

# Strength in Knowledge

The Warrant Officer Journal

October - December 2024

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# *Strength in Knowledge: The Warrant Officer Journal*

## **The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army Warrant Officer**

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:



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*General, United States Army*

*Chief of Staff*

Official:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mark F. Averill".

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2436100

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law. Funds for printing this publication were approved by the Secretary of the Army in accordance with the provisions of Army Regulation 25-30.

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
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# Commandant's Corner

**Colonel Kevin E. McHugh, Commandant, USAWOCC**

**“...that one thing.”**

Our Army stands ready for any contingency while it continues its essential transformation. The central idea of this transformation was captured in 2022 by then Commander of the Combined Arms Center, LTG Theodore Martin, in his video titled “The Army of 2030.” Almost three years later, the Army continues on its path toward a modernized force capable of winning in any environment through large-scale and multidomain operations. Still, under a new moniker, the “Army of the Future.” Regardless of the name or current status of modernization, there is one thing in our Army that will always ensure its continued success, and that one thing is you. If you are reading this introduction to another compilation of works by stewards of our profession, then I would say you, as many of us do, share a personal desire and drive for lifelong learning and continuous professional improvement. Whether Officer, Noncommissioned Officer, or Enlisted, your unsolicited drive for professional relevance and expertise through the knowledge gained by reading the works of others can only make you better. For the Warrant Officer Cohort, these readings, your contributions, and the professional discourse waged will make you better integrators, communicators, operators, leaders, and advisors for your commanders. As we aspire to be better in all we do, including the Army Profession, I would remind us of GEN Randy George’s (the current and 41st Chief of State of the Army) four focus areas, specifically his first, Warfighting. This transformation requires us to think differently about how we fight and win our Nation’s wars due to many factors, the most significant being the influence and speed of advancing technology. On today’s battlefield, we must be able to integrate our systems faster and execute our processes with more precision to enable more effective decision-making. Ultimately, this translates to our combat formations seizing the advantage and winning against any potential adversary. Professional Military Education (PME) is a critical part of this transformation, and it is also changing to assist us in understanding how we can think differently. New PME topics are being launched across all cohorts under the control of TRADOC, the Combined Arms Center, and Army University, and these topics include Data Literacy, Chemical Nuclear Integration, and Information Advantage, to name a few, all designed to shape our professional thoughts, discussions, and outcomes to influence and improve how we fight. Army Senior Leaders are actively influencing this change, as seen in GEN Gary M. Brito’s recent article titled, Data Literacy, How We Prepare for the Future, (January 2025), which describes how and why we must embrace data and information through a multidomain lens to decrease information clutter so Soldiers and leaders can use relevant information to make better decisions faster on a contested and often congested multidomain battlefield. It is an exciting time to be a part of this great Army and this profession. This brings me to the introduction of the following compilation of professional contributions assembled within Issue #4 of Volume 2 of the Warrant Officer Journal, Strength in Knowledge. Thanks to all the readers of this and other professional journals for being that one thing!



***Strength in Knowledge!***





# Deputy Commandant's Corner - Mentorship


## Part 3

### CW5 Stephen Napoli, Deputy Commandant, USAWOCC

The series of mentorship articles have been well-received, and I have appreciated the feedback. I am learning (and daresay “being mentored”) from leaders that have offered their own insights as supplements to the articles. It is fun to see leaders apply the CARE Model to things other than mentorship. By design, the Model can be applied to a variety of professions. CW2 Andrew Mauer posted a solid application of the Model on LinkedIn.com to being a Warrant Officer as he observed each component of the Model through a Warrant Officer’s lens.



As a reminder, the CARE Model was born from my poor answer to a good question about success. We should be so well-versed at being Credible, Approachable, & Relevant Everyday (CARE) that it is natural to apply its value to our lives (my biased opinion, of course). We all know people that are stellar at one component, but weak at the others. Of course, it is easier to preach it and teach it than it is to live it sometimes.



We have laid the foundation of mentorship in previous articles in *Strength in Knowledge*. To keep the momentum of the CARE Model’s application to mentorship, let’s attack the first component. To me, Credibility is the brain of the Model. It is where education, experience, discipline, and proof reside within the Model’s boundaries. We know people that we refer to as “the nicest (or any singular, good quality) person you would ever want to meet.” That is a great quality. However, that cannot be enough to be successful as a mentor or leader. The person must also be credible – in ways that can benefit a mentee. Unfortunately, your level of credibility is often determined by other people. In general, we cannot declare ourselves credible. Instead, it must be proven to be credible and endorsed by others.

What does being credible even mean? I am glad you asked. The Oxford English Dictionary highlights that the root word in Latin is “credibilis,” which means “to believe, confide, entrust.” When someone is credible, he or she is trustworthy and knowledgeable. It is even better when someone says that you are “incredible.” That word sounds like it would mean the opposite of credible (such as the relationship between “correct” and “incorrect”). Originally, it was indeed the opposite of credible. It evolved from “not believable or not trusted” to being “too extraordinary to be believed.” ADP 6-22 tells us, “Credibility of a person or organization may stem from their appearance, conduct, and reputation” (page 5-9). Those words are directly linked to other familiar terms: Character, Presence, Intellect, Leads, Develops, and Achieves.

The words we use and the way we use them can hurt credibility and a title or rank cannot heal it. There are myths (or practices) about mentorship credibility that work just enough in certain situations that they seem appropriate and useful. Every myth contradicts portions of, or all of, the Army Values as outlined in ADP 6-22. There are certainly other myths out there, but these are some of the more common ones:

**Credibility Myth #1** – Self-promotion ensures others know how credible you are: You know you are a solid performer, with vast amounts of education and experience. You know your job. You do your job very well. If those statements are true, other folks already know. Advertising your resume and how awesome you are is NOT part of maintaining credibility. I watched a senior aviator in a large meeting briefly provide his aviation resume so that others in the room knew he was amazing. He failed to realize that he was in the meeting to begin with because of his expertise. After a moment of awkward silence and a few eye rolls, the commander began discussing more important things than this person's awesomeness. That individual lost some credibility by deliberately trying to prove that he was credible. Set ego to the side. Being viewed as credible is not an event. It is a process. Information about the mentor will naturally surface during the mentorship process.

**Credibility Myth #2** – I can build my credibility by disrupting the credibility of others: We should be recognizing and advertising the excellent qualities of others. Sharing credit has tremendous benefits by building trust and stronger teams (ADP 6-22). How can you possibly be viewed as credible by tearing down a teammate or ignoring their value? That is not a good lesson for a mentee to observe in a mentor. Your credibility has nowhere to go but up when you edify others (with sincerity). When mentors devalue others for gain, mentors lose much more than credibility—they lose trust.

**Credibility Myth #3** – If I don't know, I had better say something that seems plausible: Fabricated answers that sound reasonable can be easily disproven if they are wrong. I had a Warrant Officer Candidate tell me that he appreciated when I answered a question with, "I don't know," during a mentorship session. That stuck with me, and it reminded me to not be afraid to admit a shortcoming. I did not lose credibility for not knowing the answer. Instead, I actually gained credibility and trust because I was simply honest. People know when mentors are generating an answer just to seem smart or credible. See Myth #1 and set ego to the side.

**Credibility Myth #4** – The credibility I currently possess is enough: I was at a division-level Quarterly Training Briefing (QTB). It was before the days of the ACFT when the APFT was the measure of fitness for Soldiers. The CSM made a point of highlighting how each battalion and company needs to improve their APFT scores. Of all the stats presented, that was the only area that held his attention. Why? Because he was an outstanding athlete and maintained high physical readiness himself. Fitness is certainly important for all warfighters. In reality, he was a stellar NCO; however, some saw him as a one-dimensional leader and mentor. Credible mentors are diversified investors in more than one stock.

**Credibility Myth #5** – Being credible is enough to be a successful mentor: It can be for short periods of time or in a singular area. Each component of the CARE Model overlaps for good reasons. It is not enough to be exclusively credible if you are avoiding the other components. Each component of the Model is directly and indirectly relationship based. Where you place your aiming reticle determines your value in the moment, as well as during the mentorship marathon.

When I first wrestled with the Model, I found that the first component must be credibility. As a mentor or leader, it has to be first because any further value is lost without it. Mentors without credibility are not mentors at all. They are lighthouses without a lightbulb. Taking the Model to the next component is directly linked to that first component. When we fail at the numerous credibility tests, folks will not seek us out. Therefore, we are no longer approachable. Therefore, we are no longer relevant. Next quarter we will explore the value of being Approachable as a mentor—or as a person, parent, professional, etc. depending on how you conceptualize and apply "approachability." Until then, consider your own credibility awareness as you lead and mentor others. I will do the same.

# Editor's Notes

## Jim Steddum, Managing Editor

The last issue of volume two marks two years of this evolving endeavor to share the talents, experiences, and wisdom of the Army warrant officer. Fully emerged in the spirit of the 41st Chief of Staff's Harding Project, the curricula of all common core Professional Military Education conducted at the Warrant Officer Career College contains opportunities for students at all levels to research professional journals and write with a view toward publication. This issue of Strength in Knowledge highlights that as early as 1941, warrant officers have been quietly "lurking" at the side of general officers, integrating their expertise and providing trusted advice.

Students and warrant officers from the "field" are keenly aware of the threats from the INDOPACOM area of operations as evidenced from the articles presented. Our writers also acknowledge the gaps in our systems, processes, and education in the homeland and its defenses including recruiting, retention, and morale.

As we roll into a new year and transition to a new Commander-in-Chief and civilian leadership, Strength in Knowledge hopes to continue to highlight discourse aiming to inform the Army, call to action the repair of systematic gaps in operational readiness, and better prepare the force to win wherever and whenever the fight takes place. Volume III will also focus on the identity of the warrant officer and their unique capacity to employ systems thinking.



# Beer and Skittles: Forrest Harding's Warrant Officer

**Jim Steddum, CW5 (ret) and Dr. Leonard Momeny, Ed.D., CW5 (ret)**

The Army is buzzing with talk about the Harding Project and greater professional discourse. Writing professionally—with candor no less, seems an odd thing in the Army, especially these days when most Soldiers, regardless of age, communicate in short bursts of words, memes, and emoticons. Chief of Staff of the Army Randy A. George, in large part through the efforts Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Griffiths, is signaling a paradigm shift in the Army's approach to professional discourse and lighting fire again across all the Journals of the Army.

This sort of change in professional discourse has been a long time coming for the Army. At the initial and subsequent Harding Project meetings over the past year, older members of the group continue to extol the present crowds about the history of their favorite publications. Embellished stories surrounding the past prominence of various Army journals are fond recollections about a print copy of the Infantry Journal, Military Review, or some other publication being their only companion at a duty desk.

However, things are a little different now. Technology is, of course, vastly different, but so are those that read and write. And yet, it is the history and stories of others that continue to fascinate so many of us. Many would doubt a Warrant Officer would be located at the nexus of major writing efforts in US Army history, especially given the excitement of the current Harding Project. With so many senior officers writing today, there hardly seems room for a Warrant Officer to consistently contribute to the greater discussion. After all, it is difficult to consider Warrant Officers diligent consumers of published media at all, at least outside of their venerable technical manuals. One would be hard-pressed to make a case for a Warrant Officer potentially holding together one of the US Army's greatest resurgences in professional writing.

