

Strength In Knowledge

The Warrant Officer Journal

October-December 2023

Volume I, Issue 4



Strength in Knowledge: The Warrant Officer Journal

October-December 2023, Volume 1, Issue 4

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The Warrant Officer Career College, Fort Novosel, Alabama 36362 produces *Strength in Knowledge: The Warrant Officer Journal* quarterly for the professional exchange of information related to all issues about Army Warrant Officers. The articles presented here contain the opinions and experiences of the authors and should not be construed as an approved Army position, policy, or doctrine.



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Commandant's Corner


Colonel Kevin E. McHugh

As we head into the holiday season and the final issue of Strength in Knowledge, Volume 1, I am incredibly grateful for the tremendous efforts of the USAWOCC team. Through their individual and collective commitment to education and training, we end this academic year with more than 5,000 Warrant Officers completing one of the five courses that focus on Warrant Officer professional development. The folks that make this happen daily are the dedicated faculty, staff, TAC Officers, and the Warrant Officer Career College cadre.

Since the last issue, the USAWOCC team has continued work focused on modernizing Warrant Officer education targeting the CW2 through CW5 levels within the new PME continuum.

These future courses represent the progressive and sequential common core required to continue the critical professional development that will deliver more capable Warrant Officers to Army Commanders at every echelon. As GEN George (CSA) challenges leaders to strengthen the profession through the Harding Project, I want to personally thank CW5 Leonard Momeny and CW5 (R) Jim Steddum for their efforts in establishing this enduring professional publication dedicated to the Warrant Officer Cohort. Strength in Knowledge, although produced at the USAWOCC, is the Warrant Officers' Journal. I would also like to thank those who have contributed articles and ideas that have propelled the journal to its status. I challenge all reading this to continue to write professionally and share your ideas and professional discussions. We created this journal to give the Warrant Officer Cohort, a small group of specialized officers representing ~3% of the Army force, a platform to share their unique experiences and ideas to drive change that might not occur otherwise collectively. As this professional publication becomes firmly established, we must continue improving the "fighting position" by reaching more audiences and gaining even deeper insights through those who read and contribute to its purpose.

This time of year reminds us to pause and reflect on the challenges and blessings of the previous months. Over the last year, the USAWOCC family has struggled with unimaginable loss and celebrated hard-fought victories while growing stronger together. As we look to a new year filled with new challenges, we will continue to build our team while educating and training U.S. Army Warrant Officers!



Deputy Commandant's Corner

CW5 Stephen C. Napoli

It has been almost four months since our previous Deputy Commandant, CW5 Julian Evans, unexpectedly passed away. And it has been almost two months since I started the adventure of trying to fulfill many of the visions he had. The outpouring of support from across the Army has been very encouraging and appreciated. While it is never a pleasure to assume a position under tragic conditions, it does not mean I will approach the responsibilities without a level of excitement. The excitement is not about the “why” in the situation. Rather, it is about the “what’s next?”



That is one of the subjective things we do as Soldiers. We ask, “what’s next?” Then we turn goals into accomplishments. Then we ask the question again. It is a question that can demonstrate progress. It enables us to forecast and prepare for future requirements in our homes and on the next battlefield. And it helps us to avoid complacency. When we stop asking that question, we are satisfied. That can be a dangerous position for many reasons. I have been asking that question often as I get acclimated to new demands. I will continue to ask that question of myself and my teammates.

Individual and collective growth should be bathed in the “what’s next?” mindset. The personnel at the Warrant Officer Career College are committed to providing the best education it has ever delivered. I was a department director for two years at the WOCC prior to my new role, and I saw that desire every day as instructors prepared and developed lesson plans. I see it from my new position on a much broader scale where so many moving pieces work together to serve now and plan for the future.

I am a fan of Vince Lombardi quotes. As I assumed the mantle as the Deputy Commandant, I found myself reflecting on an applicable Coach Lombardi message: “Individual commitment to a group effort – that is what makes a team work, a company work, a society work, a civilization work.” I am committed to the profession and the team that I am blessed to serve with at the WOCC. I assure you that any efforts I make are indeed individual; however, they are small contributions within the collective effort at the Warrant Officer Career College to maximize the Army’s capability to fight and win – in any required or anticipated capacity. I am honored to be in the position. I am sincerely at the disposal of every person that reads these words, as we all attempt to contribute to the success of individuals and teams that serve this great nation and great Army.

A Note from the Managing Editor

CW5 Leonard S. Momeny, Managing Editor

Reflections on a Year of the Journal

The creation of Strength in Knowledge is somewhat wrapped in the opportunity of a challenge. Queried by Army University leadership regarding the need for a publication, the question was asked whether a journal specific to Warrant Officers could even be built or sustained. It turns out that the cohort was hungry for content and readers have responded favorably. Additionally, the journal has been fortunate to see contributions from students, officers in the field, senior leaders, and faculty from USAWOCC.

This year has been one marked by achievement. Achievement in the creation of a professional journal for Army Warrant Officers, past and present. This journal serves as a platform to allow Warrant Officers the opportunity to raise their voice on matters of technical expertise and systems improvement. The journal also allows Warrant Officers to enter the realm of professional discourse on topics of doctrine, professional literature, and military history. Simply put, this journal is a place for those that comprise just 2.5% of the total force to meet and exchange ideas specific to the craft of the Army's prized technical experts.

This year has also been one of somber reflection, as the Warrant Officer Career College, and the cohort in general, experienced the loss of CW5 Julian Evans, former Deputy Commandant. Additionally, the Warrant Officer cohort, and specifically the Field Artillery Branch, felt the pain of also losing CW5 (ret.) John Robinson. Both of these gentlemen served as mentors to many and are still seen as giants in their fields of technical expertise. While Mr. Robinson's loss was significant, he was posthumously recognized as this year's Eagle Rising Society inductee. In addition to the Eagle Rising Society induction of CW5 Robinson, USAWOCC hosted the 20th anniversary of the passing of CW5 Swartworth, the namesake for the command group headquarters building. That event is captured in a special article by the journal associate editor, CW5 (ret.) Jim Steddum.

The year has simply been one of significance. With issues 1 thru 3 of the journal accumulating over 2,000 downloads, I can only assume that the journal will only grow in popularity, drawing in both future readers and writers. It has been an honor developing, writing for, and overseeing the editing of the journal, but I am handing over the duties of managing editor to my good friend and teammate Jim Steddum. I plan to stay on as an Associate Editor for the foreseeable future, but my coming retirement prevents me from continuing in my current capacity. To all the readers, thank you. To all the writers, thank you. I leave you with one request, care for and share your journal with others, both those in and outside the cohort. You all do so much for the US Army and the voice of the Warrant Officer matters.

Strength in Knowledge: The Warrant Officer Journal

The Faculty and Staff of the US Army Warrant Officer Career College

Thank you for support of the Volume 1 of

The Army's Warrant Officer Journal (January - December 2023)



Filling in the Blanks

WO1 Adrew Flor



In a military where, enlisted soldiers have college degrees, officers attend increasingly specialized training (like FA40), DOD contractors fulfill technical responsibilities, and direct appointments to CW2 are being approved, it may be difficult for Army leadership to understand where our “Chiefs” belong in the Army; paired with this sentiment is the questioning of the validity of Warrant Officer Candidate School. The Warrant Officer Career College (WOCC) discusses these questions at length, acknowledging changing expectations and operational environment; imbuing wisdom upon each of the new candidates that enter the Warrant Officer pipeline.

Since the inception of the Warrant Officer (WO) in the Royal Navy during the 16th century (Mason, 1992), WOs have been expert masters of their craft, acting as advisors for the Commissioned Officers above them. For Royal Navy Warrant Officers (officers appointed by Royal Warrant), the primary duty was to bridge the social and technical gap between the Captain (usually an aristocrat) and the crew (lower-class/illiterate). Royal Warrants were selected from the common crew to support the Captain due to their influence, literacy and naval abilities. In essence, they were the ‘glue’ that kept the crew and formal leadership connected, a vital and necessary component of the dynamic. To quote Lavery in 1989 “Warrant Officers were specialist professionals whose expertise and authority demanded formal recognition”. Warrant Officer Candidates at Fort Novosel are challenged to ask the question “Does this still apply?” each day at the 1st Warrant Officer Company.

According to CW4 Steve Buckner, outgoing Commander of 1st WOC, “Warrants are Company grade officers from the day of appointment, the Army expects these new warrants to be ready and prepared to fill Company leadership positions, and Battalion/Brigade/Division technical positions. Chiefs are Soldiers first, then leaders, then Warrant Officers.” CW4 Buckner directly supports the professional development of Warrant Officer Candidates (WOCs), and empowers Candidates to embrace the “Officer” portion of their appointment. During his tenure, the curriculum of WOCs was changed to include extended modules on the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), Counseling of Soldiers, and Mission Command; subjects usually restricted to Commissioned Officer curricula.

The belief and acceptance of a Warrant being able to fill traditional Commissioned Officer roles is not common amongst the Officer Corps or Warrant Officer Cohort, but is historically by law and doctrine. Executive Order 8938 published on 10 November 1941 states that “[Warrant Officers] be vest with all the powers usually exercised by Commissioned Officers...”.

This refers to when Warrants were placed in unit or organizational leadership positions. This posture is further reinforced by DA PAM 600-3 which says “The Army WO is a technical expert, combat leader, trainer and advisor”. This section of the 600-3 belongs to the WO Definition, which WOCs are required to recite at least once per day during their training.

Both CW4 Buckner’s teachings and the WOCC curriculum help candidates fill in the answer for:

Where Do Warrant Officers Belong?

The most common complaint of brand-new Warrant Officers in the Army is that they do not know how to integrate into their first unit (Momeny, Wolf & Parker, 2022); they do not understand where they fall into the “pecking order” of their organization. A part of this confusion is expected, as NCOs-turned-Officers there is a natural inclination to seek former and familiar leadership roles to feel integrated. This internal conflict is usually resolved with time as the WO1 (or “Wobbly One”) adjusts to their newly acquired rank, and mil-social expectations. The other part of this WO identity confusion is not so easily resolved.

Most, if not all, soldiers who have served in the Army from 2001-present have been told tall tales of “The Mysterious Chief;” A Warrant Officer that is rarely in formation, always busy “seeing a guy about a thing,” and fixes the problem within a few minutes of showing up; only to disappear once again, leaving a “drop” hat, extra set of keys, and their second coffee. This mythological Chief is what thousands of enlisted soldiers and Commissioned Officers are taught to believe how Warrant Officers incorporate into the Army (sans Aviator/Aviation Warrants).

Unfortunately, the existence of “The Mysterious Chief” is what muddles the waters for senior DOD and Army leadership when deciding WO roles in the Army. Although unlikely, the propagation of the myth of “The Mysterious Chief” (one who’s role, influence, and effectiveness is not widely perceived or understood) could spell out disaster and have permanent consequences for the Cohort; this could be as little as the reduction in Warrant Officer MOSs, such as the controversial merge and “misassignment” of Ordinance Warrants (Taylor, Theroux & Wencil, 2023), or even complete elimination of the Cohort altogether.

Elimination of Warrant Officers does not come without precedent. In 1959, upon recommendation of a board convened by the Chief of Naval Operations (the equivalent of the Army Chief of Staff), Warrant Officers were phased out of the Navy. This decision was motivated by the creation of the Limited Duty Officer (Commissioned Officers with special technical training, not unlike the Functional Area for Army Officers) and the creation of E-8 (SCPO) and E-9 (MCPO). Between the existence of these two groups, officials felt that Warrant Officers no longer had a role in the Navy. It became evident over time that E-8s and E-9s lacked the statutory authority necessary to carry out the duties formerly belonging to Warrant Officers, while LDOs were typically in

managerial positions that did not allow for direct supervision of enlisted technicians. Clearly, Warrant Officers were still needed to fill this gap in expertise, authority, and management (Roland, 2019). With this in mind, in 1963 the Navy reestablished the Warrant Officer program.

To the joy senior leaders and dismay of Warrant-Officers-to-be and Officers-who-want-to-be, the “The Mysterious Chief” will fade out of existence with the NDSM (or mustard stain) on the uniforms of new soldiers fresh from basic with the terminus of the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

The termination of the GWOT marked the notional end of counter insurgency operations (COIN) for the United States. For two decades, the United States successfully participated in continuous conflicts against non-state actors (NSA) and maintained both Air and Land superiority. This allowed for not only for strategic dominance, but also a new resource previously unavailable due to risk of loss of life, civilian contractors.

According to PBS in 2021, the Department of Defense spent approximately 14 Trillion Dollars on contractors during the Global War on Terror (GWOT); this amount being close to half of the spending during the two decades of conflict. These contractors were used as technical experts for several platforms of technology, oftentimes being veterans who used the same equipment during their service. In fact, nationals of these GWOT countries almost exclusively relied on U.S. contractors for technical expertise and training: “When U.S. contractors pulled out with U.S. troops this spring and summer, taking their knowledge of how to maintain U.S.-provided aircraft with them, top Afghan leaders bitterly complained...” With the relative safety and security of bases during GWOT, contractors were able to support military operations and systems, some even representing the original manufacturers of the technical platforms being used. This civilian workforce took over the traditional roles of the Warrant Officer. Chiefs were no longer the technical experts on these platforms, but rather the assistants to these representatives of manufacturers.

The Warrant Officers of the near future will no longer be able to rely on the manufacturer or contractor for quick answers on the battle field. With a technologically matched adversary (or Near-Peer), the security and safety of civilian contractors will no longer be guaranteed; thereby causing their fade-out. With the introduction of Multidomain Operations, and 3 dimensions of warfare occurring simultaneously, Warrant Officers will be pushed to solve problems faster and integrate systems more effectively than ever before. They will have to step into long-since uncharted territory and provide comprehensive support for their leadership, the same leadership that must now adapt to being a part of a division-centric fighting force.




Figure 1: Multidomain Operations (Retrieved and shared with permission from: <https://globalsecurityreview.com/defense-department-multidomain-operations-challenge/>).

