Ukraine's opposition leader, Viktor Yushchenko, addresses a crowd of more than ten thousand people 22 November 2004 in Kiev's Independence Square, accusing government officials of falsifying election results. Yushchenko's followers adopted the color orange as a symbol of the mass movement opposing the legitimacy of the elected government. The use of bright colors as a symbol of rebellion by other popular movements employing civil disobedience as a principal tactic gave rise to the term "color revolution."

The Urban Individual
Unassailable Source of Power in Twenty-First Century Armed Conflicts

1st Place, 2015 DePuy Contest Winner

Lt. Col. Erik A. Claessen, Belgian Army

After the battle of Borodino in September 1812, Napoleon marched on Moscow. In this time of crisis, most generals urged Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov to defend the city at all cost. Kutuzov refused because "the very act of giving up Moscow will prepare us to defeat our enemy. As long as the army exists and is capable of resisting the enemy, we are safe in the hope that the war will conclude happily; but when the army is destroyed, Moscow and Russia will perish. I order the retreat!"[1] Upon that command, the citizens evacuated the city and set it on fire.

War is an act of violence to compel the enemy to do our will by rendering the enemy powerless.[2] Therefore, the sources of power are of the utmost importance. Every

belligerent protects his own while seizing the initiative to attack his opponent's. Because he saw the army as the real source of Russian power, Kutuzov made the hard choice to preserve his forces rather than protect the capital.

At that time, Moscow counted 270,000 inhabitants. Now, the inhabitants number twelve million. In 1800, 3 percent of the world population lived in cities. That ratio now stands at 50 percent, and trends indicate it will grow to 60 percent by 2030. Taking into account the growth of the world population from one to eight billion in the same period, this means that the number of city dwellers will increase more than one hundred fifty-fold in just over two centuries.[3] The scope of this evolution raises the question as to whether the relative importance of armed forces and cities as sources of power has remained unchanged. One way to answer that question is to analyze what the incumbent Russian rulers consider the most dangerous threat to their country and regime at this moment.

Two centuries after Borodino, the Kremlin states that Moscow is once again under threat of an imminent attack. In May 2014, Russian authorities organized an international security conference entirely devoted to *color revolutions*.[4] During the conference, Gen. Valeriy Gerasimov—chief of staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation—explained his view on the ousting of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych earlier that year: "Color Revolutions have become the main lever for the realization of political ideas. … They are based on political strategies involving the external *manipulation of the protest potential of the population*, coupled with political, economic, humanitarian and other non-military measures."[5] In an earlier publication, he wrote that "the rules of war changed substantially. The role of nonmilitary methods to achieve political and strategic objectives increased, and their effectiveness, in some cases, exceeded that of armed force."[6] In the eyes of the Kremlin, this type of regime change can happen at any time in Moscow. Mass demonstrations in Moscow could be as threatening to Putin as they proved to be to Yanukovych in Kiev. President Putin therefore firmly stated, "We see that the wave of so-called 'color revolutions' led to such tragic consequences. … For us, this is a lesson and a warning, and we must do everything necessary to prevent something like this from happening in Russia"[7]

Although the Kremlin's interpretation of recent events indicates it refuses to differentiate between spontaneous protests and orchestrated subversion, it also shows the Kremlin considers urban mobilization a power equivalent or superior to conventional military force. Gerasimov's estimate of the relative importance of armies and cities clearly is the complete opposite of Kutuzov's. Other events corroborate this estimate. In megacities like Cairo, Baghdad, and Gaza, military force proved inadequate to contain popular mobilization. As urbanization continues, this trend will only exacerbate.

However, the increased role of cities in armed conflicts is not due to the cities themselves but to the way their numerous inhabitants interact. This article holds that the source of power in future armed conflicts is the protest potential of urban individuals. Therefore, rendering the enemy powerless requires its isolation from urban constituencies at the outset of operations. This calls for a renewed understanding of the first foundation of unified land operations: initiative.[8]

To substantiate this thesis, the article first explains the process of urbanization in the context of conflicts and war. Next, it describes how urban-based belligerents use megacities as strategic power sources rather than advantageous tactical battlegrounds. It further analyzes why gaining overwhelming popular support is the decisive action in megaurban conflict. Finally, it derives the military implications from that analysis.