If you are in camp with the previously described doubters of the Warrant Officer's contribution to the Army's historic publishing efforts, this article will soon settle those concerns. Warrant Officer's do not idly boast their value to their respective commanders, but instead ground their confidence in the foundation laid by our grand predecessors. Remember, history is always too good to be true, and especially when

Major General Forrest Harding talking with Soldier in New Guinea, 1941.

Private Kahn, Harding trusted Aide, picture under the handrail.





it involves a Warrant Officer. It is high time to relook the history of the Harding Project namesake, and the Warrant Officer at his side.

In 1934, Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Croft selected recent Army War College graduate, Major Forrest Harding, a 1909 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at Westpoint, to reinvigorate the Infantry Journal and influence creative writing [thinking] in the Army (Griffiths, 2024). In just two years, Lieutenant Colonel Harding doubled the circulation. Ninety years later, as Lieutenant Colonel Harding was rekindling the Infantry Journal (Kahn, 1942), the dominating powers in Europe and East Asia were also rekindling. The Army was integrating modern technology in the armor, cavalry, and infantry branches. Americans were surviving the middle of the Great Depression, and times were bleak for the country and the Army. But, through it all, the semi-official Infantry Journal served somewhat as the doctrine of the era at a mere \$3 for six issues, communicating the latest in professional happenings across the Army (Anders, 1976).

In New York, Ely Kahn, a young Jewish man was attending Harvard with aspirations of becoming a writer. Coming from an affluent, artistic family, he was not as severely impacted by the depression as most. By 1937, he joined the writing staff of The New Yorker. Compared to Infantry Journal, The New Yorker was both young and highly successful. But there is one thing that forever bonded the two—Ely Kahn’s selection for the Draft in July, 1941 (Kahn, 1942).

As the Nazi’s gained power in Europe and the Japanese continued their dominance in East Asia, Jack, as he was known at The New Yorker, was also gaining prominence. By 1941, Jack’s four years at the magazine saw him publish hundreds of weekly articles, and topics covered ranged from baseball to his personal interactions with kings of African states; suffice it to say he had become an expert in the field of writing and publishing. Luckily, for Kahn, his mastery of writing would not go unnoticed in the Army. What else can be said except that sometimes the Army gets talent management right.



Ely Jacques Kahn, Jr. 1941

After the brief stay at the reception center in New York, Kahn found himself on a train for what today we call Basic Combat Training at Camp Croft, South Carolina. Yes, that name should sound familiar. The camp was named after Major General Edwin Croft, the former Chief of the Infantry that selected the former Lieutenant Colonel Harding to the Infantry Journal. Private Ely Kahn was transferred to the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The division was only months old and was commanded by Major General Devers and Assistant Division Commander Brigadier General Harding, both from the USMA class of 1909. By the winter of 1942, Harding was promoted to Major General and given command of the 32d Infantry Division (Kahn, 1943a). Perhaps not ironically, Private Kahn transferred to the same Division. Indications are that Jack’s friends at The New Yorker convinced the Army to allow him to be a war correspondent as a Soldier (Weiss, 2005). Nevertheless, Jack’s connection with Harding was their mutual love of writing; Jack had earned Harding’s trust and Harding earned Jack’s loyalty.

Although Jack was assigned to Harding’s staff, he was still an Infantryman in the strongly contested battle for Buna, in Papau New Guinea in the South Pacific. After several frontal assaults, the Japanese held their positions. General Douglas MacArthur determined for victory, sent Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, another of Harding’s classmates to “[s]end Harding back, Bob. He has failed miserably,” and to “take Buna, or not come back alive” (Weiss, 2005). Unsurprisingly, Harding return to Australia

with Kahn and another aide prepared to defend their positions with MacArthur who did promise to keep the relief private.

Despite hard feelings for his classmate, Major General Harding was reassigned to the Canal and Antilles Zone with now Warrant Officer (Junior Grade) Kahn in tow (Weiss, 2005). Kahn continued writing segments for The New Yorker called “The Army Life” (Kahn, 1943b). Although Harding had somewhat resigned to fate and eventually retired in 1946, Warrant Officer Kahn defended his commander, mentor, and friend through writing (Weiss, 2005). Kahn wrote a two-part biography in The New Yorker profiling the “Two-Star General” and a sequel to his first several iterations of “Army Life” published by the Infantry Journal. The sequel, called G.I. Jungle (1943b) was critical of Eichelberger and MacArthur strategy in the South Pacific and perhaps gave too much credit to Harding. Eichelberger requested that the Army investigate Warrant Officer Kahn for insubordination in uniform; however, the most he might have received was a reprimand (Weiss, 2005). Warrant Officer Kahn returned the United States after about a year in the Canal Zone. He finished the war with Army Public Affairs. In all, he published thirty-nine articles about “Army Life” in both the New Yorker and in two books. He later was war correspondent for The New Yorker in the Korean War.

So, there you have it, a Warrant Officer and writer by the side of the namesake for the Army’s newest writing program. It would seem that a Warrant Officer is always lurking around every corner of the Army, from 1918 to the present, valiantly telling the story of their teammates and working to protect commanders, through good times and bad. A final truism regarding the Warrant Officer that lurks in history can be found in a forward written for Jack’s first book. In Warrant Officer Jack Kahn’s first book, *Army Life*, Major General E. Forrest Harding’s foreword sums the whole story by saying, “Army life, especially in wartime, is not all beer and skittles” (Kahn, 1942, p. ix). Readers, tell the Army story and continue to protect the commanders you so faithfully serve. Their history is our history, but no one will know if you do not write about it.

*Editors Note: Skittles in the 1930-40’s referred to a bar game similar to bowling, sometimes referred to as nine-pin.*

*Authors Note: Jim Steddum is a retired Chief Warrant Officer 5 and continues his service as the managing editor of Strength in Knowledge: The Warrant Officer Journal. Jim has represented the Warrant Officer in Harding Project working groups. He aims to develop professional writing in the Warrant Officer Cohort by integrating journal research and writing into the leadership and management curricula of warrant officer Professional Military Education. Jim’s accounting of the relationship of Major General Harding and Warrant Officer Kahn, as well as Kahn’s writing expertise, demonstrates the inseparable truth that warrant officers are destined to contribute to professional discourse. As the once labeled ‘Quiet Professional,’ this old warrant officer has never known that motto to be further from the truth.*

*Dr. Leonard Momeny is a retired Chief Warrant Officer 5 and continues to serve as an associate editor for Strength in Knowledge: The Warrant Officer Journal. Mo, as friends and Soldiers know him, represented the Warrant Officer in the Harding Project. Mo was also the second fellow for the Warrant Officer Historical Foundation and producer of the Cohort W podcast. He continues to support the Army in a civilian capacity at Fort Novosel.*

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# Make Aviation Fun Again

CW4 Joe W. Russell, Aviation



Army Aviation has a retention problem. Experienced veteran pilots are leaving the Army mid-career to pursue employment with the airlines and other opportunities in the civilian sector. Fully training and developing each aviator reflects a staggering financial investment, but the many years of experience a fully qualified pilot brings to the profession is immeasurable. The Army tried financial incentives, offering bonuses paying tens of thousands of dollars a year to sign contract extensions and calls to Active Duty for experienced National Guard and Army Reserve pilots to sign on, also with financial bonuses. When all that didn't work, additional ADSO contract extensions mandated pilots to stay in the Army longer to complete minimum contractual service obligations. Frustratingly, none of this seems to be working. Even after offering these great bonuses and financial incentives, why do our best Army Aviators continue to leave the Army and fly for the airlines?

The Army's problem with retaining experienced pilots is declining morale coupled with low job satisfaction, which is ultimately related to neglecting the psychology of the pilot. This psychological problem cannot be remedied by simply throwing money at it. We need a cultural change in the Army regarding how the Army treats, views, educates, and manages pilots from a psychological perspective. This must include reorienting the philosophy of education regarding the organizational identity of Army Aviation. Simply put, the Army needs to make aviation fun again.

**The Army must comprehensively reimagine this problem of pilot retention, placing high priority on the psychological aspects of a military aviator's core identity.**

**Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs** It is widely accepted as one of the primary psychological theories of workplace motivation. Maslow's theory arranges human needs in a hierarchy, commonly expressed visually as a pyramid with the most basic physiological survival needs at the bottom. In contrast, the more creative and intellectually oriented 'self-actualization' needs were placed at the top.

Maslow argued that survival needs must be satisfied before the individual can satisfy the higher needs. The higher the hierarchy, the more difficult it is to satisfy the needs associated with that stage because of the interpersonal and environmental barriers that inevitably frustrate us. Higher needs become increasingly psychological and long-term rather than physiological and short-term, as in the lower survival-related needs (McLeod, 2024).

Relating Maslow's theory to Army Aviation, we realize that bonuses, pay incentives, and ADSOs cater exclusively to the lower physiological survival and safety/security needs of the Army Aviator but fail to address the higher needs of the Army Aviator, such as Sense of Belonging, Self-Esteem, and, at the peak, Self-Actualization. Because their continued service meets these higher-level psychological needs, pilots are exiting the Army to seek other organizations to support these higher-level needs on their ultimate quest to self-actualize.

An unfortunate perception remains among Army Aviators that 'Big Army' doesn't like pilots. At first, this may seem absurd. How could the Army of all organizations not like pilots or have even the perception of not liking its aviators? Whether or not one agrees with this perception, it is prevalent and regularly heard in the general grumblings of disgruntled Army pilots.





Attending Flight School at Fort Rucker back in 2008, a novelty patch was going around depicting one guy kicking another in the crotch with the words “Crack!” “Welcome to B Co. Morale stops here.” The patches were wildly popular but, of course, were immediately banned by command staff. While the command was angered and upset at the B. Co. flight students for distributing such an irreverent patch, had they looked inwardly, they may have realized a greater morale problem slowly growing in Army Aviation.

One might ponder, where does this negative perception come from? The perception comes from the squashing of individualism. Years of misguided efforts to implement doctrine and policy requiring pilots to look the same as the typical soldier have effectively taken away that individual identity that we pilots used to have. Pilots imagine some high-level decision maker thought pilots had too much cockiness or swagger and sought to take our collective egos down a notch. While that goal may have been achieved, it compromised an essential psychological key to pilot identity.

**What is pilot identity? More specifically, what is the identity of a military pilot? Aviator identity is steeped in tradition spanning decades.**

Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Hiram Bingham knew this instinctively when he was involved in creating the United States Schools of Military Aeronautics and the Army Air Service. In his 1920 memoir *An Explorer in the Air Service*, he wrote much regarding the pilot’s identity: “The pilot is more like the knight of old... He must first be an officer and a gentleman. He must be the kind of man whose honor is never left out of consideration.” “He must be resourceful, keen, quick, and determined.” Also, “...that polo players and football quarterbacks made excellent pilots.” “...the first necessity [is] to get the right type of personnel: fellows of quick, clear intelligence, mentally acute and physically fit” (Bingham, 1920).

