Through the Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Lens: Linking the Strategic Environment and Operational Planning

Volume 2

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General Editors
Acknowledgments

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Foreword

The Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations (DJIMO) faculty, at the US Army Command and General Staff College, has collaborated on this second edition of scholarly work. For the authors, publishing these types of research papers represents a demonstration of their commitment to the profession and a strong sense of duty to our country. Their contributions to the body of knowledge on relevant subjects that impact our national security are an enduring representation of the depth and breadth of their scholarship both in and out of uniform.

This diverse group of authors includes current serving military officers, retired officers from all of the services, and interagency partners who are distinguished professionals committed to the goal of educating our nation’s best. Entering service during the post-Vietnam years, all were mentored and developed as the first generations of the “All Volunteer Force.” They experienced the Cold War, Desert Storm, and every conflict since then, continuing to pass those experiences on to the current generation of war fighters through academia and writings such as the ones included in this compendium.

The chapters in this volume focus on topics that have a strategic-level planning flavor, are related to the instruments of national power, and will be of interest to all security professionals. The informative commentaries are written in the context of current challenges that our national level leaders face today. It is our hope that the readers will enjoy the authors’ diverse opinions that often challenge conventional ideas while contributing to their understanding of our complex security environment.

Special thanks to Dr. David Anderson (LtCol (R) USMC) and Ms. Heather Karambelas (CW3 (R) USA), for their leadership, dedication, and commitment to this project. They have done an excellent job of identifying the talented authors and topics which will make this second volume a success.


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DJIMO Compendium Introduction
Ms. Heather R. Karambelas

Strategy without process is little more than a wish list.

– Robert Filek

These are wise words and it is in this endeavor, to apply a process to strategy, that Volume 2 is written. To take an understanding of the nation’s strategy and translate it into plans that maximize the instruments of national power is the role of planners. The faculty in the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations, once again, apply their experiences in the chapters of this compendium to present well-researched perspectives on a variety of challenges faced in developing the detailed process that applies our nation’s Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) resources toward National Security.

For this volume, we start with a view toward the diplomatic instrument of power. Something to consider with diplomacy is that the world views us in the context of our diplomatic efforts. Even military involvement around the world is an extension of our diplomatic policies. Dr. Geoff Babb takes the opportunity to expand his work from Volume 1 in which he wrote on China and Asia and the history of American military involvement in the region. For this volume, his time period is from the Korean War to the Crisis in the South China Sea (1950-2016). Our next step from military involvement in China is toward Interagency (IA) cooperation within US National Agencies. Mr. Dwayne Wagner and Mr. Gus Otto analyze the current status of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which mandated Joint requirements to increase cooperation between the services, in order to determine if a similar amendment to the National Security Act should be recommended to mandate interagency requirements.

Information is the next instrument of national power, and all articles contain some elements; however, there are no articles in this which address information individually. The third instrument of power is military, and for this volume we have several articles that address military planning. For our military instrument of power, Dr. Rich Berkebile reviews how current methods of framing strategy may compel planners toward a military solution, and makes recommendations toward reframing to achieve the best outcomes using all instruments of national power. In Chapter 4, Dr. John Modinger challenges the use of flag officers as defense contractors. He discusses the benefits, but also the risks, considering their level of military power and their potential to influence contracts. Next, Dr. John Breen challenges an assumption that planning in the CIA is useless, and recommends using operational art techniques to improve upon the CIA’s current covert action planning. Dr. David Anderson developed a contextual framework to better understand economic development for military planners. His chapter considers how the military, interagency organizations, and other stakeholders influence economic decisions, and proposes a framework that is helpful for all. Mr. Jeffrey Vordermark uses his extensive background in water scarcity research to make recommendations toward including Global Water Insecurity issues into US military doctrine. The final chapter on the military instrument of power is by MAJ Chris Henry, in which he discusses the challenges of the military’s sealift capability. He emphasizes the challenges we may face in force projection, if we fail to consider the availability, modernity, and current level of training for these vital strategic resources.

Dr. David Anderson completes the book with a chapter on the economic instrument of power which highlights the economic impacts of global oil power shifts. He specifically researched the challenges faced by oil-exporting African countries, but highlights in the global commons the
impacts of the shift toward both new oil resources, such as shale oil and tar sands, and also new extracting techniques, such as fracking. His chapter considers the unintentional consequences that increased energy self-reliance in the West may have on countries with a strong source of national power derived from historic oil revenue.

These chapters consider our instruments of national power from the perspective of military planners. There are many potential issues that could be studied for future research; however, the intent is to provide some additional considerations to those who work as operational-level planners, and to continue to challenge your understanding of what issues are important; as the world changes, so too must our considerations adapt for the best applications of our available resources.

We dedicate this compendium to those who plan and develop processes in order to execute the strategies of our nation. Our instruments of power are valuable and should not be squandered. Neither can our strategies be mere wish lists. We continue to educate our officers toward this goal.
China’s national strategic goal is to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2021 when the CPC celebrates its centenary; and the building of a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious by 2049 when the PRC marks its centenary. It is the Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

– China’s Military Strategy, 26 May 2015

From 1950 through today, Sino-American military-to-military relations have ebbed and flowed with periods of conflict, crisis, détente, and accommodation. This includes a three-year war involving both nations on the Korea Peninsula. This was followed by nearly two decades of enmity through the end of America’s involvement in Vietnam in 1972 when President Richard M. Nixon visited China. In January of 1979 relations were officially normalized, however, arms sales to Taiwan continued even though the mutual defense treaty was nullified when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was formally recognized. The United States continues to maintain major air, land, and maritime forces in the region and patrols the sea lines of communication of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Formal alliances are maintained with Japan, whose bitter legacy with China refuses to abate, and with the Republic of Korea, whose war with China’s ally to their north is suspended by armistice, but is not ended. The United States also has a defense pact with the Philippines which directly impacts the chronic crises in the South China Sea, and with Australia, even though they are one of China’s major sources of raw materials. These strategic circumstances, China’s focus on an anti-access strategy, and ongoing military-to-military contacts all complicate a relationship without a pre-ordained future. This chapter discusses the twists and turns of more than 60 years of this relationship and what this history might portend for the future strategic and operational environment of this important and dynamic region.

Introduction

On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong gave a speech in Tiananmen Square in Beijing at the founding of the PRC. He told the people of China to “stand up;” their long period of national humiliation at the hands of foreign powers was over. A year later, in October of 1950, Mao ordered his armed forces to mount a major offensive operation against a United Nations (UN) coalition led by the United States. The Chinese People’s Volunteers crossed the Yalu River attacking into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to engage American, Republic of Korean (ROK), and other allies’ ground forces. Officially under UN command, these units had advanced far into North Korea as a follow-on to the successful amphibious landing at Inchon near Seoul and a supporting attack out of the Pusan Perimeter in the far southeast of the peninsula. For the first, and only, time since the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the American military was directly involved in major combat operations against Chinese forces.

From the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 until today, the United States and China have experienced significant swings in their bilateral relations. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, between the end of the conflict in Korea and today, the PRC has fought the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, as well as India, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam, but not the United States. During this
more than 60-year period, there were times of crisis when war between the PRC and the US looked unavoidable. There have also been times when shared national interests and common enemies have made the two states appear to be close partners, if not actual allies. This chapter explores the highs and lows of this important strategic military-to-military relationship – from war on the Korean Peninsula to the current crisis in the South China Sea. The history of America’s complex relationship with China is an important component of the emerging joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, the Area of Responsibility of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM).

Despite the dynamic nature of the current environment and the complexity of our shared past, the future is not pre-ordained. America’s strategic goal in reference to China was succinctly stated by America’s senior military officer in USPACOM in his 2016 Congressional testimony. Admiral Harry Harris, Jr. of the US Navy stated, “My goal is to convince China that the best way ahead is through peaceful cooperation, participation, and conformance in a rules-based order, and by honoring agreements made in good faith.” The United States seeks both a cooperative partnership and China’s adherence to an international rule set it sees as benefitting both sides in maintaining peace and stability in the region.

Given that goal, several questions emerge. What does the history of Sino-American relations from 1950 to 2016 portend? What trends in terms of today’s strategic and operational environment are evident in this chronicle of hot and cold wars, crises, and cooperation during these past more than 60 years? Does the record offer hope of avoiding the “inevitable” clash of rising and declining superpowers or hegemons, as outlined in a recent Atlantic magazine article described as the “Thucydides’ Trap?” Hopefully, this generally chronologically-organized synopsis discussing key events in Sino-American relations during this period will offer both some answers and useful insights. This era of Sino-American relations began in October of 1950, as large numbers of Chinese People’s Volunteers from multiple corps-level formations crossed the Yalu and slammed into American and ROK units. The relationship between the US and the newly established PRC could hardly have had a more inauspicious beginning.

