming, of course, a logical basis does exist. When a man sees logically that a given thing should be done, he generally will be better motivated to do it well than when he does not. In addition to the
motivational function, explanations also serve the highly important training function of providing a rational basis on which subordinates can make the same decisions in the leader's absence that he himself would have made had he been there. Again, it is well to emphasize that this is one of many kinds of actions utilized by the platoon leader to make the function of his unit more automatic, so that it will operate as well in his absence as in his presence. The ability of a unit to function efficiently in the absence of its leader is one important criterion of judging how effectively he has built his unit. One caution is appropriate here on the habitual explanation of actions. The men of the platoon must not be allowed to believe that they have an inalienable right to expect explanation of actions. They must be led to realize that, in many cases, explanation will be undesirable or infeasible. Their attention to orders and unfailing obedience cannot be allowed to suffer when explanation is not given.

SUMMARY

In summary, as the appointed head of his unit, the platoon leader is the trustee of the efforts of his men. He is responsible for guiding their efforts so that they will meet the performance expectations of his own seniors. This requires that he (a) fully understand these expectations, (b) translate them into clear and accurate guidance his men can understand, and (c) evaluate both ongoing and completed work in terms of established performance standards so that errors or omissions can be corrected before final evaluations are made. This last function is best served by objective, unemotional critiques that include careful explanations to support performance evaluations. These, in turn, supply training essential to the development of a unit capable of functioning as effectively in the leader's absence as in his presence. A unit with this capability will function much better, both initially and during prolonged combat, than a unit lacking it.
Chapter 4

MOTIVATING PERFORMANCE

MOTIVATION AND PERSONAL NEEDS

Of all the areas of leader actions to be covered in this text, that of motivating performance is perhaps more important than any other. Men can be motivated to do good work in a number of different ways, some good and some bad. Depending on which methods he uses, the leader can build a unit that prides itself in the quality of its work and will work equally well with or without his immediate supervision, or he can build a unit that does not value good work except insofar as it promises some immediate gain. This section includes a discussion of a number of the actions a leader can take to motivate his men, and the probable long-term effects of these actions on their performance.

In an earlier chapter, an important set of distinctions was made between emergent and appointed leader groups. One of these distinctions was that people work in order to satisfy personal needs that cannot be satisfied more efficiently by participation in other groups. Some of these needs are (a) the need to earn a living, (b) the need to be recognized as contributing to the general welfare of the society, and (c) the need to be recognized as a competent person of value to the work group.

Since a man works to achieve certain definite goals, it should be clear that he can be, and is, motivated to work either because satisfaction of these goals has been offered as a consequence of doing good work or because threats have been made that satisfaction of these goals will be withheld as a consequence of doing poor work. As was stated earlier, the work relationship is a two-way partnership between the worker and the company, the soldier and the Army. Each satisfies a need of the other.

FORCE AS A MOTIVATOR

It should be apparent at this point that certain definite differences between the Army and civilian industry limit the extent to which the soldier-Army relationship can be called a partnership. The partnership relation does seem to exist for the career soldier. But how about the draftee? Does it work for him, too?

On the surface, the answer would appear to be negative. In the sense described earlier, draftees, and volunteers who are merely "avoiding" the draft, are "unwilling." They would leave the Army at any time if they were free to do so. Neither the promise of the tangible and intangible rewards offered by the Army, nor the threat that these things will be taken away, is sufficient to make these persons career motivated. The reason, of course, is that they think, or hope, that they can do better in the civilian careers that will be open to them.

At first glance, this seems to raise perplexing motivational problems for the leader. How can a man be motivated to do good work, if he does not value the available benefits? This is a problem military leaders have faced for centuries, probably from the date the first civilian was conscripted for military duty. The general solution to this problem has been a system of disciplinary
actions that the Army legally can take to force the civilian soldiers to do its will. Thus, if he does not obey orders, and does not carry out assignments, the civilian soldier legally can be deprived of his remaining freedoms, and, in some cases, even of his life. Threats of such losses are powerful motivators, and generally are sufficient to get the compliance with orders that is necessary to carry out assigned missions. While it is unfortunate that this is the case, it nevertheless is true that such a system of disciplinary acts must exist in order to ensure that orders are obeyed and assignments are completed.

THE END RESULT OF PUNISHMENT THREATS

The existence of such a system of authority is by no means an indication that its use constitutes the proper way to motivate one's men. On the contrary, it is a makeshift way to elicit good performance, and should be saved as a last resort for those who cannot otherwise be induced to do good work. The reason is rather simple. When threats of punishment for poor performance are the leader's primary means for securing good performance, the men learn rather quickly that the objective is not really to do good work, but rather to avoid getting caught doing poor work. Further, they learn rather quickly those things for which they are likely to get caught. The end result is a unit that requires extremely close supervision for effective performance. Indeed, this is very likely the origin of the old military maxim: "Close and continuous supervision is an absolute necessity." Stated simply, in a unit motivated primarily by fear of punishment for poor work, performance decrements are highly likely to occur in the leader's absence if there are ways of covering them up; and, because the leader cannot be everywhere at once, there is a strong likelihood that his unit eventually will become well versed in "looking good" as opposed to "being good."

This, of course, is not the only unfortunate result in such a unit. Another is that its attractiveness to new men is very low. Recruits learn that their leaders, their units, and, apparently, the Army as a whole are sources of unpleasant events such as criticism, threats, and disciplinary actions, but not of pleasant events. This colors their general reactions toward the Army and sharply increases the difficulty of inducing high quality, career-oriented men to remain in the service. This effect is particularly marked when the civilian economy is highly competitive for these high quality people on the basis of positive incentives.

This seems a dark picture indeed for the leader who wants to motivate his men by using more constructive methods. Fortunately, it also is an untrue picture. The phenomenon of the "unwilling soldier" is more apparent than real. It has been discussed at the outset primarily because many Army leaders, thinking this is the universal case, tend to rely heavily on the use of punitive methods for motivating their men, when they actually have many effective positive incentives at their disposal.

RECRUITS--THREE GENERAL CATEGORIES

The prevalence of the concept of the "unwilling soldier" probably can be attributed to a very small group of general misfits who are drafted into the Army.
together with the majority who adapt well to Army life. Thus, there probably are at least three general categories of recruits:

(a) **Career-minded volunteers.** This is a small group for two reasons. One is that a very low percentage of 18- and 19-year-old males in our society have made stable career decisions. The second is that an enlisted career, unfortunately, is not considered an attractive one among many levels in this society.

(b) **Draftees or "unwilling" volunteers.** The members of this category have fairly well-formulated career plans relating to the civilian economy or have decided for other reasons that the Army is not for them as a career. This group constitutes a staggeringly large percentage of all recruits.

(c) **Misfits.** These persons may be either draftees or volunteers. In either case, they can be recognized by the fact that they probably have not made satisfactory adjustments in their home lives, school, or the civilian economy, prior to reception into the Army. They are wanderers, fleeing from one unsuccessful adjustment attempt to the next. The odds are very low that they will adjust in the Army any better than in the civilian economy.

**DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CATEGORIES OF RECRUITS**

One of the main reasons for differentiating these three categories so carefully is the possibility a tendency might develop in the Army, particularly in the noncommissioned officer ranks, to react to all draftees, and even to all recruits, mainly in terms of how they, the NCO's, are forced to react to misfits. This practice would decrease the chances that the capable recruit will make a successful adaptation to Army life, because it results in his being treated from the beginning as though he will not. Thus, he has less incentive to make the effort.

In actuality, career-minded volunteers are positively motivated from the start, and value the good things the Army has to offer. If they are helped in their initial adjustment to the Army, and if they are not turned against the Army by needless harassment during their initial days and weeks of training, they will work willingly for promotions, advancement, and other forms of recognition the Army is able to give. If handled well, these people present no motivation problem to the leader. They already are motivated. The leader's problem mainly is to ensure that their enthusiasm for the service is not destroyed by unskilled subordinate leaders.

Most draftees also present no motivational problems for the effective leader, though for a different reason than that given for the potential career soldier. Even though draftees might want very much to get out of the Army, these persons generally have sufficient emotional maturity to realize that they are now in the Army, that they are now required to do their bit to serve their country, and that there is nothing they can do to change this situation. Once accepted, this realization enables the emotionally mature individual to make the best of his current situation, regardless of what the situation is.
The leader can play a major role in helping recently drafted men to accept this viewpoint toward Army service. This should be one of the first things he does when he welcomes new men into his unit. The following example illustrates how one platoon leader actually attempted to do this when he greeted a platoon of new recruits.

Men, my name is Lieutenant _________________. I would like to welcome you to Fort ____________, ___________. Right now, I know each of you is beginning to wonder just exactly what you are doing here.

Well, the answer is a simple one. Some of you are volunteers. You know why you are here. The rest of you were drafted. But regardless of how it happened, you are here, and that's that. I'm not going to go into the business of why some people are drafted and some people aren't. The draft boards know their business better than I do. The important thing is that the Army has important missions to accomplish now, and we've got to have men to do these things. Each of you is going to help during the period of time you'll be with us. This is your chance to do your fair share of the total job of helping to keep our country free. This is one of the small prices almost everyone pays sooner or later for the privilege of living in a country like this one. Let me emphasize: It's a very small price to pay.

But whatever the reason you have for being here or not being here, and regardless of what you thought about the Army before today, you are now assigned to __________ Platoon, __________ Company, __________ Battalion of the __________ Infantry. You're here, and it's up to you to make the best of your situation. If you get mad because you were drafted, and decide that you are going to get back at the Army by not doing your work well, you may find that you are in for a rough two years. Like I said, we have important things to do and we can't let little problems get in our way. But if you decide that you are going to do your part as well as you can, you'll find out the Army is a pretty good place to be. My NCO cadre and I will treat you right if you don't let us down. If each of you does his share, this platoon will be a good place to live, and you will be proud of it.

The things you learn while you are in the Army are important; you may not really have thought about it, but there may be a time when you'll need to utilize your training. It is not beyond reason that we could get called into combat sometime after your training cycle has been completed. So each of you should learn all you can while you are here.

You are probably wondering now what we will be doing for the next eight weeks. We will be going through basic combat training. The purpose of this training is to make you proficient in the basic combat skills. You will learn and be responsible for many things from firing your weapon to KP. Basic training is not easy. It is hard
and it is designed to be hard. You men will be in top physical condition when you finish here. Basic training is a challenge, but one which you can and will overcome.

Just so you know what is expected of you, let me say that I am used to having the best platoon in this company, and will want to continue to have the best platoon. Other men in this company will be able to tell if a man is from the _____ Platoon by looking at his brass, his shoes, and the way he wears his uniform. His physical appearance will be the best. The platoon will be outstanding in all respects both in garrison and in the field; and, when we move as a platoon, we will march proudly because we know we are the best.

I expect each of you men to help each other in working for these goals.

I want to see each and every one of you putting out to the utmost of your ability. I want to see outstanding performance from each of you. If you get fouled up in your training because you don't know how to do something, I may understand; however, I will never tolerate not trying.

My cadre and I are here to assist you. If you should have any problems during the next eight weeks, be sure to see your squad leader and then Sergeant ______. If they can't help you, come and see me. I will try to help you out. I expect your immediate response to my orders, as well as my cadre's. This is essential in a well run unit.

Sergeant ______ will give you all the details of being in the _____ Platoon and living at Fort ________, _________. I am sure he will also give you information about _________ and the cultural advantages of this fine city. If you have any questions, see your squad leaders and Sergeant ________.

Men, I am looking forward to working with you and making our platoon outstanding. Don't disappoint me, my cadre, your fellow platoon members, or yourselves.

While this welcome served other purposes, such as making clear some of the platoon leader's standards for the platoon, it also served the very important first purpose of trying to make clear to his men that they could gain nothing through resistance to doing a good job just because they did not want to be in the Army in the first place. By emphasizing that they were "in," whether or not they wanted to be, and that they were faced with definite and necessary jobs that must be done, this platoon leader attempted to show his new men that having been drafted was "water over the dam." That is, they could do nothing to change the fact that they would be serving enlisted tours of duty, and that the outcome of these enlisted tours would depend entirely on their own efforts.

THE DOUBLE GOAL OF THE DRAFTEE

Any emotionally mature person who has reached this realization will almost inevitably try to make the best of his situation. That is, he feels there is no point in being negativistic if it is only going to make things worse. If things
can be made better, then this is the thing to do. Such a person may then actually be more highly motivated than the career-minded soldier. He has a double goal. The first goal is to obtain the increased freedoms that the Army grants to enlisted soldiers who "play the game" by doing good work, obeying orders, and scrupulously observing regulations. The second goal is to avoid harassment or punishment that he fears he might experience during his tour of Army service.

Civilians, in general, have the impression that the Army deals harshly with its men. This impression is strongly reinforced the first time recruits encounter a basic training NCO or officer who starts a period of instruction by enumerating all the unpleasant things that can happen to the soldier who does not cooperate, and so on. Few things affect the recruit as much as being humiliated and degraded in a situation in which he is powerless, because of rank differences, to protect himself. If the enlisted soldier feels that he can avoid "getting caught" in this punitive trap by doing good work, or that a record of good work will be in his favor if he does make a mistake, he will be powerfully motivated to do good work. If the leader gives the impression that he will stand up for and treat with dignity those of his men who make a valuable contribution to the effectiveness of the unit, he generally will win the loyalty and willing obedience of all soldiers who fall into the category of "draftees."

USE OF POSITIVE INCENTIVES

There is fairly strong evidence that both the volunteer and the draftee are initially well motivated and will continue to be so if they see that good performance is a means for satisfying their own needs. Among other things, career soldiers desire promotions, advancement, and increased responsibility. Draftees desire increased personal freedom, protection from harsh treatment in the event they unwittingly violate regulations, and general freedom from harassment.

These desirable incentives are generally within the power of the small-unit leader to dispense, either directly or indirectly. He generally controls promotions and advancement by making recommendations and personal evaluations to the command levels empowered to grant these things. He also controls, to a very large extent, the general leadership climate in his unit, including the extent to which his subordinate leaders are permitted to use ineffective techniques, such as harassment, for motivating men who would respond better to the use of positive incentives. Thus, for most career-minded volunteers and draftees, the small-unit leader definitely has a wide range of available actions that are highly rewarding for his men. If he uses these positive incentives wisely as rewards for good performance, he will quickly obtain the loyalty and active cooperation of these men.

THE MISFIT

Unfortunately, this is not always true for persons in the third category. Misfits are difficult to handle because they are, fundamentally, motivational failures. In the process of growing into adolescence, the child generally finds that his parents and other adults exert pressures on him to behave in certain ways. This process is called socialization. Through it, the child learns to behave in ways considered adaptive in the adult world. The difficulty is that
the process is not foolproof. If, in his early home environment, a child finds few constructive ways of reacting adaptively and of winning parental approval, he is likely to try to find other sources of approval. This most often is a group of children of approximately his own age. Finding such approval and acceptance fills a need that seems highly important to the individual.

However, there are difficulties here also. First, approval from outside the family strongly tends to reduce the need for parental approval. Thus, the child finds it less necessary to do the things that win parental approval, and the socialization process is curtailed. Second, approval from other children tends to be based on actions that are antagonistic to adult values and the desires of the parents. This further curtails the socialization process.

In some individuals, this results in a set of personal values antagonistic to the general values of society, and of the adult world. For present purposes the critical element of deviancy is that these individuals have not learned that they can earn the things they want by conforming to the accepted function of the social system. Individuals who develop normally find that they are rewarded for good behavior and for good work. They learn that they cannot take the things they want; however, they do find that they can earn these things. The misfits have not learned this. Instead, they have generally learned that, to get the things they want, they must use force; they do not earn things. The result is that they view society through rebellious eyes.

Ordinary motivational methods may not work with these individuals, particularly over short periods of time. Their general attitudes will illustrate the difficulties involved: "Who wants a lousy promotion?" "Ha! I really didn't want a pass, anyway." "What do I care whether you think I did a good job? Who are you, anyway?" "What do I care if you yell at me? That's nothing new." Proper handling of these individuals is complicated by the fact that the unit as a whole must do good work, and that each man must do his part if unit motivation is to be maintained at a high level.