LTC Hiram Bingham was a type A personality, and his description of the ideal military aviator still rings true today. According to the American Psychological Association (APA), people with a type A personality may have the following traits:

- Highly ambitious
- Thrive on a sense of competitiveness
- Motivated by achievement
- Operating at a more urgent pace than others

- Frustration or irritation with delays
- Ability to multitask
- Assertive/Aggressive
- Extroverted
- More likely to feel stressed when faced with delays or other challenges that affect success

The Army must understand the unique psychological aspects of its aviators and tailor the profession to build an aviator's career, feed motivation, and encourage the self-esteem and self-awareness of the pilot's identity. Attainment of these higher-level psychological needs, such as the sense of belonging to a group and promotion of self-esteem, is crucial to the aviator reaching his pinnacle of success. Self-actualization is what one needs to experience true work satisfaction.

In Maslow's theory, as we ascend the pyramid of needs, the potential for individual output grows. This increased personal output is a force multiplier that the Army is not tapping into. Pilot identity is emotional, intangible, and difficult to measure. Incorporating a new culture that harnesses pilot psychology will result in an aviator who is more motivated, more confident, more professional, and more lethal. A confidence that Army Aviators are better than in any other branch or nation—truly at the very top of the game.

Currently, the Army is completely missing the mark. We are not developing pilots to reach their highest potential, so pilots leave the Army to join the airlines or some other job in the civilian sector where they are treated better, respected for their profession, and treated as elite. The type A personality seeks the highest level of self-actualization of Maslow's pyramid. To get there, we must have the other higher yet secondary and tertiary needs met—the sense of belonging and self-esteem needs.

What exactly are the airlines offering pilots that meet these higher psychological needs than the Army does? First off, pilot identity. Airline pilots get to look like pilots. The airline flight uniform is immediately recognizable by everyone who sees it. Pilots are treated with and receive the respect they so desperately crave. One can spot an airline pilot by his uniform as he strolls proudly through the airport and can recognize by the bars on the sleeves or epaulets if he is a First Officer or Captain.

The civilian public is generally in awe of and greatly respects pilots. Little kids dream of being a pilot one day. Pop culture has done the job of ingraining the legend of military aviation into our collective memory and permanently etching into all our minds what an army pilot looks like. Tom Cruise in *Top Gun* immediately jumps to mind, with the iconic green flight suit and the patches. The pilot persona is adventurous, sexy, and exciting.

Contrast this to the current uniform of an Army Aviator. Army pilots are not even allowed to look like pilots. With the creation of the AACU, the Army took away a critical piece of unique pilot identity to make everyone look the same. Sometimes, people ask, "Why did the Army take away the flight suit from aviators?" They make the differentiation by asking specifically about the Army because in other military branches, pilots still proudly wear the one-piece olive drab flight suit... lovingly nicknamed the "pickle suit." In every other armed service branch, the pilots look like pilots; they all have green flight suits and flight patches, but for some reason, not in the Army.

The iconic green one-piece Army flight suit is truly nostalgic and classic. This iconic uniform should be returned as the official battle uniform of aviators, along with a corresponding update to AR 670-1. The classic green flight jacket should accompany the flight suit.



Morale Patches are also extremely significant to aviators. Aviation unit patches (interchangeably called “morale patches”) are currently authorized by some unit commanders at their discretion. The problem is that we need that authorization standardized into 670-1. Imagine the extreme demoralization that aviators experience when, after a change of command, we are told we must now remove our patches.

The Unit Patch should be worn on the flight suit and flight jacket in the following way: RL1 aviators are authorized to wear the patch. This becomes a high motivator for pilots to achieve and maintain RL1 status. Once RL1 is attained for the first time, the coveted patch is presented to the pilot. Commanders may incorporate a ceremony to present this patch to highlight this achievement. Upon advancement to Pilot-in-command (PIC), Aviators earn a call sign. This is usually a nickname given to pilots in command in the unit, often accompanied by a two-digit number identifier, used in radio communication (Lange, 2022). Upon advancement to PIC, the aviator is now further authorized to add his/her specific call sign to his patch uniform. Some units may add this to the patch by additional custom stitching or embroidery, or some may choose to possibly add an additional rocker to the patch.

Aircrew members such as crew chiefs and flight engineers are authorized to wear the aircrew flight suits with a subdued patch, and pilots are permitted to wear the full-color patch. The green “pickle suit” and flight jackets should also have the classic leather aircrew nametape with aviator wings.

With the implementation of the Army Green Service Uniform (AGSU), the Army is returning to a proven, traditional, nostalgic uniform theme. The one-piece green flight suit is a perfect complement to the AGSU. It will be welcomed enthusiastically as we collectively honor our rich history and past, bringing aviation tradition into the future.

Envision an aviation program that incorporates Maslow’s psychology and pilot identity into our doctrine, focusing on the critical needs of a sense of belonging and esteem. With higher psychological needs met, experienced aviators will stay in the Army, supported in their pursuit of lifelong self-actualization to be above the Best.

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## **The Warrant Officer's Creed**

**Willingly** render loyal services to superiors, subordinates, and peers in every organization of which they are members.

**Always** set an example in conduct, appearance, and performance that will make others proud to know and work with them.

**Reliably** discharge all duties with which they are confronted whether such duties are expressed or implied.

**Readily** subordinate their personal interests and welfare to those of their organization and their subordinates.

**Accept** responsibility at every opportunity and acknowledge full accountability for their actions.

**Never** knowingly tolerate wrong-doing by themselves or others, whether by commission or omission, design or neglect.

**Teach** other people in a way they effectively expand and perpetuate the scope of their technical competence.

**Obtain** breadth of perspective and depth of understanding beyond the limits of their specific responsibility.

**Faithfully** adhere to their oath of office in all respects, upholding and defending the nation's constitution by both word and deed.

**Forcefully** take the initiative to stimulate constructive action in all areas requiring or inviting their attention.

**Improve** themselves both physically and mentally, professionally and personally, to increase their own abilities and the value of their services.

**Contribute** their past experiences, service, and knowledge to a dedicated effort for a betterment of the future.

**Earn** and develop a reputation for the absolute integrity of their word.

**Reflect** credit and inspire confidence in themselves, the Warrant Officer Corps, the military service of which they are a part, and the United States of America.

*Editor's Note: The author is unknown, and the creed is unofficial.*

# US Department of State Duty to Plan and Execute Evacuations

## CW4 Chuck Davis, U.S. Army, Military Intelligence

“Nobody wants to sit where I am and think now about what ‘coulda, shoulda, woulda’ happened in order to avoid this.” – Secretary of State Hilary Clinton on Benghazi

The Department of State has an abysmal record of conducting Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, especially when it comes to emergency response to social unrest and instability in conflict zones. There are internal mechanisms in place for leaders to learn from these events and to take steps to strengthen their processes. However, whether an issue of not wanting to have written documentation of failures and shortcomings or general disregard for the requirements, Department of State (DoS) officials have not conducted proper after-action documentation. This calls into question DoS level of readiness as we face continued friction and instability over Taiwan.

A memorandum of agreement between the Departments of State and Defense indicates the DoS will exercise overall responsibility for protecting U.S. citizens and nationals and designated other persons, to include, when necessary and feasible, their evacuation to and welfare in relatively safe areas. DoS further assumes responsibility for minimizing their risk of death or seizure as hostages and reducing their presence in probable or actual combat areas, so that combat effectiveness of U.S. and allied forces is not impaired (U.S. Department of Defense & U.S. Department of State, n.d.).

This same memorandum tasks the Department of Defense (DoD) with monitoring the political, military, economic, and other conditions. DoD will assess levels of hostility; local national willingness to provide protections for US citizens, nationals and other designees; number and locations of the same persons abroad and evacuation and protection capabilities, including transportation/lift requirements and their availability as well as the availability of relatively safe holding or survival areas for staging evacuees during emergencies (U.S. Department of Defense & U.S. Department of State, n.d.). These are considered Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)s.

While each agency has its own lines of effort, the DoS has ultimate responsibility to prepare plans for protection and evacuation of US citizens and DoD non-combatants. This includes coordination to maximize timely use of available military transportation assets and existing host nation support infrastructure. Given the significant failures of Benghazi and Afghanistan along with questionable decisions about non-government US citizens in Sudan, it is no wonder there is concern and apprehension in the DoS planning approach to Taiwan.

National level concerns over DoS planning and readiness is not a new focus. In 2007 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was tasked with assessing Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts. As part of the evaluation, the team assessed DoS guidance and plans to conduct training and exercises in preparation for evacuations. The GAO team also reviewed post staff efforts to collect, analyze, and incorporate evacuation lessons learned into future guidance and training (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007).

A significant finding asserts, “Posts do not find State’s primary guidance particularly useful in preparing for evacuation. In addition, while State requires posts to update Emergency Action Plans (EAP)s annually, almost 40 percent of posts surveyed have not updated their plans in 18 months or longer.” Post in Benghazi, 2016) It is evident from the failures in the Afghanistan evacuation, recommendations from both reports also gained little or no traction in the 10 years leading up to the failures at Bagram

Airport and throughout the country.

In 2017 the GAO initiated a follow-on assessment of DoS emergency preparedness. GAO findings during this evaluation period indicate only 2 of the 20 evaluated posts, which were approved by DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security, had updated all key EAPs. “GAO also found that EAPs are viewed as lengthy and cumbersome documents that are not readily usable in emergency situations”, suggesting that EAPs serve as a check the box requirement rather than a functional plan for implementation (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2017). Another significant finding indicates only 36% of the posts reported completing their evacuation drills.

GAO report 17-174 reiterated what should be obvious from previous agency assessments and actual events. DoS needs to ensure posts complete EAP updates and training exercises. Because of the inconsistency in following requirements, DoS should more closely track the policy requirements and verify posts are following through during EAP cycles. Most importantly, “State could develop a more streamlined version of the EAP—consisting of key sections, checklists, and contact lists—that could be used [by staff in and emergency], in addition to the full EAP... and take steps to ensure overseas post complete required lessons learned reports” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2017). These are all items addressed in some form during the 2007 assessment of DoS readiness.

Four years after GAO report 17-174 there was a systemic failure during the evacuation of Afghanistan. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Interim Report “A Strategic Failure: Assessing the Administration’s Afghanistan Withdrawal” asserts there was a failure to plan. Findings from the report indicate the “[DoS] took very few substantive steps to prepare for the consequences that were expected” (U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, Republicans, 2022). The report further indicates “Military commanders have clearly stated there was an utter lack of urgency on the part of the White House, the National Security Council (NSC), and the State Department as it pertained to an evacuation, despite repeated dire warnings” (U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, Republicans, 2022). These comments seem to be echoed by reports that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs GEN Milley believed DoS waited too long to initiate evacuation efforts (Blankenship, 2021).

The HFAC report also addresses key planning failures regarding NEOs. “[DoS] was unable to provide adequate assistance to U.S. citizens (AMCITs), lawful permanent residents (LPRs), Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders and applicants, and other at-risk Afghans who were attempting to evacuate the country during the NEO. Would be evacuees were sent conflicting messages, told they could not be helped, or left standing outside the gates of the airport” (U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, Republicans, 2022). Given our adversaries use of Information Warfare, disinformation operations and deep fakes, DoS needs to be both mindful and prepared with a strong communications plan.