The 1950s: War and Crises

On 25 June 1950, military forces of the DPRK attacked south to unify the peninsula with the tacit approval of the two Communist giants, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the PRC. The lightly-armed forces of the Republic of Korea, tailored for internal stability operations, with their American counterparts from the Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG), were surprised and quickly overwhelmed. President Harry S. Truman’s administration quickly took the matter to the UN, where a military response was authorized by the Security Council. This resolution was possible because the Soviet Union was boycotting over which China should be represented in the United Nations. With international backing, Truman immediately ordered elements of the US Army on occupation duty in Japan to deploy to Korea under the command of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, who was the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) headquartered in Tokyo. Truman also ordered the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait as a precaution against a wider war involving the ROC in what would be a separate theater of conflict.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, key ROC leaders, and major elements of the Nationalist armed forces retreated to the island of Taiwan in 1949. By June of 1950, with some assistance provided by American civilian contracted advisors and technicians, the Nationalist forces were reorganized and increasingly capable of defending Taiwan and its offshore islands. In July, after the outbreak
of hostilities in Korea, General MacArthur conducted an unauthorized visit to Taiwan to consult with Chiang, who offered to send troops to Korea to support the UN effort – a gesture President Truman politely refused. At this time there was no official American security assistance mission to the ROC military. The Truman Administration had witnessed the collapse of Chiang’s forces in 1948 and 1949 in the Chinese Civil War, and was not committed to come to their aid or to defend Taiwan.

In late September 1950, UN forces counterattacked the North Korean forces from the landings at Inchon near Seoul and from the Pusan Perimeter in the south. The two-pronged offensive quickly routed North Korean forces, crossed the 38th Parallel, and by October American units were at the Yalu River on the Chinese border. The war appeared to be over and the troops would be home by Christmas. (see Figure 1.1 above). However, the PRC’s senior diplomat, who had a long history of working with the US, Zhou Enlai, warned the US through India not to cross into the DPRK. This diplomatic caution, and intelligence indicating a large Chinese military build-up, were ignored. By late October, Chinese troops counterattacked and drove the UN forces into full retreat. S.L.A. Marshall’s account, *The River and the Gauntlet*, provides the details of one of America’s worst military defeats in its history. With the arrival of the Chinese forces, the war entered a new phase, and was not going to be over quickly. America’s relationship with the two Chinas was constrained within the bipolar structure of the Cold War strategic environment for
most of the next two decades. However, while the PRC clearly was the enemy, the ROC would only slowly re-emerge as an ally.

In June of 1950, Truman ordered the US 7th Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait, not in support of the ROC, but to keep the war from widening and escalating. After October 1949, the ROC and the PRC continued a low level of conflict. The PRC controlled the Chinese mainland, and the civil war was not over; however, a successful PRC invasion of Taiwan was very unlikely. The ROC kept up an internationally unpopular naval blockade of the PRC that was having a negative effect on international trade with the new Communist regime. In addition, small-scale fighting erupted from time to time over control of isolated islands held by one side or the other. Early on, the US Navy stood back and observed the ongoing situation. However, the war on the Korean Peninsula began to change the US-ROC military-to-military relationship as the value of a “second front” became more apparent. In January of 1951, negotiations began to reestablish a United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (USMAAG) on Taiwan. In May of 1951, Major General William C. Chase began a new military mission to train, assist, and equip the Chinese Nationalist forces, our old allies from World War II. When Dwight D. Eisenhower replaced Truman in January of 1953, support to the ROC military increased even further.

The conflict on the Korean Peninsula continued until the armistice in July of 1953 after the death of the Soviet leader, Josef Stalin. This limited war, the first “hot” conflict of the Cold War in Asia, was fought nearly exclusively on Korea soil. However, Korea was not the only place communism was being opposed in Asia. Nor was the US the only Western power involved in the region. The British were fighting a counterinsurgency in Malaya, and the French were engaged with the Viet Minh for control of Vietnam. In the following year, outnumbered in difficult to defend terrain, the French forces surrendered at Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam and negotiations ensued. An agreement in Geneva in the spring of 1954 divided Vietnam into two parts. Despite the accord, the communist effort to reunite the country led by Ho Chi Minh and the North began very soon
thereafter, as did two decades of American involvement in Indochina. America’s 20 years of direct and indirect involvement in Vietnam, the PRC’s ally, was a significant complicating factor in the US relationship with China.

Also in 1954, the PRC announced its goal to liberate Taiwan. This was a test of both the PRC’s relationship with the new leadership of the USSR and of American resolve in Asia after the Korean conflict. Without consulting the US, Chiang significantly reinforced several outer islands. In September, the PRC shelled Jinmen, one of the offshore islands closest to the mainland, and in November attacked the Dachens (Tachens), a group of islands to the northwest of Taiwan that were difficult to supply and defend. The US military took a major role in the operation to help the Nationalists evacuate this island group.12 The US was now committed to opposing the PRC and its Communist allies on a perimeter from Korea to Japan to Taiwan to Vietnam. In December of 1954, the US signed a defense treaty with Taiwan, a pact agreed to in the midst of this latest crisis. By January of 1955, American resolve was clear and tensions with the PRC abated, but the Nationalist naval blockade continued, ensuring future conflict.13

![USS Lexington](image.png)

Figure 1.3 USS Lexington (CVA-16, nicknamed The Blue Ghost) underway in WestPac waters, with Carrier Air Group 21 (CAG-21), 16 August 1958. Just eight days later, on 24 August, Communist Chinese artillery began shelling the Nationalist Chinese islands of Quemoy and Matsu, prompting the Blue Ghost’s deployment to the Taiwan Straits at various times during the next four months, along with other units of the 7th Fleet. Photo courtesy of the US Navy.

A second Taiwan Strait crisis began in August of 1958 (see Figure 1.4).14 The Communists on the mainland again shelled Jinmen and the ROC requested US support. Mao wanted to end the Nationalist naval blockade and his military actions were a catalyst for negotiations. Other reasons for his actions included testing an increasingly troubled relationship with the Soviet Union and a desire to begin his domestic “Great Leap Forward” to jumpstart the lagging Chinese economy. This crisis brought the US and the ROC militaries even closer together. To end the crisis, Chiang finally halted the blockade and the US agreed in principle to defend Taiwan’s key offshore islands. The
lack of assistance to Mao by the Soviet Union in this crisis further divided China and the USSR. The lack of unity and common national strategic interests in the communist world was becoming more apparent.

The 1960s and 1970s: From Enemy to Partner

O. Edmund Clubb in his book *China-Russia: “The Great Game,”* looks at 1958-59 as the “Gathering Storm” in Sino-Soviet relations. By 1960, he writes that the relationship was in “Open Conflict.” China’s relationship with the Soviets deteriorated significantly during this period. At the same time, under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union improved relations with the US, moved closer militarily to Mongolia on China’s northern border, and began to support India, which had a border dispute with China. India was also now the home of the Dalai Lama and thousands of his Tibetan followers, who had fled in 1959 during China’s crackdown. With turmoil on its periphery, the PRC was also undergoing a domestic economic disaster of its own making. Despite the break with the USSR, China and Russia continued to increase support to North Vietnam through the 1960s by providing military equipment. Through the 1960s, China sent its own soldiers to man key air defense sites and the logistics infrastructure in the north. The PRC and the United States seemed to be headed to conflict in another of Asia’s bifurcated countries.

In 1961, with the deployment of thousands of military advisors to South Vietnam, the United States began its long war in Southeast Asia against China’s communist ally, North Vietnam. Although the Soviets also supported North Vietnam, the divide between the PRC and the USSR was
growing. Perhaps the most telling evidence was Soviet support for India in its 1962 border war with China.\textsuperscript{18} Chinese forces quickly overcame Indian Army resistance, pushed several kilometers into Indian territory at multiple points, and then pulled back. China had sent a message to India that it was more than willing to contest what it saw as its sovereign territory. India also learned the Soviets would not put their forces on the ground to oppose China.

