ALLIES OF A KIND
Canadian Army-US Army Relations and the Korean War, 1950-1953
Allan R. Millett
COVER IMAGE. Brigadier J.M. Rockingham meets with US General Matthew Ridgway. (Courtesy of Canadian Department of National Defence.)
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Editor
Jennifer B. Fike
Foreword

American Soldiers take for granted the close personal relations we have developed with our Canadian comrades during more than a decade of side-by-side service in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other areas around the world. Canadians serve in responsible positions inside a number of US formations, and the reverse is also true. Therefore, it may surprise some in both armies to read Allan Millett’s less-than-rosy narrative of our two nations’ first attempt at interoperability. US Army Command and General Staff College Press is pleased to publish this short study not because we seek to focus on past mistakes, but because it helps to identify some of the issues to consider as the US Army focuses ever more energy on its regional alignment of forces. Today no less than in 1950, planners must understand and account for national differences when the goal is interoperability. With little justification, US commanders in Korea at the operational level often paid scant notice to the national strategies and aspirations of the United Nations Command member states. At best, this led to frosty relations and poor coordination; at worst, it resulted in a casual disregard for casualties among non-US formations in pursuit of tactical goals only tangentially related to strategic requirements.

The reasons for avoiding such preconceptions today are obvious, and identifying the shortcomings of our predecessors does them no dishonor. The US now relies on coalition military support for everything from humanitarian response to major combat operations. The human dimension of war, the one in which personal experiences and prejudices influence battlefield behavior, is more important than ever in an environment where technological solutions cannot guarantee strategic success. Allied interoperability is much more about each side overcoming the burden of previous experience than it is about whose materiel is more efficient. For this reason I hope you will read this short history of US Army-Canadian Forces relations during the Korean War with care and identify the themes it contains. They will serve as useful topics of discussion in formal and informal settings at every level. Dr. Millett has proven yet again that knowing our history is the first requirement for improving the future.

Colonel Thomas E. Hanson
Director, US Army Combat Studies Institute
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Introduction

The international mobilization to save the Republic of Korea (ROK) in June 1950 brought the Canadian Army into its first major sustained contact with the US Army. The experience proved generally positive and laid the foundation for cooperation for hemispheric and European defense during the Cold War. The relationship of the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (CIBG) in Korea and its rear echelon in Japan to the US Army was, however, occasionally strained. The major clash of military cultures between Canadians and Americans occurred in the Japanese domain of the US Far East Command (FECOM) and US Army Forces Far East, not in the US Eighth Army. The result was grudging accommodation and wary compromises that kept alive the Canadian and American partnership.¹

When the United Nations called for its member nations to provide ground forces to fight the North Korean Army, the US Department of Defense tried to set the terms by which FECOM would accept foreign troops for the Eighth Army. The basic criteria were reasonable enough. The forces should be of brigade or regimental size and of proven effectiveness. The forces should be supportable by their national armies and the US Army. The logistical support agreements should be negotiated for cost sharing, to be paid later. The existing military aid programs would remain in place. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) knew which armies met the criteria: Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Canada.²

The Korean War mobilization brought Canadian air and naval units to the FECOM, but for these units — three Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) destroyers and one squadron of Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) transport aircraft — integration into the UN naval and air forces, dominated by the US Seventh Fleet and US Far East Air Forces, proved smooth. Canadian and American air and naval units had worked together since 1940 in hemispheric defense. They not only spoke the same operational language but shared the international culture of modern air and naval forces. Disagreements tended to be about matters of personal style and minor operational issues, not matters for organizational attention. If sometimes miffed at being treated as stepchildren of the (British) Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy, the Canadian air and naval commanders had no special problems integrating with United Nations Command’s air and maritime forces. The Korean War simply extended the World War II partnership.
The Canadian ground forces did not have the same wealth of shared World War II experience with the US Army in forging an alliance. The Canadian Army between 1939 and 1945 had gone to war as the leading Commonwealth partner in saving the British Empire — if one excludes the Indian Army. The Canadians did not flinch after the disasters of Hong Kong (1941) and Dieppe (1942) but soldiered on to victory in campaigns in Sicily, Italy, and northern Europe, 1943-1945. By war’s end, Canada had provided five divisions to armies and Army groups most influenced by British Army commanders and military culture.

Canadian Soldiers did have some experience in World War II as part of extemporized, special-purpose US Army units. Canadian Soldiers participated in the American-commanded, unopposed reoccupation of Kiska Island in the Aleutians in August 1943. The Canadian Army contributed 5,000 officers and other ranks of the First Special Service Force and the 13th Infantry Brigade, the latter a conscripted hemisphere defense unit, to the Kiska operation. The First Special Service Force, formed for mountain and arctic raids into Norway that never occurred, then redeployed to Italy and France and served with distinction until disbanded in December 1944. Like their American counterparts, the 800 Canadian members of this force existed on the forgotten fringes of their Army.

Canadian and American Soldiers served together in both the extreme east and west of wartime Canada. During the construction of the Alaska-Canada highway and pipeline (1941-1943) 33,000 GIs and 16,000 Canadian troops, largely engineer, transportation, and support units, served under separate commands along the 1,523 mile construction project which ran from Dawson’s Creek, British Columbia, to Fairbanks, Alaska. On the Atlantic coast, US Navy and US Army Air Forces units arrived in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland to manage American participation in the aviation and maritime transit of the North Atlantic. The trauma caused by the Yanks, if any, bore upon civilians; the air and naval services shared hardships and entitlements on common grounds.

In sum, 730,159 Canadians served in their national wartime Army, but only a few thousand had any meaningful contact with the US Army. The senior officers of the postwar Canadian Army won their rank and decorations in British armies fighting the Italians and Germans. During the Korean War, the 25th CIBG had three commanders, all of them with exceptional records as commanders of Canadian brigades and battalions in Europe. The three infantry battalions, one Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (RCHA) field regiment (an artillery battalion), and ar-
mored squadron (a tank company) had 23 different commanders. Not one had served with the US Army or attended a US Army school. If they had any opinions about American Soldiers, they probably reflected the prejudices of their British Army peers, who held the US Army in mild contempt, largely because of its relaxed discipline, careless “turnout,” lack of a regimental tradition, profligacy with equipment and supplies, and tactical casualness.

In the face of the British Commonwealth’s postwar economic woes and demanding military commitments, the Canadian Army faced a new reality: Canada’s defense would depend in the future on amicable relations with the US Armed Forces. The developing partnership focused on hemispheric defense along the Arctic Circle and the northern waters of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, all doorways to and from the Soviet Union. By 1950, the members of NATO, having confronted the Berlin Blockade, had also committed themselves to the forward deployment of air and ground forces to a NATO command defending continental Europe. Despite a shrinking treasury, Canada agreed in January of 1951 to form a contingency force of division strength for both hemispheric and European defense. The Canadian Active Force (regular Army) in June 1950 numbered only 20,369 organized as a mobilization base for any future wartime force. Its combat power came from three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and a tank battalion. The Canadian regulars showed a distinct emphasis on administrative, technical, and service-support experts. Soldiers in combat units made up only one-third of the force. The Army also had a schools system and base structure to maintain, organized to train reserves.4
The Canadian Army in 1950

The outbreak of the Korean War found Canadian-American Army relations in the toddling stage of development. Accepting the association in principle did not ensure any real collaboration, certainly not equity. Although the Department of National Defence (DND) had begun contracting for American military equipment, largely for the Canadian air and naval forces, not until May 1950 did Congress approve legislation that allowed the Department of Defense to buy as much as $20 million of Canadian goods and services, a sum about one-quarter of Canadian military purchases in the United States. There were as yet no agreements on exchanges in officer professional military education or alliance staffing. The Minister of National Defence believed in US-Canadian cooperation. The Honorable Brooke Claxton, a tall, hyperactive, talkative Montreal lawyer who had served as a gunner sergeant in World War I, supported alliance initiatives, but as a Liberal Party leader, he also fretted over money and Parliamentary criticism. Until Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s retirement in 1948, Claxton served a prime minister whose basic instincts were pacifistic and isolationist as well as unbending on reduced government spending. A reform enthusiast, Claxton found the Army’s senior officers, especially Generals Charles Foulkes and Guy G. Simonds, the two Chiefs of General Staff (CGS), short on imagination and long on avoiding risk. Certainly neither attached much importance to the American connection.

Claxton himself preached US-Canadian partnership with missionary fervor. As defense minister (1946-1954), Claxton strengthened the Canadian military mission in Washington and ordered it to develop strong working ties with the US Army’s research and development agencies. He consistently looked for areas for ground forces cooperation but he found Army projects squeezed by a vulnerable defense budget that represented

Figure 1. Canadian Chief of the General Staff, General G.G. Simonds.
half of Canada’s government expenditures or $2.7 billion a year after 1950, which was 10 percent of Canada’s gross national product. Half the defense budget went to air defense, in part to keep Canada’s aviation industry aloft. The same imbalance shaped military assistance programs with the United States. In the 1952-1953 plan, the RCAF received $47 million for F-86 fighter-interceptor airframes (purchased in the US) and $112 million to pay for aircrew training with the US Air Force. The Canadian Army’s largest aid item was $2.7 million to buy US Army 155mm howitzers. Despite continuing discussions, Canadian officers found various proposals for weapons standardization unacceptable. Almost every weapon the US Army made or wanted to make impressed the Canadians as overpriced and oversold on performance. The possible exception was tactical radio communications, but by 1953 these projects faded in the rapid development of spending for air defense radars and anti-aircraft missiles. Even officer education exchanges became a one way trip to the United States. In 1952, more than 200 Canadian officers attended US Army schools while perhaps 30 Americans, mostly air defense technicians, went to Canada.⁵

In an operational sense, there wasn’t much Canadian Army with whom the US Army could cooperate. The Active Force in June 1950 fielded three infantry battalions, the First Battalions of three historic regiments, politically distributed by geography and recruiting appeal: the Royal Vingt-Deux Regiment (R22°R), the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), and the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI or Patricias). The regimental areas were eastern Francophone Canada (R22°R), central Canada (RCR), and the western provinces (PPCLI). In theory all three regiments, which had reserve counterparts, recruited on a national basis; in practice they looked more like the “county regiments” of the British Army. The working language of R22°R was Quebecois French. The other units that made up the combat forces were two armor regiments (two battalions) of Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadian), an artillery regiment (one battalion) of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, and a World War II-era range of support and service units of battalion strength or smaller to handle communications, engineering, supply, maintenance, training, ordnance, medical, security, and personnel functions.

