

# SOLDIER EXTRAORDINAIRE

The Life and Career of  
Brig. Gen. Frank "Pinkie" Dorn (1901–81)



**Alfred Emile Cornebise**



Combat Studies Institute Press  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Cover image: During the May 1942 “Walkout” from Burma, Gen. Joseph Warren Stilwell (right) makes the trek with his aide, Col. Frank Dorn immediately behind him. (Courtesy of US Army.) Colonel Dorn also designed and first produced the uniform patch used by US troops in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater.

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An imprint of The Army University Press



## Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Cornebise, Alfred Emile, author. | Combat Studies Institute (U.S.) Press, publisher.

Title: Soldier Extraordinaire : Brig. Gen. Frank “Pinkie” Dorn (1901–81) / Alfred Emile Cornebise.

Other titles: Brig. Gen. Frank “Pinkie” Dorn (1901–81)

Description: 1st edition. | Fort Leavenworth, Kansas : Combat Studies Institute Press, 2019 | “An imprint of the Army University Press.” |

Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: LCCN 2018054848 (print) | LCCN 2018057001 (ebook) | ISBN 9781940804538 | ISBN 9781940804538

Subjects: LCSH: Dorn, Frank, 1901–1981. | Generals--United States--Biography. | United States--History, Military--20th century. | World War, 1939–1945--East Asia--History. | United States--Military relations--East Asia. | East Asia--Military relations--United States.

Classification: LCC E745.D67 (ebook) | LCC E745.D67 C67 2019 (print) | DDC 355.0092 [B] --dc23 | SUDOC D 110.2:D 73

LC record available at <https://lccn.loc.gov/2018054848>.

2019



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Editor  
Diane R. Walker

## **Dedication**

For our children and grandchildren



## Acknowledgments

First, I wish to acknowledge Dr. Barbara Mason, a great-niece of Frank Dorn, for granting permission for me to use Frank Dorn's unpublished autobiography, "After The Flag Is Lowered." She inherited this document from her father, Dr. William Brooks Langston Jr., who had obtained it from Frank Dorn. I also thank her for permission to publish photographs of Dorn's art. I also wish to thank Dr. William Brooks Langston III for permission to reproduce original art work by Frank in his possession.

I cordially thank Carol Leadenham of the staff of the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University for her untiring assistance in locating and using sources in the "Frank Dorn Papers, 1927-76." Similarly, the Archives staff has been most helpful. Also at the Hoover, I wish to thank Stephanie Stewart and Rachel E. Bauer for providing me with digital images of photos from the holdings at Hoover Institution Archives.

As always, my wife, Jan Miller Cornebise, did yeoman service in proofreading my work as it progressed and in general for encouraging me throughout this effort.



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## Introduction

*Now I know that great men have no other function in life than to help us to see beyond appearances: to relieve us of some of the burden of matter—to “unburden” ourselves, as the Hindus would say.*

—Jean Renoir

Students of history are taught historiography; while it's one thing to discuss the course and nature of history, it's quite another to focus on the individuals, the *dramatis personae* who are its heroes and victims, and the revealing details of their lives. One unusual player on the world stage during the years from the 1920s and beyond World War II was a member of the US Army who is the main subject of this multi-faceted study. He was Brig. Gen. Frank “Pinkie” Dorn (1901–81), whose nickname (sometimes spelled “Pinky”) stemmed from his cadet days at West Point from 1919 to 1923. Certainly Clio, the goddess of history, must have been at her best when she inspired Dorn to embark upon the venture of writing about his life and the era and locations in which he lived and served.

Whether Dorn might be considered a “great man,” as suggested in the epigraph, his account is especially relevant regarding the presence of the United States military in Asia in the twentieth century and his own varied and involved Army career from 1919 to well after World War II. In the course of his years of service, Dorn manifested probing observations and analyses especially of Asia, where he was mainly stationed. During this time, he produced writings on numerous subjects such as his knowledge of Philippine native tribes and, through extensive explorations, much else about the islands. Also of importance were his detailed studies of Peking's Forbidden City, the origins and course of the Sino-Japanese War that began in 1937, and Burma's history early in World II. Throughout, his great love of China—especially Peking—and his mastery of the Chinese language were paramount. He always seemed to recognize and absorb various aspects of *Pen-wei wen-hua*, “China's own culture” as distinct from that of the West.

Another perennial aspect of his career was his close contact with Gen. Joseph Warren Stilwell, who was the major commander of the Allied China-Burma-India (CBI) theater of operations in World War II and hence also closely involved in China and its struggles. Stilwell had studied the Chinese language in the 1920s; then in the late 1930s, he was the US

military attaché in China. Dorn was one of his assistant attachés and later in World War II, was Stilwell's aide for several years and commander of Chinese troops in the re-conquest of Burma. Following the end of World War II, Dorn was closely involved in Gen. Douglas MacArthur's brilliant occupation and pacification of Japan.

Beyond these prime considerations, though, this study covers several books. It includes Dorn's basic biography, with some mention of his Irish and especially Dutch forbearers; his deep interest in lives of those with whom he was in contact; his world-class art; and even his cooking interests and writing of cookbooks, his considerable skills in cartography; details of life on several military cantonments in the United States and abroad at various times; and his close interrelations with various people of all walks of life. Dorn was also quite knowledgeable about the endemic folkways and Philistine culture of the US military establishment at all levels during his years of service. He especially focused on the frequent maelstroms and the interplay of relevant personalities on social and military scenes, revealing thereby layered dimensions. In any case, his account is a veritable tour de force. Dorn's autobiography, then, features a blend of varying depths and frequently sharp contrasts—extending from the frivolous to the sublime and profound. A rich tapestry, his work reveals that his insights were more than adequate for this rather grandiloquent, yet humbling, task. To be sure, it exudes much of the *extraordinaire*.<sup>1</sup>

The question then arises, what is the best procedure to follow in focusing on the subjects suggested above? James Boswell, the author of the celebrated *Life of Samuel Johnson*, observed that indeed he could not conceive of “a more perfect mode of writing any man's life, than not only relating all the most important events of it in their order, but interweaving what he privately wrote, and said, and thought; by which mankind are enabled as it were to see him live, and to ‘live o'er each scene’ with him, as he actually advanced through the several stages of his life.”<sup>2</sup> I have decided to follow his excellent advice.

## Notes

1. This study has made considerable use of the Frank Dorn Papers at the Hoover Institute Archives at Stanford, California. These include numerous official documents and much else. One of the items in the collection is Frank Dorn's unpublished autobiography, (*circa* 1974), consisting of a 940-page typescript, that he titled "After The Flag Is Lowered," alluding to his completing the account when he left the US Army after thirty years of active service. Further references to this manuscript are shown as "Autobiography." It is in the Frank Dorn Papers, in Box 5, Folders 1 through 10. Other copies of this source also exist. One is owned by Barbara L. Mason, a great-niece of Dorn. She inherited it from her father, William Brooks Langston Jr., who had obtained it from General Dorn. I have used this copy for my study with her kind permission for which I warmly extend my thanks. I further wish to thank her brother, William Brooks Langston III, for permission to reproduce art by Dorn that he owns. Thanks also to the staff of the Hoover Institute in Stanford, California, for research assistance and especially for obtaining photographs from their collections. There are also two short biographical sketches of Dorn prepared by the US Army in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 2. In addition, see a report at <https://apps.westpointaog.org/Memorials/Article/7122>. Further information about Dorn's forbearers is in Peter Thomas Conmy, *History of the Dorn Family: California Pioneer Settlers of Green Valley* (San Francisco: Grand Parlor, Native Sons Of The Golden West, 1965).

2. James Boswell, *The Life of Samuel Johnson* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 12. The Everyman's Library edition was first published in 1906.



# Chapter 1

## The Beginnings: California, West Point, and Fort Sam Houston, Texas

*Nor is it always in the most distinguished achievements that men's virtues or vices may be best discerned, but very often an action of small note, a short saying, or a jest shall distinguish a person's real character more than the greatest sieges, or the most important battles.*

—Plutarch, *Life of Alexander*

*In the end, memory creates its own reality.*

—Salmon Rushdie

In beginning the account of his life, it seemed necessary to Frank Dorn to outline his family's past as a prelude to recounting his own. He was nonetheless aware that "the branches of any family tree from which the names of ancestors dangle may turn out to be no better than the withered twigs of a tumble-weed blown and buffeted by unkind winds across an arid, inhospitable world."<sup>1</sup>

His origins focused on two European peoples. The first were the O'Reillys of Cork, Ireland. Subsequently, some members of the family made their various ways to the United States. One was his grandfather, Jeremiah O'Reilly, who sailed around Cape Horn then arrived at San Francisco, thereby setting forth the family that Dorn would be born into. Jeremiah thereupon enlisted in the US Army, establishing another tradition that Dorn inherited. He then married one Mary Benson, related to distinguished Irish families. Subsequently, Jeremiah and Mary O'Reilly prospered and build a substantial house on Guerrero Street in San Francisco's Mission District. One of their daughters, Ellen (Nellie) Josephine, was to be Frank Dorn's mother.<sup>2</sup>

The other side of Frank Dorn's family was derived from his great-grandfather, August Dorn (born van Doorn) of Holland. Marrying an Irish girl, they gave birth to Nicodemus (Nic) Dorn, Frank's Dutch grandfather. The subsequent gold rush to California in 1848 entrapped Nic, who soon made his way to that state. Subsequent events dictated that Nic and

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This chapter is derived from Dorn's unpublished 1974 autobiography, "After the Flag Is Lowered," 1–221. Throughout this study, the most important quotations from this source have been specifically designated in the notes as "Autobiography."

his bride, Ella, eventually settled in Green Valley, near Watsonville, California, where they established a 500-acre ranch.<sup>3</sup>

Subsequently, Nic and Ella produced 10 children, the five sons all becoming lawyers; Walter Everett, the last of the brood, became Frank Dorn's father. Earlier, Walter fervently desired to enter West Point and become a career officer in the US Army. His father, however, would not allow this and sent him to law school, which he finished at the Hastings College of Law in San Francisco. Walter also obtained both his MA and PhD at the University of California at Berkeley.

Meanwhile back to the other branch of Dorn's family, the daughter of Jeremiah and Mary Benson O'Reilly—Ellen (Nellie) Josephine O'Reilly, destined to be Frank's mother—entered secretarial school and was hired by two of Walter's brothers who maintained a law firm. There, she met Walter Everett Dorn. They were subsequently married on 17 August 1895. Their first children were two daughters and then on 25 June 1901, Frank was born.<sup>4</sup>

Among the historic events of that time, the 1906 earthquake destroyed much of the San Francisco Bay area but did no harm either to the O'Reilly homes in the city or at the ranch at Watsonville. Nonetheless, the repercussions were far-reaching in that part of California.

During the years when San Francisco was rebuilding, the Dorn brood spent summers mainly on the ranch. Subsequently as Frank grew up, the matter of his schooling and future became paramount. In 1912, Walter built a new 15-room home on 10th Avenue in the Richmond District in northwest San Francisco. It was to be his home for more than 50 years, rather than living on the ranch. Frank then proceeded to his education. While not in a formal way, Frank did encounter the US Army for the first time. The San Francisco Presidio military establishment was in the area where he lived. It became a Sunday afternoon destination, though the children did not go there unattended because the military police and guards at the stone gates were no doubt too tough to fool around with. Nonetheless, they enjoyed looking at the huge coast defense guns. On clear nights, Dorn's mother loved to listen to the beautifully sad notes of "taps" floating out through the night sky; she regarded it as a most romantic sound. Dorn's entertainment extended back to the ranch in the summers.

Among the events of interest in 1915 San Francisco was the great Panama-Pacific International Exposition to celebrate the opening of the Panama Canal. The Canal had been completed in 1914, amid much fanfare, and was officially opened on August 15 that year. Dorn observed that Teddy

Roosevelt's "end has long since justified his questionable means, even bringing prosperity to an ungrateful country of half-breed blacks and San Blas Indians with a thin smear of Spanish blood." He felt that the opening of the canal signaled America's last imperialistic grab "in its short colonial career from 1898 to 1913."<sup>5</sup>

Dorn wrote that he was enthralled by the Exposition. There was an impressive Palace of Fine Arts, and an auto race styled after the "Grand Prix." Another exhibit that captured Dorn's attention, and which would have bearing on his later career, was an extensive West Point display. His father encouraged his attention to this. Dorn recorded that "it was perfectly planned to dazzle any teenager who might ever have dreamed of going to the Military Academy." He went on, "it sure as hell did me—the uniforms, models, complete rooms, equipment, and photographs," especially those of national heroes who had been cadets. These had included the artist James Abbott McNeill Whistler and the poet Edgar Allen Poe. Though these had been something less than heroes [they both flunked out of the Academy], they had nevertheless "made their marks on history."<sup>6</sup> At the display, Dorn felt that he had been transported to those "almost sacrosanct grounds with their castellated towers, stone walls, great trees, parade, monuments, and all." He pictured himself "wearing those handsome brass-buttoned uniforms, being on parade, at drill, riding over jumps on a dashing horse." Indeed, "it all looked mighty glamorous." His father was greatly pleased, and exhibited a certain "smug satisfaction" listening to his son's colorful account at dinner where, he observed, "for once, I was allowed to usurp the family conversation." He had brought home many publications that described the Academy and how one might apply to enter it.<sup>7</sup>

His father, too, understood these procedures and was certain that he might elicit the support of some of his powerful political friends to get his son an appointment when the time came. Certainly, then, his father "had known what he wanted for me . . . and what he had wanted for himself, too, nearly 30 years before." Nonetheless, there was much more to occur as well as changes in attitude and other matters before this goal could be attained.<sup>8</sup>

In the autumn of 1915, Dorn entered Lowell High School at age 14. As to his classes, he was by then willing to learn and enjoyed his math classes as he did his English Lit class; the English Lit teacher manifested a vibrant spirit and enthusiasm for great writing that Dorn could never forget. He would also greatly appreciate encountering Chaucer and Shakespeare and many other literary greats. Myra Harris, a young pretty history teacher, taught European History in such a way as to tie it in with another course

on the Ancient World of Egypt, Greece, and Rome. The French teacher, who manifested an “infectious enthusiasm for France and its language,” set up a network of pen pals with French counterparts. More important for Dorn’s later career, he managed to take two art classes. Since the days much earlier in life when he had studied art with an Uncle Frank’s cartoonist friend, Dorn noted that “I had been drawing everything I saw with pencils or crayons. Now I breezed through the spheres, pyramids, and other figures to plaster casts of hands and torsos.” One of the teachers assigned him projects of sketching other students in the class, and he was also encouraged to paint posters and use pen and ink, “for which I developed a knack.” It was not long before his art efforts superseded his other assigned homework with some detrimental effects.<sup>9</sup>

Soon into his freshman year, one of his classmates, Irving Johnston, announced that he was enrolling in Saturday classes at the San Francisco Institute of Art on California Street. The Institute enjoyed a national reputation as one of the country’s top art schools. After Dorn drew a few charcoal drawings, the instructor of the Saturday junior classes, Miss Alice B. Chittenden—from a socially prominent San Francisco family—accepted Dorn into the portrait class. As Dorn remarked with glee, “I had made it! And on the first day! WOW! I was an artist!”<sup>10</sup>

Dorn began to bask in the first-rate instruction that he obtained at the Art Institute at the hands of several renowned sculptors, painters, and artists of various genres and styles. In a few months’ time, he began to think of attending the Art Students League in New York, and then perhaps on to the Beaux Arts in Paris. At 14, Dorn was thinking big, “real big.” His next step was to convince his parents to allow him to attend classes at the Institute three nights a week. Subsequently, he made rapid progress.

A measure of his attainments came at an art show that the students and instructors mounted in early June at the end of the school year. There, Dorn was pleased that his instructor informed his parents that he had a great talent. The comments were reinforced as Dorn won a first-place blue ribbon in the portrait division, greatly thrilling his family.

As World War I unwound and the United States became involved, Dorn was swept along on the national tide of patriotism—putting his artistic talents to work. He drew numerous posters to hang in the school halls urging that everyone support the war effort by purchasing savings stamps, knitting sweaters and socks for the troops, and taking any other actions that might be of help. A couple of months before he turned 17, Dorn aspired to join the tank corps. He proceeded to the recruiting depot and

attempted to enlist. The sergeant, however, phoned his father regarding some statements his son made, in particular stating that his age was 18. His father put an end to his desire to enlist, and said to him: "Don't be in such a sweat, son. Your time'll come." Dorn later affirmed, "It did."<sup>11</sup>

Dorn's triumph at the Art Institute had an impressive sequel. To prod the public to support the Third Liberty Loan Drive, a poster competition was announced for high school students throughout the city. Judged by a panel of several prominent California artists, the best posters would be reproduced on a huge billboard set up in front of the Ferry Building where the Market Street and Municipal trolley cars and all motor traffic made a wide loop before heading back into the city. Dorn submitted three entries. Later when he and his mother went to the judging site, they were amazed that he had won the first and third prizes. Dorn then stood between his winning entries while newsreel cameras recorded the scene. The late editions of the evening papers carried the story and quoted his father, who told reporters that he could continue his art studies. Two downtown movie theaters showed newsreels "of me blinking into the sun with my winning posters." He thereupon saw the shows at least a dozen times, and he made many trips on trolleys to view his winning posters enlarged about eight times on the large outdoor bulletin board.<sup>12</sup>

By the beginning of 1918, Dorn reported that his academic performance was being hindered by his great concentration on drawing, sketching and painting. "And why not?" he asked. "After all, I had decided to become *the* painter of the 20th Century." Nevertheless, his short-lived artistic fame seemed to mean very little to his parents. Still, Dorn was determined to escape "the prison called home someday, somehow, some way." Indeed, he would do "anything to escape." Meanwhile, as World War I proceeded in the spring of 1918, Dorn's father stepped up his campaign to interest his son in applying for an appointment to West Point and further considered the political side of matters. Congressmen controlled some appointment slots. Dorn began to consider that West Point might kill two birds with one stone: he could serve as an officer and, in addition "I'd also make my getaway from parental domination." He reasoned that the stone walls and towers of the Academy on the Hudson could never be as restrictive as living at home. However, because of his absorption with art, Dorn's academic attainments at Lowell High began to falter. His father decided to enroll him in Drew's Academy Preparatory School in the city, famous for its methods; more of its students made it into West Point or Annapolis than any other cram school in the country. Then on Dorn's 17th birthday, he was enrolled to begin his instruction in August 1918. He

was greatly impressed by the quality of his classes and the “tight ship” that Drew ran. The teachers were, Dorn wrote, the most thorough that he had ever encountered. He subsequently passed the final four-day exams. Dorn received a telegram from the War Department that he had passed the mental exams with the highest average of the group but unfortunately had failed the physical; he had flat feet. It turned out that the whole business of flat feet was a “medical myth.” He was then advised that the problem could be evaded simply by arching the instep. He observed that this event “put me back one year from where I might have been for the entire 34 years of my service in the Army.” At that point, it was back to Drew’s for the greatly disappointed Dorn.<sup>13</sup>

Then on 11 November 1918, the Great War ended. The question became, “Why bother with West Point?” The family “tom-toms” kept up the attack on Dorn. He had substituted Drew’s courses in place of high school; because he had no diploma, Dorn could not enter the university and instead would continue with prep courses. Dorn’s father discovered that California Congressman Julius Kahn had not yet filled his West Point appointment and had decided to hold his own exam in mid-March at a post office. Because Dorn had passed the four-day exam earlier, the one-day test should be easily done. Indeed, Dorn passed with the highest grade, and Kahn appointed him to West Point. He was directed to report there on 13 June 1919.<sup>14</sup> All seemed well, but at this juncture Dorn began to have second thoughts about the Academy; it would mean bidding goodbye to Miss Chittenden, who had meant so much to him in his artistic development. She was also greatly disappointed and noted that “it all seems so foreign to your nature. You’ll be wasting your talent on a sterile military life.” Then, he wrote that “the magnitude of what I was doing to myself suddenly struck me like a hard blow in the solar plexus. I was about to give up everything I’d ever dreamed of doing.” He originally wanted to go to West Point mainly to escape restrictions at home. Now Dorn reasoned that he could do the same thing through an art career. He also concluded that his father was simply using him to vicariously attain his own thwarted dreams of 30 years earlier. He was determined to flatly refuse to go. Dorn also admitted that he was scared. The battle between them raged for days. He realized that “I was fighting for my chosen life, the world of art. He was fighting for the life *he* had chosen for me, the world of the Army.” Finally, Dorn’s father promised that if his son graduated from the Point and stayed in the Army for two years, he would pay for him to study architecture—though not art—anywhere in the world. Dorn caved in and agreed to proceed to the Academy.<sup>15</sup>

On the morning of 5 June 1919, the entire family accompanied Dorn to the ferry that would take him to Oakland and the transcontinental train. All too soon, he was underway, bound for the future. Dorn rather forlornly concluded: “Like Caesar nearly two thousand years before, I had crossed my Rubicon . . . and there was now no turning back . . . ever.”<sup>16</sup> Indeed, Dorn recognized that he had cut free: “From here on out it would be me, only me . . . even though I was not quite 18, even if I should fail at West Point and get kicked out. Never again would I go home to live no matter what. I was free.” As he and others in the same boat trudged up the hill from the train station, “without warning, a snarling, shouting group of upper-class cadets leaped at us from every direction.” Cadets gave orders in rapid succession for the new arrivals to drop their bags and then pick them up again. Indeed, “their sudden onslaught caught the straggling, disheveled newcomers with their mental pants down.” They were ordered to fall in and stand at attention and then to march, but the newcomers could not get it right and were reminded that “I said MARCH . . . not stroll.” And so the harassment continued. The young cadets were then double-timed to a barracks and assigned their rooms. Thus began the first of countless orders for the new classmen, i.e., plebes, (or the common people of ancient Rome). Much later as upper classmen, *they* would be in charge and could enjoy the discomfiture of others entering the Point. Dorn could only steel himself to survive the weeks and years ahead.<sup>17</sup>

Dorn proceeded to describe in detail how the newcomers were initiated into all of the Point’s particulars—most quite challenging if not downright brutal; they were in what was considered to be “Beast Barracks.” Indeed, Ulysses S. Grant, earlier at the Point, once wrote to a cousin: “I tell you what, coz, it is tremendous hard.”<sup>18</sup> Dorn at once developed a deep hatred for what was happening around him but was pleased that the incessant harassment ceased during Sunday worship services. The services featured the “sonorous tones of the great organ” and the voices of the cadet choir. Dorn admitted that he found himself being greatly moved by the evening’s retreat parade, with the boom of its saluting gun, slowly lowered flag, and inspiring National Anthem music “played with the dignity its meaning deserves.” Indeed, “the retreat parade sent a shiver or two up and down my spine,” he admitted, “and still does.” Therefore, despite his horror at much associated with West Point, Dorn was from the outset impressed with its massive stone towers. He recorded in his memoirs that those granite buildings seemed “to stand as indestructible emblems of their very purpose—to spawn a never-ending stream of dedicated men standing ready to defend their country.” They were “ready to make any

sacrifice to keep that flag high on its staff above the trees, above the land.” Withal, it was “like a mighty drama, history [that] had been enacted on [the] stage of time, with the roar of cannons and the crackle of rifle fire for offstage accompaniment, eternity for a background, and the solemn words Duty, Honor, Country ringing down through the generations of those who had given their lives to preserve all that they stood for.”<sup>19</sup>

Still, Dorn was aware that there was a history of cadets unbroken by the discipline of West Point—famously including Jefferson Davis, later President of the Confederate States of America, who “was probably the most undisciplined and most unregenerate cadet of all time.” Another famous man in American history, General George Armstrong Custer, may well have been as unregenerate as any of them. He graduated last in West Point’s class of 1861 and was subsequently court-martialed for his endless pranks, escapades, and a correspondingly lengthy list of demerits. Custer only later—by dint of sheer good luck, connections, and heroic accomplishments on the battlefield fighting as a cavalryman for the North in the Civil War—was able to erase these stains from his record. Dorn recognized that his own attendance at art school and other classes were “poor physical conditioners” for entry into the Academy, though he somehow managed to survive the first grueling weeks.<sup>20</sup>

Dorn then cataloged the methods and developments common to all who attended West Point during those years. At the Academy, he also encountered officers with whom he would become much better-acquainted in the years to come. These included Brig. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who was the superintendent while Dorn was there. Dorn remarked that MacArthur had already begun to develop the symptoms of what later became his “God-complex.” Many of MacArthur’s views were reinforced by his mother, who lived in an old nearby hotel and, as Dorn opined, ran most of the MacArthur show.

Dorn also encountered other officers during this time who would be prominent during World War II. These included Major Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. He noted that Buckner “was a phoney [sic] physical culture buff, always beating his chest like Tarzan and making astonishing claims of his prowess and fortitude, but he could be tough . . . and mean too.” Later, Buckner was killed as a lieutenant general commanding the Tenth Army on Okinawa. He was the highest-ranking US military officer to be killed by enemy fire during World War II.<sup>21</sup>

Much better appreciated was Maj. Jacob L. (“Jakie”) Devers, later a four-star general who commanded the 6th Army Group in France during

World War II. Another impressive officer was Major Courtney Hodges, who as a four-star general commanded the First Army in Europe during World War II. On the quiet side was the “sternly good-looking” Capt. Matthew (“Matt”) Ridgway, also later a four-star general and chief of staff of the US Army. Dorn recognized that one mathematics instructor, Capt. Omar Bradley—later one of the few five-star generals in US history and chairman of the Allied Joint Chiefs of Staff—was highly respected by his students.<sup>22</sup>

As to his artistic talents, Dorn admitted that he posted anonymous lampoon drawings of various officers on bulletin boards around the campus. To be sure, some of the victims ascertained who the artist was and on occasion added to Dorn’s demerits and “punishment tours” as a consequence.

Near the time of his graduation, Dorn received a 10 March 1923 telegram that his mother had died early that morning, the results of severe asthma that she had endured for a long time. Dorn noted that “suddenly I felt that something I needed terribly but had always accepted had been irrevocably snatched away.” For the first time, he learned the meaning of sorrow but could not go home for the funeral. The death also precluded his father’s attendance at Academy graduation ceremonies, which undoubtedly was keenly felt given his own earlier aspirations for a military career.<sup>23</sup>

Based on class standings, the highest-ranking cadets went to the Engineers, as was customary, then on down through the ranks of the Field Artillery, the Cavalry, to the “more plebian and less dashing Infantry.” Dorn was pleased to have made it into the Field Artillery, though he had initially hoped for the Air Corps, a choice vetoed by his father. Dorn then embarked on a two-month “Grand Tour” of Europe, during which he was able to view famous art in numerous museums before reporting to his first duty station at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

Dorn was initially assigned to Battery “F” of the 2nd Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment (French 75-millimeter guns) of the 2nd Division. This was part of the VIII Corps Area. Here Dorn bought his first car, a second-hand Ford roadster. Other aspects of his maturing life rapidly emerged. He found that he greatly disliked horses and anything to do with them. As to pets, Dorn continued his liking for dogs, which he had cultivated earlier at the ranch, and often had a German shepherd around. He also had to learn to relate to enlisted men and found that he could easily get along with many of them. This was an attribute that he practiced throughout his military career.

Regarding the military establishment in San Antonio, Dorn noted the high swing of life and events at Fort Sam Houston, which shared much

military space with two large Air Corps flying fields—Brooks and Kelly. Indeed, San Antonio was a lively scene for members of the military. The city was often referred to as the “mother-in-law” of the Army; a steady supply of pretty girls and their hospitable families resulted in numerous military weddings. The negative side of military life was also present. Another problem for the champions of high morals was that the venereal disease rate was quite high due to the fact that the bawdy houses on Matamoros Street charged only 50 cents a visit. In addition, prohibition—while in force across the nation in general—was not apparent in this vast military community; “boozy brawls” were all too common. Accordingly, there was widespread opposition to the military and naval establishments in much of the United States during those years. In communities where naval bases were established, for example, signs on lawns read: “No dogs or sailors allowed.” The situation reminded Dorn of Rudyard Kipling’s poem, “Tommy;” Kipling described similar conditions in England in the late 19th Century. He recounted that the common soldier, “Tommy Atkins,” in peacetime could not even obtain a beer in a public house or a seat in a theater. Such cries resounded as “We serve no red-coats here” or “Chuck him out, the brute!” But the tone changed when war arrived; communities scheduled a “special train for Atkins” when “the troopship’s on the tide.” They also recognized the “thin red line of ’eroes when the drums begin to roll,” and the soldier was widely recognized as a “Saviour of ’is country’ when the guns begin to shoot.”<sup>24</sup>

On the local scene, Dorn reported encounters with fortune-tellers, a continuing practice throughout his lifetime until late in life. Rather unaccountably, he paid considerable attention to what they had to say and was surprised that their predictions seemed often to be correct. On several later occasions, Dorn recorded examples of fortunes being told, especially by Asian seers, with untoward events subsequently occurring as predicted.<sup>25</sup>

During the years spent at San Antonio, several events affected Dorn more personally. In May 1924, Dorn’s father married Miss Grace Dolan. His elder sisters, Bee and Bern, were already married. Dorn and the two sisters bitterly resented the marriage, which Dorn later regretted. His father, after all, was only 54 and had every right to begin a new life. The three siblings eventually agreed that they were wrong to assume that they owned their father and resented sharing him or his time with anyone else. They decided that the viewpoint was very immature. Subsequently, their father and Grace produced a son born on New Year’s Day 1926. They named him Walter Everett Jr.

In February 1926, Dorn received orders for the Philippines—preceded by a two-month leave in San Francisco. After this fun-filled period, Dorn and many others he knew set sail for the Philippines on the US Army transport *Thomas*, a venerable vessel famous for its encounters and near-encounters with typhoons; because of one in particular, the ship became known, at least informally, as “Typhoon *Thomas*.” The *Thomas* was jammed with officers, wives, soldiers, and numerous children. Dorn was surprised to find Maj. Gen. Fred W. Sladen, the former West Point superintendent, onboard. He was to become the commander of the Army’s Philippine Department.

While en route, the ship’s chaplain asked Dorn to help him publish the daily shipboard paper; his contributions were jokes and cartoons. During the 29-day voyage, the *Thomas* paused for a short period in Honolulu then continued to Guam before proceeding to the Philippines. Six days later, the ship entered Manila Bay and on into Pier Three, nearer shore, “as an Army band blared out a noisy reception.” Then, down went the gangplank; they had arrived.<sup>26</sup>

## Notes

1. Autobiography, 2–3.
2. Autobiography, 5–7.
3. Autobiography, 14–27.
4. Autobiography, 57.
5. Autobiography, 100. Note: Racist attitudes toward Panamanians were typical at that time.
6. Autobiography, 101–02.
7. Autobiography, 101–02.
8. Autobiography, 102.
9. Autobiography, 104–07.
10. Autobiography, 108.
11. Autobiography, 118–19. Two of his sisters followed Dorn in art careers: Evelyn (Ev) Gertrude and Dorothy (Doff); the latter was born in June 1911.
12. Autobiography, 119–20.
13. Autobiography, 120.
14. Autobiography, 126–30.
15. See letter, 30 January 1919, to Dorn from Julius Kahn, of California, House of Representatives Committee on Military Affairs, Washington, DC, naming him as his principal candidate for appointment to West Point. He noted that Dorn had scored a grade of 96.83 percent on the competitive examination. The Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 4.
16. Autobiography, 132. Dorn accepted his father’s plan in part because he knew, which his father apparently did not, that the study of architecture at any top school required proficiency in the arts of drawing, sketching, and painting before tackling the design of buildings.
17. Autobiography, 133. In later years, another view surfaced, and Dorn did not see the family home as a prison. He often noted, with regret, that his visits to the family were all-too-rare in the years when he lived abroad, including some 12 years in China, and other places, both mundane and exotic. When home, he remembered his father “presiding over his offspring and their offspring, a huge frosted cocktail shaker in his hand,” and the “light understanding talk and banter of a closely knit family, the boys on successive visits growing up to don uniforms or to go to college, big meals around the big table, and the group around the piano—just a typical American family.” See his book, *A General’s Diary of Treasured Recipes* (New York: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), 8–9.
18. Autobiography, 135–36. In the quote, “coz” refers to cousin.
19. Autobiography, 140.
20. Autobiography, 135.
21. See discussion in T.J. Stiles, *Custer’s Trials. A Life on the Frontier of a New America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2015), 3–28.
22. Autobiography, 154.
23. Autobiography, 155–56.

24. See the poem “Tommy” in Rudyard Kipling, *Complete Verse* (New York: Doubleday, 1940), 396–98.

25. Autobiography, 207. Sometime later, Dorn ceased involving himself so much with fortunetellers for reasons unknown; increasingly, they seemed to make him uneasy. He did on occasion, however, revert to his old habits.

26. Autobiography, 221.



## Chapter 2

### Dorn Arrives in Asia: The Philippine Islands, May 1926 to July 1929

Far more important to Frank Dorn than his initial three-year stationing in San Antonio was his arrival in Asia. He would rapidly develop in numerous significant ways. Much of his subsequent career, extending to China and World War II, rested upon foundations established in the years 1926 to 1929 in the Philippines. It was there that he came to comprehend the importance of Asia in the history of the world. These aspects accordingly need to be assessed and recorded at some length.

He was assigned to the 24th Field Artillery Regiment at Camp Stotsenburg—later Fort Stotsenburg and even later, Clark Air Force Base—located 62 miles northwest of Manila. Dorn was immediately quite taken with what he saw of Manila and its environs. He admitted that he “already loved everything in sight—colorful, noisy crowds; clattering native *chinelas* (shoes) palm trees; flowers; the newness and strangeness of Manila.” Also initially of interest was his promptly acquired membership in the Manila Army and Navy Club. Dorn was struck by the Club building and its arrangement: a large structure in its own tree-studded gardens; latticed pearl-shell windows open to the breeze off the bay; high ceilings with swirling electric fans; a huge lounge with brightly colored sofas and chairs; an inner court of tropical plants and flowers; a great dining room with arches open to the bay on three sides; comfortable, cool bedrooms on the upper floors; and last but far from least, the enormous men’s bar with its polished mahogany round tables and stuffed heads of tamarao (water buffalo) “staring disdainfully down from the upper walls as the rattle of dice boxes created a rhythmic invitation to drinks.”<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, Dorn’s early impressions of the Philippines seemed unending and intensely inspiring. During evening dining at the Manila Hotel, Dorn beheld the view of the bay, an exotic scene replete with the odors of sea and flowers; he enjoyed looking at the sky, which seemed “to be of deep purple velvet pinpointed by sequins of lights bobbing and swaying from the countless masts of fishing boats and launches.” More warlike was “a brilliantly lit cruiser and its covey of destroyers anchored beyond the breakwater [that] stood out like a sparkling cutout against the

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This chapter is derived from Dorn’s unpublished 1974 autobiography, “After the Flag Is Lowered,” 1–221, hereinafter referenced as “Autobiography.”

warm darkness.”<sup>22</sup> Almost as impressive was his drive the following day on palm-lined Dewey Boulevard along the bay to the Polo Club. There, sitting at tables on the lawn (though also swatting mosquitos), Dorn watched the sun go down “in a blaze of glory behind Mount Mariveles, the extinct volcano whose jagged crater rose at the southern end of the Bataan Peninsula over 30 miles across the bay.” There also, a few hundred yards beyond the breakwater, “the rusting hulls and superstructures of the Spanish fleet that Commodore Dewey had destroyed in 1898 still rested at crazy angles in the shallow water.”<sup>23</sup> Ever the sightseer, Dorn hired an auto for a look at Manila and its impressive sights. There was the Malacañang Palace, the former residence of the Spanish governor and its sprawling grounds along the Pasig River; the church of the Recoletos with its incredibly baroque wood carving; the twisting streets of the Walled City; the enormous Spanish-built Ayuntamiento, which housed government officers in earlier times; Fort Santiago, the headquarters for the US Army’s Philippine Department; and, finally the impressive cathedral rebuilt after an earthquake in 1868.

Driving to Camp Stotsenburg with another officer, Dorn was further impressed with the ever-shifting stage sets with “varying props and decor against a basic backdrop—high plume-like bamboos; bright red hibiscus; orange and magenta bougainvillea; nipa-thatched houses on stilts; deep green spreading mango trees; scratching coconut palms; swayback pigs; chickens; carabaos either soaking in muddy ponds or ponderously drawing carts and harrows; cute little brown-skinned children, naked as the day they were born; bright red skirts and trousers and huge piña-type sleeves; women with exposed breasts at stream banks beating the dirt out of soiled clothes with wooden paddles; women who were very pregnant; and younger women with flowers in their gleaming black hair who were going to become pregnant pretty soon.”<sup>24</sup> Then, too, there was the view of Mount Arayat (sic), which rose abruptly to a height of more than 3,000 feet. Its name was an indication of why “Spanish padres had blarneyed the ignorant into believing that Noah’s Ark had landed there after the Biblical deluge.” As to Dorn, he didn’t “know just how in hell Noah was supposed to have navigated his animal cracker craft all the way from Asia Minor to the Philippines.” Neither did anyone else, “but that yarn made the people think they had a sort of equity in a piece of Biblical real estate.”<sup>25</sup>

The city of Angeles, less than 10 miles from Stotsenburg, was the Post’s shopping center and “handiest provider.” The market offered marvelous prawns, crabs, halibut, and other fish all shipped in from Manila Bay. There were seamstresses, makers of excellent mahogany furniture,

saloons, and a group of houses enclosed by a high wall called the “Stockade” that gave the boys either syphilis or clap if they carelessly neglected to use the Army’s nearby prophylactic “green light station” before returning to camp.

Entering the post, Dorn noted an interesting innovation: in a thick, lacy arch above the road in the 26th Cavalry Regiment’s area was a double line of huge acacia trees. These were originally planted because the color of their blossoms—yellow—was that of the Cavalry. Similarly, *poincianas* or flame trees splashed brilliant red—the color of Artillery—throughout the 24th Field Artillery area.

Elsewhere within the Post, side streets and roads were densely shaded by enormous “rain” trees. In addition, bright green air plants (aerophytes) and orchids hung from the eaves of most quarters. Red hibiscus, purple bougainvillea, white *dama de noche*, and blue hedge flowers were everywhere. Dorn was also pleased to note that the Officers Club stood wide open, cool and inviting. And the golf club was nearby.

Upon entering their quarters area, Filipino boys made sure that officer luggage was unloaded and stowed away. One of the boys knew a Chinese cook who could be hired and was “on the spot.” The cook promptly arrived—he had no doubt been waiting in the wings—and announced that lunch would soon be ready. Wherever he was stationed, Dorn paid close attention to cooking in his quarters where possible. The soldiers also found that furniture, dishes, and other necessities and furnishings that they had purchased earlier in Manila were already stored in their respective quarters. The Post tailor provided the men with temporary clothing while custom uniforms were being made. Dorn pronounced that, indeed, things were looking very good and they were comfortably settled in. Once more, Dorn and his companion “had arrived,” this time in style.

In his autobiography, Dorn set forth in great detail about the lives, haps and mishaps, fancies, fears, and foibles of the officers and men of his regiment and many others as well, including Col. “Bill Nye” Butner, the 24th’s commanding officer.

Dorn proceeded to delineate something of the careers and forbearers of many of these people, including their wives. Of particular note, he made it clear that life as a military officer in the 1920s often reflected the atmospherics of the “Roaring Twenties.” In great detail, Dorn recounted much gossip as well as facts of the sometimes outrageous escapades—sparing no one of either sex—all limned in detail by his colorful pen. Indeed, Dorn, himself, partook of sexual adventures there and did not spare himself in

these discussions, though the distaff side of many of the affairs revealed that the women were often the “rusty nail” in these matters.<sup>6</sup> In fact, Dorn admitted later that by this time he had emerged as a bit too wild. Consequently, he was called on the carpet by Colonel Butner, his commanding officer, who confronted him with a set jaw and “eyes . . . like blue fire.” “With sledgehammer directness,” Butner forthrightly “growled” at Dorn, stating that a “lot of officers have tried to drink the islands dry. Better men than you, too. At least some of them could hold their liquor, which is a goddam sight more than you seem able to do. None of them succeeded.” Butner thereupon ordered Dorn out of his office and warned that if he did not reform, dire results could be expected. Dorn seems to have taken his commanding officer seriously and never again recorded any further contretemps of this magnitude. As Dorn wrote by way of explanation, life at Stotsenburg continued at its normal rather hectic pace. Indeed, it was very much like a “French bedroom farce in a setting of bamboo and palm trees except the players weren’t French—just a lot of healthy Americans rooting and rutting around.”<sup>7</sup>

Dorn also enjoyed delineating what he called “Filipino adaptations” of many aspects of life, some of which assumed an original and often hilarious character of their own. One example concerned attending a Sunday Mass at Sapang Bato, the enlisted barrio just outside of the Post proper; the area was heavily populated by Philippine Scouts, i.e., enlisted Filipino troops. When the attendees arrived, the artillery band, “more blaring than melodious,” was waiting near the altar of the large bamboo chapel.

The Scouts and their families filled the building with noisy chatter until a silvery bell called all to order. The band then swung into action and burst “into a spirited, but not too tuneful, version of ‘There’ll be a Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight.’” The Mass, under the direction of an American Army chaplain, then began. After the service, the perfectly deadpan priest started his little procession from the altar to the side entrance while the band outdid itself in a smashing rendition of “Good-bye, Girls; I’m Through.” The congregation all clapped delightedly, while Dorn laughed in huge enjoyment of the entire proceedings.

A few nights later at a dinner to which the same chaplain had been invited, the hostess ordered her Filipino cook to bake a layer cake for dessert with a special decoration in honor of the priest. He went all out, promising to make a very tasty cake which he did. On a colorful, elaborate base, the cook inscribed in bright red letters: “HURRAH FOR JESUS.” And as Dorn surmised, “for the chaplain, too, I guess.”<sup>8</sup>

In early December 1926, the Regiment went on a seventeen-mile march to a campsite at a rest camp earlier constructed near a pass just below cratered Mount Pinatubo.<sup>9</sup> This was Dorn's first introduction to the mountain *Negritos*, the "woolly haired" pygmies who hunted and roamed through the deep canyons and rugged landscape of the Zambales Mountains. It was to be a fateful first meeting with far-reaching consequences for him. He was to become a committed student of this people. These were Negroid aboriginals from a distant past who were called Balugas in the Pampangan dialect. They had been the first known inhabitants of the Philippines, though some traces of earlier peoples were also present. Forgotten by nature in the process of evolution, they remained primitives with a simple dialect. Long ago, they had invented the longbow and arrow. Their bows of up to 6 feet in length were longer than they were tall, most men being 4½ feet and women about 4 feet. Their arrows and arrowheads had undergone several stages of development, becoming more and more sophisticated and specialized depending on what game was being hunted. Some of these people lived in small villages at the lower levels of the mountains, but most remained hunters and lived in caves or rude lean-tos for shelter.<sup>10</sup>

They sometimes kept dogs for hunting. A few chickens, their legs tied together, were sometimes in evidence as were underfed skinny pigs. These were used in crude commerce among the villages. Dorn also remarked that after the first shock at the sight, it became commonplace to see a *Negrito* woman nursing a suckling pig at one breast and her own baby at the other; one might even see a baby monkey in place of the pig.

The natives in the vicinity of Mount Abu and in the deep canyons on the northwest slopes of Mount Pinatubo were known to be killers, and some had slain Philippine troops on hunting expeditions. In the early 1900s when men of the all-black US 10th Cavalry were ordered back to the States to avoid America's "Jim Crow" restrictions, some deserted to the *Negritos* and produced sons by Baluga women; some of the offspring grew up to be six-foot "pygmies."

It was a custom that when the US Army in the Philippines slaughtered ancient horses, or those with incurable illnesses, word would be sent out into the mountains; the tribesmen would come and participate in giant free feasting. On the hike, Dorn became well-acquainted with the area's terrain and tropical forest plant life against the backdrop of the dark yawning crater of Mount Pinatubo with its deep canyons and caps of white clouds, as well as the rugged cliffs of Mount Abu. As the troops neared the end of their march, Dorn observed that a whole new world opened up to

the west—wildly descending ridges comprising a hazy coastal slope, all washed by the shimmering turquoise of the China Sea.

A log cabin at the center of the rest camp, built earlier by the Regiment, marked the end of the march. Dorn mentioned an interesting fact about pack mules. Knowing from the past where the picket line would be set up, the mules trotted to the location and began to nuzzle every man on foot, “their silent and forceful pleas to get the packs off their backs.” That accomplished, they rolled on the grass to get circulation going in their backs again. Dorn also scornfully noted that the horses were simply “too damned dumb” to follow the mules’ commonsense example.

The next day the Battery climbed to the top of Pinatubo, the steepest and most breathtaking views that Dorn had ever encountered outside of the Yosemite Valley in California. The view was incredibly magnificent, and to the northwest the troops observed a silver gleaming and sparkling golden stream at the bottom of a deep canyon that, after a few miles, disappeared from view. Dorn knew that it was the mysterious “Yellow River;” while it had been seen by many, no one had been able to find where it went or to explore it. Rather later, Dorn himself would encounter the river again much more closely.

In other activities of a more normal military nature, the Regiment was involved in divisional ten-day maneuvers mounted south of the town of Angeles extending to the northern end of Manila Bay. Dorn was then ordered to close out the rest camp at Mount Pinatubo and was selected to participate in a ten-day reconnaissance mission into the mountains of the Bataan Peninsula conducted by the Corps of Engineers. The venture was to anticipate what might occur in the event of a foreign invasion and also map the area around the extinct volcano, Mount Mariveles, to assist the deployment—and escape—of troops and plan the construction of trails across the rough countryside. Their plans did, in fact, initiate the construction of trails that eventually became part of the communications network used by US and Filipino troops when they were forced to withdraw into Bataan when the Japanese invaded the Philippines in early 1942.

Following this expedition, Dorn was summoned by the Stotsenburg commandant, Brig. Gen. Lucius Holbrook. The general had seen a pictorial map of California’s Monterey Peninsula and, having been informed of Dorn’s artistic skills, wanted him to prepare such a map for Stotsenburg. Dorn agreed, informing the General that it would take about a month to complete. Holbrook made arrangements with a lithography firm in Manila to reproduce the map in color. The prints would be sold at the Post



Figure 1. A portion of Frank Dorn’s map of Camp Stotsenburg in the Philippines. (Courtesy of Brooks Langston, Dorn’s great-nephew.)

Exchange and the profits divided between the PX and Dorn. In this fashion, Dorn produced the first of a series of four such maps that he would subsequently draw, three of army posts and later a much more famous one of Peking.<sup>11</sup>

At about this time, Colonel Butner was transferred to the States. His replacement as 24th Field Artillery Regiment commander was Col. Dan W. Hand. Also at this juncture, Dorn was ordered in May 1927 to report to Fort McKinley as an instructor in the Communications School. His name had been “pulled out of a hat,” lottery style, and he was pronounced capable of instructing in all phases of radio transmissions, coding, decoding, and other subjects that he did not know or care about. Dorn bunked with the Coast Artillery unit, an association he greatly enjoyed and which made the two-month-long assignment tolerable, and in certain instances, even a pleasure. Dorn also enjoyed the pleasant surroundings of Manila’s Polo Club for cocktails, the Army and Navy Club for dinner, and the Manila Hotel for parties and dancing.

Returning to Stotsenburg after the ending of the communications school, Dorn was promptly sent back to McKinley on a special-duty assignment. The division commander there, Maj. Gen. Johnson Hagood,

learned about Dorn's colorful illustrated map of Stotsenburg and desired one for Fort McKinley. Thus, Dorn's second Philippine map appeared. Usually Dorn was warmly praised for his maps. This one was an exception; in a 28 November 1927 letter to Dorn, Hagood noted that it was "extremely clever" and much better than he had expected. Apparently, Dorn had shown Hagood the map before it was completed to get the general's final approval. Though Hagood recognized that the map was a caricature, he observed that "we must recognize the fact that certain things cannot be caricatured without giving offense." Among others, he pointed out that the Virgin of Antipolo should not have been so treated because "to many Filipino soldiers and their families, it is a very sacred relic." There were a few other instances; he especially deplored "the figure of the woman lying on the ground near Santa Ana," which he considered "a little raw," and noted that Dorn could "easily substitute something better." One assumes that the final product was more satisfactory, though "in the spirit of fun" Dorn included some well-known local cathouses "for future generations" to be aware of. However, the general missed these additions altogether during his review of the finished product. Dorn subsequently sold the rights to the map to the McKinley Post Exchange, which paid him the equivalent of more than three months' pay and allowances.<sup>12</sup>

Back in Stotsenburg in September 1927, life for Dorn resumed "its pleasant basket-of-live-crabs routine." A "modicum of interest" on the social scene emerged when a "pleasant young woman" whom Dorn escorted a number of times to parties arrived at Stotsenburg for a month's stay as a guest of a Cavalry couple. Her name was Jean Marie Faircloth, heralded as being from one of the richest families of Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Dorn thought that she tried too hard to be ingratiating and though she exhibited a friendly, lively outgoing nature, Jean failed to make any lasting impression or alliances. Such was not the case ten years later when she arrived once more in the Philippines. On that occasion, "she ingratiated herself right up to the altar with Gen. Douglas MacArthur, then [twenty] years her senior and a bit shopworn what with his dyed black hair and protruding paunch." Thus, Jean had succeeded on her "second try for the big brass ring."<sup>13</sup> Then in 1928, the whole Philippine Division was once more on maneuvers that concentrated, as usual, on the territory south of the town of Angeles. The gyrations would end with an "assault" on Stotsenburg. By this time, Dorn had been appointed assistant adjutant of the 24th Field Artillery Regiment and would serve as the personal aide to Colonel Hand. In carrying out his multifarious duties, Dorn recorded that he obtained several commendations from division and department observers, surely better than concerns

being expressed over some of his earlier—even catastrophic—escapades, perhaps denoting a growing maturity.

Following the maneuvers, Colonel Hand had recalled seeing the mysterious “Yellow River” and planned an expedition to discover what caused “that sparkling golden-yellow color,” among other things. Dorn volunteered and recommended a small party on foot but was overruled. An alternative plan by 1st Lt. Leo Donnovin was accepted; he suggested sending a forty-man unit with a pack train. And so it was arranged, with Dorn going along. The ten-day venture ended in failure. As Dorn described it, the men climbed up and down much rough country, but the unit did not reach its goal. It proved too unwieldy; in addition, Dorn declared that Donnovin was strictly a “by the book” man, and there were no books in the Zambales Mountains.

Once more revealing his growing maturity as a military officer, Dorn submitted a plan in February 1928 to rebuild the rest camp, Camp Sanchez-at Mount Pinatubo, to make it more attractive and comfortable for visitors.<sup>14</sup> Outside of the cabin, a number of wall tents were added in a semi-circle to complete the establishment. The equipment and construction materials had been transported by hundreds of pack animals up the mountain trails. On their return trips, the animals carried plants such as orchids back to Stotsenburg for use in decorating buildings. The *Negritos* had collected the plants from trees. They were paid for their work with salt, which they badly needed, and canned salmon that they dearly loved. All foodstuffs were also brought in from the Fort.

The camp was then ready for use, and visitors poured in from Stotsenburg. Many were eager to escape the heat at the lower altitudes, which was relieved by the “alpine effect” of the 4,800-foot altitude. The new camp’s “management,” i.e., Dorn himself, arranged *Negrito* dancing; competitions of bows and arrows matched against pistols, “which the pygmies usually won;” and hunting parties seeking wild boar and deer.

Running the camp only required about two hours a day; Dorn grew restless and sought other outlets for his time and energy. He did some painting and then turned to a significant venture. Dorn had earlier developed an interest in the *Negritos* as noted above. He now wanted to communicate with them and used the talents of a Philippine soldier, Corporal Pelayo, and a Zambales-born soldier to assist him. In this way, he learned much about *Negrito* life, their customs, and their worship practices and also began to capture their strange spoken sounds and combinations of sounds in English spelling. When the rainy season forced the closing of the

rest camp, Dorn brought a few of the more intelligent young natives back to the Post, where he sought to entrap the undeveloped minds of his mountain friends. This was quite difficult, however, because he noted that any concentration beyond the shortest kind was impossible for them. Nonetheless, after eight months, Dorn succeeded in creating a 3,300-word *Negrilo* vocabulary with English and Zambali equivalents. This major, and most unusual, attainment had not been done before. It remains one of Dorn's most significant accomplishments in his earlier career and bespeaks his higher intelligence, then but a young man in his twenties. Beyond this, as Dorn's knowledge of these people grew, he developed a monograph that served as the basis of *Forest Twilight*, a novel about *Negrilo* life and his first published book, which appeared in England in 1935.<sup>15</sup>

As indicated by his work with the *Negritos*, Dorn's growing interest in the Philippines led him to request an extension to his two-year tour there. After obtaining the extension, he was sworn in as a 1st Lieutenant in June. This gave him a pay raise, but more importantly, he was no longer at the bottom of the ranks and had reached the first step up in "climbing the totem pole." Also at about this time, General Sladen and his family departed the islands after completing his tour of duty as the commandant of the US Army's Philippine Department. He was replaced by Maj. Gen. Douglas MacArthur; Dorn noted that the general was not accompanied by the "formerly glamorous Louise," his first wife. In 1928, Dorn visited Japan and China on a two-month trip that began in July, a venture filled with considerable significance for his later much deeper involvement in Asia. He was accompanied by Lt. Bill Waters. Dorn's part of the trip was financed by his pay raise and the sale of the Fort McKinley map. They set sail on the Hamburg-Amerika Line's *Saarland*. Their first stop was Hong Kong, and Dorn recorded—seemingly with a sense of prophecy—that as he stepped ashore, "my whole being seemed imbued with an extraordinary sensation. I felt completely at home, as if I had always belonged in that tremendous country with its hundreds of millions of people." Dorn did not then analyze "the singularity of my feeling at the time. Later, I did," he said.<sup>16</sup>

Their next stop was on "the forbidden island of Formosa," which the Japanese closely controlled. There, they were "shadowed" as they went into the mountains to see the great camphor forests and an aboriginal village. Then, the travelers turned on their "shadows" and invited them for drinks and dinner; by the time they took their followers home about two the next morning, the men were blind drunk and "couldn't have shadowed an elephant on a treeless desert."