Thus, the leader's dilemma is that he is confronted on the one hand with a few individuals who will not work for positive incentives, and on the other hand with the realization that he must in some manner make them work. Unfortunately, if good work is to be had from these persons, it often must be obtained, at least initially, through the use of negative incentives.

USE OF NEGATIVE INCENTIVES

Even with misfits, negative incentives must be used with care. It is important to remember that the objective is never to create excessively strong fear. This would work to the detriment of the soldier's ability to do good work by making him worry too much about the possible consequences of failure. The more he worries, the less time he has available to think about what he is doing, and the more likely he is to fail. If negative incentives are to be used, as they sometimes must, the objective should be to use the smallest force that will ensure the desired outcome.

One of the best illustrations of proper limits is the constructive use of punishment that appears in the parent-child relationship. As a child develops from babyhood, he must be socialized. That is, he must be taught the "do's" and the "do not's." If he can be taught these through the use of positive
incentives alone, this is by far the best way. However, positive incentives alone will almost never be enough. Before the child learns to talk well, he cannot be "reasoned with." He must be discouraged from the "do not's" either with a roar of disapproval sufficient to discourage him, or with a swat on the backside. After the child learns to talk, he needs another period of time to learn that there are "desirable" things he can do to earn parental approval and all that such approval implies. During this period of learning, he still must be discouraged from the "do not's," by force if necessary. The gloved fist may be necessary even after the child learns to do "the proper things" in order to earn approval, primarily because the range of positive incentives available to the parent is limited, as is the case with the platoon leader. There may be times that the child is powerfully tempted by an attractive "don't." At such times the momentary temptation may be too great to be counterbalanced by the rewards the parent will give for being "good." If at these times the child knows there is impartial and unemotional, but nevertheless stern retribution, he is helped to overcome the temptation. This is true even in the best homes, where the children are best loved. The knowledge that wrongdoing produces consequences will not make the child insecure or hateful of his parents. Indeed, acceptance of this kind of social system, in which wrongdoing is punished, is a fundamental requirement if the child is to learn those things he must know to function well as an adult in our society. The important things are (a) that the child not be motivated solely by threats; that is, that he be taught through the use of a system that emphasizes rewards for good performance and uses punishment as a last resort, and (b) that the system of reward and punishment be fair and highly consistent. Contrary to some prevailing thought, insecurity comes not from fear of punishment, but rather from a lack of knowledge of "when the ax will fall," which, in turn, is produced by inconsistency on the part of the parents.

IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF AN INCENTIVE SYSTEM

The closeness of this analogy to the use of rewards and punishment in the platoon is so great that it will not be amplified further. The important elements are (a) making clear what is expected, (b) making clear the system of rewards and punishments, (c) emphasizing the use of positive incentives whenever possible, and (d) applying the system impartially, fairly, and consistently. Just as parents socialize children, the leader who does these things not only will maintain enthusiastic motivation among his well-adjusted men, but also will be able to "reclaim" a surprising number of misfits. Once they are "socialized," they will soldier as well as the next man.

To summarize, in this society at least, men will work better to achieve desired personal goals than they will to avoid punishment. If they work only to avoid discipline for poor work, their performance will tend to become undependable. They will seek other ways of avoiding disciplinary action if other ways can be found. As a consequence, the leader then is forced to exercise close supervisory control over them if he expects their performance to be good. In contrast, if good performance is obtained primarily through the use of positive incentives, such as recognition and rewards for good performance, the leader will build his subordinates into a dependable unit that will tend to work in his absence as well as in his presence.
It is clear from these considerations that it is highly desirable to use positive incentives to induce good performance whenever it is possible to do so. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of issues relevant to the use of positive incentives, and to analysis of some of the situations in which positive inducements may not work.

FOUR MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS

As might be deduced from the material just presented, a soldier's motivation to do good work is dependent on four factors:

(a) The soldier's feeling that he can succeed if he tries.
(b) His feeling that his leader will recognize his good work, either tangibly or intangibly.
(c) The value he places on that recognition.
(d) His estimate of the probability that he will be punished if he does not try.

MOTIVATION TO TRY

The first of these four factors is nearly self-explanatory. It is clear from everyday experience that a man has little motivation to try something he fears he cannot do. In fact, there is good evidence that a feeling of inadequacy, an expectation of not being able to cope with the situation, is one of the most important determiners of inadequate performance, especially in combat. In our culture, fear and breakdown of motivation to try are nearly universal consequences of certainty or near-certainty of failure.

Proper ways of handling these reactions are complicated by the fact that the relation between expectation of success and motivation to try is probably not a simple one; that is, motivation to try probably does not decrease at a constant rate as expectation of success decreases. It is more likely that there is a breaking point; that is, as a man feels less and less confident that he can succeed, as a result of comparing his own ability with what he thinks is required by the situation, it is likely that his motivation to try will drop slowly until he makes the judgment that "there isn't much chance of succeeding." At that point, his motivation to try will suddenly drop nearly to zero. However, he usually will make this judgment at a point at which his chances are not zero, and some persons will make this kind of judgment earlier than others. Generally, he still might succeed if he were convinced that there still was a chance for success, and would continue trying. The leader can help at this point by building the man's confidence in himself through being supportive, encouraging, and helpful, and particularly by indicating that the man will not be punished for failing if he has given his best. This is important to know, because, especially in combat, or on very difficult tasks, men may be encouraged to keep trying and ultimately may succeed, while without encouragement they may simply quit.

EXPECTATION OF RECOGNITION FOR GOOD WORK

Once a man is convinced that his chances of success are good enough to warrant the effort required to try, his expectation that success will be rewarded
becomes an important consideration. As the section on work groups emphasized, a worker in general, and an enlisted man in particular, generally is not where he is "just for the fun of it." There are certain definite personal needs that he expects to satisfy through performance of assigned duties. If he is not sufficiently convinced that good performance is the best way to get these needs satisfied, then he generally will have little or no interest in doing well in his work. His motivation will be low.

Two factors are influential in building a man's confidence that good performance will be rewarded. First, the platoon leader and the NCO's must have a consistent record of checking and accurately determining the quality of performance. Second, they must have a record of having consistently dispensed the rewards and corrective actions at their disposal in terms of the performance of their men. A man who does better work than any other man in the platoon should be the first man considered for privileges, promotion in rank, and positions of responsibility to which he may be eligible, and so on; the man who does not do good work should never be allowed to escape unpleasant consequences of failure, provided, of course, it is clear that the failure was primarily the result of inadequate motivation.

CONSISTENT AND APPROPRIATE REACTIONS

It is not possible to over-emphasize the importance of the consistency and appropriateness of the leader's reactions to performance. Good performance should always be recognized in some manner, and poor performance should never be allowed to go uncorrected. The consistency with which a leader reacts to performance is very important in letting the follower know what to expect. If consistency and appropriateness could be considered separately, it very likely would be found that the leader's mental alertness would be more related to consistency than to appropriateness, and good judgment more related to appropriateness. Consistency requires awareness of the things going on around oneself, a sensitivity to the things that happen in both the world of physical reality and the world of organizational reality, in order that neither exceptionally good nor exceptionally poor performance will ever go unnoticed. Once performance is noted, the appropriateness of the leader's reaction is basically a matter of estimating how well a man actually did perform, in comparison with how well he could have done. This requires the ability to judge accurately both the actual performance and the capabilities of one's men, and results in a distinction between failure resulting from a lack of ability and failure resulting from a lack of motivation to try harder. If a man is judged to have done his best, the leader's reaction should never be negative, no matter how poor the performance actually is. The leader's reactions to his followers should be far more closely related to how hard they try than to how well they actually do. Leaders often do just the reverse, very probably because this is much the easier of these two alternatives.

THE VALUE OF RECOGNITION FOR GOOD WORK

The question of reacting appropriately to performance is an apt introduction to the third general factor affecting motivation to work: The value a man places on the recognition he will receive for successful completion of assigned tasks.
It is quite meaningful to ask what the leader can provide that will be of value to the subordinate. This problem is complicated by the fact that a soldier does many routine tasks during a day or week, none of which merits a pass or other tangible reward for successful completion, but all of which must nevertheless be done well. Further, providing tangible rewards for all good performances, especially routine tasks, would ultimately cheapen their value in motivating good performance on more critical tasks. Finally, even if this would not cheapen their value, there just would not be enough tangible rewards available for the platoon leader to use in this manner. Fortunately, other rewards, intangible in nature, are available to the platoon leader. Perhaps the best example of an intangible reward is praise given at the successful completion of a task.

In many respects, doing good work on a day-to-day basis is like making deposits at the bank. By making numerous small deposits, the soldier can "save" enough to make a large purchase. Similarly, by doing day-to-day tasks well, the soldier can "save" toward a promotion, or the assistance of his leader in the event he unwittingly gets into trouble. Praise for work well done is much like deposit slips at the bank. It is vitally necessary evidence that the leader is aware of the quality of the work the soldier is doing.

However, praise does more than promise periodic "big" rewards. It also tells the soldier that he is a valued member of the unit. While an individual is said to work primarily for tangible benefits—in the sense that he must have these to live—one of his chief goals in actual practice is to feel that he is important, and worth something to someone else. One important source of this feeling is the belief that his work is important to others. The leader can create this belief by praising his men for work well done.

The contrast is equally strong. If the leader never compliments a subordinate for a job well done, it is easy for the subordinate to believe either that he never does good work, or that his leader is not really interested in good work. Either of these beliefs will cripple his motivation.

To re-emphasize, the effects of accurate and realistically given praise are quite profound. By indicating to the individual soldier that his work is valued, the leader tells him that he is a valued member of the group, with all this implies. Particularly important, this tells him that the group will go out of its way to provide help for him if he ever needs it. This goes a long way toward preventing feelings of isolation that are so deadly for motivation and morale in difficult situations.

GROUP SUPPORT AS A MOTIVATOR

However, beyond the material things, an additional important category of positive incentives is available to the leader. Almost all well-adjusted adolescents and adults in this culture have learned the value of group support, and value the esteem of their peers very highly as an indication that they are supported. When small military units are rewarded as groups for their good work, and future rewards also are made contingent on good performance, most of the individuals in the unit will want to do a good job in order that the other individuals in the unit will perceive they are carrying their fair share of the load.
Indeed, this kind of motivation to do good work can be more effective than that based on individual rewards the leader is able to give. An actual incident will illustrate the use of this kind of motivational technique, and its effects, if properly applied.

A company commander was concerned with the lagging manner in which his company responded to the "turn out" whistle for reveille. First call was ten minutes prior to second call, and men often barely made the assembly. One morning he told his men that he was surprised the last man to make formation each morning was so modest at all other times. He went on to explain this remark by saying that the last man obviously considered himself so important that he could keep the rest of the company standing waiting for him in the cold, first light of morning. He further pointed out that the last man was not carrying his fair share of the total company load.

This was not said threateningly; rather, he discussed the matter half-seriously and half in jest. But this company commander was respected for his technical competence in running the company, and for his fair treatment of his men. What he said started them to thinking about being "the last man" and "taking a free ride on a buddy's shoulders."

Soon there developed a noticeable reluctance to be last to make morning formation, to the extent that two or more men would often attempt to leave the barracks at the same time. But more important, the men became so proficient at accomplishing their morning chores, and so well motivated to do them rapidly and well, that the company eventually made formation each morning in less than three minutes.

This, of course, was not his only application of this motivational technique. He used it in many other situations as well. On marches, for example, it was applied to men who "fell out." The effectiveness of using pride in the unit and the desire for the unit's approval is well illustrated by the unit's later success in World War II. When the going got really tough, and the men tended to let down, the mere mention of taking a "free ride" was enough to put the unit back on the job. Each man knew that everyone depended on every other man to some extent. The desire not to let one another down produced the important extra effort that made the difference between satisfactory and outstanding performance.

This technique is dangerous to some extent because it encourages competitiveness within the unit and may invite the scorn of the unit for the last man. Skill is required to keep the competitiveness from becoming dangerous--it might eventually become disruptive if it reached a point of throat-cutting--and to protect the last man from scorn if he actually is giving his best. This particular commander had these skills. He also had the keenness of perception to reward his men for their increased effort. He did this in the specific case cited by delaying the first sergeant's whistle seven minutes, so that the men had this much extra time for themselves each morning.
In summary, then, this company commander significantly improved the performance of his company by emphasizing that it was to the common interest that every man pull his share of the total load, and then by rewarding the group as a whole for its increased level of performance. This technique worked well for him because he did not allow ridicule of men who tried hard but did not succeed because of lack of ability.

Of course, there are also the misfits to contend with, and for these men there is a fourth factor which exerts an influence on the soldier's motivation to do good work. This is the system of disciplinary measures that can be taken if necessary to force a man to do the work required for accomplishment of Army goals. As was indicated earlier, this is an important last resort for the leader.

END RESULTS OF POOR INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE

In the Army, assigned tasks must be done, and done well. Each leader's unit as a whole must perform well on assigned tasks. This means, in turn, that each man must do his share of the total job. If he does not, there will be three ultimate results. The first is that the unit's effort as a whole will be downgraded by the poor performance of that man. Because the unit is designed to work as a team, the common goal may be placed in jeopardy if one man fails to carry his fair share of the total task. The second end result, when a man fails to do his part, is that others then must take up the slack. But they will not continue to do this if the leader does not take corrective action against the shirker. They will feel that there is no reason for them to do more than their share, and eventually their own performance will deteriorate to the level of the shirker. Finally, the man himself will develop, over time, firmer habits of shirking his share of the load. The longer he gets away with this, the harder it will be to change him. Prompt corrective action at the first occurrence may salvage the man and eventually aid in making him into a good soldier.

These are three excellent reasons why the leader cannot permit a man to shirk his work, and get away with it. If a man fails to pull his fair share of the load, and gets away with it, the unit has taken a long first step toward mediocrity. (Note: While the platoon leader cannot legally give punishment, he can recommend it. When the circumstances support his recommendations, the company commander will rarely fail to support him. To the shirker, this has the same motivational result as if the platoon leader actually had the legal authority.)

NECESSITY FOR APPROPRIATE REACTIONS

However, the Army's formal system of punishment is not the leader's only way of motivating the misfits. If the leader reacts toward the unit fairly and consistently on the basis of the unit's performance, and if he emphasizes the importance of having each man pull his fair share of the total load, he can also utilize unit opinion so that his men will, themselves, act to prod on those among them who otherwise would not act for the common welfare of all.

From these and other points raised in this chapter, it is evident that one of the most demanding and complex problems of platoon leadership is reacting appropriately to the performance of the men. There are several factors that should guide a leader's decision as to what reaction is appropriate for a
given performance. Some of these have been mentioned earlier in this section, but bear repeating because of their great importance.

When performance is good, the leader's job is a simple one. If he attempts to obtain special recognition for his unit when the men have put forth special effort, and if good work never goes unrecognized, he will develop a fine unit, all other things being equal. Far more serious are the questions the leader must consider when reacting to poor performance.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN MOTIVATION AND ABILITY

Work performance is, in general, the product of two over-all factors, ability and motivation. While these are not completely independent, it is convenient at times to consider them so. Thus, if ability is high, but motivation is low, performance also will be low. Performance will also be low if ability is low, even though motivation is high. One of the leader's greatest problems is reacting appropriately to poor performance, primarily because it often is questionable to which of these two factors, low ability or low motivation, the poor quality of the performance should be attributed. Because the nature of the leader's reaction will be different depending on which he decides is the case, it is important that he make this judgment correctly. If the failure is basically the result of a lack of ability, the appropriate action is to identify and remove the ability block to effective performance, usually through extra training. If the failure is attributed to inadequate motivation, the key is to take whatever actions seem necessary to increase the motivation levels of his men.