To control defense spending, the DND chose to man the operational units at less than wartime strength and cut training costs. In 1950, much to General Foulkes’ unhappiness, DND raised recruiting standards and even closed its recruiting stations for the winter months. The DND also
suspended unit live-fire exercises. Largely because the US Army agreed to furnish logistical support, the First Battalion, PPCLI participated in Operation *Sweetbriar*, December 1949-January 1950, a cold weather exercise held in Alaska and the Yukon under American sponsorship. The Canadian battalion, which made one parachute jump, made up less than 10 percent of the 10,000 man exercise force. Much of the Canadian Army’s concerns in 1950 were whether its one brigade group would remain in Canada for hemispheric missions or deploy to Europe as a token contribution to NATO’s planned ground force stationed in Germany.⁶
The Origins of the Canadian Special Force (CSF) for Korean Service

As part of the Truman administration’s decision to send ground forces to help the Army of the ROK stop the invasion by of the Korean People’s (North Korean) Army, the US State Department chose to use the United Nations to legitimize the American military intervention. The key individuals who convinced President Harry S. Truman to take the “collective action” path to meet “international aggression” were Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk, and John Foster Dulles, who was the special envoy to Tokyo to initiate negotiations for a peace treaty with Japan. Truman did not require much persuading because he saw North Korea’s invasion as another Soviet military adventure to test his will to contain communism. As part of its campaign to save the ROK with a military intervention sanctioned by UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, the State Department, much to the dismay of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, especially Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins, called for America’s allies in the UN to send ground forces to join the US Eighth Army in Korea. Canadian diplomats at the United Nations in New York and in the embassy in Washington immediately felt pressure to persuade the government in Ottawa to take a leading role in sending troops to Korea. Great Britain on 16 August ordered two infantry battalions stationed in Hong Kong to sail for Pusan, which only increased the pressure.

The reorganization of the Canadian government after King’s retirement in 1948 predisposed the Cabinet to sending ground forces to Korea. Deciding to send token naval and air units to the war zone caused no special policy argument. Some Cabinet officers and key members of Parliament thought this commitment was quite enough. The Ministry of External Affairs (the Canadian State Department) was not so sure. The diplomats had a champion in the cabinet, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, who had been Secretary of State for External Affairs until King’s retirement. His principal undersecretary, a career diplomat, took office as Canada’s foreign minister, and that person was the energetic charismatic giant of the Canadian Diplomatic Corps, Lester B. “Mike” Pearson, a future prime minister and Nobel Peace Prize winner. Like his friend and counterpart Dean Acheson, Pearson had been present at the creation of the World War II alliance, the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, and NATO. Pearson carried two intellectual and emotional burdens that influenced him to be “tough” in meeting Communist adventurism.
One was a keen awareness of his unhappy military experience in World War I when, after honorable service in an ambulance unit, he failed as a pilot trainee in the Royal Flying Corps. During an unauthorized leave, Pearson had been run down by a bus and his unauthorized injuries led to a nervous breakdown. College studies, a faculty appointment, and a soaring diplomatic career restored Pearson’s self-confidence but he retained a sense of unfulfilled military obligation that predisposed him to support calls to duty, especially from the United States, which Pearson respected with affection. He shared this affection with his close friends Hume Wrong, the Canadian ambassador in Washington, and Escott Reid, Pearson’s closest advisor.

Pearson’s other concern was a Canadian faux pas in the United Nations on Korean policy. In 1947-1948, the United States turned to the UN to extract it from its military governance of the southern Korean occupation zone, established by hurried agreement with the Soviet Union in August of 1945 to repatriate Japanese Soldiers and civilians back to the Home Islands. Two years of negotiations with the Soviet Union produced no formula to put Korea back together again. Korean opposition to the haphazard American trusteeship mounted to the point of insurgency. When the United States turned to the UN for help, Canada (with Pearson deeply involved) led the plan to create the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTOK) that investigated the task of unifying Korea by UN-sponsored elections. The Canadian representative on UNTOK, George S. Patterson, played an important role in persuading the UN General Assembly to establish the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) that would supervise the Korean elections either to unite and neutralize the country or to establish the American zone as the Republic of Korea, the only internationally recognized government of all Korea. Canada, the UN assumed, would continue its leadership role as a statutory member of UNCOK. Mackenzie King, however, decided to distance Canada from this risky Asian commitment. He had little confidence that the UN, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Koreans would unify Korea by peaceful means, for which King gets high marks for prediction. More optimistic, Pearson thought the effort to make UNCOK work was critical to the UN’s reputation and Canada’s special relationship with the United States. When King refused to appoint a Canadian member to UNCOK, Pearson became angry and embarrassed for Canada and remained so. He felt Canada had an unfulfilled duty to help South Korea. As the ROK and American Soldiers fought a delaying action that finally ended
at the Masan-Taegu-Pohang perimeter, the cabinet in Canada debated whether to send ground troops to Korea. Canadian public opinion, the pollsters said, favored some commitment while the anti-Liberal opposition sounded more loudly skeptical. Despite Mike Pearson’s opposition, seconded by Brooke Claxton, Prime Minister St. Laurent announced on 19 July that Canada would not send ground troops to Korea. The popular and press outrage at this decision convinced St. Laurent to agree with Pearson that Canada’s new internationalism and rapprochement with the United States justified sending ground troops. He changed policy in another announcement on 7 August. Had the brigade group been organized from the Canadian Active Forces, it might have reached Korea in six weeks. A new formation would take longer. Either way the war would be won or lost sooner, which would have made the Canadian commitment irrelevant, as St. Laurent may have calculated. Whatever Canada did would take time and the mobilization plan actually put into effect insured that the Canadians would arrive in Korea no sooner than 1951, if at all.9

There was nothing the US Army could do to speed the Canadians to the war and the Canadians did not ask for help, yet. The US Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins regarded the UN call for troops a State Department idea whose time should not have come. Nothing about the Canadian plan to form an infantry brigade group reassured him. St. Laurent, Pearson, and Claxton charged General Foulkes and Adjutant General W. H. S. Macklin to recruit a new formation from scratch, the Canadian Army Special Force, whose combat element would be the 25th CIBG (Special Force). The concept had a historical precedent, the formation of an infantry battalion (2d Royal Canadian Regiment) for service in South Africa, 1900. In this case, Canada had a much larger pool of World War II veterans from which to recruit. It also had a pool of postwar reservists and cadets to call to the colors voluntarily. The brigade’s core would be a new Second Battalion of each of the Active Force regiments: the PPCLI, the RCR, and the R22°R. The artillery battalion would be an addition to the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery and the tank squadron a new unit of Lord Strathcona’s Horse. All the other supporting units would come from a mix of regulars, volunteer reservists, and veterans. The proposed brigade group would number almost 7,000 officers and other ranks with a forward deployed (Korea and Japan) Brigade Reinforcement Group of an additional 2,105 officers and other ranks.
The Claxton-Foulkes Plan worked in terms of raw numbers and talent. Within weeks, the recruiting offices screened 12,000 volunteers. Claxton reduced recruiting standards and established policies that cut post-special service financial commitments. For example, the volunteers would receive no special family living allowance (the regulars did) but they would not have to contribute to the Army pension fund. Even though the married volunteers had to agree to have part of their pay allotted to their families, they still received three times the monthly disposable cash ($75.00) of their World War II counterparts ($22). The demographic profile of the Special Force enlisted men did not vary significantly from the troops of the Active Force: average age 25; average level of education, Eighth Grade; employed 92 percent. Fifty percent of the volunteers were Catholics, which suggests Francophone (French-speaking) overrepresentation. Unlike the US Army, 65 percent of the Canadians were married. Seventy-five percent of the brigade had prior military experience, 45 percent in the World War II Canadian Army. The enlistment screening process, hardly fool-proof on physical and moral criteria, could not gauge motivation. Of the first 10,000 accepted volunteers, 2,230 were discharged for various reasons of unsuitability and 1,521 men deserted. The recruiters kept finding more men to fill the ranks, although the high turnover slowed individual training and physical conditioning in Canada.¹⁰

The brigade’s officers would set the standards of the brigade as Claxton and Foulkes knew. They chose the brigade commander from the pool of World War II veterans: Brigadier John M. Rockingham, a British Columbia bus line executive, who had commanded a World War II battalion and brigade with distinction (three awards of the Distinguished Service Medal). The three infantry battalion commanders — Lieutenant Colonels James R. Stone (PPCLI), Robert A. Keene (RCR), and Jacques Dextraze (R22°R) — had comparable war records. Less than thrilled by his new military career,
Rockingham set conditions for his acceptance of command that allowed him to choose the officers critical to the brigade’s success. Rockingham chose officers of proven wartime expertise and mature professionalism. Twenty-one of the 28 officers in the brigade headquarters were regulars, as were 22 of 32 key commanders and 34 of 51 technical specialists. The infantry companies were dominated by temporary Special Force officers, but many of them were former noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the regular army.

In dealing with their US Army counterparts, the Canadians had a rank advantage: majors commanded companies and captains served as executive officers (“2ICs” in Commonwealth-speak) where comparable US Army infantry billets were filled by junior captains and lieutenants. The same rank relationship applied in all units.11

Following the progress of forming a Canadian brigade, the US Army Staff assessed the mobilization and recommended that the JCS report to Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall that United Nations Command should accept the brigade groups. The JCS concurred, noting that the Canadians had met all the criteria for Korean service. If the brigade wanted to use British weapons and other equipment, then the subsequent logistical problems became Canada’s concern. The US Army already faced shortages and welcomed some relief. Spared a period of familiarization training with US Army infantry weapons and communications, the CSF might be ready to embark in late November. It could change to American weapons later if “desirable,” perhaps during another three or four months training on Okinawa. General Foulkes seemed most concerned about realistic pre-deployment training and thought that Canada’s earlier winter made training there impractical. His preference would be to send the brigade to a site in the United States, then move it to Japan to climb mountains and conduct tactical exercises “under conditions similar to those in Korea.” Foulkes chose to keep British weapons since he hoped the 25th CIBG would become part of a Commonwealth division. The CGS made one exception, he wanted the new US Army 3.5-inch rocket launcher, a proven T-34 killer.12

The US Army Staff recommended that the Canadian brigade train at Fort Lewis, Washington, staffed to support extensive training but empty now that the 2d Infantry Division was in Korea. US Army Brigadier General LeRoy H. Watson and his staff could provide vehicles, petroleum, oil and lubricant (POL), ammunition, and ranges, and the Army Staff sent Major Chester A. Lively, an infantry officer turned logistician, to Fort Lewis as FECOM’s liaison officer and Army Staff trouble-shooter.
Foulkes and Rockingham later wrote General Collins that the Fort Lewis training had more than met their expectations. Foulkes, however, kept pressing Collins to recommend that the 25th CIBG go to Germany, not Korea. Foulkes’ persistence reflected Canadian press criticism of the St. Laurent government’s Korean commitment. Collins would not be moved. Eighth Army needed not one Canadian battalion but the whole brigade group. Collins promised to help Foulkes spend an uncommitted Mutual Defense Assistance Program grant of $120 million on US Army artillery and vehicles to equip another new brigade group for NATO service. Foulkes had already started forming this force by activating a third battalion for Canada’s three Active Force infantry battalions.13