Shanghai was even more impressive than Hong Kong; its busy scene greatly intrigued Dorn, as it has countless others. While in China, Dorn obtained his first significant lessons regarding the people and their warlord leaders, noting the machinations of Chiang with which he would become much more familiar later. The *Saarland* then proceeded to Yokohama in the midst of a terrific typhoon but arrived safely in port. Dorn noted, though, that Tokyo—a short, fast electric train ride from Yokohama—“had a dullness about it; a noisy, clattering subservience to authority; a constant bowing and hissing between teeth that was in sharp contrast to the pie-faced arrogance of the police and the military.” He also took a dim view of Frank Lloyd Wright’s vaunted Imperial Hotel, which he regarded as “squatty looking, low ceilinged, dark, cramped, and badly designed.”<sup>17</sup>

Kyoto was far different, and Dorn appreciated “the ancient capital of palaces, temples, gardens, arts, crafts, and amazing shops.” They then proceeded to “dirty Kobe,” the Inland Sea, Shimonoseki, and Dairen before heading to China’s Taku Bar. They then took a river launch to Tientsin, and proceeded to Peking. There, Dorn noted that “my first sight of the Fox Tower and the great city walls was like a kick in the solar plexus” and for a moment “I actually *was* breathless.” He went on to observe, “I knew at once that this was the place for me. Again, I felt completely at home. I belonged here.” After a few weeks among all the sights that Peking had to offer and observing “the easy elegance of life for foreigners” there, Dorn concluded that “I *had* to live here.” While in the Army, the only way he could do that was to get assigned to Peking as a Chinese language officer. If that was the case, “okay, hell or high water, I *would* get ordered here; I’d learn the crazy language.” While returning to the coast as he watched Peking fade into the background, Dorn “knew deep down that somehow, sometime, I would see those battlements again.”<sup>18</sup>

On the trip back to the Philippines, he noted “across the glistening waters of the bay” that Manila “shimmering in a nacre glow under its great trees looked very beautiful and homelike.” It seemed truly to be the “Pearl of the Orient,” and Dorn was pleased to be back.<sup>19</sup>

At this juncture, Dorn’s work with the *Negritos* came to the attention of Lt. Col. J.A. Boles of the Philippine Department staff. He was so impressed that he arranged for Dorn to meet a renowned scholar, H. Otley Beyer, professor of anthropology and archeology at the University of the Philippines. Beyer himself had made a comprehensive study of the head-hunting Ifugaos. In order better to study them, he married an Ifugao girl and lived in Banawe, their capital, for five years. He had two sons by her and had been adopted as a full-fledged member of the tribe. At Boles’s re-

quest, Dorn sent Beyer a copy of his *Negrito* vocabulary and monograph. They then met, and Beyer wanted to know how much training Dorn had in scientific research. Told none at all, Beyer was amazed that Dorn had, on his own, “stumbled on to the correct approach and methods.” Dorn recalled that Beyer asked “if I realized what I had accomplished,” remarking that only once before in the 1890s a Spanish priest had anyone attempted any work in that field; the priest only came up with 300 words. Beyer continued that Dorn had waltzed “into my house with three *thousand* three hundred words. It’s incredible!” Thereupon, Beyer launched into a lengthy lecture on the ancient origins of the *Negritos*. He then invited Dorn to become an assistant professor of anthropology at the university. His job would be to study *Negrito* dialects and customs in various isolated areas of the Philippines. With enough work done, Beyer concluded, “we would have achieved a scientific and linguistic coup the like of which had never before been possible.” Beyer proposed that with his assistance, Dorn could be appointed as one of the military aides to the governor general of the Philippines. He, in turn, could assign Dorn to research studies at the university. This program was set to be enacted in February 1929 when President Calvin Coolidge appointed a new governor general to the Philippines; Dorn forlornly reported that the new governor general “didn’t give a damn about *Negritos* and their dumb dialects, or about Doctor Beyer, or about me as one of his aides.” Accordingly, the “whole thing went up in a puff of smoke, all because Cal Coolidge had decided to pay off a political debt.” Thus was lost to anthropology some quite useful knowledge. Copies of Dorn’s work were put into the University of the Philippines library that unfortunately was destroyed by fire when the Japanese bombed Manila in 1942. Beyer, who Dorn described as “a remarkably dedicated man of brains and guts” survived internment in Manila during World War II. Afterward, he lived on into his eighties, still at his post at the university.<sup>20</sup>

Meanwhile in December 1928, Colonel Hand consented to Dorn’s second attempt to find the source of the Yellow River. This time only Dorn, two corporals, and three privates made up the scouting group. Taking just a few rations—determined to see if a small detachment could live off the country—and armed with pistols for defense rather than for offense, they set off from the rest camp. Dorn had earlier made a flight in an observation plane attempting to find the river’s source but to no avail, because the steam disappeared under a dense cover of vegetation. Indeed, the terrain was “plenty rugged . . . and just plain scary.”<sup>21</sup>

As the party set out on the 200-mile march, Dorn speculated about the prospective dangers and pitfalls that might be present in that “snake-pit:”

disappearances of others before, various curses and evil spirits that seemed to prevail, outright prohibitions of some tribesmen not to enter their territory; tales of the savagery of the *Negritos* in the inaccessible mountains, stories of attacks and burnings of native villages, and much else. Locating a Filipino constabulary lieutenant in a village of Villar, Dorn noted that twenty-one of the lieutenant's twenty-five men who had ventured into forbidden territory bore scars of arrow wounds. He provided Dorn's party with a few reliable guides for the following days.

The going got steadily rougher; the party was forced to climb through high cogan grass, over boulders, over stream after stream then slide down steep slopes and at last follow a 2,000-foot-deep trench. There they encountered three *Negritos* who appeared out of nowhere. Their guide explained who they were; the *Negritos* simply stared, the Americans apparently being the first white men that they had encountered. The stalemate that ensued was broken when Dorn lit cigarettes for the natives, the match taking them by surprise; they stared "wide-eyed and open-mouthed." Dorn spoke to the *Negritos* in their own dialect, which greatly startled them, and that broke the ice for good. He then exchanged cigarettes for some small fish that they had. The now-delighted *Negritos* thereupon began making lean-to windbreaks that served Dorn's party through the night. Though the soldiers set up a regular guard routine, no untoward incidents occurred.

The following day, the Americans and their newfound friends set forth, though the *Negritos* refused to go as far as the cave of the evil spirit. The terrain got steadily rougher: the canyon walls became ever steeper; the stream took on brighter and more definite colors, running from rusty-orange to finally a glistening golden yellow; the water became steaming hot. The mysterious "Yellow River" had appeared. They were exploring a wild region where no Filipino or white man had ever been before. The walls of the canyon were streaked with wide bands of yellow sulfur and rusty iron ore.

The party then came upon the river's source: a black cave at the base of Mount Pinatubo from which gushed a steaming spout of yellow water. Here, too, was the legendary evil spirit's cave and the last activity of the long-dead volcano: a spring of boiling water.

They returned to the village of Villar "as minor heroes" then four days later returned to the rest camp from whence they had departed. Analysis of the samples of the water explained its unusual color: fine particles of sulfur and iron oxide were in suspension and the glistening sheen was the result of floating bits of feldspar. By the time the water reached the Maranut River, the colors faded and eventually disappeared altogether.

When Dorn returned to Stotsenburg, he was able to fill in large blank spots on the geodetic survey maps of the areas west, southwest, and northwest of Mount Pinatubo.

In naming outstanding landmarks, General Holbrook ordered that the 20-mile chain of cliffs forming the north wall of the Yellow River canyon be named “Dorn Ridge.” Many years later, Dorn wondered what it was then called. In any case, Dorn concluded he had at least “had his own mountain for a few years.”<sup>22</sup>

In January 1929, Dorn took a four-month period of detached service, his total allowance for his three-year tour of duty. He first travelled to northern Luzon with another officer. Then they made their way through territory inhabited by various tribes, such as “the incredible Ifugao country,” where Professor Beyer of the University of the Philippines had married and lived.

Back at Stotsenburg in April, Dorn set off for the resort at Baguio in Benguet Province in Northwest Luzon to enjoy its high pine-covered mountains. For some years after 1903, this city served as the summer capital of the Philippines; the government repaired there from Manila to escape its suffocating heat. There Dorn enjoyed golfing among other pursuits.

Other ventures during his detached service months included boarding the inter-island steamship, the 1,600-ton *Sirius*, for a trip around the Philippine southern islands. Ports included the island province of Cebu and the landlocked province of Colabato on Mindanao. From there the travelers arrived at Zamboanga on the southern tip of Mindanao. It was widely regarded as the most beautiful battalion-sized station in the US Army, being enclosed by Spanish-built walls with a castle within. In these areas, Dorn became familiar with Moro country, always “touchy” areas heavily populated by Muslims.

While in Zamboanga, Dorn learned that Lt. Col. “Steve” Stevens, a constabulary officer, was planning an official inspection visit to other Philippine southern islands. He asked Dorn to join him. This required Dorn to “jump ship” from the *Sirius* to Stevens’s 50-foot cabin launch, the *Lieutenant Burr*. Stevens was to inspect his District’s constabulary posts and also assure himself as district commander that “the lid was tightly on the ever-bubbling Moro political pot.”

They subsequently visited numerous southern islands that provided Dorn with a host of memories he would always cherish.

Returning to Zamboanga, Dorn proceeded by another inter-island steamer to Manila. The final few weeks on the Philippines were anticlimactic, spent packing to ship his belongings to Fort Sill, where he had been ordered to attend the Battery Officers Class at the Field Artillery School. Farewell bashes followed, and Dorn set sail once more on “the faithful old *Thomas*.” The ship put in at Chinwangtao in China and Nagasaki in Japan then on to Honolulu and San Francisco, where it docked at Fort Mason. Dorn was soon at the ranch for a few weeks visiting his family. He noted that the trees all looked so small and neat in comparison with the forest giants he had left in the Philippines. Perhaps other memories dwarfed much of his life back in the United States as well. He was soon on the train for Fort Sill, wondering what the next step in his career would offer.

During his time in the Philippines, Dorn reached significant heights of achievement rarely attained by officers so young and at that stage in their careers. In addition, he emerged with a thorough knowledge of the Philippines and other Asian countries. These all suggested what his future might hold and that he may well have been tapped by a benevolent fate to ascend to even greater heights. This is partially explained by the exotic surroundings and his being touched by the proximity to grandeur of man and exotic nature that made a great impression on him. His explorations were extraordinary odysseys, and he furthered his artistic inclinations by drawing two excellent maps. His research into the *Negritos* was outstanding by any measure, no matter what the age of the person involved. In any event, he was now to slip from the sublime into a deeply contrasting, mind-numbingly mundane existence back at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

## Notes

1. "Autobiography," 222.

2. "Autobiography," 223.

3. "Autobiography," 224.

4. "Autobiography," 225.

5. "Autobiography," 225.

6. For an extensive account of soldier, officer, and enlisted man conduct during this period, see William Jay Smith. *Army Brat. A Memoir* (New York: Penguin Books, 1982). Smith was with his military family at the Jefferson Barracks near St. Louis, Missouri, in the 1920s and 1930s. His memoirs provide much insight into the Soldiers' commonplace pervasive drinking, carousing and gambling.

7. "Autobiography," 244–45.

8. "Autobiography," 229–30.

9. There are photographs of this camp and other relevant subjects in the Audio-Visual Section of the Frank Dorn Papers, Envelope A.

10. See "Autobiography," 246–47, for details about the *Negritos*.

11. See "Autobiography," 256, for details of the Stotsenburg map.

12. Letter in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 4.

13. "Autobiography," 268. The MacArthurs were married in a small, quiet ceremony at the Municipal Building in New York City on 30 April 1937. She had first met MacArthur in 1935, on board the ship *SS President Hoover* when he was on his way to serve as the military advisor to Philippine President Manuel Quezon.

14. The cabin was to consist of a series of walls, a large kitchen, a stone fireplace, a radio and office room, a storeroom, and a gabled building for enlisted personnel. There was to be a 10,000-gallon dam built at a spring providing water for the animals and which was also piped into the house for use in the kitchen and showers and for the enlisted quarters. Much of the furniture was made onsite, as were curtains, cushions, and pillows. For scenes of the Philippines and the rest camp, see the Audio-Visual Section of the Frank Dorn Papers, Envelopes B, C, and D.

15. Frank Dorn, *Forest Twilight: A Novel of the Philippine Islands* (London: George G. Harrap and Co., 1935). In addition, his papers include an unpublished second novel about them that he titled *Love and War at Pinatubo*. Dorn wrote it after his retirement in about 1975; the book consists of 204 typescript pages. He apparently sought to have it published by Russell & Volkening Literary Agents in New York City, though without success. See in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 6, Folder 1. Dorn recorded in the novel's preface that it was a story based on rivalry and a 1928 war between tribal villages of the *Negrito* pygmies in the forests of the Zambales Mountains in western Luzon. The preface includes a summary history of these people, as well as something of their fate during and after World War II. For photographs of the *Negritos* and other Philippine scenes, see the Audio-Visual Section of the Frank Dorn Papers, Envelopes B, C, and D.

16. "Autobiography," 279.

17. "Autobiography," 282.

18. "Autobiography," 283.

19. "Autobiography," 283.

20. "Autobiography," 285–88. See letter from E.B. Rodriguez, assistant director of the National Library in Manila, 10 April 1929, to Dorn praising his work. Rodriguez noted their "arduous but nevertheless interesting and valuable contribution on our *Negritos* about which very little has been written." Other pertinent letters are in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 4, Folders 2–4. For illustrations of the *Negritos*, see the Audio-Visual Section of the Frank Dorn Papers, Envelope D. For a lengthy illustrated article by Dorn on the *Negritos*, see *Asia*, November 1931, 725–30, 733. This magazine was founded in 1898 by the American Asiatic Association to help improve the understanding of Asia in the West. The lack of knowledge in America was perceived as a serious obstacle to the extension of its influence in Asia. From 1917 to 1920, *Asia* was owned by Willard Straight, who had investments and other interests in Asia. In the 1920s and 1930s, the popular publication focused on trade, commerce, and especially travel. In 1934, it was purchased and edited by Richard Walsh, who included many contributions by his wife, Pearl S. Buck, and provided a literary outlet for prominent Asian writers and political figures. In 1946 following the Walsh-Buck era, the magazine merged with a new journal, *United Nations*.

21. "Autobiography," 292–93.

22. "Autobiography," 292–93.



## Chapter 3

### The Fort Sill Interlude: September 1929 to August 1934

There was not much at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, or the nearby town of Lawton to impress Frank Dorn, especially in view of his travels and encounters in years past. In addition because of the presence of Indians, the state of Oklahoma was legally “dry;” but Dorn observed that “it was a wonder that the whole damned state didn’t float off down the Arkansas and Red rivers on a flood of rotgut corn whiskey.” As to Lawton with its 12,000 citizens, Dorn noted that it consisted of a few indifferent buildings and further “of middling to cruddy restaurants and cafés, with small armies of cockroaches and June bugs competing with human patrons for what passed as food.” The town was in his words “the epitome of the drab and the mediocre.” It was only mildly enlivened by “the hard-faced broads ever ready to service young studs in uniform.”<sup>1</sup> To be fair to Oklahoma, Dorn did not see it at its best; he arrived in the years of the Dust Bowl and the dislocations resulting from the Great Depression.<sup>2</sup> All of this suggests that perhaps every career must experience a time in the doldrums when neither wind nor current can propel it further along progressive paths. Certainly, Dorn’s foundered rather markedly at Fort Sill, with a few brighter spots to be sure.

In his own words, Dorn observed that “after the color and brilliant light, the high mountains and dense jungles of the Philippines, Fort Sill looked drab and dusty, flat and almost treeless.” Regarding Signal Mountain west of the artillery ranges, he said “it was only called a ‘mountain’ because it stuck up higher than everything else.”<sup>3</sup> As to the Artillery School, Dorn was no better impressed. He did pass the year-long course, however, and in June 1930 managed to be assigned to the horse-drawn 18th Field Artillery Regiment. He certainly did not accept the “myth” of many of his instructors that firing artillery required a special brand of intellectuality; Dorn commented that, in fact, “it never did.” He argued that with time “techniques of fire had become almost stylized and routine.”<sup>4</sup> His assignment unfortunately meant that he would continue at Fort Sill, though he would rather have been assigned to just about any other post in the Army. Dorn seemed set for a three- or four-year stint with the troops, which he liked, but he was almost immediately ordered to temporary duty with the Correspondence Section of the Academic Division at Fort Sill; this assignment lasted for four years. The training mission at Fort Sill was being

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This chapter is derived from Dorn’s unpublished 1974 autobiography, “After the Flag Is Lowered,” 304–39, hereinafter referenced as “Autobiography.”

greatly expanded, and all previous course material had to be rewritten and profusely illustrated. Accordingly, Dorn's drawing talents were needed far more than his presence in a battery of 75-millimeter artillery.

Another dimension of his new activities was a considerable development in the correspondence courses used by the Army Reserves and the National Guard. Therefore, Dorn found himself "chained" to a drawing board. He proceeded to turn out tactical maps, charts, technical and mechanical drawings, and designs for use in new training manuals and correspondence course materials. Though the job was boring and repetitious, Dorn "made do" in it satisfactorily.

In the fall of 1931, Maj. Gen. Harry Gore Bishop, then chief of artillery in Washington, had seen and been amused by Dorn's maps of Stotsenburg and McKinley. He desired one for the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill. Thus, Dorn's third map appeared.<sup>5</sup>

Also during these months, Dorn could not avoid concerns about the ever-deepening Depression. During this time, he also repeatedly sought assignment to China as a language student.<sup>6</sup>

In the interim, Dorn hoped to capitalize on his being engaged as an official artist illustrating educational materials. He submitted a request to be sent to the Beaux Arts School in Paris for two years of instruction. Though several high-ranking officers supported the request, perhaps predictably, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Douglas MacArthur "turned it down flat." Dorn indicated this demonstrated that the general "couldn't have spotted a budding Rembrandt if you'd hit him over the head with one." Unfortunately, as Dorn observed, MacArthur "*could* march troops against the 'Bonus Army' in Washington with machine guns and mounted cavalry threatening the jobless, stone-broke veterans of World War I."<sup>7</sup>

Instead, Dorn was informed that he could go to China after all. One of the previously selected officers had dropped out. His hopes were once again dashed, however. This time a new development intervened, that of FDR's first significant relief program: the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). To the consternation of many in the military, the Army was put in charge of the CCC. Maj. Forrest Harding, who was stationed at Fort Benning, described the situation in his poem, "The Devastation of Benning:"

The edict arrived like a bolt from the blue,  
And assigned us by scores to the woodpecker crew;  
And it closed up the school and sent the boys forth,  
By overland travel, South, East, West and North.

And all who had orders that took them away  
Were told to clear out by the last day of May  
And haste to their posts to become C.C.C.'s  
And forget about tactics and learn to plant trees.<sup>8</sup>

However, many other officers employed in the program became strong supporters of the CCC, observing that the camps taught the boys to work together in common efforts as a unit in a quasi-military fashion, though there were no formal drills. Among these far-sighted officers were future US Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and apparently Dorn himself. They recognized that the CCC was good preparation for what many already saw as a coming war in which the United States would be involved. The CCC enlisted thousands of America's unemployed youth—eventually to number more than three million—to serve in numerous camps throughout the nation. The 200 or so boys in each camp were to be organized, fed, clothed in uniforms, and put to work in many types of programs especially in the forests and on farms. These activities prepared many men who would later live and work together in joint enterprises of a more militant nature. There trees by the millions were planted; dams were constructed; national and public parks were built; farmers were taught how to care for their soil by terracing and other methods; wildlife was cared for by the building of fisheries, for example; and many CCC boys worked as fire-fighters in the nation's forests.

Dorn recorded that he was one of the many officers at Fort Sill selected for this duty; once again his assignment to China “was blown sky high.” He promptly submitted his fourth request for Peking to be effective in 1934, or as soon thereafter as a vacancy might occur. And so in early June 1933, Dorn proceeded to Jefferson Barracks in Saint Louis, Missouri, where many budding CCC boys were gathered to be outfitted and organized into camps. He was accompanied by his beloved German shepherd, “Hans.”

Dorn felt fortunate in the boys that he was in charge of. They were lads from central and southern Illinois farming country, all sons of “good honest citizens” who had been struck by the hardships of the Depression. He and his 180 youths, ranging in age from 17 to 22, were sent to southern Oregon to work with the Forest Service building mountain trails. Arriving at Wolf Creek, they were soon in camp near Mount Reuben, on top of a ridge of the Siskiyou Mountains. Their camp arrangements and work assignments were in the hands of Chief Forest Ranger Orr Young. There was a civilian doctor, Doc Beucler, and Dorn was in direct command. Dorn was most impressed by this part of Oregon: “the mountains were magnificent; acres of rhododendrons and azaleas in full bloom wherever I looked;

yellow broom just starting to blossom; and a profusion of chinquapins promised great lemon-yellow splashes of color beneath the towering pines and spruce.” He also was pleased to note that brown and black bears, gray timber wolves, coyotes, several varieties of deer, porcupines, mountain lions, and a veritable zoo of small game and birds existed in this area<sup>9</sup>

Dorn, nonetheless, had misgivings as to whether things would work out. The Forest Service had sent a 20-man crew under Young’s orders to guide the boys in their work tasks. He was also promised that supplies were readily available at district headquarters at Medford. He worried as to how these young boys would work out in their strange environment. He need not have been concerned. His lads rapidly adjusted. Their Midwest farming backgrounds had endowed them with survival skills and knowledge to fall back on. He had almost no trouble. He liked his charges, who reciprocated, and also appreciated the skill and knowledge of the Forest Service crews who managed the work that they had to do in the forests.

In a few months, snow forced the camp to move 6,000 feet down to a more comfortable winter site on the banks of the Rogue River, where good fishing for steelhead, trout, and salmon prevailed. Having successfully launched the CCC lads of his outfit, Dorn was then transferred to command the CCC Headquarters Company at Medford. After his eight-month stint with the CCC, Dorn was ordered back to Fort Sill in February 1934, apparently none the worse for his time in the western United States that boasted some of the most beautiful country in America.<sup>10</sup> Then in March 1934, after five years of effort, Dorn at last received his orders to Peking as a language officer. In mid-August, he was in San Francisco for a month’s leave before sailing to China.

## Notes

1. "Autobiography," 304–06.
2. See John Steinbeck's novel, *The Grapes of Wrath* (New York: Viking Press, 1939), about the Oakies during this period.
3. For Dorn at Fort Sill, see photos in the Audio-Visual Section of the Frank Dorn Papers, Envelope E.
4. See the "Autobiography," 312, for a discussion of the intellectual aspects of artillery action. Dorn first met Maj. Joseph May Swing at Fort Sill; Swing would later be a lieutenant general and his commander just after World War II in Japan.
5. See letters to Dorn from Col. Laurin L. Lawson, 6th Field Artillery at Fort Hoyle, Maryland, 22 June 1931, and Col. D.W. Hand, of Headquarters of the Ninth Corps Area, 30 November 1931, regarding the Fort Sill map in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 4.
6. See letters in the Frank Dorn Papers, in Box 1, Folder 4.
7. "Autobiography," 332.
8. See in Leslie Anders, *Gentle Knight. The Life and Times of Major General Edwin Forrest Harding* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1985), 137–39.
9. "Autobiography," 334.
10. See letter from G.E. Mitchell, forest supervisor at the Siskiyou National Forest, Grants Pass, Oregon, 3 November 1933. He thanked Dorn for the "frank and sympathetic attitude" that he had demonstrated toward the Forest Service work while at the Reuben CCC Camp in Oregon; Mitchell felt that the success attained by the camp "was due primarily to this friendly and cooperative spirit." The Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 4. For relevant photographs of this venture, see the Audio-Visual Section of the Frank Dorn Papers, Envelope E.



## Chapter 4

### Peking, China: October 1934 to February 1939

Dorn's preface to this phase of his life serves as an admirable introduction for this chapter:

In the past I had known droves of people and many places; I had felt the pressure and crowding in of countless men and women; but from that late October day in 1934 when I stepped off the transport's gangplank onto the coal-gritty dock at Chinwangtao, the whole fabric of my existence became a changing tapestry of people and places as it had never been before. Not only of vast amorphous populations, nor of sweeping panoramas across the plains and rivers, the mountains and seas of an endless continent and its islands, but of individuals and personalities and their passages in and out of what I had once thought to be *my* life. I suppose it never had been really *my* life, any more than anyone can claim a private existence for himself. But on that cold, darkly overcast afternoon, somehow I realized that people, events, and far places were lining up to take over the remnants of what I'd been kidding myself *was* a private realm of my own.

Though the low roofs, gray walls, and cluttered alleys of the town seemed to present an almost ominous threat under the low-hanging clouds, I felt completely at home in China again—as if I belonged. I *had* come home; at least to a second home and a second country, and I knew it at once. But I did not know that for years to come I would be destined to face people and places in armies and in situations such as I had never before been called on to cope with, to live with, to fight with, to love, to hate, and in the end to help destroy.<sup>1</sup>

Having arrived in China, Dorn was hustled onto the train for Tientsin then on to Peking. An officer from the language school in Peking met him and the other language officer who had sailed with him, Lt. Frank Roberts—later a major general and also closely involved with Gen. Joseph Warren Stilwell—and his wife, Peggy. Arriving in Peking, they walked through the Water Gates to Canal Street and the military attaché's office in San Khan Miso. Here they met the attaché, Lt. Col. Walter S. Drysdale.

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This chapter is based on Dorn's Autobiography, 340-462, hereinafter referenced as "Autobiography."

At a welcoming party, Dorn also met other language officers, some of whom would be of importance in his later life in China. These included Lt. “Timmie” Timberman—later a major general; Timberman, a West Point classmate, who was to serve in the US 15th Infantry Regiment stationed at Tientsin from 1912 to 1938. The new students then went out to Tou Tiao Nutung to register at the College of Chinese Studies for a five-month beginning course in Chinese. The director of the school was Dr. William Pettus. A former missionary, Pettus was also well-versed in Chinese art. Roberts and Dorn were to attend the school for five days a week until March 1935.<sup>2</sup>

At this time, Dorn also acquired a Studebaker sedan exactly like that of the French minister, Monsieur Bonnet, and a chauffeur named Chou. After moving to an apartment at the Russian Hospice on Legation Street, he obtained his “Number One boy,” a diligent, loyal man named Kao who would be with him for the next four years.

There were initial difficulties with his two-man staff; the language students were required to hire only non-English-speaking Chinese. Accordingly, both Dorn and his Chinese boys had to learn each other’s languages before much could be done, resulting in many misunderstandings and “some hilarious situations.”

During these months, Dorn met many characters at numerous parties and receptions in Peking, who recognized, and greatly appreciated, what it meant for foreigners to live there. Certainly, Dorn was one of those. He admitted that though all of the guests were not characters; “only about half of them” were.<sup>3</sup>

One was the fabulously rich Mrs. Isaac Newell, wife of retired Col. Isaac Newell, who had commanded the US 15th Infantry Regiment in Tientsin, China, in the mid-1920s. She was, Dorn recognized, “just harmlessly nutty, seeing strange prophetic signs in innocuous events and in spending her dough.” The couple lived in a huge old princely palace. A stream of senior Chinese officials put in appearances. Dorn observed that one could tell the differences between their wives, “usually middle aged, plumpish, dowdy, and usually wore glasses” and their concubines, who “were young, pretty, and colorfully dressed.”<sup>4</sup>

Prominent Americans from the American legation included counselor and later ambassador and Mrs. Clarence Gauss, as well as various secretaries and other language students, including an American diplomat, John Paton Davies Jr. Born in China of missionary parents, Davies would later be an important figure in China and was closely associated with both

Dorn and Stilwell. Gauss, who would soon replace Nelson Trusler Johnson as ambassador, was described by Dorn as “obviously an intense man with little room in his mind and life for frivolity, but he was one of the most capable of all the State Department’s ‘Old China Hands.’” Davies also observed that Gauss was a man with “an underexposed complexion, a thin-lipped mouth downturned at the corners, and pale eyes refracted through thick lenses.” Indeed he “was a chilling spectacle at first encounter.” Nonetheless, Gauss’s subordinates respected his professional competence, and both Dorn and Davies came to respect him as well.<sup>5</sup>

Among the military men present in Peking was the commandant of the Marine guard, Col. Archer Vandegrift; later as a four-star general, Vandegrift would command the Marine Corps as its 18th commandant from 1944 to 1948 and would win the Congressional Medal of Honor during World War II. Davies observed that “a phenomenally high proportion of the Army and Marine Corps officers stationed at Peking became generals in World War II and the Korean War.” He attributed this to “their special knowledge of northeast Asia;” Dorn also believed that “they were more talented than the average military officer.” Another prominent Marine at the Guard headquarters was Major Graves Erskine, who would also earn his four stars.<sup>6</sup> Also, various Chinese royal figures rubbed shoulders with Mongolian princes and princesses. There were numerous wealthy Chinese and foreign businessmen—and women—on the flourishing, often-zany-at-times, preposterous social scene.

In addition, noted intellectuals were prominent in Peking. One of the best-known was French Jesuit philosopher and archeologist Père Teilhard du Chardin, characterized by Davies as “a man of craggy radiance.” He had earlier been in charge of the operation that unearthed the fossil remains of the “Peking Man,” at Choukoutien near Peking. This consisted of a “bunch of 600,000-year bones and skulls.”<sup>7</sup>

Other noted intellectuals and writers then in Peking included Sir Charles Bell, Britain’s first envoy to Tibet. He had written several authoritative books on “the mysterious ‘Land of God’ at the top of the world.” Another was Owen Lattimore, the American journalist who had travelled extensively in Manchuria and Mongolia, and written a number of books on both areas. He spoke both Manchurian and Chinese. Because he always wore a monocle, the Mongolians called him “the man with the shining eye.”

In the winter, Sven Hadin, the Swedish explorer, arrived in Peking and took an apartment adjacent to Dorn’s. He had just completed a 6,000-mile trek across high Asia, mapping routes and studying the tough grasses of

the steppes.<sup>8</sup> Meanwhile, Dorn continued to learn Chinese. Though he had immediately felt at home in China, the cold November winds “blew chilly nights and frosty mornings into Peking, gales from off the Gobi Desert raised swirling clouds of gritty dust in the narrow *hu-tungs* (neighborhoods) of the city.” It began to feel oppressive. The air was dry and brittle, bringing rare but brief flurries of snow to the city, where many shivering inhabitants “literally sewed themselves up for the winter.” He went on to say that the freezing nights also caused icy stalactites to hang from the roof eaves, and the pot-bellied stoves and coal-burning fire places filled the air “with a brownish-gray smoke that seemed to hang in still, dark layers until a raging dust storm from the heartland of Asia swept them off toward the sea.” Then as the merciless winds once more subsided to a bone-chilling cold, the rising spirals of soft coal once again formed layers of floating dark strata above the city’s towers.”<sup>9</sup> In these conditions, Dorn noted that he had recurring colds and hacking coughs that seemed never to go away. He, nonetheless, appreciated that the sea of dark padded coats worn by swarms of people “plodding along the near-freezing streets and avenues under leafless trees” was occasionally accented by bright flashes of color coming from orange-red pyramids of ripe persimmons, the pale blue smoke from portable charcoal stoves, glazed sprays of candied crabapples in the street stalls, and the “bursting creaminess and rich fragrance of roasting chestnuts.” And “looming protectively into the dark skies [were] the high gate towers on the massive city walls, the golden roofs, white marble bridges, and purplish-red walls of the vast Forbidden City palace.”<sup>10</sup>

Given the conditions, Dorn hated to venture out in the mornings; he inevitably saw many dead beggars lying in the *hu-tungs*, “frozen in grotesque rigidity,” and sometimes being chewed on by stray dogs called *wonks*. Though Dorn, and perhaps others with a sense of humanity, might want to intervene, they had been warned never to help because they would be liable for their hospital and other expenses if the person survived, in accordance with ancient Chinese customs.

Despite the many difficulties he had in getting to Peking, by Christmas Dorn began to have some serious doubts about continuing for the remainder of the four-year stint. The numbing winter cold was one factor. Another was that “the damned school” was a frightful bore. Dorn noted that “half of the time I didn’t know what was going on.” Most of his fellow students, being missionaries or teachers, were a drab bunch in drab clothes “who were not my bag.” Dorn, in fact, was shocked by them because they seemed to have so little joy or laughter in their natures.<sup>11</sup> There was at

least one exception, Mrs. Walter Judd, the attractive wife of a medical missionary, whose mouth was often opened in a happy smile. She had been in India for some years and was intent upon learning Chinese. However, her husband—later a US congressman—was cut from different cloth. Judd seemed to be an ascetic and “not much given to fun and games.” He was inclined to extreme political positions and hence allowed no middle ground or shades of gray, which became increasingly apparent as time went on. After he was elected to Congress for his home state of Minnesota, “his un-analytical and unyielding support of Chiang Kai-shek—right or wrong—did more harm than good to the role he espoused . . . that of representative and advocate of the inept bureaucracy of Nationalist China.”<sup>12</sup>

As to Dorn himself, he did not omit his own sense of *joie de vivre*, or partying, though it often cost him some much-needed sleep. He and others frequented the Peking Hotel “for hard-boiled eggs, a Pernod, or a nightcap.” To vary the routine, their destination would sometimes be the Alcazar, a nightclub. A favorite dinner spot was the Germanic Hotel du Nord owned by “two cheerful, round-bellied” Bavarian brothers; diners could obtain huge schooners of München beer, the best in town. The house specialty, beef tartar, whether eaten raw or cooked, was also delightful.

After Dorn and Frank Roberts completed their five-month Chinese school course, they were ordered to make a 600-mile trip into Inner Mongolia in an Embassy touring car, an aging Dodge which Dorn’s chauffeur was to drive. His Number One boy, Kao, was to cook and serve as tour guide. They were joined by Jim Penfield from the Embassy staff.

Before departing, Dorn met Magdalen Lloyd, the owner of a large antique shop. She was soon to marry a well-known hygienist at the Rockefeller Foundation and medical college, Dr. John Grant. At this time, Dorn was seeking to rent a house to get himself away from the Russian Hospice; he did not want to be near the Legation. To some friends, the solution seemed to be to sublet Magdalen’s newly refurbished house by Peking’s east wall. The house had big rooms with high ceilings, a huge glassed-in garden room, a large garden, a swimming pool, and a stable. Though she had planned the house for her honeymoon home, she sublet it to Dorn for \$24 per month. Magdalen found another residence closer to the heart of Peking that would serve her and her new husband admirably. In addition, she had a country place that provided a rustic setting. In any event, Dorn was at last well set up in Peking. Dorn remained close friends with Magdalen for many years. He recognized that their close friendship was grounded in mutual appreciation for both their somewhat unabashed manner in facing up to life and their ability to obtain what they strongly sought.<sup>13</sup>




Figure 2. Map of Asia with Japanese occupation areas.  
 (Courtesy of US Military Academy, Department of History.)

Before leaving for Mongolia, the three men were thoroughly briefed by the Legation staff regarding Japanese military activities since 1931. At this time, Dorn was to embark upon a years-long phase that would be most characteristic and important in his military career. As Dorn noted about this era, the whole shameful story could be summed up by appreciating that Japan’s purpose was to take over as much of China as it could digest. Much of it began with an explosion that cut the railway outside of Mukden, the old Manchurian capital, in September 1931. The Japanese had used this as an excuse to occupy the three northeast provinces, they described this action as necessary for self-defense, though they never made clear what they were protecting against.

In any event, Chinese military response was nil; civilian boycotts of Japanese goods were ineffectual. The British and Americans huffed and puffed; US Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson threatened sanctions; the League of Nations simply “wrung its helpless hands;” and Japanese militarists—in the Japanese fashion and practice—sucked their teeth, smiled, and proceeded with the next steps of their program.

Subsequently in January 1932, 70,000 or more Japanese troops landed at Shanghai to compel the Chinese to abandon the boycott of their goods. Foreign nations with concessions in the city reinforced their troops in Shanghai. But the battle was between the Japanese and Chinese, particularly the 19th Route Army—drawn mainly from the south of China, especially from Canton. Conversely, Chiang Kai-shek did little in this struggle. Though the Chinese were compelled to withdraw from Shanghai, the Japanese suffered numerous casualties. By late spring, hostilities ceased. In the meantime, the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria declared the “independence” of Manchuria, henceforth known as Manchukuo and “ruled” by Henry Pu Yi, the former boy-emperor of China.<sup>14</sup> In February 1933, the League of Nations issued a resolution—a document of powerless bombast—condemning the Japanese actions. The Japanese simply walked out of the session and left the League altogether. Meanwhile, the Japanese Kwantung Army marched into the Chinese Jehol Province in northeast China. Much of their success was the result of a betrayal of the Chinese warlord governor, T’ang Tu-lin, who sold his province for \$9 million, plenty of opium, and safe conduct of his family and possessions to Peking. For a time, he continued to live in grand style in an old palace. The success of the Japanese in Jehol brought them through the Great Wall in Hopei Province to within 30 miles of Peking. Soon thereafter, by the terms of the Tangku Truce, the Japanese forced the Chinese to evacuate all troops from the Tientsin area south of Peking.

Clearly, the Chinese were not coping well in the face of the aggressive Japanese. Dorn blamed this on Chiang Kai-shek, whose government was already clearly morally bankrupt. His people were in need of a real leader. A possible one was Mao Zedong and the Communists. Indeed, one of the reasons for Chiang’s poor showing was that he was forcefully engaging the Communists, regarding them as the primary threat to his regime and China rather than the Japanese. Chiang often observed that the Japanese, while serious, were “a disease of the skin” while the Communists were “a disease of the heart.”

A few days before their departure for Mongolia, Dorn, Roberts, and Penfield had a final briefing by US Minister to China Nelson T. Johnson. Dorn declared that he was “as ambassadorial looking as an overfed, slightly disheveled kewpie doll, with a fuzz of pinkish-orange floss for hair, a fat face, and a deeply fat body.” His oversized suit was draped loosely over his ample body. He also sported a 10-gallon Texas hat and cowboy boots. Though jovial and with the air of a “hail-fellow-well-met,” Johnson did not appear to be someone to be taken seriously. Dorn did admit later that

having known him better, “he grew to like and respect him.”<sup>15</sup> In addition to his rather bizarre appearance, what Johnson had to say to the three was rather unnerving. In view of the extremely disturbed conditions in Jehol and Inner Mongolia, Johnson noted that in the event that they got into any kind of difficulty whatsoever, “he as American Minister to China would completely disavow our connections with the Legation.” While he would look forward to reading their intelligence reports and wished them well, he reiterated that “you’re on your own entirely.” If the Japanese military or Mongolian bandits “arrest or kidnap you, do not look for any help from me.” He added, on a “cheery note,” that David Lloyd George’s private secretary had been murdered by bandits in that area a few weeks before. Dorn concluded that this was what it meant to be in the cloak-and-dagger business in “a hostile land of wintry winds and hard men.”<sup>16</sup>

In Jehol City, they checked in with the Japanese commander, seeking to convince him that they were innocent sightseers. He was not swayed but only put a tail on them in their roaming about and did them no harm. Their travels took them to the old walled city of Dolonnor, then to Kalgan. From there, they shipped the car and themselves by rail back to Peking. Unaccountably, Dorn was silent as to what they did or did not learn on their excursion. Nonetheless, he had first experiences involving the Japanese and Chinese that would be part and parcel of much of his later career.<sup>17</sup> After the harsh, cold journey, with a blizzard or two at Jehol and Middle Mongolia, the three Americans arrived in a Peking enjoying an early spring. What made the city during this period more interesting for Dorn were the “enchanting and entrancing adventures in eating.” Ever the gourmet, his preoccupation with food in some ways made the winter months more endurable, and Dorn learned to enjoy the city despite the bitter cold. He liked to visit Tung An Shih Ch’ang, a huge rabbit warren. He enjoyed early Sunday forays to the Thieves’ Market in north Peking, which he noted “was no more a gathering of thieves than happen in the cloister of a secluded nunnery.” There were exquisite dinners at the 500-year-old “duck restaurant,” *T’uan Che The*, where Peking duck and chicken velvet were specialties. Another restaurant, *I I Ya I*, featured shellfish. Mongolian restaurants cooked lean mutton on huge braziers in the freezing courtyards, or prepared meals simmered in a copper *hu-tze* in the center of a round table. These activities were sometimes enlivened by rare snowfalls of seldom more than an inch. People then went to see the golden tiles of the palaces under the thin coating of snow or “gaze on the whiteness of the terraces of the Altar of Heaven made whiter by the Hand of God.”<sup>18</sup>

One of the most pressing of Dorn's activities after his arrival back in Peking was to move into the impressive house that he had earlier rented on the street, *Tung Ts'ung Pu Hu-tung*. He had to hire a staff of servants; put the garden into shape; and, more importantly, settle in his three Chinese tutors. These were to be employed in relays for five hours of instruction a day. They "strove mightily to impart a scholar's attitude in my unscholarly, though willing, head," Dorn reported. Kao, his Number One boy, hired Sun, the cook who had worked for several years at the Russian Legation and who prepared a variety of Russian, French, and Chinese dishes. Sun was also familiar with the preparation of large dinners and banquets.<sup>19</sup> There was also Wang, the gardener, and a coolie for general work. The entire staff cost Dorn \$26 a month. With Wang, he decided to change the garden six times a year so as to feature various plants in their season. Dorn was later to remember well the garden's "moon gate reflected in the still waters of the pool and the branches of weeping willows swaying with each breeze like a woman's long hair brushing over beds of flowers." The Chinese on his staff had named the garden "The Court of Infinite Peace, Green Leaves, and Flowers;" one of Dorn's tutors, Ch'uan Teh-hung, loved to stroll around it intoning the *Analects* of Confucius. Dorn's other principal tutor was Wang En-po.<sup>20</sup> At this time, Dorn also began collecting many forms of Asian arts and crafts, including paintings, while at the same time gaining considerable expertise about them. While at this residence, Dorn later recalled sunny weekends in the Western Hills at the converted temple of *Pa Ta Ch'u* (The Eight Precious Places) and Sunday picnics at Jacques Bardac's summer place, once the mountain retreat of a Grand Eunuch.<sup>21</sup>

Above all else in Dorn's experience during these years was the great city of Peking. He described it as:

[A]lmost mystic, that made it easy to recall the thousands of shifting scenes that stood out in spectacular three-dimensional clarity: the noisy markets and crowded streets; the mad confusion of rickshaws, carts, wagons, beggars, and peddlers swirling around *Ch'ien Men*, the Great Front Gate of the Tatar City; the camel trains from faraway Ninghsia and Turkestan plodding through dusty alleys and broad avenues to disgorge their burdens of rugs, tribute silk, paintings, jade, and ivory, after a four-month trek across the Gobi Desert; the rough, sun-darkened cameleers quietly knitting socks and sweaters from the wool they stripped off the double-humped animals; the rattling, iron-tired Peking carts; foul-tempered beasts laden down with sacks of coal from the

Mines of Mentoukou spitting and kicking their way through the masses of seething humanity; shaggy-maned Mongolian ponies; priests in loose gray or yellow robes; the immaculate troops of Embassy guards in the uniforms of half a dozen Western nations.<sup>22</sup>

Dorn also commented that Peking, the Forbidden City, “retained its calm magnificence; masses of peonies and climbing wisteria reflected their soft colors in the still waters of the old Sea Palaces; and the Altar of Heaven raised its marble terraces in serene grandeur.” In addition to these grand pictures, smaller images also pervaded the scene. Among these, “fighting to dominate the countless foul odors of the streets was the rich fragrance of roasting chestnuts on cold winter days.” There was also “the red splash of persimmons and the glazed sprays of candied crab apples in the street stalls; the sputtering strings of firecrackers announcing the arrival of brightly garbed children and their parents to make a formal New Year call on aged grandparents; the ink-dyed geese bringing good luck to tremulous brides about to enter strange households.” As Dorn concluded, “I knew that I loved the great old city and that I always would.”<sup>23</sup> John Paton Davies Jr. was similarly impressed with Peking and later left it with regret:

[N]ot only because of fond associations, but also because this ancient, mellow, and noble city was a delight to live in. The symmetries of the great gates and walls, the squares and long vistas, the vermilion, emerald, cobalt, and imperial yellow of gates, pillars, and tiles, but most of all the casual, tranquil cadence of the old capital created an atmosphere of comfortable, well-worn elegance.<sup>24</sup>

Yet another Westerner, George N. Kates—an American scholar, traveler, and resident of Peking in the 1930s who immersed himself in Chinese society, culture, and language—was similarly greatly impressed with the city and its unending, dazzling “show.” There, he concluded, Peking’s streets encompassed much of the Chinese world that was free for all, and it functioned as “the poor man’s great show; and also his education.”<sup>25</sup>

Having settled in, and bent upon making his new abode something of a showplace, Dorn was soon closely engaged in the social treadmills so prominent in the Peking of those troubled but bracing times, with party-goers who looked like a swarm of “smiling, well-groomed marionettes.” There were all sorts of odds and ends of people, bobbing up at all hours. These Dorn proceeded to catalogue, assess, discuss, denigrate, or praise—all and sundry, domestic and foreign—at some length in his autobiography. Indeed, this account emerged as a veritable “Who’s Who” of many of the actors on the Peking stage at that time. But the daily tenor of

the foreign colony's lives seemed little affected by the growing tensions, and there seemed little awareness that time was fleeting. Unaccountably, the great majority of foreigners chose not to believe that they were dancing on the edge of a rumbling volcano. Most of them trusted in an abiding faith in the divine right of their own white skins and what had been true for some time: the unchallenged might of the white man in Asia.

Unfortunately, they lived to regret both of their unfounded credos, but they had to learn the hard way. It proved impossible for foreigners to take seriously the Chinese "New Life Movement," regarded as a form of "Puritanical nonsense," championed by American-educated Madame Chiang Kai-shek. Similarly, the Japanese "New Order in East Asia" seemed no more than a baseless excuse to take over China with all of its "goodies." Thus, the "old school" of Westerners were quite happy with the "old life" in China, and equally so with the "old order in East Asia." These traditions seemed to guarantee that privileged whites would remain at the head of the pecking order over a billion non-whites.

Yet, as Dorn noted, the "big apple" of people arriving in those months came on 7 July 1935. This was the new military attaché, Col. Joseph W. Stilwell, and his family. These consisted of his wife, "Win;" the eldest daughter, Nancy Doot, who arrived with a violin; Alie; and eight-year-old Ben. Dorn noted that his first impression of Stilwell was of a man who obviously felt at home in China—he and his family had been in China from 1919–23, when Stilwell studied the Chinese language—and Stilwell's air of restless energy was manifested by his "eyes dart[ing] about the crowded scene" on that hot July afternoon. Nonetheless, Dorn further observed, "his caustic wit, biting humor, gamey language, and near-devastating appraisals were yet to be revealed to me."<sup>26</sup>

Noting something of their later accomplishments, Dorn observed that Doot was already an excellent musician and soon mastered the Chinese lute. Alie, only fourteen at the time, was already a capable painter and soon excelled in the Chinese style and brush work. Before she returned to United States four years later, Prince Pu Ju, generally considered one of the finest artists in China, stated that Alie was the *second* best painter in Peking, he being, naturally, number one.

Late that fall, Lt. Joseph Warren Stilwell Jr. arrived in China, having been assigned to the 15th US Infantry Regiment in Tientsin. There would be much more to say about him later.

Another noteworthy "Old China Hand" arrived at that time, Maj. Dave Barrett, with his wife, Beth, and their daughter, Elizabeth. Barrett was one

of the Army's most fluent speakers of Chinese. It was said that he could tell the Chinese jokes which they understood perfectly, an indication of his prowess with the language. He also had grown "humorously cynical" regarding Chiang's government and its military establishment. Barrett, however, had a problem in that his wife was a hopeless alcoholic. Two years after they arrived, Elizabeth found her mother dead on the bedroom floor. Later, Elizabeth married a British Foreign Service officer who ended his career as an ambassador.<sup>27</sup>

In November 1935, Frank Roberts was sent to Kaifeng for a month and Dorn to Hsuechow. They were to isolate themselves in those sites so as better to develop their knowledge and facility in the language. They were accompanied by tutors to help them along. Dorn reckoned that Roberts had the best deal; he was in a 3,500-year-old walled fortress town. It was a city of wealth and culture that had played an important part in the history of the Yellow River Valley. His own town was characterized by agriculture production and was much duller.

On their return to Peking, the two learned of further advances by the Japanese. The Kwantung Army had established the East Hopi Autonomous Regime in the so-called demilitarized zone south of the Great Wall. In addition, Tungchow—the terminus of the Grand Canal in the north and only 12 miles from Peking—was designated the "capital" of another Japanese setup, the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, which undertook planning for further aggressive moves in the north.

About this time Dorn received a major thrill: copies of his first published book, *Forest Twilight*, a novel based on the life of the pygmy *Negritos* in the Philippines, arrived from London. It was published by George G. Harrap (1935) and manifested Dorn's considerable talents in various fields.

Another of Dorn's skills reappeared in January 1936: his mapmaking abilities. His earlier maps of Post Stotsenburg, Fort McKinley, and Fort Still were joined by a historical map of Peking. To accomplish this, Dorn undertook extensive book research and also visited numerous palaces, temples, parks, and other historic edifices. The map, which took two months to complete, hooked him for good on the history of the fascinating city. It was published by the German-owned Peiyang Press of Tientsin. Appearing in great numbers, the map was also printed on silk scarves that became a staple of the tourist trade. David Barrett styled it "a marvelously clever map of the city," and it subsequently survived the numerous occupations and changes of rulers that the city underwent following its publication. The map is still on sale in Beijing today.<sup>28</sup>

After completing his Peking map, Dorn found himself “thoroughly bitten by the writing bug,” the consequence of “an absorbing urge to learn more about the history and legends connected with those who had created and lived within the walls” of Peking’s Forbidden City. He found a similar spirit in Juliet Bredon, who was deep into research for a history-guidebook on Peking’s Forbidden City. She had obtained the services of two Chinese scholars and an interpreter as well as, most importantly, permission to study in the Dynastic Archives and the National Library, which had never heretofore been granted to a foreigner. Though Dorn was obligated to study Chinese for six hours a day and take at least one orientation trip each year, he devoted what time he could to Bredon’s project and his own plans for a publication on the subject.<sup>29</sup>

Dorn’s enthusiasm for the study was greatly enhanced by his meeting with Baron de Stael-Holstein, a direct descendant of the famous French baroness who had given Napoleon fits with her critical and independent writings of his regime. The Baron, himself one of the most unusual scholars in the entire Far East, had arrived in Peking in 1921; he was initially intent only on playing tennis and acting the role of a wealthy, socially conscious playboy. The lure of Asia, however, compelled him to buy a house and immerse himself entirely in scholarly pursuits. By 1935, he had become fluent in Manchurian, Mongolian, and Tibetan and gained a working knowledge of Japanese. These were added to his command of five European languages. He became especially well-known for his expertise in Tibetan studies.

The Baron also became an expert in Asian arts and crafts, as well as Buddhism and the role and beliefs of the Dali Lama. He had some cogent advice for Dorn: Give as much time as he could to historical research because such activity would become a life-long pursuit that would be a great addition to the inner resources that the Baron already possessed. In addition, the Baron wanted to know if Dorn believed in reincarnation, to which Dorn replied, “no.” He then argued that Dorn should, because the Baron felt that Dorn was the reincarnation of a cultured Buddhist priest whose life spanned the period of the creation of the arts and fine porcelains during the Ming Dynasty (about 400 years before). Dorn was astonished, and a bit frightened, but was informed that in the future others would tell him the same thing. Dorn could only assert: “Others did.”

In April 1936, Dorn and Frank Roberts were ordered to Nanking for two weeks to get “oriented” regarding the workings of the Chinese government. They were guided by members of the newly established US Embassy there. They visited the Central Military Academy and the Artillery

School and made calls on the Army general staff and the chief of staff. The *pièce de resistance* was an “audience” with Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek at their residence. They sat across from the visitors in a row. There were obviously secret police present—perhaps armed with Luger pistols—as betrayed by “square-toed shoes protruding from beneath heavy maroon window draperies behind the dictatorial couple.” This situation and the knowledge of what could happen, even from a mistaken move, did not create a pleasant atmosphere.