The above-mentioned transition is where the modern WOCS truly shines. WOCS instructors not only teach about the significance of the change to Multi-Domain warfare and near-peer adversaries, but also discuss the roles that Warrant Officers will fulfill. Multidomain Operations (MDO) establishes five domains of warfare: Air, Land, Maritime, Space, and Cyberspace. Each of these domains has 3 dimensions: physical, human, or informational. Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) will no longer individually deploy, but rather an entire division with its subordinate Brigades.


For many enlisted, NCOs, and Officers, this structural shift will change the leadership needs of the unit. With an extended chain of command, and larger groups of Soldiers, leaders will have greater responsibilities of accountability and organization. Warrant Officers will need to be masters of their part of each domain, serving as SMEs, primary trainers, and advisors to all levels of leadership due to their increased workload. MDO heavily focusses on not only integration of the domains, but also effective practical application of existing/developing technologies. There is no one set of individuals better fitted to fulfill this task than Warrant Officers.

What Does the New WO1 Look Like?

The new WO1 is Soldier that has unlimited potential to grow beyond their current capabilities. They are able to work with groups of individuals from different backgrounds; MDO will bring cross-component and multi-agency operations to the forefront of mission planning and execution, thus encouraging WOs to be culturally tolerant and understanding, even between branches.

The prospective Warrant Officer Candidate in your organization should be a Soldier who exemplifies their unique branch, and is eager to accept new responsibilities. It is important to emphasize that prospective candidates should not be immediately dismissed by their lack of high ACFT score or

fast run time. The new WOCS has shifted from being a rite of passage through physical strain and performance, to a course that values intellectual cognizance and interpersonal tact. Writing a Letter of Recommendation (LOR) for a Warrant Officer hopeful should go beyond a conversation reviewing ACFT and Height & Weight (ABCP) compliance, though the Army standard remains. A Warrant Officer's competence and worth will be measured in technical ability and execution throughout their career; their LOR should reflect this sentiment. Your recommendee should be a Soldier you can imagine writing essays and memorandums successfully at Warrant Officer Candidate School and potentially leading a platoon or briefing a General as a WO1. The new WOCS emphasizes the Whole-Soldier concept; gone are the days of a successful static Warrant Officer that doesn't attend PME or advances their technical training. WOCS enforces the importance of becoming a well-rounded Soldier, with the crux being candid introspective evaluation and reevaluation of tactical, technical, and leadership competencies.



Warrant Officers by SemperToonsStore
Figure 2: Warrant Officers (Retrieved and shared with permission from: SemperToons, https://www.zazzle.com/warrant_officers_mouse_pad-144663799349119064).

Throughout this article, Warrant Officer Candidate School has been mentioned several times, accompanied by its significant contribution to the education and success of past, present, and future Warrant Officers. It is by no small feat that over 2,000 of the Army's brightest and best Non-Commissioned Officers are transformed into WOs each year. Through its renowned Acculturation process (Evans & Beedy, 2023), WOCS consistently and firmly maintains itself to be invaluable asset to the U.S. Army and Department of Defense. It concisely provides understanding through expert pedagogy, facilitated by competent and experienced instructors. Beyond a doubt, the Warrant Officer Cohort and its constituents would not be anywhere near as lethal without this institution.

Ultimately, as the operational environment changes, so will the roles of Warrant Officers. With the nature of our engagements becoming more technical, we will need our “Technical Experts” to mentor and instruct soldiers across different warfighting platforms. With new leadership structures and increased responsibilities, we will need these “Combat Leaders” to step in to lead and develop technical sections. Warrant Officers in MDO will be the key to maintaining lethality in the next conflict. They will be the competing edge in war where winning is defined as technical proficiency against the enemy.

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I, Warrant, Too: Analysis of the Occupational Identity of Warrant Officers

CW5 Russell Houser, DMA

Second Prelude

The Senate Committee on Military Affairs believes that there is a real military need to provide more adequate for a career group of administrative and technical personnel within the Regular Army, with qualifications and responsibilities similar to those of commissioned officers, but not burdened with the responsibilities which accompany the command of tactical units in the field (US Government, 1941).

Restatement of the Problem

Very little research exists about Army Warrant Officer occupational identity, and the available literature does not include essentialist or social constructionism perspectives. Historical activities have shaped our contemporary understanding of the cohort; however, discerning the factors contributing to WO occupational identity could reveal potential means for strengthening recruiting and retention. Additionally, those factors can offer clues to leaders to tailor messages for their current and future aviators and technician WOs in the institutional and operational domains (Houser, 2023).

Second Interlude

Since publishing *I, Warrant* (Houser, 2023), I identified, acquired, digitized, cataloged, and read about sixty Congressional committee hearings and legislation, Army publications, military studies and reports, academic research, and Information papers published between 1920-2023 focusing on Army warrant officers. The total data corpus, including primary and secondary sources, exceeds 110. These sources enabled me to identify formal and informal activities that have changed the warrant officer program and understand the history of influences on warrant officer occupational identity.

To delve deeper, I began a mixed methods study using chronological mapping (Sheridan, Chamberlain, & Dupuis, 2011) and thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) techniques to examine the most critical activities from the data. These activities included constative (Austin, 1975) statements, e.g., definitions and descriptions, and performative (Austin, 1975) statements, such as legislation, that made changes but required additional actions to meet the intent.

Thematic Analysis and Chronological Mapping Data

I organized more than 80 summaries, purposes, definitions, and actions chronologically in MS Word. I coded segments of the chronologically arranged constative and performative statements and, after review, sorted the segments into three categories: Personnel Management (PM), Utilization (UT), and Professional Development (PD). After iterative inspection and sorting, I had 73 PM, 47 UT, and 42 PD segments. PM and UT-coded segments dated from 1920; however, PD segments did not occur until the 1960s.

Next, I mapped coded text chronologically from 1920 to 2023 in an MS Excel workbook. I identified and traced recurring themes within each category. Additionally, I identified occurrences in which activity in one category seemed to affect another. Afterward, I tabulated categorical coding quantities, plotted coding instances vs. time (see Figure 1) and performed a simple correlation test in MS Excel (see Table 1).




Figure 1 - WO Personnel Management, Utilization, and Development Activities (1920-2023)

	PM	UT	PD
PM	1		
UT	0.799	1	
PD	0.751	0.414	1

Table 1 - Correlation Coefficients Among PM, UI, and PD

Discussion

The frequency of Personnel Management activity over time showed maxima around 1939, 1992, and 2002, coinciding with the War Department General Staff Study, the Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan (WOLDAP), and The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Phase III – Warrant Officer Study Final Report, respectively. Utilization peaked in 1985, coinciding with the Total Warrant Officer Study (TWOS), and in 2002, with the ATLDP. The maxima for Professional Development occurred in 1992, 2002, and 2012, coinciding with the WOLDAP, the ATLDP, and the Warrant Officer Continuum of Learning Study (WOCLS). These broad data suggest PM, UT, or both precede Professional Development.

Warrant officer utilization evolved from the “primary purpose of rendering...more economical and efficient the administration of the larger tactical units in the field...” (Secretary of War Baker (1920) in Policy and Historical Branch, Adjutant General’s Office, 1943). Title 10 US Code (1925) authorized “...not more than 600 warrant officers, including band leaders” (War Department, 1926), which increased to 1120, all of whom were to be assigned “...where most needed...” (War Department, 1926). However, by 1938, “...growing doubt...” (Policy and Historical Branch, Adjutant General’s Office, 1943) about effective WO use led the Chief of Staff of the Army to order a study. The study revealed that “well qualified...electricians, pharmacists, mechanics, meteorologists, etc...” (Policy and Historical Branch, Adjutant General’s Office, 1943) were required to have clerical experience before assignment to other technical positions. Ultimately, the researchers recommended that “duties and functions of a technical character” (Policy and Historical Branch, Adjutant General’s Office, 1943), instead of clerical work, were how warrant officers were best utilized. Subsequent changes included specific technical functionalization (MOS), grouping MOSs by branch, assignment by MOS and grade, and proponents aligning duties with grade continually to optimize the effectiveness and adaptability of warrant officer support to the Army mission.

Overall, the most crucial data was a 1953-1957 DA study of the WO program and the subsequent decision by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Maxwell Taylor, that deemed Warrant Officers were “functional” (DA, 1977) and distinct from a “reward or incentive for enlisted...” (DA, 1977). This distinction occurred approximately 18 years after the War Department G-1 study recommending “duties and functions of a technical character” (Policy and Historical Branch, Adjutant General’s Office, 1943) for warrant officers and 16 years after Secretary of War Henry Stimson emphasized to the 77th Congress a “...real military need...for...administrative and technical personnel... with qualifications and responsibilities similar to...commissioned officers, but not burdened with the responsibilities which accompany...command...” (US Government, 1941). Taylor’s decision clarified what warrant officers were not, enabled practicality, and

set the stage for a more streamlined development, institutionally and operationally. This distinction was reinforced in policy several years later in the DA Circular No. 611-7 Personnel Selection and Classification (1960) by Deputy Chief of Staff and Personnel, LTG James Collins. “Those who cannot be retrained” (Collins, 1960) – presumably personnel who were rewarded with the rank of WO – would be attrited through retirement. Collins also acknowledged “...the problem of generalist versus the specialist” (Collins, 1960) in officer development and that warrant officers solved a problem for positions “...too specialized...” (Collins, 1960) for commissioned officers. However, Taylor’s and Collins’ focus was broadened by the publication of the 1966 Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools, Vol. II, which aimed to examine “...education and training available...as part of...career development and utilization...” (DA Board to Review Army Officer Schools, 1966). Although the stated purpose of the study was clear, one summary statement highlighted a career development that was “...individualized based on background, experience and education...” (DA Board to Review Army Officer Schools, 1966), which was a commentary on program disorganization. Additionally, three of seven summary statements focused on assignment limitation, availability of non-technical schools, assisting the transition from enlisted, and officership (DA Board to Review Army Officer Schools, 1966). This slightly critical, off-task summary foreshadowed decades of tension along the specialist-generalist continuum in Army warrant officer utilization and education by Army leaders, advisers, and decision-makers who sought to use warrant officers in inconsistent ways. Some of these inconsistent ways follow:

- The WOLDAP recommended that “...warrant officers must understand their roles and fully participate in the leadership process” (DA, 1992)
- DA Pam 350-58 Leader Development for America’s Army explained leadership development for warrant officers meant “...more responsibility as Army officers, trainers, leaders, and technicians.” (DA, 1994)
- Rand Corporation published the Future Career Management Systems for US Military Officers study that recommended the unified use of Warrant Officers among all services in billets that “exercise...technical skills” and “...do not follow...officer career patterns...” (Rand Corporation, 1994)
- The Warrant Officer Personnel Management System XXI: Final Report (WOPMS XXI) advised readers that the definition, roles, and responsibilities of warrant officers “...are not universally well understood by commissioned officer supervisors...” (Army Development System XXI Task Force, 2001) and mitigation of that confusion recommended “...including warrant officer professional development requirements...” in the DA Pamphlet 600-3 and expanding instruction about warrant officers to officers

- The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Phase III – Warrant Officer Study Final Report (US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, 2002) advised that Warrant Officers should be “...integrated into the officer corps to eliminate the perceived separation between WOs and commissioned officers and create a unified structure.”
- The Congressional Budget Office advocated for expanded warrant officer roles to use the rank to “...assist in meeting...personnel needs” (Fernandez, 2002) The “...first step towards the full integration of warrant officer recruiting, accession, education and management into the... larger officer corps...” (HQDA DAPE-HRPD-IRPD, 2004) occurred on 9 JUL 2004 through the change to warrant officer battle and dress uniform semiotics to wear branch colors and insignia.
- The next step, the “Integration of warrant officers (sic) into the Regular Army” (DA, 2006), occurred on MAY 1, 2005, when HRC integrated policy and procedures for warrant officers into the Commissioned Officer Corps.
- The Warrant Officer Continuum of Learning Study (WOCLS) advocated for “expanded roles and responsibilities” (Lamphear et al., 2012) while arguing that PME was “underdeveloped.”
- The Army Warrant Officer 2025 Strategy advocated for “...technologically agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders - trusted professionals - who will maintain capability overmatch and effectively manage logistical demands...” (DA, 2016).
- USACAC reduced the Warrant Officer Advanced Course common core pre-requisite course from over 80 hours to 18 hours after the publication of FM 3-0, Operations, in 2017

In summary, the collective historical priority of the cohort seems to have migrated from the warrant officer specialty roles to a broader officer framework while implying the need for both warrant officers and officers to understand this shifting warrant officer role better. Additionally, this observation pointed toward the second most significant change, or perhaps the least significant change, integrating warrant officers into the officer cohort. Full integration may have been an oversimplified expression that assumed a conclusion and had no evidence of a plan with a discernible outcome and Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound goals. Arguably, integration is not full or getting fuller and has neither created a unified structure nor reduced perceived separation. Additionally, integration may have come from multiple well-intentioned positions, for example, the desire for uniformity among officers and value on the education that is required of commissioned officers; however, integration, assimilation, unification, and reduced separation are social goals that distract and delay technical focus, which is what the Army may need most.

Second Interlude Summary

This historical review focused on the Army's increasingly adaptive and efficient management, development, and utilization of Warrant Officers by matching skills to needs. However, the study highlighted also revealed evidence of decades-long tension along a specialist-generalist tension.

Additionally, although the methods of this study were qualitative, a simple correlation test suggested a weaker correlation between utilization/development than between management/utilization and management/development. The discussion section highlighted how the focus in Warrant Officer management has possibly migrated from specialist to generalist themes and suggests an improved focus on the technical needs of warrant officers to support the Army. However, the tide may have turned in 2017.

Finally, returning to the initial premise of advising the Commandant, United States Army Warrant Officer Career College to understand "...Warrant Officer identity better to know if Warrant Officers will be the "technologically agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders" envisioned by General Milley and Acting Secretary of the Army Murphy in The Army Warrant Officer 2025 Strategy (2016)" (Houser, 2023) I present the preceding evidence about formal, institutional, contextual factors, e.g., personnel management, utilization, and professional development, and their interactions that influence occupational identity as a necessary step to advise the following.