By 1966, the US was escalating the use of its own ground forces in Vietnam. At the same time, China turned inward and recommitted to a major internal ideological struggle, the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” A “lost decade” of domestic upheaval lasted from 1966-1976, essentially ending with Mao’s death. In the midst of this turbulence in 1968, the peace talks to end the war in Vietnam began in Paris. Assuming the presidency in January of 1969, Richard M. Nixon was looking for a way out of the war. At the same time Mao was signaling he was looking for an ally against the USSR and wanted to change China’s approach to dealing with the United States.\textsuperscript{19} That year also saw a border conflict between China and the Soviet Union in the northeast of the country. The Sino-Soviet split was now clearly out in the open and a fundamental change in Sino-American relations began to emerge.

The secret trip to China reestablished the Sino-American relationship. The Nixon visit began a period of strategic cooperation. But while the principles of that strategic cooperation were emerging,
its framework remained to be settled. The reality of China’s self-reliance made it difficult to relate form to substance.\textsuperscript{20}

In 1972, Nixon flew to China and held talks with Mao. The February 1972 Shanghai Communique called for the United States to recognize “there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China.”\textsuperscript{21} The die was cast for the United States to recognize the Communist regime in Beijing as the one, internationally-recognized, government of China.

Figure 1.6 Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong shakes hands with US President Richard Nixon in Beijing, 21 February 1972. Photo courtesy of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.

By the end of 1972, the drawdown of US combat forces from Vietnam was completed, the Paris Peace Accord was signed in January of 1973, and in February the majority of the American prisoners of war being held by Hanoi were flown home. China’s new relationship with the US played a key role in bringing about the Vietnam accords. However, before significant additional efforts to improve Sino-American relations could proceed, the Watergate investigations began, and in August of 1974 Nixon resigned from office. In April of 1975 Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese Army. During this period, Mao and his long time foreign minister, Zhou Enlai, both suffered from ill health and died in 1976. For the next two years there was a leadership struggle in China until Deng Xiaoping emerged as the new head of the Communist Party and the country. He immediately began the process of making significant economic and social changes in China. He also restarted Mao’s initiative to improve relations with the United States.\textsuperscript{22}

The official recognition of the PRC and the termination of the defense treaty with Taiwan was not completed until the administration of President Jimmy Carter in January of 1979. The US Embassy at Taipei closed on 28 February 1979 and the US Embassy in Beijing was opened on 1 March 1979.\textsuperscript{23} Deng visited the United States in January of 1979 and the road to better Sino-American military-to-military relations opened. Deng returned home, and despite warnings from Vietnam’s
new primary supporter, the Soviet Union, China conducted a large-scale, limited-objective attack into Vietnam in February of 1979. Less than five years after the fall of Saigon, China had taken up America’s war against Vietnamese expansion in Southeast Asia and had done so in the face of a major military build-up by the Soviet Union in Asia. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, for what looked at the time to be a long-term stay, brought the US and China closer together to oppose the USSR and protect and assist a common partner and ally, Pakistan. The stage appeared to be set for a major improvement in Sino-American military-to-military relations despite the change of political parties. In January of 1981, the Republican administration of President Ronald Reagan inherited both problems and promises from the Democratic Carter Administration.

The 1980s: From “Almost Allies” to “Wary Companions at Best”

“On June 6 [1981] Reagan issued a secret directive adopting a plan to offer China a ‘strategic association’ against the Soviet Union. Never had China achieved such a prominent position in America’s global military strategy.”24 By the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping needed peace and stability to allow his domestic economic programs to grow and stimulate outside assistance from wherever he could get it. At the same time, the Reagan Administration looked to increase pressure on the Soviet Union. A strong military relationship with China could help tie down a significant number of ground and air forces east of the Urals and the Soviet Pacific Fleet headquartered in Vladivostok. However, the US and PRC legs of the Sino-Soviet-American strategic triangle, while they appeared strong and supportive, were not built on a very stable foundation. American support for Taiwan, especially arms sales, was still a major issue for China. In the United States, a powerful political lobby wanted assurances from Reagan that Taiwan’s autonomy and security would be protected.

Reagan visited China in April of 1984 attempting to finesse the Taiwan issue and “soften the blow” with Deng by offering the sale of modern weapons to China to offset Soviet military strength.
in Asia. There were also promises of increased trade and investment from American companies. High level reciprocal visits by senior military officers and increased military-to-military exchanges began in earnest. A modest program of arms sales also began both through direct commercial transactions and the US Department of Defense Foreign Military Sales program. Military exercises, intelligence exchanges, and planning for even greater involvement of American military forces in the Pacific with the People’s Liberation Army gathered momentum; however, these efforts were short-lived.

The move to near-alliance status to counter the Soviets began to crumble with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev to General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Reagan and Gorbachev first met in 1985 in Geneva, Switzerland, again in 1986 in Reykjavik, Iceland, and in 1987 in Washington. Many of the issues that brought China and the US closer together – such as Afghanistan, curbs on nuclear weapons, and the forward deployment of Soviet ground forces in Central Europe – were removed as Gorbachev’s initiatives gained momentum. The *raison d'être* for improved Sino-American relations ebbed significantly as the decade progressed. In early 1989, President Reagan was replaced by his fellow Republican and former Vice President, George H.W. Bush. President Bush was very knowledgeable about dealing with the Chinese; in 1974-1975, he served as the US Envoy to the People’s Republic of China, in essence the first ambassador.

In the spring of 1989, China’s domestic situation also became a major contributing factor in the deterioration of the relationship. Ironically, Gorbachev was in China in May of 1989 when the pro-democracy movement in Beijing blossomed into a full-blown demonstrations against the Communist Party leadership. It is also somewhat ironic that the US president most familiar with China and its leadership would not be able to move the relationship ahead because of the massacre.
in Tiananmen Square. The violent suppression of the protesters with the deployment of the PLA brought Sino-American military-to-military relations to a virtual standstill.

Figure 1.9 A Chinese man stands alone to block a line of tanks heading east on Beijing’s Chang’an Boulevard In Tiananmen Square. Photo courtesy of the US Department of State History Office.

The 1990s: The American Military Moves to the Middle East and Global Peacekeeping

In the early 1990s, President Bush attempted to deal with the aftermath of Tiananmen and reset relations with China. However, American domestic politics and the sale of 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan in contravention of President Reagan’s 1982 Communiqué, and domestic and Asian reactions to China’s 1992 claims of ownership of the Spratly Island in the South China Sea, all made improvements nearly impossible. However, for Deng, now in his 90s, while improving the PLA was important, he remained focused on the Chinese economy. It was the US, not China, that was moving slowly to improve relations. The United States also began the decade with a major war in the Middle East. Iraq, America’s foe in the liberation of Kuwait, was equipped in part with some of China’s best military equipment including the tank pictured on the following page (see Figure 1.10).

The overwhelming and apparently easy victory by the American-led coalition against Saddam Hussein’s large and well-equipped forces in Operation Desert Storm surprised the Chinese Communist Party and military leadership. In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the independence of the Eastern European states, and the haphazard reduction of Russia’s military forces took away the pressing need of the United States to seek better relations with China. Added to this was the curtailment of Soviet assistance to its communist client states such as North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam. The communist world was turned upside down in the early 1990s, and American military power appeared to be preeminent.
The Clinton Administration could not afford to ignore the domestic issues associated with China. Human rights, most-favored-nation status, and the imbalance in trade made any improvements in Sino-American relations difficult at best. “By the spring of 1993, the United States and China were two ships passing in a fog of recrimination and denunciation.” In 1996, the situation further deteriorated, as it had almost 40 years earlier, when a major crisis erupted over Taiwan. When China attempted to influence the presidential election in Taiwan through provocative use of military force and selective missile launches, President Clinton responded by sending two US Navy carrier battle groups to the region. America once again showed its support for Taiwan in the face of PRC military aggression. Also in 1996, China, Russia, and three Central Asian states formed what is now the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The establishment of this organization and its regional membership signaled a significantly improved relationship between Russia and China that continues today.

![Figure 1.10 Captured Iraqi Type 69-II tank during Operation Desert Storm. Photo taken by Lance Corporal Lanham, courtesy of Department of Defense.](image)

America’s relationship with China was even more difficult. Strategically, the founding of the SCO added complexity as China was now playing the Russia card. Many other regional issues, including the advancement of nuclear and missile technology on the Korean Peninsula and improving relations with Vietnam, also had a negative influence on Sino-American actions and activities. Nevertheless, President Jiang Zemin visited the United States in 1997 and in the following year, Clinton conducted a nine-day visit to China where he was cordially received. However, Patrick Tyler called the major unresolved issues between China and the United States “the menu of contention.” Nevertheless, there was great power agreement, or at least acquiescence, in the United Nations Security Council on the increasing internationalization of many of the world’s areas of strife.

