

# Control Roaming Dogs: Governance Operations in FUTURE CONFLICT

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*While the security threats of the 20th century arose from powerful states that embarked on aggressive courses, the key dimensions of the 21st century—globalization and the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—mean great dangers may arise in and emanate from relatively weak states and ungoverned areas. The United States and its allies and partners must remain vigilant to those states that lack the capacity to govern activity within their borders.*

—U.S. National Security Strategy<sup>1</sup>

**G**OVERNANCE OPERATIONS are integral to all military campaigns where establishing a local government over an ungoverned or disrupted political space is required to secure an intended strategic end state. Despite the inseparable role of governance throughout war's history, the United States has been reluctant to embrace a military role for establishing civil government. Aversion is rooted in concerns about military involvement in a fundamentally political activity, which seems to threaten the principle of civilian control, and the military's unwillingness to divert attention from its combat arms. As a result, governance operations have been treated as tangential postconflict missions, leaving field commanders ill-prepared for governance tasks and delaying consolidation of a conflict's political aims.<sup>2</sup>

Reluctance must give way to reality. Governance operations are integral to most phases of war, and their relevance to future conflict is increased by the interplay of globalization, transnational threats, and failing states. Military commanders will continue to serve as provincial governors and city mayors in conflict zones. To meet the evolving security challenge of ungoverned space, a more developed concept of operations for governance is needed to improve the ability of military forces to deliver basic public ser-

vices while simultaneously developing an indigenous capacity for good, democratic governance.

Governance operations are the activities of military commanders to provide basic public services while developing an effective, participatory local public management capacity to consolidate operational objectives. Governance operations at the local level set the conditions for national-level projects and the ultimate transition to civil authority. Specifically, governance involves a unique set of public management tasks and competencies that do not wholly reside within the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD); however, they must be conducted in austere, insecure, uncertain environments that demand military forces. Therefore, governance operations require blending expanded interagency capabilities through integrated civil-military planning, supported by improved social intelligence.

## Back to the Future

Throughout the history of warfare, militaries have assumed the powers of a sovereign governing authority. The United States is no exception. The Army first established a military government in Mexico from 1847 to 1848. It gained further experience during the reconstruction of the Confederate States after the Civil War and in the Philippines and Cuba after the Spanish-American War of 1898. But these experiences were not institutionalized, and the Army was not ready to govern in the German Rhineland during World War I. According to a seminal 1920 report by Colonel Irwin L. Hunt, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs for the Third Army, "The American army of occupation lacked both the training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty."<sup>3</sup> Not until 1940 did the Army formalize its doctrine on military government.<sup>4</sup>

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During the interwar period, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) assumed the governance mantle as part of small wars in Latin America, including Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic.<sup>5</sup> The hard-learned lessons of the so-called Banana Wars made their way into the highly regarded, but rarely read, 1940 *Small Wars Manual*.<sup>6</sup> Chapter 13, "Military Government," provides doctrine and techniques for associated tasks while highlighting the reality that governance operations exist across the spectrum of conflict, including cases "where the inhabitants of the country were not characterized as enemies and where war was neither declared nor contemplated."<sup>7</sup> Among other influences, the manual reflects tenets of the emergent body of international law governing "belligerent occupation."<sup>8</sup>

Armed with experience and doctrine, the military remained reluctant to prepare for the inevitable occupations of friendly and enemy territory during World War II. In fact, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's view of military government as "strange and abhorrent" was consistent with General Dwight D. Eisenhower's desire to turn responsibility over to civilian authorities as soon as possible.<sup>9</sup> Nonetheless, deliberate planning for governance operations began in earnest in 1942 with the establishment of a Military Government Division on the Army Staff and the opening of the first School of Military Government at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. Planning accelerated in 1943 when Roosevelt reluctantly shifted responsibility for occupation from the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to the U.S. Department of War. On the European front, theater planning culminated in December 1944 with the publication of a draft of the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*.<sup>10</sup> Genuinely successful occupations of Germany and Japan and an expansion of the laws for belligerent occupation in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 portended a strong future for military governance operations.