Urbanization

Twenty-first century megacities counting several million inhabitants are not simply enlarged versions of early nineteenth century cities with less than one hundred thousand residents. Urbanization does not merely mean that cities expand but that the urban character of the environment becomes the defining parameter of life itself.

In 1800, cities were small but densely populated areas governed by a rudimentary administration and protected by a fortified perimeter. The defense of a city relied completely on the value of the perimeter as an obstacle. Once breached, the city was lost. Protracted resistance inside the perimeter was impossible. As the effectiveness of firepower against fortifications increased, the importance of cities in wars dwindled.

By contrast, contemporary megacities are large areas with a high population density where life depends on administration. Perimeters in the shape of beltways enhance rather than impede access to the center. However, this does not mean that these cities are defenseless. On the contrary, the defensive value of a megacity stems from the

(Photo by Shakh Aivazov, Associated Press)

View of Leninsky Prospect in the Chechen Republic capital city of Grozny, Russia, 13 April 1995. Shelling and aerial bombardment by Russian forces during the previous January made it one of the most dangerous streets in the world.

size of the force needed to control the citizens living there. Quinlivan demonstrated that two parameters determine force requirements to hold a city: population size and contention level.[9] Comparing peaceful and conflict areas around the world, he shows that—depending on the level of contention—force requirements per thousand of population range from two lightly armed police officers in a patrol car to twenty heavily equipped and adequately supported members of the armed forces. In megacities, this rule completely changes the character of urban warfare. That force requirements for urban combat are proportionate to population size rather than enemy fighter strength puts the urban individual in the center of strategy development. Because of the sheer size of the population, an urban-based belligerent inflicts higher costs on enemies by mobilizing city dwellers against enemy forces than by directly fighting them.[10] Therefore, the strength of urban-based belligerents resides in their ability to tune the level of contention to an optimum level.

Low levels of contention do not bother the opponent, but extremely high levels of violence do not threaten the enemy either. Above a certain level, acts of violence yield diminishing returns. Even though extreme violence increases the opponent's force requirements for combat, it lowers force requirements for population control measures. Extreme violence leads to rampant insecurity and

the breakdown of administrative services, causing citizens to flee the city. The resulting decrease of the urban population diminishes the number of soldiers necessary to control the population. Moreover, as the number of citizens goes down, the effectiveness of standoff weapon systems goes up, allowing the opponent to replace soldiers with technology. Successful urban-based belligerents swamp the opposing force inside the city without scaring the citizens out.

Weapon System or Power Source

The August 1996 and January 2000 battles of Grozny illustrate that cities offer the urban-based belligerent many opportunities to escalate the level of violence against a militarily superior opponent.[11] However, they also reveal the limitations of such an approach. Grozny's concrete structures provided cover and concealment. Chechen fighters used sewers to move around the city swiftly without exposing themselves to enemy fire. Defensive positions on the upper floors of high-rise buildings denied the Russians the advantages offered by tanks because of the limited elevation of their guns. Moreover, narrow streets limited the Russian ability to maneuver and strongly reduced observation and fields of fire. This allowed the Chechens to fight at such close quarters that the Russians could not call in indirect fire support because of the prohibitive risk of fratricide.

In fact, Chechen fighters transformed Grozny's urban infrastructure into one huge weapon system designed to deny the Russians the advantages they derived from their numerical and technological superiority. In 1996, Chechen fighters succeeded in this. However, the principal disadvantage of such a high level of violence is that it depopulates the city. In the case of Grozny, the population shrank from three hundred thousand at the outset of hostilities to less than twenty thousand at the end. As more and more civilians left the capital, Chechen fighters offered the Russians clearly defined geographic locations they could focus on. Drawing on the 1996 lessons learned, Russian armored and infantry troops no longer entered the city but sealed it off. They sent in small reconnaissance

units to locate Chechen urban fighting positions and destroyed them from safe distances using fighter aircraft, artillery, and thermobaric rounds. Lacking a recruitment pool to replace losses, attrition ultimately led to the collapse of the Chechen defense of their capital.