Globally, United Nations peacekeeping was the hallmark of military conflict in the 1990s. The United States became significantly involved, but China also began to deploy staff officers on UN duty and gained its voice in Security Council deliberations. In 1992-1993 after Vietnam’s withdrawal
from Cambodia, a UN Peacekeeping mission was established, including several American staff officers and a unit from Japan. Over the course of the decade, the United States deployed forces to Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo on peacekeeping duties. The operation in Kosovo precipitated the second major crisis of the 1990s with China. In May of 1999, the United States bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia. While the United States said it was a mistake and apologized, the Chinese believed it was a deliberate attack as is indicated a 1999 article in The Guardian. The erosion of Sino-American relations again accelerated when George W. Bush took over as president in January of 2001. He campaigned on an anti-Chinese platform and indicated his intentions to improve relations with Taiwan. It would not be long before his China policy would be tested.

On 1 April 2001, an American Navy EP3 reconnaissance aircraft and a PLA Naval Air Force J-8 fighter jet collided over the South China Sea. The J-8 crashed and its pilot was killed. The badly damaged EP-3 landed safely on Hainan Island and the crew was briefly detained. The negotiations for their release and the return of the plane were conducted by the US Ambassador to China, Joseph Prueher, a retired Navy admiral and former Commander of US Pacific Command. This incident appeared to once again signal a change in the trajectory of Sino-American relations. Somewhat ironically, this incident was quickly overlooked and a period of steady improvements in relations emerged despite the constancy of intervening divisive issues.

Like Clinton four years before, Jiang Zemin warmly greeted Bush on a state visit to China in February 2002. Later that year Jiang visited the United States and was invited to the Bush ranch in Texas. By the time of the terrorist attack on 9/11 in 2001, military-to-military contacts had restarted. The US supported China’s request to put the Uighurs independence movement on the global terrorist list. At the end of the Bush Administration in 2008, China joined the counter-piracy effort off the east coast of Africa. Although its naval forces are not part of the international command
and control scheme, they work in parallel on this important mission. The Chinese warships, while operating independently, cooperate with the US Navy and continue to rotate ships as part of this mission.

In 2009, at the beginning of the Barack Obama administration, the relationship continued to be complex and strategically ambiguous. When President Hu Jintao was replaced by Xi Jinping, there was hope of a significant improvement in relations. However, by late 2011 and the announcement of the “Pivot to Asia” by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in an article in *Foreign Policy*, the trendline in relations was again tilting downward. In 2015, the administration announced arms sales of nearly two billion dollars to Taiwan, exacerbating already declining relations. In June of 2016, a crisis in the South China Sea over expansive sovereignty claims, island reclamation, and anti-air and anti-missile installation dominated the news, as China and the Philippines awaited the decision of an international tribunal. The situation between China and Japan over the Diaoyu or Senkakus islands has quieted, although it is also not resolved. However, the issue of stationing Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) weapons in South Korea, with reach far into China and the ability to protect Japan as well, is the dispute *du jour*.

American support to its allies, Japan and the Philippines, and improvements in relations with India and Vietnam, are increasingly seen by China as further efforts by the United States to contain China. Nevertheless, military-to-military exchanges in the areas of humanitarian relief and assistance and joint participation in multinational exercises such as Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise continue. The US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth sent representatives to a planning meeting for future activities between the US Army and Chinese counterparts held in Beijing in November of 2015.

Figure 1.12 US President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping of China review the troops on 26 September 2015. Official White House Photo by Amanda Lucidon.
Conclusions

At the beginning of this chapter several questions were posed about the future strategic and operational environment in East Asia. What does this history portend? Are there trends to be discerned by studying the period from the Korean War to today’s crisis in the South China Sea? Perhaps most importantly, are there insights into whether or not a major clash between the United States and China is inevitable or can be avoided? Arguably, this chapter provides several important and enduring takeaways in addressing these questions. Below are six salient points:

- Taiwan, and arms sales to its armed forces, remains central to the US military-to-military relationship with the PRC. It is also clear US weapon transfers to Taiwan can be overlooked by China when it is convenient.

- The uncertainty of the future situation on the Korean Peninsula must be addressed in terms of China’s post-1950 role. China is not likely to stay out of any conflict on the peninsula or humanitarian collapse in the DPRK. Maintaining the status quo and stability on the peninsula is important.

- In terms of relations between China and Japan in Northeast Asia, the clock started with the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895. Today, as then, the overall situation is difficult to separate from activities in Korea and Taiwan. Japan is the United States’ most important ally in Asia, for all that portends.

- The relationship between China and Russia is uncertain and uneven. Ideology did not bring together or heal what geography and national interest perpetually aggravate or aggregate. One can certainly argue that the great game in Asia over the period beginning in 1950 is not in Central Asia, but continues to exist among Russia (the Soviet Union), China, and the United States and its allies and friends.

- Pakistan, India, Vietnam, and perhaps in the future Indonesia and Myanmar (Burma), are adjuncts to the three prime players and two potential battlegrounds (Taiwan and Korea) in the region. China is “prickly” over its borders, its sovereignty, and the choices of outside security relationships of its bordering or nearby countries.

- The Chinese Communist Party uses military force infrequently and judiciously – offensively defensive, limited, and beyond Clausewitz in terms of political application for national defense. Military force is not the last resort, but a normal, if circumscribed, tool of statecraft.

Given these five factors, is a Sino-American conflict – succumbing to the “Thucydides’ Trap” – inevitable as China rises to regional power status and global military prominence? The simple answer is no. The United States and China have coexisted through a cold war as both enemies and near allies, have supported opposing sides in hot conflicts, and have competently handled significant provocations that have included the deaths of each country’s military personnel. Since the end of the Korean War, for over 60 years, through multiple administrations in both countries, major military conflict has been avoided. Radical or rational, ideological or idealistic, both nations have been practical, realistic, calculating, and nationalistic in avoiding war.

Perhaps most telling is the fact that the conflicts China has conducted since 1950 were all limited and ended in negotiation and compromise. Chinese leaders appear to adhere very closely to two key tenets of Sun Tzu’s *Art of War*. Firstly from Chapter 1, “War is a matter of vital importance to
the State, the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thor-
oughly studied.”

Whether or not to go to war will be carefully deliberated. Secondly, from Chapter
12, “A sovereign cannot raise an army because he is enraged, nor can a general fight because he is
resentful. For while an angered man may again be happy, and a resentful man again pleased, a state
that has perished cannot be restored, nor can the dead be brought back to life.”

War will only be undertaken when victory is assured. This demands the US remain militarily strong and present in the
Indo-Asian-Pacific.

War between two Chinese states in 500 BCE is far different than war between two nuclear armed
superpowers in 2016. Decisions to go to war in China today and into the future will be made behind
closed doors, by a very small group, using culturally enigmatic paradigms. The “Thucydides Trap”
might be easier to avoid if the way “New Sparta” makes decisions of national security were better
understood. Nevertheless, the lessons from Sino-American military-to-military relations from 1950
to 2016, some 66 years, are instructive. A war between China and the United States, even if short
and geographically contained with low numbers of casualties, would have dire global economic and
diplomatic consequences, an outcome not likely lost on either side.
Notes

1. This chapter is a follow-on to Chapter 9, “The Foundations of Sino-American Military-to-Military Relations from the Boxer Relief Expedition to the Joint United States Military Advisory Group-China, 1900-1949” in Through the Joint, Interagency and Multinational Lens: Perspectives on the Operational Environment, Vol 1 (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College Press, 2016).


16. Clubb, China and Russia. Chapters 31 and 32 discuss in detail this period during which Mao order the Soviet advisors to leave and Soviet support to China was significantly reduced.


Chapter 2
Interagency Coordination and Synchronization:
Do We Need a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the Interagency?
Mr. Dwayne Wagner and Mr. Gus Otto

America was thrust into the world-wide terror nexus on 11 September 2001. For the last 15 years, the US has grappled with finding the right mix of policy, strategy, operational approach, and tactical execution in defeating or crippling diverse, ideological terrorist networks. Much criticism has been levied at the apparent inability of US interagency (IA) – the various agencies, diplomatic, intelligence, military, logistic, and others – to work together. Several remedies have been offered, yet none adopted, and the core problem remains unsolved. Consider the following scenario:

Circa October 2004, Washington DC, the Pentagon:

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics (DASD) talking to the Department of Defense (DOD) Liaison to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), an Army Colonel: Dwayne, we need several federal agents to go downrange to Afghanistan to help us with execution of our policy and strategy.

Army Colonel to DASD: Yes ma’am, I will talk with the agency’s leaders and see what they can do.