Occupational Identity Clarity

Skorikov and Vondracek (2011) identified individual and contextual activities, experiences, and factors, such as work experience, quality of work environment, apprenticeships, and job shadowing, that contribute to occupational identity formation. These domains are not required, formulaic, sequentially ordered, or perhaps comprehensive with emergent post-COVID political, social, and economic situations; however, for warrant officer occupational identity, these domains also have been shaped by the past century plus of recorded and traced warrant officer history.

Skorikov and Vondracek (2011) identified other specific factors of interest, including the worker's family and peers. These factors point toward informal, non-institutional points for greater exploration during accession and initial military training, especially peers and peer groups. These relations may be what the Army can leverage to foster greater agility, adaptivity, and innovation in warrant officers. Although sociologists studied the officer corps'

“...newcomer socialization... internal dynamics... individual’s relations with the group...” (Caforio, 2018), these points have not been sufficiently studied among Warrant Officers.

Speculating using UT, PM, and PD from this study, as well as activities, experiences, and factors presented by Skorikov and Vondracek, warrant officer stakeholders from Army Senior Leaders to individuals may consider the following “intervention” (2011) strategies to foster technologically agile, adaptive, and innovative warrant officer occupational identity:

- Contemporary practices to ensure they are technologically adept and ready to adapt to evolving job requirements. <<Intellect>> Focused Isolation with Purpose: Implement short periods of focused isolation in which warrant officers and warrant officer candidates are grouped away from their regular work environments. During this time, they can engage in immersive training, workshops, and discussions about the expectations of being a warrant officer. <<Character, Presence>>
- Specialized Education Programs: Develop specialized programs focusing on theoretical knowledge and practical skills needed for their specific roles. Integrate advanced technologies and Collective Training Exercises: Organize collaborative training exercises that simulate real-world scenarios warrant officers may encounter. Encourage collaboration, teamwork, and problem-solving skills while emphasizing integrating modern technologies, data literacy, and adaptive strategies to tackle complex challenges effectively. <<Leadership, Achieve>>
- Mentorship and Peer Support Programs: Establish mentorship programs where experienced warrant officers guide and support the development of junior warrant officers and warrant officer candidates. Peer support networks within the warrant officer cohort can help individuals navigate challenges, share experiences, and build a collective sense of occupational identity within the cohort. <<Develop>>
- Interactive Workshops and Seminars: Conduct interactive workshops and seminars on emerging technologies, evolving tactics, and leadership strategies. Encourage active participation and discussions to ignite innovative thinking. Provide exposure to industry experts and thought leaders to broaden their perspectives. <<Develop>>
- Warrant officer social organizations, such as USAWOA and AAAA, adopting and advertising these concepts

These intervention strategies build upon the USAWOCC IMT and PME “mixer” environment at the Warrant Officer Career College that leverages peer learning and Project Athena’s constant career-long feedback. Additionally, these strategies are prioritized to move along the order of the Army Leadership Requirements Model from Character to Achieves while ending with Develop, i.e., the responsibility of sharing information and experiences. In summary, these activities are senior and junior warrant officers mentoring each other.

The Search Continues

What must follow is a cross-sectional study of warrant officers to examine “orientations toward work,” including intrinsic or extrinsic motivation in addition to the perception of warrant officer status and work as either job, social ladder, calling, or career (Skorikov & Vondracek, 2011). These orientations are the content of essentialist identity status. Additionally, this study would need to draw upon the framework of the past 123 years of Personnel Management, Utilization, and Professional Development, that is, how the Army treats, uses, and trains warrant officers, individually and socially, to clarify if any of the interventions seem more promising or necessary than others.

Finally, my advising to the commandant echoes CSA, General Taylor: Warrant officers are distinct from commissioned officers. Parallel, distinct management of all cohorts – Officer, Warrant officer, Enlisted, Civilian – is needed for each cohort to achieve optimal utilization. Subsequently, distinct professional development is required for each cohort to achieve optimal utilization. Individual, by-MOS, by-branch, and summative results from a cross-sectional study would likely reinforce or refute these premises—analysis of personal experiences and perceptions a next step in this search.

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Big heroes can come in tiny packages: Recollections of Sharon Swartworth, a five-foot-two giant.

CW5(Retired) Jim Steddum

In 2013, I had the honor of authoring an article for the Warrant Officers Association’s Newsliner about a remembrance ceremony held at the Warrant Officer Career College honoring Chief Warrant Officer Five (CW5) Sharon Therese Swartworth in the tenth year following her tragic death (Steddum, 2013). CW5 Swartworth was the 6th Chief Warrant Officer of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAG CWOC), the first female CW5 in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, and the most highly decorated warrant officer in the Regiment (Borch, 2020). Tragically, CW5 Swartworth died by enemy fire along with Regimental Sergeant Major Cornell Gilmore and four aircrew members from the 5th Battalion, 101st Aviation Brigade while flying near Tikrit, Iraq, on November 7, 2003 (GlobalSecurity.org, 2003). The remembrance ceremony was as somber as the day I learned she died; I remember both vividly. The difference



Fig 1 CW5 Sharon T. Swartworth

was the feeling of honor and pride of knowing her versus the pain and grief in the days and months after her death. Now, in the twentieth year, we still remember—we will never forget.

As officers and noncommissioned officers age, few still serving knew her or Sergeant Major Cornell Gilmore. However, her legacy lives on through “Lore of the Corps” and named buildings, rooms, and awards. Retirees that aspire to reach her level of character, competence, and commitment continue her legacy by sharing their stories about her. She “made friends and brightened the lives of everyone she met” (Wigglesworth, 2013). Based on an interview with CW5(ret) Ron Prescott, the 11th JAG CWOC, I realized I was the last JAG CWOC to have served as a warrant officer with CW5 Swartworth (Prescott, 2023).

Recollections of Sharon’s Career

CW2 Donnie Hughes was tasked to travel to Salt Lake City and meet with CW3 Mitch Ford from the Army JAG School and Specialist 6 Sharon Mayo to create a 30-hour criminal law and law office management training for U.S. Army Reserve Legal Administrators.

When I got there on Sunday afternoon, I met Sharon and Mitch. He said, ‘Congrats, you two must put together a 30-hour block of instruction for reserve JA warrant officers.’ I looked at Sharon, and she looked at me and said, ‘Let’s get it done!’ We stayed until almost four in the morning, xeroxing information and preparing to teach. The course went great and finished on Friday afternoon—we celebrated. It was a great introduction to Sharon and her truly professional work ethic! She did not hesitate to get it done. Later, when we worked at the Pentagon together, we would run to the Capital or the US Supreme Court. She always said, ‘Come on, Donnie, you can make it!’ I used to be a marathon runner, yet I found myself trying to keep up with her. I mean, seriously, Sharon slid into home plate at the first Legal Administrator softball game in Charlottesville. I had to find some salve from my wife so Sharon could put it on her hip (Hughes, 2023).

CW5(ret) Charlie Hooah Poulton first met Specialist 6 Mayo while on temporary duty as an instructor at the first Judge Advocate Warrant Officer Basic Course at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, in 1983. She was a new legal clerk, having reclassified from personnel specialist in 1982. She was eager to become a warrant officer and wanted to receive guidance from CW2 Poulton. He was in



Fig 2 CW5 Poulton and CW5 Swartworth

the middle of a long run when she pulled up next to him in a Corvette and asked to talk with him. He said he had five more miles, and she was welcome to join him. She pulled over and ran the remainder of the five miles as they discussed what she would need to do to become a warrant officer (Poulton, 2023).

CW5(ret) Roger Schill first met Sergeant First Class Sharon T. Mayo, US Army Reserve, when she attended a legal clerk training course hosted by the US Military Academy Staff Judge Advocate to educate legal clerks on the changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice of 1984. As a young CW2, Roger Schill recognized her “outstanding” work during the course and the “bright future ahead of her in the JAG Corps” (Schill, 2023). The Judge Advocate General appointed SFC Sharon Mayo as a Chief Warrant Officer Two in June 1985 (Carter, Judge Advocate Warrant Officer Chronicles, Volume I, 2018). Roger goes on to say:

Soldier, Mentor, Mother, Innovator, Friend, and Pioneer. These are but a few titles that come to mind when I think of CW5 Sharon Swartworth. She was all of those and much more. She was a shining light that illuminated the path that led the Judge Advocate General’s Corps Warrant Officers to become force multipliers and experts in automation and technology that supported garrison operations and extended to the ever-evolving battlefield. She fought the budget battles

at the highest levels to ensure funds were available to train JAG Corps Warrant Officers and ensure they remained technically proficient. Sharon loved the Army and particularly her JAG Corps Brothers and Sisters. She spent her last hours with those brothers and sisters while visiting in a hostile fire environment (Schill, 2023). Both Roger Schill and Charlie Poulton are Vietnam veterans and best of friends and neighbors to this day. They both mentored and looked out for Sharon throughout her career.

CW2 Sharon Mayo served as a Training, Advising, and Counseling Officer at Fort McCoy between 1985 and 1987. The Deputy Commandant during her assignment was CW5 Al Flores. CW4 Charlie Poulton worked for CW5 Flores when Charlie was the Commander of the 2nd Warrant Officer Company (now Headquarters and Headquarters Company, US Army Warrant Officer Career College). CW5 Flores told Charlie that CW2 Mayo was “the best he had ever seen” (Poulton, 2023).

CW4 Joe Ecozque was the first JAG CWOC. He served in this position from 1987 to 1990. Joe remembers meeting Sharon at the first Legal Administrator conference in San Rafael, California, in 1988. She was a USAR Legal Administrator and wanted to go on to Active Duty. Joe remembers her as “engaged, interactive, and she asked good questions and brought up good points” (Ecozque, 2023). And despite creating some “Lore of the Corps” while in San Rafael, CW2 Swartworth converted from the US Army Reserve to the Regular Army with the help of the 2nd JAG CWOC, CW3 Luther Runyon, in 1991 (Runyon, 2019).

Sharon married Captain (Dr.) William J. Swartworth, MD, US Navy, on Valentine’s Day in 1990 in Fairfax, Virginia. Soon after, she worked for the Legal Assistance Task Force/Operation Desert Storm, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Pentagon. After an assignment at the Presidio of Monterrey, California, she returned to Northern Virginia for several assignments, including her last as the Chief Warrant Officer of the JAG Corps, Headquarters, Department of the Army that began in 1999.

In addition, with her vibrant personality and tenaciousness, she inspired key Warrant Officers across all branches to embrace a united voice. This comprehensive, collective endeavor facilitated an unprecedented charter of the former Warrant Officer Leader Development Council (TJAGLCS, 2004). CW5 Swartworth spearheaded an educational redesign for Legal Administrators attending their Warrant Officer Basic and Advanced Courses by blending attorneys and paralegals into the courses. She furthered the effort to build cohesive leadership by advocating the “Foundation of




Fig 3 CW2 Swartworth, TAC Officer

Four” concept within the legal community. This initiative placed a leadership and management emphasis on the Legal Administrator without degrading legal technology services (Stedum, 2013).

CW5(ret) Michael Lanoue remembers Sharon as a “Soldier First” and always scored “300, or more, on all of her PT tests” (Lanoue, 2023). CW5 Lanoue offered CW3 Swartworth the position of running the Office of the Judge Advocate General, Information Technology Department. She told Michael that she did not know if she could do it. “Knowing Sharon as I did, I told her that she would be great at the job and that anything she didn’t know, she would learn,” Michael recalls. He said she forged relationships in the legal information technology industry that still exists today (Lanoue, 2023)!

Chief Warrant Officer Five Scott Higdon, the 9th JAG CWOC, recounted:

During our basic course, we rode in an SUV from Charlottesville to DC for her to show us around the leadership of the JAG Corps and expose us to a part of the leadership we had yet to see. It was a great introduction to our new leadership role. She also spearheaded the effort to have the legal administrators certified by hosting a Microsoft boot camp in Charlottesville. That created a solid foundation for us in managing our offices and paid huge dividends throughout our careers. It opened different areas of expertise we could apply to our offices. During that time, it was critical, as the current Army IT infrastructure needed to be there. A lot fell to individual offices to plan, execute, and maintain the computer systems at each SJA office. She created a position for me to work at the US Army Recruiting Office as a Warrant Officer Recruiter for the Army. This position soon became the branch manager and boards manager for all Officer/Warrant Officers ‘off the street’ and in-service accession boards. Because of her efforts, I was the first and only JAG Warrant Officer to have held this position. This could not have happened without her influence and leadership (Higdon, CW5(ret), 9th JAG CWOC, 2023).

CW5 Richard Johnson served as the 8th JAG CWOC. When Sharon died, he served as the senior Legal Administrator of TJAG’s Legal Center and School (currently known as the Command Chief Warrant Officer, TJAGLCS). Staff Sergeant Johnson first worked with Sharon while CW3 Swartworth was the Director of Legal Automation Army Wide Systems (LAAWS), US Army Legal Services Agency, Ballston, Virginia. SSG Johnson was planning to ETS, but Sharon convinced him to apply for Warrant Officer despite others opining he was too junior. Rick eventually succeeded Sharon at LAAWS and eventually as a JAG CWOC. Rick recounts:

Sharon Challenged everyone to exceed standards, and it was not a cliché. I recall so many leaders that made decisions on improving the JAGC and the Army, but very few of the entire scope of what that meant. Sharon invested in training when the JAGC was pivoting to support the IT role that Legal Administrators assumed. Ironically, there was pushback. Some believe we should stay focused on office administration. I recall many strategic goals during the annual leadership offsites that had no chance of success. I cannot recall one that the Legal Administrators did not meet because of her planning, investment in training, and knowledge sharing. Why is this so important? Just think about the customer we support and the expectations that are set so high. I do not know if lawyers know how intimidating and humbling it is to work for them. Sharon knew this from her experience in the private sector and during her role in such a critical time in our Nation. She was an individual that knew how powerful knowledge was through training and peer conferences. She set the tone of the JAGC's early path into knowledge management. No disrespect to my fellow legal administrators; no one had a greater impact on the JAGC and the future of warrant officers than Sharon Swartworth. Strength in knowledge and the application of it in the right moment with the right people was her gift (Johnson, 2023).