Although the Chechen concept of operations was innovative, it nevertheless reflected a vision that sees combat as "the only effective force in war." [12] This vision remains rooted in nineteenth century military theory that holds that "it is evident that destruction of the enemy forces is always the superior, more effective means, with which others cannot compete." [13] In this line of thinking, using the urban infrastructure as a battleground is merely another way to gain a position of advantage over the enemy.

Conversely, the 2005 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza shows that—above a certain size—cities offer fundamentally different options to the urban-based belligerent. In unruly megacities, force requirements for population control measures approach those needed for decisive battle. In 1967, the Israel Defense Forces needed eleven brigades to defeat the Egyptian army and conquer the Sinai Desert—including Gaza. [14] In the aftermath of the Six-Day War, it took the Israel Defense Forces just a few battalions to police the 350,000 demoralized Palestinians living there. [15] However, the population quickly grew and radicalized. In one generation, Gaza transformed from a conglomerate of villages into an extended urban area.

Activist movements such as Hamas continually mobilized the 1.3 million Gazans in frequent and violent protests, supplemented with occasional terrorist attacks. As a result of rapid urbanization and increased contention, Israeli force requirements for population control rose to nine brigades. [16] To contain Hamas, Israel had to field ever more soldiers. In 2004, the Israel Defense Forces were fighting almost the equivalent of the Six-Day War, week after week with no end in sight. This situation proved unsustainable. In an unprecedented decision, the Israeli government designed a disengagement plan and asked parliament to approve it. On 16 February 2005, the Knesset voted the dismantlement of Israeli settlements in Gaza and the unilateral withdrawal from the area. [17]

During the events that led to the takeover of Gaza by Hamas, combat never was the effective force in war. Likewise, belligerents who use the urban population as a power source rather than the urban infrastructure as a weapon system apply a fundamentally different form of warfare than that described by classic military theory. The mechanism urban-based belligerents use to win is not combat—it is conflictual coexistence.

Conflictual Coexistence

In conflictual coexistence, gaining the support of the megaurban population is the decisive operation. The actual campaign of violence and contention is but a way to

(Photo by Ariel Schalit, Associated Press)

Thousands of Israeli protesters demonstrate 15 May 2004 in Rabin Square, Tel Aviv, Israel, rallying for a pullout from the Gaza Strip.

transform that advantage into a favorable lasting outcome. Conflictual coexistence hinges on the ability to be a continuous, amorphous, and regenerative nuisance to the opponent. Popular support is the source of that ability because it provides access to the protest potential of the population.

Actually, violence in urban conflict remains crude and primitive. However, its effectiveness does not result from the casualties and damage it engenders but from the cost of the measures to contain it. Improvised explosive devices and ambushes are effective not because they kill the opponent's soldiers but because they force that opponent to carry out patrols with a combat package of armored fighting vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicle surveillance, artillery, and close-air support rather than with a couple of soft-skinned police cars. On the other hand, instruments of urban contention, such as mass demonstrations, strikes, barricades, and terrorist attacks, remain adequate and hardly evolve at all. A French revolutionary leader of 1789 if somehow teleported from Paris to Cairo amidst the masses on Tahrir Square in 2011 would have recognized and understood everything that was going on there instantly. However, he or she would have been totally unfamiliar with the methods used to get those masses there in the first place.

Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (2006), explained that "people support the source that meets their needs."[18] For rural people, that source may be their land, their own skills, the produce and fire wood in their barns, and the friends, relatives, and clan members they can rely on in times of hardship. Politics and administration hardly matter to their daily lives. None of this applies to present-day urban citizens. In megacities, basic necessities such as security, shelter, water, food, and energy depend on administrative structures such as first responders, utility providers, public works, and social assistance organizations. Urbanization creates an insatiable demand for administration. Electricity, running water, and telecommunications were nonexistent in 1800 but are considered essential in 2015. And, the skills of urban individuals are only meaningful within the context of employment and trade in the socioeconomic space shaped by city governance. Therefore, urban dwellers are very susceptible to signs of political and administrative improvement—however biased the source that delivers them.