The Generalissimo was in uniform. His head was a shaven skull and at times one could see his false gums. And often his face “was animated; his dark eyes luminous, arresting, and so piercing they seemed to look right through one—a trick he’d learned that scared hell out of his subordinates.” Dorn summed him up: “An opportunistic peasant who’d struck it rich, he had convinced himself that he was a God-inspired military genius. He was not.”<sup>30</sup> One of the ongoing problems regarding Chiang was inherent in his position in China. While Chiang’s regime was corrupt, so were many warlord regimes. Chiang, however, could not undertake sweeping purges. Were he to attempt these, he himself would be liquidated in some fashion. Therefore, “while [Chiang] was despotically inclined, the Generalissimo did not have the dictatorial power to purge at will, as did Hitler and Stalin. Nor could he houseclean a manifestly corrupt and inefficient arm of the government as could a strong leader in a democracy. He was a captive of the sorry forces he manipulated.”<sup>31</sup>

Madame was “radiant with phoney [sic] charm-school smiles and glittering with diamonds and jade. Though a good-looking woman with a fairly good figure, she lacked the distinction of the old aristocrats. Glamorized with skillfully applied makeup, her features still betrayed the lowly background of her Soong family, which included a few smears of primitive . . . blood from their Hainan Island forebears.” Altogether, Dorn was pleased that the “forced amenities and meaningless expressions were mercifully brief.” To him, his visit “to that phoney [sic] holy of holies had not consecrated me in undying admiration for the all-highest Saint Kai-shek and Saint Mie-ling.”<sup>32</sup>

As 1936 rolled around, Dorn himself staged a dinner in his garden seating sixty people. During these months, life in Peking continued apace while Dorn worked further on illustrations for his book on the history of the Forbidden City. But time was running out for the artificial foreign world of Peking that was about to be turned “upside down and inside out.” It would never recover. Some of this was the result of a lack of Western



Figure 3. Japanese cavalry enter Tang Tse Pailou, China, after the 31 July 1937 fall of Peking during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–41. (Courtesy of US Information Agency.)

understanding of ongoing history and the emerging larger picture. Dorn noted that they:

[R]ested their security on an abiding faith in the unchallenged might of the white man in the Far East. Within their world of power, intimidation, and great wealth, they believed implicitly in the ability of their governments to keep any danger or unpleasantness at as respectable distance—certainly beyond the walls of the Legation Quarter.<sup>33</sup>

Even Chinese in Peking, the capital of three empires, had felt secure in their ancient defenses for nearly 700 years. Though there had been years in which the Japanese had made major advances in northeast China, the final spark that set off the protracted Sino-Japanese War that continued from July 1937 to 1945, came during the night of 7 July 1937. It began innocuously enough when a Japanese soldier was killed near the Marco Polo Bridge [Lukouchiao] about ten miles southwest of Peking. It may well have been that the Japanese had deliberately killed one of their own men, making a martyr of him. The situation became critical because the Japanese military was conducting night exercises near the Chinese-guarded bridge.<sup>34</sup>

As to the West, no one could foresee the cataclysmic results of the death of an unknown Japanese soldier at this time and under these circumstances. They had already seen other incidents, many more serious than this. "It would all blow over in time; if one kept pretending it wasn't there, it would somehow go away" was a typical attitude of the times. Though by this time, some foreign residents had departed for the coast and perhaps thence back home to be out of harm's way, there was generally little change "in the untroubled rounds of their activities. Still firmly believing in the divine right of white skin, they 'just knew in their bones' that this latest nuisance would be smoothed over, as had so many others." Indeed, "cloudless nights found them dancing under the stars on the roof of the Grand Hotel de Péking; rainy nights in the grand ballroom below."<sup>35</sup> Beyond this, the foreign governments, especially the Americans and British, were still deep in the Great Depression. There was also the rise of Hitler and developing consequences that were the main focus in Europe and America. Nonetheless, Western involvement in Chinese affairs, especially after the Opium War of 1838 to 1842, and their steady encroachment into China had created "a supine giant so weak and fragmented that it was always ripe for further aggressions."<sup>36</sup> This fact was not lost on the Japanese militarists. Indeed, Japan was by now caught up in its own territorial ambitions especially regarding China. It was a late starter in the subduing or carving up of China. By 1937, the Japanese had conquered Manchuria, styling it Manchukuo, with a puppet Chinese as its "head." And the development of northern China including Hopei, Shansi, Shantung, Chahar, and Suiyuan into a pro-Japanese, anti-Soviet autonomous regime had further fed fuel to the fire that was about to become a raging inferno. They were assisted by failures of the Chiang Kai-shek government to resist in any effective way. China was also hamstrung by its ancient philosophies of what war consisted of in the first place, not to mention the venality, corruption, failures, and sweeping ineffectiveness of their own erstwhile military and civilian leaders, including Chiang Kai-shek himself.

In any case, Chiang was not fully in control in China. Warlords still contested how and who would wield power in China. Chiang's will to resist the Japanese was further weakened by his preoccupation with what he regarded as his chief enemy, the growing Communist movement. Then, too, the Japanese forces were much better trained and equipped, and led by much more effective and aggressive commanders. There was also the waning power of Japan's more liberal elements and the growing emphasis on an ultra-patriotism centered on the divine Japanese emperor. This grew into the feeling of the need for more substantial aggression in China,

coupled with the Japanese sense of the need to drive all Westerners from China and elsewhere in Asia. They hoped thereby to form a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” free from all foreign influences and powers. All of these factors in combination boded only ill for the Chinese people—and Westerners as well—who had already suffered at the hands of the Japanese. In any event, after the shooting in July, things rapidly deteriorated. The Japanese on maneuvers in the area opened fire, the Chinese troops entered the walled town of Wanping, and the Japanese attacked the town. At this time, the Peking office of the US military attaché, Colonel Stilwell, was galvanized into action; he was located in the San Kuan Miao, an old temple taken over after the Boxer Uprising. Stilwell instructed David Barrett, an assistant military attaché, to drive out to get information. Barrett saw the body of the killed Japanese soldier being guarded “as if they were holding a prayer meeting over the bloodied corpse who, like the first killed in action in any war, hadn’t had enough sense or luck to stay out of the way of a bullet, especially one from his own people.” Dorn concluded that “there was little doubt that he, an unknown peasant, had been singled out by his own officers for unnamed fame as the sacrifice on the altar of the god of war to create the incident the Jap army could use as an excuse to carry out its long-planned operation into China.”<sup>37</sup>

One result of the coming of the Sino-Japanese War was Dorn’s appointment as an assistant military attaché by Stilwell who, by then, was aware of Dorn’s abilities and his knowledge of Chinese.<sup>38</sup> It might be well to say something here about the military attaché in general. The Americans were late in getting involved in appointing attachés. In addition, such positions were not particularly highly regarded or desirable within the American Army establishment at that time. Alfred Vagts, who has written a detailed study on the subject, observed that the major European powers had used military attachés since the early nineteenth century. It was not until 1889 that these were appointed by the American army to the major capitals of Berlin, Vienna, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg; others were added from time-to-time subsequently, including Rome in 1890 and Madrid in 1893. In the following year, the first American attachés were appointed to Japan and Mexico. From that point, US military and naval attachés gradually increased in numbers. By the 1920s and 1930s, the system was well-established, with higher ranks often being appointed to these positions.<sup>39</sup>

Nonetheless, notions persisted in the military establishment—still persisting to the present in some quarters—that attachés were chosen for their physical handsomeness and prowess in the social graces, men who placed little emphasis on soldierly abilities and virtues. Such fields were

accordingly considered antithetical to the more virile, manly profession of arms characteristic of much military service and consequently were not normally regarded as the pathway to the higher reaches of the military profession. In addition, it was noted that many activities of those associated with diplomacy required independent financial means, thereby excluding many in the officer corps.

There was also the feeling in some areas that the study of foreign languages was somehow anathema, perhaps leading to destruction of the martial spirit. In addition, such prejudices reflected “the rampant ethnic and cultural prejudices that openly pervaded American WASP [White Anglo-Saxon Protestant] society. For most regular Army officers, such academic undertakings” as the learning of languages “were at best effete and at worst outrightly subversive.”<sup>40</sup>

In the course of his attaché duties, Stilwell then went to Wanping and was driven back by heavy machinegun fire from both sides. Dorn, in his capacity as assistant attaché, went to the marshaling yards at Fengtai, where he was confronted by two scared trigger-happy Chinese soldiers who poked their bayonets against his stomach. Dorn argued with their officer and was permitted to proceed to Wanping, by then an abandoned shattered wreck.

By this time, Japanese troops were already pouring in by the tens of thousands through the Great Wall by rail and truck and on to Tientsin. Clearly, the plans for these operations had been drawn up long in advance. The long-expected full-scale war was on.

Japanese combat troops then moved steadily toward Peking. The Chinese resisted but sustained massive losses. An attack on Japanese troops at Tungchow was followed by savage reprisals; the old walled city was burned and its citizens massacred, and the garrison was beheaded to the last man. Tientsin was bombed from the air, and village after village on the way to Peking was wiped out. On 29 July 1937, Chinese troops fled Peking and sought escape to the north leading to Nankow Pass. In the early morning hours of the 31st, the Japanese began their triumphal march into the old imperial city, “ending for all time its long era of gracious living; of flower filled, walled gardens; of a lifestyle that could never again be repeated.”<sup>41</sup> The Japanese troops proceeded first to the Legation Quarter, with shouts of “Banzai” accompanied by the raising of the rising-sun flag everywhere. Unaccountably, there was no looting or burning in Peking or drunken soldiers rampaging through the streets. Therefore, “with a collec-

tive sigh of relief, the people of Peking began to make adjustments and to scheme for profit as they always had in the past.”<sup>42</sup>

General Stilwell’s office, still in Peking, was inundated with a flood of cables revealing Washington’s dire need for information, especially as to the possibilities of Chinese resistance. There were, however, perennial difficulties of a particular type regarding China from the viewpoint of the Western attachés. These focused on Chinese views concerning warfare, among other things. In the main, as to military practice, the Chinese operations were often guided by Sun Tzu’s “aphoristic teachings” on warfare advanced in his book, *The Art of War (Ping-fa)*—dating to the sixth century BCE—than those much better known in the Western nations.<sup>43</sup> Sun Tzu sets forth a distinct propensity not to act precipitously but often to cling to inaction, taking into account the many complex variables that armed conflict is heir to and which frequently preclude direct confrontation. This condition of “impassivity” was known in Chinese as *wei-wu-wei*, or “suspended animation” or “surcease of action,” perhaps better stated as “action through non-action.”<sup>44</sup> Lao Tzu, the founder of Taoism, also circa the eighth century BCE, similarly asserted that “the sage ruler does nothing” and the result is that then there is nothing that is not brought to order. As to military application, the leader must take into account the “flow of the universe.” Regarding *wei-wu-wei* then when people exert their will against the world in a manner that is out of rhythm with the cycles of change, they may disrupt that harmony; unintended consequences may more likely result rather than what was expected. Taoism asserts that one must place one’s will in harmony with that of the natural universe. In this way, a potentially harmful interference may be avoided, and goals sought can be achieved effortlessly. Thus, the sage seeks to come into harmony with the great Tao, understanding that by doing nothing, everything is then done.<sup>45</sup>

Though he knew these views would inevitably result in high casualties in the military sphere, Chiang and many other Chinese military leaders recognized that war was indeed cruel, no matter what action or inaction was applied. Chiang accepted these as facts and faced them as an inevitability of war. Accordingly, the Chinese acted “in an ever-shifting kaleidoscopic milieu of factional politics, personal relationships, and local ties.” When applied to the military sphere, leaders such as Chiang Kai-shek often proceeded to do as little as possible, which often brought them into conflict with such men as General Stilwell and ultimately General George C. Marshall and others. These were cast in the mold of those who emphasized the employment of confronting military stances on a large scale, attitudes that are frequently ascribed to General Ulysses S. Grant during

America's Civil War. Grant, known to be ruthless and determined, once stated that one must "find out where your enemy is, get at him as soon as you can, and strike him as hard as you can and keep moving on."<sup>46</sup>

Additionally, there was the general Chinese military and political scene. With the coming of the revolution in 1911, the old Chinese empire was at an end. There then ensued years of warlords in bitter contention, with Chiang Kai-shek emerging as the shaky winner. Simultaneously, the Communists appeared as the second major center of power. The Japanese arrival with its steady encroachments into China from the early 1930s then transpired. The mastery of this maze, even for the Chinese, was most difficult; for a foreign observer, any success required at least a thorough command of the Chinese language, as well as long and intelligent immersion in the affairs of the country. Stilwell and Dorn came as close as anyone to fitting this role in that time and place.

Into this maelstrom, then, Dorn and others now entered into lengthy and dangerous proceedings that lasted—for Stilwell and Dorn—until 1939. Because the United States was neutral at this time, they were able—armed with diplomatic passports—to crisscross the sometimes porous lines of battle first in the Japanese sectors and then over to the Chinese lines and back again, seeking to find out what was happening. Dorn first sought to reach Paoting ninety miles south of Peking. He was halted by Japanese troops and encountered a "toothy major who informed me that I was apt to be shot by Chinese troops," though he did not see any in evidence. What Dorn did see was what the major wanted him to see: "how the Chinese people welcomed their deliverance from tyranny." What he witnessed, along the main street of a village, were lines of "sad-eyed children waving small Jap flags with about as much enthusiasm as they might have greeted an epidemic of the plague."<sup>47</sup>

The Japanese soldiers then ordered Dorn to return to Peking at once. Seeing no alternative, he complied. Consequently on 3 August 1937, Dorn—accompanied by Jack Belden, a *United Press* stringer, with his chauffeur, Chou, and driving an office car—embarked upon what was to become a six-month-long 2,000-mile odyssey through much of north China, a fact-finding mission for American officials, both civilian and military.

They went first to Nankow Pass northwest of Peking, making their way through the loosely held Japanese positions into a no man's land. Sending Chou back with the car, Belden and Dorn proceeded on foot. They soon were in a maze of trenches with frequent Chinese challenges. After numerous escapades, they were ordered by a Chinese colonel to proceed under

escort/arrest to the commander of the 89th Division at Huailai, a beautiful old walled mountain town. They informed the colonel that they wanted to go to Kalgan and Taiyuan. He had no objection to their travelling into the interior of China, “though he did voice the opinion that this wasn’t much of a time for sightseeing.” Meanwhile, they could stay at an inn under the protection of Chinese soldiers while awaiting repairs to bombed-out rail lines. They finally departed Huailai but could go no farther than Hsihuayuan, where the station and tracks had been completely demolished. Then a local corps chief of staff sent them on by road to Kalgan, “probably to get rid of us,” Dorn sardonically noted. There, he spent two days attempting to convince some local American missionaries with “closed minds” that they needed to evacuate in the face of the approaching storms of war, a notion that the missionaries emphatically rejected. One woman explained that she had been born in China and “when you’ve been here as long as I have, you’ll realize these flare-ups come and go. They always have. But the voice of God is heard above them all.” When she was advised that the American Embassy was warning all Americans to evacuate, she responded: “They always do. . . . [T]hat’s all they have to do except to lead sinful lives surrounded by women and alcohol.” Accordingly, she intended “to remain right here, to harvest more souls in the garden of the Lord.” Another thanked him for his concern and said, “but we will remain at our posts.” Dorn’s arguments were interrupted by a devastating air raid that destroyed the inn where they were staying.<sup>48</sup>

Dorn and Belden then “fought and gouged our way onto a train” jammed with maddened, frightened people—replete with “bawling children, chickens, dogs, pigs, bundles, blankets, and baskets.” Dumped off that branch line at Tatang, they sought to proceed by rail to Taiyuan only to miss the connection by minutes. This necessitated a bus ride, which Dorn described as “the wildest ride I’ve ever had—or ever want to have—over a steep, hairpin-curved, mountain road” which finally reached the crowded streets of Taiyuan.<sup>49</sup>

Dorn and Belden then proceeded through Chengchow on the Yellow River then east through Kaifeng and on to Ts’angchow, from which Belden proceeded south to Shanghai.

Dorn noted that by this time, boarding trains meant “a bare-knuckled street fight even to climb through open windows past screaming curses, insulting references to our ancestry, and loud condemnations to all the tortures of the eighteen hells.”<sup>50</sup>

Though Belden managed to proceed, Dorn was promptly arrested by an officer and a squad of eight men. He was then incarcerated in an inn where he was put in a two-room suite and constantly guarded by a four-man unit armed with Luger pistols. His diplomatic passport was declared an obvious forgery. He was thought to be a White Russian spy in the pay of the Japanese. He wanted to know why they thought he was a Russian. The answer was simple and irrefutable: because he had blue eyes. It was known that all Russians had blue eyes and hence he was one.

While he was “in the clink,” the city was bombed four times; the bombs narrowly missed his jail, though most of the neighborhood was demolished. Making the ordeal more difficult, Dorn discovered that the place was infested by bedbugs, relentless in their attacks. He repeatedly asked to depart by rail for Tsinan. The answer was no. Then unaccountably after four days confinement, two officers arrived “full of smiles, bows, and apologies.” Dorn was informed that he would be placed on the next train for Tsinan, the provincial capital of Shantung. This was done and upon his arrival, he reported to the US consul there, John Allison, who would much later would be ambassador to Japan. Dorn was handed a telegram from Stilwell. He was to remain in Tsinan and send daily coded reports via Sam Sokobin, the US consul at Tsingtao, for transmission to the USS *Marblehead* anchored in the bay; the ship would then radio the messages to Peking, Nanking, Manila, San Francisco, and Washington.

At about this juncture, there were further indications that Dorn and Stilwell were developing a close working relationship. A blunt message came to Dorn from US Ambassador Nelson Johnson in Nanking—now the capital of China, to which the government had migrated after the fall of Peking—to the effect that his use of certain terms in his reports were not in accord with official US policy. Dorn’s reports were too alarmist, and he henceforth must no longer use such terms as the “Sino-Japanese War” or suggest that such a war was developing. Apprised of Johnson’s “slap on the wrist,” Stilwell told Dorn that he was doing a great job and was “to continue reporting things as you see them.” And “I’ll handle the big boys,” he concluded.<sup>51</sup>

Meanwhile on 1 August 1937, Chiang Kai-shek ordered a deployment of troops to counteract the Japanese threat from north Hopei, Jehol, and Chahar provinces. From that date to 17 October, numerous battles raged with the Japanese the usual victors; they made considerable progress, wrapping up territory in Kalgan, Suiyuan, Chahar, and northern Shansi provinces. The Chinese did score a most unusual significant victory at Pinghsingkuan just south of the Inner Great Wall, but this did not change

the final outcome.<sup>52</sup> In his study, *The Sino-Japanese War*, Dorn explained some factors as to why the Chinese lost in this campaign and, indeed, in many others to follow. Though the Japanese possessed superior equipment and air support, the Chinese were greatly hindered by their feudal military thinking. They looked upon the scene of a campaign as “a gigantic military chessboard about which pieces were shifted in various confrontations to checkmate an enemy. Unfortunately for them, the more aggressive Japanese met all confrontations head-on and brusquely swept aside the Chinese chessmen, be they kings or rooks or pawns.” Another great difference was that the Japanese army was highly indoctrinated, dedicated, and greatly honored by the Japanese people. They were seen as representatives carrying out the will of the only recognized leader, the emperor. Chinese officers and men were not indoctrinated, dedicated, or honored. In China, armies were only regarded as a necessary and expensive evil that the government would have preferred to do without.

In China, also, most senior generals entertained one singular ambition: to supplant the perhaps-only-temporary de facto leader, Chiang Kai-shek. All of these considerations contributed to China’s failure as a military power.<sup>53</sup> There were two positive benefits for China during this time of the sort that Chiang vainly counted on. One was a treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union and China. Signed on 29 August 1937, it opened the way for Russian loans, military aid, and the eventual contribution of some air units. There was also some sympathy expressed in the United States and Britain, though this only led Chiang to conclude that eventually these nations would intervene to “pull his chestnuts out of the fire.” Chiang, indeed, tenaciously clung to this belief, always ignoring significant contrary advice over the years. This fallacious conviction led him into various disastrous traps “from which he and his armies never fully recovered.”<sup>54</sup> On 9 August 1937, a Japanese lieutenant was killed by Chinese sentries at the Shanghai airport after he had shot a Chinese soldier in a burst of rage. Dorn recorded that this foolish loss of temper not only gave Lieutenant Oyama a measure of immortality, it basically gave the Japanese an excuse to widen the war considerably. In only two days, eleven Japanese warships and five troop transports anchored in the Whangpoo River near the city and soon disembarked two Japanese divisions.

Meanwhile, “with an unreasoning conviction of his own infallibility,” Chiang Kai-shek decided to commit a large force of his own. He was certain that the serious threat aimed at Shanghai would provoke the Americans and the British to intervene. This was “one of the greatest miscalculations of the century,” Dorn declared. He elaborated: “Chiang had

failed to realize that false hope, the blind mother of stupidity, breeds only bitterness and disaster.” Nothing had changed appreciably in the West. There was still the lingering Depression, and the menace of Hitler was growing even greater.<sup>55</sup>

Undaunted, Chiang poured in his best trained and equipped troops. Unfortunately, there were no tactical plans in place. Therefore, “the prolonged, bitterly contested defense of Shanghai was calamitous, a clash between Chinese heroism and cowardice ineptitude and useless sacrifice” on the one hand, confronted by Japanese “determinations, ruthlessness, training, and superior arms” on the other. By 12 November, the Chinese rout was complete. Chiang had sacrificed 240,000 of his best soldiers. His gamble for world support only gained him some sympathy worldwide that was simply useless. He had also forfeited the confidence of the Chinese army in his leadership abilities. But in his determination to save face, as Dorn pointed out, “he did not have enough sense to realize the magnitude of what he had done.” There seemed to be a reason for this: “like all low people in high places, Chiang could see only the floor and lower walls; never the high ceiling nor the stars above.”<sup>56</sup>

Meanwhile early in October, US Consul John Allison was ordered out of Tsinan in Shantung to the US Embassy then in Nanking. The Ambassador feared that Allison’s safety might be in danger. Dorn was to take over some of Allison’s duties and continue to expedite the evacuation of Americans to the coast. In this task he encountered once more the “cast-iron missionary woman,” who had been determined to stick to her post no matter what. She was now on her way back to the United States. Seeing Dorn, she simply said, “Well young man, you were right. I was wrong.” Dorn also felt it necessary to respond to Ambassador Johnson’s concern regarding Allison’s safety. “I asked by radio why if Tsinan was not safe for Allison should it be considered safe for me. Wasn’t I in danger, too?” Johnson replied that “Army officers were supposed to be in danger. That’s what they are paid for.” Perhaps in some circles, State Department officials were regarded as sacrosanct; military personnel as expendable.<sup>57</sup> By the middle of November, Dorn was still in Tsinan and continued to send reports back to Stilwell, who had remained in Peking despite the Japanese presence. Soon, however, Dorn was ordered to join then-Captain Roberts in Nanking, where they were to act as a team to report on the Japanese drive to take the city. With difficulty, Dorn first made his way via Tsingtao and thence by a Jardine and Mathewson ship to Shanghai. Despite the Japanese conquest of Shanghai, foreign nations—especially Britain and the United States—could still do business there. Indeed, in the midst of

hostilities as was the case in Peking before its fall in the foreign Settlement and in the concession areas, “the luncheon, cocktail, and dinner hours in Shanghai were as gay as ever.” The “lounges and dining rooms of the Cathay, Metropole, Astor, and Carlton hotels; the [famous] long bar at the Shanghai Club; the luxurious French Club; and the Russian restaurants were crowded with milling foreign customers who seemed impervious to what was going on outside.” Businessmen, *taipans* (foreign traders), elegantly gowned women, even more elegantly gowned White Russian prostitutes on the prowl, military officers and attachés, newsmen in droves all sought surcease from the battle at their doorstep.” They employed the usual means in the Far East to attain these ends: “good drink, good food, good service, and good companionship.” Unfortunately, an act of war—this time inadvertently committed by the Chinese—brought home to them the dangers of the conflict. Poorly trained Chinese airmen attempting to sink the Japanese battleship *Izuma*, anchored near the Bund, hit a great department store on Bubbling Well Road; another bomb hit the roof of a multistoried hotel. More than 3,500 people were killed or wounded.<sup>58</sup>

After arriving in Shanghai, Dorn proceeded to the Metropole Hotel and, following instructions from Stilwell, sought to find information regarding Japanese plans to move against the Chinese city of Nanking. From Shanghai, Dorn hoped to accompany the Japanese commander when he entered Nanking as it was expected that he would soon do. Such was not to be; Dorn did not get permission. Instead, Stilwell sent Dorn from Shanghai back to Tsingtao in Shantung Province to report on the expected taking of that city by the Japanese navy.<sup>59</sup>

Meanwhile, through the last of November and early December, the Japanese continued their relentless advances from Shanghai to Nanking, the Chinese capital. By 6 December, Japanese forces were converging along the eastern and southern defensive lines around what had been the Chinese capital. Chiang was once more convinced that foreign sympathy would intervene. As Dorn noted, “in grim, irrational desperation” Chiang transferred his earlier hopes regarding Shanghai to Nanking. Nonetheless, much bitter fighting ensued. On 11 December, Nanking’s outer walls were breached and thousands of Chinese troops were trapped within the city then hunted down and slaughtered. Two days later on 13 December 1937, the city fell. This compelled the Chinese Nationalist Government to flee to Hankow (Wuhan) farther up the Yangtze River.

The Japanese commander, General Hashimoto, was frustrated that he could find no Chinese with whom to negotiate and no Chinese who would recognize and accept that Japan’s massive efforts were also intended to

drive all Westerners from Asia, and hence a benefit to the Chinese as well. Also, because the Japanese had not acquired a quick victory and had sustained many casualties in the process, Hashimoto turned his troops loose to pillage the city in what one scholar noted was the “worst holocaust of brutality since the troops of Count Johan Tilly sacked Magdeburg in the Thirty Years’ War of 1618–48.” This continued for six weeks and, whatever the basis of comparison, the Chinese suffered unbelievably; perhaps as many as 300,000 were slaughtered. Thousands were raped and savaged in every conceivable way. People were forced to dig their own graves; some were buried alive; many were used for bayonet practice; others were drenched with kerosene and torched; one-third of the city was burned.<sup>60</sup> Among the studies are many attempts to explain the causes of the massacre and come to grips with the inexplicable horror. Historian John Toland, for one, emphasized that within the Japanese, “metaphysical intuition and animalistic, instinctive urges lay side by side.” In other words, “philosophy was brutalized and brutality philosophized.” Ironically, the Japanese ended by slaughtering hundreds of thousands of orientals in Nanking for these spurious reasons. He also suggested that there was no buffer zone in their thinking “between the chrysanthemum [ideals] and the sword [blood].” He recounted an entry in a soldier’s diary describing his glee at the vicious gang rape of a 13-year-old Chinese girl by him and his companions. The soldier’s next lines are his picturesque description of a “branch of pink-white peach blossoms gently swaying in a soft breeze against a bright blue sky as he lay enthralled on a patch of sweet-smelling grass.” He was taken back to his childhood in a village and recalled the love and respect he had always felt for his parents and his tender affection for his siblings. It is with a sense of justice that Toland recounts that that soldier’s unit was destroyed in battle the following day.<sup>61</sup>

Other thoughts include those advanced by Dorn in his book, *The Sino-Japanese War*. He suggested that Japanese boys and men in the Army led greatly restricted lives, but once in uniform, “he felt 10 feet tall and cast aside the constrictive restraints that had characterized his youth.” Most soldiers believed that partaking “of the aura of the emperor’s divinity . . . made them immune in their own eyes to censorship by mere humans for slaughtering those whom they considered a lesser order of humanity.” Many Japanese commanders drummed into their men’s heads that the Chinese were mere insects and wild animals. Dorn noted, “brainwashed into a pseudo-idealistic belief that his mission was essentially a crusade to liberate the Chinese people from oppression, the average Japanese soldier had been shocked at the rejection of his efforts at liberation.” Frustrated by his

perceived rejection and the resistance of Japan's "high purpose" and the "nagging fear that he was being drawn into an endless, ever more perilous morass, were transformed in his mind into a sullen urge for vengeance and violent action."<sup>62</sup> Two days before the fall of Nanking, the American gunboat *Panay*, under the command of Lt. Cmdr. James J. Hughes on the Yangtze, had pulled out of Nanking and proceeded to Hohsien, about 28 miles upstream. Among the passengers was Capt. Frank Roberts, earlier Dorn's fellow language student and from 1934 to 1938 an assistant military attaché. Others on board were two secretaries from the US Embassy, two from the Italian Embassy, and several civilians. On 12 December 1937, while acting as escort for three Standard Oil Company vessels, the *Panay* was attacked by Japanese aircraft, though the American boat was clearly marked by large American flags. Hughes was severely wounded and unable to function, and two seamen and a steward were killed. Forty-eight crew members and several civilians were wounded. Roberts, then the senior officer aboard, took command. He ordered the boat, which was sinking, to steer for shore and be beached. The boat, while being strafed, was then abandoned and the survivors proceeded through some high dense reeds on shore. They were found by Chinese farmers who led the party to safety.<sup>63</sup> Within a few days, US Navy intelligence decoded an intercepted radio message that indicated the attack on the *Panay* had been deliberately planned by officers on the Japanese carrier *Kaga*. While this incident might have provided Chiang Kai-shek with his longed-for US intervention, the Japanese promptly apologized to the United States and expeditiously paid an indemnity of \$2,214,007.36. In addition, when four British gunboats had similarly been attacked at about the same time, the Japanese responded with an apology and compensation even before Britain formally protested. Apparently local Japanese commanders, "over exuberant and heady with success," had acted on their own. The Japanese government was not yet ready to take on the United States and Britain, whose combined fleets were three times the size of their own.<sup>64</sup>

Following the *Panay* affair, the US 15th Infantry Regiment withdrew from Tientsin, where it had been stationed since 1912. The soldiers sailed for Fort Lewis, Washington, on 2 March 1938, bringing an end to any significant US Army presence in China.<sup>65</sup> Meanwhile, Dorn left Shanghai and returned to Tsingtao on the Shantung Peninsula. From there, he observed the Japanese military action that would result in its conquest. In Tsingtao—a colorful former German city when the area was in German hands, as was true throughout China, even in the midst of the rapidly developing war—life seemed to take on an ever-more-frenzied pace. Ordered to leave Tsingtao

by the mayor, Chinese citizens obeyed, fleeing by the thousands. On 24–25 December, the Chinese army of the Shantung warlord-governor, Han Fu-ch’u, also departed “leaving the city to the looters.” Han Fu-ch’u then left his troops leaderless “in pell-mell rout” while he flew to Kaifeng in Honan Province just to the west of Shantung. Not so the foreigners, including Dorn. “We,” he recorded, “safely wrapped in the protection of our white skins, bounced from one Christmas party to another and planned a rollicking New Year’s Eve at the cavernous old German-built Tsingtao Club.”<sup>66</sup>

On 28 December, the Japanese moved into Tsinan, the capital of Shantung Province. On 11 January 1938, a Japanese fleet which had appeared near the doomed port of Tsingtao began debarking Japanese marines. This force was met by white-flag-waving foreign residents and businessmen asking that Tsingtao be spared destruction. Dorn and another embassy official were ordered to refrain from joining the group. This effort was apparently successful. Instead of shooting, the Japanese raised flags over various buildings, and as Dorn observed, “the show was over . . . or *almost* over.”<sup>67</sup>

What Dorn referenced was subsequent action taken by Chiang, “who had to settle accounts with a scapegoat. In China there always had to be a scapegoat.” How else could Chiang, “the knower of all things, be absolved of blame for the loss of most of the country north of the Lunghai Railway?” Accordingly on his arrival at Kaifeng, Han Fu-ch’u was arrested on Chiang’s orders, divested of his rank and property, and ordered to stand trial at the military headquarters in Wuchang across the Yangtze from the Chinese administrative capital at Hankow. Han Fuch’u was promptly found guilty of numerous crimes and shot on 24 January 1938. Dorn concluded that in this fashion, the end of an era was marked: that of the all-powerful local warlords.<sup>68</sup>

As for Dorn, the loss of the Shantung Province “ended my usefulness as an observer between the Yellow River and the Lunghai Railway.” A few days later in January 1938, he was temporarily ordered back to Peking. There, he reflected upon his past six months spent in “knocking around war zones.” Back in Japanese-occupied Peking, he was surprised to find that the city’s social life, “essentially unchanged by the annoyance of having a war on its doorstep, seemed as enjoyable to me as ever.”<sup>69</sup> Indeed, one of the noteworthy aspects of Japan’s occupation of vast tracts of China was that the lengthy porous Japanese lines did not seal off China completely. The millions of Chinese citizens often resumed their daily lives after the frequently intense military actions had subsided, living as they had for centuries. In China’s long history, the Han Chinese had earlier absorbed the Mongols and later the Manchus while retaining much that

was simply “Chinese.” Along the way, they often “civilized” the brash foreigners and converted them to many of their ancient traditions. Would they have been able eventually to accomplish the same with the Japanese? In certain instances during the Sino-Japanese War, they simply exchanged the rule of their own oppressive warlords for the Japanese. The Japanese also needed supplies produced by Chinese labor, and trade and exchanges resumed “under new management.” Additionally, in some areas the Japanese installed puppet regimes headed by Chinese collaborators. In many cases, opposing Japanese and Chinese military commanders agreed to local ceasefire arrangements. It is to be noted that the Stilwell family did not evacuate China during these hazardous times but continued to live off and on in occupied Peking. Though hampered, they were able to remain until their departure from China in 1939. Dorn also made his way between Chinese and Japanese areas, though there were often difficulties. He was, nonetheless, able to get goods and papers as well as other objects and materials into and out of the occupied areas.<sup>70</sup>

By this time, Dorn—similar to most Americans in the diplomatic service—had arrived from Peking to Hankow, the once-more temporary administrative center to which the Chinese government had fled after leaving Nanking. It was to function there for eight months, from the end of 1937 until 27 October 1938 when Hankow, in turn, was captured by the Japanese. This forced the removal of Chiang’s capital once more, this time to Chungking.<sup>71</sup> Among Dorn’s first orders from Stilwell in Hankow was to contact the chief of the German military mission, Gen. Baron Alexander von Falkenhausen. Later the *gauleiter* of the Netherlands, he was described as “a tall, thick frosty-eyed Prussian Junker,” with his ever-present thick-lens pince-nez trembling from his patrician nose.” Earlier, he had been sent to China by Hitler with a mission of 70 officers to advise and train the Chinese army. They had soon “run up against the usual blank wall of resistance to change.” Their advice was often ignored in favor of the usual preoccupation with views “inherited from the bow and arrow days of ancient history” and implemented by a “goddam medieval mob,” as one German officer described them, with the usual disastrous results. Dorn summed it up, observing that “the Germans were reluctant to admit a failure that they, as highly trained professionals, must surely have foreseen.” Dorn was to have several talks with von Falkenhausen over the next several months before his 10-year mission was recalled by Hitler in June 1938; having given up on China, Hitler was also under some pressure from the Japanese who had signed an Anti-Comintern Pact with him in November 1936. Hitler had maintained a posture of neutrality toward

the Sino-Japanese conflict—continuing to sell arms and equipment to the Chinese government—but it perhaps was more seemly to officially withdraw altogether.<sup>72</sup>

Dorn had also been ordered by Stilwell to make contact with Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist representative in Hankow. He first had to arrange a meeting with him. To these ends, he focused on a newspaper reporter, Agnes Smedley of the *Manchester Guardian*. Then in Hankow, she had spent several months in Yen-an in northwest China where the Communists had landed after their celebrated “Long March.” There, she had become a great admirer of the Communists, especially the officers and soldiers of the celebrated 8th Route Army. Dorn described her as “a radical with a great soft heart [who] refused to submit to any form of discipline,” and he formed a “long friendship with this unhappy, intense woman.” After some maneuvering with help from Smedley, Dorn was able to meet and confer with Chou En-lai.<sup>73</sup> At many subsequent conferences, Dorn “learned to respect [Chou’s] disciplined intelligence, his toughness and pragmatism, his frankness in discussing and analyzing the politico-military situation.” Physically, he was also striking: “heavy eyebrows shaded his large luminous eyes that could sparkle with humor and blaze with intense feeling. His manner exuded an air of charm and vibrant distinction.” Chou emphasized that the Chinese Communists were “actually agrarian reformers who had been branded with the label of Reds.” He stressed the democratic features of Communism, noting that “with some socialistic trends, democracy has worked in your country for over 150 years. Why should it not work in mine?”<sup>74</sup>

During the same time, Dorn reported, that into “this goulash of personalities, stepped Capt. Evans [Fordyce] Carlson, the same whom I had known in Peking.” He had trekked some 1,500 miles to and from the Red stronghold at Yen-an. There, Carlson had spent several months in the field with the Communist 8th Route Army. He was the first foreign military officer to have been with this unit. As such, his pursuit by the foreign press “really turned his head.” He thereupon became a victim of his preconceived picture of the Chinese Communist soldier. Dorn reported that for weeks in Hankow, Carlson went about trying to live up to his own perceived self-image: “Lincolnesque, Christ-like in nobility—wearing a dirty torn shirt and shorts,” as he had been dressed when with the Communists. Dorn as much as ordered Carlson to cease and desist with such nonsense “and start looking like an officer.” When Carlson told Stilwell about the almost angelic virtue of the Red Army, Stilwell replied that he was “mighty skeptical of *any* angels in uniform no matter of what breed.”

When he continued with the statement that no Red Army soldier would even touch a woman, Stilwell's remarks, in "Vinegar Joe" style, were even more pungent.<sup>75</sup>

By the summer of 1938, it seemed that half the world of China had descended on Hankow, waiting "for the kill." In May, Dorn had begun to share quarters with the US Embassy official, John Paton Davies Jr., whose abode became the center of much hubbub, talk, and activity as the ever-widening circle of observers, like so many vultures, awaited "the last gasp of a dying lion." Also, the city's night spots took on the air of a never-ending New Year's Eve. Frequent air raids added to the generally tense air and contributed to the heavy consumption of alcohol to drown the nagging dreads of the future.

In fact, the daytime air raids were sometimes spectacular as Russian airmen, who supplied the bulk of the Chinese defensive air force both as to aircraft and flyers, "grappled in the central blue" with their Japanese adversaries, usually ineffectively. Called "volunteers," ostensibly sent to China to assist the Chinese, actually these airmen were sent to China by Stalin "to give the fliers training under combat conditions and to inflict as much harm as possible on the Japanese air force." Some of the Chinese were also trained by Italian instructors; others by Capt. Claire Chennault, retired from the US Army Air Corps; and a few other American instructors. Dorn noted that the Russian airmen were housed apart, protected from "the contamination of Chinese political ideas" as well as "the nosy inquisitiveness of American attachés like me." Referred to as "stolid, humorless Russians," they "were a surly lot who complained endlessly about living conditions and food." As to food, what they wanted was borsch, black bread, potatoes, chunks of beef, and heavily sweetened tea. What they found was wonton or shark's-fin soup, steamed bread, rice, chicken or pork, and jasmine-flavored tea. He concluded that "they were not heroic airmen by a hell of a sight." He further observed that during most raids, many "didn't even get off the ground." During others, they went off on "special training missions" a long, safe way from the action. They almost never pursued departing enemy aircraft.<sup>76</sup>

In these ever-worsening circumstances, more and more writers and newspaper reporters "reported for duty" in Hankow. These included Arch Steele of the *Chicago Daily News*; Tilden Durdin, "a sharp observer and excellent reporter" of the *New York Times*; Yates McDaniel of the Associated Press; Jack Belden of the United Press; and the writers Freda Utley and Agnes Smedley. Another author of much greater renown was Edgar Snow, who had just published his widely acclaimed *Red Star Over China*.

Among other things, Snow had become a trusted friend of Mao Tse-tung. Though he was not himself a Communist, Snow wrote sympathetically about the Long March and much else about them.

By May, Dorn also set out—as he had previously done immediately after 7 July 1937—to attempt to follow further the course of the war more closely as “an authorized spy,” otherwise known in diplomatic language as a “military attaché.” Initially able to get to the fronts, Dorn soon found that he was increasingly less successful. After the fall of Nanking, the Japanese busied themselves with consolidating their hold on north China and places between the north and the Shanghai-Nanking areas. Dorn’s first stop was Chengchow, a bit south of the Yellow River in Honan Province. His permission to go was routinely disapproved by the Chinese G-2 Office, which he also routinely ignored. Having arrived, Dorn noted that the Japanese troops were arrayed on the north bank of the Yellow and the Chinese were on the south bank. Things were quiet, and there was a “gentlemen’s agreement” in force so that there was no ground action and various goods and commodities went back and forth across the river in boats. Such was not the case with air action; the Japanese bombed and strafed the city and its railway station at will. On one occasion while Dorn was walking about in Chengchow, a 500-pound bomb hit within a few feet of him. Fortunately, it was a dud. Dorn was soon back in Hankow.

In June 1938, one of the greatest catastrophes in the Sino-Japanese War occurred in China. Beginning on 8 June, the Japanese cavalry crossed the Yellow River and headed south. This panicked Chiang, who feared that this thrust would soon descend on his stronghold at Hankow. He ordered that the Yellow River’s 4,000 old dikes be blown up, flooding the Honan plain to cut off the rampaging Japanese. Thousands of troops and millions of Chinese would lose their land and their lives. Soon 4,000 villages in three provinces had been inundated. It did stop the Japanese advance momentarily, but the Yellow River’s lower course had been drastically altered and formed a new mouth 500 miles south of its earlier one. All of this occurred because “a nation’s so-called leader felt the wind in his pants and, scared pissless, issued a stupid order designed only to save his own hide at the expense of millions of others.”<sup>77</sup>

On 20 August 1938, the Japanese offensive against Hankow began in earnest. Initially, the Chinese won some victories, though the Japanese noose steadily tightened. Many Chinese governmental officials from Chiang on down began to decamp, bound for Chungking, as did an ever-growing number of Chinese citizens. The US Embassy staff followed along with the Chiang entourage. As Dorn recorded it, “Nelson Johnson and the embassy

staff, like so many goslings trailing the big goose and gander, chugged up river on the [US Navy] gunboat *Luzon* right behind the G-mo [Generalissimo], the Madame, and their straggling, un-heroic mob of sycophants.”<sup>78</sup>

Despite these exits, the social circle in Hankow that stayed continued what by now amounted to a “nightly dance of death in bars, restaurants, and emptying hotels.” The foreign consulates that remained “stroved to maintain a calm air of efficiency for the Chinese to see, and to prop up their own sagging spirits, as if the world about them was not collapsing into a complete breakdown of all order and control.”<sup>79</sup>

A few weeks later on 25 October, the Japanese began to pour into Hankow; then on 27 October, the conquest was complete. Dorn noted that the entry of the Japanese troops there, so long dreaded in view of what happened at Nanking, “was almost anticlimactic.” A few foreign gunboats remained at anchor nearby. The Japanese entered the city amid cries of “Banz[a]i.” A band came ashore, and played the Japanese commander to his new abode. But this time there were no disorders, no looting, no burning, no murders of civilians, and no raping or brutalizing of terrified women. Then “the army’s complement of patriotic prostitutes landed.” Thereupon, the “few remaining foreigners and hundreds of thousands of Chinese breathed a vast sigh of relief, for it was clear that Hankow would be spared the devastation that had been visited upon Nanking.”<sup>80</sup>

But as had previously occurred, Japanese officials sought their Chinese counterparts with whom they might obtain a formal surrender and arrange “some kind of settlement of this costly military venture from which they could not extricate themselves;” they found no one with whom to negotiate. Hence, Japan was simply further mired in the endless morass of Asia’s core. “They were being sucked ever deeper into the quick sands of its unlimited space.” To some extent, accordingly, Chiang’s drawing upon ancient Chinese military thinking was in fact effective and proved viable, though at a frightful cost in Chinese casualties.<sup>81</sup>

At the same time, between 12 and 21 October 1938, the Japanese forced the surrender of Canton. Following this a stalemate ensued, though the Japanese did complete much of their consolidation of the parts of China that they now controlled. Thus, with the fall of Hankow and Canton, the major phase of the military operations of the Sino-Japanese conflict during this period was over. Though China had lost much that was vital to its country’s viability, the Japanese, who held much territory by a million troops, found themselves empty-handed. To be sure, while they had accomplished their military objectives, they had not succeeded in achiev-

ing their political ends. They had not conquered the Chinese people, the majority of whom were rural, living in small towns and villages and on farms. Indeed, they could, and often did, proceed to live their lives much as before. The Japanese were in a state of continuing frustration in that the Chinese simply would not, or could not, see the advantages that might be gained by joining the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. After the fall of Canton, the next three years—until the coming of Pearl Harbor—rocked along with the Chinese employing the ancient strategies of “trading space for time.” Thus by 1941, though Japan had occupied much of north and coastal China, Chiang’s central government and military had successfully retreated to China’s western interior centered on Chungking, far up the Yangtze. The intent was to continue resistance, while elsewhere the Communists conducted ceaseless guerilla activities. At the same time, the main Chinese strategy was to drag out the war, thereby exhausting Japanese resources by building up their own forces. This was sometimes referred to as “winning by outlasting.” Unfortunately, Chiang often used this strategy to enable him to prepare for what he mainly intended: to fight the Communists, whom he regarded as the greater menace to his regime; to defeat them; and then turn to the “lesser threat,” the Japanese.

Meanwhile in early September 1938, during these tumultuous times, Colonel Stilwell asked if Dorn would accept a one-year extension to his four-year tour of duty in China. He readily assented, but he and Stilwell then confronted the long-outdated Manchu Law of the US Army. This stipulated that combat arms officers could not remain away from troop duty for more than four years. Stilwell hoped to circumvent this by transferring Dorn to the Chemical Warfare Service in China. But as Dorn described it, “some horrified chair warmer” in the adjutant general’s office in Washington perceived this as a dastardly trick and promptly had him transferred back to the Field Artillery under orders to return to the United States on schedule.

Accordingly, Dorn proceeded to Peking to collect his possessions. He then made his way to Hong Kong. There, he enjoyed a calm spell that “after months in the wreckage of the Yangtze Valley . . . was a blessed relief.”<sup>82</sup> After a few days there, having arranged for his possessions to be shipped to the United States, Dorn boarded a French steamer for Haiphong. He thereupon embarked upon a three-and-a-half-month trip in late 1938 and early 1939 that would end with his arrival in the United States as ordered.<sup>83</sup>

This lengthy sojourn was to be one of the most interesting of Dorn’s career. At last after many months under severe stress and facing many dangers, he would have a beneficial respite. He had first planned to cross Siberia to Moscow and spend two months in the Soviet Union. But he

had second thoughts about freezing to death “in that dreary country” and opted, instead, for “lands of warmth and sunlight and beauty” and headed to French-Indochina. There he encountered the striking Bay of Along as well as Hanoi, which he thought could have been lifted right out of Aix-en-Provence in France had it not been for the heat and humidity. Another astonishing place was the city of Hué in present-day Vietnam, with the Annamite king’s version of Peking’s Forbidden City. Then on to Saigon, popularly called the “Paris of the Orient”—a designation with which Dorn did not agree—nor was he impressed with other sites along the way. Then by hired auto, he arrived at Siem Reap near Angkor in Cambodia, where things changed dramatically. Remaining there for ten “never-to-be-forgotten days,” he became enthralled with the restored ruins, ancient temples and palaces, and legends and history of the country.

It was then on to Siam, also a hot and sticky country. Still, Bangkok could not fail to impress him with its palaces and pagodas in large numbers; the fine Palace Hotel also interested him, with its cooling fans, luxury, and a profusion of flowers and fruit. Dorn did not fail to take a river cruise to the ancient capital of Ayutthaya with its gigantic bronze Buddha, which he considered well worth a visit. He then departed by the Siamese section of the railway down the long peninsula to Malaya, which was perfect as to cleanliness, food, service, and coolness, a great departure from what he had known in China.

Along the way to Singapore, Dorn was unimpressed with Penang, but Kuala Lumpur with its mosque-like architecture and colorful crowds was well worth seeing. Finally arriving at Singapore, Dorn took a suite in the “justly famed Raffles Hotel,” which featured a wide-arched, breezy open lobby manifesting a general spaciousness. He was not impressed, however, with the state of British defenses in the area, noting that all of the heavy artillery was pointing toward the sea to meet a naval attack and none toward the Malay Peninsula to the north, a fateful state of affairs as subsequent events revealed. The water supply, he further concluded, was all piped in from the mainland and could easily be cut off. He was correct in his assessments, as was proved later when the Japanese rather easily captured the city.

Dorn then headed to Sumatra, in the Dutch East Indies. Soon, he was on a small steamer headed for Batavia, the capital of the Dutch East Indies. En route, he viewed Mount Krakatoa, “squatty and jagged,” which appeared menacing in the twilight and made him shiver to think of its catastrophic 1883 eruption. Dorn called Batavia, with its profusion of natural and manmade beauty, a “colorful and proud tropical city.” He stayed at

the sprawling Hotel des Indes in its own park—unlike most hotels in its superb service and immense meals. Recalling his own Dutch ancestry, he simply enjoyed visiting with many Dutchmen to get the “feel” of Holland.

Continuing in the East Indies, Dorn went to Bandung in the mountains to view the incredible temple-monument of Borobodur, a vast many-storied stone edifice with hundreds of stupas and many seated Buddhas, each in its own shrine, all being topped by a gigantic central stupa. Had he not been to Angkor earlier, he would have been speechless at the sight, he declared.

His next destination was Jogyakarta. Here, on his train he encountered another of the many sometimes unaccountable and striking fortune-telling experiences of his life. This was to be one of the weirdest, as he told it, that he ever experienced. A half-Indian half-Javanese entered his compartment. Asking no pay for his presentation, the man began a detailed account of Dorn’s family in America. Reeling off dates and facts, he noted that Dorn would soon make a change in his travel plans. He would soon return to China “under a greatly different international situation.” He also noted that he saw great dangers in his future; there would be “men fighting in battles, terrible hardships to countless people, sickness, famine.” But “you have a special protection,” he went on, “and you will live to a ripe age. So will your father.” Dorn noted: “he did, to ninety-four.” Dorn’s interlocutor added something rather vague about a “third eye” involving a past incarnation and a Buddhist priest who lived 400 years earlier. Dorn said that he had heard this before; he was informed that he would hear about it again. When Dorn later asked the train conductor about his visitor, he replied that no such man had been on the train. In any case, Dorn added the experience to his growing list of psychic encounters. One does wonder whether Dorn had perhaps earlier adopted the Latin motto, “*favete astrae*,” that is, “let the stars decide.”

Dorn then proceeded, unwillingly at first, on a four-day sojourn to the island of Bali, located two miles off the eastern end of Java in the Dutch East Indies, which he had regarded as “a mere tourist trap.” After his first exposure to the island’s incredible beauty, however, he decided that this was what he had always been looking for; Dorn forthwith cancelled all plans to visit Africa, South America, and other way stops. For the next five weeks, he dwelled in a cottage on Kuta Beach, thoroughly enjoying a respite from the strenuous and dangerous years just past. All he asked was to be booked on the KLM ship *Baloeran* scheduled to sail from Batavia to Rotterdam, Holland, at the end of that time. In the meantime, he enjoyed all the delights that the island afforded. Much of the entertainment centered in the Kuta Beach Hotel. He became especially interested in native

music and dancing. He was pleased, indeed, to be spending the Christmas season of 1938 in a most unfamiliar setting. He must have often “thanked his lucky stars” that he was being embraced by Bali’s balmy breezes and absorbing warmth rather having to endure the deep freeze of a Soviet winter in Moscow. In due course and “hating to leave that paradise on earth,” Dorn set sail in early 1939 on the Dutch KLM *Balleran*, a most comfortable and beautiful passenger liner. They put in first at Shanghai, then on to Colombo, Ceylon. From there, the route was around to “stifling Aden,” across the Red Sea, and into the Suez Canal. Across the Mediterranean, the ship docked at Marseille, France. Opting out of sailing around Gibraltar, Dorn took a train to Paris, Brussels, The Hague, and into Holland, where he visited the city of Doorn, his namesake. Then boarding another Dutch ship, the *Statendam*, he departed Rotterdam bound for Hoboken and home.

Dorn spent a short time in New York, recalling the days when he visited the city while he was at West Point. It was then on to Washington to debrief the “China desk boys in G-2.” There he listened to a tirade from Col. E. Warner McCabe, who gave him hell because he had not visited Russia and Germany. He had counted on hearing Dorn’s report on the Soviet Union. Then the colonel “buttoned his fat lips” when Dorn informed him he had paid for the entire trip which had occurred during his own leave time; Dorn regarded the trip, in part, as a reward for what he had encountered and accomplished in China. And he had learned much more about Asia as well. He then departed for San Francisco and home for three weeks with his family.

While with his family, Dorn’s sister, Evelyn (Ev), who was as obsessed about fortune tellers as he was, set up an appointment with one. That woman informed Dorn that in about three months he would have an accident in his auto. He would not be seriously injured, but his new car would suffer considerable damage. This would occur in a town to which he would be going in a few days. On this cautionary note, Dorn departed for his new posting at the Presidio in Monterey, California, where he arrived in March of 1939.

## Notes

1. "Autobiography," 340.

2. For documents relating to Dorn's progress in the study of the Chinese language, see examination report by Maj. S.V. Constant, the assistant military attaché to Lt. Col. Joseph W. Stilwell, the military attaché in Peking, 2 July 1935. This recorded that Dorn's work "in all phases of the examination was excellent" and noted that in the written phase he had earned a grade of 100 percent. On 22 December 1936, Capt. David D. Barrett, then an assistant military attaché in Peking, examined Dorn on his progress in the Chinese language and stated that it was "satisfactory." This report was also sent to Stilwell. The Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 3.

3. See the book, by a foreign correspondent who lived in China during these years, Hallett Edward Abend, *My Life in China, 1926–1941* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943). See also George N. Kates, *The Years that Were Fat, Peking, 1933–1940* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

4. "Autobiography," 345–46.

5. John Paton Davies Jr., *China Hand: An Autobiography* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1910), 22. Davies was one of the most knowledgeable of Americans at this time regarding China. See also his *Dragon by the Tail. American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters With China and One Another* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972).

6. Davies, 22.

7. "Autobiography," 349.

8. Sven Hadin, *My Life as an Explorer (1938)* (Washington, DC: National Geographic Press, reprint edition, 2003). There are numerous photographs and prints of many aspects of life in Peking and vicinity in the Audio-Visual Section of the Frank Dorn Papers, Envelopes F through L.

9. "Autobiography," 352.

10. "Autobiography," 352.

11. "Autobiography," 353.

12. "Autobiography," 353.

13. For photos of the residence, see the Frank Dorn Papers, Audio-Visual Section, Envelope G.

14. For details about the American 31st Infantry Regiment, which was the US force then deployed to Shanghai, see Alfred Emile Cornebise, *The United States Army in China, 1900–1938. A History of the 9th, 14th, 15th and 31st Regiments in the East* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2015), 182–227. For the larger picture, see Donald A. Jordan, *China's Trial by Fire: The Shanghai War of 1932* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001).

15. "Autobiography," 362–63. Johnson was soon replaced by Clarence Gauss as US ambassador. Additionally, John Paton Davies Jr. described Johnson as "a gregarious, roly-poly Oklahoman . . . [whose] instincts and behavior were those of a folksy, shrewd small-town politician." Davies, *China Hand*, 21.

16. "Autobiography," 363.

17. For scenes of Jehol, Dolunor, and Kalgan, see the Audio-Visual section of the Frank Dorn Papers, Envelope G.

18. "Autobiography," 365–66, 378. For Dorn's views on Chinese cooking, see his *A General's Diary of Treasured Recipes* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), xiii, passim.

19. "Autobiography," 366–68.

20. "Autobiography," 368. For what life was like for Westerners in China in the 1930s, see especially George N. Kates, *The Years that Were Fat: Peking, 1933–1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Hallett Edward Abend, *My Life in China, 1926–1941* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943); and Pearl S. Buck, *My Several Worlds* (New York: Pocket Books, 1954). Kates's book well illustrates how Westerners could well live "lives of Riley" on relatively little money.