CW5 Tammy Richmond, 12th JAG CWOC, was inspired by CW5 Swartworth during an Article 6 inspection. Sharon recognized talent, visualized a career path, and that young soldier grew up to follow the path Sharon could see before we could even imagine it. CW5 Richmond recounts:

MSG Jeff Frantz, my CPNCO in Alaska, was the one that pushed me to be a LA. I was not interested at the time. During the Article 6 inspection, MSG Frantz had arranged, unknown to me, to have CW5 Swartworth talk to me—one of the best interactions ever. As a Specialist (E4), I knew she cared about the JAGC and the WO Corps, but I could also tell she cared about me and what I wanted to do. It was already within six months of packets being due, and I had started nothing, but she had me thinking I might be able to do the job. She was honest and told me she expected to see my packet that year. She also told me that I would not be selected. Her goal was to target younger enlisted Soldiers, and she wanted to get them in front of the board. She said I would not be as competitive in my first year because of my experience (an E4 with four years in service). She promised that my waivers would be approved and my packet would be boarded. Then, she talked to me about preparing for my second packet. I had not even decided on the first one, and she was already planning my path. She was an absolute force and knew how to inspire and motivate. My CPNCO made me

submit my packet that year. Sharon was right, and I was not selected the first time. I did not submit it in 2003 because I was due to give birth in November and did not think it was great timing. Sharon was killed in November 2003, and I submitted my second packet in 2004. It worked out just like she said it would (Richmond, 2023).

Author's Experience

CW4 Swartworth visited Tripler Army Medical Center office during an inspection under Article 6, Uniform Code of Military Justice, in 1998 when I was a Staff Sergeant. Lieutenant Colonel Rose Anderson, my officer-in-charge, began mentoring me toward the warrant officer path shortly after Sharon's visit. But it was Sharon's contagious energy and deep understanding of everything inspired me to consider becoming a warrant officer. I finally applied, and the JAG Corps selected me for candidacy in 2000.

As a young Chief Warrant Officer Two, serving as a proponent officer, I worked indirectly for CW5 Swartworth at the Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, Charlottesville, Virginia (with CW5 Rick Johnson). I vividly remember hearing that her black hawk was shot down near Tikrit on November 7, 2003. My colleagues and I waited impatiently for the official word, which did not come until late afternoon. We all went through the stages of grief—starting with denial and quickly escalating to anger. The loss of two senior leaders and their aircrew and the near loss of the entire JAG Corps foundation shook us to the core.

While attending the Warrant Officer Candidate School, I learned that my father was rapidly dying from cancer. My primary TAC Officer, CW3 Grant Haken, allowed me to talk with him over a government telephone in his final days. My father told me he wanted me to complete my training. I knew that if I left, I would not want to come back to training. When he passed, CW3 Haken strongly urged me to attend the funeral. I was not getting far in the argument to stay in training, so I asked the Fort Rucker Legal Administrator, CW2 Debbie Martin, to call CW5 Swartworth for help. Sharon did not hesitate. She called the Deputy Commandant and immediately flew to Fort Rucker to ensure I could stay in training. Then, she came back for the class reception and graduation. I remember my eight other JAG classmates and I had dinner with her the night before graduation. She was larger than life—we were all star-struck! Because of her action, I am now a [retired] warrant officer and proudly followed her as a CWOC.

CW5 Swartworth gave me a personal tour of the Pentagon about three weeks before she died. This was my last interaction with Sharon. I was extremely impressed by her knowledge of the history of "the building" and all the people she knew from every part of the Army and beyond. Her sadness about September 11, 2001, was humbling as she led me on a tour of the Pentagon and the 9/11 Memorial

Chapel. Reflecting on her post-9/11 memories, CW5 Swartworth said she was preparing to move the Office of The Judge Advocate General into a new space in the Pentagon. The Army G1, Lieutenant General Maude, decided to delay the move by two weeks just before the attack that destroyed the space she would occupy. Unfortunately, LTG Maude died in the attack. Sharon received an exception to policy to serve as the Casualty Affairs Officer for LTG Maude, a duty she served with great honor and humility (Swartworth, 2003). Before we concluded the tour, she picked up a pocket bible from the chapel and asked if I thought she should take it to Iraq. All I could say was, "It couldn't hurt."

CW5 Swartworth, CW5 Schill, and my JAG School colleague, CW3 Brian O'Rourke, traveled to Georgia about ten days before her death to interview Mr. Gerwig, a former Judge Advocate warrant officer who had the distinct honor of transcribing and preparing multiple copies of the surrender of the Japanese during World War II on the USS Missouri in the Philippines. The recorded oral history was one of the last records of CW5 Swartworth. Hopefully, it will find its way into this Journal in the future.

Even after eight years following her passing, CW5 Swartworth's accomplishments and implementations are still vital today. Her vision was remarkable and was matched only by her enthusiasm and ambition. From the day 17-year-old, Sharon Mayo's father signed her Army enlistment papers, whether the JAG Corps knew it or not, she was destined for greatness (Higdon, CW5, 9th JAG CWOC (2011-2015), 2004).

The Chaplain's Corps offered my Legal Center and School colleagues grief counseling after the news became official. However, The JAG Legal Center and School officers toasted her on November 10, the US Marine Corps birthday. We traveled to the nearest pub with our Marine counterparts and toasted the Corps and CW5 Sharon T. Swartworth, known for being both "pretty and pretty tough" (Patterson, 2003).

Few would have guessed in 1977, when she enlisted in the Army, that Sharon T. Swartworth would dramatically change the Army and profoundly improve her fellow Soldiers' lives. But those fooled by her demure physical stature (five feet, two inches), her girlish grin, or her easy laugh would be surprised by the toughness and tenacity that sprung from Sharon's giant heart. Rarely do we find people who love so fully and so well, their fellow man. Too often, these patriots are sacrificed to the cause of freedom. Sharon is no longer among us physically, but her spirit and example live and will inspire her family and friends to live as she did – as a perfect (Swartworth, 2003) patriot and noble friend (Higdon, CW5, 9th JAG CWOC (2011-2015), 2004).

Moving on Without Sharon

The Judge Advocate General appointed CW4 Carol Hauck as the 7th JAG CWOC a few months after

CW5 Swartworth died in 2004 (Foundation U. A., 2004). Replacing a senior and widely respected officer because of the tragedy was difficult, even without the voluminous changes in the Army, the transfer to the Officer Corps from the Warrant Officer Corps, and her family challenges. Carol recounted that:

I had only seen CW5 Swartworth at annual courses and had little personal interaction with her. However, Sharon did call me while I was A CW2 Hauck assigned to Fort Lewis. We discussed the need for more formal training warrant officers received compared to regular and senior noncommissioned officers. She said she would do all she could to ensure the Army increased training opportunities for warrant officers through military and civilian channels. She made good on that promise by creating the first Legal Administrator Advanced Course at the JAG School. She also provided the means for Army and US Marine Corps Legal Administrators to attend the professional association training conferences for s LawNet (now International Legal Technology Association) and the Association of Legal Administrators (ALA). She also secured authority for the first Legal Administrators to apply and receive degree completion opportunities. She was always there to listen and did her best to make positive changes for all warrant officers (Hauck, 2023).

On November 17, 2003, CW5 Sharon Swartworth became the first female laid to rest in Arlington National Cemetery from action in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Patterson, 2023). Along with many posthumous accolades, the U.S. Army Warrant Officer Career College, Fort Novosel, named the headquarters building for Sharon in 2004. The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, Charlottesville, Virginia, named a hall for her in 2011. She was inducted Order of the Eagle Rising Society in 2007 and the Army Women's Foundation Hall of Fame 2019 in Washington, DC (Foundation A. W., 2019).



Fig 3 Section 61, Arlington National Cemetery

As you can see, just by the stories of the JAG CWOCs that followed her, everyone that became a warrant officer during her career had been personally mentored or inspired by her to follow her path. Even the JAG CWOCs before Sharon aspire to reach her depth of character, competence, and commitment. This does not even explore the countless other warrant officers she inspired throughout the Warrant Officer Corps. Tenacious, visionary, and humble—we will always remember the unique path Sharon carved for all warrant officers with her steadfast commitment and her infectious smile and giggle. Always remember; We will never forget!

CW5 Sharon Swartworth 20-Year Tribute

The U.S. Army Warrant Officer Career College hosted a 20-Year Tribute in honor of CW5 Sharon Swartworth on November 6, 2023. Guest from the greater Fort Novosel community and as far away as Hawaii traveled to participated in the full day of activities honoring the namesake of the College's headquarters. Colonel Kevin McHugh hosted the events and Lieutenant General Stuart Risch (pictured top-center), The Judge Advocate General was the guest speaker. He and his Chief Warrant Officer of the JAG Corps, CW5 Tammy Richmond (pictured bottom-right), spoke about their experiences with Sharon, and the legacy she left. After a luncheon, Lieutenant General Risch helped the commandant place a wreath at her Shadow Box in Swartworth Hall. CW5 Charlie Poulton presented the College with a Yarbrough knife that Sharon, "fought tooth and nail to make sure that I was given this knife, #0211, upon retirement" (Poulton, 2023).



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Hypermedia Microlearning Hybrid Publications

CW4 Michael Franz



The Army should incorporate hypermedia microlearning in publications to facilitate technical skill maintenance, connect to new generations of Soldiers, and allow senior leaders to reference updated information. The world changes far faster than the Army can create manuals or instructions. Publications can only transmit a limited amount of nuance, limiting the degree of reader understanding. The Army can quickly transform written media into hybrid digitally augmented hypermedia by adding quick response (QR) codes in the margins of written material that can link to various digital content activities. Examples of the most effective augment materials include games, podcasts, short descriptions, and videos that further explain and explore the nuanced aspects of printed information. This type of augmentation is familiar and ubiquitous, but it has yet to be widely employed to explain Army skills. Implementing this technology offers excellent benefits, but it also has limitations on how the Army can apply the concept. Nevertheless, it is an overall easy supplement to existing Army educational products that have the potential to deepen technical understanding and skill development at the individual Soldier level.

In my current assignment, I am an officer course instructor at the U.S. Army School of Music (USASOM). This assignment is the first time I have had the opportunity to work on any training and doctrine throughout my career, having spent much of my career in division assignments. In my first year, I focused on deep diving into the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) culture and observing as much as possible to deepen my competence as an Army instructor. Part of this deep dive was watching an Army training circular (TC) refinement. I followed CW3 Kevin Pick, who worked in the USASOM Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) office, as he was working on precise language and image updates to TC1-19.10 Army Ceremonial Music Performance. Toward the end of my time observing CW3 Pick and his team, they asked if I had any input from an outsider's perspective. The writing seemed complicated and difficult to understand, even though the directions and images were thoughtful and precise. The content was also information I understood after having used the skills extensively over the last few decades. It would be so much easier to demonstrate the task they were working on than attempting to explain the job in a training document. We could add a QR code in the margin of the TC that links to a video demonstration of the task. Everyone agreed but pointed out that adding the QRs to the document would be a lengthy uphill effort. Hypermedia contains links to other media that can allow an end-user to interact and connect with concepts and media in a non-linear way. This path allows the consumer of that media to explore related content in a way they choose, allowing their thoughts to flow in a path that best suits their

learning style. “Hypermedia technologies support much richer user interfaces, more complex navigation mechanisms, and more varied forms of information than conventional systems” (Lang, 2004). The most compatible hypermedia mode of delivery for paper TCs are QR codes. These are also known as physical hyperlinks or hard links. Writers can easily place these codes within text or in the margins, and they can be as small as two square centimeters (Tarjan, Senk, Tegeltija, Stankovski, & Ostojic, 2014). The Army has already started using QR codes in a few different ways. One way is a QR code that can access Training Manuals (TMs) for vehicles allowing Soldiers increased access to the document for vehicle and equipment maintenance. These QR TMs need to meet the operational definition of hypermedia in the context of this recommendation, as they only connect to a single document. There is a moderate risk of the code getting smudge or damaged in a way that could misdirect or fail to direct, but it would not be critical to the overall document. QRs applied to Army publications should also serve a double role as a digital hyperlink when users access them in their digital format. This additional function can allow users to navigate between content mediums quickly. Unmonitored hyperlinking can result in chaotic structures, leading to problems such as straying too far from the hypermedia’s original intent or creating difficulty locating relevant information (Lang, 2004). The Army Publishing Directorate (APD) would be a good starting platform to serve as a repository for hypermedia-connected content within the Army system.

Microlearning is a technique that uses short bursts of information delivery to learners. Writers can break down large complex topics into smaller concepts in videos, podcasts, infographics, short articles, or games. Studies of microlearning indicate that short content formatted lessons may increase information retention by up to 20 percent (Giurgiu, 2017). Some studies have even demonstrated retention level increases of up to 150 percent (Capeda, 2009). This approach allows learners to access the content at their convenience, at the time and place of choosing. It also makes it easier for learners to fit study into busy and often conflicted schedules. The short and highly focused nature of microlearning modules also makes lessons more applicable to real-life situations at the exact time these lessons the learner needs them. The best application for this type of training is for procedural activities, new system operations, or reinforcing existing knowledge. Various versions of micro lessons are scattered throughout the Army and applied to various topics. For example, the Sabalauski Air Assault School produced the first one I can remember using as a series of short video demonstrations of the day zero obstacle course. Access to these videos enhanced my confidence before I attended the course and made it easier for me to navigate the obstacles when I confronted them in person.