The urban mood is malleable. Organizations that bring the comforts of urban necessities such as running water, electricity, or trash collection to shanty towns are almost certain to gain the support of people living there. Likewise, civil society activists who campaign against corruption stand a good chance of mobilizing the skilled urban youth that demand access to upward social mobility based on merit rather than favoritism. To take advantage of the urban susceptibility to political and administrative improvement, urban-based belligerents mobilize city dwellers by providing them with comfort, hope, and anger. Their ability to do so has increased exponentially in the last four decades because of two important developments: global fundraising and unlimited communication.

Global fundraising allows urban-based belligerents to be an asset rather than a burden to the population. Several modern activist movements organize administrative structures for urban services and social assistance parallel to those of the government. They finance these structures by raising money abroad.[19] The increasing numbers of migrants and the development of accessible international money transfer systems will only accelerate this trend.

Unlimited communication is a recent but quickly progressing development. Inhibitors such as cost, range, bandwidth, and censorship used to limit the communication capabilities of nonstate actors. Up until the 1980s, rulers could restrict their people's media diet to state-owned radio stations, television channels, and newspapers. Those times are over. The ever-increasing performance of privately owned information and communication systems has resulted in a situation wherein even the smallest organization can address an audience of millions. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 provides an early illustration of this evolution. Revolutionary rhetoric on audiocassettes played a critical role in the overthrow of the Shah.[20] The Arab Spring and the color revolutions proved that activist organizations are able to mobilize millions of people, provided they come up with messages and images that resonate with the target audience's hope and anger.

In conjunction, violence remains an essential part of conflictual coexistence, but successful urban-based belligerents keep its use low and simple. Intense and sophisticated violence requires skilled fighters and real-time command and control. Both are difficult to come by and—as rare and valuable assets—are vulnerable to surveillance, target acquisition, and precision strikes. Moreover, high-intensity combat depopulates urban areas, as happened in Grozny. By contrast, low

and unsophisticated violence does not scare citizens out, is within reach of unskilled and readily available fighters, and merely requires anonymous general guidance, not traceable real-time command and control. To paraphrase Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, this type of belligerent lacks a clearly defined organization on which his opponent can focus.[21] An urban-based belligerent has no need to prevail in combat when megaurban contention is sufficient to force the opponent out.

Military Implications

The importance of popular support to conflictual coexistence gives new meaning to the concept of initiative in unified land operations. According to ADP 3-0—

> To seize the initiative (setting and dictating the terms of action), Army forces degrade the enemy's ability to function as a coherent force. … Leaders continue to exploit the initiative until they place the enemy in a position that disables any ability to coherently employ military capability. This continued resistance can only lead to the physical destruction of the enemy military potential and *the exposure of the enemy's sources of power to imminent destruction or capture* [italics added]. These are typically the military conditions required for the termination of a conflict on favorable terms.[22]

This understanding of initiative focuses on enemy forces. The underlying assumption is that the degradation of the enemy's military capabilities exposes his power sources to destruction or capture. This assumption holds true for all sources of power, except for the one that matters in megacities: the protest potential of the population.

Therefore, urban-based belligerents have a different view on initiative. They focus on people. The fall of Baghdad in 2003 clearly illustrates the different views on the problem of seizing and holding cities in an urbanized world. Upon entering the Iraqi capital, American forces destroyed enemy capabilities, seized decisive terrain, and secured critical infrastructure. By contrast, Moqtada al-Sadr organized a pilgrimage to Karbala and took control of Baghdad's religious and social assistance centers.[23] Events after 2003 showed that al-Sadr's initiatives resulted in tighter control over large swaths of Baghdad than the control exercised by the U.S.-led coalition.

The value of initiatives to gain control over the protest potential of the population is limited not only

(Photo by Tara Todras-Whitehill, Associated Press)

Egyptians celebrate the news of the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak 11 February 2011 in Tahrir Square, Cairo, Egypt. "Arab Spring" antigovernment demonstrations swept through the Middle East in 2011, leading to the successful removal of several dictators in the region.

to insurgencies and revolutions. The Russian operations that led to the annexation of the Crimea prove their applicability in state-on-state conflict.