21. Frank Dorn, *Walkout: with Stilwell in Burma* (New York: Crowell, 1971), 12. For photographs of this mansion and the gardens as well as some of Dorn's staff, see the Audio-Visual Section of the Frank Dorn Papers, Envelope G. For Sun, the cook, see Dorn's book, *A General's Diary of Treasured Recipes* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), xi.

22. Dorn, *Walkout*, 13.

23. "Autobiography," 364–65.

24. Davies, *China Hand*, 22–23.

25. Kates, *The Years that Were Fat*, 96–103.

26. "Autobiography," 374.

27. For information on Colonel Barrett, see the "David D. Barrett Papers, 1933–70," <http://www.oac.cdlib.org/institutions/Hoover+Institutution>. See also John N. Hart, *The Making of an Army "Old China Hand: A Memoir of Colonel David D. Barrett* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985). Professor John King Fairbank of Harvard once commented on Barrett's language accomplishments: "Dave Barrett had learned his Chinese in Peking, in the pure crystalline form that gave the speaker a bit of prestige everywhere else in China. Speaking Pekinese indeed could diminish a foreigner's foreignness, and Dave spoke it with an obvious love of every tone and phrase." See also J. Kahn, *The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them* (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), 75, and David D. Barrett, *Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yen-an, 1944* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970).

28. Hart, *The Making of an Army "Old China Hand,"* 17. For the map, see also the 22-page booklet written by Dorn and published as *A Map and History of Peiping; Explanatory Booklet* (Tientsin: Peiyang Press, 1936).

29. The coming of the war in 1937, the emergence of the Communists, and much else meant that the original rough draft gathered dust for more than 30 years. He was able to resume his research only after World War II and move to its publication. This appeared as *The Forbidden City: The Biography of a Palace* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), xi, Preface. Dorn felt compelled to justify the term "biography" in the title. He explained that "in a sense the great

palaces of Peking are a gigantic living entity. Having endured for over five centuries and having absorbed the lives of myriad people, they have created a spirit closely akin to life itself—a life that still pulses with the warm blood of history.”

30. “Autobiography,” 383–84.

31. Davies, *China Hand*, 52.

32. For details about Chiang, see Jonathon Fenby, *Chiang Kai-shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost* (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003); Brian Crozier, *The Man Who Lost China: The First Full Biography of Chiang Kai-shek* (New York: Scribner, 1976); and Sean Dolan, *Chiang Kai-shek* (New York: Chelsea House, 1988). To learn more about Madame Chiang, see Hannah Pakula, *The Last Empress: Madame Chiang Kai-shek and the Birth of Modern China* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010) and Laura Tyson Li, *Madame Chiang Kai-shek: China's First Lady* (New York: Grove Press, 2007).

33. Dorn, *The Sino-Japanese War, 1937–41: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor* (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1974), 1–2, 38–39. This is a substantial, even profound book. This Sino-Japanese War is known as the Second Sino-Japanese War. The first Sino-Japanese War extended from 25 July 1894 to 17 April 1895 and focused on Korea.

34. Dorn, 3.

35. Dorn, 38.

36. Dorn, 11–12. This era, which ended with Mao's triumph in 1949, has been referred to in China as “The Century of Shame.” For details on this subject, see Alfred Emile Cornebise, *The United States Army in China, 1900–1938: A History of the 9th, 14th, 15th and 31st Regiments in the East* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2015).

37. “Autobiography,” 395.

38. Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1971), 241. Stilwell used five assistant military attachés during this time.

39. Alfred Vagts, *The Military Attaché* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

40. Hart, *The Making of an Army “Old China Hand,”* 5–6.

41. “Autobiography,” 395–96. The city was formally surrendered on 8 August 1937. For illustrations of some of these events, see the Audio-Visual Section of the Frank Dorn Papers, Envelopes I, L, and M.

42. To a considerable extent, the life of Westerners continued apace, though with growing difficulties as the Sino-Japanese War unfolded. Dorn, *The Sino-Japanese War*, 46–47.

43. There are many editions of this work. Some scholars suggest that this publication should also be applied to the study of Chinese diplomatic and administrative histories as well as solely military matters.

44. This Taoist term was defined by the Taoist founder and teacher, *Lao Tzu*. Taoism—“The Way”—was founded in about the sixth century BCE, as far back as Sun Tzu's book.

45. For details about Taoism, see Ursula K. Le Guin, *Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching: A Book about the Way and the Power of the Way* (New York: Penguin, 1998).

46. John Keay, *China: A History* (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 129, and Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs* (New York: The Modern Library, 1999).

47. "Autobiography," 396.

48. Dorn, *The Sino-Japanese War*, 51–52.

49. "Autobiography," 399.

50. "Autobiography," 399.

51. "Autobiography," 402. Dorn's own private response to Johnson's exhortations was: "Who the hell do you think you're kidding?" The exchange provides a glimpse into the US State Department's stance at this time.

52. Dorn, *The Sino-Japanese War*, 57–66, and corresponding maps.

53. Dorn, 65–66.

54. Dorn, 66.

55. "Autobiography," 402.

56. "Autobiography," 403.

57. Dorn, *The Sino-Japanese War*, 80; "Autobiography," 403–04.

58. Dorn, 70.

59. Dorn, 86–88.

60. There are numerous studies of this Holocaust. Some of the most important are: Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997); Masahiro Yamamoto, ed., *Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity* (New York: Praeger, 2000); Joshua A. Fogel, ed., *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000); and Timothy Brook, ed., *Documents on the Rape of Nanking* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999). Iris Chang is by far the most famous of these authors and editors. Stricken by profound depression, she committed suicide by gunshot wound on 9 November 2004 at age 36. She has since been honored by an entire museum dedicated to her at Huai'an, China; by a bronze statue at the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall at Nanjing, China; and by a bust dedicated on 1 February 2007, at the Hoover Institution library in Palo Alto, California. There are other remembrances to her of various sorts at several locations worldwide.

61. John Toland, *The Rising Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), 65-66. See also Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (New York: Meridian Books, 1967) for comparisons between Japanese and Western cultures. It is instructive to note that the Japanese troops and their commanders took thousands of pictures that they proudly sent home to their families; the photos provide irrefutable proof of their bestiality. It should also be noted that the Japanese government, even to this day, does not acknowledge responsibility for these events, nor has it ever apologized for them.

62. Dorn, *The Sino-Japanese War*, 93–94.

63. Dorn, 95–96.

64. Dorn, 95–96.

65. See Alfred Emile Cornebise, *The United States Army in China, 1900–1938: A History of the 9th, 14th, 15th and 31st Regiments in the East* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2015), 100–13. Also for the *Panay* affair, see Manny T. Koginos, *The Panay Incident: Prelude to War* (Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Studies, 1967); Hamilton Darby Perry, *The Panay Incident: Prelude to Pearl Harbor* (New York: Macmillan, 1969); and “Nippon Planes Bomb and Sink US Gunboat *Panay*,” The US *Panay* Memorial Website, <http://www.usspanay.org>. The Colonel Roberts papers are at the Truman Library, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpape/robertsfn.htm>.

66. “Autobiography,” 410–11.

67. “Autobiography,” 410.

68. “Autobiography,” 411.

69. “Autobiography,” 411.

70. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*, 250–53.

71. Tuchman states that Stilwell arrived in Hankow in December 1937 but was back and forth to Peking, including in the summer of 1938 when he spent the season there with his family. Tuchman, 224–25, 241–47.

72. Nonetheless, a few German officers out of concern for the Chinese elected to remain behind. A few of these were still in Chungking in 1942–43, persona non grata in their homeland but still attempting to help the Chinese army. Nonetheless, their efforts were fruitless because neither Chiang nor his generals “had the good sense nor the humility of spirit to accept advice from anyone.” See Dorn, *Sino-Japanese War*, 200–01.

73. “Autobiography,” 416–18. For Smedley’s books, see *Daughter of the Good Earth* (1929), described as a forlorn, beautifully written novel-memoir; *Chinese Destinies* (1933); *China’s Red Army Marches* (1934); *China Fights Back: An American Woman with the Eighth Route Army* (1938); and *Battle Hymn of China* (1943). See also Ruth Price, *The Lives of Agnes Smedley* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), and Janice R. MacKinnon and Stephen R. MacKinnon, *Agnes Smedley: The Life and Times of an American Radical* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988).

74. “Autobiography,” 416–17.

75. Also for Carlson, see remarks by John Paton Davies Jr.: “He was forty-ish, a lanky rawboned fellow, less homely than Abraham Lincoln, less handsome than Gary Cooper.” He had also been directed to write personally to Franklin D. Roosevelt regarding conditions in China, though to what effect is unknown. Apparently Roosevelt had taken a liking to this “rugged, idealistic officer,” as he saw him, when he commanded the president’s marine guard at Warm Springs, Georgia, where FDR vacationed and worked on his shattered legs. Carlson had already served twice in China. Davies, *China Hand*, 26. Carlson’s books are *Twin Stars of China* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1940) and *The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency* (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940). Studies of Carlson include Duane Schultz, *Evans Carlson, Marine Raider: The Man Who Commanded America’s First*

*Special Forces* (Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishers, 2014), and John Wukorvits, *American Commando: Evans Carlson, His WWII Marine Raiders and America's First Special Forces Mission* (New York: NAL, 2009).

76. Dorn, *The Sino-Japanese War*, 193–94.

77. “Autobiography,” 424–25.

78. “Autobiography,” 408.

79. Dorn, *The Sino-Japanese War*, 210.

80. Dorn, 221–23.

81. Dorn, 223. It is also sometimes forgotten that the Chinese won some substantial victories in this time, as at Changsha and Guangxi. The Japanese subsequently had tremendous difficulties in administering and garrisoning the seized territories. They had to resort to creating friendly puppet governments, but because of Japanese atrocities and for other reasons, the Japanese occupations were ineffective and precluded much from happening favorable to the Japanese.

82. “Autobiography,” 429, 436–44; Dorn, 213.

83. “Autobiography,” 445–59. During this time, Stilwell and his family were mainly in Japanese-occupied Peking rather than in Chungking. This was plainly a difficult time for them, and they were ordered back to the United States and made their departure from China on 1 May 1939. They then embarked on a three-month leave, which was spent on a tour through Siam, Indochina, Malay, and Java before sailing to the United States in mid-August. See Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*, 252–55. For numerous pictures of postcards that Dorn collected on his journey, see the Frank Dorn Papers, Audio Visual Section, Envelope Z.



## Chapter 5

### Another Interlude: The Presidio of Monterey, California, March to September 1939, and Fort Sam Houston, Texas, September 1939 to July 1940

*I had been more than fortunate to have had that interlude [in China]—like an all-absorbing mistress for whom the flowing heat of love, once cooled can never be rekindled, nor could its cold ashes ever be forgotten. I'd been lucky, too, in having those years during my early thirties, the strength and physical prowess, along with most of the nerve and a large measure of the wide-eyed imagination of youth . . . yet old enough to have achieved a measure of common sense and judgment with enough maturity to have acquired an understanding of others, to have learned the value of loyalty in men, and to treasure the spiritual as well as the physical in women. Yes . . . I had been more than lucky, and it was now my turn to take a share of the lumps and the drab.<sup>1</sup>*

—Frank Dorn

Back at home, Dorn “knew at once that it had been a damned good thing I’d long since admitted to myself that the good living in Peking and the excitement of China at war had to be a once-in-a-lifetime experience that might never be repeated.” Nor could it be dragged out “in tepid imitation, as so many ‘Old China Hands’ tried to do.” Certain it was, too, that the Army—and the nation as a whole—benefitted considerably from the activities of the military attachés in the face of formidable dangers, during these years of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Nonetheless, much that was garnered and understood by men such as Gen. Joseph Warren Stilwell and Dorn was not immediately used in the months and years ahead. Americans were deeply isolationist in the 1930s; they were contending with the severe Depression and accordingly were not, at the time, tuned in to their activities in China. These matters received little attention in the American literature and documentation of that period. Many of their reports were filed away for future reference if they were in fact ever referred to at all. It is necessary to note the great chaos that ensued in Washington in December 1941 to grasp the magnitude of the effects of the raid on Pearl Harbor

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This chapter is based on information from Dorn’s Autobiography, 463–99, hereinafter referenced as “Autobiography.”

that pointed up a general lack of preparation for understanding what had ensued in Asia before the attack. Therefore, this lack of much knowledge or concern about what was happening there must be understood when assessing the role of such as Stilwell and Dorn there in the 1930s. Though by 1941, there was much concern in the United States with events in Europe, there was much less regarding China. Nonetheless, there were plans to take some steps calculated to aid the Chinese in their ongoing battle with the Japanese. One of the most important was China's inclusion in the Lend-Lease Program of March 1941, primarily intended to aid Britain, the Soviet Union, and other countries in their conflicts with Nazi Germany. Another measure relating to China was the creation of an American volunteer group to establish an air force there. These will be discussed below.

To be sure, Americans were belatedly increasingly aware of dangers in the world, especially in Europe; clearly some preparation for the possibility that the United States might need to be ready for military action in the future was recognized. One of the areas involved was California, at such sites as Monterey. Still, in Dorn's estimation, it was nothing more than a "small peewee post, neither much to look at nor of much importance at the time when most of the world was burnishing its armor and sharpening its swords for battle." It also seemed to him to be "on the penny ante side—a peanut-sized, quarrelsome Army post." Life could be pleasant enough, though, he admitted, and the post enjoyed a magnificent scenic view overlooking Monterey Bay. This vista was enhanced by groves of a rare tree: the skinny, "artistic looking" Monterey evergreen, called in Lebanon the "Cedar of Lebanon" of Biblical lore. These only grew in the Ryukyu Islands in Japan, in Lebanon and Asia Minor, and in Monterey.<sup>2</sup> The area was interesting, too, in its Spanish and Mexican history; cultural remains; and more recent history in the 1920s through the 1940s, when huge fishing fleets and canneries crowded the area—the "Cannery Row" of literary fame associated with John Steinbeck. Other interesting towns were Pebble Beach, Pacific Grove, and what Dorn called one "of the cutest, darlinest" little towns with a "quaintsy-daintsy" atmosphere provided by artists, writers, actors, and "would-be cultural buffs"—Carmel-by-the-Sea. Dorn soon checked in at post headquarters but was disappointed to be assigned to the office of the post quartermaster, a rather steep comedown from his China activities. Those in command, aware of Dorn's discomfort, assured him that the assignment was temporary and did what they could to ease his lot, though he would be there for some months. He found, as usual, congenial comrades, but the post was also steeped in an atmosphere "of the bickering, gossipy, backbiting, and cliquish small-time Army post." As Dorn ob-

served, “I was criticized by the artillery group for being too friendly with the cavalry, by my cavalry friends for inviting artillery officers and wives for cocktails, and by both for associating at all with the quartermaster element.” Nevertheless, among these officers there were many who, proving themselves to possess high intelligence and above average abilities, would achieve high rank during World War II.<sup>3</sup> Though Dorn was generally satisfied with his new station and life could be pleasant enough, he could not help comparing the local scene with what he had experienced the past five years or so. Having seen much of the world on a far larger stage, he could not work himself up over “a cheesy county fair, a half-baked civilian, or half-assed Army horse show.” In addition, the citizenry were pigeonholed in the usual way: the country club, the lodge, the huge Del Monte Hotel for dinners and dancing, the golf courses, a trip to the city;” though there were interesting characters in some of the nearby towns, many pursued “culture” with “grim determination, including painting, sculpture, wood carving, weaving, the ballet, theatricals in the round and in the square, not to mention the local symphony which stank.” Dorn could only reflect that he had had “plenty of that kind of life on a far larger and grander stage, and had enjoyed it up to the hilt.” He could not know that after his retirement from the Army he would spend ten years in Carmel, and fully participate in that very cultural scene that he then denigrated. He did get some relief from boredom in that his family often visited him from San Francisco.<sup>4</sup>

As the summer progressed, Dorn’s work pace accelerated when the annual Army summer training activities began at Camp Gigling, about 13 miles from the Presidio. Dorn’s quartermaster services were then urgently required. Working long hours on one particularly trying Saturday evening, he found himself dozing as he attempted to get home. The next thing he knew was a resounding crash and waking up from a brief blackout that followed. He had driven his car into a telephone pole. After initial misunderstandings with a local policeman, having been properly identified, he was taken to a hospital and patched up. Dorn then remembered the fortune-teller who had noted that in three months or so he would have an accident while driving his car, which would sustain considerable damage, though he himself would not be seriously injured. So it had come to pass and he could only conclude “that one had turned out to be too damned close for comfort.”<sup>5</sup>

At this juncture, one of the more significant events in Dorn’s subsequent life and career occurred. When the summer training program was almost completed, Dorn was informed that Brig. Gen. Joseph Stilwell and his family had just arrived from China to their home in Carmel-by-the-

Sea. While onboard the transport, Stilwell had learned of his promotion to brigadier general, one of Gen. George C. Marshall's first nominations for general officer rank following his own recent appointment as the Army's chief of staff. Dorn soon made his way to Carmel to congratulate his former chief. Stilwell had shortly before written Dorn that the family was on the way home. Just prior to leaving China, they had carried out a lengthy sailing trip taking them to Hong Kong, Hanoi, Saigon, and Bangkok, about which Dorn wondered, "how in the hell did that place get its name?" They then proceeded to Penang, Singapore, Java, Bali, and Manila; Stilwell acknowledged that Dorn's report of his earlier trip had had an influence on their venture.<sup>6</sup>

Stilwell almost immediately asked Dorn to be his aide-de-camp. Dorn wanted to think it over, though he was delighted at the prospect. He first sounded out Stilwell's wife, Win, and other members of the family, because "there was always a personal family side to being an aide." They readily assented; Win, laughing, noted that "you are the family's choice. Joe thinks that you and he can go places together. So do I," she declared. Neither of them knew what was fatefully to lie in store for them and their respective Army careers. And so it was arranged after an interesting *pas de deux*. Stilwell was ordinarily not interested in aides in general, seeing them as "door-openers, and coat-hangers." It was therefore with some embarrassment that he sought out Dorn for his. "I know what you think of aides," he said, "and I know what you think of generals." But he went on, stating that "I've got a proposition for you. I'll be a new kind of general and you can be a new kind of aide."<sup>7</sup> Dorn thereupon gladly accepted Stilwell's offer and—with the arrival of Stilwell's orders to Fort Sam Houston, Texas—prepared to follow him there. Certain it was that the coming together of Stilwell and Dorn was a fortuitous development and they were destined to influence each other's lives considerably, especially in the years of World War II. In a 31 March 1939 letter to Dorn from China, Stilwell had written that "we are looking forward to seeing you in Monterey. I am glad we were out here at the same time, and I appreciate the excellent work you turned in on all occasions. It was a grand feeling to be able to say 'No worry there; Dorn is on the job.'"<sup>8</sup>

Their deployment to Fort Sam Houston, in San Antonio, Texas, extended from September 1939 to July 1940. Dorn noted that far from being a "pee-wee" place as he had labeled the Presidio, San Antonio and Fort Sam Houston had been modernized and had also grown considerably since his first appearance there. San Antonio was by then a city, and Fort Sam Houston had overcome its drab Texas setting of *caleche*, cactus, and

scrubby growth set in rolling, rocky hills. He was soon well-quartered in a two-story house with good appointments. While at Fort Sam Houston, Dorn received a letter of commendation from the War Department's Adjutant General's Office in Washington, DC, in recognition of "the meritorious services performed by you as a language officer and acting assistant military attaché in China in the years 1937 and 1938 in gaining important military information and in identifying and locating major units of the Chinese Army demonstrated a high degree of tact, energy, and intrepidity." The letter concluded that "the Secretary of War has noted with interest the report of your services, described above, and directs that you be commended therefor."<sup>9</sup>

Beyond this, there was a vast difference from the daily life at the Presidio. At Fort Sam, "the whole place was jumping with ideas and activity." It was home for the 2nd Division and was the birthplace of the new experimental triangular division that was soon to be the standard for World War II in the American Army. The commander of the fort was Maj. Gen. Walter Krueger, "a dogged, determined type who would ram his way through any situation," as he proved in World War II. Brig. Gen. James Lawton Collins was the artillery commander of the new division organization. Stilwell was assistant division commander.<sup>10</sup> In short, Dorn was soon "more engrossed in the job of soldiering than I had ever been before." Indeed, Dorn reflected that unlike certain instances in his former military activities, he "was actually absorbed by the serious side of being an officer . . . or perhaps I was just maturing a bit." He was especially taken by Stilwell's "emphasis on all details of training and his experiments in mobility, speed, surprise, and unorthodox tactics," all of which "really grabbed my imagination." He thought that "this was the way things always should have been . . . new concepts galvanized by the German 'blitz' tactics . . . the excitement of two-sided free maneuvers, rather than the old stylized patterns . . . the thrill of outwitting one's opponent." He must have reflected on his memories of watching the Chinese attempt to deal with such matters with their ancient methods regarding strategy and tactics—with often, though not always, disastrous results. Though the new approach could be "tiring as hell," it was "sheer fun that was full of life and enthusiasm."<sup>11</sup>

The high command did not long delay in implementing their theories. In October 1939, Stilwell marched the entire division out to Camps Bullis and Stanley for ten days of hectic free-for-alls. The results were salutary and, as a result, Fort Sam was further energized in its ongoing accelerated training pursuits. Dorn also noted other important differences: military interests were steadily replacing civilian concerns in the San Antonio area.

Though it was well before the time of Pearl Harbor, the atmosphere was taking on distinctive attributes of a new sort. In this respect, he noted that the attitudes characteristic of the age of “the Charleston,” of ’20s fame, were slipping away. The “age of maneuvers” also seemed to have arrived. Accordingly in January 1940, the entire division marched to the area of Christine, 50 miles south of San Antonio for winter field exercises. Appropriately, “a hell of a blizzard” called a halt to exercises in the field. The men hunkered down to the task of mere survival in the trying conditions. They indubitably learned much about cold weather survival and how better to prepare for it in the future.

Much of this was a forerunner to the extensive groundbreaking, month-long Louisiana maneuvers of May 1940. They took place over a large area of the western part of Louisiana between Shreveport and Alexandria. This included varied terrain and country, including rolling hills, forests, farmlands, and swamps. The maneuvers were, in fact, sometimes called the “Battle of the Bayous.” The weather also varied greatly, including some terrific rains. Commanders who would be prominent during World War II were involved and, in many instances, set the course of their later careers as commanders during this exercise. Some of the main characters of the 1940 exercises included Stilwell and Gen. “Skinny” Wainwright, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, whose command was “captured” by Stilwell by means of a vigorous forced march during the night. This “upset Krueger’s apple cart” by depriving him of his cavalry unit that he was planning to use for further operations.<sup>12</sup> Nonetheless, Stilwell’s “conquest” was upheld by the umpires headed by Col. “Schnitz” Gruber, who incidentally was the composer of the famous “Caisson Song” in 1908, later the official Army song. The 1940 maneuvers were dwarfed by the much more extensive ones of September 1941.

Gen. George C. Marshall, the Army’s chief of staff, had come to Louisiana to inspect the troops and give them a “pep talk.” Dorn felt that this talk, however, was “more lumbering than peppy” and that Marshall “could be described as a homely, lumbering pontificating type in most of his associations.” He also seemed to be more “dogged and stubborn” than “dignified.” Dorn recognized, however, that those very qualities enabled him “to contain President Franklin Roosevelt’s volatile, smart-aleck ideas within reasonable bounds when it came to the politico-military aspects of World War II.” Certainly, it can be said that Dorn’s views regarding Marshall were rather out of the ordinary, though worthy of note.<sup>13</sup> After the end of the maneuvers, Stilwell went on leave to Carmel, where he had made his home since 1933; Dorn proceeded to visit his family in San Francis-

co. They thereupon took an extended trip through the redwood forests of northern California; into the rugged Oregon coast where he had served with the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) program in the 1930s; taking in Crater Lake and the Oregon caves; then over the Golden Gate and home.

Dorn, having received a warning to expect orders to return to the Presidio where the 7th Division was about to be activated, hastened back to Fort Sam Houston, as did Stilwell who was also involved in these proceedings. Their orders arrived a few days later, and they were once more in California. They would remain there from July 1940 to December 1941. There, the city of Monterey, site of the Presidio and newly established Fort Ord, was suddenly aware that the US Army consisted of more than men and horses, and men smelling of horse sweat.

## Notes

1. "Autobiography," 463.
2. "Autobiography," 463–64.
3. "Autobiography," 466. Though Dorn greatly disliked being mainly involved in supply matters, the camp's executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Van Fleet, perhaps routinely, commended him for his "superior service as Supply Officer of this Camp during the period of July 1st to August 4th, 1939." He also noted: "You are a valuable asset to a command. I would especially desire to have you in peace or war." Letter, 4 August 1939, in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 1-4.
4. "Autobiography," 477–78.
5. "Autobiography," 484–85.
6. For Dorn's earlier accounts of his trip that had influence on the Stilwells, see letter from Stilwell to Dorn, 31 March 1939, in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 16.
7. Tuchman, *Stilwell*, 260–61.
8. Letter from the office of the Military Attaché in China, 31 March 1939, in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 16. Stilwell and his family departed from China soon thereafter on 1 May 1939.
9. The Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 3. The commendation was dated 5 February 1940.
10. James Lawton Collins had two sons. James, who graduated from West Point, became a general and a historian. Michael, who also graduated from West Point, became an astronaut and was one of the three-man team of the Apollo flight that made the first moon landing in 1969. James Collins retired from the Army in 1946 as a major general. His younger brother, Joseph Lawton Collins, had even a more illustrious career, being the Army's chief of staff from 1949 to 1953. He retired as a four-star general.
11. "Autobiography," 491.
12. This reference is to Maj. Gen. Walter Krueger, commander of the US 6th Army.
13. "Autobiography," 498.

## Chapter 6

### Fort Ord and The Presidio of Monterey, California, July 1940 to December 1941, and the Coming of the War

The US Army's 7th Division was to be reactivated and based there as war preparations were accelerated at Fort Ord. Thirty thousand men would be initially involved. If the pace of military life in the 2nd Division at Fort Sam Houston had been jumping, Frank Dorn noted that with the newly forming 7th Division, "it was frantic." The new fort had to be constructed from scratch, and the organizational apparatus put into place. Joseph Warren Stilwell, promoted to major general in August 1940, was the designated commander of the new division. Dorn, his aide, was promoted to major and soon charged with managing public relations for the new division among his other duties. Dorn would, no doubt, learn things about public relations that would serve him well when, after World War II, he again served in this capacity at a much higher level in the Army.

Among his duties in the area of public relations, Dorn met motion picture executives and stars. One of the latter was Robert Montgomery, who broached a suggestion that would lead to the development of war-time United Service Organizations (USO) shows that were so widespread during the war years. It immediately transpired that the first such show would be staged at Fort Ord with a large collection of Hollywood stars in action. An outdoor stage was constructed, and a large seating area accommodating more than 40,000 people was arranged. Among the stars involved in addition to Montgomery were Joe E. Brown, George Jessel, George Burns and Gracie Allen, Madeleine Carroll, Deanna Durbin, Kay Francis, Alice Faye, Edward Everett Horton, Maureen O'Hara, Dick Powell, Martha Raye, Gene Raymond, and Marlene Dietrich. Afterward, Marlene Dietrich gave up the motion picture screen entirely for more than four years and devoted all of her time to the USO program, as did Joe E. Brown after he lost his son during the early days of the war in the Pacific.<sup>1</sup>

In the spring of 1941, the 7th Division was well enough trained to set off to the Hunter Liggett Military Reservation, eighty miles south of Fort Ord, for maneuvers with the California National Guard's 40th Infantry Division and the 3rd Division from Fort Lewis, Washington. The

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This chapter is based on information from Dorn's Autobiography, 500–25, hereinafter referenced as "Autobiography."

Liggett Reservation had, until recently, been a 50,000-acre ranch owned by publisher William Randolph Hearst. With Stilwell in command of the 7th Division, the maneuvers were characterized as a free-for-all; Dorn was placed temporarily in command of an engineer battalion that he used as an assault force, in the course of which, he was having “a hell of a good time.” Though Dorn did not explain the results of the maneuvers in his autobiography, he noted that the 3rd Division from Fort Lewis, commanded by Maj. Gen. Charlie Thompson, “was a damned fine outfit.” This, however, could not be said of the 40th Infantry Division commanded by millionaire Maj. Gen. Walter Story, who had “bought his commission” with huge campaign funds being poured into the state’s political campaigns. His staff was made up of political cronies. Their main concern was with their colorful uniforms—usually being the “old-style blue uniforms”—which they, being “strong on the social side,” often paraded in. Accordingly, Story’s staff was “neither interested in nor even much aware that a combat unit was supposed to be combat worthy.” In short, “Story was not worth a damn, and as an infantry division, the politically ridden 40th was not worth sic-em.”<sup>2</sup>

Thereafter, in the early summer of 1941, the 7th and 40th divisions marched almost a thousand miles to Washington State for a return engagement with the 3rd Division. These maneuvers, of necessity, had to focus on maps and the problems of marching long distances in “some of the most magnificent country in the United States.” As to the “field problems,” Dorn observed that they “bore a certain similarity to those of the past, which I suppose is to be expected.” After all, he went on, “there are only seven basic themes in all fiction. Why should there be any more ‘plots’ among the military when its officers and men are only playing at war?” Therefore, it was as it had always been: “advance, withdraw, attack through the center, envelop on the right or the left, get licked and run like hell, win on points, and pursue like hell.” He concluded: “That’s about [all] the works in the fiction the military creates for itself.”<sup>3</sup>

In late July 1941, Stilwell took command of the US Army’s III Corps, also headquartered at the Presidio. It consisted of the 7th Division, the 40th Division, and Corps Troops. One of the first things he ordered was that in August, the 7th and 40th Divisions were to confront each other in maneuvers at the Hunter Liggett Reservation. The intention was plainly to expose National Guard Major General Story and his “staff” for “the hopeless boobs they were.” The umpires rigorously judged the encounter; when confronted with the many boners that they had pulled, Story—the rich politico—nonetheless refused to give up his command. It then came down

to his physical examination, and it was found that he had ulcers—some “as big as grapefruit”—and also a dangerous nervous condition. He was placed on sick leave, and the California State Adjutant and the Governor were apprised of the situation. These various forms of pressure convinced Story that he should resign his commission, which he did, as did several members of his staff.

The new commander was Maj. Gen. Ernest “Mike” Dawley, one of Dorn’s tactical officers (TACs) at West Point. He immediately put the 40th on a solid track with a vigorous training program, resulting in an excellent combat record in World War II.

By late autumn, the world situation was ever darker. In China, military and economic conditions had deteriorated from bad to worse. Attempts by the American Lend-Lease system to aid Chiang Kai-shek’s China were being thwarted. This was supposed to run from Rangoon via the “Toonerville trolley,” i.e., the Burma Railway system, to Lashio then by truck up the Burma Road to Yunnan Province. It had, however, “resulted in staggering corruption, outright thievery, and appalling Chinese incompetence.” In addition, Chiang’s government—perpetually ridden with graft and incompetent generals—had been unable, or unwilling, to take any effective stand against the Japanese; this resulted in an ever-greater loss of confidence among the Chinese populace.<sup>4</sup> By late November 1941, therefore, the worldwide situation was in dire straits. In these circumstances, Dorn did something characteristic in those years: he consulted a fortune-teller and, “shooting the works,” ordered her most expensive reading—complete with “the crystal ball and an unlimited number of questions.” This worthy was “Madam Doreen,” an Australian living in Carmel. As to the general world situation, she saw a “terrible catastrophe” occurring between the 1st and the 10th of December. She could not make out what it would be: earthquake, flood, or something else, which would be a “frightful thing . . . impossible to avoid.” It would be one of the worst disasters ever to “befall this country.” It would take nearly a year-and-a-half “before the strength and power of the United States begins to recover,” though it would then emerge greater and stronger than ever.<sup>5</sup>

As to Dorn, she predicted that he would soon initially be in North Africa but would remain there only briefly. Then he would go to China, but again only temporarily. Finally, he would go to a place “of many palm trees, a place of intense heat and dark-skinned people who wear bright-colored clothes.” There she saw “many soldiers from different countries” and much fighting and killing. Dorn would “have a very difficult time, a very dangerous time,” and “death will be all around you—at times very close.”

In general, terrible things would happen with burning towns and cities, much destruction, and hunger everywhere. She had great difficulty in determining where this place was, but it was not one that he had previously visited. She finally announced that it must be Burma. She predicted that “in the end you will come out safe and unharmed,” warning that he “must be very careful.” Only following this experience, would Dorn return to China and “stay for a long time.” In short, she concluded that there would be great danger ahead for him in the next few years. As it worked out, Dorn concluded that “Madam Doreen” was right—indeed “so damned right that since that night in late November 1941, I have never visited another fortune-teller,” though he had “some strange ones cross my path in later years,” including “a Chinese abbot of a Buddhist monastery, a senior Chinese general, [and] a woman with the ‘Third Eye’ in California.” It should be noted that there is no evidence that Dorn’s proclivities regarding fortune-tellers had any appreciable effect on the performance of his duties as an Army officer.<sup>6</sup>

As December rolled around, Dorn may well have been experiencing a sense of uncertainty, if not impending doom, if he put any faith in the fortune-teller’s predictions. In any event, at least some of the world was following certain events, including that Admiral Nomura, the Japanese ambassador in Washington, had been reinforced by Saburo Kurusu, who had an American wife and spoke fluent English. These men were apparently entering into “some vague sort of negotiations” with US Secretary of State Cordell Hull, which might have a favorable outcome. What was not known was that Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo and his war party were not only deceiving the US government, but their own envoys as well. Nonetheless, there were warnings that “an aggressive move . . . is to be expected in next few days” and that there might be “possible hostile action at any moment;” but as is well known, there was no significant preparation for the terrible catastrophe that was Pearl Harbor.<sup>7</sup> On 7 December, well within “Madam Doreen’s” timeframe, the catastrophe duly arrived. General Stilwell and his wife had invited a large group of officers and their wives to their home in Carmel for coffee and sandwiches that Sunday morning, and light banter and conversation ensued. Meanwhile upstairs the Stilwell’s daughter, Allison—nursing a broken ankle—was whiling away the time listening to the radio. All at once, the news came over the radio regarding the attack on Pearl Harbor. Immediately, the stunned guests crowded around the radio; when all military personnel were ordered to report to their stations, the families rushed to their cars and the house emptied in minutes. Dorn then described Stilwell’s response: he first

scowled at the Pacific and noted that “it’s hard to believe they’d do it . . . they’re insane.” Then Stilwell stated—against the backdrop of the radio’s repeated instructions for all military men to “report immediately”—that “by God, they’ll rue this day for generations to come. There’s no power on earth like the aroused people of the United States. And the Japs will be destroyed by that power.”<sup>8</sup> Stilwell and Dorn were soon attempting to sort out the effects of actions and reactions of benumbed minds and souls, and sifting through the countless rumors of impending invasion or attack by Japanese forces rapidly descending on California, as it was frequently reported. As can be imagined, California was attempting to operate in an utterly confused state. The first significant official step was to establish a headquarters for the Southern Sector of the Western Defense Command, where Stilwell also established his headquarters. It was set up at the California Hotel in San Bernardino. Stilwell was closely involved and was, in particular, seeking to coordinate the actions of various military establishments, such as the 1st Marine Division at San Diego.<sup>9</sup> These activities as they related to Dorn and Stilwell soon came to a halt, however. On 23 December, a “top secret eyes only” message came to Stilwell. He was ordered to report “without delay,” to the adjutant general in Washington, though there was no indication of what was to follow. He ordered Dorn to accompany him, and they soon arranged a flight and were in Washington on Christmas Eve.<sup>10</sup>

## Notes

1. "Autobiography," 511–12. Dorn did not indicate the date of this first show, though it seems to have been in the early spring of 1941.
2. "Autobiography," 509.
3. "Autobiography," 512.
4. For conditions in China at this time, which Dorn kept up with, see "Autobiography," 516–19.
5. "Autobiography," 518–20.
6. "Autobiography," 518–20.
7. Those responsible obviously had no "Madame Doreen" to guide them.
8. Frank Dorn, *Walkout: with Stilwell in Burma* (New York: Crowell, 1971), 3-4; Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, ed. Theodore H. White (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948), 1–12.
9. Dorn, *Walkout*, 3–9.
10. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 11–12; Dorn, *Walkout*, 8–9.

## Chapter 7

### Washington, DC, 24 December 1941 to February 1942

As to the nation's capital, Frank Dorn could only report that "Washington, the seat of the government, [was] caught with the seat of its pants down by Pearl Harbor—its fat and foggy bottom exposed to the cruel winds of its own unpreparedness." It seemed to be living up to a "waggish description of itself—the only lunatic asylum in the world that was run by its own inmates." In this setting, Warren Joseph Stilwell reported, as ordered, to the adjutant general, Maj. Gen. "Hank" Adams, and soon had a private talk with Gen. George C. Marshall, the Army's chief of staff. It emerged that Stilwell was to head up an attack on Dakar, on the west coast of Africa.<sup>1</sup> There then followed meetings, briefings, arguments, and evidence of "near despair," not to mention times of "plain dumb yakking" with the leaders in the nation's high command from the president on down. These reflected the great turmoil and super-charged atmosphere that pervaded Washington in those early days. It could be characterized as "a parade of wooden soldiers" who continually waved papers at each other; while rushing from one meeting or briefing to another, they also lacked "the ability to stop shouting into telephones long enough to start thinking with their minds instead of their mouths." Dorn described the situation at some length: the Washington muddle; the "cans of worms;" the sheer bedlam; frenetic activities; horror; disbelief; all seeking to find where to lay the blame. As Dorn frequently observed, China always sought a scapegoat when things went wrong, and this was being repeated in the United States. It involved those at the highest levels, including Harry Hopkins, Franklin D. Roosevelt's confidant; Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson; Gen. Ike Eisenhower; Lt. Gen. Henry "Hap" Arnold, head of the US Army Air Corps; and numerous others. In his autobiography, Dorn assessed and rated many of these characters. He questioned much about Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins, and often severely criticized them. He admired some, such as General Arnold, "a big, genial man with a keen determined mind," and Stimson, "whose legal mind was sharp, willing to listen, and always logical," indeed, he was "firm as a rock, a Gibraltar of a man." He also held Marshall and Eisenhower in high esteem, while being sharply critical of Gen. Douglas MacArthur.<sup>2</sup>

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This chapter is based on information from Dorn's *Autobiography*, 526–39, hereinafter referenced as "Autobiography."

Meanwhile, Stilwell and many others were submerged in briefings, plans, and studies at the Army War College with the focus on Gambia.<sup>3</sup> Gambia in West Africa, a British Crown Colony, was regarded by at least one member of the British Colonial Office as “a terrible place;” however, it was thought that if it provided a way to strike at Dakar in a combined land-sea-air attack, followed by an attack on Casablanca, this would mark the first American offensive in the war against Germany.

In the midst of these deliberations, a new challenge arose: China was heard from. Was Chiang Kai-shek seeking to see to it that China was in the forefront of Allied activity? Did he already know of the US and British “Europe first” policy? So it would seem. Specifically, however, it appeared that Chiang was exceedingly displeased with the manner in which Lend-Lease was functioning—that the British were grabbing huge shipments of materials and equipment from Rangoon and using what were thought to be Chinese goods for their own purposes. They also wanted the entire US Air Force to save their hides. Finally, they wanted a high-ranking American general as chief of staff for the Generalissimo’s “Allied Staff.”<sup>4</sup>

In the end, only the final issue was addressed in Washington. Accordingly, Stilwell was summoned by General Marshall, who indicated that if he could not come up with an acceptable recommendation for the China job, “it might land in his lap.” Stilwell appealed to Dorn: “for God’s sake,” he groaned, “think hard, Dorn, or we’re hooked.” Both of them recommended several candidates, but none proved satisfactory to Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson, who declared to Stilwell that “the finger of destiny is pointing at you.” Stilwell thereupon surrendered rather meekly, telling Marshall that “I’ll go where I’m sent.” As Dorn concluded, “we hauled down our flags in the miasmatic swamps of Gambia . . . and a good riddance to that brainstorm of the general staff.” Subsequently, the US forces would not land in North Africa until November 1942 in “Operation Torch.”<sup>5</sup>

Stilwell then received orders on 2 February 1942, designating him as chief of staff for the supreme commander of the Chinese Theater, Chiang Kai-shek, as well as commanding general of US forces in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater. He was also to supervise and control all American Lend-Lease aid for China and, under the Generalissimo, to command such Chinese forces as were assigned to him. Marshall also specifically directed Stilwell “to increase the effectiveness of United States assistance to the Chinese government for the prosecution of the war and to assist in improving the combat efficiency of the Chinese army.” Stilwell was, however, unsure as to how he might be received by Chiang and his government. They remembered him “as a small-fry colonel that they kicked around, [and] they




Figure 4. Map of China-Burma-India Theater. (Courtesy of US National Archive.)

saw me on foot in the mud, consorting with coolies, [and] riding soldier trains.” Nonetheless, Stilwell was soon engaged in new briefings and entirely new problems. After a final visit to FDR, Stilwell and part of his staff departed La Guardia Airport for Miami the first leg of the trip to China.<sup>6</sup>

Along the way into Cairo, Stilwell learned of his appointment as a lieutenant general. At length after twenty-three days en route and stops along the way, especially in India and southeast China at Kunming, they landed on “the crazy concrete-slab air strip on an island in the Yangtze River” at Chungking, China’s last wartime capital. And so before a large welcoming crowd, Stilwell and his staff as Dorn succinctly expressed it “had arrived.” Indeed, Stilwell was beginning the most difficult and unrewarding assignment that any general was given in World War II. Here, he had to conjure up miracles in the maelstrom that was Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang’s China.<sup>7</sup>

## Notes

1. “Autobiography,” 526.

2. “Autobiography,” 526–29.

3. Frank A. Dorn, *Walkout: with Stilwell in Burma* (New York: Crowell, 1971), 8–16; Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, ed. Theodore H. White (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948), 13–38.

4. “Autobiography,” 530–31. This entire episode seems fantastic. What drove it? It seems to have already reflected a desire to put Europe first and treat China secondarily.

5. “Autobiography,” 530–33. For further details of Stilwell’s appointment and the turmoil then greatly in evidence in Washington, see Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 18–34. See also Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45* (New York: Bantam, 1972), 293–327.

6. Dorn, *Walkout*, 11–21, and “Secret Orders from the Secretary of War via the Adjutant General’s Office to Major General Joseph W. Stilwell,” 31 January 1942, detailing those to be on his China staff, including Dorn, in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 3.

7. The question might well be asked, “Why did Stilwell agree to take on this difficult task?” The diplomat John Paton Davies Jr. had some suggestions; in the first place, “he was a “thoroughgoing professional soldier . . . who took the wish of his commanding officer, George Marshall (who was one of the few men he really respected) as tantamount to an order.” He also believed what became something of an American military creed: that properly fed, trained, equipped, and led, the Chinese soldier would be the equal of any. This just might be the chance for him to prove this belief. John Paton Davies Jr., *China Hand: An Autobiography* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 42. Regarding Stilwell’s rapid rise in rank, General Marshall’s hand was much in evidence.

## Chapter 8

### China, Burma and India: The CBI, February 1942 to January 1945

In contrast with Frank Dorn's first arrival in Peking many years earlier when he had been so impressed with what he beheld, Chungking—once a fortress city whose citadel crowned its highest granite peak—was “now a crowded much-bombed war time capital of fire-blackened buildings reeking of wet ashes, the stench of rotting food, filth, and human excrement.” It was now “a city of narrow rubble streets and countless tunnel-like air raid shelters dug into the cliffs, of high stone walls and innumerable steep steps, of twisting alleys jammed with people whose hoarse voices sounded like the cawing of great flocks of hungry crows.” As an indication of the horrors of the place, more than 4,000 people died of suffocation in a cave when they panicked and trampled each other to death during a heavy bombing attack. Chungking was then truly an “ant hill city.”<sup>1</sup>

But for all of their weary smiles and the despair “etched deeply in their eyes and sagging shoulders,” with the slightest excuse that things might somehow improve, their faces also mirrored the characteristic resilience of the Chinese people.

As Dorn observed that “you could sense an enormous innate energy in the crowds; you could feel that high hope lay just beneath the surface of their temporary despair.” This made it easy to understand why “the Chinese people had survived as a national entity for over 4,000 years of war, conquest, rebellion, famine, and misery. And you knew in your heart that they had long deserved a better and happier fate than history had meted out to them.” In this regard, Dorn contrasted the Chinese in their dire straits with the people of India, where he witnessed only listlessness and utter dejection.<sup>2</sup> Dorn was not the only one to reflect on the Chinese and their ancient history in this context. American scholar George N. Kates, who had lived in Peking in the 1930s, once wrote that even during World War II, when his own land was dominated by “external men,” the Chinese individual was often unaccountably, perhaps—and drawing upon the thousands of years of the Chinese past—able to rest secure. He went on: “no matter what the times have brought, however violent may have been recent irruptions, it is his feeling that someday the tide

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This chapter is based on information from Dorn's Autobiography, 540–664, hereinafter referenced as “Autobiography.”



Figure 5. General Stilwell, Chiang Kai-shek, and Madame Chiang at Mayao, Burma, just before the Japanese invasion of Central and North Burma and Stilwell's "Walkout." (Courtesy of US Army.)

is bound to recede. Thus it has always been since the events of far-off history. The Chinese, being superior . . . must eventually, even passively, triumph. This is a conviction."<sup>3</sup>

In Chungking, Joseph Warren Stilwell's headquarters were located at Number 3 Kialing Village, a site which had been gouged from the side of a cliff, with one story on the street level and three on the river side. There a

staff of 37 was on hand that undoubtedly included spies of Chiang's dreaded and hated secret police headed by Gen. Tai Li. Some of the staffers joyously passed on lurid gossip about what went on in the headquarters of Chiang and Madame Chiang, detailing their fights, arguments, and much else.<sup>4</sup>

Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang soon arranged a grand reception for the Stilwell party. Dorn artfully—and sometimes cleverly—noted, identified, and elucidated the details of the main Chinese generals and other sycophants who surrounded the “royal couple.” As to Chiang and his wife, Dorn described their main attributes: making a grand entrance, Chiang was nodding “his shaven head and baring his gums in a sort of knife-slash smile, she radiant and glittering with diamonds and jade.” Chiang, “already nicknamed ‘Chancre Jack’ by irreverent GIs,” possessed piercing eyes that “glowed like hot coals glaring through slitted lids.” Certainly, “arrogance and stubbornness were written all over his face and carriage.” It was soon evident “that he considered his word was that of God.” Still, “neat, precise, and rather impressive in uniform, he usually preferred to wear a long gown . . . and a battered old fedora hat that looked as if it had been trampled in the gutter and which made him look downright funny.” In any case, “surrounded by all the stage props of absolute authority, he was indeed ‘a peanut on top of a dung heap.’”<sup>5</sup> Madame Chiang was rather tall for a Chinese woman. In this context, she was “busting herself to lay on the charm, which she could turn on and off like a water tap.” Though “acting the *grande dame* for the evening, she was obviously vain and at times inclined to be flirtatious in a coy manner. But in a split second, she could slough off the saccharine charm and reveal an irascible temper through her dangerously glittering snake eyes.”<sup>6</sup>

Having gotten down to business, the most pressing matter was the situation in Burma. Accordingly, Dorn and Stilwell spent much time shuttling by air from Chungking to Kunming and Lashio, and by car into lower Burma; in Burma, they especially visited Maymyo, Burma's beautiful highland summer capital, about 30 miles northeast of Mandalay to which the government of Burma had just retreated. What they generally found was a widespread sense of defeatism, especially emanating from British Gen. Sir Harold Alexander, the overall commander in Burma. In battle after battle, defeat was the usual result for the British, who generally were in a state of bewilderment as to what was happening to their empire in the Far East. Perhaps they should have been notified, Dorn surmised, that “for nearly 200 years its might had never been seriously challenged and, when it was, it had been found wanting.” It was no more “than a facade of pow-




Figure 6. Map of Burma 1944-45. (Courtesy of US Army Center of Military History.)

er. It had become a paper lion with cotton claws and rotting teeth whose once-mighty roar had dwindled to a querulous mee-ow.”<sup>7</sup>

Much activity emanated from Maymyo. In March and April 1942, numerous conferences were held with the British and Chinese commanders, with Stilwell attempting to discover just what his role was. Chiang and Madame arrived for one conference as well. At this time, Chiang stated firmly to his generals that Stilwell would henceforth be in command of all Chinese troops in Burma. One significant American unit was that of the civilian surgeon, Dr. Gordon Seagrave.<sup>8</sup>

The main Chinese forces consisted of the 22nd, the 200th, and the 96th divisions. The British Army of Burma, commanded by Maj. Gen. William Slim, included the 1st Burma Division, the 17th British Division, and the 7th Armored Brigade and was typical of “hodge-podge of troops the British Empire concocted to fight its battles.” The Burma Division was made up of battalions of Burmese, Indians, Sikhs, Punjabis, Gurkhas, Chins, and Kachins. Some such as the Gurkhas fought rather well if under competent leadership, as did the Indians and Sikhs, though many were less reliable and the Burmese were generally undependable.<sup>9</sup>



Figure 7. During the May 1942 “Walkout” from Burma to India, Stilwell (right) makes the trek with his aide, Col. Frank Dorn (second from right). (Courtesy of US Army.)

Uncertainty regarding who was to command continued to rankle. At length, Chiang finally accepted the British commander in Burma, Gen. Sir Harold Alexander, as the commander of Chinese troops in Burma, though in practice this proved to be a dead letter. This was because the entire situation in Burma was fluid and the Chinese generals were often ordered to do Chiang's bidding, with little or no regard for either Alexander or Stilwell. With the general collapse then underway, it made little difference who was in overall command. The Japanese continued to push all forces arrayed against them farther to the northwest. On 25 April, Alexander ordered a general retreat, with orders for the evacuation of all of Burma a few days later. India then became the destination sought.

The situation became a disorganized flight for all Allied forces. Some were able to fly out; most walked. Stilwell summed that it amounted to all the props of civilization being yanked away; one defeat after another for weeks, and then withdrawal in retreat. All order collapsed and there was a return to the law of the jungle, and of dog-eat-dog.<sup>10</sup> As the end loomed in Burma, Chiang's experiences during this period intensified his recurring strong anti-Western sentiments. He threatened to withdraw from the war entirely. In Washington, Marshall and many other Americans and British leaders, bent upon the idea of Europe first, confirmed that China was secondary. It was clear that China was last on everybody's priority list among the Western allies. Stilwell recognized, as he wrote to his wife, that "we are about to take a beating, I think." To be defeated in his first active command was a "bitter prospect that filled him with rage for revenge and vindication." Undaunted, he had already begun to plan his return. No matter what Burma was to the British, in his view, it was still the essential corridor to China; because this might well become the eventual campaign against Japan—with American troops, "as he hoped," together with Chinese troops under his command—the final victory over Japan might be won.

Stilwell's plan was that sizeable numbers of Chinese troops, having evacuated Burma, would be sent to India for intensive training under Americans. They would then participate in a return to Burma and recapture it. Rather surprisingly, Chiang soon approved the plan, providing that the Chinese would not be used to assist the British in the event of an uprising in India. The US War Department also approved it "since the plan fitted the American concept of fighting the war on the mainland of Asia with local troops." The stage was now set for what would be known as the "Walkout with Stilwell."<sup>11</sup>

Though seemingly a bit grandiose, the Walkout included only about 114 individuals. It unfolded beginning about 25 April to 24 May 1942,



Figure 8. Boats such as this one were used to evacuate troops during the “Walkout.”  
(Courtesy of US Army.)

initially at Kyaukse in Burma then ending at Imphal and Delhi, India. Undertaking the mission as its commander, Stilwell was thereby instrumental in saving himself for the roles he was to assume in the future. The nip and tuck, the close calls, and the intense efforts that all involved experienced are well-documented in Dorn’s book, *Walkout: with Stilwell in Burma*. Certain it is that Stilwell bore out Dorn’s characterization of him in his autobiography. He was, Dorn wrote, “from the beginning a solid rock, a torch of leadership and example . . . a soldier in the real sense, insistent on that understanding discipline which inspires men to fix their eyes on a goal . . . impatient with formality and pretense . . . tough . . . driving when necessary . . . caustic toward weakness of spirit and laziness . . . demanding.”<sup>12</sup> This could well apply to him in general and not only on the Walkout. What emerged among the group was an “ever-present test of both men and women; physically; mentally, because many were uncertain of the outcome and thus were basically afraid; morally, because some who should have been leaders of the weak simply ‘could not cut the mustard.’” As to Stilwell, he “led every man and woman in our party to safety, a major achievement since of an estimated 900,000 who tried to escape the Japanese by cross-

ing the mountains to India, no more than 100,000 reached the goal.” As to the other 800,000, they were “dead of exhaustion, starvation, sickness, their whitened bones gnawed clean by hungry insects, their identities sunk beneath new jungle growth to be lost forever.”<sup>13</sup>

Among those who came out with Stilwell were the American medical missionary, famed “Burma Surgeon” Dr. Gordon S. Seagrave, a major in the US Army Medical Corps, and his assistant, Dr. John Grindley, as well as a contingent of his Christian, native Burmese Kachin nurses. Some Quaker ambulance personnel were also present. Their courage and stamina, often accompanied by lusty singing and unceasing work, prompted Stilwell to observe that especially “the singing and laughter of the nurses on the trek out was the most marvelous morale-boosting device he had ever come across.” Dorn explained that the girls, “who sang rousing semi-religious songs and hymns to raise flagging spirits [and] whose example and good cheer, soon won all hearts.”<sup>14</sup> Another person of note with the group was Maj. Frank Merrill, who later as a major general was to command the American detachment known as “Merrill’s Marauders” engaged in the



Figure 9. During the “Walkout,” a colonel demonstrates use of a 45-caliber pistol to a baggage bearer. (Courtesy of US Army.)

re-conquest of Burma. Another member of the group was *Time-Life* correspondent Jack Belden, who wrote his own account of the event.<sup>15</sup>

At length, the Stilwell party arrived at Imphal, India, on 20 May 1942. Thus “through careful planning and relentless leadership, Stilwell had brought his party out without a single person missing.” Stilwell then flew to Delhi, where a press conference was held in that city’s Imperial Hotel on the evening of 24 May. One British correspondent did not understand the comments from such men as General Alexander after he had gotten out of Burma. He had stated that the “evacuation . . . was ‘an heroic, voluntary withdrawal’ and a ‘glorious retreat,’” Stilwell famously responded in an altogether different tone: “In the first place, no military commander in history ever made a *voluntary* withdrawal. And there’s no such thing as a *glorious* retreat. All retreats are as ignominious as hell. I claim we got a hell of a licking. We got run out of Burma, and it’s humiliating as hell. I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back, and retake Burma.” This statement would clearly, in a few words, set forth Stilwell’s efforts in China for the next two years.<sup>16</sup>

All too soon, Stilwell and Dorn were back in “hot, humid, and stinking Chungking.” Stilwell was sick for weeks with jaundice. On his own for a time, Dorn set out to develop an extensive account of the failed campaign in Burma. He based it on his notebook with observations and impressions, copies of available official reports and collected accounts, and observations from various British officers. He added maps. Stilwell read the first draft and made comments and wrote several pages. The history became Stilwell’s official report on the Burma campaign. Because of several blunt comments, Stilwell decided not to send it on to Washington at that time. He ordered that six copies be made, which were held in reserve. In the following May of 1943, Stilwell personally delivered several to General Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson. Others were distributed throughout the general staff. Harry Hopkins, however, apparently speaking for the president, ordered all copies destroyed, alleging that the report was too critical of friendly allies. Possessors were to report that they had been destroyed within 24 hours as ordered. Dorn, though, had three copies of the original since no mention had been made regarding copies in the order. He kept one, and today one copy is at the Hoover Archives at Stanford; another is at the Army Historical Division in Washington.<sup>17</sup> Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s close aide and adviser—on behalf of FDR—then ordered a sanitized edition that was more palatable politically and less damning to the allies involved that would be circulated in its stead, though Stilwell refused to sign it. The “official” report of the campaign that was circulated

was, therefore, an altered, manipulated version of the original that Dorn and Stilwell had created.