The Army already employs various versions and degrees of hypermedia and microlearning concepts. The easiest way to direct broad implementation would be for centers of excellence to crowd-source and centrally control media input. Social contribution plays a crucial role in effec

tive organizational microlearning, allowing learners to be creators (Giurgiu, 2017). Every center of excellence has a group of dedicated professionals working in doctrine writing and development who can vet the accuracy and credibility of any sourced material. Doctrine writers also have the institutional knowledge required to ensure that the augmented material meets the criteria for approved doctrine. However, some publication subjects may need to be more familiar or complex to employ microlearning concepts. In these cases, it is best to train developers from the proponent centers of excellence or schools to create the microlearning modules. QR links to recommend changes, request additional information, and add lessons learned should also be placed on training manuals to facilitate more direct interaction between training and doctrine developers and the Soldiers who use their products to accomplish their missions.

Including this augmentation benefits three distinct types of Soldiers directly: new Soldiers, practicing professionals, and senior leaders. New Soldiers are already learning their life skills using this type of methodology. This slight change in how the Army publishes distributed training information will meet Soldiers' current understanding and culture of learning, significantly increasing the speed and depth they can learn and apply new skills. Practicing professionals can build increased depth, individual proficiency, and currency to their existing skills. This can be especially valuable to COMPO 2 and 3 Soldiers or Soldiers who may have taken a broadening assignment that would take them out of regular practice through performing typical duties. Breaking subjects into small and easily understandable pieces makes a skill easier to apply quickly and can increase the retention of that skill over a more extended period (Mohammed, Wakil, & Nawroly, 2018). Senior leaders have increasing workloads and responsibilities as they progress through their careers. This turns their time into an increasingly rare and valuable commodity. Microlearning modules can provide senior leaders the flexibility to learn skills precisely at the point of need as they have time available. This will be especially important as the Army continues emphasizing modernization for senior leaders to track and understand the rapid changes with an increased understanding of new concepts needed to make informed decisions.

Implications of this recommendation through the lens of the DOTMLPF-P framework:

Doctrine: This recommendation has the most implications for increased work for doctrine writers. Doctrine writers should pace input of hypermedia augmentation to occur during the normal doctrine review cycle to avoid overloading the doctrine writing and review process. The cost to apply this recommendation to doctrine will be minimal.

Organization: Individual Soldier skill proficiency is the foundation of collective organizational readiness. Adding microlearning options to augment existing products does not change the personnel construction of units, but it can increase the overall effectiveness of each Soldier within those organizations. This is an exponential force multiplier, even if at a marginal level of effectiveness.

Training: Soldiers will require minimal training to apply this recommendation. The benefits are most evident in this category. This concept will allow the Army to extend the benefits of institutional training geographically and temporally. Training is also amplified by allowing Soldiers to augment their training in a way that best matches how they learn most effectively at a time that fits their schedule or needs in the best way.

Material: While the Army does not need any new material to implement this concept, organizations may gain interest in procuring media production devices to generate more content. This can include cameras, video, audio recording devices, or even computer postproduction software. Quality matters in creating this type of content, but the immediate quality is unnecessary. The concept has room to grow over the next decade with a continuous improvement approach.

Leadership and Education: Microlearning applies to leadership and education similarly to how its application to training. This augmentation will give leaders access to content at the moment of need. This efficiency is critical due to constraints on time and competing interests. Senior leaders need to have learning options that allow for time flexibility to fit into schedules filled with emerging competing interests.

Personnel: This concept does not add or remove personnel from any formation, but it does have the potential to make each Soldier more effective by arranging information in a more meaningful and intuitive way.

Facilities: Current facilities should be able to manage the changes recommended, again with no proposed growth or divestiture. Organizations may construct media production rooms in their current facilities as with material. These are optional to begin applying this concept, but as demand for increased quality evolves, organizations may choose to dedicate such a space in the future.

Policy: This recommendation requires a minor policy change, encouraging the broad inclusion of QR links connecting publications with related content and microlearning supplements. Two Army programs of record are already in place to encourage this concept. First, APD can be a repository and standardization maintainer for written documents. The Combined Arms

Doctrine Directorate (CADD) can continue to hold relevant videos, podcasts, and other media.

Augmenting Army publications with hypermedia microlearning will modernize the way Soldiers learn, customizing approaches to keep pace with rapid advances in technological complexity. All this concept needs to become a reality is a group of champions to prioritize it. This recommendation aligns with Army Futures Command's overarching priorities of prioritizing people, designing Army 2040, and delivering Army 2030 with direct application to the future operational environment, research, concepts, experimentation, requirements, and integration (Vergun, n.d.). None of these concepts are new or untested. Any approach to modernization that focuses on the development of technology without including a plan to develop the human mind is akin to a golfer believing that they can improve their game simply by investing in new clubs. The use of hypermedia is ubiquitous, and its users well understand its benefits. The only actual cost of this recommendation is waiting too long to apply it to Army doctrine. There is no question that the Army will eventually find a way to incorporate this idea in an organized and controlled way. The only remaining question is how long is the Army willing to postpone maximizing the potential of their Soldiers?

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Army War College Opportunities for Warrant Officers

By Dr, Brian Davis, Ed.D., CW5 Nathan Dowling, and Mr. Jim Steddum

U.S. Army Warrant Officer Career College

Introduction

The U.S. Army War College offers an exciting and extremely useful opportunity through its Graduate Certificate Program (GCP) in National Security Studies (NSS). Developed in their School of Strategic Land Power and delivered through the Department of Distance Education, the program was created for U.S. government (USG) national security professionals. The program provides working professionals the flexibility to take online classes that help prepare them for future national security positions. Furthermore, it broadens students' understanding of contemporary national security topics and helps students improve the knowledge, skills, and attributes needed to be successful in these positions.

Three US Army Warrant Officer Career College (USAWOCC) Faculty and Staff members earned the graduate certificate in National Security Studies from the Army War College. The benefit of personnel in academic positions at USAWOCC cannot be overstated. However, the benefits of senior warrant officers taking these courses far exceed that of graduate certificates that cost thousands of dollars in out-of-pocket tuition, tuition assistance, or GI Bill benefit. The topics are completely relevant to leading organizations, and the methods of instruction are fantastic.

An Example of the Personal Benefits from a Warrant Officer

Note: CW5 Nathan Dowling, the Warrant Officer Career College Academic Research Chair for the Department of Strategy and Doctrine, was only the second person from USAWOCC to complete the field of study. He is an Intelligence Warrant Officer, is experienced in the fields of doctrine and strategy at the National level.

Professional Military Education (PME) is a lie, you are never done. You may have exhausted the standard schools, but there are more. Promotion board Memorandums of Instruction have board members look for records that have a pattern of continuous education. The graduate certificate in National Security Studies (NSS) is a great way to show members of the board you are still developing and learning. Every nine weeks for the better part of a year and a half you finish a course, culminating in the comprehensive certificate. I finished the entire program just before the board met and selected me for CW5.

Anicdotally, it is easier to converse with regular officers from O4 to O6 since they all had to attend something similar or the same program. Whether they went to the Naval War College or the Army War College it is a shared experience of lots of reading and lots of writing, for a year and a half, whether it be resident or via distance learning (DL) on your off time. During the course you get to see a wide swath of perspectives and views from both Army personnel and other interagency students.

I thought, prior to attending this course, I had mastered the subjects of doctrine and strategy. This program elevated my comprehension of doctrine and strategy to new levels. Two classes elevated my understanding: Critical Thinking and Argumentation and Introduction to Strategic Culture. The Critical Thinking and Argumentation course showed me the wide swath of argumentative techniques that demonstrated both the strengths and weaknesses of any individual argumentative approach. In turn, I can propose ideas with increased speed and more easily identify flawed arguments. The Introduction to Strategic Culture class was fascinating. This dive into strategic culture helped me lens, with increasing accuracy how other nations think and behave in a stark contrast to our own United States based strategic culture.

Another Perspective from a Retired CW5 / Army Civilian Instructor

Note: Mr. Jim Steddum, the Subject Matter Expert for Communication and Management Systems, Department of Leadership and Management. He was a Legal Administrator in the Judge Advocate Branch and has Army Staff experience in the fields of Legal Operations, Knowledge Management, and Force Management.

When I retired in 2019 as a CW5 working in the Pentagon with a master in business administration, I was positive that I would never go back to school again. A little more than a year later, I find myself as an Army Civilian teaching Warrant Officers at all levels of PME. When I was approached by Dr. Davis, Director, Academic Operations, about this opportunity, I put off the idea of enrolling. About 18 months after beginning as an instructor, I decided I wanted to find better ways to teach. The Army War College curriculum had two lessons that caught my eye. I took Critical Thinking and Argumentation as my first class. Nathan was also taking it as his third class. The level of instruction was even better than the content itself. Not only did I learn from the course outcomes—I learned better ways of teaching using the outcomes. I was hooked. The Art and Science of Effective Communication class was equally enlightening. Many of the methods and lessons taught in this course have been incorporated into the Warrant Officer Senior Service Education course capstone event to include the AWC rubrics and peer review instructions. My elective course was Leader Resiliency. I am not one that bought into the “touchy-feely” individual resilience that the Army has incorporated into mandatory training. This class, however, was my favorite. It is

about recognizing organizational adversity as an opportunity and adapting positively for a net increase in learning and performance. In my mind, this is what Warrant Officers do every day.

I was lucky enough to attend the Army War College's resident Senior Leader Seminar as a CW5. It was by the best educational experience of my military career. But it was too close to the end of my career to make an impact. The NSS Certificate program, although DL, remains the best institutional education experience in my life. And they treat me as an alum just as if I graduated from the resident course. Dr. Brain Davis will always be USAWOCC's first graduate of the NSS graduate program, I remain thankful for him for taking us on this journey.

Program Details

Applicants must be United States federal employees (civilian or military) and possess a bachelor's degree to enroll in the program. Applicants in a grade equivalent to GS 12-14 and Service Members that are O4-5, CW3-5, and E8-9 are given preference. Others may apply if the Admissions Committee determines that they serve in a mid-grade national security position and space is available.

Students must complete four eight-week "core" courses (2 credits each) and one 2-credit hour elective course chosen from various disciplines within three years. Elective courses allow students to choose an area that interests them and advances their professional knowledge on a specific topic. The instructional modality is distance learning, and courses can be a mix of asynchronous and synchronous delivery. The courses reinforce each other but remain independent to be taken in any sequence. Students can enroll in the program intending to take one course or complete all courses to earn the Graduate Certificate in NSS.

The required Core Classes are as follows:

- Art and Science of Effective Communication
- Critical Thinking & Argumentation
- Introduction to Defense Strategy
- Contemporary Security Issues
- The Elective Classes are from the following current offerings:
- China: The Dragon Awakes
- Leader Resilience
- Asia-Pacific-China War Strategy 1941-45
- Cyber Operations

Students are expected to dedicate an average of 8-12 hours per week towards studies while courses are in session. This may vary weekly based on course material and faculty instructor expectations, but each course requires about 90 hours of total student effort in eight weeks. Course requirements typically include assigned readings, online blogs and journals, short papers, quizzes, video presentations, asynchronous group projects, and occasional synchronous classes. Faculty assess students on their ability to achieve course learning outcomes and provide graded feedback for specific requirements that enable students to demonstrate an understanding of course concepts.

If you want to apply to this broadening opportunity, you may apply directly to the U. S. Army War College at <https://ssl.armywarcollege.edu/dde/gcp.cfm>. These classes support faculty development and lifelong learning. They fill up quickly, so feel free to if the opportunity above supports your learning, current position, and organizational improvement.

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Alternate Afghanistan – A Case Study for Small COIN

CW4 Patrick Schron

Policy and Strategy Paper



This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. — President John F. Kennedy

Introduction

This paper will examine the Afghanistan conflict as a case study for the use of small-scale, Special Operations Forces-centric counterinsurgency. It will do this through a review of the principles of irregular warfare in general, the sub-set of counterinsurgency in detail, and posit the challenges it causes to established warfare United States doctrine. The research will further investigate what effective counterinsurgency planning looks like and the factors that impact success. It will also consider the framework of both large and small-scale counterinsurgency as well as the advantages, disadvantages, and risks of both doctrines. The study will culminate in a look at the events and policy decisions that conspired to eventually end the Afghan campaign in failure, and make the argument for the SOF-centric strategy in the Afghan conflict.

Framing the Problem

Irregular warfare is a type of military conflict characterized by non-linear tactics, strategies, and organizations, often characterized as asymmetric warfare, gray-zone operations, or hybrid warfare. These conflicts are becoming far more prominent in today's world, as technology narrows the capability gap between weaker actors and stronger powers begin to consider traditional warfare to be too costly in both financial resources and human lives. However, as Vacca and Dickson note:

The term “irregular warfare” reinforces a false and dangerous divide in how war is thought about and planned for. The strategic aim of war, the use of force to compel others to our will, is the same. Tactical concepts, including the use of cover and concealment, local concentrations of force, and the avoidance of decisive engagements, are the same. It is only the peculiar tactical systems which vary, and which may be asymmetric (Vacca, Dickson, 2011).

At its core, irregular warfare deliberately seeks to take advantage of the vulnerabilities of an adversary by determining its weak points and exploiting them, often using innovative methods and tactics that traditional military doctrine cannot easily counter. These unconventional forces generally show a far lower threshold of violence and a general disregard for the recognized rules of warfare. They often use targeted killings, assassination, sabotage, and kidnappings to sow fear in the population and disrupt their enemy's operations. For the most part, an insurgency is a type of decentralized conflict comprised of small, independent bands of fighters that can quickly deploy and take the fight to the enemy on their terms. Insurgents often rely on surprise and stealth, intelligence gathering and careful planning to maximize their advantage, using the terrain to their advantage, and using ambushes and raids where the enemy is less likely to expect them. Beyond the tactical level, insurgents leverage loose legal constraints, porous borders, closed cultures, and unregulated domains such as social media to project their political will and influence.

Counterinsurgency is a messy proposition

Counterinsurgency, like its overarching doctrine of irregular warfare, is challenging to define as it is often a mix of geographically dispersed belligerents consisting of varying fractions such as insurgents, gangs, terrorists, and other local actors who remain largely ungoverned. Unlike the nation-state conflict of traditional warfare, the complexity of counterinsurgency is largely derived from the ambiguous conditions that include a populous that is the center of gravity, vague and ill-defined belligerents, nebulous political intent, unclear strategic endstates, and a very fluid battlespace.