The 25th CIBG made its first contact with the US Army at Fort Lewis. Rockingham pushed to consolidate his brigade at one site in order to get his troops under the control of his officers, not active force trainers and administrators. In addition to being vacant, Fort Lewis provided American trainers, live-fire ranges and ample ammunition, and access to the Seattle port of embarkation. The Fort Lewis period allowed the Canadians to train with American crew-served weapons (machine guns, mortars, rocket launchers), some radios, and vehicles. The Fort Lewis training proved a bargain at $2.46 a day for each Soldier, or $2.5 million from October 1950 to March 1951 when the brigade departed. The training provided opportunities to see what American equipment and weapons suited Rockingham and his staff. The Canadian infantry sections kept their M4 Enfield rifles, Bren light machine guns, and Sten submachine guns because of their ammunition and troop comfort level. The Canadians kept their British style helmets, justified by their compatibility with radio headsets. The US model helmet might have provided more protection from head wounds but the Canadians wore their unique soft caps anyway. The Canadian troops found GI rations, cooked or field, acceptable but wondered why Canadian money could not buy quality Canadian food available in British Columbia. The Fort Lewis experience gave the Canadians an unjustified sense of superiority over the US Army, erroneously based on observations of US service troops. The Canadians trained hard and endured Washington’s chilly continuous winter rains. The infantry remained in the field for 12-day periods, punctuated by four days of garrison breaks for cleaning, classes, and recovery. The GIs avoided getting wet. The Canadian junior officers discovered that Madigan Army General Hospital had a superior officers’ club well stocked with young nurses. Some officers took the opportunity to learn unfamiliar jobs. Lieutenant Bob Rigma,
Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps (RCOC), learned how to manage his Mobile Laundry and Bath Unit (46 vehicles, 30 men) from a US Army captain who was a professional laundryman. Rigma, who retired as a major general and logistical specialist, remembered using his post exchange (PX) access (part of the US-Canadian military agreement on support) to purchase camp cots and electric razors. He also remembered other acts of kindness. Military police (MPs) recovered his jeep from R22°R thieves and a supply sergeant gave him wooden barracks boxes for his unit’s personal use overseas. Captain Harry Pope, a habitual critic of all things military and the brigade’s first adjutant, found the Fort Lewis training period a welcome relief from the chaotic mobilization in Canada. The Fort Lewis training and support NCOs provided timely assistance, unhindered by regulations. Pope concluded that sergeants ran the US Army. His only memorable complaint was that the managers of the officers’ club did not like rowdy parties. The FBI didn’t like Harry Pope’s interest in a blonde Trotskyite who lured him to an anti-war protest in Seattle. Under pressure to rid his ranks of “radicals,” Brigadier Rockingham sent an enraged Pope back to Canada before the brigade deployed.14
Going to Korea and Joining an American Army

The dramatic change in the war in September-October 1950 threw Canadian-US planning into disarray. General Douglas MacArthur advised that the brigade not train in Japan where it might be viewed as a new occupying force. He then thought that since he was about to destroy the North Korean government and Army, he might need only one token Canadian battalion for occupation duties in North Korea. General Foulkes then reported to General Collins that his government now thought the CSF should become Canada’s NATO ground force. The issue went to Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary Marshall for resolution. The State Department liked the NATO option but as signs of Chinese intervention grew, the JCS on 27 October insisted that the Canadians go to Korea. On 27 November, as Eighth Army reeled back from the Chinese Second Offensive, Marshall assured Brooke Claxton that United Nations Command needed every Canadian fighter Claxton could furnish and the force would go directly to Korea.15

Lester Pearson and Brooke Claxton established the political-strategic context that shaped Canadian-American ground force relations in the war zone, Korea and Japan. Both ministers knew the perils of joining a big army even for a small war. Canadian policy in the two world wars stressed the operational independence and national identity of the Canadian armed forces. For naval and air forces, the charge to be independent could not be met but if Canada could balance its army’s requirements with American assistance and its own support system, Canada might create a military presence and political leverage greater than its real operational contribution. Pearson thought the American call for troops through the UN was so much anti-communist rant, and he feared that the Republican Party would press for a war with China. Claxton worried more about his commanders’ will to resist American or British calls for force integration. The secret of independence was not to ask for too much and to give back enough operational excellence to discourage amalgamation. It was a formula the Canadians had used to ward off the British Army since 1914.16

For the 25th CIBG, maintaining its Canadian identity — and speeding its commitment to combat — meant serving under its own officers, wearing its own uniforms and equipment, using a mix of British and American weapons, driving American vehicles, eating American rations, refueling with US Army gas and lubricants, and trying to communicate with radios used by three different armies. Only the Chinese People’s Volunteer Force (CPVF) faced a similar challenge. Some of
the American weapons and equipment came from Fort Lewis, FECOM (Japan), and the 2d Logistical Command (Korea) picked up most of the supply burden. In his dealing with US Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., his own Cabinet Defence Committee, and the American defense officials with whom he met in conferences, Claxton remained enthusiastic about inter-allied cooperation in Korea. His principal military advisors, General Foulkes (Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee) and Simonds (CGS), supported the defense minister’s dogged pursuit of balance between dependence and independence in dealing with the Americans.\(^\text{17}\)

![Photo courtesy of Library and Archives Canada.](image)

**Figure 3.** Troops of the 2d PPCLI during patrol, March 1951.

While the CSF formed up in North America, Claxton and Foulkes (still only Army CGS in 1950) started to build a Canadian support establishment in the war zone. The first Soldiers to go to Japan were four officers and five enlisted men as a liaison mission to the US FECOM (General Douglas MacArthur) and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force or BCOF (Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson, an Australian). The two senior liaison officers were Brigadier F. J. Fleury and Lieutenant Colonel P. F. L. Sare, who became the underappreciated organizers and driving personalities of the Canadian Military Mission Far East (CMMFE). Although CMMFE in theory
and sometimes in practice represented the RCN and RCAF in Japan, its principal function was to serve the needs of the 25th CIBG, a task it began on 25-30 September 1950 by looking for a suitable training base for the Canadian ground forces. Encouraged by the FECOM staff and Robertson to inspect a US Army base on Okinawa, vacated by two battalions of the US 29th Infantry, the Canadians visited the island and returned to Japan unimpressed with the proffered property. They were pleased with US Army cooperation, which Fleury found more helpful than BCOF’s dire warnings of American incompetence. On 1 October, Fleury met with the FECOM general staff and then had an audience with General MacArthur himself. Subjected to a classic MacArthur “I talk, you listen” briefing, Fleury got a preview of MacArthur’s “I’ve Won the War” soliloquy staged for President Harry S. Truman on Wake Island two weeks later. The overriding message for Canada was simple: don’t bother to send an entire brigade group, but a battalion would be nice for occupation duties in a unified Korea. With this new appreciation of the situation, Fleury recommended to Foulkes that Okinawa basing be ignored and that one Canadian battalion come to Korea directly and leave North America as soon as possible and operate out of the US Eighth Army’s port and logistics base at Pusan.18

Claxton, Foulkes, and Rockingham accepted the new concept of a one-battalion expeditionary force with good grace but did not order the 25th CIBG to stand down from training at its separate posts. For one thing, Canada had assumed the obligation to form a similar brigade group for service in Germany, and Claxton did not relish sending his one “regular” brigade abroad. Instead Claxton and Foulkes ordered Brigadier Rockingham to send one infantry battalion to the US Army base at Fort Lewis, Washington, for its last pre-embarkation training. Just as Rockingham had appealed to Claxton as someone who could work as a partner with the United States and British armies, Rockingham chose the 2d Battalion, PPCLI as his first expeditionary force because he believed Lieutenant Colonel Stone, who had participated in Operation Sweetbriar, could manage the challenges of allied cooperation. The 2d PPCLI’s bases also happened to be closest to Fort Lewis and the embarkation port, Seattle. And the PPCLI had been the first Canadian battalion to reach the Western Front in 1914.19

Recognizing that CMMFE itself needed reinforcement, General Foulkes sent an advance party, commanded by Major C. J. A. Hamilton, a regular general staff officer, first to Fort Lewis and then to Tokyo to arrange for the 2d PPCLI’s arrival in Pusan. Hamilton agreed with
Fleury that the Canadians needed a support structure at both Pusan and somewhere in Japan. Although the US 2d Logistical Command was cooperative enough, its lax inventory control and Korean-Japanese work force made formal supply requisitioning adventurous. Organizing a service organization in Japan would allow the Canadians to work directly with the US Army logisticians of FECOM, in fact to use the US Army as a counterweight to BCOF, which really had little to offer in terms of facilities and equipment. Commonwealth resources were really controlled by the British Army’s General Officer Commanding Far East, Lieutenant General Sir John Harding, based in Hong Kong. Although BCOF helped the Canadians procure some local vehicles, General Robertson seemed more interested in selling Australian rations to the Canadians, which Rockingham wisely rejected in favor of US Army food, none of which included either mutton and vegemite.  

As Canadian planning advanced and the 2d PPCLI moved to Fort Lewis, the People’s Republic of China created, in MacArthur’s well-chosen words, “an entirely new war.” In late October and early November, the first twelve divisions of the CPVF attacked the lead elements of the US 1st Cavalry Division, the US 1st Marine Division, and the ROK 1st, 6th, and Capital Divisions in battles near both of North Korea’s two coastlines. Although MacArthur and his FECOM
G2, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, did not initially recognize the enormity of the Chinese intervention, Lieutenant General Walton A. Walker, the Eighth Army commander, did and demanded control of every UN unit in sight or over the horizon, including the 25th CIBG. After only four days at Fort Lewis to draw weapons and equipment, 2d PPCLI sailed from Seattle on 25 November now bound for a real war. In the meantime, Rockingham requested that Foulkes order all other elements of the 25th CIBG to Fort Lewis for advanced unit training, including the live-fire exercises still banned in Canada. The brigade would specialize in mountain and cold weather operations, certainly appropriate for Korean service, but very demanding on troops and equipment. Rockingham welcomed the challenge and appreciated the help of the Fort Lewis training cadre, who agreed to advise the brigade’s commanding officers, not ignore them as the Canadian cadre had done. Rockingham used the training to weed out the incompetent, unfit, and unwilling members of his command with the full backing of Claxton, Foulkes, and Adjutant General Macklin.21

In the meantime, the 2d PPCLI sailed slowly into harm’s way, but the battalion’s first wounds came in Japan, self-inflicted. Experiencing a sudden, uncharacteristic lapse in his unrelenting discipline, Colonel Stone allowed his bored and paid troops a 48-hour shore leave in Yokohama, presumably to buy souvenirs and Christmas gifts. Facing combat, the battalion’s officers argued that the troops needed a break — and break they did: bottles, fists, faces, stomachs, and urinary systems. They also traded their uniforms for drinks, souvenirs, and services. The collective debauch — the only unit action of its type by Canadians in the Korean War — outraged Stone and hardened his heart to complaints about food, forced marches, mountain climbing at night, primitive living, and a lack of promotions and medals.