At this juncture, many things were bruited about as to what must be done to advance matters for those who had been crushed and victimized by the Japanese. This led to countless conferences with all and sundry always seeking to maneuver to their own advantages. Dorn reported on many of these in his autobiography, with many references to corruption that was a usual accompaniment of business in Chiang's China. In the process, Dorn decided that Madame Chiang, who was "throwing her weight around, and loving every minute of it," nonetheless "when things got down to brass tacks . . . had far more common sense than her ignorant pig-headed peanut of a husband." And, "she also had a better general grasp of military tactics as on a large scale than he ever did."<sup>18</sup>

Certainly, Stilwell and Chiang were often at loggerheads, especially regarding deep-seated beliefs that both held. These matters were not improved by Stilwell's ill-concealed contempt for the man he called "peanut." Certainly, Chiang was aware of this. In the military sphere, Stilwell was a proponent of forthright action in a traditional Western fashion. Chiang's views included numerous other considerations, such as the traditional Chinese concepts of waging war. He emphasized that the nationalists had been fighting the Japanese for several years, especially since the coming of the Sino-Japanese War beginning in July 1937, without significant Western support. Why not now, he asked, let the Western powers assume the major burden of defeating Japan? Furthermore, Chiang desired to obtain Lend-Lease aid that he intended to use to take on the Chinese Communists who he regarded as his prime enemies when compared with the Japanese. The Communists were characterized as being a disease of the heart; the Japanese were as a disease of the skin. Chiang was also incensed that on the world's larger stage, China was widely regarded as a secondary theater of operations, with Europe being the foremost area of concern.

From the time that Stilwell had walked out of Burma with his small group, his dream—as he had indicated at his May 1942 press conference in New Delhi—was to return to Burma. A major first step was the creation of the Ramgarh training center located in the Bihar province in India about 200 miles west of Calcutta. It was activated on 26 August 1942, and was to create a 30-division force of Chinese soldiers. It initially consisted of the troops that had successfully retreated from Burma and was to be continuously reinforced by new recruits. The center was further intended to be a showcase of General Stilwell's faith that the Chinese would be willing to fight if sufficiently trained, equipped, fed, and led "by real men." It

subsequently remained active until discontinued on 15 May 1945. When Stilwell was able to move back into Burma in late 1943, the Chinese forces deployed from there became known as X-Force.<sup>19</sup>

In addition on 23 October 1942, Stilwell activated the larger entity, the Chinese Army in India (CAI). This would be a vehicle that would eventually assume command of all allied combat units in Assam, India, and North Burma under Stilwell on 1 February 1944, after operations for the re-conquest of Burma had begun.

Another larger unit of Chinese troops, to be known as Yoke-Force or Y-Force and also to be a 30-division creation, was established in China's Yunnan Province, headquartered at Kunming. It was authorized by verbal orders from Stilwell on 29 April 1943, with Col. Frank Dorn as chief of staff. When Dorn was promoted to brigadier general on 8 November 1943, he was made acting commander of this force, though Stilwell exercised overall control through Dorn. Later when Y-Force was committed to action in Burma, it was also designated as the China Expeditionary Force (CEF).



Figure 10. Brig. Gen. Frank Dorn in his office at Y-Force Headquarters in Kunming, China. (Courtesy of US Army.)

Y-Force, as was true of Ramgarh itself, was dedicated to the realization of Stilwell's dream of getting back into Burma to revenge his precipitous Walkout. The vision also consisted in part of meeting his desires to see the Burma Road reopened, and the re-conquest of Burma was accordingly often referred to as simply "a dream for a road." It also endorsed Stilwell's faith in the Chinese, especially the *lao pai hsing*—the common people—as distinct from Chiang and other military and civilian leaders. Dorn captured something of this in his foreword to a lengthy "Historical Report of Y-Force Operations Staff, period 1 Jan 44 thru 24 Oct 44." He recalled that members of Y-Force operations staff heard an old Chinese adage when they came to Kunming, China, early in 1943: "never use good iron for nails, nor good men for soldiers." Dorn noted this was "somewhat discouraging in the light of the mission of the Y-Force operations staff," which "was to help China build up a modern army to help fight the common enemy Japan." Dorn thereupon reiterated Stilwell's views regarding



Figure 11. Headquarters of Brig. Gen. Frank Dorn's 30-division Yoke-Force (Y-Force), also known as the Chinese Expeditionary Force, in Kunming, Yunnan Province, China, 1943–45. (Courtesy of US Army.)

the potential of Chinese troops: “just as fine steel can be made from old iron when smelted with other proper ingredients, so with proper training and tempering under fire, a good soldier can be developed from the lowliest conscripted coolie.” It was certain, Dorn concluded, that as many US Army officers had long contended, the Chinese “with training and modern equipment can press an offensive—and win.”<sup>20</sup>

Later another outfit called Z-Force, consisting of additional Chinese forces, was created in Chungking on 1 January 1944. Its first chief of staff was Brig. Gen. Malcolm Lindsey, with Stilwell exercising overall command. Its main source of troops was the 5315th Infantry Training Center established on 1 January 1944 at Kweilin, China. It was disbanded on 25 July 1944, because the Japanese in the meantime had captured Kweilin.<sup>21</sup>

By this time, Stilwell had surveyed his situation in general, especially regarding avenues for obtaining supplies and planning for the extended operations that now loomed. In April 1942, the Japanese were deep into Burma and had cut a vital artery, the Burma Road, used by the British for getting supplies to China. This was 717 miles in length and ran through much rough mountain and jungle terrain. The section running from Kun-



Figure 12. North Burma transportation and supply routes in 1942 as well as Japanese occupation area in Burma. (Courtesy of US Army.)

ming in southwest China into Burma had been constructed in 1937–38 by Burmese and Chinese laborers as the Sino-Japanese War raged on. It was subsequently extended down into Burma to Lashio in north central Burma; supplies came in by rail from Rangoon in far south Burma.<sup>22</sup> With the Burma Road then cut, other means had to be devised to keep the Chinese supplied. A most ambitious and daring decision was made, also in April 1942, to supply China from India by means of an airlift. This American operation, called “The Hump,” demanded the utmost of airmen and their aircraft. These operations were conducted by the US Tenth Air Force, and later its Air Transport Command. Beginning at Assam, India, aircraft were flown to Kunming in China over the hazardous Himalayan Mountains. The major dangers resided in the very high elevations where the aircraft operated, all the while encountering frequent rough weather. At high costs of aircraft and their crews, an unbelievable record was established. By August 1945, the airlift had flown 650,000 tons of materiel into China. By 1945, about 640 aircraft were then in use.<sup>23</sup>

A new surface artery, the Ledo Road, was also instituted to fill the gap after the Japanese cut the Burma Road. It was largely an American creation built by 15,000 American troops, many of whom were African-American personnel. Work on it began in December 1942, at Ledo in India’s Assam province. It progressed through the major city of Myitkyina, after it had been wrested from the Japanese. The Ledo Road then proceeded to Bhamo in north central Burma and to the junction of Mong-Yu, where it joined the reclaimed Burma Road. It then wended its way to Wanting, just over the China-Burma border, and on to Kunming. Though many Americans predicted that the Ledo Road, which was 1,072 miles in length, would well exceed the Hump tonnage, by the end of the war it had only attained a total of 147,000 tons, far short of the 650,000 tons brought in by the aircraft.<sup>24</sup> There were two other developments that had occurred a few months before in 1941—before the attack on Pearl Harbor—that involved China and with which Stilwell had to contend and utilize, often with much controversy involving many people both in China and the United States. The first of these was the far-ranging Lend-Lease Program designed to provide war supplies free from the United States to nations hard-pressed by especially Nazi Germany and, to a lesser extent, Japan. This policy, formally titled “An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States,” was signed by President Roosevelt on 11 March 1941. This was destined to last until September 1945. It was eventually to involve the shipping of \$50.1 billion worth of supplies or seventeen percent of total US war expenditures in the course of the war. Of this, \$31.4 billion went to Britain,

\$11.3 billion to the Soviet Union, \$3.2 billion to Free France, \$1.6 billion to China, and the remaining \$2.6 billion to various other allies. There were provisions for reverse lend-lease to be provided back to the United States in services of various sorts, such as the rent of air bases abroad. These services totaled about \$7.8 billion. Certainly, Chiang Kai-shek noted the relatively small sum going to China when compared with the numerous billions sent to Britain and the Soviet Union.<sup>25</sup> The second was often more controversial, especially within China, largely because of the hatreds and distrust that were often generated in the course of its operation. This was the establishment of the American Volunteer Group (AVG), better known as “The Flying Tigers,” a “special air unit” which was authorized by an unpublished executive order signed by President Roosevelt on 15 April 1941. This stipulated that a total of 100 Curtiss-Wright P-40B fighter aircraft, previously earmarked for the British in Burma, would be turned over to the United States for use in air defense of Burma and China.

This organization was to be manned by about 300 American pilots and maintained by personnel secretly recruited from America’s military flying services. They made their way to Burma and China posing as tourists to avoid any news of their being sent to Asia. They were taken in hand by a former US Army Air Corps pilot and officer, a retired captain, Claire Lee Chennault, who had earlier arrived in China in 1937 and become an air adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. Chennault rapidly trained these pilots and organized the AVG into three squadrons. Their first battle occurred on 20 December 1941, flying out of Kunming, China, against attacking Japanese aircraft. They rapidly emerged as a colorful and highly effective combat group destined to much fame and fortune, as well as incurring the wrath of such American soldiers as General Stilwell. The conflicts between Stilwell and Chennault often reached high levels of intensity.

The AVG was subsequently formally dissolved on 4 July 1942, and incorporated into the US Army Air Forces as a China Air Task Force and part of the US Tenth Army Air Force. This air task force was still under Chennault’s command; he had earlier been commissioned a colonel when he rejoined the US Army. On 15 April 1942, Chennault became a brigadier general. On 5 March 1943, Chennault was promoted to major general and placed in command of the newly created theater-level US Fourteenth Army Air Force headquartered at Kunming, China, that had emerged on 10 March 1943, by the orders of President Roosevelt. Later in mid-1945, both the Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces were combined and placed under the command of Lt. Gen. George Edward Stratemeyer. Chennault thereupon retired from the US Army on 8 July 1945.<sup>26</sup>

One area of conflict stemmed from Stilwell's strong feelings that Chennault sought by any means possible to obtain advantage. "Alternately blowing off steam as to what he could do if given everything in sight and bootlicking Chiang and the Madame by promising them the moon," Chennault sought to influence the press—often by belittling Stilwell as well as Gen. Henry "Hap" Arnold, head of the US Army Air Forces. To these ends, Chennault found a ready accomplice in the correspondent Joseph Wright Alsop V—aka "Joe All-slop" in certain circles—who was related to the Roosevelts and, as a "gift-bearing tooth fairy," was often winging his way between Chennault and FDR. Dorn could only conclude that Alsop's "melodramatic hysterics on the use of air power [based on Chennault's own views] were just silly, his dire predictions more like the braying of an ass than serious warnings."<sup>27</sup>

Meanwhile in August 1942, Stilwell and Dorn set out to assess the situation in India. They proceeded from the Assam airbases on to Karachi and Ramgarh. Stilwell and Dorn then made it to Calcutta, with its "cluttered filthy streets, with starvation and poverty rubbing cheek by jowl with



Figure 13. The US Tenth Army Air Forces use a supply drop to provide the troops below with rice and other needs. (Courtesy of US Army Signal Corps.)

the trappings of imperial grandeur and vast wealth of a fortunate few.” Indeed, Dorn noted that “India typified a frightfully depressing gloom and sad dullness of spirit. For its countless millions, there seemed no hope, no desire, and no interest but bare survival . . . and for what?”<sup>28</sup>

At Karachi, Dorn was to demonstrate his artistic skills in a rather unusual fashion and for an interesting purpose. It seems that it was not possible for the United States to ship khaki uniforms to India in any great quantity. Accordingly, Stilwell had authorized his supply troops to purchase and issue for general use the “cool, practical, British uniforms of shorts and jungle shirts.” Unfortunately when on pass, the troops of both services looked similar. Therefore, when the men got into drunken brawls, American MPs often entered frays and found that their swinging billy clubs “were bashing in as many British heads as those of their own men.” British MPs were doing “similar service” to American troops. Each side was up in arms. The British commanding general asked Stilwell to authorize a distinctive insignia for the Americans that would set them apart from the British. Stilwell asked Dorn to promptly come up with a solution.<sup>29</sup>




Figure 14. Col. Frank Dorn designed and first produced this China-Burma-India (CBI) patch in Karachi, India, in August 1942.

In a few hours, Dorn complied. He created a distinctive red, white, and blue China-Burma-India (CBI) shoulder patch. It consisted of a US shield with the Star of India and the twelve-pointed Chinese Sun imposed on the blue field. Dorn considered using the emblem of Burma but, as he explained, that emblem “was a peacock, so to hell with that. Besides, we’d lost the lousy place anyway.” He had an Indian uniform shop make up a few and sewed one on the left sleeve of his uniform. The next day in New Delhi, he wore the patch “as casually as I could.” But Stilwell spotted it and asked, “What the hell’s that thing you’re wearing, Dorn?” He informed him that it was his new theater shoulder patch, “a thing of beauty to behold and a protection for American skulls against British night sticks.” Stilwell, grinning, had him order 20,000 immediately. “You’ve hit the jackpot. It looks great,” he concluded. Dorn noted that eventually, hundreds of thousands were issued throughout the CBI Theater. It remains one of the most readily recognized patches of the World War II era.<sup>30</sup>

In New Delhi, Stilwell met with US Minister to British India George Merrill; the viceroy, Marquess of Linlithgow; and Lord Louis Mountbatten. There was growing unrest in India by this time, seeking an end to British rule, which considerably clouded the picture.<sup>31</sup>

At this juncture in late 1942 and early 1943, Madame Chiang—code-named “Snow White”—undertook a “sort of Roman triumph through the United States,” though there were qualms in many quarters about her staging a “Ringling Circus across the country.” Accordingly in late November, Madame Chiang and a large contingent of servants and assistants arrived in the United States, primarily for medical consultations. Flown in at great US expense from China to Florida and then on to New York City, she and her retinue occupied the entire 12th floor of the Harkness Pavilion of the New York Presbyterian Hospital. At that time, she visited with many people, the first being Eleanor Roosevelt. She was provided with US Secret Service security. Later, Mrs. Roosevelt invited her to Hyde Park and in mid-February 1943, Madame Chiang made many speeches at rallies in Madison Square Garden, Carnegie Hall, and other locations. She addressed both houses of the US Congress on 18 February 1943, where she was met with standing ovations and wild acclaim. Madame Chiang’s personal aspect and poise—and her lucid, dynamic speech in clear English—played a salutary role. She was dressed in a black dress with a slit up one side that revealed her neat appearance and evoked much favorable comment. She urged the US to rethink its “Europe First” priorities and look to China that had fought so long since 1937, and much else of interest. Nonetheless, the United States did not change its basic policy for the waging of the war. She

then visited her alma mater, Wellesley College, and presented a \$15,000 check from funds she had collected for the “China Relief” program that had been intended initially for China assistance. She proceeded to Boston, Chicago, San Francisco’s Chinatown, and Hollywood, where she was the center of a huge rally at the Hollywood Bowl on 4 April 1943, managed by David O. Selznick and attended by numerous movie stars. She subsequently returned to Macon, Georgia, and Canada, where she addressed Parliament. She hoped to play a role in the Trident summit conference in Washington, held from 11 to 27 May between Roosevelt and Churchill, but with little success; FDR did later invite her to the White House for a short stay. At length at Chiang’s behest, she returned to China in July 1943, by which time her “welcome had worn very thin” and her reputation had dipped considerably, both in China and in the United States. Matters were not helped by her filling much of her luggage for the return flight with large quantities of expensive furs, jewelry, clothes, and cosmetics from Fifth Avenue stores. She was also infamous for her often-imperious demands on hotel staffs, with instructions that her bed linens be changed several times per day.

While many initially greeted Madame Chiang with great acclaim, the negative aspects eventually outweighed the positive. She “was rude as hell to the president’s wife,” Dorn recorded. Often unruly and abusive, she refused to pay legitimate bills and, in general, made a nuisance of herself. Apparently the White House through the FBI, “in a none-too-polite order,” eased her out of the country and back to China.<sup>32</sup> It is usually not recognized that during the course of the war, Madame Chiang was absent from China for lengthy periods—perhaps because Chiang was having an affair with another woman, at least according to rampant rumors. In any case, in July 1944, Madam Chiang was in Brazil and then once more in a hospital in the United States and for long periods lived in various houses and apartments owned by her Soong sisters in New York City and Long Island. She remained out of China until late August 1945. Accordingly, she left Stilwell with no well-informed, high-level intermediary of the Chinese government who could brief him on the crucial stages of the negotiations for the conduct of the newly opened Burma campaign. These negotiations eventually resulted in the recall of Stilwell by FDR in October 1944 and subsequent drastic changes in the conduct of the war in China.<sup>33</sup>

Meanwhile after the summer of despair (1942) and the winter of false hopes (1942–43), Dorn was then to experience the much better spring and summer of 1943. For him, there was now to ensue a time “of accomplishment, of pushing ahead, which, of course, meant an ever-increasing swarm

of people.” Being appointed a full colonel, he arrived in Kunming to set up the headquarters for the Yoke Force (Y-Force) that was about to come into being. This was formally established on 29 April 1943 by verbal orders of General Stilwell, with Dorn being appointed chief of staff of the Y-Force operations staff. The Y-Force was to train and equip another planned 30 divisions to be added to the similar numbers of Chinese then being trained at Ramgarh in India. Indeed, Dorn’s activities with the Y-Force, including taking them into battle, constitutes his major contribution to the re-conquest of Burma.<sup>34</sup> It was to be composed of Chinese forces led and trained by Americans with the eventual intention of returning to Burma. The headquarters was established in Hostel One, a former agricultural college. The building had previously been taken over to house the American Volunteer Group (AVG) and later the headquarters of the Fourteenth Air Force that was then relocated to the main airfield at Kunming. With only one other officer, Dorn was to create a unit that ultimately numbered more than 1,800 officers; about 4,000 enlisted men; and more than 1,500 interpreters. Hostel One was beyond the city limits of Kunming and surrounded by farmland. The college buildings “were a rather handsome adaptation of Chinese and western architecture.”<sup>35</sup>

For the next several months with the rapidly expanding needs of Y-Force, Dorn proceeded to build office buildings, an enlisted barracks, a photo lab, a school for interpreters, and housing for Red Cross girls. Quarters were constructed for Stilwell, Dorn, and members of his ever-larger staff. A movie theater and recreational hall were built.

Chinese execution grounds located nearby behind high walls provided another form of “entertainment.” When these were scheduled, the Americans would pour into the enclosure “with cameras at the ready.” As Dorn declared, “the shivery thrill of watching a dozen or more kneeling men shot in the head one by one never seemed to pall.” Though there were expectations that the executioners might revert to the use of the beheading sword, such did not occur; the Chinese claimed that their method of sending victims off to join their ancestors was more civilized.<sup>36</sup>

The people of the city of Yunnan spoke a bastardized form of Mandarin, acquired by the seventeenth century Manchu garrisons that were sent in to establish order and intermarry with the daughters of the original Lolo inhabitants, creating a mixed Lolo-Chinese Manchu culture. The French arrived on the scene in 1895 with a railway from Hanoi in French Indochina and established their own buildings, such as a pseudo-Gothic Catholic cathedral. French schools were set up as well as French commercial buildings, a convent, and other structures. With the fall of France in 1940,



Figure 15. American soldiers instruct and train Chinese troops in the field, though the equipment—most obviously the helmets—was German in origin. (Courtesy of US Army.)

French influence waned and the railway was torn up for 50 miles toward the border of French Indochina.

The plateau of Yunnan at 6,000 feet in elevation made for a quite comfortable climate. Among the spas and hotels in the hills, Dorn's favorite—at which he spent "as many Sunday afternoons as he could"—was a huge isolated monastery and Temple of 500 Buddhas, presided over by a bearded abbot, "a wonderful old guy." There the two discussed religion and the concerns of the human race in general, providing Dorn some respite from his many command concerns and responsibilities.

Dorn's activities to implement Stilwell's plans for a thirty-division Chinese force to be utilized in invading Burma were numerous, complex, and well beyond anything that would normally be required in the US Army.<sup>37</sup> At the top of the Chinese pecking order in the Yunnan area was the warlord governor, Lung Yun ("Dragon Cloud"). This man and his career are typical of several that Americans encountered during these months and is instructive as to what US Army personnel had to contend with in China in those days. He began as "an ordinary bandit" then clawed and assassi-

nated his way to taking command of four “ill-equipped, ill-fed divisions” before becoming the governor of the province. As Dorn recorded, “there was always an air of the fanciful about Lung Yun and his rise from a poverty-stricken bandit to a position of great wealth and a defiant power that Chiang Kai-shek did not dare to challenge on his home grounds.” Lung Yun was not interested in such important features of waging war as the necessity of roads and oil pipelines. But he did have a theory of why Stilwell wanted to return to Burma: the warlord governor thought that Stilwell was trying to recapture the jade, ruby, and sapphire mines, which would make him a very rich man. Therefore, as Dorn concluded, “his isolation from any reality but his own position could reach the ludicrous at times.”<sup>38</sup> The manner in which Lung Yun attained his own wealth became clear when his three corrupt sons—adept at blackmail as well as employment of monopolies in opium, prostitution, and the building trades in Yunnan for the family’s benefit—began to affect the US Army and Fourteenth Air Force. The sons began to highjack US jeeps and steal the gasoline supplies needed for them. Dorn issued an ultimatum that the jeeps had to be returned by a specified date and hour or he would expose details of the family’s nefarious activities to the American press and Stilwell would also send a complete report to Chiang. This got results: “all jeeps were returned by the specified time.”<sup>39</sup>

In other instances, Dorn encountered Lung Yun’s attempts to profit at the expense of the United States. With the expansion of Y-Force, it became necessary to construct numerous barracks, headquarters buildings, warehouses, and airstrips all over Yunnan and the surrounding countryside. Here Dorn discovered that Lung Yun had anticipated that the United States would require these things and had acquired all the kilns; he fixed astronomical price for bricks, lumber, roof tiles, and furniture. In order to undercut him, Dorn set up his own kilns and paid a decent wage to the workers. He formed a partnership with some furniture makers and with other suppliers for meeting additional needs as well. His efforts were successful, and his building program largely became a successful game to outwit old Lung Yun.

Dorn also found another way to put pressure on Lung Yun. He discovered that a distant cousin of the governor, Gen. Lu Han, might prove helpful. He was the commander of the 60th Chinese Corps, made up of three divisions stationed on the Indochina border. Unlike many Chinese military organizations, the 60th was well-disciplined, well-fed, and better trained than most Chinese units. But because they were provincial troops and not under direct control of the Central Chinese Government, they were

not well-equipped and could not receive American arms and ammunition. Dorn wanted these superior troops—led by an able and honest commander—as part of his forces, and Stilwell ordered that the 60th be re-equipped with US arms. Dorn then entered into an agreement that he might even assist General Lu Han if he came to blows against Lung Yun.<sup>40</sup>

Dorn kept Stilwell well-informed as to the progress—or lack thereof—of the Y-Force in numerous reports. One undated report, entitled “Status of Chinese Troops in Yunnan,” catalogued the existing conditions present in the early stages. Principally, the problem of troop replacements was severe and the physical condition of the Chinese men coming on board was often pathetic. The problems of weapons supply needed to be addressed. There was a lack of spare parts for them as well. The Chinese were notorious regarding supply in general, and recordkeeping was often lax or nonexistent. Much evidence of extensive corruption at all levels existed. In general, the report continued, Chinese staff work did not exist. Staff officers were incapable, or afraid, to take any action unless the personal approval of their commander had been obtained. Neither staffs nor commanders displayed signs of initiative, though there were a few exceptions. Also, their tactical conceptions were “antiquated and timid.” The higher-ranking commanders were often “simply incompetent,” again with a few exceptions, and regarded their troops in a political and financial light rather than as military forces. The report ended with an assessment of individual higher-ranking Chinese commanders. The document noted that though Y-Force was not ready for offensive or defensive combat, nonetheless, the relationships between the Chinese and Americans was excellent. In addition, the Chinese enlisted men and the junior officers were generally responsive and anxious to learn. The conclusion also stated that “with leadership and attention to their simple needs, Chinese enlisted personnel can be expected to carry out orders and missions.” Accordingly, there was much to do, but foundations existed upon which to build.<sup>41</sup> One problem surfaced involving Americans rather than Chinese. This concerned Gen. Claire Lee Chennault, who Dorn charged was never loyal to his theater commander, General Stilwell; Chennault even held the head of the Army Air Forces, Gen. Henry H. “Hap” Arnold in low esteem, which was unfortunate because Arnold was extremely influential in Washington. One observer has noted that Chennault and Stilwell experienced an ongoing “rancorous association.”<sup>42</sup> It was deplorable, Dorn continued, that Chennault had left his wife and six children in Louisiana in 1937 when he went to China and proceeded to lay the foundations for a Chinese Air Force. He apparently did not inform his family that he had no intention of ever returning to them. “As a big shot in

the Far East, his new life had quickly opened his eyes to all he had missed as a retired captain.” Far removed from his barnstorming county fair days, suddenly “he had plenty of dough, servants, women, and a status among the great and would-be great for which his background had not prepared him.” He developed a “pugnacious egoism,” which soon emerged “as conceited arrogance.” Dorn and others would note that Chennault did not bother to learn Chinese. Certainly, Chennault emerged as one of the most controversial figures of World War II.<sup>43</sup>

Most objectionable to Stilwell and others was that Chennault was of the opinion that with a few hundred planes he could destroy the entire Japanese Navy, forestall the expected attack on Singapore, and even defeat Japan itself. As to China, with a few medium and heavy bombers “he could make the planned counter attack to retake Canton and Hankow an easy success.” When he commanded the Fourteenth Air Force, with many planes at his disposal, Chennault certainly did not bring the war to an end. There were other concerns involving Chennault. Dorn admitted the courage and limited successes of the AVG pilots, but they “never acquired a sense of discipline, either militarily or personally.” There were other activities that Dorn focused on: the sexual activities of all of the AVG from Chennault on down. One area of activity involved the Mayguo Club, “a combined dance hall, bar, dining room, whore house, and fence for stolen property.” Indeed, with Chennault’s connivance, the club degenerated “into a den of iniquity . . . a fence for the sale of Army gasoline and PX items; a filthy dive in which all the hostesses were infected with syph or clap or both and were passing them on to many Air Corps men.” Chennault, however, regarded the club as a means of improving “the social life” of his enlisted men. When even the Chinese complained of the conditions there, Theater Inspector General Col. S.F. Griswold made detailed recommendations for improving the situation. These, however, were not implemented. Accordingly, Stilwell appointed Dorn as the deputy chief of staff of the theater for Yunnan Province with power to act in his name when dealing with the Air Corps. He ordered Dorn to close the “cesspool” down, which Dorn proceeded to do, placing it “off limits.”<sup>44</sup> The expected response came from Chennault’s chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Edgar Glenn, who asked by what authority Dorn had acted. When advised of Stilwell’s orders, Glenn—who Dorn regarded as “a fine upstanding officer”—was appalled by the situation and thought that he had not been told the truth by some of Chennault’s men. Dorn indicated that if the inspector general’s recommendations had been carried out, then he would have not acted as he did. This apparently had the effect of cleaning things up a bit, though as Dorn noted, Chennault “was bitterly resentful of

what he considered a breach of his authority;" ever afterward, Dorn commented, he "really hated my guts."<sup>45</sup>

Dorn gladly remembered regarding the Yunnan situation that "in assembling a staff and selecting field commanders, the Lord was good to me." Indeed, "the staff was the best I have ever seen," he asserted. Later in combat, these were officially liaison officers but in fact were the drivers and leaders "whose enthusiasm for their jobs resulted in over 30 killed or wounded in action." Certainly, their reckless yet commendable courage forced Dorn to issue an order reminding them that a dead hero or an out-of-action liaison officer was of no good to themselves or the Chinese war effort. Therefore if they were wounded, upon recovery they might be investigated or even court-martialed. When Stilwell was informed, he noted that Dorn could be proud of the "guts of your officers," though he was correct in issuing the order because "you've got to hold these young fellows down, even though you don't mean a word about that court-martial threat." Dorn agreed but revealed a bit of battlefield psychology: "I'm just trying to see if they're more scared of me than of the Japs."<sup>46</sup>

Col. John Stodter, one of Dorn's West Point classmates, was assigned as liaison officer to the 53rd Chinese Army, commanded by General Chou Fu-cheng, and to the 8th Army, commanded by Gen. Ho Shao-chou. Chou "was damned popular" with Dorn, who had rated him as follows: "stubborn, quiet, and commands the respect of his subordinates. When convinced of the merits of a project, he will press to the limit. [He was] the best of the army commanders on the western front, but he gets temperamental and his feelings get hurt." From northeastern China, Chou was not popular "with some of the lousy southerners, but he is a far better commander than any of them." Chou asked Dorn that to appoint Stodter as his chief of staff for all training and combat operations, to which Dorn readily assented "providing that no administration, other than supply, would be involved." Dorn explained why: "Chinese administration would have driven John, or anyone else right up the nearest wall."<sup>47</sup>

The commander of Stodter's 8th Army was a nephew and adopted son of Chiang's minister of war and chief of staff, Gen. Ho Ying-ch'in. He was "absolutely worthless as a commander, so utterly hopeless that I recommended that he be relieved," Dorn commented; he later was relieved. That "boob in a soldier suit," however, had a vice commander "who was a ball of fire—Li Mi." Brigadier General Li "was alert, forceful, intelligent, [and] afraid of nothing." A Lolo, he was a Catholic. "Among the very best," he and Dorn became close friends.<sup>48</sup>

Another important Chinese leader, Gen. Wei Li-huang, was then assigned to command the China Expeditionary Force (CEF). He had a fine record during the Sino-Japanese phase of the war. He had fought the Communists in Kiangsi Province, winning many battles. He was known as “100 Victory Wei” and had been awarded “the entire tax revenues for life from four rich farming counties in Hunan;” he was also given the honorary rank of marshal, the manner in which Chiang rewarded some victorious commanders. Dorn remarked about him: “Coming from an upper-middle-class family, Wei was well-educated, a realist, ‘pro-American,’ and inclined to study both sides of any problem before reaching a decision; he was a conservative with a pretty impressive set of credentials.” In addition, he was “dignified, urbane, and humorous with those he considered his equals.” He and Dorn “hit it off right away. Our initial feelings of rapport grew into mutual respect, complete trust, and fondness engendered by true friendship.”<sup>49</sup>



Figure 16. Brig. Gen. Frank Dorn with two of China’s major commanders working under Stilwell and himself in North Burma: Gen. Wei Li-huang (left) and Gen. Ho Ying-ch’ın (center), Chiang’s minister of war and chief of staff of the Chinese Army. (Courtesy of US Army Signal Corps.)

Also notable was Hsiao I-hsu, Gen. Wei Li-huang's chief of staff. Dorn reported that Hsiao was "a great guy . . . capable, aggressive, decisive, hot-tempered, humorous, and understanding." Furthermore as a realist, "he was afraid of nothing, be it God, the devil, or Japs." Indeed, "from our first handshake, an electric current or something went through us both. From that moment, we were not just friends; we were instant-old friends, with the highest mutual respect and trust." In one respect, however, Dorn could not convince Hsiao that in the time when reinforcements were needed, he should consider reinforcements from the well-fed and well-trained Communist armies. Dorn suggested that perhaps only twenty percent of Chinese troops be Red. Hsiao was dead-set against the idea, noting that if even twenty percent Reds arrived, within a month all of the Chinese troops would be Communist. Hsiao also, by the way, was a great drinker; "he and I spent many an hour in off-duty competition to see which could hold the most and make the other cry 'uncle'."<sup>50</sup> By the time the Chinese forces were ready to attack across the Salween River, Wei Li-huang, Hsiao, and Dorn had "achieved a mutuality—rare in the Far East—of complete frankness, at times even conspiratorial, in our personal and official dealings."

Beyond this, there were times when Dorn and Chiang were to settle their differences amicably, often with Madame Chiang's close support. Chiang would, in fact, on occasion follow Dorn's advice as to which Chinese officers should be removed or appointed. Later as a mark of his esteem, Chiang directed a staff officer to arrange to award Dorn the Order of the Blue Sky and White Sun, China's highest decoration.<sup>51</sup>

Nonetheless, not all of Dorn's relations were happy ones. There were unfortunate cases. One of the worst was "a slippery scoundrel" named T'ang, the vice minister of communications in Chiang's government. Using his authority, T'ang constantly diverted supply trucks for his own profit and would steal large quantities of American gasoline for the black market; he also would turn loose his private army of thugs to rob both the Chinese and US governments. When confronted by Dorn regarding his misdeeds, T'ang "blandly admitted everything. What else was one supposed to do when such opportunities for self-enrichment were all around?" Dorn indicated that he was sending a full report to Chiang. He seemed little perturbed but did indicate that he was sending Dorn a complete dinner service of blue-white Kiangsi porcelain, each piece embossed in gold with Dorn's name, and an accompanying set of silverware. Dorn told him to "shove it" and sent in his report. T'ang was ordered to report to Chungking, where he was tried by a court-martial. He was sentenced to be executed by a firing squad.<sup>52</sup>

Nonetheless, Chiang Kai-shek was not usually so cooperative with Americans. His normal stance was to demand the impossible in planes, munitions, and billions of dollars. Much of Chiang's demands came from his concerns that China's percentage of Lend-Lease was quite low when compared with other recipients. It is also noteworthy that for some time, Stilwell administered China's Lend-Lease funding and often received Chiang's complaints regarding it. More disconcerting to Stilwell and Dorn was that Chiang was continually making long-distance telephone orders directly even to the smallest troop units, "reiterating the ridiculous claims of his propaganda machine, and in general giving fits to old man Stilwell." As to those, Dorn noted that "by nature inclined to impatience, Stilwell looked with contempt on Chiang's peasant mentality, his ignorance, and his arrant stubbornness." In a gross understatement, Dorn concluded that "the two didn't get along worth a damn." Indeed, it began to be clear even to American war correspondents, something of the tremendous load of problems that were piled on Stilwell and the clear impossibility of expecting "any sense or genuine action out of Chiang." As Brooks Atkinson of the *New York Times* summed it up, "if the saintly Francis of Assisi were now handed Vinegar Joe Stilwell's job, within three months he'd be nicknamed 'Vinegar Frank.'"<sup>53</sup>

During these months, also, Dorn got his first look at the tremendous canyon of the Salween River ("Angry River" in Chinese) and understood something of the dimensions of the task before him. It was "as deep as the Grand Canyon of the Colorado but far more precipitous." The water was about sixty feet deep, averaging 400 feet in width, and rushed between its high walls at a speed of fifteen miles an hour. "The roar of the raging torrent could be heard for miles. And this was what we had to cross with over 100,000 men to attack Japs who were dug in along the heights on the opposite cliff tops. WOW!"<sup>54</sup>

One set of mixed blessings that Dorn recounted was that there never seemed to be a dearth of visitors to China. Among the more vexing were politicians and Army "fat cats" from Washington, who wanted to put in a few days in a combat zone to pick up a campaign ribbon.<sup>55</sup>

Some of the politicians were interesting and good to have around. One such was US Sen. "Happy" Chandler of Kentucky, later the US commissioner of baseball. Chandler and Dorn got along rather well, and he turned out to be "a pleasant and amusing guy" to have around for several days.

Another was Congressman Mike Mansfield of Montana, who was later a US senator and ambassador to Japan. Unlike many such visitors,

Mansfield had some knowledge of China. Whetting his abiding interest in the Chinese, he had been a sergeant in the US Marine Embassy guard in Peking while Dorn was there as a language officer. During his stay in Kunming, Dorn grew to like Mansfield and his “down-to-earth approach.”

Other visitors were casts of the USO shows that presented numerous top Hollywood stars. Their contribution to the war effort, “that poked into every overseas corner where a lonesome GI might be stationed, were the second-biggest morale builder from the States. The first was, is, and always will be the letter from home.” They were certainly much more interesting than the politicians and the “fat cats.” Stars such as Paulette Goddard, Jinx Falkenburg, and Ann Sheridan—being “characters” in their own right—provided much more than stage entertainment. Each day such stars as Paulette Goddard were around, they were followed by an army of soldiers with clicking cameras. Paulette argued that she was not a first-rank actress and could neither sing nor dance well. No matter, Dorn replied, “You’re just being around is enough.” When she asked about recommendations for future tours, she was informed—in a comment typical of the sexism of the times—that girls should be sent out “with well-stacked



Figure 17. Brig. Gen. Frank Dorn greets members of the Pat O’Brien-Jinx Falkenburg USO troupe at Paosnaw, China on 25 October 1944. The entertainers were touring the China-Burma-India Theater. (Courtesy of US Army.)

breasts” who could “really fill out a sweater,” as the men were “sick of looking at these flat-chested Chinese women.” Paulette, with fire in her eyes, threw out her own, asking, “What’s the matter with me, buster?” The answer: “Nothing. Nothing at all.”<sup>56</sup>

As things developed, late in the summer of 1943, Stilwell recommended Dorn for his star as brigadier general that was soon approved. Stilwell also had some advice: Dorn should not act so impetuously. This was no way for a general to act. Neither was he to “start being a character,” which might get him tagged with a “dumb nickname.” He thought that Dorn was lucky when he got hooked with the innocuous “Pinky” at West Point; if he would stick with it, Stilwell suggested, “You won’t have to live up to something worse.” Stilwell plainly found “Vinegar Joe” a nuisance, as he was expected to be “a tart, caustic old bastard,” a hard label to duck “once it’s pinned on you.” Then there was George Patton, a “hell of a good soldier” and he gets that silly nickname: “Blood and Guts.” In fact, Patton was something of a poet and a fine historian. But he had to live up to his billing, “or he thinks he does, with his pearl-handled pistols and swearing in that squeaky voice of his.”<sup>57</sup>

Dorn was often noted for his concern for those under his command. For instance, he staged an elaborate Christmas celebration in 1943 at his headquarters in Kunming. It was well-fueled by a part of some 13 tons of American beer that Dorn had flown over the hump for the occasion, much of it being dispatched to the Fourteenth Air Force, Chungking Headquarters, and other bases. Though he had doubled the allotment to Chungking, someone there “squealed on him” and reported it to Stilwell. Dorn was called on the carpet and reminded that the procured refreshments constituted “illegal shipments over the Hump.” Dorn, having had a hand in drafting the order in the first place, knew that he was in violation but stated the beer was “for the biggest Christmas party I could swing for my officers and men.” He could have the beer flown back on returning empty planes if ordered, but Stilwell declared that this would not be necessary as the beer had already arrived and should be used as planned. In any event, Stilwell concluded, “I’m glad you’re thinking of your people;” though invited to the party, Stilwell could not attend, as he would then be “an accessory in the violation of my own theater orders.”<sup>58</sup>

The party in Kunming, despite its “illegal aspects,” Dorn reported was a “WOW.” The French bishop of Kunming presided over the religious part of the proceedings and granted “a dispensation to all my Catholic lads to eat and drink anything they wanted on Christmas Eve. His elaborate document also granted mass absolution to ‘those poor, lonely boys so far

away from home at Christmas for almost any sin, or crime, they may have committed in the past, the present, and the future.” Dorn concluded that “he was my kind of bishop;” in return, Dorn led all of his Catholic officers and men to mass in the bishop’s “gloomy old cathedral,” with instructions to give generously when the collection plate passed. This they did, greatly impressing the bishop.<sup>59</sup>

Back in Yunnan, there was never a slack moment in Kunming, where life “was always busy, never dull, often sort of nutty, and sometimes pretty hairy.” Indeed, Dorn’s office seems to have been, to say the least, a rather unusual Army headquarters. When all else failed, his Indochinese monkey “Fanny”—so called “because of her bright red behind”—managed to stir things up with her unpredictable antics. More involved, and unexpected, Dorn got into the opium business; saved a French convent from being looted by Lung Yun’s troops; formed an anti-smuggling alliance with Gen. Tai Li, the sinister chief of Chiang Kai-shek’s secret police; got himself on Chennault’s “skunk list” by carrying out Stilwell’s orders to oversee Air Corps courts-martial of officers and men for smuggling gold into China, which involved Chennault himself; and, finally, “a small matter like planning the assassination of Chiang Kai-shek.” Therefore, Dorn concluded that in addition to his usual Y-Force duties, “I managed to keep busy and to get into more mischief than Fanny,” whether it was “stirred up ourselves, . . . stirred up on its own accord, or from higher up.”<sup>60</sup>

As to the matter of the opium, among the more interesting ventures that Dorn undertook as chief of staff of the Y-Force, in March 1943, he had to search out means of transport connected with the Salween River Campaign “through some of the deepest gorges and wildest mountains on earth.” The task required pack horses and mules, pack cattle, and human carriers. The men could be “Shanghaied” provided that the local work force was not disabled. The animals could be purchased, again so that local farm needs were not endangered. The Chinese general involved—Hsiao I-hsu—argued for a dominant force of men as they could be “requisitioned;” animals cost money, but Dorn observed that if the animals failed, they could be eaten; not so the men. Hsiao replied that if a man died or was killed, no financial loss was suffered; if a horse died, whether eaten or not, it cost money. In the end, “after much discussion and clicking abacus and by scratchy pen,” the final figures were agreed upon. It was calculated that the average carrying capacity of pack cattle was 165 pounds each; mules or ponies, 130; and humans, 65 pounds. The final figures were for 22,000 pack cattle; 20,000 men; and 10,000 mules or horses. If one considered that all might be in action at the same time, some 2,800 tons of supplies

could be carried. Hsiao became responsible for the cattle and men; Dorn undertook to supply the mules and horses.<sup>61</sup> As Dorn explained, the horses proved to be the most difficult. He noted that the old saw “you can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make him drink,” might be paraphrased as: “you can meet a Tibetan at the market, but you cannot make him sell a horse for money.” He explained that the best source of horses were the weekly horse fairs at Chungtien in a remote area near the Tibetan border “where everything seemed to be vertical, and where the course of three of the world’s greatest rivers—the Salween, the Mekong, and the Yangtze—tore through their deep gorges within thirty-five miles of each other.”<sup>62</sup>

On his first attempt to purchase horses there, no Tibetan would sell; they sneered at Chinese paper money. Neither would they accept gold, which was simply too heavy for easy transport through the mountains. The only worthwhile currency for them was opium. Accordingly, for five months or so—through veterinarians and officers in the field—“the US Army became one of the largest traffickers in opium in southwest China.” They kept no detailed records of such transactions, so the final expenditure was not known; nonetheless, Dorn concluded, “the American taxpayers bought a hell of a lot of opium in the winter of 1943 and spring of 1944 to trade for that herd of crow-baits.”<sup>63</sup>

Another rather-offbeat operation that Dorn’s headquarters was involved in was rescuing the funds of the French convent and school near Kunming. Just before the Japanese seizure of French Indochina in 1940, the mother chapter of the order in Hanoi sent a large sum of cash—worth several hundred thousand in US dollars—to the Kunming convent for safekeeping. In early 1944, Chinese general Lung Yun learned of its location and planned to seize it with his troops. His ploy was that since the Vichy government was allied with Nazi Germany, it was at war with China. He stated to the mother-superior that he intended to search the convent seeking evidence of enemy activities and material. Knowing that the safe was the real object of Lung’s incursion, she asked Dorn for advice, which he happily supplied.

On the day set for the search, a company of Lung’s troops demanded that the gates to the convent be opened at once. When they were, the troops beheld four emplaced machine guns manned by American soldiers with orders to fire if the troops tried to enter. The dumfounded troops of “Dragon Cloud” “shuffled off empty-handed to their barracks,” and the funds were saved.<sup>64</sup>

More serious was another case that Dorn confronted. In this instance, though he did not relish it, he had to team up with Gen. Tai Li, the feared and hated head of Chiang's secret police. This concerned what Dorn and many others knew: that officers and men of the Fourteenth Air Force were deeply involved in smuggling gold from India into China, where it was sold at large profits on the black market. American pilots and their crews were paid handsomely for making the deliveries. Chinese customs officials—even if they were honest—could not search American planes. Accordingly, “the fly-boys went merrily on, expanding their operations to include several senior officers.” Indeed, it was rumored that Chennault himself was involved. Chiang ordered Tai Li to investigate. He first asked for an appointment with Dorn. They met on a little-used auxiliary runway. Dorn was to come alone; he would also be alone with an interpreter. Dorn declared that he measured up to his sinister reputation in appearance, dressed in black from head to foot. Though unsmiling, Tai was friendly and apologized for implicating American pilots and crewmen, though Dorn admitted that he already knew of their activities. In fact, Stilwell had previously ordered an investigation, and Dorn was to submit recommendations for disciplinary action if indicated.

In addition, General Chennault had been ordered to convene a general court-martial board to conduct trials where appropriate. Though he apparently threw up some roadblocks, as Dorn reported, Chennault did continue with the proceedings. Dorn promised Tai that he would assist him as well, with one proviso: no Americans were to be harmed in any way, and only Americans would deal with those who were guilty. Tai agreed to work with the Americans with those stipulations in place. He also noted, “You have been in China long enough to understand certain necessities in my work.” Dorn agreed, and they shook hands as they departed. Less than a year later, Gen. Tai Li may have fallen victim to American revenge. His C-47 aircraft, furnished and serviced by the Fourteenth Air Force, crashed in a remote mountain area; all onboard were killed. No answers were ever forthcoming as to the details, though weather was not a factor. Tai Li may have come too close to either Americans or Chinese victims of his activities; he had numerous enemies on every hand.<sup>65</sup>

Meanwhile, the courts-martial proceeded—with Chennault as reviewing officer, setting aside some of their decisions. Nonetheless, some of these were later reversed and their stipulations carried out. In addition, during the proceedings, many remarks were “struck from the official record,” though notes by Dorn's stenographer carried some very compromising statements implicating the highest-ranking officers of the Fourteenth Air Force.

These included remarks made by a sergeant and two lieutenants, who “burst out indignantly that they were small fry; that the big deals in gold were higher up. ‘Why not go to the very top?’ one cried out.” The lieutenants asked “why they should burn while the higher-ups went scot-free.” In any event, Stilwell directed Dorn to “oversee and report directly to him on all smuggling trials.” This he did, though “it was a hell of a job for me,” because Dorn “was junior to Chennault and . . . outside of his command.” Dorn, nevertheless, did the job “as unobtrusively as I could.” Certainly, the trials were fraught with much divisiveness, and Dorn noted that he was henceforth even more cordially hated by Chennault.<sup>66</sup> The bitter conflicts between Stilwell and Chennault are well-documented. Less well-known were the strong feelings between Chennault and Gen. Henry “Hap” Arnold, head of the US Army Air Forces. In this regard, Dorn recorded that later in May 1945, he, Stilwell, and other high officers met Arnold at Guam when all were en route to other destinations. On this occasion, there ensued a deep discussion among Arnold, Stilwell, and Dorn. There was common agreement that Chennault was involved in smuggling operations. There was no proof but circumstantial evidence seemed to suffice, with speculation as to the degree of his guilt; their talk concluded with Arnold’s avowed determination to see justice done, because Chennault “was a disgrace to the Air Corps.” Arnold had already blocked Chennault’s promotion. Consequently, Chennault quit “the service in a huff,” ostensibly because he had not been appointed to command the China Theater, “a position for which he was totally unfitted.” Chennault’s request for retirement was “approved with the speed of light.” General Arnold had had “a belly full of his shenanigans.”<sup>67</sup> Later, Chennault married his companion, “an amateur news hen and daughter of a minor Chinese official. Then out of the service and with the financial backing of Chiang’s government and the proceeds from his moneymaking activities in Kunming, Chennault founded the Flying Tiger Air Line. During the next few years, his airline profited greatly from US Central Intelligence Agency contracts for moving freight and personnel.”<sup>68</sup>

Also in December 1943 while Dorn was acting commander and chief of staff of Yoke-Force, General Stilwell—just returned from the Cairo Conference—asserted that while there he had had a private conversation with Roosevelt. The president had manifested considerable impatience with the procrastination and constant demands of Chiang and the Chinese government that amounted to a substantial change of heart. He was “clearly fed up with Chiang’s tantrums, his inordinate demands, and his constant weaseling out of agreements.” Roosevelt then stated that “if you

can't get along with Chiang and can't replace him, get rid of him. Put in someone you can manage." In the course of this private conversation, as Stilwell reported it to Dorn, the president had instructed Stilwell to "prepare a workable plan for the assassination of Chiang Kai-shek." It was to be a plan only "and one that could never point the slightest finger of guilt at any agency or individual of the US government." Nothing was ever to be committed to writing. Stilwell then presented Dorn with the "astounding order . . . to 'prepare a plan for the assassination of Chiang Kai-shek.'" If Dorn could come up with a "workable plan," it was to be explained to Stilwell in a later private meeting. If such a plan was to be carried out, the order for its execution was to "come from above." Stilwell himself stated that he "doubted very much if anything would ever be done about it" and reiterated that the scheme "comes from the very top," though he named no names. Dorn's subsequent plan involved Chiang and Madame Chiang and consisted of their being flown to India; during the flight, engine failure would necessitate the passengers and crew bailing out. But the chutes had been sabotaged, and these two would fall to their deaths. To disguise the plot, at least two of the American crewmen on board would meet a similar fate. Stilwell thought that the plan might work, but nothing further was heard "from on high" regarding it, and Stilwell never mentioned it again.<sup>69</sup>

Nonetheless, during the long weary months from May 1942 until late in 1943, the political dimensions and diplomatic aspects of numerous problems involving Stilwell—and by extension Dorn—were front and center to all else. Chiang was often at the hub of these matters. It is not for nothing that Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, the authors of the three volumes of the series, the *United States Army in World War II* devoted to the China-Burma-India Theater, entitled one of their books *Stilwell's Command Problems*. Among these were decisions at the TRIDENT Conference between Roosevelt and Churchill, 12–27 May 1943, in Washington, DC. Heeding the pleas of Maj. Gen. Clair Chennault, commander of the US Fourteenth Air Force, these leaders decided that he should be given much more of the tonnage being flown over the Hump; they downplayed the buildups of ground troops projected by Stilwell.<sup>70</sup>

Still, Stilwell was able to persevere; as one consequence of the 23–26 November 1943 Cairo Summit meeting of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Chiang named SEXTANT, while FDR insisted that China be recognized as one of the Big Four (United States, Britain, the USSR, and China), he by then had come around to Stilwell's views rather than those of Chennault. Accordingly, the re-conquest of Burma using British, American, and Chinese troops was given the green light in Washington. To be sure, Chiang

still had to be convinced that the use of his troops was in order. He only fully agreed to allow considerable Chinese participation on 19 December 1943. Even before this, however, Stilwell in October 1943 launched two Chinese Divisions of X-Force forward from the Ledo Road area toward Myitkyina, Burma. This was supported by the British Fourteenth Army from Imphal in India.<sup>71</sup> It is also necessary to indicate something of the difficulties under which Stilwell and Dorn labored in leading Chinese troops into battle. It was understood that the Chinese commanders were the ultimate leaders in the action, with their ears always attuned to Chungking and Chiang, even if under Stilwell's command. Dorn made it clear that the Y-Force Operations Staff, for example, had never been in a position to order the Chinese Army into action. It was a military mission in a foreign—though friendly—country; nothing more.” He noted further that “the official mission of the US Army in China [was] to increase the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army—and nothing else.” Therefore, “the Americans could recommend; they could persuade; they could cajole, but they could not command the Chinese.” They were to train, plan, and oversee supplying of the Chinese. Finally, when Chiang on 12 April 1944 agreed to the deployment of Y-Force—also known as the Chinese Expeditionary Force—the Americans could then make recommendations as to the acceptance of their detailed plans. “These, after much discussion and revision, were approved.” This awkward arrangement did not always work out as planned and made for considerable conflict when military operations in Burma were initiated by both Stilwell and Dorn. The key issue was invariably the same: who, Chiang or Stilwell, had the last word in any given situation?<sup>72</sup>

A bit later, Stilwell's forces were reinforced on 6 January 1944 by an American regiment, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) commanded by Brig. Gen. Frank D. Merrill. Stilwell had repeatedly asked Washington for several divisions of American troops, but none were forthcoming except for this unit. It had been organized in Deogarh, India, on 10 October 1943. On 1 January 1944, the unit was re-designated the 5307th Composite Regiment and called the “Galahad Force,” though newspaper correspondents styled the outfit “Merrill's Marauders.” Its chief missions involved penetration actions behind enemy lines, with emphasis on jungle warfare, and other exploits of derring-do.<sup>73</sup> Unfortunately, the conditions under which the Marauders operated—with the monsoon rains to further hinder them—caused tropical diseases such as malaria and scrub typhus. They were comparatively lightly armed, ill-fed, and poorly supplied. Consequently, they suffered many casualties, in fact were decimated, espe-

cially because of diseases and malnutrition. In addition, being the only significant organization of American infantry in China-Burma, Stilwell depended on them to continue fighting despite their poor condition. The soldiers had earlier been informed that they would be relieved after three months in the field. By the end of five months, they were still fully engaged, despite many protests being lodged by their commanders, especially the second-in-command, Col. Charles N. Hunter.