The principal difficulty with counterinsurgency lies within its decentralized nature, often resulting in a flurry of operations ranging from macro-level strategic engagements down to localized subversive tactics. Conventional militaries are often confounded by insurgent tactics using sabotage, assassination, and harassing attacks, as well as the employment of weapons like improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers. When countered inappropriately, counterinsurgency becomes a force multiplier for the insurgent as it amplifies the negative effects of traditional tactics, hindering potential politico-military mechanisms meant to slow their progress. Will Cory frames the problem through Gen McChrystal's counterinsurgency or COIN Mathematics:

Let us say that there are 10 insurgents in a certain area. Following a military operation, two are killed. How many insurgents are left? Traditional mathematics would say that eight would be left, but there may only be two, because six of the living eight may have said 'This business of insurgency is becoming dangerous, so I am going to do something else.' There are more likely to be as many as 20, because each one you killed has a brother, father, son and friends, who do not necessarily

think that they were killed because they were doing something wrong (Cory, 2020).

Counterinsurgency operations are almost always a prolonged engagement and require very well-defined parameters of what success looks like, as it is virtually impossible to overcome and remove all insurgents. While the insurgent does not suffer from the need for a well-defined endstate, they do require a well-defined cause. David Galula notes, "A successful insurgency requires a viable cause to rally support. If the demands of an insurgent can be met through state action (without undermining its own authority), the insurgent is deprived of his/her cause." (Galula, 2006). Fully understood, the counterinsurgent can set conditions to degrade or eliminate the circumstances on which the insurgent's cause is built, potentially obtaining victory solely through this premise.

What does success look like?

Success in counterinsurgency is defined from the perspective of each entity involved, whether it be a state at war or individual ideological groups in opposition to a state. While ambiguous in definition, success for the counterinsurgent should be established early by clearly defined objectives emphasized by foreign policy formed from the national interests of the counterinsurgent. Additionally, there must be a delineation between the strategic and tactical goals, thus ensuring an understanding of the difference between the campaign writ large and individual engagements. Tactical goals focus on internal security, target the sources of insurgency, and counter foreign and domestic influences promoting unrest and civil disorder. The strategic goals emphasize removing the elements contributing to the conflict, whether through military response, diplomatic engagement, or economic sanction.

Factors that impact success in counterinsurgency include diplomatic exchange, working through partner countries to build relationships, promoting development in the conflict region, a conclusive strategy with attainable goals, a communication strategy that marginalizes the insurgent's cause, and a legal framework that criminalizes the insurgent's behaviors and reduces material and financial support. These factors are supported or augmented by economic and material aid, specifically targeted at the affected local communities to develop infrastructure, promote growth, and stabilize the populace in an effort to derail insurgent influence. These actions are messaged through media and information operations to counter the insurgent narrative, create grass-root support for the government, and further marginalize the insurgent cause. Intelligence and targeted operations, and the degree with which the impact on the populace help guide the counterinsurgency campaign while minimizing collateral damage and civilian injuries to maintain support.

America's counterinsurgency amnesia problem

History repeatedly demonstrates that the U.S. military routinely moves away from conflict that does fit within the traditional forms of warfare and has difficulty learning and remembering the hard-bought lessons learned of asymmetrical conflicts. While its convincing record of conventional conflict is intimidating, the United States repeatedly exhibited an inability to enter irregular warfare with any degree of institutional knowledge to enable success. In short, the U.S. military suffers from Irregular Warfare Amnesia. As such, the consequences of Vietnam and its disconnected aftereffects were a leading cause of failures in both Iraq and Afghanistan as conventional forces struggled to understand and respond to insurgent attacks.

The root cause of the problem lies in a combination of factors. To begin with, the U.S. military is built around traditional, large-scale operations that prioritize expanding combat power and establishing a dominant presence on the battlefield. As a result, the U.S. military developed a culture predicated on this traditional approach, leaving little room and flexibility to adjust and adapt to newer forms of conflict rapidly. Furthermore, the U.S. military generally focuses on short-term planning and immediate goals rather than long-term objectives and comprehensive strategies. This mindset can prevent leaders from adjusting their strategies, resulting in a situation in which old lessons are forgotten, and new ones must be relearned at the beginning of conflicts that do not naturally conform to expected conflict.

To further compound this issue at the tactical edge, institutional inertia within the U.S. military makes it difficult to change how it operates, particularly given the bureaucratic structure of its military institutional process. While there have been attempts to reform and modernize these military organizations over the years, their inherently entrenched bureaucracy tends to be highly resistant to change and reluctant to learn from previous conflicts. In addition, the predominant U.S. military strategic culture is based around large-scale combat operations and that becomes a stumbling block to adopting a more comprehensive approach to modern combat in which irregular warfare is disaggregated. As the Department of Defense becomes more focused on quantitative measures of success within shorter degrees of time and space, there becomes a perceived need to emphasize short-term results at the expense of more comprehensive strategies required for the extended timelines of irregular warfare exemplified by COIN.

The American Way of War

The issues with the United States military's reversion to previous traditional warfare practices can prospectively be captured as "the American Way of War," also known as AWW. A very broad label, the AWW has been the subject of no small amount of scrutiny over the years, particularly since the end of the Cold War. As a military doctrine, it has been a powerful and successful strategy in conventional warfare, having its roots in the revolutionary war and developed over centuries under the guidance of founding fathers and military leaders. The American Way of War principally relies upon the effective use of firepower, maneuver, surprise and superior speed to achieve victory. In large conventional wars, the AWW has been extremely successful in achieving strategic objectives, as seen during the "Shock and Awe" of Desert Storm and, more recently, in the blitzkrieg armored invasion of Iraq. However, in recent years there is increasing criticism that the doctrine fails to account for the forms of more non-traditional conflict derived from irregular warfare and is therefore ill-suited for asymmetric conflicts.

As a form of irregular warfare, insurgencies do not conform to a linear battlefield and feature non-state actors such as proxies, surrogates, terrorists, and criminal organizations. In such conflicts, power is seldom equal, and success is often determined by the ability of the less powerful to outwit or neutralize the more powerful. History demonstrates the AWW, which emphasizes the use of superior firepower and technology to overwhelm the enemy, is not suitable as a successful frame work within an irregular warfare battlespace.

By its very nature, the AWW is highly specialized and requires a great degree of individual training as well as specific equipment, which is focused on an established set of warfighting functions that are oriented on set-piece battle. The strategy of overwhelming firepower is exceptionally effective in large-scale combat operations, but it is insufficiently tailored to confront a highly mobile, indeterminate, and unknown enemy that understands the vulnerabilities of U.S. doctrine and does not follow the law of armed conflict. Compounding these problems, as the U.S. military has regularly found to be true, using superior firepower (lethal or non-lethal) against insurgents quickly aggravates local populations, leading to increased insurgent recruitment and further emboldening the enemy to greater acts of violence.

Furthermore, the AWW relies heavily upon the mass deployment of troops, vessels, and aircraft to achieve victory and sustain overmatch upon enemy forces. However, during counterinsurgency operations, these large troop concentrations located on Forward Operations Bases become focal points for insurgents, making them vulnerable to attack by indirect fire and ambush points along the main lines of travel in and out. Lastly, and quite possibly the most critical factor the AWW does not properly account for during

irregular warfare efforts is the emphasis on the importance of public opinion throughout the battlespace. While battlefield success and defeats are clear-cut in the traditional framework of conventional conflict, those clearly defined, quantifiable results become uncertain and ambiguous during irregular warfare. Non-traditional battles often take place in the social, political, and psychological realms, where success depends on the opinions of the local and domestic population at times exceeding the tangible effects of conflict. As such, the AWW often fails to recognize this importance, fails to account for the enemy's narrative, and often wins the battle while losing the war.

Big COIN versus Small COIN

Since before Vietnam, the U.S. military doctrinal approach to counterinsurgency focusing around an enemy-centric strategy that is a direct derivative of the American Way of War. This principal views COIN as a variant of its conventional warfare dynamics centered on a contest against an organized enemy and its ultimate defeat defined as mission success. The U.S. version of the doctrine is based on many of the same principles found in its traditional combat dogma and plays to its strengths without considering the inherent weaknesses of the approach. A successful COIN strategy instead should avoid being linear. To this point, Tom Brouns suggests, "focus on two dimensions: Actions (use of physical force vs. political or moral actions) and Targets (active insurgents vs insurgent support). This perspective divides the space of possible counterinsurgency efforts into four quadrants, suggesting that effective counterinsurgency campaigns find a balance of effort across the four quadrants that is well matched to the specific context" (Brouns, 2006).

A successful Counterinsurgency strategy must be tied to selecting the correct approach, matching a force composition and capability that enhances this methodology, support it with appropriate resources nested within synchronized tactical and operational executions that consider the popular and domestic support. While there are numerous methods of counterinsurgency strategy, the current American doctrine for COIN can be primarily broken into two forms – the direct approach, commonly referred to as Big COIN, and the indirect approach or Small COIN.

The conventional force "population-centric" approach is a misleading label, as most counterinsurgency strategies now follow the tenets outlined by Galula and identify the population as the center of gravity of the campaign. The Big COIN direct approach came into being following the release of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 (MCTP3-02B) and began implementation in Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States and its allies late in 2009. This approach focuses on the insurgent's people, particularly those living in the hostile environment, and seeks to protect civilians, reduce their support for the insurgency, and build their loyalty to the government. This methodology also includes using a variety

of nation-building measures, including reconstruction efforts, economic development, disarmament of insurgents, and training of security forces, implying the attempt to win the “hearts and minds” of the population. Security needs to be provided and offered to the local population while, at the same time, the government needs to be transparent and accountable. This approach sees the population as a resource and an instrument to achieve success over insurgents.

Small COIN or indirect approach, favored by SOF for its small footprint and use of surrogate forces, assists host nations in defeating an insurgency by relying on indigenous forces that have a vested interest in their country’s security. While this approach uses many of the same elements of a population-centric methodology, it puts the host nation at the forefront of the COIN effort as opposed to the doctrine used in Afghanistan, which required enormous foreign military support. This form of COIN heavily leverages the *By* (operations executed *By* surrogates or partners), *With* (resourced and supported *With* U.S. means), and *Through* (enabled *Through* authorities and permissions) operational approach. A senior special operations officer offers, “Our nation’s, our coalition’s, and our Afghan partner’s shared counterinsurgency experience in Afghanistan was an incredibly complex endeavor. One of my key takeaway impressions from my tours in Afghanistan is that counterinsurgency efforts generally focused on controlling a population with centuries of experience in resisting superiorly-equipped powers does not reap the same return as focusing on influencing the same populace through buy-in and genuine partnership. Despite intentions otherwise, appearing as an occupying power most likely provided vital fuel for adversarial narratives and drew external support.”

Direct approach counterinsurgency, not unlike its traditional combat structure, relies heavily on the overwhelming strength of ground forces, supported by robust logistics and enabler formations to provide security and take on large portions of both military and civilian tasks for the foreign population. While built to support developing government and military components, there remains a foreign face to the endeavor and an unavoidable dependency on that U.S. support structure as there is no forcing function for host nation forces to take over the fight. This inevitably transitions into difficulties for the host nation to build legitimacy with the population the counterinsurgency force is protecting.

Counterinsurgency is a complex and challenging strategy that involves the careful application of a range of military, political, economic, social, and information operations to undermine, degrade, and defeat an insurgent enemy. Indirect or SOF-based counterinsurgency is an attractive alternative, focusing on smaller forces than traditional counterinsurgency tactics, allowing forces to use fewer resources yet remain effective in specific contexts. The key argument for small COIN is the ability to more efficiently target areas of potential unrest and engage with them with tailored and better-resourced operations. Using smaller, more agile forces enabled by Special Operations Forces allows for greater adaptability and customization, allowing for

better target selection and focus as compared to more traditional forces. On the operational side, smaller forces are better suited to operating in small villages or regions with specific issues, as they can more quickly respond to situations as they develop and maintain a good understanding of the local situation with less effort. Furthermore, small forces are generally less expensive to deploy and maintain, allowing for more efficient and economical operations.

At the strategic level, SOF, especially U.S. Army Special Forces, are useful in leveraging local networks for intelligence and information gathering, given their ability to better integrate into operational environments and engage with local populations. This is particularly useful in counterinsurgency, as intelligence networks established on the ground are critical for successful operations, and these elements are well-positioned to identify areas of potential unrest or terrorist support. Small COIN operations also create less of a footprint, allowing counterinsurgency forces to often act more discreetly and avoid potential escalation of large-scale military operations as insurgent patrons through external support mechanisms are more likely to intervene against the threat of large conventional forces staged in an adjacent country.

The decreased visibility of SOF-led operations often results in a better public image for indigenous counterinsurgency forces, as they assume ownership of the operation and do not overtly conflict with civilian nationalism. These forces' small-scale and discreet nature also allows them to build closer relationships with local populations, ultimately leading to greater compliance and support. This can be especially important during post-conflict stabilization operations, or "transition," as good relationships with local populations and stakeholders can easily make the difference between success and failure.

No single approach to counterinsurgency is perfect, and both of these approaches have their advantages and disadvantages depending on the specific situation, how they are employed, and many other factors. Overall, the big COIN approach attempts to swiftly and permanently end the threat of violence and chaos by deploying military forces in overwhelming strength. This method may have the advantage of being more decisive, but it is also inefficient and costly both in terms of financial expenditures, potential civilian casualties, and host nation hostility. In contrast, small counterinsurgency operations employ incremental tactics and focus on generating greater stability and unity among the local population, reducing the need for large-scale deployments. Although this approach may take longer than the direct counterinsurgency approach, its goals are often more attainable and involve far less risk.