The Yokohama affair did not alarm FECOM, however, since it demonstrated Canadian fighting spirit. The incident did not attract much high-level American interest since at that moment (15-17 December 1950) the Eighth Army was in full retreat back to South Korea. The incident, however, may have strengthened CMMFE’s recommendation that off-duty Canadians be concentrated in the port city of Kure, already a Commonwealth naval base and growing British Army support center for the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade (BCB). That unit was already in combat and a probable home for the 2d PPCLI until the 25th CIBG arrived.22
When the 2d PPCLI reached Pusan, Stone faced another challenge, an Eighth Army order to march to the sound of the guns, mostly Chinese, just north of Seoul. Distressed by his battalion’s lack of training, discipline, and physical fitness, Stone firmly and politely kept saying “no” all the way up the chain-of-command until he reached the Eighth Army Commander, General Walker. Despite the constant assertion by Walker’s chief-of-staff, Major General Leven C. Allen, that the 27th BCB needed more troops, Walker accepted Stone’s orders not to enter combat until he judged his battalion fully trained. Walker decided not to force the issue despite Allen’s plea that other new UNC foreign units (the Turkish brigade and the Greek battalion) had not been such reluctant warriors. (Stone called Allen a “rather snarky individual.”) Before Walker could change his mind, Stone moved 2d PPCLI to mountainous Miryang, North Kyongsang province, and away from crowded, odiferous Pusan. Stone immediately mounted a regime of hard marches, tactics, climbing, and weapons firing that by design drove the faint-hearted and unfit Patricias from his ranks. His program of forced attrition alarmed Canadian personnel planners, who estimated that Stone’s rate of non-combat attrition, if applied to the whole 25th CIBG, would require 1,350 replacements a month — above replacing casualties. Stone did not relent in his Spartanesque training. He did not get the eight weeks of training Walker approved, but 2d PPCLI improved rapidly in the six weeks the Eighth Army granted.

With the 2d PPCLI safely dispatched to Korea, CMMFE and Advanced Party, 25th CIBG concentrated on creating a sound administrative-logistical organization in Japan, largely at Kure, designed to parallel US Army service commands and to work closely — but independently — with other British, Australian, and New Zealand military agencies. The Canadians even provided inter-allied entertainment between a 25th CIBG hockey team and a Japanese all-star team. To their surprise, the Canadians lost 6-2 and 6-4 to a group of ice rink kamikazes.

By the time the 25th CIBG entered combat in May 1951 the Canadian organizational presence in Japan had taken its final form. Canadian Military Mission Far East consisted of the following (Canadian Base Units Far East): 25th Canadian Reinforcement Group; 2d Canadian Administrative Unit; Canadian Transport Company; Canadian Movement Control Group; and Canadian Section, British Commonwealth Hospital.
As the 25th CIBG entered Korea and joined the First British Commonwealth Division in July 1951, the Canadians also contributed to the division’s support structure in Korea. By the end of the year the Canadian service units within the war zone included:

- 57th Independent Field Squadron (Royal Canadian Engineers)
- 25th Canadian Field Ambulance, RCAMC
- 25th Canadian Field Dressing Station, RCAMC
- 54th Canadian Transport Company, RCASC
- 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group Ordnance Company, RCOC
- 25th Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineer Workshop
- 25th Canadian Provost Marshal Detachment
- 25th Canadian Field Detention Barracks
- 1st Canadian Field Security Service
- 25th Canadian Public Relations Unit
- 25th Canadian Field Dental Unit, RCDC

Unless formally assigned as an attachment to the Commonwealth Division, the Canadian support units fell under the administrative control of Headquarters, Canadian Base Units, Far East, but provided services to all of the British Commonwealth ground forces in the war zone. The Headquarters, Canadian Base Units, Far East, did not become a formal organization until February 1953. Until this reorganization, the brigadier commanding the 25th CIBG served as the nominal commander of all Canadian units in Korea and Japan, an impossible assignment for an operational commander with a limited brigade staff, which had far fewer officers than a US Army regimental combat team. In practice the brigadier commanding the CMMFE functioned as a de facto commander of the Canadian units in Japan.

The Canadian policy of non-integration in the Eighth Army applied to the British Commonwealth Division as well. Only the ordnance company and Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RCEME) workshop became a Canadian “element” within a Commonwealth Division specialist unit. The loose and complex organizational structure actually worked well for the Canadians, who formed and maintained lateral contacts with their US Army counterparts in 2d Logistical Command and its successor, Korean Communications Zone (KCOMZ) (October 1952) or the 8006th Army Unit. In Japan the Ca-
nadians worked with the Japan Logistical Command (JAPLOGCOM) (8000th Army Unit) and its successor Headquarters, US Army Forces, FECOM (October 1952). The size and complexity of United Nations Command’s structure encouraged informal, personal contacts at which the Canadians became experts, probably because of their World War II experience with the British Army. There was almost no part of the Eighth Army, KCOMZ, and JAPLOGCOM that Canadians could not contact with their broad but thin support structure. The Canadian support units formally became part of the First Commonwealth Division and BCOF and its parallel component, British Commonwealth Forces, Korea, whose commanders during the war were three different Australian lieutenant generals. In its determination to remain separate from the tar pit of US Army Forces Far East, the Canadian 25th CIBG and its support structure became embedded in the First Commonwealth Division, much to the pleasure of General Guy Simonds, the CGS and an unreconstructed Anglophile. The support protocol with the US Army remained in place, however, exercised formally and informally by Canadian officers in the service units in Korea and Japan. In the meantime the combat formations of Canada entered the war in the Eighth Army and learned quickly that dealing with the US Army demanded watchfulness, patience, and determination.24
To maintain their identity in the face of British and American pressure, however mild, to sacrifice some national independence in the name of efficiency, the Canadian combat forces had to prove their operational excellence. The 2d PPCLI did so in the battle of Kapyong (21-26 April 1951), and the 25th CIBG proved itself in Operation Commando (1-7 October 1951), the battle for the Maryang-san mountain complex northwest of the Imjin river valley. When the Eighth Army shifted to the strategic defense in the winter of 1951-1952, the 25th CIBG had become an integral part of the First Commonwealth Division, which was part of the US I Corps and the defender of Seoul and the Han River valley. The Commonwealth Division held this critical terrain until United Nations Command and the Communist coalition signed an armistice on 27 July 1953.25

While Lieutenant Colonel Stone worked up his battalion to combat effectiveness in North Kyongsang province’s mountains, the Chinese Army drove the Eighth Army out of Seoul in January 1951, and attacked again in February to stop a relentless Eighth Army advance back to the Han River watershed. Having checked the Chinese Third and Fourth Offensives, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, Eighth Army commander since late December 1950 after General Walker’s accidental death, ordered corps-level offensives that recaptured Seoul and put United Nations Command across the 38th Parallel. Ridgway’s immediate goal was to occupy a system of roads, rivers, mountains, meager valleys, and corridors that would defend South Korea and serve as a base for any other offensives farther north to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, a potential strategic, imposed UN victory.26

To pursue Ridgway’s offensive plans, the Eighth Army needed more troops, and it needed them immediately. As a veteran of WWII in Europe, Ridgway appreciated the dependability of British Commonwealth troops. He welcomed the 29th British Brigade Group when it became operational in Korea in November 1950, and he pressured Stone to move into battle as an addition to the veteran but shrinking 27th British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade (BCIB), which had been engaged since September 1950. The 27th Brigade needed a fourth infantry battalion to maintain its operational efficiency within the excessive frontages and “die-hard forlorn hope” missions it received. When Stone took his battalion forward to join the 27th BCIB on 15 February 1951, he arranged for his battalion to have a sobering experience by marching past 68 dead GIs of the 2d Infantry Division’s reconnaissance company.
and L Company, 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry. Stone told his troops the GIs had been killed in their sleeping bags, where they had disrobed and fallen asleep without adequate security. Stone believed his troops needed this shock treatment to increase their toughness; some Patricias wondered about the dependability of the GIs and South Koreans to their front and on their flanks. On 21 February, the 2d PPCLI marched north in Operation *Killer* against sporadic Chinese resistance. The Canadians moved up hills and down hills to avoid Chinese road-oriented fire sacks and ambushes. They also learned that like the stars, the Chinese came out at night, when they attacked instead of defended. Eighth Army artillery and Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers had made the Chinese daytime moles and nighttime badgers. On 7 March, the Patricias attacked a Chinese-defended hill and took 44 casualties, a good test of the Canadians’ fighting heart. Along with its parent brigade, which managed relations with the US IX Corps (Major General William M. Hoge, US Army), the Patricias would face their greatest challenge at the roadside village and creek called Kapyong.27

The battle of Kapyong (21-25 April 1950) proved that the 2d PPCLI had learned how valuable American fire support could be for embattled infantry. Senior officers noted that American generals tended to imperil the Commonwealth formations by assigning them to backstop faltering South Korean divisions, in this case the ROK 6th Division, which had already been routed three times by the Chinese since November 1950. The 27th BCIB won Kapyong against a Chinese division because 2d PPCLI and 3d Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3d RAR) held the two dominant hill masses above the main road south to the critical Pukhan River corridor. However, the winning edge came from four batteries of US IX Corps artillery, the 16th New Zealand Field Regiment (a 25-pounder howitzer artillery battalion), Company A, 72d Tank Battalion, and the Patricia’s own 81mm mortar platoon. The only air strike — one Marine F4U Corsair — hit an Australian company. The difference between 3d RAR’s desperate defense and partial withdrawal and 2d PPCLI’s firm hold on Hill 677 on the brigade’s left flank was timely, close, and accurate artillery fire of the New Zealand artillery. The Canadians also believed their support (weapons) company, armed with US Army 81mm mortars and .50-caliber Browning heavy machine guns and mounted in mobile half-tracks, delivered more effective area fire than their Australian counterparts conducted with British crew-served weapons. When 2d PPCLI began to exhaust its water and ammunition supply on 25 April, four USAF C-119 cargo aircraft dropped the critical
Figure 5. 27 British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade Operations, 19 February-11 March 1951.
supplies (including food and medical stores) on the Canadian position with almost pinpoint accuracy. The only flaw in American fire support was the limited contribution of the 4.2-inch mortar company positioned behind Hill 677 near the main road and thus subject to direct Chinese fire. Colonel Stone thought the problem was that the 4.2-inch mortar forward observer disappeared, and he had no communications with the US Army heavy mortar company in his sector. Stone believed that his artillery and mortar support explained the difference between his casualties (33 killed and wounded) and those of 3d RAR (84 killed and wounded). Neither Stone nor Brigadier B. A. Burke thought the corps artillery batteries27 had fired up to British standards of coordination but they appreciated the numbers and weight of shell that US Army guns could provide.28