During the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War periods, however, focus shifted from wars of occupation to nuclear war, revolutionary war, and peace operations. Officially, Army Civil Affairs (CA) gained responsibility for governance. In reality, training and doctrine withered while Civil Affairs prepared for the humanitarian-assistance role. Training disappeared entirely, while guidance shrank to a few paragraphs in field manuals and joint doctrine.<sup>11</sup> As a result, military commanders performed governance tasks on an ad hoc basis during operations in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

Operation Iraqi Freedom offers the most recent and compelling case for renewed attention to governance operations. The ability of military commanders to simultaneously combat insurgents and govern communities after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003 is more a testament to their flexibility and problem-solving skills than it is to deliberate planning. Civil Affairs teams prepared to deliver humanitarian relief were instead opening banks, setting up school boards, and clearing out roaming dogs.<sup>12</sup>

Military commanders governed Iraqi provinces and towns for several weeks before the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and, later, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) were established. These initial local efforts were not guided by theater-level policy or doctrine, however, nor were they linked to an overall concept of governance for Iraq. For example, Special Forces Major Jim Gavrilis's only guidance during his administration of a Sunni city and the western portion of the Al Anbar province in March and April 2003 was Central Command's mission statement. Gavrilis's initial successes were ultimately reversed "because no real guidance ever materialized, and there was no CPA representative at that level to take over once he departed."<sup>13</sup> The limited civil-military planning generated false starts, wasted resources, and ultimately delayed the translation of operational victory into strategic success.<sup>14</sup>

## **Ungoverned Space**

Governance operations are not confined to wars of occupation. They also emerge from ungoverned political space. As described in the *United States National Defense Strategy*, "The absence of effective governance in many parts of the world creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents.

Many states are unstable, and in some cases, unwilling, to exercise effective control over their territory or frontiers, thus leaving areas open to hostile exploitation.”<sup>15</sup>

Tomorrow’s threats breed and prosper in the ungoverned space of failing states where terrorists find sanctuary, humanitarian crises grow, and the illegal trade of drugs, guns, and humans flourishes. As a result, military operations across the spectrum of conflict, including humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, counterinsurgency, and others, will include a governance component. Among many contemporary examples, the ongoing Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, established in October 2002, combines intercepting Al Qaeda operatives with operations “designed to strengthen the ability of local governments” to improve social conditions and undercut the spreading influence of Islamic extremism.<sup>16</sup>

Across the security landscape, the problem of ungoverned space is growing. A recent World Bank study of governance in 196 countries cautiously asserted “evidence is suggestive of deterioration, at the very least in key dimensions such as control of corruption, rule of law, political stability and government effectiveness.”<sup>17</sup> Further analyses from the Institute for National Security Studies indicates approximately 50 percent of the 196 countries evaluated by the World Bank qualified as weak, very weak, or failed.<sup>18</sup> Not surprisingly, these states are concentrated in the strategic ghettos of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Of the remaining states, a quarter rated as fair, leaving only about 20 percent of the surveyed countries in the categories of excellent and good.<sup>19</sup> Out of 90-plus failing states, “terrorist groups, as well as insurgent and criminal organizations, are located in the remote parts of more than 20 countries.”<sup>20</sup> Over the last 20 years, U.S. military deployments have been with few exceptions to very weak or failed states.<sup>21</sup> This is an unremitting trend that carries with it a burden of governance.

Trends in governance also provide clues to the characteristics of the future operating environment. The battlespace for governance operations will be turbulent, creating uncertainty for planners and commanders because of complexity and rapid change. Complexity refers to the number of battlespace features relevant to a governance line of operation.<sup>22</sup>

Battlespace clutter is increased for governance operations since they most often occur in messy urban terrain with its associated decaying infrastructure, impotent public service capacity, and wide range of actors vying for control of resources. The governance battlespace is also dynamic; features change rapidly over time. Given the inherent political character of governance, allegiances shift, resources dry up, and public support oscillates. Moreover, persistent media scrutiny, pressure to deliver services, and high stakes associated with political transitions elevate uncertainty. While uncertainty cannot be eliminated, it can be mitigated with a clear concept of operations.