Afghanistan: The Argument for Small COIN

Coalition efforts in Afghanistan provides a case study where Small COIN would provide a more efficient and less resource intensive means to counter-insurgency. Not unlike the Vietnam War, the two-decade long conflict in Afghanistan was the unintended consequence of a series of failures to understand the dynamics of the ethnic, social and political structure in and around the battlespace. The U.S.-led conflict in Afghanistan also demonstrated that is often the case in an insurgency, the weak do not win, they only have to wait for the strong to lose. It also reveals a continued core problem of the American Way of War with regards to anything outside traditional nation-state warfare – an “over-militarization” of United States foreign policy.

What Happened and where it went wrong

In the years following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. campaign plan in Afghanistan underwent a significant shift in focus from a Special Operations Forces-based operations to a conventional force structure focused more on counterterrorism than counterinsurgency. While initially viewed as a positive move by many in the U.S. Administration, this shift ultimately proved ineffective and, in many ways, exacerbated the security situation in the country. For the entirety of its involvement in the conflict, the United States never fully understood or accounted for the Afghan Way of War. Even as a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine came into use, the Americans could never fully separate themselves from their big COIN philosophy. To understand the series of mistakes made, one needs to look back to the first months of the campaign while U.S. Army Special Forces and CIA operatives were pushing the Taliban toward collapse.

With the fall of Kabul in November 2001 and the virtual collapse of combat efforts in the north, the Taliban abandoned their hold on the country, and the end of their self-described emirate began as Mullah Omar fled from Kandahar to Pakistan. The Northern Alliance victory should have led to conditions signaling success as a new government formed in Bonn, Germany. Unfortunately, events would eclipse these events and set conditions for two decades of subsequent warfare.

Had the United States entered the fight better prepared to understand the Afghan Way of War, they would have been prepared to immediately integrate the thousands of Taliban that ceased fighting and were openly willing to swear fealty to the winning side. These fighters were nearly all Pashtun, and while they had tried to kill him just before the invasion and assassinated his father, Hamid Karzai professed them to be “my brothers.” Following the Taliban’s swift and sudden collapse, Karzai made it known he would not have them punished, allow them to resettle in the communities, and help them reunify with family living in Pakistan. Karzai understood that “in seeking

to negotiate, they were recognizing the authority of their new leader, Hamid Karzai, who shared their Islamic identity and possessed traditional legitimacy, both as a Southern Pashtun aristocrat from the Popalzai tribe and by virtue of his consensual endorsement by loya jirga in Bonn” (Greentree, 2021).

While Westerners could not understand his reconciliation, this stance exemplified the Afghan Way of War and the pragmatic approach the culture holds to politics and power distribution. What Karzai understood and could not articulate to his Western partners was that this would not only pacify dissident Taliban, but it would also separate them from Pakistani patrons and bring them into the fold of his leadership, ultimately stabilizing Afghanistan. Additionally, once reintegrated into the social fabric and dispersed to their local communities, the new government would need a minimal security apparatus to ensure their loyalty. Even if the more staunch Taliban leaders remained in Pakistan under the auspice of the Inter-Service Intelligence, the bulk of the opposition would become a part of the general populace and have a place within its government.

The pivotal point came in December 2001 when Karzai backed an effort to invite Taliban representatives to the Bonn conference to discuss their reintegration. The Bush administration and members of the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance vetoed this proposal. “Seasoned U.N. negotiator Lakhdar Brahimi would later call this act the “original sin.” U.S. leaders were simply unprepared to comprehend how magnanimity after victory could be the best way to terminate the war and bring order to Afghanistan. Instead, the CIA and special operations forces and willing Afghan partners set about killing or capturing the Taliban, thus provoking an insurgency where none had existed” (Greentree, 2021).

This represents a clear case where Westerners approach solutions and make decisions based on a skewed optic tailored to their view without accounting for ethnic differences. Many speculate that had this proposal been allowed and Karzai allowed to follow his plan, a completely different series of events would have transpired, potentially negating decades of needless conflict. A better understanding of the ethnic, religious, and cultural differences would have noted that al-Qaeda remained the enemy, not the defeated Taliban, who were prepared to become part of the greater populace.

Enter the American Way of War (Big COIN)

The initial campaign culminated in December 2001 with the capture of Mazar-e-Sharif, Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and SOF transitioned mainly into a counterterrorism fight to interdict enemy leadership and key elements. Subsequent conventional force package requirements called for three ground divisions of ground troops, supported by elements of another three divisions. As events transpired, an U.S. Army airborne brigade soon joined them. These units were ill-prepared for flourishing insurgency and were hard-pressed to develop coherent tactics until the

introduction of the populace-centric doctrine of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency in 2009. While this provided military leaders and decision-makers with policy and principles to work from, it was never as successful as envisioned. Former Special Operations Command – Central commander General Cleveland notes in his work on Afghanistan “conventional formations struggled to translate tactical successes into something more enduring in nearly every population-centric campaign in which I was involved. They brought tremendous capabilities to the fight, but their potency in orchestrating mass, maneuver, and fires was often of little direct relevance to the causes of the insurgencies and resistance movements they were fighting” (Cleveland, 2020).

Primarily envisioned by General Petraeus as a solution to the insurgency in Iraq, the new doctrine did not resonate in Afghanistan. One of the main reasons why big COIN did not work can be attributed to the fact that the project was too ambitious for a country like Afghanistan. The task of nation-building was intended to be done over decades, and even though the Afghan government supported the project and there was a massive infusion of money and resources, big COIN was implemented too quickly. Meant to be a quick, all-encompassing solution to a very complex problem, and it ultimately caused the sudden and dramatic collapse of the very system it was meant to enable. Far too centralized and authoritarian, the implementation was based on the idea of top-down control and failed to give local communities any role in the decision-making process. The lack of flexibility, combined with the absence of public consultation and input in the projects identified and executed, only exacerbated existing grievances and led to resentment among the local population. More importantly, big COIN emphasized using hard power to achieve its goals, further alienating the local population and many of the more moderate elements in the Afghan government. The heavy-handed approach meant that the project was unpopular from the start and failed to garner local support or trust. This highlights Schlenoff’s declaration that “while indiscriminate force may be tactically effective in the near-term, indiscriminate force alone does not produce long-term success” (Schlenoff, 2015).

The security meant to be focused on the population inappropriately focused on the well-established urban areas, but unlike Iraq, Afghanistan is rural, being an agricultural nation. The security was never able to permeate into the regions that needed it the most, and like the development projects and reforms, the vast portion of the population never reaped the intended benefits of the big COIN effort. As a result, many of these initiatives ended up being more of a burden on Afghanistan’s already-fragile systems and structures rather than a positive change for the country. Additionally, there remained a heavy counterterrorism drive that all but overshadowed the counterinsurgency mission. As Lamb and Martin observed, “One reason for the undue emphasis on direct action is that resources have been disproportionately allocated to targeting insurgent and terrorist leaders rather than to indirect SOF activities in support of counterinsurgency” (Lamb, Martin, 2010).

The most significant problem associated with the big COIN principle was time – the time required to change doctrine midstride of a burgeoning insurgency being addressed by the wrong approach. Watts, Polich, and Eaton note that most insurgencies typically last beyond ten years; however, foreign militaries generally intervene for substantially shorter periods. They note that the U.S. involvement in Vietnam lasted from 1965 to 1972, but America was looking for an exit after the Tet Offensive of February 1968, only three years after escalating its involvement. It sought to extricate itself from Iraq by 2007, less than four years after the invasion. “In the case of the large-scale French counterinsurgency in Algeria (1954–1962), many observers argue the war became unwinnable for France as a result of its widespread use of torture in the Battle of Algiers, which ended in 1957—3 years after the escalation of French involvement.

Similarly, India completely withdrew its forces from large-scale counterinsurgency operations in Sri Lanka within 3 years (1987–1990), and Israel withdrew the bulk of its forces from Lebanon in less than 2 years (1982–1983)” (Watts et al., 2015). Their work also demonstrates that conventional units had a substantial developmental time requirement to transition from a traditional combat mindset to an organized irregular warfare template. “On average, countries such as the United States have only 5 years (at best) to adapt to the requirements of large-scale irregular warfare abroad before they come under extraordinary political pressure to draw down their presence. Nevertheless, the United States recently required between 3½ and 4 years to adapt at least reasonably well to these sorts of contingencies. In other words, the United States was ill-adapted to the requirements of irregular warfare for—at a minimum— approximately two-thirds to four-fifths of the time that it has typically had to fight such wars on a large scale” (Watts et al., 2015).

These issues could have been mitigated over time and consideration, but when compounded by deep-seated corruption prevalent throughout the Afghan government, it became an insurmountable downward spiral. The transparency and accountability measures that should have been implemented as part of big COIN were not, and the lack of a strong state institution further hindered its progress. As a result, the funds and resources allocated to the Afghanreconstruction effort under the campaign plan were either misappropriated or not used as efficiently as they could have been.

The Case for Small COIN

Small COIN, or small-scale SOF counterinsurgency operations, focus on localized solutions to counter terrorism and insurgency at a more granular level instead of focusing on conventional approaches with massive ground force structure and the considerable basing requirements. The strategy was championed by former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and focused on aiding local Afghan communities in terms of economic aid, civil development projects, and providing

increased security and stability. The leading component commanders of their time, Generals Odierno and Amos, and Admiral McRaven supported this strategy in their action memorandum *Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills* by stating, “Small interdependent teams of conventional and special operations forces can build local forces capable of handling many situations that previously called for direct U.S. intervention while maintaining a low-cost, small footprint presence almost indefinitely.” The doctrine advocates for utilizing direct action missions such as raids and HUMINT gathering and providing tangible resources in the form of humanitarian aid and construction projects. Small COIN offers a more active role than the traditional methods used in Afghanistan, wherein combat forces pursued clear and hold operations with the intention of engaging in an immediate response against insurgent groups. Instead of relying on raw power, small COIN utilizes a more nuanced approach in order to gain control of disputed areas. The focus of this approach relies on hearing the concerns of the local population, understanding the causes of the insurgency, and by building relationships with local populations in order to harness their assistance in the mission. SOF specializes in this approach, forgoing the need for immense Forward Operating Bases, or FOBs, for the more connected relationship developed by living within the community with which they work.

These close relationships also provides a much-needed economic push towards stability in the region through agricultural projects and small business development projects coordinated by the SOF connection to supporting agencies. This economic support fuels the development of local economies while providing hope and opportunity to local populations and ultimately moving them away from insurgent influence as they become invested in their future. The economic fruit of this approach becomes evident in increased employment, education levels, and a greater sense of prosperity that transition into enhanced provincial revenue collections supporting the growth of governmental structures.

This approach better lends itself to the dispersed population density of a country like Afghanistan because it promotes the idea of a ‘bottom-up’ solution, focusing on the strategic mechanisms that support local stability. The mission can create more secure and prosperous communities by providing economic opportunities, enhancing community security, and building relationships between local populations and security forces. This bottom-up approach allows for a more granular approach to insurgency conflict by combining security with development to achieve more enduring gains. The opportunities provided by this approach allows the populace to play a more active role in the nation-building process, which helps build loyalty to the nation and reduces support for insurgents. Provided the time for these effects to mature, the small COIN approach very well could have worked towards an endstate where reconciliation and diplomacy were the driving forces for sustainable peace. This meant creating an environment where the insurgents and the Afghan government could engage in a dialogue to find common ground and

work towards a lasting resolution. Negotiations and incentive-based reconciliation programs, such as the reintegration of Taliban foot soldiers and local leaders, could have then been further implemented alongside the development of an effective and legitimate Afghan government. A small COIN approach was offered by SOF later on as “One of the most useful – and recent – models has been the development of Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police, indirect programs that supplement direct action and civilian efforts in Afghanistan. Their goals are to help Afghans stand up for themselves and re-empower their traditional institutions of security, economic development, and informal governance in step with Afghan history and culture. VSO and ALP are joint and interagency in nature” (Jones, 2012). However, this short-lived program was never given the adjacent resourcing it needed to fully meet the tenets of small COIN.

Time, Policy, and Politics

Hindsight demonstrates that the politics and policy surrounding the U.S. military operations within Afghanistan hindered the ability of the United States to successfully reach its goals due to various domestic and international considerations. Domestically, the American government struggled for national unity, as different views on the necessity of a presence in Afghanistan were split between Democrats and Republicans. While externally, the development of a unity government, or a suitable power-sharing arrangement between the Afghan government led by President Karzai and the various warlords and insurgents, proved incredibly difficult. As a result, the Afghan government lacked the power to enforce laws or enact necessary changes, and hence the U.S. military was forced to serve a policing role that it was not fully prepared for, leading to extended casualties and a breakdown in gains.

Lamb and Martin note, “Between late 2003 and early 2005, we were moving on the right path in Afghanistan. Under Ambassador [Zalmay] Khalilzad and Lieutenant General David Barno, the United States completely overhauled its strategy for Afghanistan. We abandoned a counterterrorism-based strategy that emphasized seeking out and attacking the enemy in favor of one that emphasized counterinsurgency and the protection of the population. All of this was overseen by an integrated civil-military command structure in which the Ambassador and the coalition commander worked in the same building from adjoining offices. The result was that, by late 2004, governance and reconstruction were improving. . . Rather than building on these gains, however, we squandered them. Beginning in 2005, our integrated civil-military command structure was disassembled and replaced by a balkanized and dysfunctional arrangement. The integrated counterinsurgency strategy was replaced by a patchwork of different strategies, depending on tAfghanistan. In a move that produced images he location and on which country’s troops were doing the fighting...” (Lamb, Martin, 2010).

Neither national-level figures nor field commanders fully understood the operational environment, including the human aspects of military operations. To fight war among the people, one must first understand them. We were not intellectually prepared for the unique aspects of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both conflicts, ethnic, religious, and cultural differences drove much of the fighting. Efforts to solve this problem— Human Terrain Teams and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program, for example— came too little and too late. Our intelligence system was of little help here primarily because the Intelligence Community did not see this as its mission (Hooker, 2015).