As the Chinese Fifth Offensive stalled north of Seoul, then shifted to the Wonju-Hwachon central corridor in May with equal futility, the 25th CIBG embarked in Seattle (19-21 April 1951) with 7,000 officers and other ranks, 1,500 vehicles, and 2,000 tons of supplies. Four weeks later the brigade reorganized ashore at Pusan on the assumption that it would have several weeks more training in Korea before it became operational. The deliberate speed with which Brigadier Rockingham planned to enter the battle also reflected his knowledge that his brigade, reunited with the 2d PPCLI, would soon become part of the First Commonwealth Division, a concept approved by the Commonwealth political and military leadership after long negotiation in April. Instead, Eighth Army wanted the 25th CIBG to join the battle against the Chinese as an independent brigade. Rockingham carried instructions from his government not to enter the fighting until he was sure that his Canadian identity was secure and his brigade battle-worthy in all respects. His next likely commander, Major General A. J. H. Cassels, a smart and determined Scotsman, supported Rockingham’s reluctance to go directly under US Army corps command as the 27th and 29th Brigades had fought since January. Having served in India and northern Europe, Cassels had commanded a division in World War II and had been an admired “Pommy” (British officer) as the senior UK representative in Australia after the war. Sensitive to Canadian reservations about Commonwealth amalgamation, Cassels did not challenge Rockingham’s political guidance to preserve a Canadian identity.29

By May 1951 Commonwealth senior commanders agreed that being part of an American division or a corps carried substantial risks. Brigadier B. A. Coad, commander of the 27th Brigade until March 1951,
Figure 6. The Action at Kapyong, 24-25 April 1951.
described his deep reservations about the Eighth Army operational style in his post-command report of April 1951. US Army commanders did not issue mission orders, only imprecise statements of intent defined by geography and terrain. They dispersed artillery, air, and transportation support in a capricious manner with little attention to time-space factors. They allowed units to be road-bound, yet assigned frontages that were too wide and flanks that gaped open. Ridgway had attacked this problem but thus far with limited success. Commanders and their staffs did not visit their units down to the battalion-level or explore the terrain except, perhaps, by air. The GIs themselves did not help themselves in the defense, but waited for engineers to dig, plant mines, and string barbed wire. Americans ignored their organic crew-served weapons and expected instant, massive artillery support. The Eighth Army had many fine units, especially armor, artillery, and engineers, but it was an uneven, inconsistent, and poorly-commanded force. General Cassels and Brigadier Rockingham agreed with Coad’s analysis. Faced with paper orders from distant commanders, Cassels cautioned his division that Americans “look at military problems in a very different light to us.” He even published guidance on “Relations with United States Formations” that focused on risk-avoidance and excessive casualties. Rockingham got his first taste of Eighth Army operational carelessness when he had to take his troops north by train while their heavy weapons and ammunition went forward by truck with inadequate security in a guerrilla-infested rear area. American officers seemed too busy to explain missions or to ask others’ opinions.30

Figure 7. Brigadier J.M. Rockingham inspects Corporal Rocky Prentice and other soldiers.

Rockingham’s nervous entry into the Korean War, shared with General Cassels, received ample justification in the three months between 25th CIBG’s arrival and the creation of the First Commonwealth Division. Assigned to the US IX Corps during the second
phase of the Chinese Fifth Offensive, Rockingham resisted a mission until he recovered his vehicles, including 20 Sherman M4A3E8 tanks for his armored squadron, and heavy weapons from a railhead. He then learned his brigade had to move west without clear march routes and assembly areas to join the 1st Cavalry Division. Rockingham and his staff and subordinate commanders conducted their own reconnaissance as an advance party and found the routes and then called the brigade forward by echelon. In the meantime he received more orders to replace the US 3d Infantry Division (ID) at the front, orders then changed by General Cassel’s intervention to put the Canadians in US I Corps reserve behind the other two Commonwealth infantry brigades. The US I Corps, however, received Eighth Army orders to attack towards Chorwon on 30 May, and the corps commander, Major General Frank W. Milburn, sent the Canadians to join the US 25th ID in an advance up the Hantan river valley northeast of Seoul. Worn out by corps command since September 1950, Milburn had a reputation for high anxiety and professional sloppiness. To complicate the operation, I Corps attached the 10th Battalion Combat Team (BCT), Army of the Philippines, to the 25th CIBG. Thus far most noted for its inability to function in cold weather and its reluctant tactics, the 10th BCT needed nearby allied help, in this case provided by the R22°R French-Canadian battalion. Rockingham thus had only the 2d RCR for an advance, and this battalion’s attack became a one reinforced company affair since two other companies had to seize and hold a flank on the Hantan River to the west and the dominant Hill 467 to the east. The Chinese, however, had decided to organize a major defensive position south of the Hantan, and a fresh Chinese regiment blunted the 2d RCR’s advance of tanks, mounted infantry, and vehicles with heavy weapons. The shells of the 2d RCHA and a supporting US Army 155mm howitzer battery kept the Chinese at bay, but the Canadians could not hold their objectives, and the whole brigade risked encirclement. The company on Hill 467 had to hold the high ground to allow the mobile task force that occupied the road junction of Chail-li to withdraw. The 2d RCR escaped what might have been a disaster with 31 casualties.

The 2d RCR commander, Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Keane, confessed that he underestimated the Chinese Army’s military expertise and the importance of holding hills, not road junctions. He and Rockingham were not unhappy to bid the front goodbye to spend much of June in corps reserve while sending tank-infantry patrols toward the base of the “Iron Triangle,” a critical area in central Korea. The brigade
awaited better times than these after the summer rains abated and the First Commonwealth Division became operational.\textsuperscript{31}

As he awaited the arrival of the equipment, supplies, service units and division staff that would turn three different infantry brigades into a division, General Cassels also assumed the responsibility of dealing with the US Army’s senior commanders in Korea. Brigadier Rockingham and his British counterparts — Brigadier Thomas Brodie of the 29th British Infantry Brigade, Brigadier George Taylor of 28th British Commonwealth Brigade, and Brigadier William G. H. Pike, Commander Royal Artillery — faced enough internal organizational problems that they welcomed Cassels’ efforts to integrate the division into the US I Corps, the division’s higher headquarters for the rest of the war. For his part, Rockingham, backed by his own battalion commanders, shared Cassels’ reservations about the US Army’s operational style and the leadership of the new corps commander, Lieutenant General John W. O’Daniel. Ridgway requested O’Daniel as a corps commander because he valued “Iron Mike” for his aggressiveness and loyalty, not his professional sophistication and charm. O’Daniel’s claim to successful battlefield leadership rested on his World War II command of the US 3d ID, arguably the US Army’s best standard infantry division when commanded by Lucian K. Truscott, Jr. Only an incompetent, which O’Daniel was not, could have failed as the 3d ID commander. More importantly, a US Eighth Army corps headquarters was well stocked with able and energetic staff officers eager to please their general. There was a deputy corps commander (a general), a chief of staff and four G-staff assistants (G1, G2, G3, G4), a corps artillery group commander (a general) and group staff, and a host of special staff officers, normally colonels and lieutenant colonels. Cassels’ staff had only two principals, the GSO 1 (a combination of chief of staff and operational director) and the Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General (AA&GQM) (whose duties combined those of a US Army G1 and G4). The GSO 1, a Canadian, was Lieutenant Colonel (then Colonel) E. D. Danby and the AA&GQM, a British lieutenant colonel, A. W. N. L. Vickers. In dealing with its own units, Cassels’ staff proved adequate, but in dealing with the US I Corps it was understaffed and overwhelmed by paperwork and meetings. At the brigade level, the Commonwealth commanders and their small staffs worked outside the formal hierarchical corps structure and relied on informal, personal relations with American officers who were inclined to be helpful for reasons both effective and affective. These lateral contacts made Commonwealth Division-Eighth Army cooperation
The First Commonwealth Division spent late August, September, and October 1951 moving northwest between the Samichon and Imjin rivers in order to occupy the hill mass between the two rivers. The northernmost of 11 peaks along the ridge gave the hill mass its name, Maryang-san. The final goal was to seize the western or reverse slope of the ridge, designated the Jamestown Line. The initial objective was the eastern lower ridges that would serve as the start line for Operation Commando and adequate cover for vehicles, supporting machine-guns and mortars, and some advanced artillery batteries. Starting with tank-infantry probes across the flooded Imjin, the 25th CIBG pushed back the weak Chinese patrols and outposts to occupy the Wyoming Line, the start line by the end of September. The final phase of Commando, the capture of Maryang-san, required the commitment of all three brigades. Tirelessly supported by the three division artillery battalions, a reinforced 4.2-inch mortar company, and four tank companies, the Commonwealth infantry companies took position after position with patient skill and occasional ferocity. None of the Canadian battalions failed to take their objectives. In completing Operation Commando on 3-8 October, the division suffered 58 dead and 262 wounded. The contemporaneous assault on Heartbreak Ridge cost the US 2d Infantry Division 2,900 casualties. Problems within the Commonwealth Division were small and correctable except for the slow flow of replacements. The division had made itself a formidable killer of Chinese soldiers. The division’s professionalism impressed Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, who had no complaints about the performance of the division and no desire to challenge its new reputation for operational success, victories that contrasted with the lethargic advances and high casualties of the flanking US 1st Cavalry Division. In addition, Cassels made no pressing demands on the US I Corps since his scheme of maneuver allowed his own artillery to mass its fire against sequential battalion objectives. Only five corps artillery batteries provided occasional reinforcing fires. The major contributions from the US Eighth Army came before Commando, hundreds of trucks and additional engineering equipment to build bridges across the Imjin and scrape roads across the flood plain to the Wyoming Line.33

Although the officers of the First Commonwealth Division could not have known that the Battle of Maryang-san would be the division’s
only major offensive of the war, they certainly knew that they would hold the high ground they had captured in Operation Commando since the Jamestown Line gave the US I Corps operational depth above the Imjin and deprived the Chinese of direct observations of the sector. The US I Corps’ mission was the defense of Seoul and the Han River valley. Prospects of an armistice were uncertain at best in the autumn of 1951 but another Korean winter arrived and froze the front for months. Commonwealth officers of a historical bent began to wonder if they were besieging Sevastopol or manning a mountainous version of the Western Front. Italy also came to mind. In any event, the division had a sector to defend and an American corps commander to appease, please, and deceive.