Additionally, “U.S. military personnel on the ground involved in the evacuation said they had been prohibited from coordinating evacuation planning with all allies except for the UK until early August 2021” (U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, Republicans, 2022). This is an operational failure which was identified and addressed as a key planning consideration in the Benghazi Report. General Sullivan noted US forces weren’t even allowed to coordinate with the Turkish forces commanding a primary military contingency at the airport and Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman did not begin NEO coordination through her channels until August 22, 2021, which was nine days after the fall of Herat and Taliban seizing control of all national border crossings (Faiez & Popalzai, 2021). These types of coordination would be critical to success given the more than 20 countries and organizations that were trying to conduct similar evacuations. Failing to heed this type of coordination in future NEOs, such as Taiwan, will also be disastrous. This is especially true given the number of countries who have a significant population of citizens working in Taiwan.

On April 22, 2023 DoS initiated an evacuation of embassy personnel and their dependents from

Khartoum Sudan. This evacuation did not include civilians and other designees. Under Secretary for Management, Ambassador John Bass indicated the DoD took the lead on evacuation operations for the Embassy after it was determined that use of commercial air and access to the airport was no longer an option. He further applied to the loss of access to commercial air as a reason not to attempt a US government evacuation of other American citizens in the near term ((U.S. Department of State, n.d.). DoS makes a point of asserting it has the authority to assist in the evacuation of US citizens but is not required to do so.

Ambassador Bass did indicate the DoS was attempting to maintain contact with US citizens and provide them with a best assessment of the security environment, while encouraging them to take appropriate precautions. He further asserted the DoS was working with other countries and the United Nations, as well as international organizations to enable US citizens to make their way to safety (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). There was no indication that this was part of an EAP or that early coordination had been ongoing, with an expectation for the DoS to need the support of partner countries and non-government organizations. Given previous examples of planning failures and the number of posts that have not completed EAP requirements, it is likely these efforts were cobbled together as events unfolded.

Recent reporting from multiple news agencies suggest the United States is conducting advance planning for a potential NEO evacuation of the Taiwan DoS post. While the one China policy has dictated that the US not establish an embassy in Taiwan, DoS works out of the American Institute in Taiwan. A June 13, 2023 piece by dayFREURO suggest multiple sources provided perspective on US evacuation planning that began more than 6 months prior. Unnamed sources indicated the planning process was not a public topic due to its sensitive nature and the potential fear and apprehension it might evoke within the Taiwanese population (Euro DayFR, 2023). The fact that DoS is taking an active planning approach, suggests recommendations and lessons learned are finally being applied in EAP development for this post.

A Messenger report from December 2021 indicates roughly two thirds of the Taiwanese population identifies as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. This growing shift along with recent Taiwan and US efforts to shore up defenses may be contributing to China's need to act sooner rather than later, on its claims to the island nation. This is not the first time Taiwan and the US have drawn attention over evacuation training. A 2003 Taipei Times report on joint training exercise Han Kuang #19 indicated Deputy Defense Minister Chen Chao-ming specifically addressed the inaccurate perception the US military was participating in evacuation training (Taipei Times, 2003).

"China has unsuccessfully attempted military force against Taiwan before, in the 1950s and 1990s. For much of that period, Taiwan itself had a superior military to the People's Republic, and U.S. naval dominance in the region was unquestioned" (The Messenger, n.d.) An example can be found in June 1950, when President Truman placed the 7th Fleet between mainland China and Taiwan. In this case deterrence through the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait discouraged Chinese forces from conducting an amphibious assault. However, the same policy of deterrence today may be speeding China's decision-making timeline.

As DoS continues to develop NEO evacuation planning, the Philippines are likely to play a key role. The country's May 2022 presidential election significantly shifted Philippine relations with the US and China and allowed the US to reestablish democratic relationships that had deteriorated under Rodrigo Duterte (Wilson Center, 2022). And, as recently as May 2023 the US has reaffirmed its 72 year defense alliance with the Philippines, through a defense treaty in the South China Sea (Nicholson, 2023a). Just days after confirming this treaty, President Marcos indicated Philippine bases could play a key role if China were to attack Taiwan (Nicholson, 2023b).

An example of how DoS planning might leverage Philippine bases includes the Ports of Kaohsiung



and Subic Bay. Kaohsiung is located on Taiwan's southwestern coastline and Kaohsiung port is one of the biggest container handling facilities in the world. The port handles roughly 5000 vessels and 18,900,000 tonnes of cargo annually (Marine Insight, n.d.). Along with the port, Kaohsiung boast one of the country's largest international airports co-located just outside the port area. Subic Bay, Philippines is approximately 500 miles south and served as a US naval base until 1992. The Subic facilities also include an international airport. Given DoS intentions to rely on commercial transportation as a first alternative, these two facilities provide multiple avenues for departure and arrival, not only for US citizens but other countries as well.

A possible indicator to the approach above can be found in a DoS Joint Statement from April 11, 2023. "Mindful of the growing complexity of the Indo-Pacific security environment, including the multidimensional nature of modern challenges and threats to the peace and security of the Philippines and the United States, the Secretaries reaffirmed their shared determination to defend against external armed attack in the Pacific... Accelerate the implementation of [Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement] EDCA projects and increase investments in EDCA agreed Locations to further support combined training, exercises, and interoperability between the U.S. and Philippine Armed Forces, as well as the Philippines' civilian-led disaster preparedness and response capacities. Most recently, a July 30, 2024, press release indicates the United States has allocated USD \$500 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) from the FY 2024 Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act (U.S. Department of Defense, 2023).

Whether through learning from previous events or developing new approaches, DoS will face significant obstacles during a NEO event in Taiwan. Reliance on a variety of networks and resources will be paramount to conducting a successful NEO. This will include advance coordination and relationship building before the crisis and NGOs may play a substantial role.

In early 2000 Taiwan established the Department of NGO International Relations, which falls under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is responsible for maintaining positive relationships with NGOs, through open dialogue on difficult topics such as political freedom and civil rights. Associations such as this provide early indicators of instability which may extend operational and execution timelines. During a potential crisis such as this, time is a valuable commodity.

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# China's War in the South China Sea

**CW2 Dylan C. Fackler,**

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is at war in the South China Sea (SCS). The militarization of the SCS by the PRC is already hostile. Any nation that opposes PRC hegemony in the region risks the escalation of current hostilities into outright conflict. PRC militarization of the SCS includes sophisticated basing and power projection within multiple domains. The current level of violence and coercion is nearing crisis levels of resource scarcity, a diminishing window of opportunity, and potential miscalculated escalations. Resource scarcity is increasing pressure on developing the various Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the SCS. Due to the rising global focus on the region, there is the condition for a perceived diminishing window of opportunity for the PRC to achieve its goals. This then creates an environment for potential miscalculated escalations. The following text explores to what extent this hostility could escalate if unchecked, highlighting the need for careful consideration and strategic planning to avoid unintended escalation.

Rising populations and diminishing economic prospects exist in multiple nations surrounding the SCS, resulting in fierce competition over limited resources (Frank, 2023). The PRC's aggressive actions, such as illegal fishing within neighboring EEZs, not only limit the economic vitality of these neighbors but also their ability to sustain internal food production (Khaskheli & Wang, (2023). The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) plays a crucial role in this space, where coastal nations have jurisdiction over living and non-living resources (Khaskheli & Wang, (2023). This area is beyond a nation's coastline's traditional 12 nautical mile territorial waters. Additionally, the PRC seeks to limit neighbors' ability to unilaterally exploit oil and Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) fields within their EEZs. This while simultaneously seeking PRC beneficial partnerships to profit from these same fields. The increasing need for economic development by the PRC and its SCS neighbors will likely strain diplomatic efforts. Economic pressure from the PRC could negatively impact susceptible markets such as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (Delechat et al., 2024). The Philippines is of note, given its competing claim to the Second Thomas Shoal, where the PRC has multiple bases. These external factors and PRC internal influences may alter its assessment of its available time to achieve its end state.

The PRC's desire for regional hegemony is facing a diminishing window of opportunity due to evolving conditions within the region (Sullivan & Brands, 2020). The United States shift of its national strategy to the INDOPACIFIC region holds the PRC's prospects for success without contest at threat (Biden, 2022). This threat is exacerbated by the PRC's aging population from its former One Child Policy (Ezrati, 2023). Additionally, the growth of the PRC domestic market has repeatedly not met CCP expectations (Leng, 2024). The 2024 sinking of the PRC's newest nuclear power submarine was a significant blow to the military readiness for any action against competitors such as the US or Australia (Reuters, 2024, September 27). These factors will likely contribute to a perceived narrowing timeframe in which the PRC can achieve its regional goals without significant military escalation. The threat of not achieving its regional goals without large-scale conflict may lead to a coup de main attempt before potential adversaries are positioned to interfere. These factors and the speed-up timeline may lead to unanticipated consequences with SCS stakeholders with competing end states and timelines.

The PRC may escalate hostilities within the SCS. However, a third party may miscalculate PRC activity and trigger an escalatory chain of events. The US and the Philippines have mutual defense assurances threatening PRC interests in the SCS. This treaty, signed in 2014, allows for the "preposition and store defense equipment, supplies, and material." (US Department of State, 2014) The PRC perceived the



2024 presidential inauguration in Taiwan as a step towards the declaration of independence of one of its sovereign territories (Davidson, 2024). Bilateral and multi-lateral regional players increasingly resist the PRC's monopolization of resources within the SCS (Reuters, 2024, August 20). As more actors seek to defend their claims within the SCS, they may inadvertently or intentionally escalate hostilities if they perceive favorable conditions. This inadvertent escalation may drag in more actors due to treaty or organizational membership.

The PRC is already conducting hostile activities within the SCS, and the conditions are set for rapid if accidental, escalation into a regional crisis. A regional crisis with some 21% of global trade, 3.37 trillion dollars, is at risk (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021). Competition over limited resource fields within the SCS will only increase soon. This competition will become increasingly militarized as the PRC expands its military activities in scale and frequency, and its neighbors will respond in kind. The focus on this competition by global powers, such as the US, will likely drive a reassessment of a dwindling timeline for the PRC to achieve its goals. While the US and PRC spar over influence within the region, any nation with SCS interests may miscalculate its actions and inadvertently trigger high-end conflict. It is in the PRC's interests to instigate actions of their SCS neighbors that can legitimize the PRC's military response to achieve its end state.



Chinese claimed territory in the South China Sea, 2024.

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# Out of Time: The Gap in Homeland Air Defense

CW4 Joshua Bowen, Air Defense

## Why Should We Care about Homeland Air Defense?

Until very recently, Air Defense has been relegated within the Army, except for a few niche mission spaces. This is my humble opinion based on observations over the last twenty-five years as an Air Defender. However, that is changing. The entire tone that the Department and the Service use to talk about Air Defense is changing.