Their treatment was later reviewed, even by a special Congressional hearing, but this did not result in any punishment of Stilwell or of anyone else. One of the actions that they were engaged in was the conquering of Stilwell's prime objective: the pivotal central Burmese city of Myitkyina, which had held out tenaciously until 3 August 1944. Their poor condition then dictated that they be disbanded, which was done on 10 August 1944.<sup>74</sup>

Meanwhile at this juncture, though early successes for the X-Force and the British were forthcoming, the Japanese fielded a large force of about 100,000 men in the Fifteenth and Thirty-Third Armies under the Burma area army commander, Lt. Gen. Masakazu Kawabe. This began in March 1944



Figure 18. Near the end of his command in China, Joseph Warren Stilwell (left) was promoted to four-star general. He is shown here with Dorn (second from the left). (Courtesy of US Army.)



Figure 19. Chinese troops of Y-Force train to use rubber rafts to cross the Salween River. (Courtesy of US Army Signal Corps.)

and forced the altering of the Allied plans until July 1944, when Kawabe's forces were depleted and the Allies could renew their own offensive.

Y-Force, also designated the China Expeditionary Force, was expected to be finally committed in support of Stilwell's efforts. During this time, Dorn focused on further training, supplying the force, getting together animal transport, and providing the rubber rafts needed to ferry the Chinese over the Salween River. He also needed to train the Chinese troops in use of the rafts, using the Mekong River, which was a muddy stream similar to the Salween and about 20 miles east of it.

While these developments were proceeding, Chiang continued to drag his feet when it came to finally committing Y-Force to cross the Salween River; he was supported by Ho Ying-ch'in, the Chinese minister of war, and the Military Council. At this juncture, Madame Chiang offered to help get things moving, and Stilwell gave Dorn the responsibility for getting him fully engaged. There then ensued a two-week virtually non-stop series of conferences with American and Chinese officers in Chungking. During this time, Madame Chiang often sent for Dorn at any hour of the day or



Figure 20. Brig. Gen. Frank Dorn (front center) with a group of Chinese officers.  
(Courtesy of US Army.)

night—on one occasion, simply because she could not sleep. With “the constant burdens of statecraft pressing on her poor weak shoulders,” she needed a respite and wanted simply to talk and drink, though she did not usually indulge to excess.

Dorn declared that “she was as good as her word and actually did win over some of the sluggards of Chunking.” She advised Dorn to give a large dinner and named the key Chinese generals who should be invited. Dorn included his close friend and associate, Gen. Hsiao I-hsu, to give him support and advice. The tone of the dinner, held on 12 April 1944, has been described in the official history of the US Army in World War II: “He (Dorn) may well have had in mind the ancient practice of the Persian General Staff, which it is said, offered the advantage of combining the impetuosity of youth, the genius of experience, and caution of maturity by the simple device of considering a plan in all states of intoxication and sobriety . . . in this case, mostly intoxication.” As Dorn recounted, “Before departing, all of the guests were just plain bombed.”<sup>75</sup>

At a follow-up meeting of the Chinese Military Council the following day, 13 April, Dorn played his major cards. He was informed that Chiang had given “grudging consent” for the operation on the day before. However, Ho Ying-ch’i then stipulated that four virtually impossible conditions be met and Dorn must give his personal assurance that they would be:

- Ferry 50,000 troops across the Salween River—a feat not attempted by the Chinese in the previous 1,000 years.
- Give air support to the undertaking.
- Coordinate and supply American-trained artillery units.
- Share Gen. Wei Li-huang’s command responsibility of feeding and supplying munitions to the CEF.

Dorn accepted these conditions at once, much to the astonishment of those present. He then asserted that he would organize a US special provisional battalion that would act as a spearhead to lead the Chinese troops into battle. Dorn noted that he was of the opinion he would not be called on to implement that “burst of bravado” because of the Chinese fear of colossal loss of face were it to be carried out. Hence, Dorn’s thorough knowledge of Chinese psychology was brought to bear at this crucial juncture. Indeed, Ho “caved in” and pressed his official seal on the Chinese order to attack. Thus, Dorn won; members of the Military Council were greatly surprised, because they had expected Ho to win. Dorn held another major card up his sleeve: President Roosevelt and General Marshall had become so impatient with Chiang’s procrastination and demands that they had ordered all CEF supplies, munitions, and training cut off at once until Chiang approved the operation. Dorn, however, held off on announcing the ultimatum; it would only have been employed as a last resort. Accordingly, it was never fully implemented, having been put into effect for one day only. Deliveries were quietly resumed the next day following Dorn’s request to Washington when things began to proceed according to his plan.

Back in Kunming, Dorn ordered the American special provisional battalion to be organized to keep up the pressure on the Chinese. Members of his staff were certain that such a unit with so little training would surely be slaughtered if called upon to fight. Dorn recognized the truth of these assertions but argued that the Americans were at war and must prepare for action. All the while, he “was hoping and praying” that his bluff would not be called. And, as he succinctly observed, “it wasn’t.” As he had counted on, Generals Ho, Wei, and Hsiao insisted that the American spearhead would not be necessary, meaning of course “that they could not permit such a terrific loss of face.” In short, Dorn had got by with doubly ensuring that

the Chinese would not back out again. General Hsiao complimented him, observing that “you are thinking more like a Chinese than most Chinese.”<sup>76</sup>

Then the real work could begin. Soon, a field headquarters was set up outside of Paoshan near the location of the forces of Gen. Wei Li-huang. Then from mid-May 1944, until late January 1945 when Dorn returned to the United States, the long-awaited Salween Campaign—“a kaleidoscope of people, places, animals and things”—was underway. The first matter was the collection of hundreds of inflatable rubber boats, numerous bamboo rafts, and a cumbersome rope-operated ferry; these were put in place at five projected crossing points at the bottom of the Salween Gorge. The scene was crowded with more than 100,000 troops; 10,000 pack mules and ponies; 20,000 carriers; and more than 20,000 pack cattle that “cluttered




Figure 21. The Salween Campaign, 11 May–30 June 1944.  
(Courtesy of US Army Center of Military History.)

the steep zig-zag trails down the precipitous slopes to the raging torrent of the river.” The roar of the rushing water in the 7,000- to 8,000-foot-deep gorge drowned out the reverberating echoes of bronze bells and clappers as well as the clatter of equipment and weapons. Meanwhile, Dorn continually had to prod Gen. Sung His-lien, in command of the XI Group Army, to get “off his can and into action.” To assist in his efforts, Dorn recruited several American photographers and newsmen to convince the general that his picture and accounts of his deeds would forthwith be blazoned across newspapers and magazines throughout Europe and America, and he had a great chance to become a worldwide hero. Though he “fell for our soft soap,” he nonetheless needed “a daily goosing” to keep up to the mark; but “when the bell rang, he got on his way.” Dorn had also admonished the press always to give the credit for the operation to the Chinese.<sup>77</sup>

Before sunup on 11 May 1944, 32,000 men crossed the Salween at five points and caught the Japanese 56th Division “with its pants down;” by late afternoon the Chinese troops had scaled the opposite heights and secured the three northern passes. Within the next two days, an additional 80,000 men crossed with almost no losses. The first engagements with the



Figure 22. Y-Force troops use this temporary suspension bridge to cross the Salween River in Burma on the night of 10–11 May 1944. (Courtesy of US Army.)

Japanese became known as “the Battle of the Clouds,” which was “the highest land engagement in World War II” that the Chinese forces handily won. They forced the Japanese to withdraw to the south leaving the 11,000-foot-high passes, a cloud-shrouded snow and ice field, in Chinese hands. Unfortunately, as Dorn had anticipated, Gen. Sung Hai-lien failed to capture Lungling, headquarters of the Japanese 56th Division.

Though he attacked, the Japanese counterattacked; the “non-hero tucked tail, pulled back his entire army, and refused to resume the offensive.” Though the Chinese made advances, they suffered heavy casualties.<sup>78</sup> They then came upon the heavily fortified area known as Sungshan. This was essentially three mountain peaks, sometimes called “The Eastern Gibraltar.” The fortifications consisted of a complicated series of bunkers, tunnels, dugouts, pillboxes, and trenches surrounded by barbed wire topped by warning bells. Because much of the fortified area was underground, artillery fire and aerial bombardments were largely ineffective. The Japanese were able—with about 1,200 troops—to hold out for several weeks. They, however, began to run out of steam, rations, and ammunition. Finally on 11 August, an American engineer and a detachment of Chinese made their way to a point near the wire and began to tunnel into the mountain’s slope, at last arriving under the main defenses. They planted a charge of 6,000 pounds of TNT then ignited it on 21 August, blowing the top off of Sungshan Mountain as though a “one-shot volcano” had erupted. This ended the resistance, though a few isolated pillboxes held out for some days thereafter. Of the original defenders, only nine survived. Chinese casualties were quite heavy, with almost 8,000 killed and many others wounded.

Dorn was warmly praised by Stilwell, who congratulated him on his reduction of Sungshan. Stilwell then concluded that if Dorn could knock off Tengchung, all of his worries would be over. Dorn was pleased to note that as he and Stilwell predicted all along, the Chinese troops had “done well at last.” Having accomplished this victory, Dorn was given to philosophizing about whether or not the losses were justified: “Was it worthwhile?” Stilwell had once opined:

[I]n war the victor can lose whatever high purpose and moral values he may have started with. And thus, he’s defeated at the moment of his triumph, for he sees the desolation and the misery he has wrought. . . . The instrument of war is the most wasteful and immoral device ever contrived by man. The squandering of human life and national resources can seldom be justified. Even wars with good causes have doubtful results, and there are few, if any,

moral principles involved. But one of the greatest tragedies is that war can and does break down the moral fiber of the individuals who fight it.<sup>79</sup>

Dorn, seeing many of the mutilated bodies of the killed Chinese soldiers who had been sacrificed to capture a mountain road, reflected, however, that that road “could save a nation in distress.” He then embarked



Figure 23. Brig. Gen. Frank Dorn surveys damage caused at the Battle of Tengchung, Burma, in June 1944. (Courtesy of US Army Signal Corps.)

upon an extensive résumé of war and its effects and consequences beyond Stilwell's surmises:

The general had been right as far as whole nations were concerned. But what about individuals mad with the wild thrill of combat? And what of man's atavistic impulse to glorify himself as a hero? What of his subconscious urge to seek complete release from lifetime restraints in the kind of savage elation and sense of power that can exist in no other phase of life? Wasteful and immoral as it may be, war has always been and always will be the greatest experience man encounters in his entire life. The so-called piping times of peace are dull, drab, routine, and repetitious. The crash and struggle of battle are exciting, exhilarating, even fun if one comes out with a clean skin. When boredom and good deeds become a national affliction, somehow, somewhere, and in some way men will find the excuse to make war. Instinctively the male human loves war as he might a beautiful and alluring woman who pulls out all stops for him; just as he basically abhors the depressive dullness of peacetime life. . . . War is like an enchanting perfume; peace like the acrid stench of wet diapers and the odor of boiling cabbage. But though either victory or defeat can bring forth a man's greatest moments, so can they nurture his worst depravity.<sup>80</sup>

As to the Salween Campaign, Dorn had no illusions about its overall importance. In one of his historical reports regarding the Y-Force, he stated that "on the gigantic canvas of a World War, the Salween Campaign took only a few brushstrokes; yet, nonetheless, it holds great significance to the completed picture. It demonstrated the correctness of the basic assumption that properly trained, equipped, and led, Chinese soldiers are fully capable of beating back the Jap armies."<sup>81</sup>

Nonetheless, with the fall of Sungshan, Dorn felt no pity: "The only good Jap was a dead Jap." Certainly if the Chinese had been the defeated ones, the Japanese would not have spared them. However, Dorn still could only reflect on the parents, wives, and children of the slain Japanese; he then returned to the final results, that "dead or not, they had deserved their violent end. Their king had sinned against God, man and Nature . . . had destroyed in themselves all possible redemption of moral values."<sup>82</sup> One of the worst things that had occurred were many cases of cannibalism found among some isolated Japanese units that had run out of food. The Chinese, in particular, were horrified. To Dorn, it seemed that good propaganda could result if the Japanese actions were publicized. He was voted down in Chungking and CEF headquarters, however. Not knowing the reasons,



Figure 24. The first convoy of US Army supply trucks makes its way on the Ledo-Burma Road bound for Kunming, China, on 28 January 1945. The trucks arrived in Kunming on 4 February 1945. This act marked the official end of the Salween River Campaign by attaining the operation's main goal, which was to reopen a supply land route from India to China. (Courtesy of US Army.)

Dorn finally realized that the Chinese might have harbored fears that, if widely known, their own troops might get some ideas “for fancy menus when *their* rations ran low, which all too often was the case.”<sup>83</sup> While Dorn was being engaged with Y-Force, farther west X-Force under Stilwell accomplished the fall of Myitkyina on 3 August 1944. The way was then clear for the realization of Stilwell's dream of the “road.” It was soon possible for road traffic to be resumed. It began in Ledo in Assam, India, and proceeded to reconnect with the old Burma Road at Mong Yu in Burma. There supplies could be trucked on to Kunming in Yunnan Province, China. A fuel pipeline also paralleled the roads on into Kunming. The first truck convoy departed Ledo on 12 January 1945 and arrived in Kunming on 4 February. By this time in early 1945, Chiang had renamed the Ledo Road as the “Stilwell Road,” in belated recognition of Stilwell's dream.

Meanwhile, back in the Salween area, Dorn's immediate objective after the fall of Sungshan was the granite-walled city of Tengchung, garrisoned by about 3,000 Japanese. The troops were heavily supported by dozens of pillboxes entrenched on a high ridge that overlooked the valley where the town was situated. For centuries, the town had been the center

for the importation of jade from Burma. Strategically, it was most important to Army engineers who wanted to capture it and thus shorten the distance between Myitkyina and Paoshan on the Burma Road that was being reconstructed. Five understrength Chinese divisions—each of about 4,500 combat troops—had surrounded the town, driven the Japanese from the commanding heights, and begun to shell it. In addition, an aerial attack had burned much of the city, and a portion of the wall had been demolished. The Chinese then moved into an area of the city itself.<sup>84</sup>

Tengchung was then besieged. This was the result of a 51-day assault that started when the Chinese 56th Division arrived on the edges of the city which was, interestingly, occupied by the identically numbered Japanese 56th Division. This was an ancient walled city that “had been old even when Marco Polo was said to have visited in the thirteenth century.” Unfortunately, the Japanese were behind the walls of the ancient city that “were thirty-five to forty feet high and as much as sixty feet thick at the base and eight feet thick along their tops.” Though much artillery was used, the city was only opened up when the Fourteenth Air Force bombers at length bashed holes in the imposing fortress walls that made it possible for the Chinese to enter. Their technique then was to spray streams of gasoline ahead of the advancing troops, igniting it with flame throwers.



Figure 25. Another view of the first convoy to traverse the Ledo-Burma Road bound for Kunming. Note the bleak landscape and the difficult terrain for road building. (Courtesy of US Army.)

In this way, the old city was burned out—forcing the Japanese to begin to abandon it, though rearguards remained.

Indeed, Dorn thought that the Chinese should have immediately overrun the final defenses, but the divisional leaders—safely ensconced in comfortable dugouts in hills beyond—preferred a holding action. Thus, the troops’ “flabby leaders chose to observe the action from a safe distance rather than to get off their cans and lead their men.” Dorn hit upon a solution. With two of his staffers, Lt. Col. Johnny Darrah and Col. John Stodter, Dorn flew into a makeshift airstrip in a Stinson L-5, a light observation aircraft that was flown by an enlisted sergeant-pilot; for an hour or so, they proceeded to stroll casually through the small captured portion of the town. Dorn, for maximum effect, wore no helmet. He admitted that “throughout this whole stage act, though, the hackles on the back of my neck felt as if they were sticking up like the quills on the back of an aroused porcupine. To the Chinese troops in the vicinity, we probably looked like damned fools since we didn’t have to be there at all.”<sup>85</sup>

After the exhibition was completed and ignoring invitations for dinner by the Chinese commanders, Dorn’s group flew back to his headquarters at Paoshan. When asked about what the incident might accomplish, Dorn replied rather smugly: “You’ll see.” Indeed, the results were not long in coming. News of their exploit swiftly reached the ears of the Chinese commanders, who had lost “big face” and had been “shamed into getting off their fat tails.” Thus, Dorn’s knowledge of the Asian world, and the importance of “face,” stood him in good stead. The Chinese commanders thereupon hastily moved their command posts inside the city. In a matter of days on 15 September, the city fell to the Chinese. There were no prisoners or survivors; many had committed suicide or, if wounded, were slain by their comrades.<sup>86</sup>

One Chinese infantryman, Li Shi Fu, described some of the scenes they found:

There was an area for comfort women [Japanese-imported prostitutes], and the women had all committed suicide with pistols. In other areas of the old city, we’d sometimes find Japanese troops still shooting at us. By now, with our greater numbers, we’d quickly surround them and kill them. When we’d overtake the enemy position, we’d find the Japanese had chained these soldiers to the earth. They’d have put a chained shackle around the man’s ankle; then they’d attach the other end of the chain to a spike that had been driven into a boulder or the stone foundation of a building. There would be a few cans of rations nearby for these soldiers to

eat, and each man had been given a little bit of ammunition. But each time we came upon these chained men, we were amazed! *Amazed!* Chained to the battlefield! What kind of an enemy had we been fighting?<sup>87</sup>

The Tengchung operation was destined to be Dorn’s last military action in Burma.

A few weeks later, Dorn reported that he was visited by a delegation of surviving city fathers, “all bows and smiles.” They had come to thank Dorn for liberating their city. They planned to rebuild it and intended to change the name from Tengchung to Dornchung. They presented him with a silk scroll in appreciation. Dorn was astonished because, as he told them,




Figure 26. Map of the Burma Campaign, 1 January–18 June 1945.  
(Courtesy of US Army Center of Military History.)

he had just destroyed their city. But the Burmese replied that “We thank all of you Americans. . . . Without you we would still be occupied by the dwarf monkey-people. Without you, our own armies would never have destroyed the enemy.” Dorn realized, yet once more, that his “grasp of the thinking of the ‘mysterious east’ would always be just as hazy as that shimmering landscape,” as peace descended on the valley.<sup>88</sup> As 1944 proceeded, events “far beyond the misty Salween Gorge” began to forecast a final overwhelming victory for the Allied forces. There were the landings at Normandy, the fall of Rome, and the battle for Saipan in the Pacific. In China, however, the Japanese were achieving considerable success that “was pressing the panic button in Chungking.” This was the result of the Japanese determination to capture the Fourteenth Air Force’s bases in east China. Consequently in the summer and fall of 1944, these bases were thought to be secure; however, Stilwell had warned that “an air force is only as strong as the ground forces that defend its bases.” Chennault had ignored these warnings, and Gen. Chang Fa-kuei’s armies, which had been charged with the defense of this area, simply melted away into the hills. Chennault also “spewed out an amazing series of reports noting their successes in repelling the Japanese force’s offensives known by



Figure 27. Dorn, Stilwell, and US Army Air Forces officers in an airfield conference in 1944. (Courtesy of US Army.)

the code name of ICHIGO. As Dorn recorded it, “fed up with his propaganda, the combined chiefs in Washington turned complete thumbs down on Chennault’s screams for the moon and the stars, and thus began his [ultimate] sulky, ill-humored departure from the scene of war.”<sup>89</sup> Added to these developments and the continuing acrimonious exchanges among Chiang, Stilwell, and the US Ambassador Clarence Gauss, Dorn recorded that “Little Jack Horner” Roosevelt “stuck in his thumb and pulled out a prune in the person of one Pat Hurley.” This worthy “proceeded to create an impossible mess within both the American setup in Chungking and in China itself.” Dorn commented that though Hurley meant well regarding matters political, “he sank deeper and deeper into the quick sands of oriental shenanigans:”

[H]is frantic struggles to bail out seemed to develop into a hysterical panic that fathered a series of vindictive actions. This, coupled with a complete inability to distinguish fact from fiction, and a growing conviction that everyone was against him, made Hurley a dangerous meddler in matters of high estate that he knew little about.<sup>90</sup>



Figure 28. An October 1944 airfield meeting with Stilwell, Dorn, and other officers. (Courtesy of US Army.)

In the upshot after two years of “acrimonious exchanges” between many actors on the stage—ranging from Mountbatten, Churchill, T.V. Soong and Madame Chiang, Chiang himself, and “Hurley’s turncoat stab in the back”—FDR was apprised of Chinese matters as interpreted by Hurley; the president finally acceded to Chiang’s “ill-tempered demand for Stilwell’s relief from command on the CBI Theater.” Certainly, FDR had mixed feelings about the matter, but did express his opinion that Stilwell lacked finesse in handling Chiang and certainly should not have referred to him as “peanut,” a fact well-known by Chiang.<sup>91</sup> As a consequence, the CBI was to be split into the Burma-India and Chinese Theaters. This was accomplished on 24 October 1944. Command of India-Burma would go to the very able US Lt. Gen. Dan Sultan. Dorn was impressed with this



Figure 29. After Stilwell was recalled to the United States by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Lt. Gen. Albert Coady Wedemeyer replaced him on 29 October 1944 as the commander of US Forces in China. (Courtesy of US Army Signal Corps.)

“solid citizen and highly experienced officer with a mind fully capable of grasping the basics of any problem.” The China Theater was to be taken over by Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer.<sup>92</sup>

Soon thereafter on 17 November 1944, X and Y-Forces were disbanded and placed under a new organization, the Chinese Training and Combat Command; Dorn became its commander, though for only a few short weeks



Figure 30. Y-Force troops and American personnel raise flags in October 1944 after the capture of the city of Lungling, Burma. (Courtesy of US Army Signal Corps.)

as things turned out. Dorn was soon replaced by Maj. Gen. R.B. McClure, Wedemeyer's chief of staff. The Chinese Training and Combat Command was to have a short life. In early January 1945, it would be divided into the Chinese Training and Combat commands as separate entities.

On his way to India and home, Stilwell and Maj. Gen. Bill Bergin of his staff spent a half-day at Dorn's headquarters at Paoshan. When Stilwell asked if he would like to return with him, Dorn said that he wanted to stay with the Americans and Chinese serving with him. He noted that whoever the new commander was would need all the experienced hands that he could get. Stilwell predicted that Dorn would regret his "altruistic decision," and Dorn observed that he "sure as hell was right." He soon learned that the new commander neither requested experienced hands nor wanted them. Indeed, the conflict between Dorn and Wedemeyer that emerged is still significant today in view of the continuing debates concerning Wedemeyer's role in China late in World War II and following. On these grounds, the strife merits consideration at some length.

Before departing, Stilwell wrote Dorn a 20 October 1944 letter in which he expressed "his respect and admiration" for what the Y-Force had done. He recognized that the conditions "you have wrestled with have been most trying." Their resources had "been most meager," and they were to receive very little help from anyone. Yet in spite of the difficulties, "you have had a profound influence on the units you have worked with" and accordingly "made a valuable contribution to Chinese-American solidarity and the war effort." Stilwell commented that no Americans had labored with greater difficulties and met them so "faithfully and successfully." Dorn could know that when he returned home, he could have a sense that a "big job well done" was then behind him.<sup>93</sup> The reactions among senior officers in the Chinese Army regarding Stilwell's dismissal were almost universally in favor of his remaining, despite Chiang Kai-shek's views. Gen. Wei Li-huang, who commanded the China Expeditionary Force, and his chief of staff, Gen. Hsiao I-hsu, radioed to Stilwell that they were "deeply grieved at your departure, consider this is most serious mistake, is [an] irreparable loss to China." Accordingly, they added that they "view [the] future with greatest misgiving." They wanted Stilwell to know that they "consider you have done more for China than any other individual past, present, or future." The generals predicted that Stilwell's departure would mean much less activity on the part of China. Chinese newspapers were filled with long articles of nervous speculation. Even at the highest command level, Ho Ying-ch'in, Chiang Kai-shek's war minister and chief of staff, feared for the future "without Stilwell at the helm" and hoped that he might return.<sup>94</sup>

Other generals wanted Stilwell to know that they were willing to lead their troops in open rebellion in defiance of Chiang. Dorn advised against it, noting that such action would hurt both China and Stilwell; hence it did not occur. In the midst of these developments, Lieutenant General Wedemeyer arrived in Chungking “with an entourage of sycophants, a determination to belittle the former command and all that it had done, and a fixation on change for change’s sake.” At the heart of much of these efforts was the new chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Bob McClure, described by Dorn as “a low-slung, burly, boozehound whose most tactful approach to people and problems was with a bludgeon.” He had served in Tientsin with the US Fifteenth Infantry Regiment at the same time that Wedemeyer had been there. Dorn noted that the two, “though apparently opposites in most respects, had formed a lasting friendship.” It was also in Tientsin that Wedemeyer had had his only command of troops in his 25 years of service, and that with a mere platoon.<sup>95</sup> Dorn was then summoned to Chungking to report to his new boss. They immediately clashed over how to defend against the Japanese advance beyond the airfields of the Fourteenth Air Force. Wedemeyer wanted plans immediately drawn up for the defense of Kunming. Dorn felt that the Japanese were by now overextended and that their supply lines were in danger of being easily cut. Furthermore, with winter coming on and with mountainous terrain to be crossed, the Japanese could not operate at that time beyond their present positions. Indeed, Kunming—not to mention Chungking—were in no immediate danger despite the panic of Chiang. Nonetheless, Wedemeyer ordered Dorn to plan for a barricade defense of Kunming and even consider how to defend Chungking, thus allaying Chiang’s—and Wedemeyer’s—fears.<sup>96</sup>

More to the point perhaps, Wedemeyer was intent upon Dorn’s disclaiming Stilwell, changing from a “Stilwell man” to a “Wedemeyer man.” Were that to occur, Dorn was promised that he would be a major general in the near future. Dorn could only be “baffled and disillusioned by Wedemeyer’s program of spite.” Subsequently when Dorn and Wedemeyer met on several occasions with various Chinese generals—among those Wei Li-huang, commander of the China Expeditionary Force and his staff officers—Wedemeyer brusquely stated that if the town of Wanting were not captured by a certain day, he would cut off American support regarding medical, air, liaison, and supply from the China Expeditionary Force. Accordingly, General Wei had been put in a difficult position; he would lose face in front of his commanders by acceding to the threat or risk losing vital American support for his troops. He gambled that Wedemeyer could not carry out his threat without jeopardizing American policy. Wanting

was not taken on the prescribed date but fell a few days thereafter. In this way, Wei had shown up Wedemeyer as a “big-wind no-rain” man, thereby losing face among the Chinese.<sup>97</sup>

By this time, Dorn learned from several sources that “the big boys at theater headquarters were out to get me.” It was clear that the new regime “wanted to get rid of anyone closely associated with General Stilwell.” In a bewildering array of orders, counter-orders, policy statements, rescissions, and new statements, Dorn’s requests for clarification were interpreted as attempts to subvert orders. For one on 27 December 1944, Dorn—still referred to as the commanding general, Chinese Training and Combat Command—was sent a memorandum from Major General McClure, Wedemeyer’s chief of staff. The memo indicated in detail how the present Chinese Training and Combat Command was to be reorganized. The training function was to be separated from the Combat Command area and placed together with the General Staff School and Field Artillery School. Dorn was to be retained as commander of the Chinese Combat Command. His headquarters were to be at Hostel #11, in Kunming.<sup>98</sup>

On the following day, 28 December, Dorn replied to Wedemeyer. After observing that “it is hardly necessary to mention that we are here to carry out your decisions to the best of our abilities,” Dorn reminded Wedemeyer of his previous comment:

[E]ven after a decision had been made, if I or any other officer felt strongly that he should repeat an opposite conviction, you hoped that this would be done. . . . I feel most strongly that the present projected reorganization . . . demands a reminder of what I have tried to suggest on many occasions. If I did not “stick my neck out” in this matter, I feel that I would not only be disloyal to you as the commanding general, but to all Americans who have worked under me.<sup>99</sup>

Then Dorn followed this up with a much more detailed rebuttal in a 31 December 1944 memo.

Wedemeyer responded personally in a 3 January 1945 letter addressed to “Dear Pinky.” Wedemeyer asserted that he was recovering from minor surgery but needed to “state categorically that I disagree with you and many of the premises embodied in your letter. I am going to separate the Training and Combat Commands.” Though he appreciated “your frank exposition and want you to know that I have carefully considered all of the factors which you have mentioned,” Wedemeyer indicated he had “definitely concluded that the plan for reorganization which General McClure

will explain is my desire and will be fully implemented as rapidly as possible." The letter was signed "Sincerely, A.C. Wedemeyer."<sup>100</sup>

Matters rapidly reached a climax. McClure descended on Kunming, and Dorn was ordered out of his quarters and told to report to Wedemeyer at Chungking the following day. McClure then informed Wedemeyer of his recommendations regarding the Kunming command. At the subsequent meeting with Wedemeyer, "a rather lengthy bill of particulars" about Dorn was read. Among other things, he was charged with being "pro-Chinese." Dorn replied that he must ask for relief from the Theater. Wedemeyer replied, "You're not quitting. You're fired." This was apparently on 6 January 1945.<sup>101</sup>

Wedemeyer went on to say that he "couldn't understand why *anyone* would ask to be relieved from his command. *Everyone* wanted to serve under him knowing the great experience that would lay ahead for them." Dorn replied that he would depart for the States as soon as he received written orders. He returned to Kunming and two days later was on his way to Washington.<sup>102</sup>

On 10 January 1945, just prior to leaving China, Dorn wrote another letter to Wedemeyer observing that "in some respects this will probably seem a peculiar letter to you;" rather uncharacteristically, Dorn then stated that he wanted to "express my appreciation for what I consider was your most fair approach and decision in my case. Under the circumstances, I could not have asked for more." He recorded that when General Stilwell left the Theater, "he offered to take me with him. I refused the offer because I believed there was a big job to be done where my past experience could be of assistance; because it never occurred to me that there ever would be any question of the support, I would give to the new theater commander." Dorn noted that he could see, however, that "doubts have come into the minds of you and General McClure." He thought that it was proper "that I should present as strongly as possible my beliefs and convictions up to the time of your final decisions." He wanted Wedemeyer to believe "that my intention was a genuine desire to accomplish the assigned objective in a manner which at the time I was convinced was practicable. If I have been at fault, please be assured that fault was not due to any lack of sincerity or lack of determination to see the job done as it might be directed by you." He hoped that Wedemeyer's plans for the future would "achieve every success." He wanted his best regards to be tendered to General McClure and the staff, "whom I will not have a chance to see again." There may well have been a method in Dorn's apparent "madness." He perhaps adopted this stance in the hopes of retaining his

general's rank, among other considerations.<sup>103</sup> Despite Dorn's 25 January 1945 conciliatory letter, Wedemeyer completed Dorn's efficiency report for the period 27 October 1944 to 21 January 1945, and routinely sent it to the adjutant general in Washington—after Dorn had departed from China. While noting that Dorn's "manner of performance" and other things such as physical activity and physical endurance were graded "excellent" and his knowledge of his profession "superior," Dorn did not similarly follow through on others. In response to the question, "does he render willing and generous support to the plans of his superiors regardless of his personal views in the matter," the answer was a categorical "No." Likewise as to the matter "of all the general officers personally known to me, I would place him 499 of a group of 500." Finally Wedemeyer had concluding remarks: "This officer is bright, clever, and decisive. He is of questionable loyalty, uncooperative, extremely selfish, of immature judgment, and not dependable."<sup>104</sup>

Much later on 16 July 1945, Dorn sent a lengthy memo to the adjutant general in Washington describing Wedemeyer's attitudes toward him and his highly insulting 25 January 1945 fitness report. Dorn took strong issue with the derogatory remarks in the report and asked that the adjutant general refer to his earlier efficiency reports for the previous twenty-two years; none contained references to his being "not dependable, of questionable loyalty, [and] uncooperative." Because these remarks were "so damning in character and tend to affect so vitally my future career," Dorn felt called upon to discuss the matter fully as was his right "under paragraph 5(b) (1), AR [Army Regulation] 600-185."<sup>105</sup>

In the first place, Dorn's contacts with Wedemeyer had been so brief that surely he could not have taken Dorn's measure in such a short interval and, in his crude fashion, negate Dorn's efforts and works in the three-year period in which he was in China and Burma. During those years, he had been decorated three times by the US government and once by the Chinese government, with another honor being recommended by the Chinese.<sup>106</sup> Furthermore, Dorn had apparently been considered *persona grata* by the Wedemeyer group early in December 1944. He noted that General McClure had been informed that Dorn could "count on a second star before long" if he continued to work as before. Wedemeyer alluded to the same thing, but Dorn noted that things changed dramatically from about 20 December 1944 to 6 January 1945. By this time, Dorn was aware that all higher officers who had been associated with Stilwell were being systematically denigrated. Additions remarks were commonplace that many of Stilwell's men were "pole-sitters" and that nothing worth the name

had been accomplished by them. Thus, these “old China hands,” who had “failed in everything they attempted,” must be replaced.

In addition, all the advice that Dorn and others offered to Wedemeyer and McClure was brushed aside, being clearly “not welcomed.” Dorn concluded that though his recommendations about the Theater and the Chinese in general were summarily rejected, they “represented the opinion of nearly 1,500 US Army officers with experience in China.” Furthermore, Dorn instanced his own seven-year-long career in China and his more than three years working with the Chinese Army, which should have counted for something. In contrast, both Wedemeyer and McClure had only spent two or three years in China with the US Fifteenth Infantry in Tientsin in the early 1930s.<sup>107</sup>

Neither would the new men take advice as to how to treat the Chinese, who were indeed bitterly shocked by the attitudes of the new régime. A common remark by them “was that the new American command was attempting to make an American colony of China.” Also, when informed of Dorn’s relief, the Chinese High Command and members of the Chinese



Figure 31. In October 1944, the US Army met with the Communists under Mao Zedong in Northwest China in Yanan. They were exploring the possibilities that the Communists and Chiang might cooperate in fighting the Japanese. This had little result. The Americans were sent in as the Dixie Mission commanded by Col. David D. Barrett, pictured here with Mao on the right side of the photo. (Courtesy of US Army.)

General Staff stated that they would protest this action to the Generalissimo and insist that he remain in China.” Though Dorn asked them not to take such action, which would only complicate matters, at least one did so.

Dorn confessed that “leaving China,” which came on 12 January 1945, “was a great sadness for me. It had indeed been my second country in which I had many roots.” He had at least one satisfaction: the opening of the road from India to China, via the Ledo-Burma Road; the Ledo by then had been officially named by Chiang as the “Stilwell Road.” The first convoy of trucks, which began its journey on 28 January 1945, arrived in Kunming on 4 February 1945, a tangible justification of Stilwell’s determination to reopen a land route to China after its two-year blockade of China. It also marked the successful completion of the Salween Campaign, so Dorn had attained his goals as well. Otherwise, McClure moved into Dorn’s former command with Col. David Barrett as his chief of staff. Barrett, however, “made a hopeless mess of things and was relieved in less than three months.” He never obtained his general’s star. McClure did little better; he “completely failed to win the confidence of the Chinese military, and, of course, operations came to a standstill.” American personnel returning from China to the United States later told Dorn that when he pointed out the probable consequences of Wedemeyer’s proposed changes, that the results—called Dorn’s “prophecies”—had in fact occurred; they also indicated that many of Dorn’s earlier rejected recommendations had subsequently been successfully enacted. Henceforth to the end of the war, Dorn noted that “despite Wedemeyer’s resounding strategic plans and position papers, the Chinese armies contributed virtually nothing to the defeat of Japan.” Indeed, as the Chinese “rather plaintively” asked: “How can we be expected to operate with strangers we neither know nor trust?” As to Burma, belatedly the British under Slim recaptured Rangoon, and the Japanese threat was at last removed.<sup>108</sup>

Later, back in the States, Dorn sought to sort out what had happened after the arrival of Wedemeyer and his staff. In a 27 March 1945 interview with a Colonel Condon, former G-4 and G-3 of Y-Force, Dorn noted that the reports from China were that Col. David Barrett was “distrusted and disliked.” In one instance, Dorn was informed that certain American troops had received no supplies for ten days. Barrett’s response was, “I don’t give a damn if they starve to death.” In the face of such attitudes, morale in China was generally very low. In addition, General McClure had “successfully messed things up, and completely.” Beyond this, Dorn’s recommendations for organization and methods “have been adopted by

General McClure, as they were the only ones which could work.” In short, Dorn was “being justified daily.”<sup>109</sup>

Following another interview with Lt. Col. Vann Kennedy on 7 May 1945, Dorn observed that while Wedemeyer and his staff had attempted to institute a completely new deal in US personnel, “they had forgotten that though ‘a new broom sweeps clean,’ an ‘old broom finds the corners.’” Wedemeyer, though he could often grasp the “big picture” on a global scale, was “utterly incapable” of understanding things such as the Chinese Theater. He remained a “book soldier” with little practical experience. General McClure had also failed to make much headway with the Chinese generals. As to Dorn’s old Y-Force personnel, they had “only one loyalty and still look back to the Y-Force as the only agency which could or can really make the Chinese do things.”<sup>110</sup> In an undated handwritten note—internal evidence places it about two months after Wedemeyer took over command, and there is no indication as to whom it was written or from whom it was received—Dorn denigrated Wedemeyer in blistering terms: he “preaches,” instead of talking. He should “make [an] excellent old-style missionary.” Dorn described Wedemeyer as a “stuffed shirt” and “rude and inconsiderate in discussions.” He would not “allow anyone to express opinions,” which were generally “brushed aside as worthless.” Dorn noted that Wedemeyer held the Chinese in contempt, was not interested in the well-being of his own troops, and was “not a soldier in any sense” or a commander but rather a “paper and a theory man.” Dorn added that Wedemeyer continually blamed his own problems on the “utterly hopeless” situation that he inherited. This might also insulate him from any failures in the future. Many high-ranking American officers found it impossible to be loyal to a man “of whom you are *ashamed* in front of Chinese.” The Chinese resented the patent “lack of any interest in trying to understand [the] Chinese;” accordingly, Sino-American relations were at a low ebb. They also wondered why the US government withdrew the only two officers “who have ever been able to make Chinese fight offensively,” i.e., Stilwell and Dorn.<sup>111</sup>

Back in the States, Dorn was bombarded with encouraging and beseeching letters from his former staff and from many Chinese leaders he had known. The gist of the American letters was that you must “get us transferred out of here any way you can to any other place.” The Chinese refrain was, “General Stilwell and you must return to China,” about which Dorn simply concluded, “Neither of us ever did.”<sup>112</sup>

## Notes

1. For details about the United States Army in the CBI, see the official three-volume series in the major US Army in World War II studies volumes, commonly called the “green books,” published by the Center of Military History, US Army, Washington, DC. The three, all written by Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, were in the China-Burma-India Theater series and consisted of the following: *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 1956; *Time Runs Out in CBI*, 1959, and *Stillwell's Mission to China*, 1987. To learn more about Chungking during this period and later, see Andrew Hicks, ed., *Jack Jones, A True Friend to China: The Lost Writings of a Heroic Nobody* (Hong Kong: Earnshaw Books, 2015).

2. “Autobiography,” 540.

3. George N. Kates, *The Years that Were Fat. Peking, 1933-1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 143.

4. Stilwell's residence and offices, which he occupied from 1942 to 1944, at 63 Jialing New Road, in the Yuzhong Region of present-day Chongqing (Chungking), was converted into the Stilwell Museum by the Chinese in 1991. It has been well maintained to the present in memory of Stilwell's employment there as chief of staff of the Allied forces in the China theater of operations and commander-in-chief of the US Army in the CBI theater. He also served on Chiang Kai-shek's staff. The site is a popular tourist destination in present-day China. The Stilwell Museum also houses the Flying Tigers Exhibition Hall.

5. See “Autobiography,” 541–45, for details of the Chiangs and those present at their headquarters.

6. For Chiang and Madame Chiang's characteristics, see Frank A. Dorn, *Walkout: with Stilwell in Burma* (New York: Crowell, 1971), 39, and “Autobiography,” 545.

7. Dorn, *Walkout with Stilwell*, 98–100. British Gen. Sir Harold Alexander formally terminated his command on 20 May 20 and departed for England. He went on to command *GYMNAST* and win renown in Tunisia in North Africa. He later became a field marshal, a viscount, and governor-general of Canada. See Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45* (New York: Bantam, 1972), 364–74. For a summary of the Japanese conquest of Burma, see the online site: World War II Database, the Invasion of Burma, 14 December 1941–26 May 1941.

8. See Gordon S. Seagrave, *Burma Surgeon* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1943). In early March, Seagrave set up a field hospital to care for wounded Chinese troops, though his hospital was under the auspices of American missionaries, and Seagrave's 40 or so Kachin nurses were all Christians. For the mid-April 1942 events at Stilwell's headquarters at Maymyo and environs, including Mandalay, see the well-illustrated, lengthy two-part diary by *Life* correspondent, Clare Boothe, who had flown to China with Stilwell when he arrived from the United States, in *Life Magazine*, 15 June 1942 and 22 June 1942, <http://www.cbi-theater.com/mission/life-mission.html>.

9. Slim, for whom Dorn had considerable respect, emerged as one of Britain's foremost commanders, later becoming a viscount and field marshal and chief of the Imperial General Staff and, later still, governor general of Australia. Dorn generally denigrated British commanders as a whole, observing that the "British simply were not able to produce forceful senior commanders." In fact, Dorn concluded, he had little respect for the usual "spewings that had come out of Sandhurst [the British Military Academy]" during those times. See "Autobiography," 546–49.

10. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*, 365–67.

11. See Dorn, *Walkout*, and Seagrave, *Burma Surgeon*, and his later book, *Burma Surgeon Returns* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1946).

12. "Autobiography," 560–61.

13. "Autobiography," 560–61.

14. "Autobiography," 562.

15. See Jack Belden, *Retreat with Stilwell* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943); Dorn thought little of Belden and deplored his writings, and his life in general; however, there are also accounts of their later being on friendly terms. Belden's papers are in the Hoover Institution Archive, <http://www.oac.cdlib.org/institutions/Hoover+Institution>. For a discussion of many of the people on the walkout, see Dorn, *Walkout*, 101–222. Though she was not among those, *Time-Life* correspondent Clare Booth Luce was also in the area during these weeks.

16. Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, ed. Theodore H. White (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948), 106, and Tuchman, *Stilwell*, 384–85. For the larger picture, see Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1987), vol. I. For background on the Chinese Army in Burma as well as Chinese political thinking and philosophy during this period, see Yung-chi Ho, *The Big Circle* (New York: The Exposition Press, 1948). See also Graham Peck, *Two Kinds of Time* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950). For the Washington scene, see Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948).

17. "Autobiography," 570–71. Dorn often denigrated FDR and especially Harry Hopkins for whom he had a large measure of contempt. He remarked about his being dyspeptic, unkempt, and slovenly in appearance. His brain was certainly no better, Dorn maintained. As to FDR and Churchill, Dorn deplored their heavy drinking—Churchill with his huge daily consumption of scotch, brandy, and champagne and FDR's love of martinis and old fashioned, also consumed to excess in Dorn's view. He questioned how these men could effectively make decisions affecting the whole world and the course of the war. Dorn also deprecated Churchill's preoccupation with his burning desire to preserve the old British "em-pah" (empire) at whatever cost.

18. "Autobiography," 571. The constant difficulties that Stilwell and Dorn encountered in China, especially involving Chiang Kai-shek, bring to mind a line in the 1967 movie "Cool Hand Luke" starring Paul Newman. When Newman failed to follow orders, the latter noted "what we've got here is a failure

to communicate.” The failures of both the Chinese and the Americans in this time and place revealed a similar impasse. The deep-seated reasons have been discussed by many observers. One who captured key essences regarding the Chinese in particular was, *The Years that Were Fat*, 126–48.

19. For more about Ramgarh, where thousands of Chinese troops were located, see Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 136–38, and Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 214–20. See also discussion with illustrations at <http://www.cbi-theater.com/ramgarh/ramgarh.html>. See a booklet prepared by Staff Sgt. John “Red” Sweeney, *Ramgarh: Now It Can Be Told*, n.d., John Sweeney Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. He was a senior instructor, US Infantry Section, Chinese Training and Combat Command at Ramgarh. Ramgarh was set up in accordance with an initial plan back in November 1941, between the US War Department and Chiang, to “train and re-equip with American weapons 30 divisions of the Chinese as an offensive force to combat the Japanese invader in China.” Dorn was not closely involved with this center.

20. “Historical Report of Y-Force Operations Staff, period 1 Jan 44 thru 24 Oct 44,” Headquarters Chinese Training And Combat Command United States Forces China Theater, 25 November 1944, by Brigadier General Frank Dorn, Commanding, Chinese Training and Combat Command, the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 55.

21. For organizational details of the US Army in China during 1942 to 1945, see “Order of Battle Of The United States Army Ground Forces In World War II Pacific Theater of Operations, United States Army Forces China, Burma And India” at [http://www.cbi-theater.com/cbi-history/cbi\\_history.html](http://www.cbi-theater.com/cbi-history/cbi_history.html).

22. For more about the road, see Donovan Webster, *The Burma Road: The Epic Story of the China-Burma-India Theater in World War II* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003). See also Hicks, *Jack Jones*.

23. For studies of the Hump, see William H. Tunner, *Over The Hump: The Story of General William H. Tunner* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1964); Carl Frey Constein, *Born to Fly . . . The Hump: A WWII Memoir* (New York: 1st Book Library, 2000); John D. Plating, *The Hump: America's Strategy for Keeping China in World War II* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2011); Otha C. Spencer, *Flying the Hump: Memories of an Air War* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1994); Nedda R. Thomas, *Hump Pilot* (New York: History Publication Company, 2014); and Eric Sevareid, *Not So Wild a Dream* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1995). The plane of Sevareid, a civilian newsman making the flight, was forced down and he and his companions had to walk out to civilization. There were in fact two Humps. The first was the higher of the two and was employed early in its operations. Later, when the Japanese were driven back into central Burma, and no longer such a threat to operations, the second Hump, to the south of the original, was used. It was much lower, and the weather was not as rough.

24. The Ledo Road was christened the “Stilwell Road” in early 1945, at the suggestion of Chiang Kai-shek.

25. For more on these programs, see Edward R. Stetinius, *Lend-Lease Weapons for Victory* (New York: Penguin Books, 1944); US War Department, *International Aid Statistics, World War II: A Summary of War Department Lend Lease activities Reported through 31 December 1945* (Rochester, NY: Scholar's Choice Press, 2015); and Warren F. Kimball, *The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939–1941*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969).

26. Chennault became a lieutenant general in retirement on 18 July 1958, nine days before his death. He is interred at Arlington National Cemetery. For more on the AVG, see Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and His American Volunteers* (Washington, DC: HarperCollins/Smithsonian Books, 2007); Charles R. Bond Jr. and Terry H. Anderson, *A Flying Tiger's Diary* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1984); and The Hump Pilots Association, *China Airlift: The Hump* (Dallas: Taylor, 1980). For Chennault's own account, see his *The Way of a Fighter* (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1949). For more on Claire Lee Chennault, see his papers for 1941–67 at <http://www.oac.cdlib.org/institutions/Hoover+Institution>. For more on the US Army Air Forces in World War II, see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: Air Force Historical Studies Office, 1948–58), and also Henry H. Arnold, *Global Mission* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1949).

27. "Autobiography," 572. Indeed, Chennault, while respected by President Roosevelt, was held in considerable contempt by such American commanders as Gen. George C. Marshall, the Army's chief of staff, and Gen. "Hap" Arnold, the head of the US Army Air Forces, as well as General Stilwell. For more on the US Army Air Forces in these years, see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol. IV, *The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), and Henry H. Arnold, *Global Mission* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1949).

28. "Autobiography," 572–73.

29. "Autobiography," 573–74.

30. See *CBIVA Sound-off*, Spring 1983, [http://www.cbi-history.com/part\\_vii.html](http://www.cbi-history.com/part_vii.html). The patch illustration in this book is from the author's collection.

31. For more on Stilwell's difficulties during these months, see Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, vol II.

32. "Autobiography," 577–78. According to rumors, on a later trip to the United States during which she was less blatant and more businesslike, Madame Chiang purchased two paneloads of salable items: watches, fountain pens, non-prescription pills and medicines, canned and luxury goods, furs, clothes, and shoes. On her return to China she opened at least two stores to sell the goods at huge profits. For more on these matters and events, see Jonathan D. Spence's review of a book by Hannah Pakula, *The Last Empress: Madame Chiang Kai-shek and the Birth of Modern China* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009) in the *New York Review of Books* (25 February 2010), <http://www.chinafile.com/triumph-madame-chiang>. For more on Madame Chiang in the United States, see

the *Chicago Tribune* (19 February 1943), and many other papers on this date. See also Chih-Yu Shih, "The Eros of International Politics: Madame Chiang Kai-Shek and the Question of the State in China," *Comparative Civilizations Review* 46 (Spring 2002), 91–119.

33. See Spence's review of Pakula's book about Madame Chiang.

34. See "Special Orders, Number 120," Headquarters of the US Army Forces of China, Burma and India Theater, at Chungking, 26 September 1942, the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 3. This announced the temporary promotion of Frank Dorn to colonel, with date of rank from 26 September 1942. It was by command of Lieutenant General Stilwell. See also "Historical Report of Y-Force Operations Staff, period 1 Jan 44 thru 24 Oct 44," Headquarters Chinese Training and Combat Command, US Army Forces China Theater, 25 November 1944, the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 55. For a photograph of the Y-Force Headquarters, see the Frank Dorn Papers, Audio-Visual Section, Envelope O.

35. "Autobiography," 584–87.

36. "Autobiography," 584–87.

37. See details in "Historical Report of Y-Forces Operations Staff, period 1 Jan 44 thru 24 Oct 44," by the Headquarters Chinese Training and Combat Command US Army Forces China Theater, 25 November 1944, signed by Dorn and sent to the Adjutant General, Washington, DC, the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 55. This document had to do with the Chinese, their corruption, and much else concerning their *modus operandi* in general and under Chiang's government in particular.

38. "Autobiography," 589–90.

39. Dorn discussed other examples of such corruption among the Chinese forces, as well as good Chinese commanders. "Autobiography," 590–91.

40. "Autobiography," 589–91.

41. the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 25.

42. John Paton Davies Jr., *China Hand: An Autobiography* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 46–47.

43. For more on these matters, see Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, 313–89. Chennault's own book, *The Way of a Fighter*, was published by Putnam Press in 1949. For other studies, see Martha Byrd, *Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2003); Martin Caiden, *The Rugged Warriors* (New York: Ballantine, 1978); and Ford, *Flying Tigers*.

44. "Autobiography," 593–95.

45. "Autobiography," 595.

46. "Autobiography," 604–05.

47. "Autobiography," 608.

48. "Autobiography," 608.

49. "Autobiography," 609.

50. "Autobiography," 610–12.

51. However, Dorn did not receive this honor. Army regulations required the approval of theater headquarters before an American officer could accept a

foreign decoration. Later after Stilwell was relieved in China, the new theater commander Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer disapproved Dorn's award. "Autobiography," 612.

52. Dorn consequently never received his goodwill offering of the proposed porcelain and silver goods "after I had hastened the Honorable Mr. T'ang on his way to a reunion with his ancestors in the other world." "Autobiography," 615.

53. "Autobiography," 615–16.

54. "Autobiography," 607–08.

55. "Autobiography," 616.

56. "Autobiography," 621.

57. "Autobiography," 623.

58. "Autobiography," 624.

59. "Autobiography," 624.

60. "Autobiography," 628.

61. "Autobiography," 629–30.

62. "Autobiography," 629–30.

63. "Autobiography," 629–30.

64. "Autobiography," 630–31.

65. "Autobiography," 631–32.

66. "Autobiography," 633–34.

67. "Autobiography," 633–34, 592–93.

68. "Autobiography," 592–95, 663.

69. "Autobiography," 636–38. Frank Dorn, *Walkout with Stilwell in Burma* (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1971), 75–79, and letter, "Dorn to Major General Wendell J. Coats, Chief of Information, Department of the Army," 7 May 1969, in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 6, Folder 4. In the letter to Coats, Dorn sought advice about including information regarding this plan in a proposed book on the Walkout with Stilwell. Dorn noted that "as far as I know neither security nor classification in the strict sense of the terms are involved." But he did not "want to cause embarrassment to the present US government—either inadvertently or otherwise." He was also working with Barbara Tuchman on her study of Stilwell and wanted to advise her of the plan. He was therefore, mindful that "the episode . . . could possibly effect [sic] higher policy than that normally involved in the usual clearance procedures." Apparently Coats' advice was positive, because Dorn soon published *Walkout with Stilwell in Burma* in 1971.

70. For more on the TRIDENT Conference, see Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 203–06, and Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper, 1948).

71. For a useful summary of US involvement in the war in Burma, see George L. MacGarrigle, *Central Burma: The US Army Campaigns of World War II* (n.p.: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), <http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/centburma/centburma.htm>.

72. See discussion in the Foreword to "Historical Report of Y-Force Operations Staff, period 1 Jan 44 thru 24 Oct 44," 25 November 1944, by Brig. Gen. Frank Dorn, then commanding the Chinese Training and Combat Command,

addressed to the Adjutant General, Washington, DC, in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 55.