Superficially, it would seem easy to identify the reason for a given failure; however, this is considerably more difficult than it seems. The complicating factor is the current high rate of turnover among enlisted personnel serving short tours of duty. The outcome is that one of the major activities of the peacetime Army is training. And motivation to learn is one of the major determinants of the time necessary to acquire given abilities. Thus, a failure that clearly is attributable to a lack of ability may be indirectly the result of an earlier lack of motivation to learn faster.

But regardless of the complexities involved, it is critically important that the leader distinguish accurately between these two kinds of failure. Past performance is a help, but not a totally reliable one; for example, a new man may "goof-off" from the day he joins the unit, and thus appear "dumb." Or, a man with a good past record may suddenly start fouling up because of urgent personal problems he cannot solve.

TWO TYPES OF ERRORS

When there is doubt, and there almost always is, the leader's first step should be to identify as many of the possible reasons for failure as he can. Of course, the importance of this step depends on the seriousness of the consequences of an incorrect decision by the platoon leader. The consequences, in turn, depend a great deal on the kind of error the platoon leader may make. There are two major types. One is to recommend punishment when the failure was primarily the result of a lack of ability to do better. The second is to give extra training when the failure resulted primarily from inadequate motivation.
ABILITY FAILURES SHOULD NOT BE PUNISHED

Of these two types of errors, the first is by far the more serious. There are at least three reasons for this. First, if a man gives his best, fails, and then is punished, one can be quite sure he will never again try that hard. If he is going to be punished for failing, he might as well be punished for not trying, as well. Second, if he fails because of a lack of ability, his failure is not entirely his responsibility; rather, it is mainly the responsibility of the leader who assigned him a task beyond the limits of his ability. Thus, if a man gives his best and still is punished for failing, his motivation to try the next time will be sharply reduced, and he further will be resentful that he was punished for something not his fault.

The third reason is provided by a look at the consequences of assuming incorrectly that a given failure is the result of inadequate ability. The correct remedial step for an ability failure is generally extra training, usually given on the man's own time. In cases in which the man can try harder if he wants to, giving extra training will have a motivational effect. He will try harder next time in order to avoid loss of his free time. Extra training thus will not "backfire" even when the leader has incorrectly judged the reason for failure.

Thus, if it seems as though a given case is sufficiently ambiguous that a clear-cut decision cannot be reached, there are three very good reasons for giving the man the benefit of the doubt, reacting as though the performance failure was the result of a lack of ability to do better, and following up with extra training, either during duty hours or on the man's own time. It is highly important that a man never be punished for an ability failure. He should always be commended for his effort, and helped to do better.

SUMMARY

In summary, an attempt has been made in this section to present some considerations important for motivating a platoon to outstanding performance. Simply stated, it is the platoon leader's responsibility to get his platoon to meet or exceed performance standards set by his own seniors. Over the long run, this can best be done through the use of positive motivating techniques such as those described in this section, particularly with regard to protecting from harsh and abusive treatment those men who perform well for positive incentives. Equally important, when these positive techniques have been tried, and fail with one or more men, the platoon leader must immediately utilize disciplinary measures to force each of these men to pull his fair share of the total load.

Perhaps the most important key to good leadership is balance. The platoon leader is not supposed to "sweet talk" or "baby" his men; if he does, he will be the butt of their ridicule. On the other hand, he must not continuously flog them either; most men, a platoon leader's subordinates included, will fight if driven far enough. However, the middle ground works well. Most men will work willingly and well for positive incentives, if they know that performance failures stemming from a lack of motivation will not be ignored.
Chapter 5
NCO USE AND SUPPORT

THE NCO AND JOB SATISFACTION

The NCO is the backbone of the Army. It falls his lot to do much of the actual day-to-day close supervision of the men in the platoon, particularly in garrison situations. Many of the fatigue and housekeeping details are accomplished during periods when the platoon leader is not present in the platoon area or when he is engaged in administrative duties, which tend to be especially heavy in garrison. Although the platoon leader will check the work in progress and the proper accomplishment of the assigned duties, the detailed supervision will often, of necessity, be left to the NCOs. If the platoon's NCOs are well motivated and capable, platoon performance will generally be good. With poor NCOs, platoon performance is likely to suffer, regardless, in most cases, of what the platoon leader does. One of the platoon leader's most important tasks, therefore, is to build his NCOs into a capable team, both interested in their work and motivated to do good work.

In earlier sections, many factors were discussed in terms of their effects on the performance of one's men. In quick review: All men look for certain satisfactions in their work. When they find these satisfactions, they like their jobs and are likely to do good work. However, when they do not find these satisfactions, they generally are discontented, and do no better than they must to get by. It is basic that a man will work willingly to keep something he wants, but not for something he does not want. This principle applies in a straightforward way to the NCO. If his job is attractive and he really likes it, the understanding that he must do good work to keep it will result in a hard worker.

What things, then, lead the NCO to be satisfied with his job? In this culture, perhaps the most fundamental goal for persons in all walks of life, including the NCO, is self-respect and the respect of others. This need is basic to the persistent desire to do good work, and is also important in the satisfaction of a second basic need, security. These are related, primarily because a man will feel more secure in his job if he feels that others respect him for his work. While other factors lead to a feeling of security, this is probably as important as any.

These needs lead most persons in this society to aspire to positions of leadership or influence over others, and of increased responsibility within an organization. Such positions are generally considered to be marks of recognition by the organization. They indicate that the person so rewarded is skilled in his trade and is sufficiently more capable than the others in his group that he can be entrusted with the responsibility for supervising their efforts. This recognition is an important indication to a man that he is esteemed by others and that his position in the organization is secure.

However, holding a position of leadership is not enough alone. The actions of higher leaders can do much to enhance or detract from the meaningfulness of a position of leadership as an indication that the leader is a valuable and respected man. This is particularly true with regard to the relation between a platoon leader and his NCOs. Depending on how he interacts with them and uses them within
the platoon, he can increase or decrease their feeling of achievement and value to the Army, and, in turn, their satisfaction with their jobs.

AMOUNT OF RESPONSIBILITY GIVEN THE NCO

One of the most important problems the platoon leader faces in deciding how to use his NCOs is the amount of authority he should give them in handling their various units (squads) within the platoon. It is obvious that even though the platoon leader is responsible for all his platoon does or fails to do, responsibility for running the squads is inherent to the squad leader by virtue of his assignment as squad leader. However, to insure the job is accomplished by those responsible for accomplishment, authority must be delegated commensurate with responsibility. In other words, the platoon leader must delegate to his squad leaders the authority to run their squads as the company commander must delegate authority to the platoon leader to run his platoon.

It is clear, therefore, that the NCOs must be given some independent authority in the control of their men and in the supervision of their work for which their squads are held responsible. The question, then, is not whether they should have authority, but, rather, how much.

Two important factors tend to confuse this problem: The first is a much misunderstood saying in the Army that responsibility cannot be delegated. Confusion on this issue has tricked many inexperienced leaders into robbing their NGOs of responsibility rightfully theirs. This point can be illustrated by example.

If a squad leader fails on an important assignment, the company commander will generally hold the platoon leader responsible; only rarely, if ever, will he involve the squad leader. However, if the assignment is completed in an outstanding manner, the company commander generally will consider it appropriate for the platoon leader to identify the responsible squad leader to him. In particular, the platoon leader would not claim sole responsibility for the excellence of the job. The question of "delegating responsibility" then is clearly addressed to the fact that the platoon leader cannot "pass the buck" and not to how he divides the work load in his platoon and/or supervises the work. While he is responsible for the quality of the work done by his unit, he also has a great deal of freedom to create responsibility within the platoon for each of his subordinate leaders. Of course, as discussed above, this requires the delegation of authority in accordance with the responsibility inherent in the assigned task or position.

The second issue clouding this general question is that under routine garrison conditions, or even under conditions of field training, the inexperienced platoon leader may feel that he can obtain better results by personally shouldering a large part of the direct supervision involved in "running" the platoon. The trap is that, under combat conditions, the work load will be considerably heavier. In addition, he will not be able to move about the battlefield freely enough to be able to personally direct the operation of individual soldiers within the platoon. At the same time, he will not easily be able to re-structure his control of the platoon to give the NCOs greater freedom and responsibility, because he will have missed his chance in the less hurried training situation to learn to work with them as a team and to determine the upper limit of authority each of them could assume.
TWO TASKS FOR A PLATOON LEADER

These considerations are directly relevant to how the platoon leader forms his NCOs into a chain of command, and the amount of freedom and support he gives them within his framework. This poses two important tasks for the platoon leader. One is to determine the degree to which each of his NCOs can successfully accept authority; the second is to give increased freedom and responsibility for the decision-making activities to those who profit from it. Implicit in this is the need to provide authority which is appropriate to the
responsibility inherent in the performance of the assigned positions especially in regard to the NCO’s interactions with his own men as a function of that responsibility.

Support within a chain of command may take many forms; one of these is restraint by higher leaders in bypassing lower leaders to assign or approve work tasks.

BYPASSING A SUBORDINATE LEADER

Bypassing subordinate leaders can be quite dangerous because it reinforces a desire most men share to gain approval for their work at the highest level possible. This desire is a function of the expectation that approval of an immediate senior may not be "final." Approval of a next level senior is often required. When this is the case, it "makes sense" to look to him for the initial approval, rather than to the immediate senior. This, of course, works to the detriment of the organizational structure. Therefore, if a leader higher in the chain of command constantly bypasses an intermediate leader, both in issuing work assignments and in approving work performance, he tends to eliminate the need for the intermediate leader. This will promote an inclination on the part of the men to bypass the intermediate leader, particularly on matters on which they disagree with that leader. The result will be lowered group morale, conflict, and decreased effectiveness.

This does not mean that a leader is always committed to rigid adherence to a chain of command. Quite the contrary, one of the earmarks of a good organization is flexibility, the ability to adapt to changing conditions. Thus, the leader’s actions should be oriented toward the best functional approach to unit effectiveness, rather than toward unreasoning adherence to rules. There are good functional reasons why the platoon leader should use his subordinate leaders to their maximum when ongoing activities are routine and time pressures are low, as in garrison. This will (a) increase the NCO’s standing with their own subordinates (by demonstrating that the platoon leader considers them sufficiently capable that he can delegate work, etc., to them without the necessity for subsequent close supervision), (b) increase their effectiveness—especially that of junior NCO’s—with their subordinates (by giving them practice in the independent exercise of authority that will be of great subsequent value if the unit is ever used in combat), (c) free the platoon leader from the necessity for undue concentration on matters which they can handle as well as or better than he can, and (d) teach both the platoon leader and his men the interaction skills required for effective teamwork so that the unit can operate well as a team under conditions in which time pressures and the total work load are heavy.

On the other hand, when time pressures are great, as under field conditions, there may be good functional reasons for the platoon leader to issue instructions, guidance, or orders directly to a subordinate leader’s men, if that leader is absent. However, he should realize that in so doing he stands a chance of creating more and possibly greater problems than the one he is trying to remedy. He must be careful not to damage the status of the subordinate leader with his men, and to preserve unity of activity and purpose between himself and the NCO. Specifically, he should (a) first inquire as to the instructions the men
are acting on, (b) state that he wishes them to proceed otherwise and that their immediate leader will be notified, and (c) then, above all, immediately notify that leader of his action.

The exercise of discretion when bypassing a subordinate leader will always pay dividends. Constantly bypassing an intermediate leader will destroy the need for that man, his consequent authority over his subordinates, his feeling of value to the unit, and his self-respect.

SUPERVISION AT A GENERAL LEVEL

This helps to define the kind of working relationships a platoon leader should develop with his NCO's. One of the most important satisfactions a man can get is that of feeling that he is doing something important in his job, and that his job is worthwhile. Similarly of value is the feeling that his superiors are aware of the quality of the work that he is doing, and are appreciative. One of the best ways a platoon leader can indicate this to his senior NCO's is by using the most general level of supervision compatible with the ability and motivation of the NCO involved. This applies both in giving assignments and in checking ongoing work.

The specificity level at which he gives assignments must, of course, be tempered by the routineness of the task. Greater specificity of detail is naturally required in assigning unique tasks. However, this also is a function of the NCO to whom the task is assigned. The more capable he is, the less will be the need for detail, even when the task is unique.

The primary reason for giving assignments at a general level is that the NCO is then permitted to formulate for himself the details of how the task is to be done, and to assign parts of the over-all task to his own subordinates in terms of his judgment of their abilities. This personal involvement in planning and executing the assignment will generally lead him to feel that he has a personal stake in successful completion of the task. This, in turn, will increase his motivation to complete the task well, give him better over-all control over his men, and support his conviction that he is making an important contribution to the unit.

Close supervision of ongoing work will have the same detrimental effect as when making assignments. In both cases, the NCO and the men interpret this as evidence that the platoon leader does not trust the ability, the motivation, or both, of the men to whom he gave the assignment. Because overly close supervision is interpreted thusly, it will decrease the motivation of most good NCO's and men to do good work. Of course, if the NCO actually is deficient in either ability or motivation, the platoon leader will have no choice; he will be forced to exercise close and detailed supervision in order to get the work done. It should be obvious that each NCO will respond best to a level of supervision appropriate to his own ability and motivation. However, it is probably best to give each a chance to work under a more general level of supervision before assuming that close supervision is required.

There is some danger involved in general level supervision. Many NCO's will interpret lack of detailed guidance and supervision as a lack of interest in the quality of their work. However, this danger is minimized if the platoon
leader:

(a) Emphasizes initially that performance is highly important, and that each man will get a fair deal in terms of how well he works.

(b) Checks carefully and in detail on the quality of the completed work in every case. Contrary to some beliefs, none but a very exceptional work group in any context will do well those things which senior officers do not check. If they do not check, this is interpreted as an indication that the task is unimportant to the unit.

(c) Recognizes good performance, taking corrective action in every case when performance does not meet or exceed standards.

NCO'S NEED FOR THE PLATOON LEADER'S SUPPORT

One other important topic should be included in the discussion of NCO responsibility—the kind and amount of control the NCO is free to exercise over his men. This is a touchy problem, primarily because it involves the question of how the NCO can reward his men for excellent work, or chastise them for poor work. While the problems faced by the platoon leader in this area are knotty, as was indicated in the last chapter, the problems faced by the NCO are worse. He generally has a great deal of responsibility for direct control of the men during the accomplishment of platoon assignments, but little or no authority to dispense rewards, and none to dispense punishment. However, effective motivational methods include both promises of positive rewards for good work and threats of disciplinary action for failure to do well, provided failure is the result of inadequate motivation. When these promises or threats are made, they must be kept. To promote the use of effective methods of motivation and control, the platoon leader therefore must make desirable incentives available for his NCO's to dispense to those men who do good work. Similarly, he must back up requests by NCO's for punitive treatment for those of their men who will work only to avoid punishment.

Of course, the platoon leader is limited in this respect also. Most of the rewards and all the legal punishments must be given within the authority of the company commander. However, there still are certain actions the platoon leader can take on his own, particularly with regard to privileges. For example, particularly in training companies, he can identify the squad in his platoon that will be first in the mess line. If all squads have an equal chance to earn this privilege, giving it to the squad that has performed best on assigned tasks, as a part of a well-conceived over-all program of positive incentives, will help to increase the motivation of all squads to do well. This principle applies equally well to other desirable privileges, such as (a) passes—when passes are scarce and cannot be given to everyone, they should be given to those who have done the best work, (b) extra details—when extra details are assigned to the platoon, but only part of the platoon is needed for the work, the men who have done the best prior work should be excused as a reward, and (c) extra training—when a man in training has mastered the required skill, excusing him from further training in this skill, in those few cases in which this is possible, will serve
as a powerful incentive for all to work harder during regular training. When the use of these and other positive incentives can be determined by the NCO—always with the knowledge and concurrence of the platoon leader to ensure the determination is just—the NCO will be more likely to make use of them and will therefore both command more respect from, and enjoy better control over, his men.

In contrast, if the platoon leader does not provide the required support, the NCO may then be reduced to the position of bargaining with his men for their performance or of resorting to various sub rosa methods for maintaining control over them. The latter may take the form of harassment, derogatory treatment, the illegal use of physical force, and so on, with the end result that the men perhaps are forced to work solely to avoid illegal coercion, rather than for desirable goals. The previous chapter makes amply clear the pitfalls that lie in this direction.