Fires are the primary consideration in the most recent publication of Training and Doctrine Command's assessment of the Operating Environment for Large Scale Combat Operations in the 2024-2034 timeframe. The foreword states that "Fires will be the center of gravity." I concede that this includes Offensive Fires, but some sections point to the need for Defensive Fires (ADA), particularly the need for Homeland Defense Fires. The following four statements are pulled directly from the July 2024 TRADOC publication, titled The Operational Environment 2024-2034 Large-Scale Combat Operations:

LSCO will feature Homeland Defense requirements as adversaries will have conventional, hybrid, and irregular capabilities to conduct operations against the Homeland.

These include threats to the Homeland [such as] long-range cruise missiles

At the onset of LSCO, adversaries will probably shift from nonattributable cyber and information operations toward more destructive, physical effects. Adversaries are likely to escalate their actions using ultra-long-range systems with conventional payloads

Fires have become more lethal and practical with new systems and technology expanding their range and improving precision. GPS has improved the accuracy of munitions and firing points. Battlefield sensing, long-range fires, and position, navigation, and timing capabilities have enabled faster strike capability with more accuracy

The potential for a Homeland Defense requirement against long-range conventional payload attacks from adversaries is significant. The assessment suggests that as Large-Scale Combat Operations escalate, our adversaries will have the capacity and "are likely to" strike with their conventional long-range offensive Fires. I offer for your consideration that the changing character of modern warfare is that we might see conventional air attacks from our peer adversaries on our Homeland during the next war. That is why we should all care about the gap in Homeland Air Defense.

## What GAP?

The Department of Defense and our elected officials have been discussing and admiring this problem for nearly a decade. A recent July 2024 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Panel on Air and Missile Defense in the High North provides valuable insight into where we currently stand. I've selected some key comments from the discussion panel for your consideration:



## **Senator Sullivan (R-AK), House Armed Services Committee**

You know, the incident we had with the Chinese spy balloon that happened last year, we have definite vulnerabilities in terms of over-the-site radar capabilities but, really importantly, in terms of cruise missiles that the NDAA tries to address, so many of these high-tech. These smaller businesses are focused on national security and defense. It's a great opportunity for us where we have some of our best minds to work in this space and some great innovative companies. You may have heard that Lockheed Martin was just awarded a big \$17 billion contract for the next generation of interceptors to defend the United States from intercontinental ballistic attacks. But we also have these smaller, very nimble companies being developed. I think they are learning a lot from what's happening in Israel and what's happening in Ukraine, and it's going to be a very active space for our military and missile defense. It will involve a lot of the learning we're seeing from these conflicts around the world.

## **Dr. Peppi DeBiaso, Senior Associate of the CSIS Missile Defense Project.**

Cruise missile defense of the Homeland, cruise missile defense of North America. I mean, we took sort of a 20-, 25-year holiday, right, in the post-Cold War period, right, in terms of the concerns we had with some kind of significant powers like Russia and China. I mean, up until 2016, 2017 – and this wasn't even much of a focus within the Pentagon.

You can go back six-plus years. I would argue that you should look at all the critical national security and defense strategy documents. The policy on the importance of some kind of homeland CMD against this new type of threat we've been discussing is well-established and agreed to across both Republican and Democratic administrations. Yet, there's been close to zero investment over the past six years.

Yeah, very little bit. However, the big developments over the past three or four years should be related to sensors and domain awareness. Everybody agreed, right? This is—we can all agree on this. We don't really agree yet on shooters for Homeland, CMD, how many, what type, are they kinetic, are they non-kinetic? We'll let the Air Force figure that out, which it probably won't.

## **Dr. Tom Karako, Senior Fellow CSIS, Director, Missile Defense Project**

That is the nonnuclear strategic attack. We talked about this a lot during the CSIS missile defense project. And I want to – I recall that was, I think it was, nine years ago this spring, we had the Vice Chairman Admiral Winnefeld in this room talking about that, in his view, it was the cruise missile threat to the Homeland that was overtaking the importance of the threat from regional ballistic missiles. And that was the Obama administration when regional ballistic missile defense was the thing. That was in 2015 that the vice chairman said that. It doesn't seem like it's sunk in yet.

## **Gen (Ret) Charles Jacoby, former USNORTHCOM and NORAD Commander**

Look at what Russia is doing and what they are building. They are refurbishing all their long-range strategic bombers. They are developing cruise missiles that can be launched from distances barely out of Russian air space.

I mean, in the big picture, every NORAD/NORTHCOM commander since my day has been making the case that the Homeland is not a sanctuary anymore and recognizing the fact that the Homeland can be held at risk by other things besides massive nuclear exchanges with Russia.

So one of the things that's frustrating is this doesn't require a bunch of research that takes a decade, like, you know, trying to figure out how to have a fusion reactor or a quantum computer that can add one plus one faster and get two. This stuff is out there. We just tested a bunch of it. And, well, we're testing it in Ukraine, and we're testing it right now in the Middle East. (Laughs.) And it works. But it's not focused, and it's not here.

Based on the comments from this CSIS forum, we can conclude that Homeland is vulnerable to adversary cruise missile strikes and that we have not invested sufficient resources to mitigate this threat. Further analysis suggests that public opinion would most likely not support the current strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction and nuclear retaliation. This would, of course, depend on the target, but if it is a valid military objective, I do not believe the American people or the international community would support a nuclear response.

### **So, what are our options?**

In the recent history of U.S. Army Air Defense, many significant advancements have happened in labs and test ranges. However, we don't currently have a suitable System of Record for Cruise Missile Defense beyond the Patriot missile system. The Patriot system is an exceptional system in high demand worldwide, with over four decades of proven success. However, it has several significant drawbacks. It is not quick or easy to move; it is one of the more expensive systems to operate, and there are limited quantities of both the platform and the effectors. I don't believe it is realistic to plan for an option where we get Patriot weapon systems defending the Homeland. Those systems will remain in active war zones, defending the forward team like today.

I am excited about the innovation within the Air Defense branch. I believe that we will learn and produce amazing things from what we are gleaning from the air battles in both Ukraine and Israel. However, I am concerned about the timeframe for these advancements. Senior leaders across the Department of Defense have acknowledged and called for changes to the acquisition process to address systemic inefficiencies. With that in mind, I recommend pursuing an interim Air Defense solution achievable today by procuring a system that is already proven effective against this specific threat.

### **The NASAMS Option**

The National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System is a battle-proven cruise missile defeat weapon system that is currently being used by thirteen countries (Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace). There are three key reasons why this weapon system is the solution we must consider now. The primary reason is that it has successfully defeated our acute threat's munitions. Russia has been attacking Ukraine with cruise missiles for several years now. The NASAMS system has defeated those incoming missiles

(Reuters,2022). The next key reason is that the Norwegian manufacturing line, where NASAMS is made, is already in place and producing (Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace). Or, more simply, we can get in line and purchase the systems today. Lastly, the U.S. Army National Guard has experience in training and operating this system. The Army National Guard has used this system to support the NCR-IADS for many years. However, this is a non-system of record. A precedent has already been established for U.S. military operations, and the existing expertise in the National Guard can be leveraged.

The NASAMS solution could provide a credible defense as an interim capability while the Army modernizes and brings the next-generation air defense systems online.

Ok, but why should the Army or even DOD do this?

First and foremost, it is what the American people expect. What other organization is trained, equipped, and organized to defend against incoming cruise missiles from hostile nation-states? This is not a task for local law enforcement or the department

of Homeland Security. From FM 3-01, U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations, “Air and missile defense are the direct defensive actions to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and assets.” The Department of Defense and the Army, specifically, are tasked with this responsibility. We must accept that the friendly forces and assets we need to defend are in the Homeland now too.

## Conclusion

The threshold between non-attributable/non-kinetic actions and nuclear strikes is extensive. Our peer adversaries will transition to conventional warfare as escalation continues. For decades, we have conducted traditional missile cruise strikes on military targets and key personnel with precision around the world. Russia and China are capable of doing the same. We must begin defending our military installations in the Homeland now. The most suitable option for starting that process is the NASAMS weapon system.

*Authors Note: CW4 Joshua Scott Bowen is a career Army Air Defender with 26 years of service. CW4 Bowen spent the majority of that time working on Operation Noble Eagle. He is an Air Defense Coordination Officer, providing Army Air Defense subject matter expertise to the NORAD and NORTHCOM Area Air Defense Commanders. This paper was created for Professional Military academic graduation requirements; the views, opinions, and analysis expressed do not represent the position of the U.S. Army. Specific guidance was provided to create a readable, enjoyable, and persuasive article.*

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# The Role of US Army Warrant Officers in Re-Establishing Trust in Army Processes

**CW2 Marcus J. Harvey, Adjutant General's Corps**

One of the moments I cherish most from my time as a Warrant Officer and in the Army was my first interaction with a Brigade Commander. Despite being in the unit for 90 days, I had not met much of the leadership because of a deployment. When they returned, I was summoned to Brigade headquarters by the Brigade Commander. After a quick introduction, he asked me about the verbiage needed for an evaluation. I gave him the answer, and he responded, "Thank you, Chief." I replied, "Thank you for trusting me." He then said, "Chief, I trust you unequivocally."

I often reflect on this encounter when discussing what it means to be a Warrant Officer. His trust in me was not solely about me as an individual but the legacy of over 100 years of Warrant Officers being the standard-bearers of trust. We are trusted with sensitive conversations, trusted to deliver bad news to prevent worse outcomes, and trusted to accomplish the most challenging missions because we have the necessary experience. Today's Army needs the Warrant Officer to stand at the forefront of re-establishing trust in the Army's processes.

## **Current State: Erosion of Trust In Government Institutions**

Trust is the foundation of effective operations, mission success, and cohesive leadership. Over the years, there has been a growing concern over the erosion of trust in government institutions, including the Army. According to a 2021 survey by the Pew Research Center, only 24% of Americans trust the federal government to do what is right "just about always" or "most of the time." This lack of trust extends to the military, where Soldiers have increasingly expressed concerns about transparency and the consistent application of Army processes. According to research, the main reasons for declining trust in military organizations are poor communication, a perceived lack of transparency, and inconsistent application of policies and processes (Williams, 2017). For example, Soldiers may feel disillusioned by opaque promotion systems or decisions related to deployment and assignments, leading to inequality. An Annual Army Senior Leadership Survey found that only 25% of surveyed Soldiers felt senior leaders were transparent in their decision-making (Vie et al., 2021). These figures highlight the need for a systematic approach to restoring trust—something Warrant Officers can uniquely address. How many complaints and stories do we see on popular social media pages due to failures to follow the Army processes?

The continued loss of trust in Army processes is dangerous and can have far-reaching consequences, including decreased morale, reduced unit cohesion, and a decline in overall mission effectiveness. When Soldiers feel that processes are not applied consistently or fairly, they become disengaged and less likely to commit to their duties, creating a trust deficit. Trust deficit is a significant lack of trust between parties, arising when one party perceives that the other has failed to act in a reliable, transparent, or ethical manner, leading to skepticism, doubt, or a general unwillingness to rely on or cooperate with that party. This trust deficit can lead to increased turnover as Soldiers seek opportunities in environments where they feel their concerns are addressed and their trust valued.