### Concept of Operations

Governance operations provide public management of disrupted political space, enabling other stabilization tasks such as infrastructure recovery, humanitarian relief, and public security. Governance is a distinct type of operation that builds on past and existing doctrinal concepts. From the World War II era, governance draws on the military government experience and Army and USMC doctrine. From the post-Cold War period, governance draws on service and joint civil affairs doctrine for civil administration and postconflict reconstruction. Future governance operations will entail activities and competencies that deliver short-term results while developing an enduring local capacity. Finally, governance operations set the conditions and facilitate the transfer of local public authority to another agency or to local officials—they win the peace.

Governance is the capacity to deliver essential public services. It encompasses the institutions and rules for the effective allocation of resources in a target community; it is a political decisionmaking process. Public management is the function of governance at the local level and is considered effective when local governments have the “technical know-how, capacity, and financial resources to sustain delivery of public services at levels satisfactory to citizens.”<sup>23</sup> Governance is participatory, or democratic, when the political process is competitive, civil society is active, and government institutions are transparent and accountable. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), governance is “good” when a government

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is able to “maintain social peace, guarantee law and order, promote or create conditions necessary for economic growth, and ensure a minimum level of social security.”<sup>24</sup>

Applying the definitions to the military, governance operations are *the activities of military commanders to provide basic public services while developing an effective, participatory local public management capacity in order to consolidate operational objectives*.<sup>25</sup> In ungoverned situations, communities are primarily concerned with execution—the effective short-term delivery of public services. Because of persistent violence and limited access, the military is often the only potent authority until civil capabilities can be brought to bear or built. At the municipal level, commanders are at once the mayor, city council, magistrate, and city manager.

Practical necessity, as well customary international law, require commanders to provide for public

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order and the general welfare of the population.<sup>26</sup> Even so, there is a necessary distinction between governance operations in friendly versus hostile or occupied territory. The former is more likely to occur pursuant to humanitarian or stabilization missions that have the support of the national government(s) involved and/or with international sanction in the case of collapsed states. In these cases, governance operations will seek to restore the legitimate local governing authority. In hostile or occupied territory, international law guides governance operations, and they are subject to the occupying power’s authority. Most likely, the military will work to establish local governance but will not be empowered to determine the final governing authority.

Increasingly, the operation’s strategic end state goes beyond *effective* governance to include the added expectation for *good, participatory* government. Therefore, military commanders must also be prepared to initiate and support the civic process for constituting accountable institutions,

building government capacity, and ensuring broad participation in reconstruction.<sup>27</sup> Commanders reestablish the presence of the state while pursuing the demilitarization of local politics.<sup>28</sup> On the socio-economic front, commanders restore or oversee the restoration of basic services and revive economic activity. For example, in 2003-2004, 1st Armored Division brigade commanders governed Baghdad suburbs while the division’s governance support team implemented a Baghdad Citizen Advisory Council System in cooperation with the CPA.<sup>29</sup> Governance operations that focus only on execution at the expense of developmental work risk the campaign’s overall objectives.

Governance operations involve execution and developmental activities, which enable and align other stabilization and reconstruction tasks. During execution, the first governance task is to determine and prioritize the needs of the local community. The needs assessment is a structured process that involves a technical assessment of recovery needs and provides “a platform for national and international actors to agree on joint principles, define their commitments, and prepare their activities.”<sup>30</sup> More important, it demands direct involvement from the community. Former military governor of Karbala province, Iraq, USMC Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Lopez, the commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, highlighted this point in July 2003: “I have many groups telling me what all the problems are: crime, security, unemployment, food. What I’m looking for is leaders in the community who can also help me to solve these problems.”<sup>31</sup>