[Next Day]

Army Colonel to DEA Senior Agent (Jesse): Jesse, how long will it take for DEA to send some agents to Afghanistan in support of the new program we developed together?

Jesse to Army Colonel: Colonel, we just cannot tell a DEA agent to go into a combat zone, they have to volunteer. We can give you what you want and support DOD, but it will take a while to process the posting, take applications, select someone, train them, and put them into theater.

Army Colonel to Jesse: You got to be kidding me…, a federal agency needs permission to send trained investigators overseas for a United States Government (USG) mission in a war zone?

As demonstrated in the scenario, there is an issue in solving the problem of determining leadership and prioritization between the different agencies. Establishing either Unity of Command or Unity of Effort requires answering three questions: How does America create a culture and environment empowering federal departments and agencies to better work together in time of peace and war? Is national-level policy development and strategic direction so complicated and obtuse that dysfunction is the norm? Can the military’s journey with the 1986 Goldwater Nichols Act (GNA) inform our next step? Let’s explore these questions through the lenses of two experienced professionals and historical context.

One lens is from circa 2004-2008, when Colonel Dwayne Wagner (co-author) was assigned to the DOD as a Counternarcotics policy staffer, with duty at the DEA, an agency within the Department of Justice (DOJ). Colonel Wagner was on the DOD books, but assigned for duty at the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) headquarters and was supervised by both DOD and DOJ political and appointed Senior Executive Service (SES) leaders. During that time, he straddled both agencies and worked with the National Security Council (NSC), Department of State (DOS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Department
of Treasury, the Joint Staff, US Central Command (CENTCOM), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). All in an effort to coordinate and synchronize the USG Counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan.

Gus Otto (co-author), a GS-15 level intelligence supervisor offers the second perspective. From 2004-2008, Mr. Otto was the Chief of Counterintelligence (CI) Hard Targets Division, countering the top seven CI threats posed to the United States. His responsibilities included collaborating across the USG to achieve synchronized action to identify, exploit, manipulate, or neutralize these threats. From 2009-2010 he worked with the USG’s Afghanistan and Pakistan CI czar, the senior CI Officer working in the Pentagon across the US Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities to achieve collaborative attention against force protection and CI threats in the region.

From 2010-2013, Mr. Otto was the Deputy Director Afghanistan Pakistan (AFPAK) Fellows Program at the National Defense University in Washington DC, working across the whole of government for the first and only AFPAK Fellows Senior Service School. His assignment, in response to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) tasking to work across USG, IGO, NGO, religion, academia and industry: to determine better ways to engage in peace-making and peacekeeping in the region.

Both authors spent a full career in either a military capacity or as federal employees. Both roles required an exhaustive application process, months of training, and concluded with an oath of office in front of the American flag. An outsider watching both careers may assume that our government is one bureaucracy, one team, one focus, and working towards one mission, with synchronized and interlocking connectors. Nothing could be further from the truth. Our government is comprised of multiple teams, different portfolios, varying focuses, responsibilities, and overlapping authorities as we try to accomplish national-level objectives or missions. Chain-of-command or unity of effort are muddied because federal agencies or functions are stovepiped, making overall coordination difficult or very bureaucratic.

Vignette:

Gus Otto recalls a deployment in Afghanistan when a senior GS-15 was assigned to an office via a personal by-name-request, in advance of the operations in Helmand and Kandahar. The GS-15 was directed by two generals to his future office. This new assignment provided a pivotal function to intelligence, security and combat operations of each location. The office deputy chief was a colonel-select, and out of his element, having only one tour in an interagency and multinational environment before in Iraq. He grudgingly became the deputy to the GS-15. The civilian federal leader was on his eighth multinational, interagency, and joint deployment. With no time to lay blame, point fingers, or to argue, both knew soldier and civilian lives were on the line. The GS-15’s first line of business was to establish a strong, confidential, and trusting relationship with his new deputy. Learning as quickly as possible where the Army officer felt he was failing, and working on those shortfalls, allowed positive prioritization. The budding Colonel had much to offer, and he quickly started to learn the GS-15 wasn’t too bad a boss. In four short months they were able to turn their mission around…

Imagine the hundreds of times this sort of scenario plays out in our government because we stovepipe people into one agency and do not afford the opportunity for broadening by working within or with sister agencies early in a career. Improved interagency coordination could still be a fleeting dream, according to one observer who says, “Unfortunately, other than the DOD, current
interagency departments and agencies do not have the capacity, capability, or culture to assist in planning.”¹

**Historical Considerations and Goldwater Nichols Act (GNA) Impact on DOD**

The American military has been accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl – a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the conflict in Iraq – considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared.² Adaptation and the willingness to change are key to meet future security concerns.

America faces external and internal threats. A review of the last century shows that diplomacy’s failure led to military force as the standard response for both conventional war (combined arms maneuver) and unconventional war (wide area security), whereas historically the military had lesser use for federal agency support (intelligence, diplomacy, contracting, or security). The last 15 years of warfare taught America that all the nation’s resources must be applied to resolve conflicts or national security concerns. This has proven problematic because our various agencies do not work well together. At what point will the President of the United States, Congress, or the American people seriously consider a type of GNA – the legislation that mandated the four services work together – for our civilian agencies?

Lessons learned from World War II regarding stove-piped and dysfunctional command and control between the services, inter-service rivalry, and poorly coordinated theater strategic decisions, set the stage for rethinking the Department of Defense role as mandated by the National Security Act of 1947. The Vietnam War also provided evidence of inter-service bickering and rivalry as land, air, and maritime leaders struggled to coordinate and synchronize campaigns involving two or more services. But it took the failed missions of the Iranian hostage rescue in 1980, and the poorly coordinated 1983 invasion of Grenada, before Congress and several committees seriously reviewed DOD roles and functions.

The GNA remains the most wide-ranging directive to the DOD, and it changed several major programs or functions, including (1) Chain of Command; (2) Acquisition of Major Systems; (3) Personnel Promotion Policies; (4) Role of Service Chiefs; (5) Advice to the Chairman, JCS; (6) Role of the Geographical Combatant Commanders; and (7) Integrated Services for Warfighting. These changes, enacted in law, forced the services to start assigning some of their better officers to joint assignments (Pentagon, Combatant Commands, and joint field agencies) so the services could develop a cadre of officers well-suited to lead joint forces as junior and senior general officers, while enabling them to better advise their civilian leaders, particularly the President of the United States (POTUS).

**Current Status of GNA**

The GNA led to a wide-range revamping across the Department of Defense from 1986 to the present and its effects are seen in every contingency operation, conflict, or war, including the 15-year long effort against several international terror networks today:

1. The four service chiefs no longer have operational control of forces. Their role is to equip, train, and provide forces to Combatant Commanders, who are responsible for employment of the force for both fighting the war and providing support in the region;

2. Procurement and Acquisition is more integrated as the services try to develop and buy the same multifunctional helicopter or radio system, as opposed to having four different types
3. Promotion boards now ensure selection of military officers with joint experience at the same rate or higher than the service rate, and this mandate entices high quality officers to seek joint experience;

4. Service Chiefs focus inward toward their service as opposed to outward at international operational matters;

5. The Chairman, JCS now talks to Service Chiefs about training, equipping, and provision- ing ready units and to the Combatant Commander regarding operational matters in the various regions;

6. The Combatant Commander focuses on preparing plans for war, engaging in and around the region and prepares to receive forces from the Services, the intent of GNA; and

7. Military doctrine and warfighting calls for the establishment of three star (Joint Task Force) and two star (Land Component Command or Air Component Command) joint headquarters with staffs comprised of Soldiers, Airmen, Marines, and Sailors.

Mr. Wagner’s senior service college monograph, “Preparing Army Officers for Joint Warfare Leadership” identified that the GNA was significant in educating officers on joint doctrine at the Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth), sending better officers to joint billets, and establishing a joint warfare mentality as officers contemplated military operations. He participated in three military promotion or selection boards from 2001 to 2008. Joint service proved to be a positive discriminator for Army officers vying for promotion or school. Since 2008, the Command and General Staff College proactively worked with the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands to infuse joint doctrine into the CGSOC curriculum. In programs throughout Department of Defense for both promotion and education, Goldwater-Nichols continues to influence today.