In July 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 14036 to address these trust issues by promoting transparency, accountability, and ethical behavior across federal agencies. This order mainly focused on economic competition but recognized the importance of rebuilding trust in government institutions, including the military. In December 2021, President Biden issued another executive order, 14058, titled

“Transforming Federal Customer Experience and Service Delivery to Rebuild Trust in Government.” The key objectives of this order are to enhance the quality of services provided by federal agencies by improving service delivery, measuring customer experience, enhancing transparency and accountability, and cross-agency collaboration. Each of these orders mandates the US Army and all federal agencies to recommit and improve processes.

With our unparalleled technical expertise, deep understanding of Army operations, and commitment to common sense, Warrant Officers are uniquely positioned to restore, reinforce, and improve trust in Army processes. Our role is vital to ensuring that Army procedures are innovative and transparent, thus regaining the confidence of both Soldiers and the public.

## **Warrant Officers as Guardians of Army Processes**

Warrant Officers play a critical role in Army processes because our technical expertise makes us the go-to leaders for ensuring that processes are carried out efficiently and consistently. Unlike commissioned officers, who often rotate through different commands and assignments, Warrant Officers typically remain within their specialty for extended periods. This continuity allows the Warrant Officer to develop a deep knowledge of the processes within their domain and to build strong, trusting relationships with the Soldiers they lead.

As the technical and tactical experts in our fields, Warrant Officers are often responsible for implementing and overseeing key processes within the Army. Whether in logistics, intelligence, aviation, or human resources, Warrant Officers ensure that processes are followed correctly and that any deviations are addressed promptly and transparently. Our role as enforcers of standards is essential to maintaining the integrity of Army processes.

Warrant Officers can lead initiatives to improve transparency in decision-making processes, ensuring Soldiers understand how decisions are made and impact the organization. Due to our unique role as trusted agents, we can also advocate for the consistent application of processes across the Army, addressing concerns about favoritism and fair treatment. Warrant Officers can help restore trust in Army processes and the institution by aligning our efforts with broader strategic initiatives.

## **The Way Forward**

Last year, I served as an Army Training With Industry (TWI) fellow with Deloitte in Rosslyn, VA. The first project I had the opportunity to work on was in Human Resources Transformation, specifically as a member of the consulting team for the Navy’s Customer Experience (CX) section. The CX team is tasked with improving Navy HR by going further than if a Sailor’s pay was corrected. Instead, they measure the sailors’ experience in correcting it by asking questions about their interactions with service agents. This section’s data drives training and strategic communication and identifies process shortfalls. With the help of the Deloitte team, the Navy HR team has identified how to measure trust and improve it over time. As Doerr (2018) highlights in his book, *Measure What Matters*, they have identified the correct key performance indicators to drive decision-making, leading to an organization that is more transparent, committed to processes, and, thus, more trustworthy.

Warrant officers can harness and communicate data to enhance transparency and accountability, essential for building trust. For instance, by analyzing performance metrics and operational outcomes, warrant officers can identify patterns and areas for improvement, ensuring that decisions are driven by data rather than subjective judgment (Akain, 2024). This data-driven approach improves the accuracy of

decisions and demonstrates a commitment to fairness and objectivity, reinforcing trust among Soldiers. Relying on data identifies if the process is working or needs improvement. Due to the expertise of the Warrant Officer, we know the KPIs to measure, the KPI standard, the skills necessary to reach the KPI standard, and often the best processes and training to achieve proficiency in those skills.

Transparency is a crucial component of trust; data sharing can significantly contribute to this aspect. Warrant officers can implement data-sharing practices that inform Soldiers about mission objectives, progress, and outcomes. Just like a physician who shares test results with a patient before they agree with a treatment plan, warrant officers can empower soldiers with knowledge by providing access to relevant data, reducing uncertainty, and fostering a sense of inclusion in the decision-making process (Krist et al., 2017). For example, during training exercises, warrant officers can share performance data with their units, allowing soldiers to understand their strengths and areas for development. Commanders can use this information to justify additional training events and provide achievable goals. Incorporating data into the decision-making process displays openness. This openness builds trust and promotes a culture of continuous improvement and mutual respect.

Transparency may be the hardest of all the areas to improve upon to build trust, but it has the opportunity to make an immense impact. Think of the things that Soldiers care about and the level of transparency in those processes. My last permanent change of station move was one of the most difficult for my family because of the availability of on-post housing. However, when someone presented me with the data that reflected occupancy percentages, projected move-out dates, and how the wait list worked, it improved my trust in the system even though I did not get the news I wanted. While many may not be fans, nobody can argue that the Assignment Interactive Module (AIM) did not improve the assignment system because of its transparency. For the most part, officers can see all available positions and get information about them. More can be done to improve transparency within AIM; however, with the data reflecting that more than 80% of officers received a position in their top 10% (Kimmons, 2020), how can you argue that this process is not more trusting than its predecessor? While proponents do a fantastic job of sharing board data that includes education and position data, so much more data and feedback can be given from these boards. How much more trust would Soldiers have in the Army if they were given readily available access to their Manner of Performance (MOP) score, how their MOP score ranks amongst their peers, or got the same level of individualized feedback from centralized boards as is given from decentralized board? How many more personnel would enroll in college, make different preferences for assignments, and take advantage of another professional improvement if they truly knew how they are ranked and seen amongst their peers through data? Again, openness builds trust and promotes a culture of continuous improvement and mutual respect.

## **Challenges and Considerations**

Restoring trust in Army processes is paramount to protecting our national interests. Improving trust makes selling the Army to the public, future Soldiers, and current Soldiers easier. The entrepreneur Vusi Thembekwayo explains that the one way to sell anything to anyone is by building trust through commitment and communication. This path will present the Army and Warrant Officers with numerous challenges and considerations.

While leveraging data presents many opportunities for building trust, warrant officers must navigate challenges such as data security, privacy concerns, data education, and the potential for information overload. However, all stakeholders must stay committed through this process. The commitment begins with Warrant Officers being willing to lead data education, specifically data literacy. Yes, we need to show others how to leverage the tools we build, but we also must communicate what the visuals mean and their connection to processes. This submission is not a rallying cry for every Warrant Officer to create a business intelligence dashboard. Our lust for information-overload dashboard visuals may

hurt overall data literacy and storytelling data, but I will save that for another article. However, it is a rallying cry to improve data literacy and incorporate data into Army processes to strengthen trust. As renowned data intellect Jordan Morrow (2024) stated, “Not everyone needs to be a data scientist, but everyone needs to be data literate.”. Commitment begins with education and continues with expectation and open-mindedness. There should be an expectation at every element of command that data is integrated into the decision-making process. As leaders identify what needs to be on the long-range training calendar or how many hours are devoted to lessons in institutions, there should be a conversation about what the data says should be there or take up most of the time. This data should be a mix of measured performance and feedback from those trained and expected to execute these tasks. Commitment also includes open-mindedness because there will be times when the data does not support historical processes. In these cases, an honest assessment has to be given to whether those historical processes produce the required result and if the organization is genuinely committed to solving the problems.

Warrant officers must balance data-driven approaches with the human element, recognizing that trust relies on interpersonal relationships and effective communication (Hreha, 2024). The data is going to present several hard pills for Soldiers to swallow. It may present that several more field exercises are required to support Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) correctly logistically. The data may show that significant and unexpected personnel distribution measures must be enacted for a unit to meet operational requirements. Warrant Officers can help coach leaders to communicate these challenges and decisions respectfully and empathetically instead of press releases and memorandums. By addressing these challenges thoughtfully, warrant officers can effectively use data to enhance trust without compromising other critical aspects of leadership.

## **Conclusion**

Warrant Officers are crucial to re-establishing trust in Army processes. Our technical expertise, continuity within specialties, and relationship with data make us indispensable in ensuring that Army operations are conducted consistently and transparently. As the Army continues to confront challenges related to trust, both within its ranks and in the eyes of the public, the role of Warrant Officers will only grow. By serving as guardians of these processes, Warrant Officers can help to rebuild trust and ensure that the Army remains a trusted and respected institution.



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# [Argument For] Constructive or Equivalent Credit for Warrant Officer Professional Military Education

**CW3 Meirong W. Magee, Adjutant General's Corps**

The U.S. Army modernizes the force by prioritizing the development and management of its People through strategies like the Army People Strategy, Army Talent Management Strategy, and Army University Strategy. The Army emphasizes lifelong learning, builds diverse expertise, and empowers Soldiers through flexible educational and career development pathways. The Warrant Officer Career College should extend constructive credit options to broaden learning, increase training flexibility, and diversify expertise, better preparing warrant officers for modern warfare's complex challenges.

Extending Professional Military Education (PME) constructive credit options for warrant officers aligns with the Army Innovation Strategy to offer creativity and innovation training to employees and management, which will broaden warrant officers' learning experiences (U.S. Army, 2017). As the Army continues modernizing processes and operating environment, innovative education is a way to modernize our People. The Army has consistently produced and developed high-quality commissioned officers through different credentialing programs and advanced civil schooling. The basic branch officers may receive partial Intermediate Level Education (ILE) credit through approved credentialing programs (HQDA, 2017). The Army could similarly develop warrant officers' common skills through credentialing programs and advanced civil schooling. For example, many credited advanced-level master's or higher programs, such as MBA or master's degree in organizational leadership, develop executive writing and communication skills that align with warrant officer ILE programs of instruction (POI) writing and communication modules.

Extending PME constructive credit options for warrant officers promotes training flexibility and shortens the training pipeline, a crucial need as the Army operates under resource constraints. All warrant officers must complete a five-week WOILE course, regardless of prior advanced education, except those who complete the ILE 10-month resident, nonresident, or common core satellite campus (HQDA, 2017). By offering an expedited WOILE version for those with advanced education, the Army can streamline the training process, focus on strategic-level doctrines, and reduce the demand for resources and staffing at the Warrant Officer Career College (WOCC). The Army Credentialing and Continuing Education Service offers flexible and relevant education programs and credentialing certifications (U.S. Army, 2023). Some warrant officers might already obtain the common skills through advanced education programs or certifications. Recognizing the constructive credits between military and civilian education programs aligns with the Army Innovation Strategy, which encourages efficient use of resources and innovative training approaches.

Extending PME constructive credit options for warrant officers motivates individuals to take on challenging operational/strategic assignments, ultimately diversifying expertise and supporting the Army's talent management objectives. Recognizing operational experience encourages continuous learning and creates a more dynamic career pathway for warrant officers. TRADOC, WOCC, G-3/5/7, G-1, and Branch Proponents could establish criteria for PME constructive credit based on operational experiences and achievements, enabling warrant officers to diversify their professional development and take on more complex roles across the force. The DA Pam 600-3 outlines the professional development of warrant officers (HQDA, 2023). However, the Army lacks sufficient policies to incentivize warrant officers to take on some assignments. Recognizing operational assignments as constructive credit could be a motivational strategy.

Expanding constructive credit options for warrant officers would enhance the Army's ability to manage

talent, modernize education, and prepare its leaders for the challenges of modern warfare. Lifelong learning should encompass a broad range of opportunities beyond military institutional training, fostering the development of knowledge, skills, and behaviors critical for Army leaders. As warfare evolves, the Army must ensure its leaders adapt quickly and apply diverse perspectives to emerging challenges. By recognizing the value of advanced civilian education and experience, the Army can create more flexible training pathways, streamline the PME system, and better equip warrant officers to serve as adaptable, strategic leaders.