73. There was some cooperation of Stilwell with the famed British unconventional unit the Chindits, who had pioneered guerrilla operations and long-range penetration jungle warfare in Burma. This unit had been created and led by British Brig. Gen. Orde Wingate. Both units were closely supported by air-drops and other air operations. Wingate, however, was soon killed in an aircraft crash on 24 March 1944.

74. For more on this outfit, see Alan Barker, *Merrill's Marauders* (New York: Ballantine, 1972) and Charlton Ogburn Jr., *The Marauders* (New York: Harper and Row, 1956). It should be noted that there were many in the US forces in China and Burma who entertained less than complimentary feelings about Stilwell. This had to do especially with his conduct regarding the Marauders. He was strongly castigated for his treatment of the very worn-out and pummeled Marauders. In addition, they were kept in the field much longer than the promised 90 days. They were to have been withdrawn after three months' action. Instead, Stilwell kept them involved and earmarked them for action against Myitkyina, because he concluded that the success of the north Burma campaign meant more than their rest and ease. Thus, "as their commander, it was a decision he'd had to make alone, and he was suffering a commander's pain for it." In fact, after their participation in the lengthy painful capture of Myitkyina, the soldiers had to be evacuated in large numbers to medical facilities and were soon disbanded. This treatment led to harsh judgments among those affected. One involved noted that Stilwell was widely regarded in certain quarters as simply "a lump of crap." See Webster, *The Burma Road*, 234–35.

75. "Autobiography," 638–39. For developments leading to the time of the Y-Force deployment, see Foreword to Dorn, "Historical Report of Y-Force Operations Staff.

76. "Autobiography," 638–41.

77. For more on the Salween Campaign, see "Autobiography," 641–53, and undated report compiled by the public relations officer, Chinese Combat Command, entitled *Completion of the Salween Campaign*, <http://14usaaf27tcs.4mg.com/SALWEEN.htm>, which was apparently written in early 1945. See also historical reports of the Chinese Training and Combat Command by Brig. Gen. Frank Dorn, then its commanding officer, for the period 25 October to 31 December 1944, dated 1 January 1944 [sic, 1945] in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 2, Folder 10, and another dated 25 November 1944, in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 55. For details of the extensive air supply of the Chinese troops engaged, see "Air Supply on the Salween River Front," *Quartermaster Review*, March–April 1945, and Webster, *The Burma Road*.

78. "Autobiography," 644–46.

79. "Autobiography," 648–49.

80. "Autobiography," 648–49.

81. Dorn, "Historical Report of Chinese Training and Combat Command."

82. "Autobiography," 649–50.

83. "Autobiography," 650.
84. "Autobiography," 650–53.
85. "Autobiography," 651–52.
86. "Autobiography," 652–53.
87. "Autobiography," 650–53.
88. "Autobiography," 653.
89. "Autobiography," 653–54.

90. Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 47. For details of Hurley's activities and attitudes at this time, and much else, see Dorn's undated analysis "Situation (Sino-American) in China," in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 4, Folder 14.

91. Dorn recorded that before departing from Chungking, Stilwell had one small satisfaction: when Chiang offered him the award of the Order of the Blue Sky and the White Sun, which Chiang had also ordered for Dorn, Stilwell said to tell the Chinese leader to "shove it."

92. For a pro-Wedemeyer and Chiang Kai-shek view of these events and what led up to them, see Wei Liang-tsai, *A Wrong Man In The Wrong Place: An Assessment of the Failures of General Joseph W. Stilwell In China* (Taipei: The Institute of American Culture, Academia Sinica, n.d.), 127–65. For Chiang's views regarding where he believed that China and he should stand during these many months, see a book that was apparently ghostwritten for him and published in early 1943, *China's Destiny*. The very inexpensive publication was widely circulated and seemed to have somewhat enhanced Chiang's prestige. The book asserted the supremacy of traditional Chinese ways and deplored the evils that foreigners had brought to China. A translated edition was published in London by Dennis Dobson in 1947, with commentary by Philip Jaffe. There are still debates between "Stilwell people" and "Wedemeyer people." For more on General Wedemeyer, see John J. McLaughlin, *General Albert C. Wedemeyer: America's Unsung Strategist in World War II* (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2012) and Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (New York: Henry Holt, 1958).

93. Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 47.

94. "Autobiography," 656–57.

95. "Autobiography," 657.

96. "Autobiography," 657–58.

97. "Autobiography," 658–59. See relevant memos and other pertinent documents in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 2, Folder 6; Dorn to Wedemeyer memo, 28 December 1944 in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 2, Folder 7; and Dorn to Wedemeyer memo in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 2, Folder 8.

98. Frank Dorn Papers, Box 2, Folder 11.

99. Dorn later reported that McClure had sent an earlier radio message to Wedemeyer recommending his immediate relief, reduction to a lower grade, and return to the United States. A bit later, Wedemeyer temporarily relented as to Dorn being reduced in rank. Though it "would be impossible" for Dorn to remain in China, Wedemeyer stated, that he should return in grade, and promised that "there would be no future derogatory action" against Dorn. As Wedemeyer noted, "I have decided that it would be an injustice to the War Department, an injustice

to the US Army in China, and an injustice to you if I were to take action to reduce you in grade.” See in Memo from Dorn to the adjutant general in Washington, on 16 July 1945 in which he rebutted Wedemeyer’s 25 January 1945 fitness report at great length. This is in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 2, Folder 19.

100. Frank Dorn Papers, Box 2, Folder 11.

101. “Autobiography,” 661.

102. “Autobiography,” 662.

103. Frank Dorn Papers, Box 6, Folder 10.

104. Frank Dorn Papers, Box 2, Folder 14.

105. Frank Dorn Papers, Box 2, Folder 19.

106. This refers to Chiang’s stipulation that Dorn was to receive the Order of the Blue Sky and the White Sun as mentioned previously.

107. Frank Dorn Papers, Box 2, Folder 19. It is interesting to note that later Barbara Tuchman, while writing her classic study of Stilwell, interviewed Wedemeyer. When asked what she thought of him, she replied, “‘What a pompous ass.’ I guess he couldn’t change with time. He was just born self-important and pompous.” Dorn noted that when he first encountered Wedemeyer, he saw him being “a tall homely guy with a florid complexion who was very conscious of his importance. He was convinced that he’d been gifted with a superior mind, which had been nurtured into dazzling brilliance by two years at the German War College.” A bit later, Stilwell wrote in his diary: “I am beginning to get tired of that self-important young man.” Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 247.

108. For assessments of the Wedemeyer regime, see Dorn’s report to the adjutant general in Washington, 16 July 1945 in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 2, Folder 19. See also general conclusions by Dorn as to Wedemeyer and his command’s numerous failures and weaknesses in an undated paper titled “Wedemeyer” in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 4, Folder 18. To learn how the war then transpired in Burma and China, continuing until August 1945, see Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Time Runs Out In CBI* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department Of The Army, 1959). See also monograph by George L. MacGarrigle, *Central Burma: The US Army Campaigns of World War II* (n.p.: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), <http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/centburma/centburma.htm>.

109. See Dorn’s interview with a Colonel Condon on 27 March 1945 in the Frank Dorn Papers, Speeches and Writings, Box 4, Folder 6.

110. See Dorn’s conference with Lt. Col. Vann Kennedy on 7 May 1945 regarding Wedemeyer’s failures in China in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 4, Folder 8, Speeches and Writings.

111. See a lengthy assessment of Wedemeyer and the situation in China that developed after his arrival in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 4, Folder 14, entitled the “Situation (sino-American [sic]) in China.

112. “Autobiography,” 664.

## Chapter 9

### Washington and Okinawa, January to August 1945

John Paton Davies Jr., the diplomat who had been in China as political adviser to Joseph Warren Stilwell, was also forced to leave China. The State Department reassigned him to Moscow. It was Gen. Pat Hurley who—in what would be central to much of the McCarthy era’s staples in the early 1950s—had “with thunderous denunciations” “Hurley’d him out of China,” as Davies himself had stated it. Wedemeyer had done the same to Frank Dorn.<sup>1</sup>

In any event, Dorn was soon flying home. Had he known that Wedemeyer had, in fact, recommended that he be demoted to lieutenant colonel, he would have had a much dimmer view of his future. The adjutant general, however, had “set aside that last bit of petty vindictiveness with the notation: ‘Looks like Al Wedemeyer’s out to get Stilwell’s people.’”<sup>2</sup>

Arriving in Washington, Dorn was met by Maj. Gen. Bill Bergin, his close friend and confidant, and by Stilwell himself, who had just arrived from California. He then set out to visit New York City and Baltimore; took a jaunt to West Point to visit his half-brother, Walt; and then continued to San Francisco for his first visit home in three years. His father, at age 74, was on the local draft board and an air raid warden for his block. Dorn’s major impressions were how shabby and drab the country appeared to be, noting that in fact it was “badly in need of a national coat of paint.”

Back in Washington, he was assigned to the Research and Development Division of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces at Fort McNair in Washington, DC. This organization was under the command of Stilwell. Nonetheless, Dorn found the job boring and hated to be back in “the stultifying air of Washington,” when he wanted to be overseas “where I damned well thought I should be.” He was able to travel about the country: to Detroit and Chicago to confer with contractors and once to Fort Sill, where his map had been selling “like hot cakes” to the wartime students there; the bookstore had a fat check waiting for him.

One positive thing about Washington was that many people of Dorn’s earlier days began to be in evidence, and he renewed his former social activities with much wining and dining, seemingly in endless profusion. He often visited with the Stilwells at their handsome quarters at Fort McNair.

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This chapter is based on information from Dorn’s Autobiography, 665–86, hereinafter referenced as “Autobiography.”

With the coming of V-E Day, things changed rapidly for Dorn, who was about to be returned to participation in the Pacific War and its ending in several entirely unexpected roles. As the war wound down in Asia, Gen. George Marshall needed to know what was going on in the Philippines and elsewhere so as better to get troops and munitions from the European Theater to the East. He decided to send a senior general to confer with Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Adm. Chester Nimitz, one who would be acceptable to both. He suggested Stilwell, and MacArthur noted that he would be “delighted” to welcome Stilwell and would even welcome him as an Army commanding officer under his command. The staff for the trip consisted of several generals, including Bill Bergin and Dorn.

With stops along the way, the group arrived in the Philippines still engaged in fighting the Japanese. Bemoaning the fate of once-beautiful Manila and Fort Stotsenburg, Dorn made his way to the front and to other areas in the still-embattled islands, including Mindanao. Of more importance for his future, he visited Maj. Gen. Joseph May Swing’s 11th Airborne Division, still engaged in action after its major role in the Battle of Manila.<sup>3</sup>

The staff group headed by Stilwell then flew homeward, finally arriving at Hickam Field in Hawaii. There they learned that Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, in command of the Tenth Army on Okinawa, had just been killed by Japanese artillery. Buckner had been a tactical officer at West Point and had given Dorn his last punishment tours there. Stilwell was ordered to assume command of the Tenth Army and fly back to Guam for orders from Admiral Nimitz, whose command still included this outfit. Though he had decided to proceed on his own, Dorn and also Bergin were determined to accompany Stilwell, to which he finally agreed, though neither had official orders to do so. They were, therefore, technically AWOL for some weeks.<sup>4</sup>

Flying into Okinawa was for Dorn “an eye opener” with the hundreds of ships and the intense activity on every hand, not the least of which were the actions of the *kamikazes* that inflicted much destruction and many casualties among the American forces. The Japanese forces also sustained huge losses, though when Stilwell took command, operations had reached “the mopping up stage—mopping up on a grand scale.” Another occupation of Stilwell’s was to begin planning for the expected assault on Japan. Switched from Nimitz’s command, the Tenth Army was then under MacArthur’s orders and was being scheduled to land on Tokyo Bay with the Eighth Army. To assist Stilwell in working out the details of this proposed operation, Dorn was dispatched to San Fernando, California, to

consult with Gen. Walter Krueger's Sixth Army staff, especially with that outfit's newly created staff section—G-5—concerned with combat transportation requirements. When Dorn returned to Okinawa, he was assigned to that position on the staff of the Tenth Army.

In mid-July, some weeks after Dorn's return from California, Stilwell received a long message from MacArthur, the contents of which he could not believe since he had no prior information. The message indicated that a new secret weapon—more powerful than any other known to man—would soon be employed against the enemy. This was expected to produce an unconditional surrender in "a matter of weeks." Stilwell could not believe that anything short of complete destruction of Japan could produce this result and reckoned that either MacArthur had information that Stilwell did not possess or "he's gone off his rocker." The prediction, of course, was correct; the two atomic bombs dropped on 6 and 9 August produced the Japanese surrender in short order. Then on 10 August, the Japanese government, after much infighting between the hawks and doves, sued for peace. On 15 August—V-J Day—the Japanese formally accepted the American terms of unconditional surrender. Dorn declared that "President Harry Truman had had the guts to order the use of the 'bomb,' a short-range destroyer of enemy lives and a long-range savior of the lives of as many as 1,000,000 young Americans."<sup>5</sup> On Okinawa, the Japanese commander and others committed *hari-kari*, ending the struggle there. Dorn did note that when the news of peace was publicized on Okinawa, a wild celebration broke out with indiscriminate firing of weapons that resulted in the deaths of a dozen or more men until the spree was brought under control several hours later. Stilwell was then ordered to Manila to confer with MacArthur regarding the landing of American troops in Japan.

At this juncture, Dorn received a personal message from Maj. Gen. Joseph May Swing in the Philippines asking if he would transfer to Swing's 11th Airborne Division. The division was about to stage through Okinawa, where it arrived on 12 August 1945 en route to becoming the first occupying troops in Japan. Swing understood that Dorn's long experience in dealing with people in the Far East would be of use to him in the new conditions. If Dorn accepted, Swing would arrange transfer orders through MacArthur's headquarters.<sup>6</sup> Dorn sent news of the request to Stilwell for his approval. Stilwell, still in Manila, "unwillingly agreed to my transfer," Dorn said, "but made it plain that he was griped as hell at me for wanting to leave his staff for another job." Dorn noted, however, that Stilwell plainly had not taken into consideration that he himself would soon have no staff at all. As for Dorn, what was more important was that "I was busting my

bitches to be *the* first—or among the first—to set foot on Japanese soil.” He was, no doubt, aware that unlike in the past, there was perhaps little to be gained by being with Stilwell any longer. This marked a major new course for Dorn and what proved to be a downturn in Stilwell’s fortunes. Stilwell was destined to die not too long afterward on 12 October 1946.<sup>7</sup>

With the arrival of the 11th Airborne Division, Dorn departed the Tenth Army to become the commanding general of the 11th’s divisional artillery. During the night of 29 August 1945, the entire Division boarded a fleet of C-54 aircraft bound for Atsugi Airfield, about 16 miles from Yokohama. When the flight approached the islands, Dorn recorded that “as the sun spread its golden light on the sacred peak [of Mount Fuji], a brief pang of sympathy filled my heart for the defeated people whose land we were about to occupy.” Were there not some people below who were not guilty and as brutal as their armed forces? But then years of hatred for the Japanese returned and “quickly wiped out any sign of sympathy as damned nonsense.” Dorn then felt that “the whole race was insane with its own sense of destiny, blood-soaked with military power, absorbed in a lot of gibberish about sun goddesses and semi-divinity.” The recent generations had been guilty “with supplying men for the armies and navies of their madly ambitious leaders.”<sup>8</sup>

Shortly after daylight, at 0600 on 30 August, the planes began touching down. Dorn made a dash for the door to be the first to land, but his commander, General Swing, indicated that he was going to be the first; Dorn could be second.<sup>9</sup> And so it came to pass. Done in this fashion, Dorn wondered for a moment what suicidal Japanese troops might try to do. The entire American contingent could have been speedily wiped out. But soon a perimeter was established around the airfield; Dorn, with a few other men, raised the first American flag to fly in Japan from a hangar. Thus “after eight years of war—beginning for me outside of Peking on 7 July 1937—we’d beat the hell out of the little bastards. We had brought the empire of Japan to its knees. We had become the conquerors, the supreme and most powerful nation at the end of the most cataclysmic war in recorded history.” Then to his surprise, Dorn suddenly discovered that “I no longer hated the Japs. I had no feeling at all toward them. Why hate the ones we had just defeated? They were now nothing. *We* were on top.”<sup>10</sup>

## Notes

1. Davies then had a checkered future, during which he would later be dismissed from the foreign service and only belatedly reinstated. The end result was the ending of his career as a diplomat; he was one of many who fell victim to the sordid actions of Wisconsin Sen. Joseph McCarthy and the China Lobby in Congress. For more on Davies' later years, see Bruce Cumings's epilogue in John Paton Davies Jr., *China Hand: An Autobiography* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1910), 331–39.

2. "Autobiography," 665.

3. Dorn had earlier known Swing at Fort Sill and Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio.

4. This caused some difficulty and bewilderment later that was easily worked out by the adjutant general's office headed by James Ulio and his deputy, Monk Lewis, who issued retroactive orders for them.

5. "Autobiography," 681.

6. "Autobiography," 682.

7. "Autobiography," 683.

8. "Autobiography," 684.

9. For more on Maj. Gen. Joseph Swing, see numerous references and discussions in *Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific, 1942–1945*, Jay Luvaas, ed. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972).

10. "Autobiography," 686.



## Chapter 10

### In MacArthur's Japan, August 1945 to February 1946

The occupation of Japan officially began when Gen. Douglas MacArthur and his staff and other officers departed Okinawa mid-morning on 30 August 1945, bound for Atsugi airfield near Yokohama. Meanwhile, advanced guards of Allied personnel were already ashore. MacArthur was aboard his plane, a Douglas C-54 named *Bataan II*. Their only escort was two B-17s. As the aircraft approached, they noted that the entire US Pacific Fleet of 280 ships was drawn up in formation waiting for the formal surrender ceremony scheduled for 2 September. Many on the staff were apprehensive that this day could have resulted in a bloodbath, because there were many Japanese soldiers still armed there. Indeed, as MacArthur observed, there were “fifteen fully armed Jap divisions within ten miles of us.” MacArthur nonetheless ordered his staff not to bring their pistols be-



Figure 32. Gen. Douglas MacArthur and several of his senior officers arrive 30 August 1945 at Atsugi Airdrome near Tokyo, Japan, following the end of hostilities. (Courtesy of US Army Signal Corps.)

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This chapter is based on information from Dorn's Autobiography, 687–794, hereinafter referenced as “Autobiography.”

cause if the Japanese decided to start something, “those toy cannons won’t do any good.” This led Winston Churchill to assert later that “MacArthur’s arrival at Atsugi was the single most courageous act of the war.” All of this indicated that MacArthur desired that he and his staff would “be arriving as guests of the Japanese people, not as conquerors.” Japanese historian Kazuo Kawai later wrote that MacArthur’s stance there, as virtually an American proconsul, “was even more a gesture of trust in the good faith of the Japanese. It was a masterpiece of psychology which completely disarmed Japanese apprehensions.”<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile Dorn, having landed on Japanese soil, proceeded into Yokohama to help prepare for MacArthur’s official entry. Here he had to contend with waves of uncertainty as to what the Japanese would do. The Americans were so few in number that the Japanese could have easily wiped them out in short order. No untoward incidents occurred, however. Dorn was interviewed by US newsmen who informed him that they could not mention him because he was a brigadier general and the newsmen and photographers had been informed “that in order to get a plane ride from Manila to Okinawa and Japan, we all had to agree not to mention that any general had got into Yokohama before MacArthur.” Dorn thereupon decided to head back to Atsugi “so MacArthur wouldn’t have his fun spoiled at the sight of my stars.”<sup>2</sup>

In an agreement reached in Manila a few days earlier regarding the surrender, it was understood that the Japanese would provide MacArthur and his staff with an escort into Yokohama. And so they did—but because MacArthur had ordered that no military vehicles be used at this time, either Japanese or American—the procession was made up of one of the strangest assortment of antique automobiles seen anywhere. Someone observed that they “looked like a car pool from a Harold Lloyd silent movie.” MacArthur’s was in an ancient Lincoln touring car. The thirty-mile route into Yokohama, where their destination was the Grand Hotel in Yokohama, was lined with Japanese soldiers—two divisions’ worth, some 30,000 troops standing stiffly erect at present arms at 100-foot intervals but with their backs to the roadway so as to hopefully “make sure that no one took a potshot at the motorcade.”<sup>3</sup>

Dorn described the unfolding of the developing events. As his advanced guard to Yokohama was heading back to observe MacArthur’s entry, he saw an approaching column of miscellaneous vehicles loaded with heavily armed men. The vanguard waved Dorn’s jeep off of the road into a ditch. From that vantage point Dorn and his companion, a major, “were able to see the great man, the victorious tribune, standing erect in the tonneau of an open car.” As Dorn noted about MacArthur, “he was staring

straight ahead with eyes raised to his own private corn-ball heaven, and obviously enjoying every minute of the noisy and horn-blowing parade.” Dorn’s companion, meanwhile, had “tactfully” hidden Dorn’s star by his hand so that no erstwhile photographer might shoot his picture revealing him to be a general. MacArthur’s “usually pale face looked flushed with triumph, as it had every right to be,” and Dorn wondered about the often-repeated story that the general “used rouge on his cheeks and occasionally even lipstick.” Dorn “half expected to see his arm extended straight to the front carrying that Philippine marshal’s baton he so dearly loved.” Anyway, “the old boy was officially the first general to enter, and supposedly to take, Yokohama.” Dorn could only conclude, “What a laugh! And shades of Madame Roland . . . ‘Oh, vanity, what lies are committed in thy name.’”<sup>4</sup>

Almost immediately after the Americans had arrived in Yokohama, it became necessary to assign a general officer to run the motor pool. Usually a job for a sergeant, because representatives from many of the Allied nations were pouring in to witness the surrender ceremonies onboard the USS *Missouri* and needed transportation, they all resorted to pulling rank in order to get it. Hence, a general officer seemed required to get the pool into operation and establish some order in its proceedings. As Dorn concluded, therefore, “I became the first general officer in history who personally ran a motor pool.” He admitted that though the job was “a pain in the neck, [it] had its compensations, even some fun.” The fun part involved many GIs who were ordered to confiscate any form of automotive transportation that moved on a “no-questions-asked, no-answers-given” basis. They were to “just kick out the Jap drivers and passengers and get the vehicle over to the motor pool in a former park next to the Grand Hotel.” All screams and protests were ignored, and his “Operation Grab-bag” trebled the number of vehicles in the pool.<sup>5</sup>

Dorn recorded a typical telephone conversation:

‘General Dorn speaking.’

‘Oh, I beg your pardon, general,’ an embarrassed voice would say.

‘I was trying to get the motor pool.’

‘*This* is the motor pool.’

‘There must be some mistake, sir. I did not want to bother you, general. I wanted to speak to the man in charge.’

‘I am the man in charge,’ Dorn would answer gleefully. ‘With whom am I speaking, and what can I do for you?’<sup>6</sup>

His caller was usually an aide for some general. Things were generally sorted out, though Dorn did give the Russians some headaches because they were often overbearing. On one occasion, they had already been issued autos and had failed to return them on schedule yet wanted another. Dorn insisted that the initial vehicles must be returned before he would issue another; when the Russians complied, he gave them “the most dilapidated one on the line.” He decided that the arrangement worked very well, because the caller did not know whether Dorn wore one star or as many as perhaps five. Curiosity got the better of some British and Americans, who personally visited the pool to ascertain what the true circumstances were.<sup>7</sup>

Dorn recalled the noon meals in the big crowded dining room of the hotel. There were some memorable scenes, such as that of the first meeting between MacArthur and the commander he had left in charge of the Philippines, Lt. Gen. “Skinny” Wainwright. Dorn could only compare his truly “skinny” appearance, his being even “skinnier than his nickname.” This contrasted with his former boss’s looks, being “well-fed and pink-cheeked.” A reunion of the pair was staged at the hotel, and “Old Doug threw his arms around the man he’d left to hold the sack on Bataan with an already defeated army while he had high-balled off to the healthier climate of Australia.” Then, “as flash bulbs popped like firecrackers, poor old Wainwright looked a bit surprised at the effusive corn of the whole performance.”<sup>8</sup>

On 3 September after the historic signing of the surrender documents on the day before, the Eleventh Airborne Division was ordered to occupy the northern Japanese provinces of Akita, Yamagata, Morioka, and Sendai; headquarters were to be established at Sendai City. When asked who was to head up the operation during a staff meeting, Dorn made it more than clear that he wanted the assignment—in violation of the old Army saw: “don’t volunteer for anything.” He got it, with wide-ranging authority, which he was not loath to exercise to the hilt.<sup>9</sup> For the sojourn, Dorn planned a small party of about 40 officers and men in five jeeps and three or four trucks. He also wanted an English-speaking member of the Imperial General Staff, gold braid and all, in the lead jeep who would be first target if they ran into trouble. This seemed too limited a force to Swing, but Dorn felt that the small size was an advantage. The Japanese, he argued, simply would not believe that they were alone, “that we haven’t got something big up our sleeves.” They themselves would not have acted in this fashion without reinforcements nearby. The only danger would be from individual snipers or fanatics. The goal of the mission was to begin to disarm the estimated twenty-two fully armed and equipped divisions in northern Honshu.<sup>10</sup>

The small group made its way over neglected roads, averaging about twenty miles per hour. But the 240 miles to Sendai City were uneventful. When the convoy caught people by surprise, the women and girls in particular “took across the fields like bats out of hell.” If the roles had been reversed, there would have been wholesale rape and looting. Because this did not happen, the Japanese assumed that the Americans were holding something in reserve to be sprung on them as a surprise. This also indicated that “until we showed our hands, they were scared to try any shenanigans.” Hence, also, the need to quickly get the disarmament well underway.<sup>11</sup>

Along the way all shops were shuttered, all doors closed, and all streets empty. One mayor, dressed in top hat and frock coat, met the convoy with baskets of fruit and flowers. Dorn refused the offerings and drove on. He stated that “there’d be no signs of friendliness between us until I knew that those twenty-two divisions were disarmed and disbanded.”<sup>12</sup>

Entering Sendai, they ate a prepared supper; Dorn indicated that he wanted all military and civilian leaders to meet him at 0900, and “they’d better be on time.” The next day leaders were dutifully there, and all military commanders were to turn over their weapons to his officers and then deactivate all units and send the men to their homes. They were informed that all the buildings of the big military base were to be vacated within three days.

The admiral who was present had nothing to surrender. He asked permission to return to his family farm, which was granted with Dorn explaining that “we were occupying Japan, not imprisoning its people.” He asked the admiral when the navy realized that Japan had begun to lose the war; to Dorn’s surprise, the admiral answered, “After what you call the Battle of Midway.” It was clear that Admiral Yamamoto was correct. If the US fleet could strike such a blow so soon after Pearl Harbor, “we would not have a chance. Your industrial capacity would defeat us.”<sup>13</sup>

Dorn then indicated to the governor and the mayor that they should be prepared to vacate, on short notice, all government buildings, schools, warehouses, and docks for the Americans to use. When they protested that the Japanese people needed these installations, Dorn abruptly replied: “So do I. And now *I* am boss around here.” When asked by the governor’s secretary why Dorn and his about 40 officers and men were not aware that they could be easily wiped out in a matter of minutes, Dorn responded that if they had been, “the holocaust of bombs, troops, and destruction that would have descended on northern Japan would have left it a depopulated desert.”<sup>14</sup>

Dorn continued with the disarmament schedule, though it gave him no pleasure. He often reflected on what this all meant to the Japanese. He was aware that they would have shown him no mercy had the reverse been the case. One occasion proved to be a bit different. He was looking forward to obtaining the official surrender from the commanding general of the 56th Division, Gen. Yuzo Matsuyama. This division had fought Dorn's Chinese Expeditionary Force in the Salween Campaign. During the course of the struggle, Matsuyama had put a bounty on Dorn's head. When Dorn drove up to his headquarters, a Japanese aide informed him that the general and other officers invited him into the main offices to drink tea with them. Dorn refused the invitation and noted that "I will *not* have tea with him, and that I will *not* walk through this mud . . . but that he *will*; and he'd better be . . . quick about it." General Matsuyama and his staff did so and then saluted, though Dorn did not return it. The general then proffered his sword in surrender "in the old traditional manner," hilt first. Dorn "touched it lightly in token of acceptance" and then went on to introduce himself. He stated that he was with the Chinese in the Salween Campaign. Dorn said, "Your officers and men fought stubbornly and suffered great hardships as well as many thousands of casualties. For that I respect them as soldiers. We came very close to destroying your 56th Division."<sup>15</sup> He then said, "you may keep your sword in memory of the dead who fought so valiantly. The loss of your division was enough. I will not take the sword from you." When the words of the translation sank in, the general's expression "changed from official oriental poker face to one of utter astonishment," and he was on the point of tears. Dorn had to leave promptly, because "suddenly I was beginning to feel pretty damned emotional myself." It was another time "for the remembrance that we had been instrumental in the deaths of over 50,000 soldiers in the remote gorges of the China-Burma border [which] had seemed to rise like a ghostly aura about us. As [at] the blood-soaked scenes of other great historical struggles between armies, the spirits of all those thousands of men seemed to envelope us in a chill emanation of sibilant whispers endlessly repeating the haunting words: 'Why? . . . Why us while we were still so young? . . . Why?'"<sup>16</sup>

Dorn could also show a demanding side when dealing with the Japanese. On one occasion he called in some officials to inform them that the entire Eleventh Airborne Division would soon be in north Honshu and that American soldiers were very fond of good beer, and eggs for their breakfasts. Accordingly, Dorn continued that "it would create a wonderful feeling in the hearts of the Americans if the division was presented with 22,000 bottles of beer and 22,000 eggs for their first breakfast in north

Honshu.” The Japanese protested that this would be impossible. Dorn noted that they had four prefectures in which to collect these things and they should “get cracking;” in exactly three days, “I shall expect this entire voluntary contribution of goodwill to be delivered at my new warehouses on the docks.” He concluded, “either that . . . or else.” Dorn laconically noted, “It was.”<sup>17</sup>

Moving on to Akita on the northwest coast, Dorn established his headquarters in the largest bank building in town and his quarters in an elegant house with a beautiful garden of “the richest man in town.” There, five gardeners had kept the trees, shrubs, waterfalls, brooklets, ponds, and gold fish “manicured to perfection.”

One of Dorn’s duties was to check on the graves of American prisoners-of-war and ascertain the reasons for their death, though only a few were sent north to two prison camps. Only two had died; the remainder had already been shipped to American hospitals. In Akita, he found a small graveyard where the two dead had been buried. There he found a surprise: it was “a neat little square of green lawn surrounded by a white-painted picket fence. The actual grave sites were marked by white crosses with the men’s names and identification.” It was obvious “that the Jap officer in charge had had an unexpected humane streak in his nature.” The local police chief stated that one of the soldiers had died of pneumonia; the second had died after the Japanese surrender when he had rushed to a field into which American aircraft were parachuting foodstuffs and medicines. He had been hit on the head by a descending package.<sup>18</sup>

Turning to domestic affairs, Dorn noted that it was too late to plant rice and to meet the pressing needs of the populace; all Japanese military stores of food were confiscated and distributed free together with blankets, clothing, and medicines to the needy populace. Japanese distributors who were profiteering in these items were promptly jailed. In order to get the fishing fleets out to sea, confiscated Japanese supplies of fuel were distributed, soon reviving the local fishing industry.

One “surprise find” at Akita was a small German-run convent and girls school under the direction of a saintly mother superior. That “marvelous old lady . . . [who] had braved a long period of hardships,” with a few German and ten Japanese nuns, “had continued the operation of her school throughout the entire war, completely cut off from her mother house.” When meeting the mother superior and plying her and the others with fresh coffee and doughnuts, Dorn asked what she needed most of all. Her reply: starch for their bibs. They had had to use rice paste as a

substitute, which was not only ineffective but offensively “smelly.” Dorn had a carton of starch promptly airlifted to her and also supplied her with coffee. In addition, the mother superior was extremely pleased that Dorn’s chaplain was available to administer Mass and Communion, which had not occurred in her chapel for many years. Indeed, the news brought “a new light in her lined face.”<sup>19</sup>

Another surprise: in a former Japanese officer’s club near the city of Sendai, Dorn saw hanging on the wall in the main entrance lobby a framed copy of his pictorial map of Peking—“and those Jap monkeys hadn’t paid me for it.” Later when he had free time, Dorn wrote to his former staffer, Lt. Col. Johnny Darrah then in Peking, to contact the Peiyang Press in Tientsin for details. In due course, it was discovered that the press—a German company—had attempted to learn where Dorn was and if he was dead or alive; they enclosed a draft for nearly \$200 for sales of the map to the Japanese occupying forces. They then wanted to issue a new postwar edition for sale to the Americans. This Dorn authorized; but with the coming of the Communists to power in 1949, the German firm was put out of business “and that was the last I ever heard of this map.”<sup>20</sup>

Following his excursion to Akita, Dorn proceeded to the southern part of his area, Yamagata city. It was the center of a fruit- and grain-growing region. Also Yonezawa, 40 miles south of Yamagata, was an important center for the production of high-quality silk. The main need there was to get the mills back into operation. This was soon accomplished to the surprise of the Japanese, who thought that the Americans would close them down. The area was soon thriving with a great demand for fine silk products, especially from the American forces.

In Yamagata, Dorn took over a bank building for his headquarters. He then set out, with the local police chief, in search of an official residence. He was led to the magnificent ancestral home of Count Sasayama. This was indeed expansive and quite beautiful. It consisted of fine courtyards and a grand wooded park. Dorn inspected the house, noting all the while the intense dismay of the family. He then determined that he could not evict this family and stated to the count: “Your home and its park are beautiful. But I will not dispossess you and your family for my personal comfort. You may keep your home, and I will issue orders that your family is not to be disturbed.” The police chief indicated that this was indeed the finest home in the city and that he should have taken it over. Dorn strongly demurred and ordered the police chief to take him to the *second* best house in town.<sup>21</sup>

Here he found a sprawling home and business premises of a rich merchant-trader. It, too, had courtyards and large expansive rooms. Of particular interest to Dorn was that the former chef of Prince Chichibu, the younger brother of the emperor, came with the house. He turned out to be “a culinary artist” who “could do things with C-rations and powdered eggs that would have made the ghost of the great Escoffier green with envy.” Indeed, “beside him Julia Child would have looked like a scullery drudge, Duncan Hines a kitchen boy who hauled out the garbage to slop the hogs.” The provincial government provided the house with a battalion of servants, all obsequious and striving to please.<sup>22</sup>

The situation was more than adequate; as Dorn lyrically explained: “returning from work on cold autumnal evenings which turned the leaves to a blaze of purple, red, brown, and gold, we would gather in the long living room, draw the curtains against the outside chill and darkness, and sip a few cups of hot sake for the benefit of our inner warmth.” Then “dinner would be announced by the grunts, grins, and gestures of the serving boys, and we would proceed to suffer the hardships of the occupation by wrapping ourselves around another of the chef’s superb concoctions.”<sup>23</sup>

Once more in Akita, Dorn found his quarters full of Japanese flower arrangements done by the mother superior’s girls. He also found the cleanest and most scrubbed railway station in the Far East. This was run by a mere private first class of the Quartermaster’s railway troops who had taken over the supervision of the system in Japan. (More will be said about this man later in this chapter.)

Upon his arrival in Akita, Dorn was informed that Gen. Robert Lawrence Eichelberger, commander of the Eighth Army headquartered in Yokohama, was on a rail sightseeing circuit of his command. Eichelberger proposed to pass through Akita but not to stop. Dorn saw an opportunity to “make some points” for himself and the men of the Eleventh Airborne Division. By phone, he requested that Eichelberger stop by and inspect the men there. The general, unaware that he had troops in Akita, agreed that he would make a two-hour layover. Dorn then went into high gear. He asked the mother superior to stitch up eight oversized general’s flags on long staffs and got the drum and bugle corps to practice for a grand reception, with the appropriated “ruffles and flourishes.” He employed others in “borrowing” the largest hall in town and ordered the mayor to arrange for a “most elaborate Lucullian” banquet—replete with “singing, dancing, music, and scores of geisha girls”—to create a major party “suitable for a state visit of an imperial prince.”<sup>24</sup>



Figure 33. Gen. Douglas MacArthur's overall commander of Allied ground forces in Japan was Gen. Robert Lawrence Eichelberger. Dorn had close contact with Eichelberger in Japan. (Courtesy of US Army.)

On the day of arrival at 1500, the General's train was met with the band in full swing with "ruffles and flourishes," the dipping of the general's flags, a bugle rendition of "The General," a large saluting honor guard, and a line of local Japanese officials bowing as in abject surrender. General Eichelberger then inspected the guard of honor and, certainly out of the ordinary, Dorn called over the private first class railway station chief and introduced him to the general as the "young man who has done a superb job of running the station and the train operations in this province." Eichelberger agreed that "this is the cleanest station I've seen in Japan. But why is he only a PFC [private first class]?" Dorn explained that there had been attempts to get him promoted but the responses were that there were no vacancies and, therefore, "nothing happened." The general decisively stated: "Well, something will damned well happen now." He said to his aide, "I want this man

promoted to staff sergeant at once.” He congratulated the new sergeant and ordered him to sew the new stripes on that very afternoon.<sup>25</sup>

Dorn then proceeded with the plans of the day. The men were inspected in their barracks, though Eichelberger initially demurred. Dorn insisted that the men deserved to see their commanding general. He then complied, concluding that Dorn’s men were the finest-looking troops he had seen since combat in the Philippines.

Dorn then invited him and his entourage to “a little dinner and entertainment I have arranged.” The general argued that he could not accept in the interest of time; in addition, there was the matter of the railway schedules. Dorn replied that the new staff sergeant had the matter fully in hand and had cleared the line through to Yokohama. This convinced the general that he might spare a bit more time, but just for a little while.

Dorn concluded that the “little while” lasted for seven hours, with “Eichelberger being entertained like an imperial prince,” and he clearly loved every minute of it. Meanwhile, the entertainment began with a veritable horde of girls in beautiful kimonos, dancing a twirling parasol dance and singing to the accompaniment of *samisens*, a performance of many acts full of movement and color.

More delicious dishes followed and more cups of sake. Eichelberger asked his staff why such performances were not made available to him in Yokohama. The general was repeatedly apprised of the passing time by his aides; he finally told one, “Go away. I don’t want to see you again. I’ll leave when I get damned good and ready.”<sup>26</sup>

The entertainment then included American music with even jitter-bugging and conga lines in evidence; Eichelberger’s younger officers were fully engaged in the lively festivities. At length the party was over, and the general was ready to go, “full of food, fun, booze, and good cheer.” When asked about the time, the general was informed that it was 0100 and he was not to be concerned; his newest staff sergeant had cleared the line all the way to Yokohama.

During these days, the Japanese had complaints for Dorn. He was informed that with the disarming of their troops, a problem had surfaced both in Akita and Yamagata with which they could not cope. They held two camps of several hundred Chinese prisoners, the disposition of which had not been resolved. There had been considerable violence and some casualties. Dorn stepped in on both cases. The Chinese were surprised and then gleeful when he entered the camps addressing them in fluent Mandarin.

In short order, he had the matter resolved. He had earlier commandeered a small rusting ship in the harbor at Sakata. He had planned to refit it as a boat for excursions along the west coast for the troops. Instead, it was dubbed the “Eleventh Airborne *Maru*,” put into working order, and turned over to the Chinese, who were soon on their way to China. And “since it wasn’t reported as going down with all hands or piling up on a rocky coast, I suppose it reached its destination.”<sup>27</sup> Not long afterward, Dorn learned that Eichelberger was planning another trip around northern Japan. He would have no whistle stop except in the Yamagata prefecture “provided that this would not be inconvenient to General Dorn.” Dorn knew this meant that the boss was bored with Yokohama and wanted “to have a little fun.” This meant, in effect, a reprise of the former trip that had been so elaborately prepared. The general’s train arrived in Akita to the accompaniment of the drums and bugles, the flourishes, etc. In the meantime, Dorn sent his own train to Yamagata, 160 miles to the south, to prepare a “royal reception.” This was duly accomplished at Yamagata; and then on to Tonezawa where Dorn’s train then proceeded for the third full treatment as done before. There was an added attraction there: a visit to the largest silk mill in town. And the owner-manager would be honored to present the general with twenty or thirty yards of silk. He chose a bolt of white and departed from the excursion in a most happy frame of mind.<sup>28</sup> As to his relations with his men that Eichelberger may have appreciated, Dorn often had meetings with groups of GIs and established a give-and-take attitude with plenty of questions. And they were forthcoming. The men sometimes noted that Dorn seemed to be more open, and they also noted that he was a West Pointer who seemed to make a difference. Some observed that the usual officer seemed to be a “90-day wonder” and seemed to be not as capable. Dorn asserted that the men should give their officers a chance; they were often younger and not as well-experienced but were doing their best. On one occasion, Dorn was asked why he lived in the best quarters in the area. He answered that he lived in this fashion to better impress the Japanese. Also they were often merely guesthouses to house travelling “brass” and, as such, served to keep them from spending too much time nosing around the barracks area. Thus, Dorn explained, that in this way he was keeping the higher-ups off all of their backs. In addition, after such treatment guests such as General Eichelberger would leave telling the world that the Eleventh Airborne Artillery was the best outfit in the Eighth Army; they, in effect, were the best-looking and the best-trained troops in the whole of Japan. Yet, if the men thought that he should not keep the accommodations for these reasons but should move out himself, then so be it. The men protested, however, that things should go on as before.

As to Dorn's relations with his men, Eichelberger himself may have formed favorable opinions of Dorn—one of the reasons, among others, that the general spent time in Dorn's part of Japan, again with some repercussions among other officers. The same might be said closer to home, regarding Gen. Joe Swing. For instance, as Dorn bragged a bit by explanation, Swing had inspected Dorn's areas and thereupon "ordered the commanders of the three infantry regiments—the engineer, signal, and headquarters units—to go from one end of Akita and Yamagata to the other and learn how things should be done for the men." Naturally, Dorn concluded "that didn't make them very damned happy."<sup>29</sup>

At this juncture, Swing ordered Dorn to Sendai to take command of the division for two months while he was in the States for a belated leave. Dorn asked what orders he had for him during this period. Swing stated that he wanted him to get the training program underway, including jump training and push athletics "to make the division the Far Eastern champion in as many sports as possible." [Dorn noted that they later won first in



Figure 34. Brig. Gen. Frank Dorn commanded the artillery of the Eleventh Airborne Division, which was under the command of Maj. Gen. Joseph May Swing, pictured here. Dorn came to Japan with Swing somewhat earlier than MacArthur. (Courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library and Museum.)

every category.] Swing also wanted him to push the reenlistment program. Dorn himself intended to fix up the hotel at Matsu Shima, making it a star attraction among official residences. Swing replied, “Okay, the division is your baby until I get back. Do anything you want.”<sup>30</sup> So Dorn and many others turned to the renovation of the Matsu Shima. In addition to extensive new construction, such as building a grand fireplace, Dorn called in the Count of Sendai, the mayor, and the chief of police; Dorn noted that as a gesture of goodwill, he asked to borrow many objects from the local community such as artworks, artifacts, and even “beautifully dwarfed aged trees.” The place was thus transformed, and it soon became a drawing card for visitors, whether official, military, or from the press.

At this juncture, however, a hitch occurred that well illustrates the perennial rivalries at the highest levels of US Army command. One visitor was Maj. Gen. Charlie Ryder, the corps commander who outranked General Swing. Though Ryder and Swing were West Point classmates, “they hated each other’s guts.” Following his two-day visit, Ryder ask Dorn to inform Swing upon his return that he intended to set up his corps headquarters at Sendai and would take over the hotel as his official residence. This caused great consternation and the necessity of creating a new headquarters for Swing’s residence. Accordingly, a section of a former Japanese officers’ club was refitted as Swing’s abode. When Swing returned, he was greatly perturbed, though admitting that the last time he and Ryder had clashed, “I did him in the eye in a big way.” Swing noted that therefore “now I’m to get the sharp stick;” the next time it would be his due once more. Dorn suggested that while Ryder had asked for the quarters, it could be left without furnishings of any kind. This may have been done, leaving Ryder with “one bed, one chair, and a piece of used soap in his bathroom; one chair and a bridge table in the middle of that huge dining room.”<sup>31</sup>

Certainly, the ongoing often-bitter conflicts perennially in evidence regarding the higher-ranking officers of all of the armed services of the United States have been often remarked upon. MacArthur’s second-in-command in Japan, General Eichelberger, was one of those who were constantly aware of these vicissitudes, examples of vanity, and the eternal maneuvering and jostling for position. In the book of his letters to his wife, *Dear Miss Em*, he noted that “I have not lost my feeling that Uncle Sam should be the one big figure in the picture. For many years I have been a student of my fellow man and as I get older I realize how ruthless some people get in their later lives in quests for glory, high command, publicity, etc. The Shadow of Uncle Sam often seems very dim. . . . Now my feeling is that

I would like to fight the Japanese as often as possible; but I realize, too, that in most operations one must be more afraid of the man behind than the enemy in front.” To be sure, Eichelberger often manifested his own levels of vanity and seeking recognition. He was bitter that his own accomplishments were glossed over by MacArthur, Walter Krueger, and others. On one occasion, Eichelberger noted that Krueger, the commander of the US Sixth Army, had not recognized something that he had accomplished: “I got darned little thanks for it and no mention was made of my presence.” But then Eichelberger thought that possibly Kreuger had himself become “a walking bundle of pomposity.”<sup>32</sup>

About the middle of January 1946, the Eleventh Airborne Division was ordered to take over Aomori Prefecture at the north end of Honshu from the 81st Infantry Division, which was to be deactivated. It was commanded by Maj. Gen. Paul J. Mueller. His areas of occupation included Aomori, Hirosaki, west of the mountains, and an old cavalry post at Hachinoche. Dorn was horrified that Mueller for some reason had his men stockpile their arms and munitions in the deep snowdrifts. Dorn noted that the general was clearly less than completely competent. After it was designated that he would be placed in charge of this operation, Dorn began to take in hand the Japanese officials with whom he would soon be involved. Mueller protested, to no avail because Dorn was soon to be in command in the area. Mueller also complained about the uniforms of the Eleventh Airborne that were not altogether regulation. Dorn explained that the men were indeed wearing the uniform as prescribed, or permitted, in the Eleventh Airborne Division. Thus, “as airborne troops, they are an elite group entitled to certain authorized liberties.” Mueller wanted to know who had prescribed these and the reply was the division commander. Mueller, angered by Dorn’s impertinent remarks about the no-doubt rusting arms in the snow, intended to write the Eleventh Division commanding officer; however, he was informed that Dorn was at the time that worthy character. Mueller’s remarks should be addressed to Dorn personally, and “they will be given all the attention I think they may deserve.” Another vexing matter for Mueller was a concern as to where Dorn got the special train that he was riding in. Dorn’s pithy answer: “I *took it*.”<sup>33</sup>

At about this time, the Eleventh Airborne Division in Sendai, Japan, was visited by Secretary of War Robert Patterson. There Patterson witnessed the parachute school, which particularly interested him, and “got the impression that you have a rugged lot of men, well capable of carrying out any mission assigned them.” Patterson extended his commendation

to Dorn's command, praising their appearance and morale "and for the splendid manner in which they are performing their duties," which may well have been the usual response of various high officials following such inspection missions.<sup>34</sup>

At this juncture, a jarring event occurred: the arrival of Dorn's official "Dear John" letter demoting him to colonel, and he "didn't like it a damned bit." But, as Dorn noted, "What the hell . . . the Army had to lop off about one thousand generals;" he concluded that "naturally the younger ones would go first while the seniors in control hung on to their rank by their back teeth." This was the inevitable outcome of the widespread demotions attendant upon the drastic shrinking of the armed forces following the end of the war.<sup>35</sup> Dorn was given three choices: remain in his present assignment, retire, or return to the United States for further assignment. He chose the latter. If this were the choice, his demotion would not become effective until he returned home. He certainly did not wish to be demoted while in Japan and hence "lose face." He could also do one more job for the Eleventh: take over the large northern island of Japan, Hokkaido, for the division. Few incidents occurred in this process but the Russians, who had occupied the Kurile Islands about ten miles from the northeast coast of Hokkaido and all of Sakhalin further along the north coast, employed naval vessels close to shore. They did this either for nuisance value, regarding which the Russians were most adept, or for possible landings on the island. Dorn thereupon ordered US patrols to fire upon them, and that was the last that was seen of the Russians in that area.

Dorn, his Northern Japan mission completed, returned to Sendai in preparation for his departure for the United States. To return home, instead of flying as he had done enough in the years past, Dorn decided to take the more leisurely way home by sailing. He set sail on the USS *Admiral Robinson* in a large stateroom with five other brigadier generals, all of whom had been "busted back to colonel." Two were men with whom Dorn stated that he could "have got along with in the Black Hole of Calcutta;" he looked forward to a pleasant journey. They promptly stocked up with plenty of booze for the trip. Two of their aides were in the junior officers section of the ship, "but they were instructed to report for duty at our cabin every morning at 10. The order of the day for them never varied . . . keep us supplied with ice and club soda and they could drink all of our booze they could hold."<sup>36</sup>

After a sixteen-day voyage from Yokohama, the ship docked at Seattle and the generals—now colonels once more—were temporarily quartered at Fort Lawton in Seattle.

## Notes

1. MacArthur's service for the next five years is often recognized as a considerable success. See studies by Kazuo Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). To learn more about MacArthur's Japan, see the fine studies by Seymour Morris Jr., *Supreme Commander: MacArthur's Triumph in Japan* (New York: HarperCollins, 2014) and William Sebald and Russell Brines, *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965). This time was one of the highlights of MacArthur's entire career. Dorn's months in Japan were also a memorable period in his Army life. His sterling account of these times reveals countless interesting details of what transpired as the victors and vanquished interacted at many levels. His insights into the first pivotal five months of MacArthur's significant—even brilliant—actions as the Allied supreme commander in Japan are, therefore, a major strength of his memoirs. It has been recorded that Dorn was the *second* American to set foot there; his commander, Maj. Gen. Joseph May Swing of the Eleventh Airborne Division, was the first. He was also the first to raise the American flag there, which he did over the first American airfield established in Japan.

2. "Autobiography," 687–89.

3. "Autobiography," 689.

4. "Autobiography," 689.

5. "Autobiography," 690.

6. "Autobiography," 690–91.

7. "Autobiography," 690–91.

8. "Autobiography," 691–92.

9. "Autobiography," 694.

10. "Autobiography," 694–95.

11. "Autobiography," 695–96.

12. "Autobiography," 696.

13. "Autobiography," 696–97.

14. "Autobiography," 697.

15. "Autobiography," 698–99.

16. "Autobiography," 700.

17. "Autobiography," 700.

18. "Autobiography," 701.

19. "Autobiography," 704.

20. The map is still for sale in Peking at the present time. One recent visitor to Beijing reported that it was being used as a placemat in a certain restaurant there.

21. "Autobiography," 706.

22. "Autobiography," 707.

23. "Autobiography," 707.

24. "Autobiography," 708.

25. "Autobiography," 709.

26. "Autobiography," 712.
27. "Autobiography," 717–20.
28. "Autobiography," 721–22.
29. "Autobiography," 723–24.
30. "Autobiography," 724.
31. "Autobiography," 725–27.

32. Eichelberger was the commander of the US Eighth Army, MacArthur's first and most important US force in Japan. For more on Eichelberger, see his account of the Pacific war in *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo* (Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, 1989) and a collection of his letters to his wife, ed. Jay Luvass, *Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific, 1942–1945* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972.) Eichelberger liked to refer to his wife as "dear old doll" and other terms of endearment. As to Eichelberger, he and MacArthur were for a time quite close but drifted apart later. One source stated that Eichelberger "was beloved by everyone—a big teddy bear, genial, honest, uncomplicated, [and] approachable." Indeed, he was "as easy, as they say admiringly in the South, 'as an old shoe.'" A war hero, Eichelberger had won the battle of Buna in the Philippines, which made possible much of MacArthur's success there. Morris, *Supreme Commander*, 100–01 and *passim*.

33. "Autobiography," 731–33. See letter dated 28 February 1947 by Maj. Gen. J. M. Swing praising Dorn for his meritorious service as commanding general, Eleventh Airborne Division Artillery, and provisional military governor of Akita and Yamagata prefectures during the period 15 September 1945 to 15 December 1945. Swing noted that Dorn competently discharged his duties as artillery commander and "rendered outstanding service" as provisional military governor. Dorn was therefore authorized to wear the Army commendation ribbon by direction of the secretary of war. The Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 4.

34. "Autobiography," 730–31.

35. The US Army was reduced from about 8.5 million soldiers to about 690,000 personnel that did not include those in the Air Force by September 1947. The US Air Force was created on 18 September 1947 and was no longer part of the US Army. The selective service act was terminated on 31 March 1947.

36. "Autobiography," 739–42.

## Chapter 11

### **Dorn's Later Military Career After the War: Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, March 1946 to May 1949, and Washington, DC, May 1949 to December 1953**

His first stint after Japan was the result of a telegram that Frank Dorn received soon after he returned to the States from Brig. Gen. Williston B. "Willie" Palmer, the commandant of the new Army Information School at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Palmer asked Dorn to become the assistant commandant. The school was a post-war establishment set up to teach officer and enlisted students the basics and principles of public relations and the Army's Information and Education (I&E) program. It was under a new commander: the Army's chief of information, Lt. Gen. Joseph Lawton Collins. Dorn consented and asked for a two-week leave with his family, following which he would report for duty. He reported in March 1946. Dorn was, at last, home from the wars.

One dimension of Dorn's world was maintaining discipline and handling civil affairs. More interesting was the unending stream of college presidents and professors, publishers, editors, newsmen, authors, artists, actors, top government officials, and various and sundry military and naval officers. Some were more prominent than others. There was, for example, Arthur Sulzberger and his wife—of *The New York Times*—who twice addressed the students.

From the opposite direction on the political spectrum was Jack "Beaver" Thompson, who was Col. Robert R. "Bertie" McCormick's "rock-bound champion of all Republican causes that did not originate in the 'effete east'" and who often clearly presented McCormick's "so-called thinking and point of view [which] had been ossified in cast iron many years before." McCormick's influential newspaper, *The Chicago Tribune*, was the vehicle for such thinking. While Dorn was a conservative, he did not go as far right as either Beaver or the colonel. Beaver also addressed the students, as did Hal Isaacs of *Newsweek*, whose anti-establishment views made him a student favorite. Other popular presenters were famous cartoonist Bill Mauldin and Rex Stout, creator of the popular Nero Wolfe mysteries, who headed the staff at the Book of the Month Club.