**Why a Goldwater Nichols Act for the Interagency?**

Across the rest of the government, Mr. Otto contends there are individual cases in which Joint or Interagency experience is required for promotions; however, there are no formal directives across the US Government (USG) or Office of Professional Management (OPM) to compel interagency participation with other agencies as a mandate for either promotion or education. Others have voiced opinions specifically about what would be needed to fully integrate DoD with the rest of the Interagency partners of the USG. LTC Havi Brunson, a battalion commander serving in Alaska, stated:

The DOD perspective was at least fundamentally achievable because of the mandates established in GN. Specifics in regard to education and [Professional Military Experience] PME, promotion, and a bar to be a fully qualified joint officer can be proliferated through doctrine, practiced by AOs and at worst, socialized amongst senior leaders as they mentor captains and majors. The success[ful] interoperability for (The Interagency) will only be realized, in my opinion, with rules that have some teeth. We’re talking about large, civilian based organizations with not nearly as much depth, and maybe twice the width, proportionally. . . for this to work, the mandates must be promulgated for all of the USG and there has to be homogenous ‘penalties’ or limits for not complying.³

At a panel discussion in March 2016, Jamie Garelick, a member of the Defense Policy Board which offered advice directly to Defense Secretary Ash Carter, said the White House had generally...
siphoned authority away from the traditional departments and invested its officials with greater authority over the execution and creation of policy. She said, “It’s not just defense; it’s across the board.” She said she understood why presidents over-centralize: because they suffer the political pain when subordinates make mistakes. She said, “we’re not going to fix this until that is not the case.”

Several calls have been made to review our current federal framework. For example, “in September 2004, General Peter Pace, USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked whether we needed a Goldwater-Nichols–like change for the interagency process.” He recognized that non-state actors, especially “the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) continues to pose a significant asymmetric, transnational threat to state and non-state actors across the Middle East and North Africa. The United States and its allies are forced to change their strategies.”

Fifteen years after 9/11, the nation continues to grapple with the enormous task of confronting terrorism at home and across the globe. We now have several reports, Inspector General (IG) reviews, and first-hand accounts questioning the effectiveness of our current bureaucracy; all replete with recommendations to improve interagency coordination and synchronization. The USG must improve our ability to focus on a mission, deploy mixed agency teams and groups into a deployment zone or combat zone, and have the same operational picture as each entity reports back to Washington DC.

One of the first questions to be answered prior to an overhaul or revamping of our nation’s approach to interagency coordination and execution revolves around which agencies should be targeted. Should the focus be on all agencies or just the ones involved with national security who focus on the War on Terror and supporting the military in operational deployments? Since it has been our wartime experience that has exacerbated acknowledgement of the challenge, logic forces us to focus on the agencies directly involved in national security missions. Colonel Larry Rentz, a Military Police officer with extensive interagency and deployment experience, states:

A civil service equivalent to Goldwater Nichols would be a significant step towards interagency cooperation. However, it would take a major event of 9/11 proportion to give it the political fuel needed to become a law. Goldwater Nichols was a good step in the right direction, but it is far from achieving its goal of “jointness.” While there are numerous forcing functions in place to ensure the services work together, you only need to look at our stove piped acquisition systems and the failure of the Defense Integrate Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) to see we are far from “Joint.” It’s really tough to be joint operationally with disparate institutional systems. There is no incentive (even a law) to get career service civilian personnel to overcome parochial bias and work closely with other agencies. Significant changes would have to be made to the Civilian Personnel Management System and numerous attempts to implement something as simple as merit pay over the years have not survived.

**Bureaucratic Hurdles?**

The USG has a reputation for bureaucracy, regardless of efficiency or effectiveness. Bureaucratic hurdles abound: (1) Statutes; (2) Laws; (3) Unions; (4) Agency legacies; and, (5) Agency missions. Each agency grows and morphs over time, depending on their interpretation of Congressional intent. Senior leaders and workers grow up in an agency, adopt that culture, and indoctrinate new employees into the same. In the early 2000s, the federal government reorganized, moved some agencies to a different department and modified some missions. The Border Patrol was initially...
told to wear the uniform of its new department and refused, citing history and legacy. To this day
the Border Patrol continues to wear the same uniform. Change is hard. As Niccolo Machiavelli
famously said:

There is no more delicate matter to take in hand, nor more dangerous to conduct, nor more
doubtful in its success, than to set up as a leader in the introduction of new things. For he
who innovates will have for his enemies all those who are well off under the existing order
of things, and only lukewarm supporters in those who might be better off under the new.
This lukewarm temper arises partly from the fear of adversaries…and partly from the in-
credulity of mankind, who will never admit the merit of anything new, until they have seen
it proved by the event.9

Our federal bureaucracy often mimics Machiavelli’s description because, as one observer argued:
For the past decade, as a result of failures in interagency policy, planning, and execution in
conducting military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, a call for interagency reform has
resonated inside and outside government, to include a list of “who’s who” within govern-
mental, military, and think-tank circles. Experiencing the perils and pitfalls first-hand of
attempting to adapt military planning and operations to an outdated interagency system,
proponents for reform seek formal change to the current ad-hoc interagency system, chang-
es that would span the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Federal government.
Interagency reform advocates seek extensive organizational change in much the same man-
ner as that which the Department of Defense (DOD) underwent as a result of the 1986
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act.10

Would interagency reform cause push-back? Of course. The Department of Defense initially resist-
ed early efforts at reform. For example,

Goldwater-Nichols addressed the lack of emphasis on high-level planning by requiring the
president to submit annually a national security strategy, on the basis of which the chair-
man was to prepare fiscally constrained strategic plans (and) the Pentagon at first had major
objections. . . but a year’s experience with the new process put them to rest.11

Is Congress an Option?

The GNA was the brainchild of the late Congressman Ike Skelton. He used a congressionally
dictated mandate – directed at the DOD – to force the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
to work together in a joint effort. Congress tied promotions to joint service, designating selected
personnel billets as joint, and required some joint headquarters. The historical significance of this
congressional action in 1986 has led to several calls for Congress to act again, this time to force
all USG departments and agencies to become more user friendly for national security missions,
personnel training for said missions, and the ability to deploy almost anyone in a federal billet.
Congress is important because “obviously, Congress would enact any legislation, appropriate
the funding for new organizations, and oversee implementation”12 What about the power of the
President?

Would an Executive Order Hasten Cooperation?

American Presidents get a vote. President George W. Bush promulgated national-level guid-
ance relating to joint interagency coordination on 7 December 2005: National Security Presi-
dential Directive 44, “Management of Joint Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and
Stability.”13
President Barack Obama had eight years in office, and several decisions (appointment of functional czars, empowering the NSC) implied that he did not trust the current infrastructure, and use of his authority to force change was an option. President Obama came under fire from some quarters for overusing Executive Orders (EO). Historically, American presidents have used EOs to implement significant and lesser initiatives. An EO could be the impetus to initiate or influence federal agencies to move toward more cooperation. The challenge is for the President to influence IA functions or responsibilities that are open to change and not restricted by federal statute or laws. Presidential EOs may be able to influence how strategic and policy workgroups are put together in response to contingency scenarios.

It remains unclear if Presidential EOs would withstand legal challenges and labor unions’ push-back in response to changing job classifications, transfer rules, promotions, and job assignments. There have been several smaller Interagency-focused Executive Orders that facilitate coordination, but nothing as directive as the GNA. POTUS could recommend or mandate that the OPM create GNA like personal performance measures.

If both Executive Order and legislative actions fail, or are not feasible, how does the federal government improve the ability for its agencies to work together? If the President and Congress cannot direct such action, federal agencies are not going to self-initiate and organic change evolves much slower. Are there other options?

LTC Brunson believes that a commissioned corps for civil service may be part of the answer when he states:

I had the pleasure of meeting one of my neighbors who is part of the commissioned corps in the DHS... and the notion of a like body of individuals who serve amongst the “security corps” of civilians (DOJ, DOD, DOS, DOA, DOE) as applicable for interagency work would serve as an appropriate vehicle for this premise to work; especially in regard to them being the nexus of departments that have international relations. I think focusing on these Departments that have a focus on non-domestic issues tightens the reins on the right focus group for this premise to be both applicable and relevant.¹⁴

A Way Forward

Vignette:

NSC directive to WH Situation Room (WHSR): OSD directs new CI Officer to WHSR from DOD CI Hard Targets, administered by Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

DIA SES: Gus, I just got off the phone with OSD and they were on the phone with the White House. They want one of our best CI officers detailed to the WHSR, who do you have who can rotate over immediate, and fulfill the mission?

Gus: No one.

DIA SES: Wrong answer. How about your team’s Special Forces Deputy? How about one of your team chiefs?