The Crimean campaign was above all an effort in strategic communication followed up by a minimal but decisive military operation.[24] The ousting of the Ukrainian President Yanukovych on 22 February 2014 sparked violent mass demonstrations in the Crimean capital Sebastopol. The Russian media capitalized on popular unrest and depicted the new government in Kiev as a fascist regime. Promises of economic development and social benefits supplemented propaganda promoting adhesion to the Russian Federation. One week later, the Russian parliament discussed a bill granting Russian citizenship to "Russian-speaking citizens of the former USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republic], irrespective of their nationality, faced with the real threat of discrimination based on ethnic and cultural, political or professional affiliation."[25] By offering passports to the Crimean people, the Kremlin not only gave them the opportunity to express their affiliation to Moscow in the clearest of ways but also it created a Russian minority on Ukrainian soil—a minority the Kremlin could claim to have the right and duty to protect. Increasing numbers of "little green men"—believed, but not proven, to be Russian soldiers who had removed all insignia from their uniforms and light-armored vehicles—appeared in Sebastopol's streets. They mingled with civilian protesters and armed "self-defense" militias surrounding key infrastructures and Ukrainian military bases.

These militias were not of great military value but provided the Kremlin with the deniability it needed to claim that the little green men were not Russian troops. Unable to enter or leave their barracks, Ukrainian units surrendered one after the other. In less than one month and almost without firing a shot, an estimated ten thousand Russian soldiers forced sixteen thousand Ukrainian troops to leave the Crimea, abandoning 189 military bases, all weapons, and the entire Ukrainian fleet. The annexation of the Crimea proves how initiatives to mobilize the protest potential of the urban population can greatly enhance the ability of land forces to create favorable and lasting outcomes to armed conflicts.

Conclusion

As a result of urbanization, belligerents now have the option to tap into an unassailable source of power: the protest potential of the population. In the ever more numerous megacities of the twenty-first century, this potential allows urban-based belligerents to raise force requirements for population control measures to prohibitive levels. The defeat mechanism in this type of warfare is not decisive battle, but conflictual coexistence. It is applicable in revolutions and insurgencies as well as to state-on-state conflict. As urbanization continues, its occurrence will only increase. To cope with this evolution, land forces need to adjust their understanding of initiative. Because popular support—as a source of power—is not exposed to destruction or capture, the only way to deny it to the enemy is to acquire it for oneself. Therefore, initiatives in land operations have to focus on the comfort, hope, and anger of the megaurban population. This calls for capability development in the fields of understanding, inform and influence activities, humanitarian assistance, and the provision of urban essential services. In an urbanized world, gaining popular support is not a mechanism to consolidate the outcome of decisive military operations but a prerequisite to start them. ■

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Notes

1. Albert Sidney Britt, *The Wars of Napoleon* (Garden City Park, NY: Square One Publishers, 2003), 117.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.

3. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, Highlights* (ST/ESA/SER.A/352), 2014, accessed 1 September 2015, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf. This source provides data regarding world demography and urbanization.

4. "Color revolution" refers to mass demonstrations that led to regime change in the former states of the Soviet Union and the Balkans. Examples include the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Ukrainian Orange Revolution of 2004, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine.

5. Valeriy Gerasimov, "On the Role of Military Force in Modern Conflicts," *Report of the Third Moscow Conference on International Security, Conference Materials*, ed. A.I. Antonov, (Moscow: The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2014), 15, accessed 13 June 2015, http://mil.ru/files/morf/MCIS_report_catalogue_final_RUS_21_10_preview.pdf. Original text: "Основным средством реализации политических замыслов становятся «цветные революции». … В их основе лежат политтехнологии, предусматривающие манипуляцию извне протестным потенциалом населения в сочетании с политическими, экономическими, гуманитарными и другими невоенными мерами." Translated by E. Claessen.

6. Russian Army Gen. Valeriy Gerasimov "New Challenges Require Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Warfare," Военно-Промышленная курьер 8(476), 27 February 2013, accessed 13 June 2015, http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632. Original text: "И сами «правила войны» существенно изменились. Возросла роль невоенных способов в достижении политических и стратегических целей, которые в ряде случаев по своей эффективности значительно превзошли силу оружия." Translated by E. Claessen.