In summary, the closeness of the platoon leader's supervision over his NCO's, the level of detail of his assignments to them, and his support of them in controlling their men will all affect the NCO's feeling of responsibility and value to the unit. This, in turn, will affect both his ability to do good work, and his satisfaction with the job and the unit. All worthwhile NCO's want to be given real responsibility, provided they have authority commensurate with that responsibility and are assured that their good work will then be recognized. This is a very basic formula for advancement. The big step is attaining the first position in which capability for handling responsibility can be demonstrated; beyond this, chances for upward mobility are good for the capable man.

THE NEWLY COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT

Discussion of a second area of importance will complete this chapter. It is directed primarily to the recently commissioned lieutenant with no prior troop experience.

An officer's first assignment with troops is generally a cause for great personal concern. He typically wonders what to expect, what problems he will face, how adequate his skills will be to solve them, and what, in general, will be expected of him by his NCO's and his company commander. His concern generally is complicated by a realization that he will be working with NCO's who know more about running a platoon than he does, especially where technical matters are concerned. This, of course, is an especially realistic concern. It has a great deal to do with the kind of working relationship he will develop with his NCO's.

In actuality, however, this is less a problem than it would seem to be, if the platoon leader makes a good first impression on his NCO's. NCO's have seen many platoon leaders come and go. A few will try to make life miserable for any newly commissioned officer, and a few others will do nothing constructive unless made to do so; but most are able, conscientious men with a fairly high degree of maturity. They have a personal interest in their platoon, and will help to make it a good one if given half a chance. If their initial impressions convince them that the new leader is a tolerant, emotionally mature officer who is interested in learning his job and doing it well, their
cooperation is virtually assured. If they believe him to be a "gung ho" know-it-all who is out to "shape up" the platoon, they will tend to withdraw into protective shells.

This strongly implies that the leader should have a well thought out strategy for developing an effective working relationship with his NCO's, and that he should be guided by this strategy from the moment he meets the first NCO. The development of this strategy requires analysis of the elements of a good working relationship. Perhaps the most important is willingness to delegate authority. This was discussed in the first part of this chapter. Nearly as important are actions that reflect his estimate of their competence relative to his own. These actions can be categorized into two types, one dealing with how formal, or informal, he is with his NCO's, and the other with how he treats or elicits their suggestions on the technical matters of running the platoon.

FORMALITY AND INFORMALITY

Formality probably can best be defined as the requirement by the leader that his subordinate, in a given situation, render those military courtesies that normally would be rendered in the presence of the leader's senior officers and his subordinate leader's men, regardless of who actually is present. Informality, then, can be defined as a relaxation of some of these formal requirements. There consequently are many degrees of informality, each depending on how many formal restraints the leader does relax, in comparison with those formal restraints normally demanded by their difference in rank.

It is important also to define familiarity, because this is often confused with informality. Familiarity probably is best defined as an aspect of the working relationship that develops between peers; it is characterized by the use of first names on an equal rank basis, and so on. This is a different dimension from formality-informality. Obviously, the platoon leader should never want or permit a subordinate to interact with him on an equal rank basis. Indeed, the better NCO's would generally reject such a relationship, particularly if permitted by an inexperienced platoon leader.

However, the capable and well-motivated NCO does want a working relationship that permits him to operate with maximum effectiveness in achieving platoon goals. Formality becomes an important factor when it prevents this. The process through which formality can become a barrier to effective teamwork is quite subtle, particularly so to the officer. The analysis of this process is a fine lesson in group dynamics.

Subordinates view formality as a reminder of rank differences that exist between themselves and their seniors. These rank differences are associated with differences in power. Specifically, the senior is given a certain degree of power over the subordinate by his senior rank. Awareness of this power differential is usually a source of discomfort for the subordinate, because he always will question, to some small degree, when this power may be turned against him if he ever were to forget to comply with a formal requirement. This is like living next to an atomic reactor. One day he might do something wrong and make it blow up.
Because requirements for formality in interaction thus generate tensions—that is, the subordinate feels he must be continuously on guard to be certain he conforms—they tend to make interaction unpleasant. The inevitable result is that the subordinate will avoid interaction as much as he comfortably can. This is his way of avoiding tensions. However, when interaction decreases, the flow of information between the two ranks also decreases, and this will lead to a critical reduction in shared information on issues relevant to accomplishing mutual goals. In extreme cases, insistence by the leader on formality can result in his ignorance of important platoon problems—because no one wants to go to the bother of telling him.

To this point, the discussion of formality and formal requirements has been rather general. It is meaningful now to ask the question of what formal requirements the platoon leader can relax, and what this relaxation means at the level of everyday actions. This can be illustrated by an example contrasting two different platoon leaders interacting with their platoon sergeants.

I

Platoon Leader: 'Afternoon, sergeant. The clerk said you were looking for me earlier.
Platoon Sergeant: Yes, sir.
Platoon Leader: Well, come on in and sit down. What's on your mind?
Platoon Sergeant: Private Wight fouled us up again.
Platoon Leader: What this time?

II

Platoon Leader: Good afternoon, Sergeant ______. Did you want to see me?
Platoon Sergeant: Yes, sir.
Platoon Leader: Come into my office.
Platoon Sergeant: Yes, sir.
Platoon Leader: What's your problem, sergeant? (Seating himself, but leaving the platoon sergeant standing.)
Platoon Sergeant: Private Wight fouled us up again.
Platoon Leader: What?
Platoon Sergeant: Private Wight fouled us up again, sir.
Platoon Leader: What happened this time, sergeant?

In the first conversation, the platoon leader's manner would encourage his platoon sergeant to talk, and to seek advice on future matters. It emphasizes easy accessibility and willingness to listen. These are highly important to the subordinate. In contrast, the platoon leader in the second example was cold and aloof. His manner could not have endeared him to his platoon sergeant. Leaving the sergeant standing, and requiring the "sir" to be added to a spoken line—which the sergeant, of course, should not have forgotten—were rebuffs that would have produced a bit of reluctance on the part of the sergeant to initiate subsequent interactions.
Of course, more than mere formality is involved here. The platoon leader who is comfortable with his NCO's will reflect this by his actions with them; the leader who is not will be equally transparent. He who must for his own peace of mind continuously remind others of his felt superiority will do little for their peace of mind; for, by so doing, he reminds them that he considers them inferior.

LIMITS FOR RELAXING FORMALITY

However, there are obvious limits to which the platoon leader can and should relax requirements for formality. These limits are determined by several considerations.

One is the subordinate's rank and formal position within the platoon. Because informality of interaction does increase the accessibility of the leader, the leader must exercise discretion in deciding the men with whom he can be informal. For example, he cannot be informal with privates to the same extent as with squad leaders, and not as informal with them as with the platoon sergeant. Permitting privates equal access to himself would (a) tend to encourage them to bypass their NCO leaders, and (b) clutter his own time with a lot of low-level matters his NCO's should handle instead.

A second important consideration is the NCO's competence at his own job. It is customary among competent men of different rank to use informality of interaction as an indicator of mutual respect for that competence. Thus, in combat, if one listens to the conversation between a company commander and his most respected sergeant, one might hear:

**Company Commander:** Where would you guess their main strength is, sergeant?

**Platoon Sergeant:** Probably over there, captain.

**Company Commander:** Do you think you could get through along that draw and lay down a flanking base of fire for us to move in on them?

**Platoon Sergeant:** It would depend on how quickly you could take the pressure off once we get there. We could sure try, sir.

**Company Commander:** Good, let's do it that way. Use your platoon and ....

With a less competent NCO, the commander might simply have given an order for the desired movement.

This, interestingly, can work both ways. Especially in combat, where a man's competence may be a matter of life or death for the men who fight with him, an outstandingly competent NCO may consider his own status within his platoon higher than that of an inexperienced platoon leader replacement. Importantly, so will the rest of the platoon. In this case, the sergeant may be unwilling to be informal with the lieutenant, because he is not willing to admit the lieutenant to a similar status, competence-wise. The platoon leader's first big step toward gaining effective leadership over his platoon may then be the
willingness of the sergeant to step into an informal working relationship with the lieutenant. Such willingness, in a case like this, will be a function of the platoon leader's demonstration of ability and willingness to learn; that is, capability. It cannot be "courted," or solicited by "being pals."

Another important constraint is the platoon leader's estimate of the subordinate's ability to recognize situational requirements for formality. There are some situations in which the platoon leader can be informal and others in which he cannot—but only if his subordinate can recognize the different formality requirements of these different kinds of situations and react accordingly. If the subordinate cannot tailor his behavior to the requirements of the situation, he will eventually embarrass both of them. Consequently, the leader cannot, with safety, be informal with that man under any conditions.

One final constraint on the platoon leader in relaxing formal requirements is that he generally should be equally formal with all subordinates of equal rank in a given situation. To do otherwise is to differentiate among them publicly. It would indicate to the group that one of them is a "favored" person. This would be dangerous. To be more informal with one man than with the others can work to the good of the unit if it is clearly recognized by all that the informality is based on the person's superiority in performance, motivation to perform, etc. This will be accepted, because the others will already have accorded that man their respect for his greater ability. However, if this superior ability and this motivation are not clearly visible to all the men present, they may assume that the platoon leader is really playing favorites.

It is important to emphasize that relaxing the formal requirements is the prerogative of the senior officer. The subordinate may never violate an established formal barrier between the two. If he does, it is an indication that he cannot be trusted with an informal working relationship.

In summary, the more informal the working relationship between the platoon leader and competent NCO's, up to a certain point, the more efficient the working of the unit will be in general. However, perception by the unit that the leader has come to favor some men more than others, as a consequence of something other than performance, will result in a loss of control and a loss of respect both for the leader and for the subordinate with whom he was "too informal." This is a thin line for the platoon leader to walk. His ability in this respect will determine in large part the motivation and ability of his platoon to operate together and with him as a team.

PLATOON LEADER'S REACTION TO NCO SUGGESTIONS

Another difficult problem inevitably faced by the inexperienced platoon leader is that of how to react to suggestions from his NCO's, especially (a) when he thinks he knows the way the current task should be done, because of relevant training he received in his branch school, and (b) when he has not had the chance to evaluate the NCO's technical competence. Whose judgment does he trust? He knows, of course, that he has both the prerogative and the responsibility for making the final decision, and that he should act decisively, but he also knows that he can be decisively wrong.
Suppose, for example, he tells his weapons squad leader to emplace his machineguns in a given location, and is met with the suggestion that they could better be placed in a different spot. This has all the elements of the dilemma. In his branch school, the platoon leader received some training on how to emplace machineguns. But he also knows that the weapons squad leader has had a great deal of practical experience. Further, the weapons squad leader may have based his suggestion on the existence of a company SOP. What to do?

The answer is not a simple one, but there are certain guidelines that will almost always work. First, he should ask why the NCO thinks the other location would be better. Comparison of the squad leader's reasons with his own will resolve most of these situations, especially if the platoon leader does not start such discussions with the general attitude of, "I'm the boss here."

However, there will be some situations which cannot be resolved in this manner. The reasons may look equally good. The best approach then is to consult another NCO. In this case it would be the platoon sergeant, never a subordinate of the squad leader. If there is no time to consult another NCO, the decision should, of course, be made on the spot. If spot decisions go against the NCO, this can and should be eased by a remark such as, "I think your idea is a good one, but we had better do...because..." If the "because" is followed by a good reason, the decision more than likely will be well accepted.

Perhaps the most important single caution is that suggestions from subordinates should always be given courteous attention. Completely aside from the fact that this will probably result in better unit performance, suggestions generally are indications that the NCO cares enough about his unit's performance to speak up. It shows personal interest in what is going on. If the platoon leader does not give suggestions courteous treatment, whether or not they are good suggestions, he will destroy the man's interest, and cut off future suggestions to the eventual detriment of the platoon.

It is important also to emphasize that suggestions from subordinates pose no real or implied threat to the platoon leader's control over the platoon. Even the newest private can recognize the existing differences in rank and legal authority, and will act accordingly when the chips are down. It should be obvious that unthinking and initiativeless obedience is the thing to be feared, and not disobedience.

HOW TO DEAL WITH UNSOUND NCO DECISIONS

Another problem that frequently concerns the inexperienced leader is generated when an NCO makes an unsound decision or takes ineffective action as a result of an unsound decision. Should the platoon leader support a poor decision by an NCO? Which will have the more serious effect, letting the decision stand or reversing it with the likelihood the NCO's men will learn of the reversal?

The answers to these questions depend on the platoon leader's judgment on four factors: (a) his best estimate as to the reason for the ineffective action or decision--this is the question of distinguishing between motivational and ability failures, (b) his estimate of the consequences of the decision or action
on platoon performance and/or morale, (c) his evaluation of the NCO's past record in the platoon, and (d) the relation he has built with the NCO during the time they have worked together.

If the NCO is a good man and the consequences of his ineffective action are judged to be trivial, correction by the platoon leader may be seen as "nitpicking" and can do more harm than good. A highly motivated NCO with a lot of initiative may make more minor "errors" than an NCO with little or no initiative, because he does more work and makes more decisions within the platoon. However, these minor "errors" will not keep him from being of far greater value to the platoon than a man who does little or nothing he has not been told to do. The platoon leader who seeks perfection and is therefore intolerant of small errors may find that he eventually suppresses the initiative of his subordinate leaders. This is a predictable outcome because a man who does only what he is told, that is, a man with little initiative, will make few small errors, and thus will not be criticized so often.

However, in many cases, the consequences of an ineffective NCO action or decision are not trivial, and correction must then be made whether the NCO is a good man or not. Here, the manner of correction must be based heavily on consideration of the NCO's past record. An NCO with a good record will generally have adequate motivation. He consequently will correct his faults if given a chance to do so. He will generally react well to private correction, which includes specific information as to why past actions were ineffective and alternative kinds of action would have been superior.

A more complex problem exists when the NCO's past record is not good. There are accidents of promotion in any organization. Consequently, there will be some NCO's who are definitely not worth their salt, some because of a lack of ability and some because of either inadequate or perverse motivation. The platoon leader cannot afford to let poor NCO leadership go uncorrected. It will work hardships on his men, and also will jeopardize his own record by producing an inferior platoon.

An NCO who is deficient in ability but nevertheless well motivated is relatively easy to handle. If he is well motivated, his men will usually go to fairly great lengths to "cover up" for him; too, he may be able to compensate to a large extent for his lack of ability by trying harder. The platoon leader's best role in this case probably is that of providing the man with all possible opportunities to better himself through his hard work. Further, and perhaps of greater importance, he should concentrate on rewarding the NCO and his men as a group (a) to encourage the men to participate in helping their unit look good, and (b) to encourage the NCO to rely on the abilities of his men for the good of the group. The contrast here is in basing the NCO's rewards on good group work rather than on how sharp the NCO is judged to be and how he measures individually in comparison with other NCO's.

THE UNMOTIVATED NCO

It is not so easy to help an inadequately or perversely motivated NCO. Motivational failures occur when a man's values lead to depreciation of the rewards offered by his work environment. In a number of cases, the consistent
use of a just system of rewards and punishments may lead to acceptance of an appropriate set of values, and thus may rebuild the man's motivation. If this is attempted, tasks assigned him should be particularly clear-cut in nature with definite target dates for completion, where possible, so there can be little subsequent doubt as to whether the task was completed according to expectations. Completed tasks should be closely inspected and judged in terms of standards of excellence specified when the task was assigned. Failures in any respect should be pointed out objectively and clearly, so that subsequent disciplinary action is unmistakably related to the performance itself.

If the NCO does not respond, it will then be necessary to take more drastic action to protect the unmotivated NCO's subordinates and the platoon as a whole from his disturbing influence. If it is clear that he cannot be rehabilitated, he must be removed from his rank and leadership position to make room for more highly motivated men to advance. This kind of decision is difficult for the leader to make. It is much easier to "ride out the storm" or "close one's eyes" and thus let a successor inherit the problem. Nonetheless, it is amply clear that, in this case, the difficult course serves the over-all good of the Army far better.