These elements only further contributed to the desire to extricate U.S. military presence from Afghanistan, regardless of the conditions set by years of operating without a well-defined exit strategy. The insurgents, understanding the weight of American public opinion on election cycles and used to fighting external powers for prolonged periods of attrition-based conflict, merely needed to wait out the impatient and ill-organized foreign invaders. Ultimately, in a move to gain statistical favorability points of public confidence, the Biden administration arbitrarily set the twentieth anniversary for the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from rivaling the last helicopters evacuating the U.S. embassy in Vietnam, the conflict concluded in failure.

Conclusions

The purpose of this study is not to argue the mistakes of the Afghanistan conflict nor the value of conventional military doctrine involved in counterinsurgency strategy. Rather, it seeks to express that, like irregular warfare, there are many approaches to counterinsurgency. This paper has examined the strategy and policy impacts on the Afghanistan counterinsurgency campaign, the failure of a large force-focused counterinsurgency doctrine and posits the alternative approach for the SOF-based small-scale counterinsurgency approach. There is no definitive “one size fits all” solution for counterinsurgency, but when proper analysis in the operational environment is made, some approaches have a higher probability of success. In the case of Afghanistan, the ultimate mistake was applying doctrine, policy, and politics built for Iraq in a country that, while Islamic, was not the same.

Ballow notes in his work that “we may be moving towards a new period of irregular warfare. This new period is defined by the importance of domestic and international opinion and characterized by the irregular’s ability to influence political and social change without taking up arms. In other words, public opinion and support has become a weapon for the weak to affect change. Therefore, future study and research should be dedicated to understanding how social movements intersect with irregular warfare, and how these movements begin and are sustained” (Ballow, 2016). Almost twenty years ago, Hoffman also noted that “Irregular warfare is a natural reaction to

globalization and America's overwhelming military superiority. Having raised its own way of war to its apotheosis, the United States has turned future opponents to alternative means that are purposely designed and deployed to thwart conventionally oriented Western societies" (Hoffman, 2006).

David Ucko makes a very compelling point on "why did counterinsurgency apparently work in Iraq and fail in Afghanistan? More fundamentally, what does this patchy track record say about counterinsurgency's credibility as a concept? These seemingly poignant questions belie a gross misunderstanding of counterinsurgency—one that explains the heated polemic that the term has provoked. Counterinsurgency offers a collection of insights and guidelines collected from past operations, which, if used and adapted in a manner sensitive to local context, can help in the design and execution of a specific campaign plan" (Ucko, 2019).

Even after twenty years of conflict in Afghanistan, a continued tenuous presence in Iraq, and SOF conducting daily counterterrorism operations around the world, the U.S. military is in danger of repeating the post-Vietnam mistake of believing that irregular warfare is the infrequent abnormality. struggle for great power competition remains an irregular warfare environment. While component service leadership sees this as a scenario where SOF is in the supporting role, it is a conflict in which they are already heavily engaged and succeeding across the world. "The U.S. Army can get as big and as powerful as it wants, but the scenarios and assumptions that inform thinking about the need for overmatch are unlikely to come to fruition. While achieving deterrence through overmatch may be useful in preventing the very conflict that it is preparing for, overmatch does nothing to change the everyday behavior of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation as they seek to expand their influence" (Ball, 2020). While there remains a predominant perception that special operations forces are solely focused on direct action and counterterrorism operations, the vast bulk of the force is engaged in working by, with, and through partner forces around the world. In a world of escalating tensions that lay just below the threshold of open conflict, these partnerships are the competition the United States denies its adversaries influence and potential allies.

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Editor's Note: CW4 Schron was the distinguished honor graduate of the Warrant Officer Senior Service Edition Course, Class 24-0001. His class selected his Capstone paper for publication. This paper is similar to his Capstone article but created for the completion of his Master's Degree.

Chickenhawk

Written by Robert M. Mason, Published by Penguin Books.

New York, NY, 1983. 496 pages.

A book review by Dr. George Wade, EdD.



Chickenhawk, Robert Mason's memoir of a Warrant Officer Pilot in Vietnam is worth reading, if for no other reason, for the descriptions of his experience flying during the 1965 Ia Drang Valley battle. The intensity of this action, especially through the eyes of a helicopter pilot, is sobering to consider even by a generation of pilots who have fought in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Beyond that the book is at once part technical description of flying helicopters, personal reflection on the meaning of the war in Vietnam, and jarring war stories, Chickenhawk repays reading with a glimpse into the world of a Warrant Officer aviator in war. These three themes are the backbone of the book. Reading this book is like having a wizened mentor tell you about how things really are.

Mason begins his work by confessing his ignorance about important aspects of Vietnam and its people. He was unaware of U.S. support of Ho Chi Minh against the Japanese in World War II, the first Indochina war, Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva Conference on 1956, or the corrupt south Vietnamese Diem regime back by the United States. What he did know was that he wanted to fly helicopters.

This contrasts sharply with the schematic presentation of a Bell UH-1 Iroquois helicopter commonly referred to as the "Huey." Of this, Mason is a subject matter expert befitting the role of Warrant Officers generally. Mason has a knack for making the complexities of flying helicopters seem natural. Anyone can understand descriptions such as "The fuselage of a helicopter in a hover is like a weight at the bottom of a pendulum, the top being where the mast joins the rotor hub" (Mason, 1983, p. 160). This is a good reason to read Mason. He relates how the limitations and capabilities of the aircraft are the "stuff" of true expertise because of the way pilots learn to use these to maximum advantage on a battlefield.

Mason, of course, was more than an Army Warrant Officer and pilot. He was a person with family, plans for the future, and fear. The Vietnam war threatened this future. Mason has several reflections on death in battle unique to flying. The bullet riddled canopy or fuselage, the feeling of absolute vulnerability in the cockpit of a machine meant to fly not stop bullets, the absurd finality of death in combat. Yet, this is done in service to other soldiers—who just as likely might get you killed through their own ignorance or oversight. His story of the infantryman who discharged an M79 grenade launcher inside his aircraft is a cautionary tale to aviators in all times. As Mason says, "never trust a grunt," in reference to yet another story of

botched landing directions from a soldier on the ground unable to use hand signals properly.

Military memoirs tend toward war stories and Mason's is no different. That should surprise no one since the war stories are instructive for others. Time and again in soldier memoirs, and again Mason's is no exception, there are stories which are difficult to believe. The behavior of soldiers in combat is a singular experience which cannot be duplicated in any other environment. It should also come as no surprise that extraordinary descriptions of chaos, violence, and death are entwined with observations about pilots going about their duty despite fear, anxiety, and uncertainty. Consider this description of flying wounded out of an engagement. "...so, I looked back to see the kid sitting on the bench next to the rushing wind. He made wide gestures with his arms, which I could see, but it was too dark to make out much else, His shadow arms were orchestrating a private nightmare. Make that three wounded and one loony on board" (Mason, 1983, p. 192).

If all of this seems paradoxical or contradictory, welcome to the world of a combat aviator in Vietnam. The name of the book does the best job of illuminating this paradox. It comes from a conversation with another aviator in which they contrast the feeling of fear with the feeling of confidence in their abilities. The fear is chicken, the confidence is hawk, therefore chickenhawk. These aviators created a type of culture from these experiences which might resonate with Army Warrant Officer pilots today.

This culture is defined by the unique privilege these aviators enjoyed by virtue of warrant officer rank. They were all intensely interested in flying. Helicopters comprised their entire purpose. All other purposes were irrelevant to them. In this they came to see themselves primarily as pilots whose rank carved out a space for them to continuously improve their skills. It also created an informality amongst the group which translated into a passing interest in military protocol of any type. Finally, it solidified a determination to conduct their missions in the most arduous of circumstances—circumstances which a rational person would probably not tolerate.

Mason's work then is a good example of the military memoir genre. It is honest, gritty, real, and authentic in ways that resonate with anyone who reads this book. It should be required reading for all new Army Warrant Officer pilots.


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Faculty Spotlight

CW3 Shanique Buckner, MA

CW3 Buckner served as a Senior Instructor/Writer for the Department of Leadership and Management at the United States Army Warrant Officer Career College with phenomenal impact throughout the institution. Shanique currently serves as the Deputy Quality Assurance Officer for the USAWOCC. In her new role, she is leading the FY24 USAWOCC Accreditation efforts, executed by the Training and Doctrine Command in support of the USAWOCC-managed Warrant Officer Candidate School, Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education, and Warrant Officer Senior Service Education Course.



Shanique was born and raised in Jamaica and continues her family lineage by serving as a Warrant Officer. CW3 Buckner has served in the Army for over 19 years. After an illustrious career as a Non-Commissioned Officer, CW3 Buckner identified that her sphere of influence and impact on the Fuel and Water Quartermaster Branch would be suited as a Petroleum Systems Technician (923A), serving as a 923A in multi-echelon commands in both garrison and combat operations. Shanique holds a Master of Arts in Management and Organizational Leadership and a Bachelor of Arts in Hospitality Management and Food Service from the American Public University. CW3 Buckner is an awardee of the Demonstrated Master Logistician, with several Faculty and Staff Development Courses and Fuel Certifications for fuel quality surveillance and quality assurance. CW3 Buckner served three tours in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, two tours in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, and one tour in support of Operation Spartan Shield.



Warrant Officers in History

CW4 Grayford C. Payne

*Editor's Note – The following was retrieved from the Ordnance Hall of Fame, <https://goordnance.army.mil/HalloOfFame/2010/2012/payne.html>.

Grayford Payne was born near Dallas, TX on 21 September 1919. He joined the New Mexico National Guard in 1939. In 1941, his unit, the 200th Coast Artillery (Anti-Aircraft), was deployed to Fort Stotsenburg in the Philippine Islands. After the landing of Japanese troops in the Philippine Islands, Payne conducted nighttime combat and scout missions behind Japanese lines in order to find artillery positions, troop concentrations and ammunition storage areas.

On the night of April 8, 1942, a Colonel greeted him and told him 'Lieutenant, we are preparing to surrender Bataan.

We have to get the wounded and whatever we can to

Corregidor. Your platoon is to hold the road at all cost, you will have to die on your guns. We have prepared you a fighting position to block the road, there is a column of Japanese tanks several miles down the road and infantry is breaking through trying to cut our retreat.' Payne took his remaining 14 soldiers and occupied their positions. Their next task was to collect large stones and bury them in the road. It was not long after they had buried the last stone that they heard, and then saw, a column of Japanese tanks on the jungle road. However, the sloppy job of 'mining' worked, the tanks stopped. Payne ordered his soldiers to shoot only a few rounds at the tank to keep the gunner inside the turret. This trick worked for over an hour. Finally, they saw the Japanese infantry crossing the road several hundred meters behind their position. Payne told his men he would try to surrender if possible, but he did not know if the Japanese would accept. For those who wished to escape in the jungle, he told them to do so now. All agreed they would stick together. CWO4 Payne got a white handkerchief, held it above his head and slowly climbed out to the trench. After clearing the 'mines', as the Japanese officer insisted, the remaining soldiers surrendered. April 9, 1942 was the beginning of 3 years, 5 months and 20 days in 5 Japanese POW camps, the Bataan Death March, a voyage on the 'Hell Ships' to Japan and internment as slave labor.

There are numerous stories of Payne's selflessness. When he could steal, he rarely kept anything for himself. Stolen food was to be used to nurse the sick back to health. The Japanese treatment of the sick was far worse than those prisoners who could work. In one of his most



memorable acts, he switched his uniform with another who had been seen stealing. During the ensuing muster, the Japanese guard could not confirm the identity of the man who wore the uniform of the soldier who stole the food. Ultimately, it resulted in the beating of the Japanese guard by a Japanese officer for his inability to confirm the identity of the thief. After the war, Payne was recognized by his fellow POWs for this specific act. They requested he be awarded the nation's highest medal, but it was determined that what he did was an act of humanitarianism, not valor.

After liberation and extended hospital stays in the United States, Payne applied as a Warrant Officer and was accepted as both a Maintenance and an Ammunition Warrant Officer. His battlefield commission, given to him before captivity, had been revoked due to a lack of documentation. Payne's next assignment was on the 2nd Army staff at FT Meade, MD.

Following duty in the Korean War, he was stationed in Germany, Sierra Army Depot, Okinawa, Japan, and Camp Darby, Italy. Payne deployed to Vietnam in 1966 and worked on the Ready Assist Teams as a part of the U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV). He traveled all over Vietnam assisting units in resolving various logistics issues ranging from accountability issues to determining why a howitzer had a pre-detonation in the breech to studying ammunition jamming in the M16 Rifle.

Upon retirement in 1968, an old POW friend, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson, called Payne and wished him well. Grayford Payne died on 1 May 1998.



Announcements and Administrative Notes

Call for Papers

Strength in Knowledge: The Warrant Officer Journal is maintained by the faculty and staff working at the United States Army Warrant Officer Career College (USAWOCC). The editorial staff produces the quarterly publication in effort to improve all areas of the Warrant Officer's education, whether common core or technical in nature. This resource is intended inform and shape organizational systems in the greater profession of arms through the sharing of key insights and lessons learned.

We continuously accept manuscripts for subsequent editions with editorial board evaluations held once a quarter. The journal invites practitioners, re-searchers, academics, PME students, and military profes-sionals to submit manuscripts that address the issues and challenges of military education and training, training development, doctrine (whether specific data from manuals or discussion of concepts), systems warfare, Army modernization and other subjects relevant to the profession of arms. Submissions related to technical areas of various Warrant Officers' specialties will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Book reviews of published relevant works are also encouraged.

Submission Guidelines

Submissions should be between 1,500 and 5,000 words and supported by research, evident through the citation of sources. Scholarship must conform to commonly accepted research standards such as described in *The Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association*, 7th edition. For resources on writing in approved APA format simply reach out to USAWOCC. Book reviews should be between 500 to 800 words and provide a concise evaluation of the book and its relevance to the professional Warrant Officer or current fight.

Submitted manuscripts in Microsoft Word, or compatible format, with separate picture files and a 100-150 word author's note by 15 November (Jan – Mar Publication), 15 February (Apr – June Publication), 15 May (July – Sep Publication), or 15 August (Oct– Dec Publication). For additional information, an email to wo_journal@army.mil.

Strength in Knowledge!