7. Vladimir Putin, Transcript of the Meeting of the Security Council on 20 November 2014, accessed 13 June 2015, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47045. Original text: "Мы видим, к каким трагическим последствиям привела волна так называемых «цветных революций» … Для нас это урок и предупреждение, и мы обязаны сделать всё необходимое, чтобы подобное никогда не случилось в России." Translated by E. Claessen.

8. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 10 October 2011), 5.

9. James T. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," *Parameters* (Winter 1995): 59–69.

10. Ibid., 69. Quinlivan concisely explains what this means in practice: "The combination of force ratios, current populations, the size of existing infantry forces, and the implications for rotation can be astounding. Force ratios larger than ten members of the security forces for every thousand of population are not uncommon in current operations (Northern Ireland, or even Mogadishu). Sustaining a stabilization force at such a force ratio for a city as large as one million … could require a deployment of about a quarter of all regular infantry battalions in the U.S. Army."

11. Olga Oliker, *Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001). The analysis of the battles of Grozny draws on the study found in this book.

12. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 97.

13. Ibid.

14. Martin van Creveld, *Defending Israel: a Controversial Plan toward Peace* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004), 148.

15. Ibid., 26. "For many years after 1967 the forces needed to keep down the Territories were negligible, consisting of just a few battalions."

16. Ibid., 148.

17. On 16 February 2005, the Implementation of the Disengagement Plan Law (Compensation for Evacuees) was passed with fifty-nine members of the Knesset in favor, forty against, and five abstaining, accessed 13 June 2015, http://www.knesset.gov.il/review/YearPage.aspx?yr=2005&lng=3.

18. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 15 December 2006), 3–11, now obsolete, superseded by FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 13 May 2014), *see* pages 2-6 to 2-7 for a discussion of the effects of economic variables.

19. U.S. State Department, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2009*, August 2010, 251, accessed 14 August 2015, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141114.pdf. Hamas provides an example of global fundraising: "HAMAS receives some funding, weapons, and training from Iran. In addition, fundraising takes place in the Persian Gulf countries, but the group also receives donations from Palestinian expatriates around the world. Some fundraising and propaganda activity takes place in Western Europe and North America."

20. Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi and Ali Mohammadi, *Small Media, Big Revolution: Communication, Culture and the Iranian Revolution* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1994). This source provides information on the role of audiocassettes in the Iranian Revolution. The Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini was a pioneer in the use of novel communications that escaped regime control. He recorded political sermons on audiocassettes and distributed them among Shi'ite pilgrims who visited his city of exile, Najaf in Iraq. The widespread use of cheap Japanese cassette players during the seventies was a prelude to social media. Instead of tuning into state-controlled media, Iranians listened to Khomeini's stirring speeches, copied the cassettes, and passed them on to friends and relatives. For the first time in history, individuals were able to select, copy, and share voice-recorded information. This ability played an important role in the urban mass mobilization that led to the downfall of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi ("the Shah") and the emergence of the Islamic Republic.

21. ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 4.

22. Ibid., 5.

23. Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 55, "Iraq's Muqtada's al-Sadr: Spoiler or Stabiliser," International Crisis Group website, 11 July 2006, 7 and 9, accessed 14 August 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/55_iraq_s_muqtada_al_sadr_spoiler_or_stabiliser.pdf. "Muqtada demonstrated his ability to reflect and channel inchoate popular feelings as early as his first Friday prayer (al-Khutba), delivered in Kufa on 11 April 2003. He asked Shiites to express their piety by undertaking a pilgrimage to Karbala on foot. … Coming on the heels of the regime's fall, the massive celebrations offered Shiites a first opportunity to see and measure their new, colossal force."

24. Anton Bebler, "Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict," *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* Vol. 15(1) (March 2015). This source provides an analysis of events leading to the annexation of the Crimea.

25. "Procedure for Obtaining Russian Citizenship will be Simplified for Residents of the CIS" *Interfax*, 27 February 2014, accessed 13 June 2015, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/361446. Original text: "русскоязычным гражданам бывшего СССР вне зависимости от их национальности, столкнувшимся с реальной угрозой дискриминации по этнокультурной, политической или профессиональной принадлежности." Translated by E. Claessen.