Translating needs into solutions is the job of public management. Public management encompasses all the activities to develop, implement, and enforce the administrative laws, regulations, and policies that guide the delivery of services. The first days and weeks are the most critical to avoiding negative ripple effects. Early governance operations are personnel and resource intensive and might require military units to act in unfamiliar roles. Rapid results to build momentum and demonstrate potency require the ability to quickly distribute resources across multiple communities in an area of operations. Moreover, one of the military commander’s first acts should be a public statement that at a minimum clarifies intentions, jurisdiction, applicability of local laws, the role of

indigenous institutions, and penalties for violating ordinances.<sup>32</sup> Other pressing implied tasks include the preservation of public records; identification of civil administrators; initiation of media relations; and the opening of financial institutions, markets, hospitals, and schools. Over the long term, public management includes budgeting and cost analysis, urban planning, civil service management, and public-sector quality control. As capacity is built, the military commander increasingly delegates these tasks to other agencies and local officials.

Commanders can facilitate speed to transition and consolidation of political aims through three inter-related developmental imperatives: decentralize, build capacity, and democratize. The commander has a role in setting these in motion and supporting progress, but is unlikely to see the end results.

**Decentralization.** Decentralization, probably the most politically charged activity, involves handing over power from the central to local government along political, financial, and administrative lines.<sup>33</sup> The process brings government closer to the problems and its constituents, allowing for tailored solutions while holding officials accountable.<sup>34</sup> Decentralization also carries risk. As witnessed in Iraq as part of a program to extend local participation, the Citizen Advisory Council System empowered local elites, but also generated corruption and conflict over scarce resources.<sup>35</sup> USMC military governors were dealing with similar problems before the CPA initiated its governance programs. Within the first 2 weeks of July 2003, the first postwar Iraqi governors of Karbala and Najaf were ousted for misappropriation of funds and kidnapping.<sup>36</sup> Striking the right balance between a controlled, yet slow process and early success is the greatest challenge. Of course, decentralization is only meaningful if the central government has capacity to transfer. In failing states (Somalia and Haiti) the government is impotent at federal and local levels.

**Building capacity and democratization.** The long haul of decentralization is complemented by building local capacity and expanding participation. In addition to linking resources with training, capacity is built by expanding revenue-generating authority and engaging local officials and citizen groups in policymaking. The latter buttresses democratization at the local level, which seeks to increase transparency, accountability, and responsiveness by—

- Creating opportunities for citizen participation.
- Establishing a legal basis for local government associations.
- Opening public meetings, records, and information to the media and citizens.
- Strengthening media relations.
- Expanding the net of participation to include women and minorities within a cultural context.
- Promoting partnerships among local government, civil society, the private sector, and other groups.<sup>37</sup>

Developing effective, good, participatory local governance enables progress in other stabilization and reconstruction areas. In turn, garbage removal, clean water, and public security strengthen governance—a reinforcing cycle the military initiates and sustains.

### Preparing for Governance

The governance experience the United States is currently gaining in Iraq and Afghanistan can serve as a foundation for future operations in ungoverned space. Preparing the force requires initiative in three areas: developing governance competencies in the right organizations for the right tasks, integrating skills sets through improved civil-military planning, and placing increased emphasis on social intelligence.

**Developing competencies.** Proficiency in governance operations requires the military to update past programs and the civilian sector to adapt existing expertise to a new battlespace. For the military, the way forward begins with recognizing the central role of governance in consolidating objectives and continues with emphasis on leadership. The commander is sovereign under law and by necessity until transition.<sup>38</sup> Former Central Command commander General Anthony Zinni clarifies: “On one hand, you have to shoot and kill somebody; on the other hand, you have to feed somebody. On the other hand, you have to build an economy, restructure the infrastructure, and build the political system. And there’s some poor lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier general down there, stuck in some province with all that saddled onto him, with nongovernmental organizations and political wannabes running around, with factions and a culture he doesn’t understand.”<sup>39</sup>

In addition to problem-solving skills, commanders need a deep understanding of the local battlespace, insight to working with civilian organizations, and basic public management knowledge. Minimal areas of expertise include those described earlier with

emphasis on the exercise of military law, supervision of local officials, collection and expenditure of revenues, and preservation of personal and property rights.<sup>40</sup> Know-how should be combined with practice in solving municipal problems as part of professional education and staff training programs. More important, the commander must provide a clear statement of intent to guide street-level decisionmaking and the alignment of other stabilization and reconstruction tasks.