Figure 8. The 2d Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, equipped with American half-tracks and British 25-pounder howitzers, provide fire support in the Iron Triangle, June 1951.
The War on the Jamestown Line, 1951-1953

Even though the armistice talks had resumed at Panmunjom, peace was not at hand. The Commonwealth senior officers assumed that speculating about how near or far away a ceasefire might be was a futile hobby, so they began to organize their sector for protracted defense. Over the winter of 1951-1952 the 25th CIBG endured a harsh Korean winter while the Canadian government faced the dilemma of replacing the 18-month Special Force volunteers, first the 2d PPCLI. The eventual plan, designed by Secretary Claxton and General Simonds, was to send the First Battalions (regular) of the three standing infantry regiments with similar plans to replace the artillery battalion, armored squadron, the engineering squadron, and the brigade’s service and technical units. The rotation scheme would provide unit phasing so that no unit would be inexperienced. Individuals and units would ease into the war beside their departing counterparts. Thus the new Canadian infantry were the First Battalions of the PPCLI, RCR, and R22°R regiments, while the 1st Field Regiment, RCHA, and C Squadron, Lord Strathcona’s Horse assumed the duty of direct fire support. Even as the 25th CIBG recreated itself in early 1952, Rockingham conducted exercises when the brigade went into division reserve, established demanding schools for NCOs, and even shifted the brigade to the division’s left (western) flank in the Samichon River valley where the 1st PPCLI occupied a vulnerable bit of terrain, “The Hook,” in February. The three-division 63d CPVF Army, roughly 30,000 fighters, faced the 7,000-man Canadian brigade. As the war dragged on, the Chinese increased their lethality by building deep field fortifications and observation posts, deploying battery after battery of Russian artillery and mortars, and training special nighttime units that mirrored the German strumtruppen units of 1917-1918. The Chinese tactics reflected a niupitung (sticky candy) tactical doctrine that would reduce the destructiveness of UNC air and artillery by stressing local surprise and “hugging” UNC infantry positions.34

General Cassels turned over his command to Major General Michael M. Alston-Roberts-West, a personable infantryman who had commanded two brigades in World War II, in September 1952. Mike West inherited a toxic relationship with the commanders of the US I Corps, General O’Daniel, and then Lieutenant General Paul Kendall and Lieutenant General Bruce Clarke. The tension was not simply a matter of personality and style, but a reflection of serious disagreement about how to wage defensive war. The three wartime commanders of the 25th CIBG — Rockingham and then M. P. “Pat” Bogert and Jean
V. Allard — supported their General Officer Commanding (GOC). The problem started with the Eighth Army commander, James Van Fleet, a personality with a fixed commitment to attacking and killing Chinese. No one (except ordnance supply units) objected to Van Fleet’s orders to increase the use of artillery. The issue was holding a combat outpost line (COPL) well beyond (a mile or more) the Main Line of Resistance (MLR). The corollary operational concept was to patrol the considerable gaps and spaces in the COPL and MLR, designing the patrols (almost always at night) to become raids against Chinese outposts to take prisoners. The I Corps commanders made the patrolling program unacceptable by stressing that the patrolling would keep the troops aggressive and active, a goal Generals Cassels and West thought superfluous and dangerous. To avoid the lethargy of trench warfare, they instituted strenuous offensive exercises for formations in reserve. The difficulty was that the excessive frontage of the division (15,000
Figure 10. 1 Commonwealth Division Front, 31 March 1952.

Enemy locations taken from Intelligence Report 234, dated 16 March 1952.

Chinese attack against C Coy 1 PPCLI 26 March 1952

Symbols
- Creek/stream
- Elevation
  - 393 feet/120 meters
  - 525 feet/160 meters
meters) made it difficult to create an operational reserve. Cassels and West protested constantly about the US I Corps’ operational priorities. Had they been US Army generals, they might have been relieved for non-cooperation. Since all four Commonwealth national commanders in the division had orders to inform their national chains of command of operational and administrative conflicts in United Nations Command, the GOC had a powerful weapon with which to pressure the I Corps commander into some modification of the outpost defense-active patrolling orders. As a result the Commonwealth Division managed to avoid the worst excesses of the “Stalemate War,” but it nevertheless took unnecessary casualties in a series of “forlorn hope” outpost and patrol battles. General West even found 25th CIBG a reluctant patroller beyond his own cautious guidance. This experience enabled the Canadian CGS, General Simonds, to reorient the whole Canadian Army back to its historic association with the British Army, perhaps the lesser of two evils.35

The patrolling policy of the US I Corps aggravated Brigadier Rockingham, who backed Cassels’ resistance movement. Eighth Army, O’Daniel insisted, wanted every division to capture one Communist Soldier every three days and could use up to a battalion to raid and set up ambushes. The division conducted company raids, but produced dead Chinese, not POWs. O’Daniel then ordered each battalion to send out one company-sized “fighting patrol” each week, seeking POWs. Throughout March 1952, Rockingham ordered out patrols of platoon and section strength and objected to their casualties from mortar fire and Chinese patrols. The patrolling lapsed as the 25th CIBG began to replace battalions. Now commanded by Brigadier Bogert, the new battalions sallied forth in June with unhappy results. The division approved multiple reconnaissance patrols as security measures but only 200 yards beyond the outposts.

The “fighting patrols,” less than ten percent of all patrols, produced no great results except experience for the new Canadians and some attrition of Canadian infantrymen. The ultimate futility came in raids by 1st RCR on 21-24 June, one of which lost 23 of 32 patrol members. The summer rains and tours into reserve status reduced the patrolling. General West, the new GOC, was loathe to execute large raids that had no defensible purpose and carried obvious risks.

The patrolling controversy ballooned for the 25th CIBG when it moved across the Samichon to occupy the hills dominated by one hill mass labeled “The Hook.” The 1st PPCLI occupied the defenses and
became a principal target of Chinese artillery and of Chinese trench raids. Rockingham persuaded Cassels to negotiate a change of boundaries, which the GOC did by mid-April 1952. “The Hook” and its neighboring ridges became the responsibility of the 1st Marine Division, whose élan and skill impressed the Canadians. They also learned these strange Americans shared a similar lack of respect for the US Army. When Major Harry Pope finally reached Korea in 1952 as a company commander in Third Battalion, R22°R, he discovered an outpost war shaped by Eighth Army’s patrolling policies, which he found appalling. Supposed to support active patrolling, the small, vulnerable combat outposts served only as hostages and easy targets for Chinese artillery. The US Army’s disregard for Chinese tactical skill had spread to the Commonwealth Division’s senior commanders and staff, and led to carelessness by association. American visitors, easily observed by the Chinese, drew unwelcome shelling and sniping. Already short-handed to cover all the positions he had to man, Pope resented the Americans’ casual attitude to UNC infantry casualties. Only the neighboring 1st Marine Division seemed dedicated to husbanding the troops’ lives.36

The strongest argument the First Commonwealth Division had for more operational freedom was its artillery employment. This excellence did not depend on the number of tubes (72 of 1,832 guns in the Eighth

Figure 11. Brigadier Rockingham shows the incoming Canadian brigade commander, Brigadier M.P. Bogert, the forward position on the Jamestown Line, August 1952.
Army) nor the weight of shell in which an American division artillery group (four battalions) was superior. The British system of mission request and fulfilling fire missions depended on experienced officers serving as observers. Commonwealth batteries could answer fire requests in about a minute with admirable accuracy. Very practiced gunner officers held every key place in the fire request and response process. The 2d and 1st RCHA met the highest standards of division gunnery. The Canadian gunners knew their infantry counterparts and targets by direct contact; the FOO (Forward Observation Officer) could call for artillery and mortar fire from any division battery within range. A FOO could make any requests and call the missions; a Commonwealth observation post was a Spartan three- or four-man team who manned the request nets; the Americans deployed one team for every type of weapon. Within a brigade the artillery battery commanders massed and shifted fires while the CRA massed fires for the division, seldom a necessity. The beauty of Commonwealth artillery was the rapidity and accuracy of the shells that winnowed out the attacking Chinese. The neighboring 11th Marines (at least one battalion) and the I Corps artillery could fire with 1st RCHA target data with confidence. The gunners’ union worked on the basis of lateral respect, regardless of infantry doctrinal disputes. Massed artillery saved the outposts and main strongpoints of 1st RCR on “The Hook” in October 1952 in a battle in which 1st RCR lost twice as many casualties (67) as the 2d PPCLI had suffered at Kapyong in 1951. Artillery superiority covered many flaws of tactics in the 25th CIBG.37

Operational excellence did not protect the Canadians from other unpleasant episodes with UNC’s senior officers. Two events stood out as stressful enough to attract the attention of the national Army headquarters. The first was the dispatch of two Commonwealth Division companies to Koje-do, the island POW camp, to participate in Operation Breakup, the division of the prisoners into repatriate and non-repatriate groups. Anxious to give a coat of UN blue to the force he had sent to Koje-do to crush a POW rebellion, General Mark W. Clark ordered General Van Fleet to send four allied infantry companies to the embattled island. The JCS actually encouraged Clark to “internationalize” the new guard force. Clark made his request for two Commonwealth companies to Lieutenant General Sir William Bridgeford, the new BCOF, who turned the request into an order to General Cassels, who chose Company B, Kings Shropshire Light Infantry and Company B, 1st RCR to go to
Koje-do. This half-battalion, codenamed Peterforce, left for Pusan on 24 May 1952.\textsuperscript{38}

Learning about Company B, 1st RCR’s new mission from press reports, Mike Pearson, Brooke Claxton, Charles Foulkes, and Guy Simonds angrily concluded that the United States, especially its Machiavellian generals, had violated an implied agreement to consult on any “special” use of Canadian Soldiers. Ottawa’s unhappiness started with Brigadier B. A. Connelly, Commander CMMFE, who learned of the deployment after it began from a FECOM liaison officer. Ignorance soon cost Connelly his job. The Ottawa “Gang of Four” made noises about removing Company B from Peterforce and the 25th CIBG from the Eighth Army if the Americans did not promise future consultation of any controversial deployments that touched POWs or internal peacekeeping in the ROK. Empty threats against General Bridgeford only produced charges of political naiveté and immaturity directed at Ottawa by the US State Department, the British Foreign and War Offices, and the Australian government. The Pearson-Claxton-Simonds-Foulkes group lapsed into dismay, but the Canadians and British agreed that the Americans did not appreciate the domestic political implications of POW mistreatment. Pearson believed that the United States would now be more careful about dragging its allies into the bog of POW segregation and repatriation. In the meantime Company B helped breakup one compound of Communist diehards and ended its Koje-do service of 8-14 July without incident.\textsuperscript{39}