Gus: Our mission is too important, choose another part of the organization. My SF Deputy has no experience, he’s a leader not a CI officer. He and I are two halves of the same and are just starting to enjoy combined success. You know that.

DIA SES: Okay, no SF Officer. Team Chief. Send them your best team chief, we both know the other parts of the organization are mostly dead weight.
**Gus:** Isn’t that your problem? I’ve been telling you for some time we needed to jettison the “dead weight.” If I lose a team chief, then you set the team back, and disrupt our synergy.

**DIA SES:** Good, then you’ll have a team chief name to me by COB. I’m sorry, I don’t have time to deal with dead weight. You have to remember this isn’t the military where I can just relieve someone. This is civil service -- we both know I can’t just go around firing people.

Gus dispatched one of his top team chiefs a week later. In return he received some of the dead weight and spent the next 18 months trying to make them work better, train and improve them, manage them out, or fire them. The team was ready because they were so well developed by their chief, and he prepared them for his eventual access. The captain who came in to take over the team struggled as the new person and because she’d never worked in the interagency. She was made the team deputy, and replaced by another member. Only then did the team recover. The team maintained its success only because of dedication to the cause, and willingness to partner across a wide set of stakeholders.

How do we prevent these types of scenarios in the future? Our nation must take formal action and each federal employee should embrace the idea of being multi-functional and working with other agencies and assignment to sister departments. Dan McCauley talks about restructuring DOD, specifically the Combatant Commands, and allowing DC-based Interagency Planning and Execution Groups, comprised of different representatives, to take more ownership of regionally-focused missions. They could also deploy into theater to help the Combatant Command staff, or work with a Joint Task Force headquarters.

The GNA achieved many of its goals during the past 28 years and strategic leaders, both political and military, are discussing the next step in terms of softening some of the requirements, adding others, or both. Leaders would be wise to review federal agencies and civilian functions to find ways to strengthen the nation’s overall ability to respond to international crises and wartime deployments. Success might approximate:

(1) an interagency model, as a complex system, highly fluid and (a) process in which each agent, or actor, adapts to the inter-subjectivity and shared norms in sub-cultures as life worlds. . . conceptualize when seeking the collective output to influence non-state actors in anarchic international systems.15

The GNA also:

Created unnecessary bureaucracy between senior generals and the president, as well as demoted the Army’s influence to an equal footing with the other services. This relegation to equal status occurred even as the Army served as the nation’s strategic force, shouldering the majority burden of war efforts in personnel, logistics (including support to the other services), and casualties.16

Several steps in the right direction would be:

1. Identifying departments and agencies with a primary national security role and tasking them to maintain deployment capability of 25 percent of their investigators, analysts, technicians, and others who provide direct or secondary support to for USG OCONUS missions, wartime deployments, and contingency operations.

2. Modifying accessions, training, and assignment requirements for similar functions. Federal agents, intelligence officers, financial crime technicians, and administrative staffers should be relatively interchangeable between agencies, meaning no need for different
requirements by department or agency. For example, today there are 36 different types of federal investigators. Why so many?

3. Eliminating agencies or functions with duplicative roles and missions.

4. Requiring federal employees to spend a 2 to 3 year tour with another federal agency.

5. Creating a federal-wide basic training program attended by all new federal hires in an effort to indoctrinate and inculcate a sensing of a federal team, as opposed to an agency-only focus.

We offer personal advice for leaders, managers, and staffers on their first job within the Inter-agency or at another department:

- Listen, learn, communicate early, often, and aggressively in order to extend understanding throughout the team.

- Interagency isn’t the enemy, and neither is the military; the military still has senior officers who weren’t promoted under GNA. After 30 years, the DOD is just starting to reap the benefits of the GNA.

- If you think the battlefield is dynamic, wait until you see the political spaces you must navigate at the strategic level. Joint, interagency, and multinational are nice notions, but they don’t begin to describe the strategic political landscape you find at the department, service, or agency levels; seek opportunities to experience these different levels.

- Across the USG, we’re already working jointly, just not consistently. Like the military departments, the more the interagency is forced to work together, the sooner we’ll enjoy increased success.
Notes

5. Colin Clark, “NSC Staff Too Big, Too Activist: Top Former Generals, Officials.”
Chapter 3
Reframing Strategy: Framing, Unity of Effort, and Operational Outcomes
Dr. Richard E. Berkebile

Abraham Maslow once quipped, “I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.”1 When it comes to bureaucratic politics, Maslow’s hammer theory, also known as the law of the instrument, could very well have a corollary. If you ignore a problem, you will never need a tool to fix it. Among critics, a common refrain is that the United States’ national security establishment formulates strategy poorly and the evidence is in the outcomes. Explanations include cultural impatience, battle focus, hubris, reductionism, as well as others.2 What is missing is an examination of obstacles imposed by the framing of strategic theory and the consequent organizational regimes precluding embracing and solving some operational problems.

Frames matter.3 Frames influence thinking, the formulation of problem solutions, and the interpretation of information.4 While frames do not determine strategic choices, they limit the range of available options.5 The military approach to strategy, and its subsequent link to operational warfare, is framed through a narrow technocratic lens. Ideally, domestically apolitical military professionals orchestrate resources to produce security outcomes as part of a larger whole of government effort.6 Unfortunately, the current framework’s aperture on military roles is too constricted, handicapping both the formulation of strategy and the resulting design of operational campaigns.

I argue self-imposed conceptual limitations on military roles and responsibilities result in suboptimal operational outcomes. Nowhere is this more evident than in post-conflict stability operations. I begin at the strategic level, where the current framework mischaracterizes the international environment and the military role in attaining strategic endstates.7 Next, I describe the how strategic frames, translated and made resilient through doctrine, create an interagency collective action problem. This chapter ends with observations on operational level realities and the possibility of reframing strategic theory in military education as an implementable and potentially fruitful long term option.

The International Strategic Environment and the Instruments of Power

The Department of Defense uses the acronym DIME – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – reflecting four “instruments of power.” When Edward Carr originally conceived of states exercising power, it was through three “instruments” – military power, economic power, and power over opinion.8 The instruments were separable for analysis, but Carr warned they were ultimately inseparable in the application of power in the international environment.9 Carr was certainly cognizant of diplomacy, but considered it indivisible from the state actor wielding the instruments. For Carr, diplomacy was not an instrument in itself but the manipulation of the other instruments.10 Analogous to Carr, Clausewitz considered war integral to diplomacy.11 For both, diplomacy and the state were synonymous. In other words, diplomacy – the state – was superior to, but not completely distinct from, the other instruments of power.

The Defense Department conceives the state as a single actor wielding the four DIME instruments orchestrated by “appropriate governmental officials, often with NSC direction.”12 In this conception, diplomacy is a coequal instrument of power with the other three. Using the Department of Defense’s four-instrument framework facilitates a military insularity from diplomacy, ultimately at odds with the political nature of the international environment and war itself. It subverts the generation of strategy by separating diplomacy from force. Specifically, this frame circumscribes the military’s
role in the development and accomplishment of strategic endstates by enabling the conception of a purely military endstate. Secondly, it inhibits unity of effort by ceding the military lead in post conflict operations to the diplomatic instrument of power.

Separating Diplomacy from Force

Watch any nightly newscast and one is likely to hear top political leaders, influential pundits, or media commentators delineating military from diplomatic – often termed political – solutions. This ignores one of Clausewitz’ most famous dictums – “war is merely a continuation of policy [or politics] by other means.” If one accepts the correctness of Clausewitz’ thesis, there never has been a military solution, only political ones.

The political speech of those attempting to shape public opinion is designed to be persuasive to very large audiences. Simple messages far outperform their more intricate counterparts in this regard. While one should not decry politicians practicing their craft, the simplified, and inaccurate, framing of diplomacy separately from military force is problematic. The problem is the construction of strategy and the design and successful execution of campaigns are extremely complex phenomena unsuited to populist analogies.

The separation narrative frame is pervasive. Based on public pronouncements, it broadly shapes the views of political leaders. It informs the structure of the National Security Council system and federal bureaucracies. It is also widely accepted even among diplomatic and military professionals, most of whom were assumedly educated in the political nature of war, who actually assemble strategy. The result is often myopic turf battles rather than policy designed in the greater interest of the state. For example, it is not unusual for diplomats to decry Defense Department meddling in diplomacy and generals to chafe under the responsibility for “nonmilitary” political tasks.