Concentrating all the expertise of governance in the commander is neither desirable nor feasible. Functional responsibility for advising the commander and running governance programs has traditionally belonged to and should remain with Civil Affairs. However, changes in structure, numbers, and training must be addressed. Regarding structure, 96 percent of Army and 100 percent of USMC CA personnel were in Reserve units as of 2005.<sup>41</sup> One implication of the limited activation period for Reservists is the rapid exhaustion of a specialty that is required well beyond its 2-year commitment.<sup>42</sup> Additional CA Active or Reserve units are being created to meet the pressing and growing demand.

We should also revive governance training. Reflecting the peace operations focus of the 1990s, CA training in preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom focused primarily on humanitarian relief. Training programs are already being adapted; however, it is not clear that they are taking full advantage of the curriculum from the World War II-era School of Military Government, the doctrine and techniques captured in the *Handbook for Military Government* or *Small Wars Manual*, and the lessons of past experience.<sup>43</sup> In addition to general governance training, each CA unit should recruit and develop a core cadre with public management (city/county managers, municipal administrators, public utility managers) expertise. Finally, CA units must participate in service, joint, and interagency exercises. We can avoid overreliance on CA units by leveraging complementary skills among functional specialties that enjoy greater numbers, such as engineers, judge advocates, comptrollers, and medical personnel.

The need to significantly expand military Civil

Affairs can be offset in part by developing an expeditionary civilian capacity. Among U.S. agencies, USAID offers a repository of expertise commanders can tailor for governance operations. Specifically, a decade's worth of expertise in the Office for Democracy and Governance (DG) should be matched with the flexibility of the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI).<sup>44</sup> Prior to military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the DG worked primarily in transitional countries that had secure, receptive programming environments.<sup>45</sup> In addition to relying primarily on private-sector contractors with minimal conflict-zone experience, a cumbersome and unresponsive spending authority hindered the effectiveness of the DG.<sup>46</sup> Nonetheless, the DG knows governance development and has established relationships with core private-sector organizations with in-demand governance skills.<sup>47</sup>

Enter OTI. This USAID office is specifically chartered to deliver quick results in dynamic situations, including postconflict reconstruction. In addition

to a "culture of risk-taking, political orientation, and swift response," OTI has a unique budgeting authority that allows immediate spending through rapid, competitive contracting and direct grants to local organizations.<sup>48</sup> The future for USAID lies in finding

the right balance between an organic, expeditionary governance capacity and a pool of readily available contracting expertise that can be integrated with military operations. Even with organizational change, the security situation will likely constrain civilian capability during the first days and weeks. This reality, as well as the mix of civil-military expertise, supports a military emphasis on execution during initial intervention complemented by a civilian focus on development over the long term.

**Improving civil-military planning.** Integrated civil-military planning is required to link civilian expertise with the military's capacity for early action in ungoverned space. Progress is underway at the national level. In November 2005, DOD released Directive 3000, establishing stability operations as a core military mission that includes developing local governance.<sup>49</sup> The directive charged the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with developing policy

and identifying required capabilities. Within DOS, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was established in July 2004 with a broad mandate from the U.S. Secretary of State to “manage resources, planning, and development of policy options to respond to failing, failed, and postconflict states.”<sup>50</sup> Its meager 30-member staff includes officials from USAID, the CIA, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Joint Forces Command. Among S/CRS’s ambitions is the ability to “deploy personnel and resources in an immediate surge response,” suggesting a need to significantly expand its staff.<sup>51</sup> National-level coordination is essential to coherent policy, clear political objectives, and coordination with a wide range of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations.

Healthier interagency coordination is an important first step toward improving civil-military planning and execution at the operational level. The next steps include deploying S/CRS teams with governance expertise to regional combatant commands in order to participate in campaign planning and interagency participation in joint military exercises with a governance component. During execution, experience with Provisional Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Governance Support Teams in Iraq validates embedding civilian expertise with CA personnel and military units. When security does not allow embedding, information technology offers a reachback option for CA units to tap subject matter expertise.