Caught in the Peterforce incident, Brigadier Bogert received no comfort from Eighth Army on the issue of putting Koreans in his depleted infantry platoons. In 1950, desperate for replacements, Walton Walker accepted a proposal negotiated between FECOM and the South Korean government to put Korean Soldiers into the ranks of American infantry companies. The program was Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA). Throughout 1951 other UN units accepted Korean fillers in various ways. The First Marine Division adopted the First Regiment, ROK Marine Corps. The French added a Korean company to their battalion as did the Belgians and Dutch in platoon strength. Within American divisions some KATUSAs joined machine gun and mortar teams as ammunition bearers. Most infantry company commanders assigned the Koreans as riflemen to a GI foxhole buddy, the least satisfactory option. The First Commonwealth Division resisted the KATUSA program until General West decided Korean Soldiers might be useful trench fillers and rear area patrollers. The Canadian
government had objected to the KATUSA program on a cost and control basis, but it would not object if the division thought the Koreans might be useful. General Cassels had thought so without much enthusiasm, and General West accepted the plan somewhat more favorably. In late 1952 the division agreed to take Korean fillers, who entered the ranks, one hundred to each infantry battalion, in March 1953. Brigadier Bogert and his battalion commanders welcomed the Koreans without much confidence. The KATCOMs — or Koreans Augmented to the Commonwealth — were not the first Koreans to join the division. In October 1951 each infantry brigade added a Korean Service Corps (KSC) battalion as bearers and laborers. The KSC “riceburners,” spared military service for age and disability, did good work under close Canadian and Korean military supervision. The KATCOMs were another matter.40

The Canadians had many cultural and practical reasons to dislike the KATCOMs, who were ill-trained, spoke little or no English, and did not have much motivation for combat or the sanitary needs of bunker warfare. The Koreans did not like or respond well to Western rations. They were undependable and surly, but beyond standard moral appeals or Western field punishment. Their basic motivation (if given a choice)
was to escape service in the draconian ROK Army. The KATCOMs and KSC bearers did not get along, in part because the bearers earned far better pay than the ROK soldiers. The KATCOMs wanted to eat Korean food, as KSCs did. Even though the KATCOM program faded in urgency, Eighth Army did not change its lenient KATUSA policies on food, alcohol consumption, and terms of service and discipline, which were borrowed from the US Army. In a word, the Commonwealth Soldiers had to deal with overfed, underpaid, generously supplied, constantly ill, and unwilling Koreans. Bogert and his successor, Brigadier Jean V. Allard, had no leverage to improve the Koreans’ performance or reduce their troops’ antipathy to the KATCOMs. When Syngman Rhee prolonged the war by releasing 27,000 internees on 18 June, the Canadians retaliated by cutting off the KATCOM’s food, rum, and cigarettes. The Canadians also did as few local civilian construction projects as they could. Misbehavior against Koreans increased. The KATCOMs remained in the Commonwealth Division’s ranks but not in its plans. The Canadians saw the KATCOMs as another burden forced on them by the US Army.41

In the spring of 1953 the real enemy remained the Chinese Army that faced the US I Corps, an Army that remained active and dangerous even though an armistice appeared near in April. The First Commonwealth Division and its Marine, US 25th ID, and ROK neighbors became the target of heavy outpost attacks in May. The sporadic but violent attacks were designed to keep the I Corps engaged and fixed while the Chinese mounted offensives to the east against the exposed Kumsong River salient. The 3d RCR lost 82 soldiers (including 22 KATCOMs) in one outpost battle, and Brigadier Allard and his battalion commanders judged their junior officers and NCOs not up to professional standards in tactical skill and ardor. Fortunately, the armistice ended the Chinese threat but it did not prevent Allard from continuing an arduous training program and leadership screening process, organized to the norms of the British Army.42
Getting Along in Korea and Japan with the US Army

Away from the war along the MLR, the Canadians of the 25th CIBG and their personnel and logistical support system in Korea and Japan dealt with the US Army as a cornucopia of resources that could be exploited to the benefit of the Canadian expeditionary force. Korea was a world of two acquisition systems; one was the structured military system of requirements, requisitions, warehouses, trucks, consumables and non-consumables, Ammunition Supply Points, more trucks and military trains, repair depots, and gasoline parks. The other system had been born to make the first system work more responsively. It was a “gray exchange” system that sometimes cultivated theft (especially by Korean “slicky boys”) to supply the black markets in Seoul and Pusan. The open “gray” system, however, involved barter for things someone wanted and had something to trade. Besides their ability to speak English, the Canadians had special advantages that made them formidable traders.43

At the heart of the Canadian gray economic system was the 1950 agreement to eat American rations and be paid in the US dollar equivalents in Military Purchasing Equivalents (also known as MPCs and “Mickey Mouse” money) that could be used anywhere for anything in Korea or Japan. When money drove a transaction, the Canadians had money, their own and their Army’s. They were provisioned to generous American standards, for which the Canadian government reimbursed the Department of Defense. The Canadians did not especially like US Army rations except the fresh food. They liked British and Australian rations even less — and so did the British and Australians, who could trade with the Canadians for GI chow.44

The ultimate items of barter could be purchased in either the US Army post exchanges or the British Navy, Army & Air Force Institutes (NAAFIs) (military shopping centers). Canadians were the only Soldiers with legal access to both. The coin of the realm was NAAFI liquor for the Americans and American cigarettes and electrical goods for everyone else. Colonel E. C. W. Myers, Chief Royal Engineers, praised the Canadian field engineering squadron for its ability to draw, borrow, or barter for the US Army’s best equipment and for materials for bunker construction, some of which came from civilian projects. The Canadian artillery battalion traded whiskey on the standard of one bottle for one tent with a wooden floor. Foragers and whiskey traders brought in two Turkish mules, a jeep, and a TD-18 heavy bulldozer. The Canadian engineers rebuilt Korean schools and hospitals because they could take
home cement, timber, steel reinforcing rods, and sand bags. A bottle of gin bought a camp cot and folding chairs. A 3d PPCLI lieutenant braved student anti-armistice mobs to rescue a boxcar full of Pepsi Cola from a siding inside Seoul, declared off-limits because of the spring 1953 riots. The RCOC officers who ran the Commonwealth Division’s Mobile Laundry and Bath Unit learned that they had a service in high demand everywhere and a lever for high value, fast bartering. The high number of US Army logistical units and the vast accumulation of supplies, 1952-1953, provided wide options for bargaining. The Canadians exploited the logistical opportunities like their frontier forebears, happily encouraged by their southern cousins.

Creature comforts, even with GI collusion, remained rear area treats, but Korean rear areas were not without the perils of homemade soju (liquor) capable of dealing out death and blindness. Canadian Soldiers (like the GIs) could be hard on the Koreans, whom they blamed for the war. Caught in a gang rape, four Patricias killed three and wounded four men of the victim’s family. In addition to the buildup of service units in Seoul, 1951-1953, the 25th CIBG sent an inordinate number of men to the Commonwealth hospital in Seoul for venereal disease, a varied mix of Asian fevers, and self-inflicted wounds. The Commonwealth military police, well supplied with Canadians, patrolled Seoul and the rear areas with hard hearts and quick nightsticks. The “Redcaps” made sure their mates stayed out of the hands of American MPs and the Korean National Police. The requirement to keep the peace in Korea meant that Canadians required a “rest and recreation” (R&R) center in Japan, built at Camp Ebisu near Tokyo, and another center in the Commonwealth logistical enclave at Kure.45

The Canadian support base in Japan created its own set of problems in relations with the US Army Far East sprawling base system. Reducing the Commonwealth logistical footprint along Tokyo Bay helped, as did strict law enforcement. Although the 25th Canadian Reinforcement Group (CRG) had its share of processing transients to and from the 25th CIBG, the directing staff developed an autonomous system of R&R facilities, pre-deployment training, and administrative processing that ensured control of the troops and amicable relations with the Japanese. Keeping the troops busy and the Japanese of the Kure-Hiro employed made the 25th CRG immune from FECOM interference. Nevertheless, the Canadians and Americans split on several issues related to the Japanese. One was US Army regulations on marrying Japanese women, which were more restrictive than Canadian practice, conditioned by
different immigration laws. Another was more pay and fewer working hours for the Japanese in US Army employment than the Canadians could afford. Access to both PXs and NAAFI shops remained a sore point for the British and Americans. Living conditions in Japan were so good for rear echelon troops that one Canadian officer observed that the base officers lived in fear — of going to Korea or being sent back to Canada. Brooke Claxton encouraged other ministers (government and religious) to visit Japan and Korea. They reported the US Army’s praise for Canadian fighting skill and discipline compared to the GIs. The Canadians wondered if that was good enough. The 25th CIBG, however, was a model of professionalism compared with the new 27th CIBG that had deployed to Germany. Brooke Claxton and Guy Simonds monitored newspaper reports on both brigades and worried far more about the bad publicity and low morale of Canada’s first NATO ground force.46
Conclusion

The Korean War put the US Army and Canadian ground forces in closer contact than their association had been before 1950. The results were mixed, but in balance the degree of integration that Brooke Claxton had mildly proposed did not occur. If anything, their experience with the US Eighth Army and the Japan-based US Army Forces Far East helped put the Canadian Army back in the Anglophile camp championed by Generals Charles Foulkes and Guy G. Simonds. The NATO commitment, in which the 27th CIBG took up a position in northern Germany with the British Army of the Rhine, put the Canadians back into the British Army professional culture. In matters large and small, like the adoption of US Army small arms, the two armies remained separate and unequal and liked it that way. The mindset or mentalité (with a bow to the R22°R) of the US Army remained rooted in the mass, conscripted Army of World War II, an Army led by an inner corps of career officers and senior NCOs whose attitude towards short term citizen officers and senior NCOs could be described best as late Prussian.