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# Warrant Officers and the Harding Project

By Dr. Leonard S. Momeny, Ed.D., CW5 (ret), and Jim Steddum, CW5 (ret)

There is a movement occurring across the entire United States Army, the Harding Project. The Harding Project is an effort originating from the office of the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). The overall effort of the project is to reenergize professional conversations in every formation by revitalizing the Army's vast collection of journals. The project has included two conferences, one at West Point and the other at Army University, countless working groups, web-based Substacks, podcasts, and multiple in-person information briefs from members of the CSA's office. While it does not necessarily seem the natural area of the Army Warrant Officer, the Cohort has been present every step of the way. The following article provides background information on the project, identifies key members, shares tools, and hopefully spurs the Army's technical experts into involvement with an Army-wide effort.

## Harding Project Origin, Inspiration, and Workshops

During the fall of 2023, the Commandant of USAWOCC selected CW5 Leonard Momeny and CW3 Suzie Albert to attend the inaugural workshop for the Harding Project. The Modern War Institute hosted the event at the US Military Academy at West Point. This invitation nearly sounded too good to be true, especially since *Strength in Knowledge: The Warrant Officer Journal* had only recently been published by Army University Press. However, representatives were requested from all areas of Army publication, and the topic was the revitalization of Army professional writing. As the sole Warrant Officer-centric publication in the Army and the "new kid on the block," it was an honor for the *Strength in Knowledge* team to participate. Upon arrival, all workshop members would learn the purpose and intent of the project directly from LTC Griffiths and SFC Summerlin, the Harding Project team. Additionally, Lieutenant General Beagle, General Brito, and General George (CSA), emphasized their full support for promoting professional discourse in writing across the Army. The interest was high, and the potential outcomes to benefit the entire Army were enormous.

### Origin

The problem statement guiding the project was simple enough: interest in Army publications was down, and the absence of quality professional conversations became more evident daily. To stimulate renewed professional discourse across the formation, the office of the CSA was looking to link Army leaders with journals once again to spur innovation and discussion to maintain an edge in future combat. After all, "[e]ffective military writing provides a way for leaders to inform the force, connects units and individuals laterally so they can share lessons and best practices, allows the field an outlet to pass information up, connects soldiers today with inspiration from our past, and develops better communicators" (Griffiths, 2023, p. 1).


### Inspiration

The inspiration to address the problem originated in 1934 with Major Edwin "Forrest" Harding. In 1934, the Army, though not engaged in massive conflict at the time, was looking toward preparedness and force modernization. Just as today, modernization requires ingenuity and thoughtfulness. An emphasis on movement and maneuver marked this moment, and the Army was only beginning to see technology integration into its greater formations and their guiding doctrines. Major Harding was thrust into this moment of need by his assignment to the *Infantry Journal*, with the goal of increasing the dissemination



of information and reenergizing professional communication. “In just four years, Harding doubled circulation and fostered critical debates over the rapidly maturing tank and combined arms. Today, the Army again finds itself in an interwar period, seeking to transform before the next war” (Griffiths, 2023, p. 1). Interwar period organizational revitalization seemed to work in this historical instance and is the inspiration for much-needed current efforts in revitalizing Army publications. And so, in the spirit of MAJ Harding, the first workshop was convened with about “50 experts in military journals, accessible archives, and professional military education...[to] chart the way forward for the Army’s journals” (Griffiths, 2023, p. 1).

Perhaps the first Warrant Officer to publish in Infantry Journal was Warrant Officer Ely Jacques Kahn, a prolific writer drafted during World War II in 1941. While serving, he wrote for several sources, including Yank, the Army Weekly, and the Infantry Journal. In 1942, Kahn wrote *Life at Camp* (Kahn, 1942). By the fall of 1943, Chief Warrant Officer E.J. Kahn wrote scores of articles for the Infantry Journal, Army newspapers, and even New Yorker magazine. But, probably none more relevant than the first that later turned into a book with a forward from Major General Edwin Harding himself. Interestingly, Kahn wrote about the battles in New Guinea during World War II, where he served under Major General Harding’s command in the 32d Infantry Division until Harding was relieved by MacArthur in December of 1942 (Huber, n.d.).



## Workshops

Representatives from across the Army and beyond participated in the conference, including Warrant Officers, and all exchanged ideas openly. Senior leaders expressed intent and interest, and to paraphrase one of them, “[w]hatever my boss finds important, I find completely consuming.” The CSA found this important, and the call to arms was essentially given, and all found it consuming. The members were broken into four working groups: Policy and modernization, Archives, Staffing, and Education. Each working group was tasked with knocking over bureaucratic walls, finding commonality in capability, and looking for efficiency and innovation in publication. Each working group was to collect their data and provide the CSA with their findings, hopefully crafting a way forward.

Some of the items brought out of the initial working group were recommendations toward mobile-friendly platforms, web-first publications, increased attention on archiving to determine accessibility and other usage statistics and adopting changes in professional military education to “improve familiarity with professional journals” (Griffiths, 2023, p. 1). The improvement areas were immediately reintroduced at a subsequent Fort Leavenworth, Kansas workshop. Jim Steddum and CW3 Albert attended these sessions for Strength in Knowledge. Army University Press hosted the effort, even spearheading a massive effort to reorganize the location and accessibility of all Army journals under the banner Line of Departure. Other outcomes from the second workshop included a tremendous, and still ongoing, campaign in which LTC Griffiths, SFC Summerlin, and so many others discuss the intent to revitalize Army publications. War on the Rocks, The Green Notebook, and multiple podcasts, including *COHORT W*, started hosting guests to discuss the efforts of the Harding Project.

Again, this article means not only sharing a working group’s activities. It is so much more important. Through this working group, the CSA is trying to maximize problem-solving among leaders throughout the Army by increasing communication and professional discussion, but it intends to create vehicles that augment doctrine. There is no better vehicle for the coming talks than Army journals and their

associated supporting mediums. Do not take my word; simply listen to General George, General Brito, and Sergeant Major of the Army Weimer (2023):

As you contribute to our revitalized professional journals, you will be solving problems and you will also be strengthening the profession. For individuals, writing a well-argued article with supporting evidence hones the ability to think critically and communicate. These are essential leader traits. It also requires some courage to put your ideas out there, and both individuals and the institution will take some licks in the process. But this is exactly the type of courage we need right now. It is no different than any other form of training. Well-meaning leaders may be wary of “rocking the boat,” but the Army needs the absolute best ideas at echelon. You have our commitment that we will be open to the best ideas, even if they challenge the sacred cows of the Army’s conventional wisdom. Encourage writing in your formations so that our Army remains the greatest ground force in the world—strong, professional, and ready to defend its fellow citizens.

## **Tools and Resources**

If you have stayed with this article to this point, chances are you are interested in joining the effort to revitalize professional discourse within the ranks of the Warrant Officer and the Army writ large. Perhaps you feel motivated to contribute to the discussion and are unsure where to start. Or maybe you know where to start but do not consider yourself much of a writer. Well then, welcome to the starting line reader, and worry not; tools abound to assist you in learning, writing, and communicating your ideas to a greater force.

The best starting point for anyone looking to join in revitalizing Army journals is to visit Army University Press or AUP. The AUP website hosts tons of information and publications, including *Strength in Knowledge: The Warrant Officer Journal*. On the flagship page, you will also find a tab to select the Chief of Staff of the Army Recommended Articles. If you are going to read one thing every month, then let it be the CSA’s recommended articles, as this will likely give you an understanding of preferred topics of discussion. Additionally, this site will soon host *Line of Departure*, a one-stop shop for all journals within the US Army that will be mobile-friendly. There have even been discussions that the selected software will allow an audio function for future articles. AUP is the best place to visit if you seek inspiration, knowledge, or the current pace of professional discourse within the Army.

Perhaps you feel interested in the current discussion and are well-read, but writing is not your strong suit, or you simply need assistance. One option is attending professional military education (PME) courses, e.g., WOILE, as faculty will coach students through writing via Writing Improvement Classes. Additionally, in WOSSE, students can present articles for consideration and peer review on critical topics from their field. They can even sit with instructors for coaching to bring their papers to a publishable level. It is hard to find time to write, and PME is intended to be a moment of professional solace and growth where students can focus on improving skills and knowledge.

If PME attendance is not available in the near future, perhaps you simply need other assistance. Free resources are available online, such as *Professional Writing: The Command and General Staff College Writing Guide* (2024), which emphasizes the writing process and all associated pitfalls and tricks for writers. There are also writing communities and discussions occurring consistently online. One CGSC faculty member, Dr. Trent Lythgoe, author of *Professional Writing*, always discusses elements of the writer’s craft on his LinkedIn account. Additionally, editors across the various publication vehicles in and around the Army are always willing to help a new or first-time writer. The point is that tools exist, and writing for publication is accessible to all willing to put in the effort. The Army’s Flagship journal,

Military Review published a special edition on Professional Writing. This issue has become the standard reference for Warrant Officer PME at the Warrant Officer Career College. Writing to publish is the standard we ask all students to tackle, including researching other journals.

Finally, it is notable that the Library of Congress has issued an International Standard Serial Number to our young journal. The Army also recognizes the Journal as Professional Bulletin 1918—a fitting number representing the year of official recognition as an Army cohort. We will publish more on the Line of Departure in individual articles. Once published, the article will be archived at the Defense Technical Information Center and receive Digital Object Identifiers (DOIs) to increase searchability across the research sphere.

## **Closing Thoughts**

Writing for publication in an Army journal allows for a professional conversation to occur beyond the walls of an office or organization. I remain incredibly grateful that the CSA office included Warrant Officers in the greater Harding Project endeavor. The voice of the technical expert is critical and not always heard outside of an aircraft, legal office, or motor pool. Writing or sharing professional thoughts in a greater context is challenging, as it usually brings scrutiny and potentially welcomes disapproval and argument. Who cares! A little conflict is good in an organizational setting as it gives way to discussion and possible innovation. Warrant Officers must be a part of the discussion, and so the cohort must write. It is all too appropriate to close with the following from LTG Beagle (2023):

Now, here are my three easy ways to drive this change:

Our force must learn how to write (again). I recall days of staff duty where the assignment to the commander in the morning was a paper. I remember doing the same as a battalion and brigade commander. Writing takes practice.

Help Soldiers and leaders overcome a fear of writing and the feedback. To write is to think, but it is also to be vulnerable and who wants to be vulnerable?

Encourage, endorse, and create environments where our teammates will be willing to give of their time to write.

## **Line of Departure**

Line of Departure debuted October 11, 2024, at the Association of the United States Army Exposition in Washington, D.C. You will be able to search for all journals and articles, including those featured by the Chief of Staff of the Army's reading list at <https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil>. You will also find journals and publications hosted by Army University Press at <https://www.armyupress.army.mil>. On social media, the look for the username @LDUSARMYJOURNALS on:

- Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/LDUSArmyJournals>
- X (formerly Twitter): <https://x.com/LDUSArmyJournal>
- LinkedIn: <https://www.linkedin.com/showcase/ldusarmyjournals>
- Instagram: <https://www.instagram.com/ldusarmyjournals/>



## About the Authors

Dr. Leonard Momeny, Ed.D., retired from the U.S. Army as a Chief Warrant Officer 5 after 26 years of service. He served as senior faculty at the Warrant Officer Career College, Fort Novosel, Alabama. Leonard holds degrees from Central Texas College, Southwestern College Kansas, American Military University, and Liberty University. He finished his doctorate at Liberty University in 2020 and is an adjunct faculty member at Liberty University and Purdue Global. Leonard is a Master Army Aviator and a graduate of Ranger School.