However, in these and in other cases, the platoon leader should exercise care to avoid either public correction of the NCO's, or public countermanding of their instructions, unless, of course, the situation is such that more undesirable consequences will follow if he does not take immediate action. Fortunately, there almost always will be time to consult the NCO privately about questionable actions or decisions. Both the NCO and his men will appreciate the consideration shown by this treatment.

HANDLING THE "SHARPSHOOTER"

Another kind of problem for the inexperienced platoon leader is a "sharpshoter" who gets perverse pleasure from demonstrating to all that his platoon leader is inept. This man can be recognized by the fact that his suggestions will almost always be given publicly, so others can hear, and in a manner calculated to embarrass the platoon leader. He rarely will make suggestions in private. This poses a problem, particularly if the public suggestions are constructive and good.

The decision that a man is "sharpshooting" must be made with a great deal of care. If the embarrassing comments rarely contain any constructive content, the decision is much easier; that is, there is less doubt about the man's purpose. However, if the comments, as suggested above, are constructive and good, there may be considerable doubt over a fairly long period of time. The alternative possibility always exists that the man is sincere but either tactless or grossly unconcerned with the feelings of others. Inexperienced platoon leaders may incorrectly judge such a man to be malicious because they tend to be defensive about their lack of experience and technical knowledge in running a platoon. The result of an incorrect judgment in this case will be to eliminate a source of good, constructive suggestions when a more appropriate course would be to teach the man to behave tactfully.

However, if the platoon leader is convinced he has run into a "sharpshooter," he must act quickly to correct the situation, or he will run the chance of losing the respect of the other NCO's. While they may personally hold the
"sharpshooter" in contempt among themselves, they probably will view the whole thing as a contest between him and the platoon leader, and will be equally contemptuous of the platoon leader if the "sharpshooter" wins. The principle is that, if the platoon leader is not clever enough to find out what is going on, and to do something about it, he does not deserve their respect.

Perhaps the best first step to stop a "sharpshooter" is to tell him privately that the reasons for his behavior are known, that his behavior is having a disruptive effect on platoon morale, and that future suggestions must be made more discreetly. However, the leader should avoid a display of uncontrolled emotion at all times, because this probably would actually please the "sharpshooter."

This talk may solve the problem because a large part of the "sharpshooter's" pleasure is usually derived from the thought that the platoon leader does not know what is going on, that is, is being made a "fool," or that he has made the platoon leader lose some of his self-control. When the game gets into the open, a part of the pleasure will be gone, and only the most perverse "sharpshooter" will continue. Of course, if he does, further measures will be necessary. One might be to give perfunctory replies to the man's future suggestions in a manner implying little actual consideration, as, for example, "That might be interesting," while reacting favorably to good suggestions from everyone else. However, the platoon leader should be careful not to "pull rank" on the man, as, for example, by assigning this man to the "dirty" jobs in the platoon. This would be resented by the rest of the NCO's. Fortunately, this is about the only thing that would be resented. All they want is a "fair fight." If the platoon leader can win this fight by skill rather than by rank, which they may feel he has not yet "earned," he will generally win their respect at the same time.

A METHOD FOR LEARNING

The next question the new platoon leader probably will raise is, "If suggestions are not given, how do I go about learning?" The answer is simple: Ask. There are two important sources of information available to the new platoon leader. One consists of the other platoon leaders in the company. They will often have greater experience, and through this experience will have "learned the ropes" sufficiently well to be able to offer good advice about problems the new leader faces. It is best to learn the small, but important, details of running a platoon from them, if at all possible.

However, it will not always be possible to consult another platoon leader. In these cases, such as in the field, a second important source of information is the platoon sergeant. It does not lower the dignity of an officer to ask his platoon sergeant what he should say to his men at a given time, or what he should do next in a given situation, provided he is really interested in learning. This cannot be interpreted as revealing ignorance because they already know how "ignorant" he is. Quite to the contrary, they will respect a leader who asks because this reveals the inner strength to admit a lack of knowledge. Further, it builds their confidence in him, because they will, over time, come to expect that he will ask when he does not know, thereby keeping both himself and his platoon out of the various kinds of trouble he could, in ignorance, cause for it.
SUMMARY

In summary, the NCO is a small work-group leader in every sense of the definition. As such, he should be an example to his men, a teacher of skills they need, and a source of accurate technical guidance as to how assigned tasks can best be done. The importance assigned to these of his functions by the platoon leader, and the manner in which the platoon leader provides supervision and support will determine how well he can perform these functions, and how much he will value his job in the platoon. This, in turn, will determine, in large part, his motivation to do good work. The importance of a satisfied and well-motivated staff of NCO’s cannot be overemphasized. They can make or break the platoon.
Chapter 6

HANDLING DISRUPTIVE INFLUENCES

THE EFFECT OF UNSOLVABLE PROBLEMS

To this point, substantial emphasis has been placed on the work environment of the enlisted man and things within this environment that have an important influence on the quality of his work. However, leadership responsibility extends beyond this single context. Men live in a multiplicity of environments: the work environment, the home environment, the social environment, and so on. These are not independent. Experiences within one context will color a man’s perceptions and actions within other contexts. Thus, if a soldier gets a "chewing out" during the work day, this will color his interactions with his family and friends after he leaves the work environment. He will be more likely to argue with them, or perhaps to make harsh statements that he otherwise would not make. Similarly, experiences from nonwork environments, especially intense experiences, will be remembered within the work environment, and may negatively affect the quality of on-the-job performance. Thus, a squad leader who has a violent argument with his wife at breakfast is likely to be unreasonable with his men that day.

These two illustrations are examples of experiences that generally have relatively short-term aftereffects. The soldier probably forgets the "chewing" relatively quickly and then begins interacting "normally" with his family and friends, and the squad leader may be his "old self" before the end of the morning. So, aftereffects of this sort may not be too serious, unless they start a chain reaction of aftereffects among others. However, there are other experiences that are not resolved so easily and which have more serious and more prolonged aftereffects. These usually involve a problem situation for which there seems no immediate solution; for example, a serious split with one’s wife that threatens to end in divorce.

When a man is confronted with unsolvable problems of a serious nature, he inevitably will spend a part of his work time thinking about them. This, in turn, will reduce his capacity to concentrate on the immediate problems involved in the ongoing work, and, ultimately, lower the quality of his performance. In addition, his inability to resolve these problems may make him chronically irritable with the men with whom he works, and thereby create additional long-term problems of an interpersonal nature.

For the present context, the most significant characteristic of problems and experiences of the type thus far described is the generally disruptive influence they exert on the normal functioning of the man affected. When these disrupting influences extend to the work environment, they generate a requirement for the platoon leader to take remedial action, not so much for humanitarian reasons—although these are important—as to maintain the performance potential of his unit.
This, however, is not always an easy task. For example, how does the leader learn of the existence of such problems? And, once he has detected a problem, how does he go about deciding what to do and how to do it?

LEARNING ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF PROBLEMS

The question of learning about the existence of problems perhaps can best be approached by examination of important differences that exist between a platoon leader and his subordinates, even his senior NCOs. Because of obvious differences in rank, on the one hand, and possible differences in background, intelligence, and education, on the other hand, the platoon leader may find himself in a working relationship with his NCOs and men which does not encourage them to talk freely with him, particularly about personal problems. The effects of these differences are compounded by his over-all responsibility to his seniors, and to the Army, that requires him to use threat of punishment for failure, even if only as a last resort, to enforce requirements for good performance. This ultimate threat is often misinterpreted by his men unless they understand the necessity for this part of his role as a leader. When such misunderstanding does exist, the men also expect their leaders to take punitive action toward them if they reveal the existence of personal problems, even problems that interfere with their work.

However, the men may be reluctant to discuss personal problems with a senior even if there is no fear of punitive action. They may fear, realistically, that confession of a personal problem indicative of adjustment difficulties, will jeopardize chances for promotion. Such reluctance is, of course, more typical of career soldiers. (A very delicate problem in ethics is also involved here. The question is whether the platoon leader should expect his men to lower their chances for promotion by discussing such problems with him, and, on the other hand, if he should, indeed, use such knowledge in reaching decisions about promotions once a problem has been revealed.)

Difficulties involved in learning of problems are further compounded by the efforts of many junior NCOs to "protect" their platoon leaders and company commanders from gripes and personal problems that they think are either inconsequential or amenable to solution at the NCO level. Unfortunately, junior NCOs, and, sometimes, even platoon sergeants and first sergeants are less capable than the platoon leader or company commander of judging which problems are serious and which are not. Frequently, the end result is that a man with a really serious problem is barred from seeing those who could help him until the problem has gotten out of hand.

The platoon leader obviously needs cues which are reliable indicators of the existence of disruptive influences.

COMPLAINTS AS CUES TO DISRUPTIVE INFLUENCES

Perhaps one of the best cues is a higher than normal incidence of gripes and/or complaints from either the men or the NCOs. Men do not gripe unless they think they have something to gripe about, although the gripe itself may not be a reliable indicator of the basic problem. This is important. Often, a man will be concerned with one kind of problem but will gripe about another because
for one reason or another, he does not want to talk about the thing that really matters. For example, a man may have serious trouble with his wife, but gripe only that his squad leader is giving him too much work. There are many other troubles that a man may consider too embarrassing to be discussed, or that he may be afraid to discuss, that will then lead to gripes about other things. A great deal of tact will be required with these persons to discover the real problem.

This can also happen in the duty environment. For example, a given squad leader may be unfair or excessively harsh with his men, but only when the platoon leader is absent. His men may be afraid to complain about this to the platoon sergeant, fearing the platoon sergeant will side with the squad leader. They may also be afraid to talk to the platoon leader, fearing that he will not believe them, but nevertheless might check the validity of their complaint with the squad leader. In either case, they could get themselves into worse trouble than they already have.

It consequently is wise to regard any complaint or gripe as an indication of trouble, but also to look hard and long at the gripe itself to discern if it actually reveals the true problem. Often, it is helpful to look for groups of men who are griping. If the gripe is confined to one person, it may be (a) accurate, (b) indicative of a personal but undisclosed problem, or (c) evidence that the man himself is a malcontent. On the other hand, if a number of men are griping, the chances are greater that a real problem exists. Examination of similarities among the men may then give a clue to the nature of the problem, if the content of the gripes does not. Examples are (a) all the men in one squad are griping (this may indicate that the squad leader needs correction, or that the platoon sergeant is picking on this squad's leader, and so on), (b) a group identified by a common race or religion is griping (this can indicate discrimination on the basis of the common characteristic).

THE SUDDEN DROP-IN-PERFORMANCE CUE

Another indication of the existence of disruptive influences is a sudden and unexplained drop in performance. For several reasons, the drop-in-performance cue is one of the most important, if not the most important, indicator available to the platoon leader in learning of the existence of disruptive influences. Gripes would be as important, if they always were quickly brought to the leader's attention. Unfortunately, there is generally a long time lag between the time a disruption occurs and the time a gripe is brought to him, although this depends on the extent to which he has been successful in establishing upward communication channels from his men to himself. A similar problem exists in utilizing the morale indicators—toward to be discussed shortly—as cues; there generally is an excessive time lag between the disruption and the appearance of deviant behavior. Such long time lags reduce the utility of these two types of cues because they generally put the leader in a position to not able to take effective remedial action. All too often, the optimum time for such action will have been in the distant past, and he will be faced with the prospect of trying to repair the damage, rather than of preventing it from occurring. This is much less the case with the drop-in-performance cue. Performance decrements tend to occur much more rapidly in response to disruptive influences than do other types of cues.
Again, if the performance drop is characteristic of more than one person, some common characteristic of the group may indicate the source of trouble. An incident from a TOE platoon stationed in Germany will illustrate how one platoon leader failed to utilize these cues.

The mission of the scout platoon, when an alert was sounded, was to mount the platoon's vehicles and mark the route for the rest of the battalion to follow with its vehicles. The performance of this particular platoon had been on the decline for several weeks since the replacement of their old platoon leader. Finally, their performance deteriorated to the point that they were regularly passing the trucks of two or more companies to regain their lead position during a practice alert.

In an attempt to correct the poor performance of his platoon, the new platoon leader began holding his men during week ends for the purpose of running practice alerts. His procedure was to have them run, in full combat gear, from the barracks to their jeeps. During these practice sessions, their times were generally good. After each performance, he would call out their time encouragingly, and state that they could stop the drills if their time were this good during a real alert. However, their times during real alerts did not improve.

This platoon leader had correctly assessed the problem as motivational in nature. However, he had not probed deeply enough to determine the cause of the lack of motivation. To an analytical thinker, a performance decrement on the part of the whole platoon would have indicated a disruptive influence felt by all, or almost all, the men. If he had searched for an event or condition that could be common to the entire platoon, he might eventually have questioned if the change in platoon leadership might have produced the performance change. Of course, if he actually had arrived at this point, he still would have been faced with the question of what specific things were wrong, and what specific things he could do to remedy the situation. Even so, he would have been in a far better position to improve the situation. Definition of the problem, in this case, would have been far more than half the battle. It would have provided insight into the need for self-improvement.

MORALE INDICATORS AS CUES

Another set of factors which indicate the existence of disruptive influences consists of those described in most military texts as the morale indicators. Of these, perhaps the most reliable are sick call rate, unless the rate can be explained on other terms, such as weather; AWOL rate; and frequency of disciplinary actions, particularly for off-post offenses. It should be emphasized that these are by no means perfect indicators. In fact, their power as indicators is relatively low and reaches a peak only when morale has deteriorated to a substantial extent. Further, the use of punitive motivational methods can obscure the relationship between morale and the morale indicators even longer than would normally be the case. However, they still constitute danger signs that should not be ignored.
THE POSSIBILITY OF INACCURATE DIAGNOSIS

These considerations lead clearly to the conclusion that it is not always easy to learn of the existence of disruptive influences. This is particularly true when the nature of the underlying problem is such that the man involved fears its disclosure will either limit his chances for advancement, cause him to lose stature among his friends, or result in punitive treatment from his superiors. Especially in these cases, identifying the underlying causes of the basic problem is even more difficult, primarily because they will often be products of fundamental adjustment problems. Since adequate remedial action depends quite heavily on correct diagnosis of both the immediate and underlying problems, it is apparent that remedial actions attempted by persons without professional skills in diagnosis may turn out to be "hit or miss" propositions.

The following incident illustrates well the results that are obtained all too often when treatment is attempted by persons who do not have the necessary diagnostic skills.

As a last resort, a basic trainee who was a chronic troublemaker was referred to the battalion chaplain. His squad leader, his platoon sergeant, his platoon leader, and finally his company commander had worked with him to try to straighten him out. They could do nothing with him and consequently considered that they had failed as leaders. After talking with the man, the chaplain quickly came to the conclusion that he was a psychotic and sent him to the psychiatrist, who confirmed the diagnosis. The psychiatrist emphasized that a failure of leadership definitely was not the difficulty in this man's case. The problem was failure to recognize much sooner that this man's psychosis was so acute that not even the best of leaders could have straightened him out. And the long delay in seeking professional help while his leaders were trying to get the man straightened out only caused the problem to get worse.

All four of the man's immediate leaders failed to recognize the basic problem. As a consequence, they wasted their time, which could have been far better spent helping their able men become better soldiers, and also delayed initiation of competent treatment for the man, thereby decreasing to some degree the chances that therapy would succeed in his case.

One reason for this diagnostic failure is, of course, that these four leaders simply did not have the necessary training to be able to recognize the real cause of the troublesome behavior. They probably assumed, incorrectly, that the man had the ability to "shape up" if he wanted to, and acted accordingly.