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This chapter is based on information from Dorn's Autobiography, 747–94, hereinafter referenced as "Autobiography."

During this time, though, Dorn knew that Gen. Joseph Warren Stilwell, commander of the US Sixth Army in San Francisco, was not well. On 3 October 1946, Stilwell underwent surgery that disclosed cancer of the stomach and liver and that he had only a few days to live. Under Secretary of War Walter Patterson flew from Washington to award Stilwell the Combat Infantryman Badge, which he was normally too high in rank to receive; however, these restrictions were waived in his case. Stilwell died in his sleep on 12 October and was cremated. His ashes were scattered over the Pacific in accordance with his wishes. The last communication that Dorn had with Stilwell was an autographed photo that he had requested. Stilwell's inscription read: "To Frank Dorn; Enemy of stuffed shirts and a loyal friend in time of need, Joseph W. Stilwell, General, USA."<sup>1</sup> Dorn then journeyed to New York to assist Win Stilwell in getting *The Stilwell Papers* ready for publication. The publisher was to be William Sloan, who Dorn had known from China days. Teddy White was suggested as the edi-



Figure 35. Frank Dorn's first assignment after his return to the United States from Japan was at the Armed Forces Information School at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He had also just been demoted to colonel. In this photo, Dorn (right) is being decorated with his second US Army Distinguished Service Medal. (Courtesy of US Army.)

tor; because Dorn was on active duty, he could not undertake this because the Pentagon would have to give its approval and deal with censorship matters. Win would never consent to that.<sup>2</sup>

Then in May 1948, Dorn's stepmother, Grace, died. At this time, his half-brother, Walt, who had been washed out of West Point, was in Korea. He was a second lieutenant, having obtained his commission via a Reserve Officer Training Corps program. The funeral was attended by Win Stillwell, among others, coming up from Carmel.

At about the same time with the unification of the nation's armed forces under the Department of Defense, the Army Information School was expanded and became the Armed Forces Information School. It became Dorn's job to coordinate these developments.<sup>3</sup>

Dorn's next job was in the Office of the Military Personnel Policy Board. There Dorn felt that he was an alien—the board being one of those “much ado about nothing” organizations “that thrive in the Pentagon.” He soon was completely bored and also had to move to Washington, DC, in May 1949.



Figure 36. Col. Frank Dorn (right) and two US Navy officers at the Armed Forces Information School at Carlisle Barracks. (Courtesy of US Army.)

Dorn was duly impressed, if sometimes confused, by “the largest building in the world.” The gigantic Pentagon structure was opened for business in January 1943, and Dorn described it as it was when he arrived. The Pentagon was sited on 34 acres of land and possessed 17½ miles of hallways; more than 5 acres of glass in nearly 5,700 windows; 28,000 miles of telephone wires, and an exchange large enough to serve a city of 125,000 people. It had parking spaces for nearly 9,000 cars; the largest single food serving operation in the world; a concourse shopping mall with banks and a worldwide travel service; a hospital; and more than 31,000 people holding down jobs. He also recorded that “in its first six years of operation, two generals had committed suicide within its walls, a half dozen natural deaths and one unsolved murder had taken place, and several unwanted babies had been born unattended in the stairwells.”<sup>4</sup> If his first apartment was unsatisfactory, he soon found a two-story row house on 35th Street in Georgetown, which he moved into over the Fourth of July 1949 weekend. This was to be his home for the next four years.



Figure 37. Col. Frank Dorn (right) with two fellow US Army 11th Airborne Division officers at the Armed Forces Information School, Carlisle Barracks.  
(Courtesy of Armed Forces Information School.)

In this fashion, Dorn began his work and endured a long hot, humid Washington summer and his attempts to keep busy in what he regarded as “an unnecessary over-staffed section of the Department of Defense.” But this most unsatisfactory condition ended in November when Gen. Floyd Parks asked if Dorn would like to return to the Department of the Army and join his Public Information Division. Dorn accordingly became chief of the Army’s News Branch, which was part of the Army’s Public Information Division; he happily concluded that for the next four years, in various capacities, he never had a dull moment.

Late in the spring of 1950, Dorn was elevated to the position of chief of the Army’s Public Information Division. Soon thereafter on the night of 25 June, North Korean troops invaded South Korea. There soon followed another promotion for Dorn, who became deputy chief of information for the Department of the Army, a job that he would hold for three years.

During these months Dorn was plunged into the civilian world of Washington, often attending elegant dinners and receptions; he met many influential people. One Sunday afternoon on a Georgetown patio, he first met Bernard “Bernie” and Phyllis Gallagher, “who were destined to influence and later change my life entirely.” In fact, about 10 years later he would marry Phyllis after she became a widow; she would be, at long last, the woman of Dorn’s dreams. Bernard Gallagher was one of the top corporation lawyers in Washington. Born and raised in Vermont, Gallagher studied law at Georgetown and remained in the city for his career. Gallagher’s wife, Phyllis, was born in Virginia, her ancestors extending back to the first settlers at Jamestown. She was an accomplished concert pianist, having attended school in France for four years, where she also studied art. Phyllis had subsequently published 14 novels and numerous short stories. She was one of the capital’s important hostesses, and Dorn admitted that “in the face of such an impressive background . . . I felt almost timid in spite of my attraction toward her and her husband.” Meanwhile, these years were filled with numerous official duties and many social encounters at all levels of society.<sup>5</sup>

The Korean War continued apace with Gen. Douglas MacArthur becoming a more difficult problem, especially to Truman, as time evolved. This culminated on 11 April 1951, when he openly threatened to bomb Chinese troops along the Manchurian border and publically opposed Truman’s foreign policy that consisted of planning to negotiate with North Korea and China on how the conflict might be resolved. Accordingly in face of this insubordination, President Truman—with the agreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the secretaries of State and Defense—relieved



Figure 38. Col. Frank Dorn was an observer at Frenchman Flat, Nevada, on two occasions when atomic shells were detonated. This scene occurred on 25 May 1953, when a 280-millimeter cannon fired a shell to test its capabilities. (Courtesy of US Army.)

him of his command and named Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, a four-star general, the commander of the US Far East Command.

MacArthur returned home to tumultuous welcomes by both the public and the press, “who in most cases didn’t know what the hell his being fired was all about.” Dorn was of the opinion that “the sad truth about MacArthur’s relief from command was that it should have taken place years before.” By the time of the Korean War, he was seventy-one years old “and had become so imbued with what he considered his position as an independent pro-consul that he felt that he was *above* the president, his boss.” Indeed, “a vast personal vanity and belief in his infallibility had long since rendered his judgment open to serious question.” Apparently, “he felt he had been sitting at the right hand of God long enough; and that it was now high time for God to move over and vacate the throne to him, the archangel MacArthur.” He should have resigned voluntarily in 1947 when the essential job of the occupation of post-war Japan had been successfully—even brilliantly—accomplished. He would then, no doubt, have gone down in history as one of the greatest of military commanders, perhaps “on the rococo and flamboyant side,” but one “whose sense of the dramatic had been sorely needed in times of great trial.” Instead, “he is recorded in the Book of History as a great commander who ended his official life a ham actor on a stage where he no longer belonged.” MacArthur subsequently ended his life as chairman of the board of Sperry Rand Corporation.<sup>6</sup>

Regarding Dorn’s career, Gen. Joseph Lawton Collins, the Army’s chief of staff, told him in late November 1951 that he had forwarded his nomination for the star of a brigadier general and that Secretary Pace had approved. A few weeks later in early 1952, General Collins pinned the stars on Dorn in his office.<sup>7</sup>

There then ensued other possibilities for Dorn to participate in various ventures once again involving China. None of these materialized, however; in February 1952, Dorn made his way to the Nevada Proving Ground to handle the public relations aspects of the first atom bomb test with troops. These involved 3,000 infantrymen from the Sixth Army, then commanded by Lt. Gen. Joe Swing with whom Dorn had served in Japan following World War II. This exciting experience, repeated the following year, may well have resulted in Dorn’s cancers late in his life, first diagnosed in 1979. He would be dead in 1981.

Meanwhile, when the Army participated in the making of several films in Hollywood such as "From Here to Eternity," Dorn became closely involved in such ventures. The Army's movie business extended into other areas. It began a weekly TV documentary, "The Big Picture," based on incidents throughout the Army's history from its beginnings to the present time. Dorn's office also developed a feature-length documentary called "This Is Your Army." Several abortive prospects then occurred, but Dorn was finally tired of all Army ventures and planned to retire on 30 September 1953, at which time he would have completed thirty years of service. His plans were deferred and became effective only on 30 November 1953.<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile in September 1953, Dorn's much-heralded cookbook broke into print with much fanfare. Friends in the news media "gave it much publicity. Bernie and Phyllis Gallagher threw a huge "coming-out" party for the cookbook, and Marie McNair had a big story in the *Washington Post*. Clementine Paddleford, who wrote cooking articles in *This Week* magazine, also featured his book with photos. Five years later another cookbook by Dorn appeared featuring herbs and spices. This was written with Eleanor Langdon, with a foreword by Edith Foster Falwell. Titled *Good Cooking with Herbs and Spices*, it was published in 1958 by Harvey House Press at Irvington-on-Hudson in New York. The cookbook consisted of 25 chapters, each of which considered one herb or spice and how it should be used.

Then at last after a three-month delay, Dorn's retirement was approved, effective on 30 November 1953. Dorn noted that he had stepped away from under the all-protecting wings of Holy Mother Army and found himself naked in a "cold new world." He was also scared, though not for long. Dorn decided to return to California and departed Washington by car on 30 November. He left with a warm glow provided by congratulations, regrets, and letters from numerous colleagues and compatriots. One of these was a letter dated 13 January 1954 from Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, then the chief of staff of the US Army. Reviewing Dorn's career, Ridgway especially emphasized that Dorn had "continuously demonstrated exceptional talents in a wide variety of fields." Most outstanding was his "marked ability as an instructor and unusual skill as an artist and writer." These talents had been developed, Ridgway asserted, "to the Army's advantage throughout your career." In addition, he continued, "a fine grasp of staff work foreshadowed your unusually commendable performance of reconnaissance and intelligence duties as assistant military attaché in China." Regarding World War II, Ridgway noted, "your distinguished service in coping with the manifold problems of the vital China-Burma-India

Theater, both in training and in combat, won for you not only our own admiration but that of the Chinese government as well.” After the war, Dorn’s most outstanding service, at least in the opinion of Gen. Joseph Lawton Collins, culminated with his being deputy chief of information of the Army. On 19 March 1956, Collins recommended to the US Army chief of staff that the services of Lt. Gen. Floyd L. Parks and his principal assistant, Brig. Gen. Frank Dorn in the Department of the Army Office, Chief of Information during the Korean Conflict—noting that both had been “denied the opportunity to command troops in action . . . during that time”—be given “suitable awards” in recompense.<sup>9</sup>

During his military career, Dorn was awarded the American Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, and Army Commendation Medal. The Chinese decorated him with the Chinese Order of the Cloud and Banner and the Order of the Sacred Vessel and also made him an honorary general in the Nationalist Army.

## Notes

1. "Autobiography," 772.

2. Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, ed. Theodore H. White (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948).

3. One of Dorn's supervisors at the Armed Forces Information School was Fay Elizabeth Kinkaid. Upon his departure from the school on 11 May 1949, she wrote an appreciation of his work there. She noted that it had been necessary "for Colonel Dorn to work with a changing group of military and civilian personnel, representing not only the numbskulls of this world but also a few of the complete idiots." She indicated that "he has carried the ball throughout the years (from 1 June 1946 to May 1949) in a manner amazing to see." In his position of assistant commandant, he had "demonstrated unusual adaptability, superior intelligence, degree of dependability, and loyalty which has left nothing to be desired." Beyond his official duties, "in an extra-curricular way Colonel Dorn has been outstanding to a marked degree. His parties have been famous—something to look forward to, something to look back on. The superb manner in which he has performed the duties of host has given him the right to be known as the Perle Mesta of Carlisle Barracks." Kinkaid was happy "to recommend him for any position to which he may aspire." The Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 4.

4. "Autobiography," 795.

5. "Autobiography," 817–18.

6. "Autobiography," 822–23.

7. When Dorn kept his colonel's eagles after they had been taken off, Collins asked him why. Dorn replied, "I needed them once before . . . and I may need 'em again." "Not this time you won't," Collins laughed. See Memo to Dorn from Maj. Gen. K.B. Bush, the acting adjutant general, 17 October 1951; Memo for the President from Frank Pace Jr., secretary of the Army, 19 December 1951, recommending a recess appointment for three officers, including Dorn, because "the Senate . . . failed to confirm these appointments prior to recessing." Truman approved these on 19 December 1951. See also memo from Maj. F. Witsell, acting adjutant general to Dorn, 29 December 1945. The latter noted that Dorn had been selected by the secretary of war for inclusion in the 1945 General Officers Eligible List. The Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 3.

8. See Memo, Dorn to the adjutant general, 5 August 1953, requesting "Voluntary Retirement" in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 3.

9. For these and other relevant letters, see the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folders 4, 5, and 15. It is not certain whether Dorn received a "suitable award," but apparently he was given a second Distinguished Service Medal. See the biography prepared by the US Army in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 2.

## Chapter 12

### Dorn's Later Career and Last Days: California and Washington, DC, December 1953 to July 1981

Frank Dorn was suddenly aware that he was to start his life over again in the same place where his grandparents had faced the prospect of their new lives long before. He was now content to do the things he had wanted to do for years: to paint, write, and travel where he wished, and to grow flowers in his own garden.

He first leased a house and garden in Carmel-by-the-Sea, where he would live for more than ten years. Dorn was most pleased that “the coastline of the Monterey Peninsula and south was the most beautiful and rugged in America; huge smashing waves pounding the rocks and cliffs, ridges and shoreline scattered with the growth of pines, cypress, and flowering seaside plants.” In addition, “an almost perfect climate made life agreeable for most . . . [and] there was an almost motion picture-like setting to much of the area.”<sup>1</sup> Dorn then embarked upon an illustrious painting career. He stated to a sister that “give me a year and I’ll have a whole one-man show;” she summarily dismissed that statement, but in less than nine months, Dorn held a one-man exhibit at the Artists’ Guild Gallery in Carmel “and sold over half the paintings.” He then proceeded to visit all of the twenty-one [California] missions started by Father Junipero Serra in 1769, “painting each as it stood in partial ruins or in perfect restorations.” He then held a second exhibit in the Carmel Valley Gallery.<sup>2</sup>

Dorn also became a regular visitor to Win Stilwell, Gen. Joseph Warren Stilwell’s widow, who lived near Dorn’s residence. “She soon adopted me as a member of the family and promptly stomped on anyone who had the temerity to criticize anything I might do.” She also “firmly believed that she communicated with General Stilwell’s spirit quite frequently, and that he often made his presence known by rattling the roof tiles.”<sup>3</sup> Far more numerous were the artists of various skills and fame that populated the Carmel area. Dorn gave considerable space to delineating their histories and accomplishments, not to mention much gossip about them. Another individual proved to be significant to his growing career as an artist. Dorn was asked to entertain a visiting French newsman, Henri Anneville of *Paris Match*. Later after examining some of Dorn’s paintings, Henri

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This chapter is based on information from Dorn’s Autobiography, 890–940, hereinafter referenced as “Autobiography.”

asked Dorn if he would like to have a one-man show in Paris. Dorn was flabbergasted, but Henri insisted that he could arrange a show at one of the best galleries on the right bank, the André Weil Gallery on Rue Matignon. Dorn soon received an invitation from André Weil himself, and the opening was set for 15 May 1956.

The event was a resounding success. The attendees included the duchess of Windsor; the ex-queen of Italy, Margaret Biddle, who bought some



Figure 39. Frank Dorn's painting of an old Chinese imperial archer.  
(Courtesy of Brooks Langston, Dorn's great-nephew.)

paintings; and Marie Powers, the opera singer who had created Menotti's opera, "The Medium," and arrived with the opera's entire cast. Many other persons of high rank in French and European society also attended. Numerous dinners and other functions then ensued, bringing Dorn into contact with many people of note.<sup>4</sup>

Dorn then went to Madrid to prepare for a one-man exhibit scheduled there, opening on Columbus Day 1956. He was sponsored by US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, as well as the Spanish Ministry. The event was held in the gallery of the Institute of Hispanic Culture, and Gen. Francisco Franco officially opened the exhibition. "Most of the big shots in the Spanish government were on hand to add their prestige to the event," Dorn recorded, and even the Archbishop of Madrid was there in "his elegant red robes." This was another major artistic triumph for Dorn. He was quite impressed and stated that "I had loved Spain as one man might love another after many years of close friendship. I had loved France as one might love a charming woman. For Spain was masculine; France feminine in character."<sup>5</sup> The next major art exhibit was to be held at the Institute of Cultural Relations in Mexico City in the spring of 1957. This, too, was a glowing success for the month that it was on display. Dorn also took advantage of the time to travel extensively throughout Mexico, as he had done in Spain and Portugal while his art was being exhibited in Madrid.

Following these successes, Dorn then held numerous exhibitions in various locations in the United States. At this juncture, a major physical blow struck. After some weeks of grave difficulties, Dorn was admitted to the Fort Ord hospital. He was diagnosed with encephalomyelitis, a rare disease that attacked the nerves and was related to polio. After a month in the hospital, Dorn was released for home recuperation. This lasted for seven months; much of time was spent at the Brighton Hotel in Washington, DC, at the behest of Phyllis Gallagher, who was then watching over him "like a mother hen."

The result was that Dorn gradually realized Phyllis Gallagher meant a great deal more to him than just being a good friend. The truth seeped through that he was in love with her and he couldn't say or write a word about it. He feared that he was too old to marry; in addition, Bernie Gallagher, her husband, was one of his best friends. Finally, Phyllis had a family of position and much else to uphold.

In the spring of 1959, Dorn was once more involved in Hollywood and participated in making a Universal Pictures film called "The Mountain Road," based on the American effort in south China in 1944. Dorn's main

task was to obtain US Army cooperation and support, at which he was an old hand. He helped rewrite the script, worked on costuming, advised as to Chinese food and eating customs, and taught American-born Chinese bit players to speak some Chinese. The film starring Jimmy Stewart and Henry Morgan was shot in Arizona with cooperation from the Arizona National Guard. It was set in the Salt River Canyon east of Phoenix; the wild terrain had a remarkable resemblance to the mountainous areas of Keichow and northern Kwangsi provinces in south China. Dorn noted that the sites were especially effective; their main difficulties involved shooting around the ever-present and sacred saguaro cacti. The shooting continued until late summer 1959, and it was the last of Dorn's post-retirement movie career.<sup>6</sup> Phyllis also at this time had offered to help Dorn write a novel, tentatively titled "The Fury," though with little success. They finally concluded that a total rewrite was necessary, and this lengthy work was never published.<sup>7</sup>

This was not, however, to be the end of Dorn's time on earth. Another decade remained to him. In many ways, he may well have regarded these years as the most important of his life. This phase began in early 1963, when Bernie Gallagher died of a heart condition in his sleep. Dorn knew that there was nothing he could do: "there never is when death strikes. For death is always waiting, waiting since the day we were born, for it is on that day that we start to die."<sup>8</sup> He was also aware that he had been in love with Phyllis for more than four years.

Yet following the death of her husband, Phyllis would not marry Dorn until February 1964, in Washington, DC. They were destined to have a decade of married life until this was terminated by Phyllis's death. Other events of note in Dorn's life included the death of his father at age ninety-four in the fall of 1964. There then ensued a period of about 10 years when Dorn and Phyllis were back and forth between Pebble Beach and Washington, DC, on occasion staging joint art shows featuring both of their works. This stage in his life ended on 5 July 1978, when Phyllis died of cancer.<sup>9</sup>

During these years, Barbara Tuchman asked Dorn to assist her with the biography of General Stilwell; she had been advised by everyone to see Pinky Dorn, who knew more about General Stilwell than anyone else.<sup>10</sup> Dorn worked with her for about two years. He had the highest regard for Tuchman: "she was meticulous researcher, a hard worker, and a highly intelligent woman." Her book deserved all of its praise and accolades. In return, Tuchman helped Dorn find the right agent for his work in New York at the firm of Russell & Volkening. This resulted in the publication of




Figure 40. Frank Dorn created the artwork for the dust jacket of his book *The Forbidden City: The Biography of a Palace*. (Courtesy of Barbara L. Mason, Dorn's great-niece.)

Dorn's book on the Forbidden City of Peking (1970) and his book *Walk-out: with Stilwell in Burma* (1971). This was followed by his study of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–41 (1974); all were dedicated to Phyllis.

After his wife's death, Dorn was stricken to the uttermost and noted "for the first time in my life, our marriage had taught me the true meaning of the words love and happiness, and the difference between making love and being truly in love. The closeness of the bond between us had always seemed to be a special sort of thing, of laughter, of shared interests, and of doing things together."<sup>11</sup> Certainly her death led to "simply an inconsolable grief," to which Dorn could never be reconciled. He had something, though, that made it possible for him to continue: "my only comfort is the sure knowledge that the next time I live, whether in the spirit world or in this, God will put her hand in mine, for He knows that we belong to each other. My constant prayer is that it will not be long before we are once more together."

Less than six months after Phyllis's death, x-rays revealed that Dorn also suffered from several cancers and that one growth in particular, unknown to him, had been active for years. Then two years later after numerous operations and radiation therapy, "I feel like a walking wounded case with an ever-increasing weakness of body and spirit." As he recorded in his final words, however, this "will be as nothing when my prayers to rejoin Phyllis are answered. Then, with the last note of 'Taps' over my grave, once again I will know the true meaning of the word happiness."<sup>12</sup>

Not too long afterward, Dorn died on 26 July 1981 at the Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington, DC. He was buried with full military honors in Section five of Arlington National Cemetery. His wife, Phyllis, is buried with him.

## Notes

1. "Autobiography," 890.

2. "Autobiography," 890. Dorn recorded that several years later he presented the entire collection of the California mission paintings, 23 in all, to the Father Serra Museum at Petra, Mallorca. This was the birthplace of the great founder-padre of California.

3. "Autobiography," 891.

4. "Autobiography," 907–11.

5. "Autobiography," 914–16, 919.

6. "Autobiography," 926–28. Dorn recorded that while shooting was underway, Jimmy Stewart was notified that he had been promoted to brigadier general in the Air Force Reserve as of 23 July 1959. This was a highly deserved recognition of his wartime services as part of the 8th Air Force's operations against Germany in B-24 aircraft. Stewart's last duty was as the commander of the 2nd Air Wing. His promotion had heretofore been blocked by Sen. Margaret Chase Smith of Maine. This impediment had by then been removed. Dorn himself pinned Stewart's star on his uniform.

7. See Dorn's 890-page typed manuscript in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 2, Folders 33–36; Box 3, Folder 6. As to Dorn's fiction, the unwary reader might have noticed that in 1978 and 1979 three novels appeared under the name of "Frank Dorn." This was the pen name of a mother-daughter team that wrote science fiction books. They were Frances Catherine Paterson and her mother, Nancy Paterson, who also wrote under the name of Nancy Dorer. The novels were *Appointment with Yesterday* (1978), *When Next I Wake* (1978), and *Sun-watch* (1979), published by Manor Books in New York.

8. "Autobiography," 934.

9. "Autobiography," 934–40.

10. Barbara Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), xix. Dorn also drew the six maps that "adorn" her study. Regarding Tuchman's book, Col. David Barrett, who knew Stilwell well, remarked that he could only "imagine the screams of anguish which it will arouse both in the US and Taipei." As for himself, though Barrett admired Stilwell for his courage and determination and his wide range of cultural interests, nonetheless he did not particularly like him and thought that he "was at heart a stinker." He felt that Tuchman had presented him "in far too charismatic a light. He was certainly good, but I don't think all *that* good." Barrett admonished Tuchman, asserting that "I thought she was overly gaga about him, but she paid to attention to me." He concluded that Barbara was obviously very greatly influenced by the attitude of Stilwell's family "to who U.J. [Uncle Joe] was Jesus Christ come back to earth." See Letter, Barrett to Dorn, 17 November 1971, in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 7.

11. "Autobiography," 940.

12. "Autobiography," 940.



## Chapter 13

### Conclusions

This study has focused on a soldier *extraordinaire* who grew up in the San Francisco Bay area during California's later halcyon pioneering days. The consideration of Frank Dorn's forbearers contributes to an understanding of how Americans proceeded to move into the western part of the country. A focus on his personal development as an American soldier and as a human being living in the early twentieth century, both in war and peace, is further instructive. As one instance, the details of life at the US Military Academy during his years as student are interesting. Subsequently, his accomplishments and attainments were often prodigious and therefore have merited consideration.

As examples, his later publications, such as those pertaining to certain natives in the Philippines, are noteworthy. So are the details of life in Peking in the early 1930s, especially as to the Forbidden City, borne out by the eventual publication of *The Forbidden City: The Biography of a Palace*. Dorn's close involvement with Gen. Joseph Warren Stilwell in the early phases of the Sino-Japanese War that ensued on 7 July 1937 also merits close attention. These ventures enabled him to write one of the most significant studies of that era, published as *The Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1941: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor*.

More importantly, Stilwell and Dorn's involvement in China after Pearl Harbor had to do with the larger scope of World War II. From the point of view of the myriad leaders in England, Russia, the United States, and China regarding World War II and how it was to be waged, China generally was considered as a secondary theater of operations. This was clearly demonstrated by China's very low standing as to Lend-Lease provisions when compared with lion's shares provided to England and Russia especially. This was despite the fact that the Chinese had suffered for years at the hands of the Japanese, long before Pearl Harbor. It must have seemed to Stilwell and Dorn, at least on occasion, that their struggle against the Japanese in Burma and China was almost a private war of their own which did not seem to concern Washington much at all. It seems remarkable that they did as well as they did, in fact, by tying down large numbers of Japanese troops in the China-Burma-India Theater. The Chinese were very difficult to work with in many respects, and Chiang was often far from cooperative. Stilwell was bereft of the large numbers of American troops that he repeatedly sought to aid him in his endeavors. Seemingly to them

also, all-too-few kudos came their way, with the crowns of victors over Japan being eventually bestowed much more handsomely on Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Adm. Chester Nimitz.

Certainly to both Stilwell and Dorn, China had to take pride of place. Accordingly, Dorn's account of Stilwell's "Walkout" of Burma describes their close escape from the Japanese, which fueled Stilwell's inexorable determination to return to Burma. This became a veritable crusade and a major feature of the later stages of the war in the China-Burma-India Theater, the CBI. In this regard, both Stilwell and Dorn were to achieve the realization of their dreams in reopening the road route into China from India after it had been blockaded by the Japanese for two years.

China's situation in World War II was often the product of internal Chinese conditions and affairs. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and numerous warlords and other centers of power ebbed and flowed throughout China's days and years. The widespread corruption at myriad levels of Chiang Kai-shek's régime was often remarked upon. Indeed, it might be said that Chiang was a hostage to this corrupt system that he also manipulated and attempted to rule.

The Chinese were also under the influence and weight of their lengthy history and the manner in which philosophies as to ruling and waging war dictated courses of action—or inaction. Within this arena, the continual personality clashes involving Stilwell and Chiang, for instance, often precluded clear understanding. Chiang presided over a China that had been at war for much of the 1930s before Pearl Harbor. He was keenly aware that the great challenge to him at home, the Communists, were in fact more to be feared than the Japanese. He thought that the Allies would—and should—take care of the Japanese in any case. China must obtain what it could from Lend-Lease, for instance, and keep the cream of his forces in reserve pending the expected after-the-war conflict with Mao and his Communists. These considerations, together with many others, made it almost impossible for Stilwell to get along with Chiang. Even basic strategy that Stilwell and others wanted to employ may well have been too ambitious in the views of many—both within China and other centers, and in Britain and the mind of Winston Churchill. Perhaps the Japanese in Burma would have died on the vine as the Allies surged through the Western and Central Pacific under the command of General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz and left them stranded. Therefore, why attack them at all, Chiang often thought. All the expense and loss of life could have been avoided. To be sure, some Japanese were tied down by British, Chinese, and American action; hence they were kept from challenging those two

commanders in the Pacific, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. That may well have been a positive feature of combatting the Japanese on the ground in Burma.

What Dorn's account has mainly and most importantly recorded, though, was not primarily what the bigger picture was or should be; it showed how Stilwell and Dorn in particular experienced events and responded and reacted to them on the smaller World War II stage—the CBI—especially regarding the re-conquest of Burma. Certainly, Dorn was unusually adept in Asian surroundings. This was appreciated by such officers as Stilwell and others concerned with the larger Asian picture. In order to do justice to these factors, it is necessary to consider Dorn's many years in the East during which he learned much about Asians. Some of his knowledge was employed to good effect when Dorn was in charge of some of the training and equipping of Chinese forces and later when he commanded them in Northeast Burma engaged in the re-conquest of that nation. Among so many others, for example, Dorn recognized the importance of "face," and especially conditions and situations when it could be "lost."

Among the more valuable aspects of his work: Dorn had a keen sense of war as well as its dynamism, travails, and consequences. Throughout, Dorn manifested deep feelings as to what the eternal all-too-common experience of conflict was like to all involved and, by extension, in all the ages of human history. His reflections on the aftermath of the retreat from Burma—involving embattled Chinese, British, some Burmese, and Americans out of Burma in May 1942, in the face of the overwhelming Japanese invasion—describes something of these matters. Stilwell, and some 114 Americans and others in one small group, made it to safety on foot to India. But just as the Stilwell-led portion of the great walkout succeeded, Dorn explained that the participants suffered:

In the weeks to come, they died, while straining every muscle and every ounce of will to live. Starvation caught them in its clutches, and exhaustion, malaria, and dysentery. Some are ambushed. Others were trapped by deep mud and the floods of monsoon rains. No one will ever know how many died—the British estimated hundreds of thousands. The whitened bones that lay under arching ferns and at the bottoms of treacherous ravines were never counted.<sup>1</sup>

As instructive is Dorn's theme emphasizing Stilwell's continual focus on getting back to Burma. It explains much about Stilwell's interaction with and opposition to Chiang. Dorn noted, "It has been said that in defeat, one may learn more about the art of war and more about one's self

than in victory. But who wants a college degree in how to get the living hell knocked out of him?" He went on: "And in victory? What does the conqueror end up with? Empty hands and a sense of futility; the loss of the high purpose and moral values with which he may have started out." So in a sense, the victor too "was defeated at the very moment of his triumph. For when he surveys the results of that triumph, he sees only the desolation he has wrought among the enemy and the undoubted grief of the Japanese people for the loss of their sons." Then again, in time, "the vanquished might end up among the victors, as is the case today in Germany and Japan."<sup>2</sup>

Further as to war based on his own direct contact with conflict, Dorn stated that "as the most wasteful and immoral device ever conceived by man, the squandering of human life and national resources in war can seldom be justified. Even wars that start with good causes, or good intentions, lose all moral principles in their execution and deprive the individuals whom circumstances have forced to fight of their normal sense of decency." Beyond this, "regardless of high-flown propaganda and assertions that the Almighty is always on our side, the basic motive of all war is simply man's greed for power and its purpose to win, to kill, to destroy and finally, to reap its only lasting reward—a taste in the mouth like sand and a wonder what it was really all about. There can never be any real victory in armed conflict, for when man wages war he not only sins against God, but against all of Nature too, since he alone of the creatures of the earth thus strives to destroy his own kind."<sup>3</sup>

Yet, Dorn could only conclude, "but sin or not, there will always be wars as long as man, the most contentious of all creatures, exists on earth. For he, the one animal gifted with the ability to differentiate between good and evil, has an atavistic love for the excitement of fighting and conflict." Indeed, to the average young man, wartime combat service and the legal right to kill someone he doesn't like remains the most thrilling time of his life, a time he prolongs in veterans' organizations and get-togethers long after their sophomoric inception has become outdated." Certainly, the veteran "has a love-hate complex for the thrill and fear of battle . . . and in insidious boredom for the humdrum of everyday life in time of peace. In speech, he asserts that he hates the evil of war and what it means. In his heart, he loves—and fears the quivering emotion that battle, like a stimulating woman, can rouse within his daydreams."<sup>4</sup>

In these matters, Dorn, the thinking man's general, saw a great deal more of the World War II era than many and in varying circumstances, giving him insight into life of people at war on many levels. His own was

a kaleidoscopic life, and it is to be regretted that the comprehensions of many observers, such as Dorn and other knowledgeable persons, have not always been appreciated and utilized to the fullest, if they are heeded at all. His substantive admonitions and contributions seem all the more valid for those who proceed into the twenty-first century, better armed and informed from having encountered his additions to the historiographical literature of the age in which we live.

Later, the details of Dorn's forced departure from China by an overbearing attitude and activities of Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer needed to be recorded at some length. Many of the aspects of these events later surfaced in debates as to "whither China" under Chiang or Mao Zedong as well as US views and actions regarding these matters in the postwar years. Wedemeyer had strongly supported Chiang, especially in his firm opposition to Mao. Stilwell and Dorn favored a policy by which Chiang should seek to cooperate with Mao. Later manifestations of these two positions proceeded beyond China. The United States would be more directly involved. These views were strongly in the forefront and were especially intense in the early 1950s when Wisconsin Sen. Joseph McCarthy—seeing a new Communist threat present in the nation—launched what was known as "McCarthyism," motivated by a new prevailing "Red Scare." McCarthy viciously attacked the US Army, the State Department, and even Hollywood, among others, seeking to root out alleged infiltrated Communists. The nation only got relief from the intense struggles when the Senate censured McCarthy on 2 December 1954, followed three years later by his early death on 2 May 1957.

Dorn's relationship with Stilwell, which began in the 1930s, was always close. Still, when it was clear that Stilwell following his recall from China in 1944 was perhaps at a temporary end to his power and influence, Dorn did not hesitate first to see how things might work out with Stilwell's replacement, Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer. When matters in this regard speedily deteriorated, Dorn returned to the United States, once more under Stilwell's command. Later, though, when it seemed that Stilwell was not going to be able to continue to participate in World War II to any great extent and would, in fact, rather soon after become ill and die of cancer on 12 October 1946, Dorn considered his own future. In the face of these developing factors, Dorn switched alliances and came under the command of Maj. Gen. Joseph Swing, one of MacArthur's major troop commanders; he participated significantly in Japan then rapidly rebuilding under American direction and assistance.

Dorn's account of MacArthur's significant—even brilliant—management of the occupation of Japan after the end of hostilities is one of the most important aspects of the MacArthur story written from the vantage point of one who was closely associated with those events. This was especially significant in the important first six months of the occupation of Japan when the new regime was set in place. Certain it is that Dorn contributed substantially to MacArthur's success. His empathy with the Japanese is noteworthy, and his encounters with them once more revealed his deep knowledge of Asia, which he had encountered first in the Philippines, and then his years as a Chinese language student in China in the 1930s. There, too, his working together with Stilwell as an assistant military attaché added to his insight and knowledge.

Throughout his autobiography, Dorn revealed a keen situational awareness and sensitivity. His descriptive skills were considerable, whether in prose or in his art, and he had an ability to focus on the quintessential of many circumstances and conditions. Specifically, Dorn's accounts provide much detail that is often missing or unavailable from other sources regarding how Americans had to work with Chinese soldiers and their leaders engaged in reentering the theaters of action of south China and Burma. The lengthy, difficult training and employment of Chinese troops—often in the face of Chiang's opposition—is well worth consideration.

More generally, beyond his views regarding war, Dorn also possessed an acute sense of people and places, was a close and often accurate observer of the world's passing parade. He has provided readers with a gift: his own thoughts and views about significant happenings in his life. His autobiography indeed provides a good window of the age in which he lived. His approach was at once sophisticated or earthy, according to circumstances. He had clear opinions of many people: military, political, and prominent members of society, including specific populations, such as those that inhabited Hollywood for example or the artistic world. Cogent comments were often forthcoming from his pen regarding life as a multi-faceted, vibrant, colorful progression. He possessed a scintillating prose style that was often apt, clear, and pungent. He was, indeed, a perceptive observer and raconteur who seemed ever on the *qui vive*, picking up the vibes and acuity of life in all of its subtleness, seriousness, baseness, tragedies, and times of grand triumph, all often closely intertwined.

The last years of his military service in the US Army followed more ordinary paths in the post-war era, and mirrored the considerable reorganization of America's armed forces during this time. It was only after his

retirement that Dorn launched his world-class artistic career by mounting major exhibits in Paris, Madrid, and Mexico City.

Finally, in many respects the multitalented Dorn is a fine exemplar of the citizens of Tom Brokaw's "Greatest Generation" who successfully traversed the Great Depression and World War II to the nation's lasting gratitude and benefit. His autobiography—and much else that he produced in various media—are significant sources for assessing many dimensions of those momentous stirring times and, by extension, our own century as well, especially regarding the ever-more-important arenas of Asia.

## Notes

1. Frank Dorn, *Walkout: with Stilwell in Burma* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1971), 101–02.
2. This chapter includes excerpts from Dorn’s 1974 Autobiography, hereinafter referenced as “Autobiography,” 648–49. See also Frank Dorn, “Situation Sino [sic] American in China,” in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 4, Folder 4.
3. “Autobiography,” 559–60. Dorn was greatly interested in the war’s impact on both Chinese and American operations in Burma. For details, see “Historical Report of Y-Force Operations Staff, period 1 Jan. ’44 thru 24 Oct. ’44,” in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 1, Folder 55.
4. “Autobiography,” 559–60.

## Appendix A

### Dorn's Preface to His Autobiography

*Before Fate in divine indifference to its own prescribed order of things snuffs out our lives and all we have striven for, a glance backward on the endless promenade of the strong and the weak, the great minds and the half-wits, and what we ourselves have seen and done suggests a memorial to our brief passing. But before proceeding, one might ask why did man create and then destroy the very monuments of his skill designed to perpetuate his own glory? Of course, there is no answer to that question, and no reason. For history does not explain itself. Like a bricklayer with his bricks and mortar, history awaits its own good time, sets people and things on certain courses, then soon forgets them and the consequences it may have willfully caused. Nor does history record its own doings. We record history as we see it, or as we may wish to distort it. And most annals are merely glued together by dates, by success or failure in battle, by men of prominence with those who had fallen from power.*

*When most generals write their autobiographies, they have either of two intentions: to prove that they won World War II (or any other war that might fit into their life spans) singlehandedly, or that they would have won that war singlehandedly if that damned Pentagon had only left them alone. Few generals without very high rank have the gall to attempt this feat of military legerdemain, for obviously the relatively small share in the victory outlaws the lesser fry from beating their own drums too loudly.*

*The following annals do not pretend to meet the criteria for most military biographies. Nor do they emphasize heroics, valor, and great events, except as a constantly changing backdrop for the busy little puppets on the stages of their affairs. Rather, it is a collection of biographies of people and the dust they raised conniving behind the scenes, of their strength and pettiness, and the bravado and courage that gave the Army much of its character during the first half of this century . . . not to mention a hell of a lot of fun to its members.*

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This Preface is from Frank Dorn's unpublished 1974 biography, 1.



## **Appendix B**

### **General Stilwell and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek Characterized**

In view of the importance of the relationship between Gen. Joseph Warren Stilwell and Frank Dorn—who might be called Stilwell’s debonair alter ego, with a deep knowledge of Stilwell’s milieu—it seems appropriate to present an undated document by Dorn. Apparently for some unidentified official use, the document concerning the relationship between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek is titled: “Stilwell vis-à-vis Chiang Kai-shek;” one segment, called “Stilwell,” focuses on the general’s character, shedding light on his thinking and actions while in China, 1942–44. The excerpt below discusses some of the myths surrounding Stilwell and provides glimpses into the true nature of the man himself as Dorn perceived him.<sup>1</sup>

#### **Stilwell vis-à-vis Chiang Kai-shek**

Considering the Chinese do-nothing attitude and general reluctance to take positive action, have you ever thought of them as an essentially feminine race of people?

Other nations also seem to develop a sort of “national gender” in their approach to life and events. For example, today and for some years past, the French are a psychologically feminine people. In contrast, Spain is basically masculine. So were Japan and Germany. During her rise to world power England was masculine, but since her decline, is no longer so. Today Russia and Israel are masculine in spirit. India and most of the Asiatic countries are feminine. The United States used to be masculine, and much of it still is, but God knows what we are drifting into now.

In most cases it almost seems that nations on the rise are fundamentally masculine and positive (though not necessarily right). Then, as their power wanes, they seem to grow feminine in national outlook.

Psychologically the Chinese are basically refined, sensitive, charming when they want to be, dignified, volatile, cynical, irreligious, over-cultured in spirit, hedonistic, lovers of beauty, form, line, texture and design, selfish in the defense of family and beliefs (no matter how cock-eyed the latter may be), easily offended, resilient, adaptable, humorous, and more often than not kind and

tolerant. They can also be cruel to an extreme degree and almost savage if either their position or security is threatened. Yet, they will submit with a show of meekness to force and applied power. As a people they have no national conscience when it comes to benefitting or protecting themselves and their families by the most devious means or by the most atrocious acts. When it suits the occasion, neither truth nor honesty is in their natures.

In other words, the Chinese are a feminine people—and quite similar to the French in that respect.

General Yu Ta-Wei, Chief of Ordnance and later Minister of Defense, who earned an MA degree at the University of Berlin and a PhD at Harvard, told me in 1942: “There is an essential difference between the United States and China, a difference that makes it impossible for our two peoples ever to fully understand each other. China has an autocratic government and a democratic people. The United States has a democratic government but an autocratic people.”

This somewhat oversimplified truth might just possibly—along with the masculine-feminine theory—have been the underlying taproot that grew into the tall tree of Stilwell’s and Chiang Kai-shek’s differences and clashes of personality. (*Some* metaphor!!!) The masculine man of action and the basically feminine nature of the man of non-action found themselves pitted against each other by circumstances and convictions in what amounted to a struggle for superiority. There were two people facing each other in a conflict of wills—each tenacious, each stubborn, and each inclined to be cantankerous when thwarted. Undoubtedly, it rankled Stilwell to realize that he never could achieve the “Number One” position over an individual he considered inferior militarily (with complete justification) and in reasonable thinking. So, like a dominant man who wakes up to the unpleasant fact that he can never achieve ascendancy over a woman, Stilwell began to hate the G-mo, and then to look upon him with wrangling contempt.

Because [of] their personalities, neither seemed to realize that together they complemented each other in many ways. Neither would give an inch. Nor did they perceive that a close, understanding association would actually personify the age-old principle (to the Chinese, at any rate) of the Yin and Yang—of opposites which counteract each other and thus make whole the essential aspects of

life—hot and cold, male and female, light and dark, love and hate, action and non-action. Both were wrong. But Chiang was the most guilty since he had more at stake.

Stilwell could get along and sympathize with the Chinese people and troops because he knew inside that he could assert and hold his position as top man with them—even if he could not with the “contemptible” Generalissimo.

He could feel warmly toward the French in World War I because two factors mitigated against any conflict or urge for superiority: 1) the French Army at the time was a very masculine and capable machine which he admired; and 2) French men, like French women, know how to make a man feel comfortable and important.

On the other hand, the British were desperately trying to maintain their already slipping position of world power. Psychologically they could not wholly accept those they knew in their hearts would be their successors to world power—the Americans. And Stilwell was an upstart very American individual.

## Stilwell

In reading the manuscript I kept trying to put my finger on what made Stilwell tick. There is an elusive something in his character. In an effort to straighten out my own thoughts I adopted one of his lifelong habits, jotting down notes. Here they are:

Stilwell was a man of contrasts.

He was obsessed by an urge to excel—not necessarily for the usual rewards of life, but for some inner satisfaction within himself.

He was rebellious of much of what the “establishment” stood for. Yet he believed in its stability order and security.

He was often liberal and sympathetic by instinct. But he was conservative in thought and politics.

He rejected the dogma and form that characterizes most religious worship. But in his own way (which he probably would deny if he were alive today) he was essentially a “God-fearing man.” In a mild way he preferred to experiment with thought and seek his own answers.

He seemed to be running away from something within himself—probably the 19th Century Puritan culture of his own American background.

He was physically courageous—no matter how many times he said he was “scared to death.” He possessed the *quality of mind* that enabled him to encounter danger with firmness and without fear. At times he was actually foolhardy.

He seemed, somehow, to have a fear of being hurt. Though self-confident in his own thinking and reasoning (usually with justification), he seemed to be afraid they might be attacked or denigrated in some way. (Hence the apparent chip on his shoulder).

He was impatient—often intolerant—with pomposity; stuffed-shirtedness; incompetence; and any form of bragging, posturing, or dishonesty. This was a flaw—a weakness in a sense—because he could not admit or accede to the right of others to be impatient, or perhaps fear, the abrasiveness, wit (rather than humor), caustic or terse appraisals, and the “old-shoe act” of which he was an exponent.

He was a true American in the sense that he could never tolerate the slightest attack in any form against what he considered American principles and aims. He seemed to believe that one’s ultimate reward was simply the defense of what he believed in.

He was a highly moral man in the conventional meaning of the term. Yet he accepted the earthy qualities of most people and did not condemn them for their hanky-panky—provided their conduct did not endanger or disrupt the family unit, or interfere with duties or work.

He was one of the biggest softies I’ve ever met when it came to lowering the boom on incompetent or erring subordinates. Unless forced by unavoidable circumstances, I have never heard of him clobbering anyone—though it would have been to his advantage and benefit on more than one occasion to have done so. Rather than hurt someone else if he could avoid doing so, he allowed himself to be imposed on.

He was stubborn in his judgment of people and events, once he had made up his mind.

He believed wholeheartedly in certain people. (In a few cases, I used to wonder why). When they failed to measure up or “desert-

ed” him, he was actually hurt—*not* angry—though he might cover up his feelings with biting and unflattering remarks.

At times, he seemed uncertain—even concerned—as to the possible reaction of strangers when he first met them. With some this seemed to bring out his cocky aggressiveness. With others he might be as polite as Emily Post (???). And with others he might appear completely indifferent. (These attitudes I never learned to gauge).

He was a quick thinker and “decider.” His reasoning was direct and simple. He never lost sight of a main objective, no matter how many the blandishments or side issues might be along the way.

He had a clear mind which brushed aside what he considered the extraneous clutter and petty “roadblocks” of life. But he was not a profound thinker.

He had a simple, almost child-like faith in what he considered to be *right*. Though he recognized all the shades of gray in life and conduct, he was firm in his belief that right was shining white and wrong the blackest black. (So he never did manage to escape his nineteenth century background.)

He admired and respected competence, honesty, and integrity above all else. In most respects he lived his life by the motto “Duty, Honor, Country.” (And if he heard me say this, he would probably snort—but not deny it.)

## Notes

1. Frank Dorn Papers, Box 4, Folder 15.

## Appendix C

### Frank Dorn's Writings

#### Books

Dorn, Frank. *Forest Twilight: A Novel of the Philippine Islands*. London: George G. Harrap, 1935.

—. *A Map and History of Peiping: Explanatory Booklet* (22 pages). Tientsin: Peiyang Press, 1936.

—. *A General's Diary of Treasured Recipes*. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953. This book was later republished by the Cookbooks Collectors Library in a leather-bound edition.

—. *The Forbidden City: The Biography of a Palace*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970.

—. *Walkout: with Stilwell in Burma*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1971.

—. *The Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1941: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor*. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1974. This has been described as “a definitive work on that seldom-chronicled period.”

Dorn, Frank, and Eleanor Langdon. *Good Cooking with Herbs and Spices* (with illustrations by Frank Dorn). Irvington-on-Hudson: Harvey House, 1958. (Reprint: n.p.: Literary Licensing, 2013).

#### Journal Article

Dorn, Frank. “Hungry Negritos in their Watchful Forests,” *Asia* (November 1931): 725–30, 733. In the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 4, Folder 4.

#### Unpublished Works

Dorn, Frank. “This Fury,” an autobiographical novel in 890 pages of typescript. In the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 2, Folders 33–36; Box 3, Folders 1–6.

—. “Love and War at Pinatubo,” a novel about the *Negrito* tribes in the Philippines, 204 pages of typescript. This was about an actual 1928 “war” of several villages in the forests of the Zambales Mountains in western Luzon. It was written in 1971. In the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 6, Folder 1.

—. “China in World War II, 1941–1945: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay,” no copy found. Dorn sent this manuscript to his agents, Russell & Volkening, in New York City. They informed him, in a letter dated 2 June

1976, that they had sent it to seven publishers, none of which had any interest “in the subject matter.” Letter in the Frank Dorn Papers, Box 6, Folder 3.

## Appendix D

### Dorn as Chef

No study of Frank Dorn would be complete without some consideration of his attention to cooking and entertaining, for which he was well-known. His interests culminated in the publication of two books on the subject of fine dining. He once explained the importance of these matters: “like the bustles and corsets of a past generation and like the powders, rouge, and creams of the present, stuffings and sauces change nature into a glittering semblance of itself. In Hollywood, careful makeup and grooming can convert a pretty girl into a glamorous siren. In the kitchen, carefully planned sauces and stuffings can convert a barnyard hen into a triumph for the table.”<sup>1</sup>

The reader also meets many of Dorn’s cooks—the hiring of which he paid close attention to, and with them, closely entered into how foods should be prepared. Just how seriously he took such matters is revealed in a conflict that he had with one of his favorite cooks, Geraldine, at the Presidio of Monterey, California—not an uncommon occurrence. He explained: “The first time that Geraldine and I were about to prepare a baked ham, we disagreed loudly and long. Geraldine insisted that it be cooked in beer—I insisted that it be cooked in wine.” Later when he “heard tell-tale sounds from the kitchen,” he reported that “I rushed out to find her about to pour beer into the bake pan. She had a look of defiance and was much too determined to brush aside. So I grabbed a bottle of sauterne, and we each poured from our respective sides while we glowered at each other across the innocent ham.” They then stood guard by the stove for many hours “to be sure that neither could tamper with the ‘compromise.’” The next time, however, Geraldine beat him to it. Arriving at home, Dorn then “beelined out to the kitchen. She was sitting smugly beside the stove with several empty beer bottles set significantly on the drain board. Well, I know when I am licked, so I gave in as ungraciously as possible.” In the event, her ham was quite delicious. He was therefore often outvoted by the cooks, frequently with results that surprised him when their choices and methods proved very successful. He thereby became a more knowledgeable and better cook himself from having spent many hours in the kitchen “working with them as fellow gastronomes rather than as servants.” He concluded that they were “artists all of them,” though they were frequently temperamental. Notwithstanding, “their great virtues were imagination and the nerve to try.” Dorn was also well-known in his social circles for his

elaborate parties and entertainments, and the details of some are described in this book.

Dorn's first cookbook recounts much about cooking in various parts of the world. As to India, for example, he describes curries as that "hot and peppery camouflage of a world that seldom has enough to eat." Therefore, curries were "a crystallization for the moment of the heat, the color, the exotic smells, the sharp cries, and indifference to humanity that describes the world of India and of Southeast Asia." One commentator Morrison Wood, writing a preface to his book of treasured recipes, noted that Dorn not only liked to eat good food, he had "one characteristic that is absolutely necessary in order to become a great cook. He [had] a willingness to experiment, to try new combinations, to improvise."

Indeed, during his military career, Dorn lived in some of the most exotic spots in the world. In each of them he savored the food and then went into the kitchens seeking to learn how to prepare the meals. But he not only lived in the East; he journeyed to France and Germany and many interesting places in America as well. Therefore, he had "not only written a wonderful cookbook, but his vignettes of faraway places, his anecdotes about recipes and people make fascinating reading. He takes you with him to the stifling heat of wartime Chungking; to the charm of Peking before the war, its delightful Hotel du Nord, its old temples which sometimes doubles as country homes; to Yunnan Province with its clear blue skies, rugged mountains, and the Lolo tribesmen; to Calcutta; to Delhi with its great mosques and the bazaars and shops studded with chests of sapphires and rubies." He does not stop there but also takes the reader—and eater—to Paris, Heidelberg, and Japan and in the United States to the Pennsylvania Dutch country, where one meets the cooking of the Amish people.

Yet, Dorn still marveled most of all about Chinese dishes. He explained: "For centuries the Chinese have been the greatest culinary artists in the world. They have discovered the most subtle flavors, and have acquired a knack for blending and balance in cookery that has been equaled by no other people. To them a dinner does not merely consist of food. It is a blend of wine, conversation, and balanced dishes." In fact, the taste buds of Chinese guests were "aroused by the application of the principle of the Yang and the Yin—which is merely the belief that all elements of life must be balanced by opposites—light and dark, male and female, hot and cold, sweet and sour. With a minimum of imagination, the Chinese cook has before him a vast panorama of culinary combinations. The preparation of every meal becomes a game and an adventure."<sup>2</sup> Certain it is that the Chinese at all levels appreciated food. Writer George N. Kates recorded that

“No Chinese, whatever his nurture, needs convincing of the prime rank of the actual pleasures of the table. They all enjoy food enormously . . . and talk about food incessantly.” Indeed, “One does not say, ‘How do you do?’ as a greeting, but ‘Have you eaten?’”<sup>3</sup>

As to his first book on cooking, one of those denizens of the literary world so numerous on the Washington scene was Eleanor Langdon, who had heard of Dorn’s culinary exploits. She was armed with a proposition from a publisher that Dorn expand and illustrate his mimeographed pamphlet of recipes into a publishable manuscript. This he did and eventually Henry Regnery of Chicago “published the *first* cookbook by an American general.” Dorn had proposed that the title be “Over a Low Flame,” but Henry Regnery himself insisted that it be called more simply “The Dorn Cookbook,” not the first nor last time that a publisher disagreed with an author on a title. The cookbook was published as *A General’s Diary of Treasured Recipes* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953).

Dorn’s second cookbook was: Frank Dorn and Eleanor Langdon, *Good Cooking with Herbs and Spices* (Irvington-on-Hudson: Harvey House, 1958), which included illustrations by Dorn.

## Notes

1. Frank Dorn, *A General's Diary of Treasured Recipes* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), 179.
2. Dorn, xiii.
3. George N. Kates, *The Years that Were Fat: Peking, 1933–1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 134–35.

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**An imprint of Army University Press**  
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