Jim Steddum retired from the United States Army as a Chief Warrant Officer 5 after 30 years of service. He is the academic lead/SME for the Leadership and Management Department, Warrant Officer Career College. Jim holds two degrees from American Military University and graduate certificates from the University of Alabama and the U.S. Army War College. Jim is pursuing a doctorate in strategic leadership from Liberty University. Jim assumed the duties of managing editor of *Strength in Knowledge* upon Dr. Momeny's retirement transition.

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# Book Review

## **A review of *The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them* presented by Jim Steddum, Department of Leadership and Management, U.S. Army Warrant Officer Career College**

Written by E.J. Kahn, Jr. Published by Viking Press, New York, N.Y. 1975. 337 pages.

E. J. Kahn Jr.'s, *The China Hands*, stands as a testament to Kahn's prowess as a journalist, WWII veteran, and historian. Kahn tells the overlooked stories of the American diplomats who played crucial roles in shaping U.S. policy towards China during and after World War II. He focuses on the experiences of a group of U.S. Foreign Service officers known as the "China Hands," who were stationed in China during a tumultuous period marked by the Chinese Civil War and the rise of communism under Mao Zedong. The book provides insight into the complex web of diplomatic relations, personal experiences, and political machinations with a nuanced understanding of the challenges faced by these diplomats.

The historical context covered in "The China Hands" is crucial for understanding the evolution of U.S.-China relations. Kahn expertly navigates the period from the 1930s through the 1950s, encompassing the alliance between the U.S. and China during World War II, the subsequent Chinese Civil War, and the early years of the Cold War. This era saw dramatic shifts in U.S. policy towards China, from support for the Nationalist government to the severing of official ties following the Communist victory in 1949 and the subsequent marginalization of diplomats during the McCarthy era.

True to his reputation as a master storyteller, Kahn employs his signature anecdotal and detailed reporting style in "The China Hands." His approach, honed through decades of work at *The New Yorker*, combines rigorous research with engaging narrative prose. Kahn's ability to weave personal stories with broader historical events brings the "China Hands" to life, making their experiences accessible and relatable to readers still today.

The book is fifty years old in 2025. While the book may seem irrelevant, readers will gain a historical perspective as well as a better understanding of history itself. Said differently, the study of history is as important as the study of the perspectives of history over time. Most Soldiers today would not know that Soldiers were stationed in China during WWII as described by Kahn, who was appointed Warrant Officer in the early 1940s. As a War Correspondent, Kahn fought for his country and fought to preserve history through journalism and writing; a true Harding fellow.

*The China Hands* remains highly relevant in the context of contemporary U.S.-China relations. Kahn's work provides valuable historical perspective on the roots of this complex relationship. The book's exploration of how individual diplomats can influence foreign policy resonates with current debates about expertise and decision-making in international relations. Moreover, the themes of ideological conflict, misunderstanding, and the personal costs of diplomatic service explored in "The China Hands" continue to be pertinent in today's geopolitical landscape. The book serves as a cautionary tale about the dangers of allowing domestic political pressures to overshadow nuanced foreign policy approaches, a lesson that remains relevant in current U.S.-China relations.





# Warrant Officer in History: The Honorable Service of CW2 Fuchigami

## Warrant Officer Candidate Robert A. Sanders, WOCS Class 25-02 (Fort Novosel)

*Editor's Note: Warrant Officer Candidate Robert A. Sanders penned this article during his study of Army Leadership Doctrine in the Warrant Officer Candidate Course. After grading the assignment, his instructor submitted the article for editor's review based on the power of his words. The editors formatted the article and made minor corrections for ease of reading; however, the content is that of the author's. As such, this is the first article selected for publication from a warrant officer candidate since the inception of Strength in Knowledge: The Warrant Officer Journal.*

When I was in high school, I met a young man named Kirk Takeshi Fuchigami Jr. He was short and scrawny but funny, friendly, smart, and never boasted or beat his chest. In high school, that is a rare trait. What I did not realize then was that my new friend would be a Chief Warrant Officer 2 (CW2), a Bronze Star recipient, and a hero to a very scared group of soldiers in Afghanistan.

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, chapter 2-1, states that: "Influences such as background, beliefs, education, and experiences affect all soldiers and DA civilians." This becomes apparent without the reading when you look at people like CW2 Fuchigami. Even before becoming a soldier, he displayed all three leadership attributes as if they were his first language. During our years in high school, Kirk was active in AFJROTC and our school's aviation magnet program. He was often found in a leadership role that required him to do public speaking, cite regulations, critique strangers' uniform wear, and occasionally teach various subjects. He always did so with confidence, professionalism, and expertise that would make you think he had been doing it for years. During high school, he became one of the youngest people in the school's history to earn his private pilot's license. Now, anyone who has ever flown a plane knows that doing so is a very mentally challenging task. To fly an airplane takes a great deal of mental agility, confidence, and discipline. Now, do that same task when you are sixteen or seventeen years old when your brain is still developing. Kirk was able to perform expertly years beyond his age level. That is, in my opinion, something that made him such a perfect candidate for warrant officer.



Kirk was a good man and a good friend. That made it that much harder when I learned of his passing. I had let life get away from me and, as a result, had not spoken to Kirk in several years. I had no idea he had become a Warrant Officer, an Apache pilot, or a husband until I read his obituary on a popular social media page. That was when I learned that my friend had died a true leader and a savior to a platoon of men. On November 20, 2019, CW2 Fuchigami died while he was helping a group of soldiers whose lives hung in the balance. A man named Brandon Hernandez posted on Kirk's obituary page that his platoon had been hit with a vehicle-borne IED a week prior; he was nervous, anxious, and scared when he had to go on patrol again so soon. Those emotions grew exponentially when the mission "ended up going wrong", as he put it. The man explained how he "was panicking, nervous, and scared that he was going to lose his life, he was losing faith with every minute." But when he heard the Apache in the sky, flown by CW2 Knadle and CW2 Fuchigami, his fear turned to hope, and his anxiety calmed. He explains that the mission ended up being 18 hours long, and the Apache were with them all the way.

During that one engagement, Chief Fuchigami showed clear leadership competencies and attributes. When he arrived on-site, his presence motivated and inspired the rest of the platoon to carry on the mission. By staying there to provide overwatch for the platoon, he and his copilot helped build trust in those soldiers on the ground. They knew that someone had their back. They could see it, and that made all the difference in their ability to achieve mission success. From what I have been able to find, CW2 Fuchigami and CW2 Knadle died when their AH-64 Apache crashed due to mechanical failure. I've never met Kirk's widow, and I may never know the finer details of that mission. But I knew I had not considered becoming an Army Warrant Officer until I learned about it. When I learned about Kirk's passing, I looked into the Warrant Officer school and learned more about it. All I knew at that point was that they were technical experts and the only service members who could be pilots without a college degree. I don't know why anybody would want to do anything else; I know I have a lot to learn.

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# Faculty Spotlight - CW3 Pete Ray

## Department of Military History

Chief Warrant Officer 3 (CW3) Peter C. Ray is a remarkable member of faculty of the Warrant Officer Career College (WOCC). His commitment to service and leadership is evident in various capacities throughout the WOCC and the community. Pete is an instructor in the Department of Military History. He also served as a Training, Advising, and Counseling (TAC) Officer with the 1st Warrant Officer Company. He serves beyond his instructional duties by serving as a mentor to hundreds of Warrant Officer Candidates that pass through the hall of the WOCC. His expertise and military history and passion for teaching helped him lead the project of designing the Warrant Officer Museum at the historic J.D. Holman House in Ozark, Alabama. With contributions from the Warrant Officer Historical Foundation, Pete has dedicated countless hours to gather and categorize artifacts, effectively narrating the history of the Army Warrant Officer from its inception in 1918 to the present day. Pete continues to collaborate with the Warrant Officer Historical Foundation to ensure the accurate and respectful presentation of the Warrant Officer's lineage and history effectively giving students an opportunity to witness history.



CW3 Ray is actively involved in various organizations within the Wiregrass region, including the Enterprise Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) and the United States Army Warrant Officer Association. Pete has volunteered over five hundred hours and helped to raise more than \$8,000 for the CW5 John Robinson Scholarship Program, benefiting five local high schools. His community involvement extends to environmental efforts, such as participating in the Adopt a Highway program.

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Peter C. Ray exemplifies selfless service and dedication to his community. His contributions not only enhance the educational experience of his students but also foster a powerful sense of community through various initiatives. As such, the U.S. Warrant Officer Association recognized CW3 Pete Ray as the 2024 CW4 Albert M. Holcombe Warrant Officer of the Year.



# Call for Papers and Submission Guidelines

*Strength in Knowledge: The Warrant Officer Journal* is a professional bulletin of the United States Army produced by the faculty and staff working at the United States Army Warrant Officer Career College (USAWOCC). The editorial staff produces the quarterly publication in effort to improve all areas of the Warrant Officer's education, whether common core or technical in nature. This resource is intended to inform and shape organizational systems in the greater profession of arms through the sharing of key insights and lessons learned.

We continuously accept manuscripts for rolling publications and subsequent Journal editions. The journal invites practitioners, researchers, academics, PME students, and military professionals to submit manuscripts that address the issues and challenges of military education and training, training development, doctrine (whether specific data from manuals or discussion of concepts), systems warfare, Army modernization and other subjects relevant to the profession of arms. Submissions related to technical areas of various Warrant Officers' specialties will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Book reviews of published relevant works are also encouraged.

## Submission Guidelines

Submissions should be between 1,500 and 5,000 words and supported by research, evident through the citation of sources. Scholarship must conform to commonly accepted research standards such as described in The Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, 7th edition. For resources on writing in approved APA format simply reach out to USAWOCC. Book reviews should be between 500 to 800 words and provide a concise evaluation of the book and its relevance to the professional Warrant Officer or current fight. The editors recommend using *Professional Writing* (2024) available at: [https://armyuniversity.edu/cgsc/cgss/DCL/files/ST\\_22-2\\_US\\_Army\\_CGSC\\_Writing\\_Guide\\_March\\_2024.pdf](https://armyuniversity.edu/cgsc/cgss/DCL/files/ST_22-2_US_Army_CGSC_Writing_Guide_March_2024.pdf)

Articles and manuscripts must be submitted in Microsoft Word, or compatible format, with separate, author owned or creative commons licensed picture files and a 100-150 word author's note. We will publish articles individually and/or on a quarterly schedule. For additional information or to submit an article, email to **wo\_journal@army.mil**.

## Order of Eagle Rising Society

To learn more about the modern warrant officer exemplified by lifelong leaders of character, read about the inductees of Order of the Eagle Rising Society at: <https://sites.google.com/view/eaglerising/home>.