The possibility of inaccurate diagnosis, and the unfortunate consequences when this is the case, make apparent a need to define indicators the leader can use to judge when he can probably make a correct diagnosis, and when he probably cannot. One of the most helpful indicators is the apparent source of the problem.
INFLUENCES FROM OBJECTIVE FACTORS

Disruptive influences can arise from nonpersonal factors in the man's objective environment. (See Table III for definition and examples of objective problems.) Such problems are distinguished by the following indicators:

(a) The man will define his problem or complaint in clear and definite terms.
(b) He will more often than not be able to identify a specific event or circumstance that led to or caused the problem.
(c) While he may not know it at the time, there more often than not will be a logical solution to the problem. That is, knowledge of the specific cause of the problem will indicate a probably successful remedial action.
(d) While he may not have been able to figure out for himself the logical remedial action, he more often than not will readily accept it when it is suggested and will act accordingly.
(e) The logical remedial action will actually solve the problem and the man will not return with this or another, related, problem.

Of course, no logical course of remedial action may be apparent to the platoon leader. This in itself does not, however, mean that the problem does not belong to this objective category. It is quite possible that the platoon leader also lacks certain factual information that would make a solution apparent.

INFLUENCES FROM PERSONAL FACTORS

In contrast to this objective category of disruptive influences, there is another consisting of problems that arise as a function of the fundamental characteristics of the personalities of the man or men involved. It is accurate to say that these people "bring trouble on themselves." This may happen because they have maladaptive ways of meeting environmental problems, such as living beyond their means or drinking excessively, or it may happen because they have fundamentally poor self-discipline or are unable to cooperate.

Indicators are not as easy to define for this category of disruptive influences as for the preceding category, mainly because they are not completely reliable. Consequently, these should be used tentatively. With this caution, they are:

(a) The platoon leader may learn of the problem indirectly, or the possible existence of a problem may be indicated solely by one of the disruptive influences indicators.
(b) The man will more often than not be reluctant to discuss the problem.
(c) The man may be emotionally upset about his inability to solve his problem. (This is the best single indicator that he is trying and that his failure is attributable to a lack of ability.)
(d) He may not be able to discuss possible causes of the problem; in a large number of problems in this category, the man will not have even a remote idea of what the underlying causes are. He consequently will often attribute the problem to antecedent events that seem to the observer not to be logically related to the problem.

(e) The basic problem may be accompanied by various anti-social behaviors, such as stealing, lying, or other actions, which may become of record and thus require that disciplinary action be taken. In these cases, the man can be a malingerer, and deserving of punishment, a neurotic, or a psychotic who should not be in the Army at all. In the latter case, board action arranged by the psychiatrist can be by far the easiest and cheapest way for the Army to separate him.

(f) He may be reluctant to take remedial action suggested by the platoon leader. If he does, it more often than not will not work, with the result that he will return later with the same or a different problem.

EXAMPLES OF OBJECTIVE AND PERSONAL FACTORS

Examples of disruptive influences illustrating these two categories are shown in Table III. Assuming the leader recognizes the existence of the disruptive influence, it is clear that the specific nature of remedial action is easy to determine for problems in cell one. In the case of the illustrative problem, the leader merely needs to obtain some information for the man involved. He can easily recognize this, and will also find it easy to determine if the information is available.

In the cell two problem, on the other hand, there is a very important question of why the man is inept. It could be a function of a lack of ability, a lack of motivation, or both. Further, a lack of ability can be the result of physical factors, such as very poor motor coordination, or of adjustment factors, such as a very high anxiety level. It is obvious that the nature of the most effective remedial action is obscured by uncertainty as to the cause of the problem. Even if this were not so, the remedial action would require a great deal more skill in its execution than that required for the cell one problem.

In cell three, as in cell one, the problem is not a product of characteristics or aspects of the person involved. The problem proves easy to analyze and solve, and the effective remedial action is easy to take; that is, refer the man to a source of temporary financial aid, of which there are several.

However, in cell four there is another complex problem. Because problems in this cell also arise from factors in the basic personality structures of the men involved, the real cause of the problem may be quite obscure to a person who is not professionally trained. The man himself may have no idea why he is continuously in trouble. As was the case with the cell two problem, uncertainty as to the real cause of the problem will defeat efforts to solve it.
### Table III

**EXAMPLES OF DISRUPTIVE INFLUENCES STEMMING FROM EITHER OBJECTIVE OR PERSONAL FACTORS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUSE</th>
<th>CONTEXT IN WHICH PROBLEM ARISES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OBJECTIVE</strong></td>
<td><strong>WORK</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors unrelated to the man's basic personality</td>
<td>1. Man is worried about the outcome of a promotion board</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Uninsured driver hits and demolishes man's automobile, causing financial hardship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>NONWORK</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Man is harassed by NCO's because of ineptness in drill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERSONAL</strong></td>
<td>4. Man has incurred unpayable debts as a function of living beyond his means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors related to the man's basic personality</td>
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**THREE CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS WITH PERSONAL PROBLEMS**

Analysis of the four general types of disruptive influences shown in Table III indicates that, when viewed from the eyes of the platoon leader, there probably will be three different categories of individuals with which he will be confronted. These differ principally in terms of the extent to which the man with the problem either has or can learn skills for handling his own problems in the future; this, in turn, determines what the platoon leader's approach should be in helping the man.

The first category includes individuals who lack either information or authority to utilize available information. As was implied in the earlier discussion of influences from objective factors, this individual will usually have clear insight into the problem. He will have been unable to solve it because he lacks a critical element of knowledge, or because he simply does not have the authority to do what needs to be done. An example at a relatively simple level might be an individual who is badly in need of money for reasons beyond his control, and who does not know that he is eligible at the time for a partial pay. If his need actually arose because of circumstances beyond his control, and if the need can in fact be handled by a partial pay, it is obvious that the platoon leader can "handle the problem" simply by providing the information the man does not have. Another example would be that of a man who has determined for himself that the only way out of his dilemma is a loan from the Army Emergency Relief, for which he is eligible, but who cannot "handle" this for himself. In this case, the man knows what to do, but lacks the authority; his commander must initiate the action. Solution of the problem rests simply in doing just this.

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It should be clear from these examples that there are individuals who get into difficulties not of their own doing, and who need only the simplest of guidance to solve the basic problems involved.

The second category of individual is not so easy to handle. An unfortunate but existing fact of life is that some individuals lack the basic skills for managing their own affairs successfully, but at the same time are not hampered by basic and enduring adjustment problems. These are individuals who simply have not yet learned how to manage their lives. An example would be that of a young soldier who has gotten into embarrassing debt simply because he has never made a budget, and who did not realize he was overcommitting himself as he bought on credit, perhaps to equip his newly-formed family for housekeeping. Though it sounds incredible, it is entirely possible, as will be indicated in the following section, for a man to be quite unaware of how much he spends for miscellaneous items each month, and thus be quite unaware of how much he has available from his monthly pay for debt reduction. Another example, at a more trivial level, is that of the young soldier who yearns for a powerful automobile, and who succumbs to the local dealer who sells him such a car with monthly notes of $49.50. Without previous experience, he could be quite unaware of the fact that gasoline for such a car in even moderate use could cost him another $20.00 per month. Insurance for an unmarried person under 25 could easily run $10.00 to $20.00 per month more, and so on. This already adds to his approximate monthly pay, which is an intolerable situation.

The leader's role in cases of this sort cannot be simply that of providing information. There are individual management skills that are lacking in the first case, and probable emotional involvements that he must contend with in the second case. That is, if the soldier really "wants" that car, he may be incapable of emotional acceptance of the fact that he cannot afford it. In cases of this sort, then, he must choose as his goal the development of a greater level of responsibility and maturity in the individual who has the problem. This requires that he not solve the problem for the individual, but that he rather provide just enough assistance, and no more, to enable the man to solve his own problem. Only in this way will the individual learn problem-solving skills that he can use on his own in future situations. Examples of some of the rules the leader can follow in executing this kind of action are:

(a) Do not offer solutions; expect the man to arrive at his own decisions.
(b) If necessary, ask the man questions that will elicit information necessary to solve the problem, but do not use it yourself to hand him a "ready-made" answer. Expect the man to be able eventually to integrate such information for himself.
(c) Do not be evaluative; if you show scorn or disapproval, he will stop talking. It will be difficult enough to get the man to talk freely if you accept what he says objectively and unemotionally. Above all, do not try to elicit information that will require you to take legal action against him, or that would be destructive of his personal integrity without contributing a solution of the problem.
You do not have the legal right of privileged communication, as does a lawyer or doctor; that is, if you learn information of a criminal nature, you must reveal it to proper authorities or become an accessory after the fact. Thus, you must not, unless the good of the service requires it, try to learn information that will require you to abuse the man's confidence. If you decide you must ask for such information, you have an ethical responsibility to warn the man first that the counseling session is at an end, and that you must begin to act in the capacity of an officer investigating something for which the man may be punished. He has a legal right to protect himself by refusing to disclose such information.

(d) Do not become impatient with his progress. If your goal is to help the man build problem-solving skills of his own, remember that he has already had eighteen or more years to learn them. You cannot hope to accomplish in a matter of minutes what life has failed to do for him in a matter of years. (This, of course, should be a consideration in reaching the decision to try to help the man yourself. If you are not required to spend the time required, do not commit yourself; even if you could have handled it yourself, given adequate time, it is better to refer the problem to someone whose time is less heavily committed, such as the Chaplain, the Mental Hygiene Clinic, and others that will be discussed later.)

(e) Praise the man for partial success. Learning how to manage one's life is difficult, especially because the necessity for the counseling is a continuing reminder that one has failed thus far to do so. If the man receives recognition and praise for each successful insight as he works toward the eventual solution of the problem his progress will be speeded substantially; without such marks of progress, he might even give up and thus not only fail to arrive at the solution but also fail to acquire the skills you are trying to teach him.

(f) Expect more from the man than he expects from himself, and let him know it; but let him know at the same time that you are confident in his ability to succeed. In some cases, you may be the first person who ever expected the best from him instead of the worst. But do not expect too much, too soon. If you see the solution to the problem and he does not, you are ahead of him in problem-solving ability. Do not expect him to see the solution as easily as you do; the solution is not really your goal. Your objective is not to dispense solutions but rather to build problem-solving skills so that the man can become self-sufficient.

(g) Do not treat any two cases in exactly the same manner. No two will be exactly alike. Further, you must not make your own decision too quickly. If you make the mistake of arriving at your conclusion too soon, your mind will be closed to further information that you
otherwise might have been able to elicit and utilize. The process of diagnosing another man's problem and then of helping him to work out his own solution can be illustrated by the fable of the blind men and the elephant. Because they each had and acted upon incomplete information, each came to a different conclusion as to the nature of that with which they were dealing. The leader cannot afford a similar error in a counseling situation.

These rules are not the only ones that could be given, and they do not constitute a complete set of rules. However, analysis of those given indicates that the skills required to do this kind of counseling are not the most easily acquired of the leader's skills. However, if the leader does have, or can develop, such skills, he can be of enormous help to his subordinates through their use.

The third category of individuals with personal problems is that of men with basic adjustment problems. Cells 2 and 4 in Table III illustrate problems in which an adjustment problem may be involved. The required treatment for such individuals usually is prolonged, and involves specialized skills that the leader will almost never have; however, as the following section will make clear, the question of whether the leader has the required skills is not the only consideration. There are several good reasons why the leader should never knowingly become involved in counseling a person with a basic adjustment problem. The word "knowingly" was used in the preceding sentence because it may often not be apparent, initially, that an individual's problem stems from this source. It is thus the leader's responsibility to be alert to this possibility, utilizing the cues described in the section INFLUENCES FROM PERSONAL FACTORS. When it becomes apparent that an adjustment problem has been encountered, referral should be the next step.

**REASONS FOR REFERRING ADJUSTMENT PROBLEMS**

Being "beyond his depth" is probably the most important reason for the platoon leader to refer adjustment cases to trained professionals. Lacking necessary technical training, the leader's approach to effecting "cures" in adjustment cases—illustrated particularly by the cell 4 problem—very likely will be little more sophisticated than methods used with the insane during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These methods were oriented basically toward the use of physical punishment to suppress the obnoxious symptoms, without much effort or ability to discover and remove the basic causes. These methods typically resulted in a compounding of the problem rather than in cures. Obviously, no leader with conscience wishes to be guilty of this gross kind of error.

A second, and almost equally important reason for referring adjustment cases, is the limit on the leader's time to handle these cases himself, even if he did have the requisite skills. Few platoon leaders or company commanders can afford the luxury of an eight-hour day, or even a ten-hour day. With time already so scarce, the wise leader can ill afford to spend it without hope of a reasonable return for the time invested. With adjustment problems, the hope is very low. This argues strongly for the leader, especially in the combat arms, to spend his time discharging his primary mission, training fit men to be good
soldiers, and to leave to specialists the problem of counseling men who are suffering from basic adjustment problems.

A third important reason for referring adjustment problems is that it is difficult for the leader to be objective about his own men. A man's performance reflects on the leader's own capabilities. If each man in the unit does an outstanding job, the leader is complimented by his own seniors; if not, these seniors ask why the leader has not done a better job. It, consequently, is difficult for the leader not to become defensive when he sees a threat to his own good record. Unfortunately, men with adjustment problems may pose such threats by not responding favorably to the efforts of their leaders. This often happens when these efforts are made in ignorance of the real cause of the problem. When the man is not responsive to attempts to "help," the inevitable result is that the leader then becomes emotionally involved. He must assume either that he chose the wrong remedial actions, or that the man is malingering. It is far too easy to choose the second of the two; the result is a lack of tolerance and a strong tendency to use aggressive or punitive treatment. This assumption will eventually lead him to taking punitive action which can only make matters worse. The following incident illustrates this point.

Sergeant X's company commander received a letter of indebtedness from a merchant in a nearby city. He consequently initiated proceedings that resulted in the man's reduction because he firmly believed that any man who deserved to be an NCO should be able to budget his finances well enough to stay away from unpayable debts. He further intended this to be punishment for Sergeant X that would keep him from getting further letters.

The obvious fallacy here is that Sergeant X's reduction also resulted in decreased pay and thereby made it harder for him to get out of debt. The company commander's punitive solution to Sergeant X's problem could therefore hardly have failed to result in further embarrassment to Sergeant X and the Army, which almost certainly would have continued to get letters from his creditors as a consequence of his reduced ability to meet already excessive obligations.

It, of course, is much easier to say what was wrong in this example than to say how it should have been handled. In actual practice, each case may need to be handled differently, based on the particular circumstances involved. However, in this particular case, it is safe to say that some or all of the following actions should have been tried before the action that was taken:

(a) The company commander probably should have attempted to counsel the NCO regarding his responsibility for proper management of his finances. In such a counseling session, the commander typically tries to determine the circumstances surrounding the receipt of the letter of indebtedness. This is prerequisite to any intelligent remedial action.
(b) He probably should also have tried to help the NCO work out a debt reduction schedule. It is easy for a man to get "in over his head."
The wise commander can even help such a man prepare a budget for his finances; not unfrequently, the man will not have the slightest idea of how much he spends each month on a number of different kinds of items, with the result that he has no really clear idea of why he never has enough money left to pay all his bills each month. With help, some men can acquire the skills necessary to manage their money better, sometimes by simply finding out how much they actually spend each month on such simple items as cigarettes, beer, gasoline, and the like.

(c) The company commander sometimes can help by interceding for the man with the local merchants to whom he is indebted. If it is obvious from analysis of income and obligations that the current debt load simply cannot be managed, creditors often will agree to lower monthly payments, provided there is some assurance that the man will not take advantage of a lower payment schedule by getting even deeper in debt. For the vast majority of creditors, the principle requirement is that the man keep them informed as to his status, pay something each month, and offer some hope that the debt will eventually be paid. Though it seems incredible, many individuals who find themselves hopelessly in debt simply stop making payments, with the result that the creditor abruptly finds himself holding a delinquent account. If the commander intervenes, most such creditors will be more than reasonable in working out new schedules.

(d) In some cases, major adjustment problems may be involved. If the commander's attempts to aid the man fail, an adjustment problem is indicated. In this case, the company commander should without fail refer the individual to the Mental Hygiene Clinic, where a thorough analysis can be made by professional clinicians, who can also provide therapy if therapy is indicated.