**Emphasizing social intelligence.** Pervasive local knowledge, or social intelligence, is a critical enabler for governance. The battlespace is unique for every operation. Social intelligence goes beyond culture to include collection and analysis of socioeconomic conditions, political institutions and affiliations, and demographic characteristics. Cultural analysis is gaining prominence; however, most current efforts mistake insight to customs for actionable intelligence.

Instead, culture should be operationalized to address the underlying value system enacted as behavioral norms. Not eating with your left hand is a custom; loyalty to one’s family over personal needs is a value.<sup>52</sup>

Political analysis looks at the tradition of local governance as well as the web of relevant stakeholders. A community’s history with local governance, including the degree of decentralization, extent of participation, and existing capacity, are all prerequisites to planning. An analysis of the individuals and organizations with a stake in the outcome helps commanders navigate the complex social network of relationships that exert influence on the development process and end state. Demographic and socioeconomic analysis addresses the changing composition of the population in relationship to relevant identity-based characteristics (religion, ethnicity, age) and human security concerns (unemployment, health care, education). Finally, social intelligence must be scalable from the theater to the neighborhood.

## Forging a Capability for Governance

Governance operations reconcile political ends with civil-military means.<sup>53</sup> The dark dynamics of globalization are eroding state sovereignty and expanding the terrain of ungoverned space. The U.S. military is obliged to forge a capability for governance to consolidate political aims across the emergent security landscape. To this end, this concept of governance operations focuses on delivering basic public services and building local capacity in anticipation of transition to a civil administration.

Preparing the force begins with the commander and continues by reviving and updating governance expertise in Civil Affairs and creating a complementary civilian expeditionary capacity. More important, the new mix of competencies must be integrated through coherent, street-smart civil-military campaign planning. **MR**

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### NOTES

1. U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1 March 2005), 1.

2. Nadia Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance,” *Parameters* (Autumn 2003): 85. Schadlow, the first to articulate the concept of governance operations, argues that “governance operations are the operational link needed to consolidate a state’s final political aims in war.”

3. Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1990), 3.

4. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 27-5, *Military Government* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1940).

5. For a history of U.S. military involvement in small wars, see Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), and Ivan Musicant, *The Banana Wars: A History of United States Intervention in*

*Latin America from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990).

6. U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), *Small Wars Manual* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1940; reprint, Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 2004), chap. 13, sec. 1, 1.

7. *Ibid.*

8. The Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the Convention, 18 October 1907, requires the occupying power to “take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country” (W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, eds., *The Laws of War* [New York: Random House, 1994], 232).

9. Schadlow, 88. For the most complete compilation of World War II primary sources on military government, see Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, eds., *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1964).

10. U.S. Department of War, *Handbook for Military Government in Germany* (Washington, DC: draft, 1940).

11. FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 February 2000), has two pages on civil administration. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 20 February 2003), and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-57, *Joint Doctrine on Civil-Military Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 8 February 2001), offer only a few paragraphs each. For an excellent history of occupation-related doctrine, see Wally Z. Walters, "The Doctrinal Challenge of Winning the Peace against Rogue States: How Lessons from Post-World War II Germany May Inform Operations against Saddam Hussein's Iraq," U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, 9 April 2002, on-line at <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/walters.pdf>, accessed 25 January 2006.

12. William Booth, "Ad-libbing Iraq's Infrastructure," *Washington Post*, 21 May 2003, A01.

13. MAJ Jim Gavrilis, U.S. Army Special Forces, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 11 February 2005.

14. For an accounting of the interagency planning process for Operation Iraqi Freedom, see James Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad," *Atlantic Monthly* (January/February 2004). See also Edwin F. Connerley, Democracy Officer; Julie Werbel, Senior Democracy Fellow; and Pat A. Fn-Piere, Office of Democracy and Governance, Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 14 October 2004.

15. *National Defense Strategy*, 3.