The US Army, however, even when it did not fare well in post-Korea defense budgets, remained a well-supplied monster, equaled in size only by its designated enemy, the Red Army. The weapons programs funded during the flush fiscal years of the Korean War produced a new rifle (the M-14), a new machine gun (the M-60), a new self-propelled 155mm howitzer (the M-109), a family of mechanized combat vehicles (the M-113) and more. None of them went into Canada’s arsenals, stocked instead with British-Belgian weapons. Interoperability disappeared as a land forces goal because Canada focused on NATO defense first and United Nations peacekeeping missions second, the “wicked problem” embraced by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson in his self-proclaimed role as the anti-interventionist wise man who would lure the United States and Great Britain away from foreign follies.

At the national-fiscal level the United States had no better ally in Korea than Canada. When the US Department of Defense tallied the bills, twenty nations owed it for Korean War support. Great Britain owed the most, $77.6 million, and received a bill in 1954 for $61 million. It paid $342, 385 as of 30 November 1954. The next three debtors were Canada ($59.9 million), Turkey ($57.9 million), and the Philippines ($54.5 million). Only Canada paid its bills. By 30 November the Canadian government had paid $44.7 million of its adjusted $52.3 million bill.
All but $6 million had gone to the Canadian ground forces. Turkey and the Philippines had paid virtually nothing. Of all the nations only the Union of South Africa had paid its bill in full ($15.6 million) for support of its aviation squadron. Canada’s fiscal heroism is even more remarkable than its debt service. Its defense budget surged from $372 million (Canadian dollars) in 1949 to $495 million in 1950, then shot up to $1.2 billion (1951), $1.97 billion (1952), and $1.97 billion (1953).47

Far East Command praised the Canadian Military Mission Far East for performing its liaison and support missions with quiet efficiency. Even though their governments paid their bills, the national military missions, eleven in Tokyo by January 1951, made time-consuming and financially-complex demands on FECOM. The UN liaison groups claimed diplomatic status and US Army PX and commissary privileges. The senior officer of each national mission exercised the right of direct access to Commander in Chief UNC as well as direct communication with his parent government. Only the British Commonwealth nations took care of their own business. Canadian support units processed replacements, hospital patients, trainees, prisoners, visitors, and press members with patient efficiency. Only Great Britain had a larger troop base to manage.48

Force integration had few champions across the Niagara River. The military assistance programs Congress loved most went to Cold War allies in the Middle East (Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia) or Asian allies with authoritarian regimes like Taiwan, Thailand, Pakistan, and South Korea. The modest Canadian arms industry looked like a competitor, not a co-partner, except in the case of tracked arctic vehicles. The US Army regarded the Canadians as a quaint semi-British elite force, a very small distant cousin whose Soldiers sometimes spoke a language understood only in Louisiana. On NATO staffs the Canadians became gentle ombudsmen who adjudicated differences between American and British senior officers into the 1980s. The Canadians, it is true, went strange in the 1970s when clever politicians forced all the services into a single green uniform with Army ranks and Navy rank insignia, but this bit of confusion disappeared by 2000.

The performance of the 25th CIBG in Korea produced a relationship of mutual respect best maintained by limited contact by each Army’s professional officers, attending schools and serving on NATO staffs. Judging by the US Army’s analysis of problems with allies within the Eighth Army, the Canadians, indeed the First Commonwealth Division as a whole, were valued comrades who posed no special problems.
The US Army is now more likely to welcome not only infantry brigade groups, but military missions heavy with trainers, advisors, logisticians, communicators, medical personnel, transportation specialists, and electronics technicians. Such forces need to be self-defending and trained to rigorous Special Forces standards. The performance of the 25th CIBG in Korea established the Canadian Army’s reputation as a steadfast ally that stressed excellence on the battlefield and self-sufficiency in its support requirements. Perhaps the Korean War should have its own inter-allied motto (with apologies to the R22°F): *nous nous souvenons* (we remember).⁴⁹
Notes

1. The two basic political and strategic histories of Canada’s Korean War experience remain Denis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) and Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada* (Ottawa: Minister of National Defence, 1966). Both are limited for different reasons. Stairs depends upon the Lester B. Pearson papers, memoirs, and interviews with some use of Brooke Claxton’s papers from the Department of National Defence. He did no research in the Truman and Eisenhower Presidential libraries, but depended on printed (and suspect) American sources. Many US State Department records were closed to him because the Korean War volumes of *Foreign Relations of the United States* for 1950, 1951, and 1952-1954 had not yet been published. A new study is overdue. As the DND official historian, Wood knew the Canadian officers well and served as the CSF brigade major in Canada and (later) a battalion commander in Korea. Writing so close to the events, Wood had special documentary access and an intimate knowledge of the Canadian Army. He is silent on some issues of importance, but his book remains an essential source. Among the many celebratory works occasioned by the war’s 50th anniversary, two stand out, both written by respected Canadian scholars, David J. Bercuson, *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) and William Johnston, *A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003). Both cover Canadian military operations in detail, but do not replace Stairs or Wood. For a more critical view of the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group’s experience, see Brent Byron Watson, *Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950-1953* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), a primary source-based history that provides coverage on subjects related to training and troop behavior that Wood avoids. Watson, however, patterns his work on the literary, ahistorical “cultural approach” championed by Paul Fussell, which means collecting the critical memoirs of junior officers and other ranks and matching their remembered complaints with contemporary hostile reports. Such evidence can be important, if used carefully. There are two more dispassionate studies of the Canadian military experience by Commonwealth historians: F. W. Perry, *The Commonwealth Armies* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1988) and Jeffrey Grey, *The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1988). Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada* (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1985) devotes only part of a Cold War chapter to the Korean War and only because of its influence on defense spending and the NATO commitment. His summary does not do justice to the UNC conduct of the war or 25th CIBG’s experience. I have also drawn on recent studies of the Canadian political principals: John English, *The Life of Lester Pearson* (2 vols., Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, Ltd., 1989 and Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 1992) and David J. Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).


4. CGS, “Summary of Canadian Army Staff,” June 13, 1952, a background paper on Canadian military policy since 1945, and DND, memo, “Canadian Defence Data Prepared for General Eisenhower,” 1952, both in Minister’s Correspondence Files (MCF), Brooke Claxton Papers, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Ottawa. See also Wood, Strange Battleground, 16-19, and Bercuson, True Patriot, 207-239.

5. B. Claxton to Amb. to the US Hume Wrong, April 4, 1950; B. Claxton to SecDef L.A. Johnson, September 14, 1950; Claxton to Sec of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., 1950-1953, General Files 32-88, MCF, Claxton Papers.

6. JCS, “Record of Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Relative to United Nations Operations in Korea from 25 June 1950 to 11 April 1951 Prepared by Them,” April 30, 1951, copy, Korean War Files, President Secretary’s Files (PSF), Truman Papers, Truman Presidential Library; Stairs, Diplomacy of Constraint, 26-60.


9. Wood, Strange Battleground, 24-32; Watson, Far Eastern Tour, 3-7; Bercuson, True Patriot, 207-239.

10. In addition to Wood’s descriptions of the 25th CIBG senior officers, I have used Major General J. M. Rockingham, “Recollections of Korea,” 1975, Rockingham Papers, LAC, and remembrances of Stone and Dextraze in John Gardam, ed., Korea Volunteer: An Oral History from Those Who Were There

15. Brigadier H. E. Taber to US Army G3, October 26, 1950; Secretary of State D. Acheson to Secretary of Defense G. G. Marshall, October 20, 1950; JCS to SecDef., October 27, 1950; SecDef. To JCS and SecState, November 27, 1950; memo, G3 (ops) File 091 (Korea) 1950, “Canadian Army Special Force,” October 25, 1950, all in G-3 (ops) Army Staff, Decimal File, 091 (Korea) 1950, RG 319.
17. War Diaries, September and October, 1950, CMMFE, RG 24 (18441), CL/A; Cmdr. CMMFE to CGS, No. 1, October 4, 1950, reprinted in Wood, Strange Battleground, Appendix 1, 261-262; Cmdr. CMMFE, Reports 1 and 2, October,
1950, CMMFE File, DHH Archives. The US Department of the Army agreed to take the 2d PPCLI to Pusan on October 21.


21. War Diary, December, 1950, CMMFE; Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Stone to CGS, “Report on Operations to Date,” 2” PPCLI, March 9, 1951, CGS File 5-1/25, Canadian Infantry Brigade Files, Vol. 4, DHH Archives; Barns, Deadlock in Korea; Gray, Beyond Danger Close, 137-140. Stone discusses the Yokohama incident in Melady, Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War, 51-52.

22. Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Stone to CGS, “Report of Operations to Date,” HQ, 2d PPCLI, March 9, 1951, CIB Files; Adjutant General to CGS, March 6, 1951, quoted in Wood, Strange Battleground, 68.


27. Colonel J. R. Stone and Jacques Castonguay, *Korea, 1951: Two Canadian Battles* (Ottawa: Canadian War Museum, 1988), 1-11; Colonel J. R. Stone, lecture notes to officers, 3d PPCLI, “Kapyong,” December 18, 1973, File 800.32, archives, 8th ARC; Hub Gray, *Danger Close*; Melady, *Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War*, 70-80. Informed or not by the officers of the 1st Middlesex who found the Chuam-ni battlefield, Stone exaggerated the GI “massacre.” The two companies had been surprised and lost 114 KIA and 98 WIA of an initial force of perhaps 270. The bodies the Patricias saw had been looted and stripped of outer clothing by the Chinese. These KIAs were non-walking wounded wrapped in sleeping bags for protection who had died of wounds or exposure when their eight ambulance jeeps had been riddled at a destroyed bridge. Other bodies had been scattered over several miles of battlefield. In fact, GIs of both companies had fought their way out with two light tanks and two tracked personnel carriers. See Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, 289-292, based on the investigation of the 2d Infantry Division IG, Lieutenant Colonel Ray W. Horton, report to General Ridgway, May 13, 1951, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, USA MHI.


36. GOC, First Commonwealth Division, Periodic Reports, No. 3 (15 February-30 June 1952 and No. 4 (1 July-1 November 1952), DHH Archives; Rockingham, “Reflectons on Korea,” 1975; Pope, *Leading from the Front*, 153-190; Major H. Pope, MC, “Paper on Infantry Defences in Korea,” September 19, 1953, File 681.009 (D11), DHH.

37. n.a., “1st Battalion: The Royal Canadian Regiment,” *Duty First* 1 (December, 1992), 105-11; Rockingham, “Reflections on Korea,” 1975; Standing Orders for Battle, l’t Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, 1952, RCHA Collection, LAC; memoir, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew C. Moffat (Lt. 1st RCHA, 1952 53),


44. Major C. J. A. Hamilton, CO Advance Party 2d PPCLI to Colonel C. P. Stacey, July 26, 1955, File 601.013 (D70), DHH; entries, January-April, 1951, CMMFE, War Diaries, RG 24; Briefing Papers For Brigadier R. E. A. Morton,


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