(e) In the extremely rare case in which all else fails, the commander probably should initiate action to administratively separate the man from the service. While this action might seem harsh, it is less harsh than other actions that might otherwise become necessary as a result of the fact that the man is no longer setting a proper example for others.

Punitive action ideally should never be taken against a man who has difficulties attributable either to a basic inability to adjust or to unresolved personal problems. This is not because one should be "nice" to these men, but, rather, because punitive treatment will almost inevitably increase the psychological load they carry and thus make the condition worse. Punishment therefore is self-defeating. It increases the likelihood of further trouble, which, with serious problem cases, may also include serious antisocial behavior such as absences without leave or suicide attempts.

A very similar kind of error occurs when the leader makes a superficial analysis of the problem, identifies a promising course of action based on the superficial analysis, and then imposes this course of action, by force if
necessary, on the man involved. The fallacy here is, of course, similar to that in the incident just given. The intended remedial action may be ineffective because the leader has not identified the real problem. This can make matters worse because it will further limit the man's ability to find an adaptive solution to the real problem by giving him the additional requirement for carrying out his leader's solution.

This is not intended, of course, as an indictment of efforts by the leader to help his men. It is intended to illustrate the limited ability of the leader to help solve personal problems or problems of adjustment, and to emphasize that the leader's best course of action in these cases most often is to refer the man to an appropriate source of expert assistance.

IMPORTANCE OF EARLY REFERRAL OF ADJUSTMENT CASES

Thus far, a great deal of emphasis has been given to rationales for referring men who have adjustment problems. The principal reason for this extensive coverage is the importance of early action to relieve psychological tensions. This, of course, is equally true for problems not related to factors in the man's basic personality structure.

When a man's tensions accumulate over time, as a function of any problem situation he cannot solve, he approaches a critical point beyond which he will "break." If his tensions are relieved before he reaches this point, little or no damage will result. Nor will the man's adjustment to the service have been hindered. However, if the breaking point is exceeded, irreversible damage generally will be done. Beyond this point, the man really is not responsible for his actions in the customary sense. If he cannot find a legal way of solving his problem, there is a very great danger that he will turn to illegal ways. The following incident illustrates this point.

Pfc X's wife lived in a town about 120 miles from Fort . She was expecting the birth of their first child within a very few days. Pfc X had been trying for two weeks to get leave to go home so he could be with her at the time the child was born. Each time he tried, his squad leader told him the company was too busy to release him. He tried talking to others in the chain of command, but everyone seemed to be too busy to help. Further, he apparently was prevented from seeing the company commander by NCO's in the chain of command.

As a last resort, he finally went to see the chaplain, determined that, if he received no help from this source, he would then go AWOL and take the consequences. The chaplain immediately called the company commander who turned out to be completely unaware of the problem. The company commander quickly realized the importance of the problem to the man, and granted the leave.

In this incident, it is strikingly obvious that Pfc X was driven almost to the point of committing a serious offense because he could find no solution to a
The tendency to resort eventually to trying maladaptive and irrational solutions is a characteristic of men who have failed for a period of time to find adaptive solutions. Some reach the breaking point more rapidly than others.

RELUCTANCE TO REFER ADJUSTMENT CASES

This raises the need for one final caution in the handling of serious disruptive influences. Often, the leader will try to help because he feels he should be competent to help his men personally. He thus feels it an admission of personal leadership inability if it becomes necessary to send a man to a "source of more competent help."

This sentiment might be reasonable if it could be assumed that all recruits were basically well adjusted before entering the Army. Then, adjustment problems could reasonably be blamed on poor leadership after their induction. This, however, is far from the actual truth. A significant percentage of so-called "normal" Americans have adjustment problems of one variety or another, before entering the Army. The attitude that the leader has failed if he cannot acclimate these persons to the Army imposes unreasonably high requirements on the officer. No leader can make a good soldier from basically unfit material.

Current practice with regard to physical injuries provides an important contrast. It is generally recognized that specialists in first aid or medicine should be used for treatment of physical illness or injury. "No cut is too small for first aid." It seems no less reasonable to use specialists to treat adjustment problems. The platoon leader should not be willing to accept the responsibility for counseling a soldier who is basically maladjusted unless he also is willing to accept the responsibility for treating acute appendicitis, hepatitis, or other physical illnesses. This is no exaggeration. Indeed, skills required to diagnose and treat physical illnesses may be less difficult to acquire than skills required to diagnose and treat mental illness or to handle serious and delicate personal problems.

One other possible reason for a reluctance to refer a man who "isn't working out" is the thought that this man may be malingering, and that the psychiatrist or the chaplain is an "easy out" for him. Of course, it is possible that a given man is malingering. However, this really should not influence the decision too much, because almost as much skill is required to detect an accomplished malingeringer—this is defined as a pure motivational failure—as to treat a seriously disturbed personality. The experts to whom referral is made have these skills. It is important that the leader leave this diagnosis to them. If he attempts to make it himself, the loss of time will make the problem more acute if there really is a problem. This, in turn, will make treatment more difficult.

REFERRAL AGENCIES

To assist the leader in handling the problems of his men, a list of referral agencies has been attached as an Appendix at the end of this text. Included for each agency are a description of its function, examples of cases
commonly handled, examples of cases not handled, and procedures for contacting the appropriate persons in each agency. In general, referrals must be made by the company commander, or by someone acting for him. Consequently, the information in the Appendix will be useful to the platoon leader primarily as (a) a source of initial guidance to those of his men who have problems, while the company commander is arranging for their referral, and (b) a source of essential basic information that he may need when he is acting as company commander, or when he actually assumes command of a company. In all cases, this Appendix should be a help in the initial analysis of problems brought to him. This analysis will generally help in deciding whether he should probe deeper into the nature of the problem himself, or leave this for specialists. It is recommended that this Appendix be carefully read.

PROBLEMS ARISING WITHIN THE DUTY ENVIRONMENT

Attention thus far has been focused on personal problems arising outside the work environment, and on personal problems of adjustment. It is characteristic of these problems that the platoon leader will find that his ability to be of personal help is limited. It is important now to consider certain categories of disrupting influences that can originate within the soldier's duty environment, which the platoon leader can handle. These can be almost anything that the soldier thinks is unfair, unjust, or unwarranted, and can lead to even greater disruption of work performance than influences originating outside this context.

Many aspects of the soldier's life may create problems for him and his leader. One broad category consists of factors that have to do with the physical welfare of the men. Compared with the life of a civilian, the soldier's life is filled with hardships, discomforts, and inconveniences. A reasonable prediction would be that these conditions of the soldier's existence would tend to produce low morale, initiative, and job satisfaction.

Examination of the facts reveals that while this sometimes is the case, at other times it is not. The critical difference apparently is whether the soldier considers the problem, treatment, or experience to be a legitimate condition of his work. Thus, while the rifleman will complain about a sleepless night in the rain on a field problem, this probably will not have any lasting effect on his morale if he perceives it as a valuable training experience. Indeed, if his seniors use proper techniques of motivation, his morale may even be heightened by the experience. Ranger training is a good example. Most Rangers are proud of having met and overcome this challenge. Although they probably would not want to repeat it, they are better men for having met the challenge once, and they know it.

However, there is a quite different result when the soldier thinks the treatment or experience is not warranted, or is unnecessary for the performance of his work. Most good soldiers seem to use this criterion. The following incident, taken from a scout platoon stationed in Germany, illustrates this well.

During this period, it was standard practice on extended field maneuvers for the battalion commander to recall the scouts at the end of a three- to six-day period, as conditions permitted, for one or two days of rest. This was felt necessary because the
scouts were forced to operate continuously, day and night, while performing their mission in the field. Their platoon leader always withdrew them to the area of the battalion CP during these periods, and maintained no night security.

The critical elements of this incident occurred after this platoon leader was reassigned and replaced with another. The new platoon leader refused to permit zero security during these rest periods. Commenting that Seventh Army regulations specifically required units to maintain at least 50 per cent security under tactical conditions, he made clear that his unit would comply, whether it was in the area of the battalion CP or otherwise. Consequently, when the scout platoon returned to the field after their "rest," they were as tired as when they were recalled, earlier. The members of the scout platoon soon came to dread their "rest" days. The morale and performance of the scout platoon dropped sharply over this period as a result of this and other ineffective leader actions.

Thus, this leader required that his unit comply with an Army regulation which it previously had disregarded. While this action would, on the surface, seem to have been quite effective, it actually was quite poor. In essence, he defeated the purpose of the "rest" recall. His men felt that 50 per cent security in the area of the battalion CP was unnecessary for them because there were other security forces in the area. This, in fact, was the specific reason they were always recalled to that particular area for rest. As it was, the unnecessary loss of sleep degraded their ability to perform assigned missions, and was sharply resented. For the men, this was a disruptive influence of the first magnitude.

Other examples could be given. The central theme in most of all of them is that the men are thoughtlessly exposed to privation, hardship, or extra effort which is unnecessary as a part of their training, or in the performance of their mission.

TAKING CARE OF ONE'S MEN

The leader's role in preventing or eliminating these disruptive influences is clear, and important. It sounds trite to say that the leader should make sure that his men get hot meals in the field, whenever possible, or that they are maximally rested when operating tactically. However, trite or not, many leaders apparently are not sufficiently concerned with such matters, possibly because they are not really aware of the negative results that can follow lackadaisical discharge of these leader responsibilities. Diligent efforts to "take care of one's men" seem to be an integral part of the effort needed to produce a cohesive unit that will operate as a team under stressful conditions.

Another aspect of "taking care" of one's men is that of protecting them from excessive use on details, particularly when the men could think their use is the result of an unwillingness on the part of their leader to "stick his neck out" for them. The following is an example. It happened during an Arctic maneuver.
In this phase of the problem, the company had been out two days. On the night of the first day, the company did not get its tents. Consequently, the men of the company were crowded into ten-man tents, about 40 in each, and no one slept very much. The following day, the ____ Platoon was designated to break trail from 1100 until 1800. The tents did not arrive the second night, either, so, again, approximately 40 men were sheltered in each ten-man tent. Again, no one slept very much. On the third morning, the ____ Platoon was again designated to break trail. After two sleepless nights, and seven hours of trail breaking the second day, the platoon did poorly. Five men fell out during the time the platoon was breaking trail. The company executive officer chewed out the platoon and told them they would break trail again the fourth day.

At this point, the NCO’s felt it necessary to complain to the platoon leader. One asked, "Did you tell him we are a beat up platoon?" On receiving a negative answer, he commented, "Well, if you don't speak up for us, who will? I can't go to the company commander." This NCO then left. After this, it was soon announced that the platoon would not break trail the next day.

The inference is clear that the platoon leader later spoke to the company commander about the physical condition of his men, and that this resulted in cancellation of the platoon's trail breaking assignment. It is unfortunate that he did not do this before the NCO's complained to him.

HARDSHIP SUPPORT

However, there are many circumstances in which the men must do dirty, hard, unrewarding work. This is particularly the case in close combat. When so confronted, the men will be faced with difficult decisions: Should they continue trying, or should they not? Should they assault, or just "go along for the ride"? Should they expose themselves in order to fire at the assaulting enemy, or seek the temporary security of their foxholes? Or, less dramatically, should they do a really good Command Maintenance Management Inspection (CMMI), or just one they think will pass?

Some soldiers will react adaptively under such conditions, regardless of what the leader does. Others will not. Incidents have been recorded in which men lay prone in the face of hand grenades rolling straight to them, immobilized by fear, indecision, and "give-up-itis," until they were blown, screaming, into oblivion.

Between these two is a large third category of men to whom the leader is very important. In difficult circumstances, they will summon the will to continue trying, if they receive emotional support from their leader. This is hardship support. In many respects, it is highly similar to the emotional support a parent can give a child in time of trial. This support is also important in non-crisis situations, which are merely unpleasant. Further, the leader's presence alone may suffice to provide the needed support, even as a parent's presence in a dark room provides the emotional support needed by a child, who is afraid of
the dark, to react adaptively to the dark. This is even true when the work is such that the leader either cannot or should not personally engage in its actual performance. The presence of the leader, both commissioned and noncommissioned, is a powerful source of support, even though he does not actually do any of the work himself.

The analogy of the leader-man relationship to the parent-child relationship is strikingly close. Especially in war, the leader's "men" may fall generally in the age range of 17-19. While these people do mature rapidly under stress, they initially are inexperienced adolescents. Even in peacetime, when the ages of enlisted men tend to be higher, the same is generally true because of their relatively greater lack of maturing experience. Statements that the leader must also be a father to his men probably attribute a great deal of their accuracy to the immaturity of the men.

SUMMARY

In summary, disruptive influences generally decrease the ability and motivation of the men to perform well on assigned tasks. To maintain the performance potential of his unit, the platoon leader is responsible for taking quick action to eliminate these sources of performance decrement. When the problem is not basically an adjustment problem, the platoon leader is uniquely suited to help. His rank opens avenues of communication not available to his men, and his actions in "taking care" of them can be instrumental in producing an effective team that will work well under trying conditions. When the problem involves a personal inability to adjust, however, the platoon leader's wisest course of action is to refer the man concerned to a source of specialized assistance. Generally, only persons with specialized training will be able to diagnose and treat the difficulty correctly. However, in both cases, willingness of the leader to help will tend to produce unit loyalty and confidence necessary to outstanding unit performance.
APPENDIX
Time is of essence in handling most personal problems encountered. The persistence of such problems almost inevitably makes solutions more difficult to achieve. This Appendix has been prepared to aid the small-unit leader in the timely selection of an appropriate referral agency which can furnish technically competent assistance to individuals with problems their leaders are not qualified to treat. While not all such agencies are listed, those which handle the majority of problem cases encountered by the average platoon leader have been included.

In this list, agencies have been grouped roughly in terms of the major function served. Under each agency's name are examples of cases handled and cases not handled, together with procedures for locating an agency representative and referring a problem case to him.

It should be emphasized that, while such an appendix can greatly aid a platoon leader in handling problems, this in no way indicates that the company level chain of command should be bypassed. The Administrative Headquarters of the company will relieve the platoon leader of the task of making appropriate contacts for the individual concerned.

The standard procedure for referrals to agencies listed in this Appendix is for the individual first to see his squad leader, who will refer the man to his platoon leader, who will then take the problem either to the first sergeant or to the company commander. There are three important reasons why this procedure should be used. One is simply that the individual must obtain permission to be absent from his unit. Absenting himself without permission will only compound his problems. The second reason is that many problems can be solved at a company level, if they are known. This does not preclude the possibility that a man may have a problem of such a nature that he will not discuss it with personnel at company level, nor does it imply that all problems can be solved at the company level. However, eliminating those problems that can be handled saves not only the individual, but the agencies concerned, a great deal of time and effort. A third reason is to keep the company commander informed as to the existence of problems and/or complaints in his unit. A lack of knowledge could become embarrassing for him in the event he were called by a referral agency for more information about a case.

One final caution should be noted. While the functions of the referral agencies listed in this Appendix are generally well defined by appropriate Army Regulations, and thus should be the same from one area to another, local conditions may nevertheless produce minor differences in the organization and operation of these agencies, particularly with regard to referral procedures. Further, for some agencies, minor differences in the handling of some kinds of cases may arise from differences in command policy. Thus, although the materials in this Appendix will generally be accurate, the leader will find that familiarity with the organization and operations of the referral agencies in the area concerned will be necessary for their most effective use.
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I. AMERICAN RED CROSS

At a post, camp, or station level, all units are served by a central unit of the Red Cross. Overseas, or when a division is operating independently, a Field Director is attached to the G1 Section of the Infantry division. Further, if battalions are operating in a dispersed situation, an Assistant Field Director is attached to each battalion.

The Red Cross provides services to all personnel of any military establishment and their dependents.