16. Stewart M. Powell, "Swamp of Terror in the Sahara," *Air Force Magazine* (November 2004): 54.

17. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Massimo Mastruzzi, "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002," World Bank, 20 June 2003, 32. The trend was reconfirmed by Kaufmann in "Corruption, Governance and Security: Challenges for the Rich Countries and the World," *Global Competitiveness Report 2004/2005*, World Bank, September 2004, 84; "Revisiting the long-term trend evidence, . . . we find that, overall, this stagnating trend does not appear to have been reversed over the past year." In addition to the four dimensions of governance this article mentions, states were also evaluated in the areas of "voice and accountability" and "regularity quality."

18. Richard H. Shultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochar, *Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority*, Occasional Paper 57 (USAF Academy, CO: Institute for National Security Studies, September 2004), 55.

19. *Ibid.*, 55.

20. *Ibid.*, 8.

21. *Ibid.*, 58.

22. Lines of operations define the directional orientation of the joint force in time and space in relation to the adversary.

23. USAID, *Decentralization and Democratic Local Governance Programming Handbook*, Technical Publication Series (Washington, DC: Center for Democracy and Governance, May 2000), 12.

24. *Ibid.*, 12.

25. Gavrilis introduces a related idea he terms "operational follow-through" and says "that it is critical for military commanders to be able to transition rapidly from combat operations to civil administration. The speed and depth of operational follow-through on the part of the military in most cases will exponentially increase the success of civilian stability and reconstruction efforts later."

26. JP 3-57, I-19.

27. "Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction," Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., January 2003, 13.

28. Gavrilis suggests that "we have to help show [other countries] the details of democracy" at local levels. In his view, "it may be the military commander that is in the best position to do so, and in many cases the military commander may be the only one to do so." See also Linda Robinson, "Ready or Not," *U.S. News and World Report* (14 February 2005).

29. According to Scott Callwell, 1st Armored Division Civil-Military Affairs Officer, the Division's Governance Support Team worked with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to establish 88 neighborhood and 9 district advisory councils for the city of Baghdad (interview by author, Arlington, Virginia, 25 October 2004). See also CPA, *The Baghdad Citizen Advisory Council Handbook*, 3d ed. (Iraq: 7 November 2003).

30. Uwe Kievelitz, Thomas Schaefer, Manuela Leonhardt, Herwig Hahn, and Sonja Vorwerk, "Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations," Joint United Nations Development Group, United Nations Development Program and World Bank Guide, on-line at <www.undg.org/documents/4937-PCNA\_-\_Practical\_Guide\_to\_Multilateral\_Needs\_Assessment\_in\_Post-Conflict\_situations.pdf>, accessed 25 January 2006.

31. SPC Benjamin R. Kibbey, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, Coalition Force Land Component Command, "Political freedom flourishes in Iraq," on-line at <www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/4863526af38d7aa85256feb00436338?OpenDocument>, accessed 25 January 2006.

32. The *Small Wars Manual*, 13-9, outlines the minimum requirements that a commander should address in his public statement. The 1944 *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*, 145, echoes the *Small Wars Manual*.

33. USAID, "Decentralization," 7. The political dimension involves the transfer of political authority to the local level through the establishment or reestablishment of elected local government, electoral reform, political party reform, authorization of participatory processes, and other reforms. The financial dimension refers to the shifting of financial power to the

local level and involves increasing or reducing conditions on the intergovernmental transfer of resources and giving jurisdictions greater authority to generate their own revenue. The administrative involves the full or partial transfer of an array of functional responsibilities to the local level, such as health care service, the operation of schools, the management of service personnel, the building and maintenance of roads, and garbage collection.

34. *Ibid.*, 5.

35. According to Callwell, corruption was a persistent problem at the neighborhood level where he primarily worked, which led commanders to dismiss many officials who consulted with the CPA. The *Citizen Advisory Council Handbook*, 18, outlines specific prohibitions as well as penalties with which to fight corruption.

36. "Picked Governor of Karbala Resigns," *New York Times*, 8 July 2003.

37. USAID, "Decentralization," 36-39.

38. Per the *Small Wars Manual*, "Military government may be said to be exercised by the military commander, under the direction of the president, with the express or implied sanction of Congress. The president cannot, of course, personally administer all the details, so he is regarded as having delegated to the commander of the occupying forces the requisite authority. Such commander may legally do whatever the President might do if he were personally present" (13-15).

39. GEN Anthony Zinni, remarks at the U.S. Naval Institute and U.S. Marine Corps Association, Annapolis, MD, 4 September 2003, on-line at <www.usni.org/Seminars/Forum/03/forum03zinni.htm>, accessed 25 January 2006.

40. *Small Wars Manual*, 13-8, 13-13.

41. Marine units include the 3d Civil Affairs Group (CAG) at Camp Pendleton, California, under Marine Forces Pacific, and the 4th CAG aboard Naval Station Anacostia in Washington, D.C., under Marine Forces Atlantic. The only active duty Army unit is the 96th CA Battalion (Airborne) with six companies. There are 4 Reserve CA commands, 7 Reserve CA brigades, and 24 Reserve CA battalions.

42. In Iraq, the rapid exhaustion of a specialty has proven less problematic for the Army than for the Marines. With only two 60-plus-person units, the 3d and 4th CAGs had served a full 2-year activation period by 2003. See LTC O.R. Lovejoy, After Action Report, MAFORPAC G-3, 31 October 2003.

43. *Handbook for Military Government or Small Wars Manual*.

44. Both the Office of Democracy and Governance (DG) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) are in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance.

45. USAID Congressional Budget Justification 2004 Program Highlights says: "USAID implements democracy and governance activities in nearly 80 country and regional programs that help nations develop and consolidate effective, authoritative, and legitimate democratic governance. The highest funding allocations have recently been directed to Serbia, Indonesia, Egypt, Gaza and the West Bank, Ukraine, Russia, Haiti, Nigeria, and Armenia," on-line at <www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/highlights.html>, accessed 25 January 2006.

46. Edwin F. Connerley, Democracy Officer; Julie Werbel, Senior Democracy Fellow; and Pat A. Fn-Piere, Office of Democracy and Governance, Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 14 October 2004. K. Scott Hubli, Senior Advisor for Governance Programs, and Jim Delia-Giacoma, Senior Advisor for Citizen Participation, National Democratic Institute, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 18 August 2004.

47. In an interview by the author with Carol Bartle, Program Manager, on 23 September 2004, Bartle said that existing and potential partners include the National Democratic Institute, Research Triangle Institute, Chemonics, Management Systems International, and the International City/County Management Association. For example, the International City/County Management Association sent nine staff members to Iraq from June 2003 to March 2004 to provide training, technical assistance, and policy analysis in the areas of city management, public administration, utilities management, public finance, and others.

48. See USAID, Funding Legislation, "Transition Initiatives," on-line at <www.usaid.gov/our\_work/cross-cutting\_programs/transition\_initiatives/index.html>, accessed 25 January 2006, which says: "For necessary expenses for international disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance pursuant to section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, \$50,000,000, to remain available until expended, to support transition to democracy and to long-term development of countries in crisis: Provided, That such support may include assistance to develop, strengthen, or preserve democratic institutions and processes, revitalize basic infrastructure, and foster the peaceful resolution of conflict: Provided further, That the United States Agency for International Development shall submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations at least 5 days prior to beginning a new program of assistance."

49. U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," Washington, D.C., 28 November 2005. On-line at <www.thomaspubbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/002755.html>, accessed 30 January 2006.

50. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), DOS, presentation at the Joint CSIS-Woodrow Wilson Center Event, Washington, D.C., 20 October 2004, slide 6.

51. S/CRS, slide 8.

52. Margaret K. Nydell, *Understanding Arabs: A Guide for Westerners* (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1987), 17.

53. The core idea for governance operations—that they reconcile political ends with civil-military means—is applied to all stabilization and reconstruction tasks, but is particularly relevant to governance. For further discussion, see Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2004), 19.

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