EXAMPLES OF CASES HANDLED:

(a) Aid to those who need assistance in communicating with their families concerning their health and welfare.
(b) Consultation and guidance on emergency personal and family financial or health problems, except those of a religious or moral nature, which are a chaplain's function.
(c) Reports of specific home conditions, which are needed in the consideration of applications for emergency leave, morale leave, compassionate reassignment, deferment from overseas reassignment, and dependency or hardship discharge. (These reports must be requested by the commanding officer of the person concerned.)
(d) Aid in obtaining federal and state benefits available to Army personnel and their dependents.
(e) Grants or loans to return home on account of sickness, death, or other grave emergencies in the immediate family, which includes only parents, brothers, sisters, wife, children, and persons in loco parentis (acting in lieu of parents). Such help is given only with approval of the commanding officer, and after the emergency condition has been verified by the Red Cross.
(f) Loans or grants needed for basic maintenance, when allotments are delayed or interrupted, or when emergency needs arise.
(g) In cases the Red Cross cannot handle, referrals will be made to local community referral agencies.

EXAMPLES OF CASES NOT HANDLED:

(a) Loans or grants to return home on account of the sickness or death of someone not in the immediate family.
(b) Problems involving questions of law or legal rights, which should be referred to the Legal Assistance Officer or the Military Justice Section.
(c) Problems which are basically moral or psychological, which should be referred to the chaplain or the psychiatrist, respectively.
PROCEDURES FOR REFERRING TO RED CROSS:

(a) Unit chain of command.
(b) Individual directly to Red Cross.
(c) Appointment desired but not necessary.

NOTES:

In cases where illness exists in the immediate family, the local Red Cross will contact the chapter located nearest the family. This contact may be by wire, phone, or letter, depending on the seriousness of the reported illness.

REFERENCES:

AR 940-10 w/C 4    National Red Cross Service Program and Army Utilization, 30 August 1955.
II. ARMY EMERGENCY RELIEF

Each unit commander and personnel officer initiates and handles Army Emergency Relief (AER) cases. The personnel officer refers cases to the post, camp, or station AER office.

The AER provides emergency loans and/or grants to military personnel and their dependents, when the Red Cross cannot assist.

EXAMPLES OF CASES HANDLED:

(a) Emergency loans when military personnel do not receive pay or allowances on schedule.
(b) Emergency loans when military personnel lose their pay or other personal funds.
(c) Loans to cover emergency medical, dental, or hospital expenses.
(d) Loans to cover funeral expenses, not to exceed $500.00.
(e) Travel expenses when travel is due to an emergency.
(f) Funds for emergency transportation of dependents to meet port calls.
(g) Loans for payment of initial rent, or payment of rent to prevent eviction.
(h) Loans or grants to prevent privation of dependents due to some emergency situation other than the ones described above.

EXAMPLES OF CASES NOT HANDLED:

(a) Loans to cover court fees, lawyer's fees, fines, income taxes, installment payments, or debts incurred while maintaining standards of living not commensurate with their pay and allowances.
(b) Loans to cover emergency expenses which the Red Cross will help defray.

PROCEDURES FOR REFERRING TO ARMY EMERGENCY RELIEF:

(a) Interview and approval of commanding officer.
(b) Personnel officer verifies Expiration Term of Service (ETS), pay status, and administrative actions.
(c) Referred to Red Cross. If Red Cross cannot assist, then referral back to AER.
(d) Dependents, if living on an Army post, should apply to the AER officer. If living in a civilian community, they should apply to the local Red Cross chapter.

NOTES:

(a) Before AER can lend or grant money, the Red Cross must indicate that it cannot assist in the case. There is a space on the AER application form which requires an entry by the Red Cross to this effect. Consequently, the unit commander should send men in
Appendix

need of emergency financial aid to the Red Cross first, and if it cannot assist, referral will be made to the AER.

(b) The Army Relief Society (ARS) is closely affiliated with the AER. The purpose of the ARS is to assist needy widows and orphans of Regular Army personnel.

REFERENCE:

AR 910-10

III. PERSONAL AFFAIRS OFFICER

The unit personnel officer is normally designated as the Personal Affairs Officer. In cases that he cannot handle, referral is made to Post Personal Affairs Officer (normally Post Personal Affairs Officer and Post AER Officer are the same).

The Personal Affairs Officer will counsel military personnel about a wide range of matters classed as personal affairs.

EXAMPLES OF CASES HANDLED:

(a) Inquiries concerning insurance policies, companies, and salesmen.
(b) Advice on absentee voting for service personnel and their dependents.
(c) Problems concerning Soldiers' Deposit or the Savings Bond Program.
(d) Advice on retirement rights and benefits to those about to retire from active duty.
(e) Survivor assistance to the dependents of deceased service personnel (for example, advice on funeral arrangements, survivor benefits, probating of wills, etc.).

EXAMPLES OF CASES NOT HANDLED:

(a) Problems involving legal considerations, which should be sent to the Legal Assistance Officer or the Military Justice Section.
(b) Problems involving requests for loans or grants.

PROCEDURES FOR REFERRING TO PERSONAL AFFAIRS OFFICER:

(a) Unit chain of command.
(b) Individual directly to Personal Affairs Section.
(c) Appointment desired but not necessary.

NOTES:

It is critical for the commander to refer to the Personal Affairs Officer those of his men who have questions on in-service loans, insurance, etc. After insurance is purchased, or a contract is signed, the Personal Affairs Officer is powerless to help. In most installations, the Personal Affairs Officer will also be the custodian of Army Emergency Relief funds. He also works closely with the Red Cross.

REFERENCES:

AR 608 Series
AR's on Personal Affairs
IV. INSPECTOR GENERAL (IG)

The Inspector General (IG) is a detailed inspector general and is assigned for duty on the staff of the division commander.

The IG's office investigates many complaints of the individual soldier and military dependents. Some of these complaints are listed below.

EXAMPLES OF CASES HANDLED:

(a) Administration— partiality in administration, mistreatment of personnel.
(b) Allegations— forced payments of donations, memberships, etc.
(c) Disciplinary matters— mass punishments, etc.
(d) Duties— degrading to NCO, excessive hours, excessive guard duty, partiality in assignments, protest of details (CQ, KP, etc.).
(e) Discrimination— segregation.
(f) Enlistment promises— not kept for schools, organizations, grade, or MOS, etc.
(g) Denial of permission to see IG.
(h) Leave and pass— denial of leave or pass, passes unjustly withheld, restrictions on passes too stringent.
(i) Mess and food— quality and quantity.
(j) Pay and allowances— complaint about any type of pay or allowance; for example, failure to receive, deductions, etc.
(k) Services and supply— dental and medical care denied, or inadequate; living conditions.

EXAMPLES OF CASES NOT HANDLED:

(a) Complaints of wrongs or appeals under Act 138, MCM.
(b) Actions as result of report of survey (AR 735-11).
(c) Actions in connection with courts-martial (UCMJ and AR 15-185).
(d) Protest of type of discharge from military service (AR 15-180).
(e) Matters involving indebtedness and nonsupport (AR 600-20).
(f) Matters involving counterintelligence investigations (AR 381-130).

PROCEDURES FOR REFERRING TO IG:

(a) Unit chain of command.
(b) Individual directly to IG.
(c) Individual by letter to IG (division level or higher).

NOTES:

The preceding list of examples of cases handled is only a very condensed listing of referral matters brought to the IG. Actually, almost any type of
Appendix

complaint or problem may be a matter for the IG. For a more detailed list of types of complaints, consult the Chief Clerk of the Division IG's office.

REFERENCE:

Appendix

V. MILITARY JUSTICE BRANCH

The Military Justice Branch is a section of the Division Staff Judge Advocate Section. This section advises and assists military personnel with military justice problems.

EXAMPLES OF CASES HANDLED:

(a) Timely appeal of punishment under the UCMJ, when the claim is that the punishment is not legal, or is unjust, or is disproportionate to the offense (par. 134, p. 234, MCM 1951). (Administrative reduction appeals in which the person is claiming prejudice on part of the commander are IG problems.)

(b) Requests for advice from military personnel confronted with civil criminal charges. (This advice usually is limited to recommendation of a panel of civilian criminal lawyers.)

(c) Requests for advice as to the rights of suspects in criminal investigations before charges are preferred. After charges have been preferred, individuals may seek advice from the defense counsel of the Military Justice Section of the Division Staff Judge Advocate.

EXAMPLES OF CASES NOT HANDLED:

(a) Legal problems involving civil law. These are handled by the Legal Assistance Officer.

(b) Command deficiency complaints. These should be sent either to the Staff Judge Advocate for processing through Article 138, or to the IG.

PROCEDURES FOR REFERRING TO MILITARY JUSTICE BRANCH:

(a) Unit chain of command.

(b) Appointment made by the individual's commander with the Military Justice Branch.

REFERENCE:

VI. LEGAL ASSISTANCE OFFICER

The Legal Assistance Section is a section of the Division Staff Judge Advocate Section. This section counsels military personnel and their dependents about their personal legal problems.

EXAMPLES OF CASES HANDLED:

(a) Problems involving contracts and repossessions, where the validity of the contracts or the rights and obligations of the parties thereto are in question.
(b) Naturalization, citizenship, and adoption problems.
(c) Marital problems involving divorce or separation proceedings, and the legal rights of the parties to these proceedings.
(d) Problems involving disputed debts, where the soldier allegedly owing money denies the debt or says he was cheated. (If the debt is admitted, there is no legal problem.)
(e) Any legal problem involving civilian law.
(f) Tax problems.
(g) Wills and powers of attorney.

EXAMPLES OF CASES NOT HANDLED:

(a) Financial problems in which the problem is to borrow money. These should be sent to the Army Emergency Relief or the Red Cross.
(b) Allotment problems; for example, how to stop or start Class E or Q allotments except when the problem arises because of infidelity of the wife. In this case, the Legal Assistance Officer should examine the evidence to determine if it is in legal form. All other such problems should be sent to the unit personnel officer or the Finance Office.
(c) Medicare questions. These should be sent to the Hospital Administrative Officer.
(d) Hardship discharge or compassionate transfer problems except when competent legal documents must be prepared. In this case, the Legal Assistance Officer should be consulted to put the documents in the proper form. With this exception, these cases are personnel problems.
(e) Marital problems when there is no question of legal rights or divorce. These should be sent to the chaplain.
(f) Advice on court-martial procedure or board actions. Legal Assistance Officers are not permitted by regulations to give advice to people facing investigation for courts-martial or other disciplinary action of an administrative nature. These are problems for the Military Justice Section or Military Affairs.
(g) Questions on how to get furniture moved, which should be sent to the Transportation Section, and on how to collect for damage done.
Appendix

to furniture during transit, which should be given to the unit claims officer.

(h) Drafting of leases, deeds of trust, real estate mortgages or deeds, partnership agreements, articles of incorporation, **inter vivos** trusts or complicated wills, or the examination of abstracts of title to real estate or other similar documents for purposes of rendering an opinion on the legal sufficiency of such title. However, a person having a legal document to be prepared should take the matter up with the Legal Assistance Officer and see whether or not it is within the scope of his endeavor and responsibility to draft such a document.

(i) Appearing in person or by pleading before domestic or foreign civil courts, administrative tribunals or government agencies, except as authorized under AR 27-5.

(j) Does not act as a collection agent or lend aid to defeat the fair collection of any just debt or obligation. The primary responsibility for debt counseling is that of the company commander. The Legal Assistance Officer may discuss with personnel their legal liability for a debt.

(k) Cases involving matters arising from or connected with the business activities or civilian income-producing activities of an individual member (AR 210-10 and AR 600-20).

PROCEDURES FOR REFERRING TO LEGAL ASSISTANCE OFFICER:

(a) Unit chain of command.

(b) Individual directly to Legal Assistance Officer.

(c) Appointment desired but not necessary.

NOTES:

(a) Legal assistance is normally given only in an established legal assistance office or at a hospital or place of confinement.

(b) The Legal Assistance Officer's advice is solely in his individual capacity as an attorney, and his views or opinions are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or of the U. S. Government.

(c) Privileged communications exist between client and Legal Assistance Officer.

REFERENCES:

AR 608-50  
DA Pamphlet 608-2  
Legal Assistance, 22 August 1961.  
VII. CLAIMS SECTION

The Claims Section is a branch of the Division Staff Judge Advocate Section. This section handles the administrative payment and settlement of claims for or against the United States Army.

EXAMPLES OF CASES HANDLED:

(a) Damages done to household goods during transit or storage.
(b) Damage of private property by military personnel.

EXAMPLES OF CASES NOT HANDLED:

(a) Claims of individuals against other individuals. (Should be referred to Legal Assistance Officer.)
(b) Individual claims against private corporations, etc. (Should be referred to Legal Assistance Officer.)

PROCEDURES FOR REFERRING TO CLAIMS OFFICER:

(a) Unit chain of command.
(b) Individual directly to Claims Section.
(c) Appointment desired but not necessary.

REFERENCES:

AR 25-25 w/C1  Claims Arising from Activities of Military or Civilian Personnel or Incident to Noncombat Activities, 1 October 1959.

AR 25-30 w/C1  Claims Arising from Negligence of Military Personnel or Civilian Employees Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (Title 28, United States Code, Sections 2671-2680), 1 October 1959.

AR 25-100 w/C1  Claims of Military Personnel and Civilian Employees for Property Lost or Damaged Incident to Service (Title 10, United States Code, Section 2732), 1 October 1959.
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VIII. CHAPLAIN

Chaplains are available for duty with each battalion of the division. The chaplain provides for every military man his church away from home, and is the individual's pastor or priest.

EXAMPLES OF CASES HANDLED:

(a) Marriage problems—before and after marriage.
(b) Family problems—arising out of indebtedness and marital problems.
(c) Problems of conscience.
(d) Problems of adjustment to the service—including homesickness.
(e) Religious problems.
(f) Problems involving a need for moral or spiritual motivation or encouragement from a moral or spiritual leader.

EXAMPLES OF CASES NOT HANDLED:

(a) Compassionate transfer cases, hardship discharge, and other similar cases. Although these are originated by the company, the chaplain can assist the men and commanding officer in this.
(b) Emotional or physical disturbances that require psychiatric or medical help.

PROCEDURES FOR REFERRAL TO CHAPLAIN:

(a) Unit chain of command.
(b) Individual directly to chaplain.

REFERENCE:

FM 16-5 w/C5 The Chaplain, 27 August 1964
IX. DIVISION PSYCHIATRIST

The division psychiatrist is a member of the Division Surgeon's Staff. The mission of the division psychiatrist is to provide professional aid to military persons who have emotional problems.

EXAMPLES OF CASES HANDLED:

(a) Adjustment problems.
(b) Marital difficulties of cadre and/or basic trainees.
(c) Situational evaluation for change in job, assignment, profile, etc.
(d) Psychotherapy of psychoneurotic patients.
(e) Evaluation for administrative boards, hospitalization, security clearances, CID investigations, etc.

EXAMPLES OF CASES NOT HANDLED:

(a) Financial problems. In some cases, the underlying cause of the existing financial problems might be due to psychological or psychiatric factors and the individual is referred from another agency.
(b) Problems involving question of law or legal rights.
(c) Administrative matters, such as hardship discharge, where there are no psychiatric implications.

PROCEDURES FOR REFERRING TO DIVISION PSYCHIATRIST:

(a) Unit chain of command.
(b) May be referred by chaplain, JAG, hospital clinics.
(c) Individual refers himself.
(d) In tactical situation, individual is referred through medical channels, that is, battalion surgeon, to Division Clearing Station where the Neuropsychiatric Section is located.

REFERENCES:

AR 40-216
AR 635-89 w/C1, 2
AR 635-208 w/C 5,6
AR 635-209 w/C 6,8

Neuropsychiatry, 18 June 1959.
Homosexuals, 8 September 1958.
Discharge; Unfitness, 8 April 1959.
Discharge; Unsuitability, 8 April 1959.
X. PUBLICATIONS GOVERNING AND EXPLAINING THE
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<td>Claims Arising From Activities of Military or Civilian Personnel or Incident to Noncombat Activities, 1 October 1959.</td>
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<td>AR 940-10 w/C 4</td>
<td>The Chaplain as Counselor, 22 April 1958.</td>
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<td>DA Pamphlet 16-60</td>
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Legal Assistance Digest, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C.