None of this is to suggest the supplanting of political decision-making with diplomatic or military bureaucracies. Usurping democratic domestic processes is neither necessary nor helpful for strategy. It does suggest strategic advice is best dispensed by politically knowledgeable servicepersons and diplomats versed in the utility and complexity of violence. In addition to technocratic expertise in the application of violence, professional military competence requires political knowledge, particularly as it applies to relations among states, deterrence, transnational terrorism, counterinsurgency, imposing sustainable post conflict security, and the development of friendly and competent foreign militaries. Widening the conceptual aperture of the military instrument of power to include external politics is a necessary first step toward the more effective realization of strategic goals. The same framing model holds for the diplomatic corps as well. The study of the use of violence to achieve strategic endstates is integral to diplomatic craft, not an alternative to it.

Conceiving Strategy

Strategy may be defined as the synchronized and integrated employment of the instruments of national power to achieve endstates. Among military officers and across the federal government, the most influential institution in the framing of strategy is the United States Army War College. Through professional military education, a vast majority of officers have been exposed to Arthur Lykke’s famous depiction of strategy as a three-legged stool. As reflected in Figure 3.1, Lykke conceived of military strategy as a combination of objectives, concepts, and resources – more commonly known as “ends, ways, and means,” respectively. He also captured military strategy in the form of an equation as Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means. Lykke’s elegant and parsimonious strategic framework, conceived as a military subset to a larger national strategy including four instruments of
power, had detrimental side effects. Specifically, it minimized the military’s role in achieving strategic endstates and inhibited unity of effort.

**The Military Role in Strategic Endstates**

![Figure 3.1 Lykke’s Original Depiction of Strategy with Ends, Ways, and Means added. Graphic courtesy of Arthur F. Lykke Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” in US Army War College Guide to Strategy.](image)

As written, the strategic equation does not reflect all strategic variables. For example, the totality of strategic and operational environments are conventionally described, to include by Lykke, as consisting of four variables, not three – endstates, ends, ways, and means. By excluding strategic (political) endstates from military expertise or even concern, the conventional strategic framework divorces politics from military operations. The result is a military with a truncated conception of its expertise and unrealistic expectations of the capabilities of other federal departments – principally the State Department and the US Agency for International Development. A subtle follow-on effect is to shift the focus from the achievement of more difficult and often riskier national strategic objectives to a more conservative achievement of military objectives and the protection of the Defense Department’s bureaucratic interests. Unanticipated by Lykke and in much strategic process literature, evidence indicates the military does, in fact, maintain an advisory role in the formulation of political endstates. However, its institutional behavior is to place limitations on its responsibility for the achievement of those strategic political objectives. That is, other departments are obligated to achieve anything beyond a self-conceived military endstate, regardless of whether they have the capability or intent to do so. From a national perspective, departmental specialization is efficacious. It makes sense to organize similar missions and capabilities together. From a departmental perspective, though, the boundaries of specialization are selfishly defined. Stated differently, if your agency does not “own” a problem, you do not need tools to fix it.
Collective Action and Unity of Effort

Olson suggested three impediments to collective action – free riding, coordination, and conflict of interest. The military concept of unity of effort, also known by the related term unified action, is synonymous with collective action and subject to all its properties. Contemporary military doctrine well recognizes the need for a harmonious unity of effort between political and military effects. Joint publications are replete with references to cooperation and coordination among organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental. This unity of effort, however, depends on cooperation among bureaucratic organizations. The Pentagon is not totally unaware of the limits of cooperation. It relies on assistance from presidential strategic direction and the shared incentives of national interest to overcome them. Nonetheless, rather than mitigating, coequal diplomatic and military instruments of power heighten the problems of collective action.

Free riding occurs because while all groups may share interests, national or otherwise, in public goods, they have incentives to minimize paying the human and resource costs for the public good. Successful strategic outcomes are public goods, but by framing a role distinct from politics, the military’s strategic framework creates an expectation for cost sharing on other federal agencies they are unwilling to assume, or incapable of, or only marginally capable of, performing. This has special salience for strategies requiring activities as cost intensive, glacially progressing, and prone to second guessing as counterinsurgency, stability operations, or governance. With a coequal cabinet system, the Department of Defense is in no position to sanction other departments for shirking cost sharing. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate that departments avoided the costs of stability and governance despite common interest in successful outcomes.

Absent a hegemonic group or a means to enforce conformity, coordinating on objectives is very difficult. The theoretical and doctrinal reliance on presidentially-enforced compliance and coordination proves to be misplaced in practice, at least for high-risk and contentious issues such as war. While the four-instrument framework equalizes the policymaking roles of the State and Defense Departments in the conduct of war, the ability to pay the costs rests overwhelmingly with the Defense Department. While the military may be under-resourced, ill-structured, or unprepared for stability and transition operations, democratizing the development of objectives or dependence on other departments only further inhibits unity of effort. Once again, evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan and even earlier reflects the failure to coordinate objectives among federal departments, State and Defense in particular.

Closely related to the inability to coordinate on objectives, the four-instrument framework also increases the likelihood of intragovernmental interest conflicts. Organizations embedded within larger organizations, for example the Departments of State, Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency within the United States government, have reasons to maximize the benefits of policy influence while minimizing the costs of policy implementation. Lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan indicate this was a major source of strategic dysfunction. In other words, differing bureaucratic perspectives survived the strategy process despite best intentions, years to adapt, the costs of war, and presidential direction for an integrated approach to the national interest.

Operational Realities

By shedding politics from the military menu of options, the strategic framework impacts operational outcomes before they are even planned. Specifically, because it is conceived as a diplomatic instrument responsibility, the military has inadequate capability and doctrine for imposing political
order on foreign soil. Current operational-level realities may be explained by the historical roles of the military and State Department, bureaucratic resistance, and political inertia.

**Historical Context**

While the paucity of doctrine is historical, shedding military government missions is a post-World War II development. Prior to World War II, the State Department – the Agency for International Development and its predecessors date from 1953 – did not concern itself with post-conflict governance. The model was largely successful but never embraced by the military. The *continental* scope and devastation of World War II, combined with the assumption of global responsibilities by the United States, demanded interdepartmental cooperation and coordination. Evidence suggests that while State played the major role in decisions of a multilateral nature and concerning the distribution of power in the emerging international system, it and the rest of the federal government took little interest in, let alone provided oversight for, the conduct, construction, and transition of post-conflict governance. In the case of Germany, the State Department rebuffed Eisenhower’s effort to transfer governance responsibilities. In the Far East, MacArthur acted autonomously in spite of interagency and international guidance.

The Cold War provided impetus for the Department of Defense to divest itself of occupation duties it was never particularly fond of. Dyer *et al.* describe both the reluctance to absorb military governance and the historical reality of actually practicing it with two cogent observations:

> America as a whole had not yet learned the lesson that the primary mission of military government is not technical but *political* [emphasis added]: that military government is both the instrument and the creator of foreign policy…. So long as the organs of a state responsible for foreign policy failed to mark the nexus between such policy and Military Government the natural tendency would be to leave policy decision with the operating agency.

In other words, politics are inherent in post conflict stability and the military will be “left holding the bag.”

By the early 1960s, the new bipolar Soviet-American international system was entrenched and the paternalism of the European colonial system had largely collapsed. United States Army-commisioned research advocated the creation of a new civil affairs discipline and the divestment of military governance. The irrelevance of military governance was explained thus:

> It is unlikely that this [military governance] requirement will arise in the context of the present world situation except with regard to either the USSR or China. The requirement, if it arises, presumably will be preceded by thermonuclear exchanges. The time to recover from such devastation permits, also, time to create and tailor the capability if national policy requires it.

In the view of the Army, the new problem was to smooth relations between a US military *invited* by sovereign states in a *multilaterally governed* world.

> It is foreseeable that a friendly government the US is assisting in a limited war may collapse, to be replaced by elements unfriendly to the US. The realities of the present, and the existence of the United Nations, combine to suggest strongly that in such circumstances the US is unlikely, unilaterally, to proclaim Military Government in the classic and traditional sense. The primary concern of a commander will be the safety and security of his own forces… For this he will need a Civil Affairs capability but not a Military Government organization.
What the Army did not anticipate was unsovereign states, virulently malignant non-state actors, uninvited United States interventions, or the inability to conform international coalitions to American interests.

**Bureaucratic Resistance**

Regardless of the reasons, the capability for and even thought of extensive military governance waned. From the military perspective, the strategic framework placed military governance and related political endstate concerns firmly under State’s purview. That the State Department did not embrace the idea, let alone develop the capability, mattered little except when it came to failed operational outcomes in support of strategy. The victory of Defense’s strategic framework over State was officially codified over five decades later with the publication of *National Security Presidential Directive 44* directing the Department of State to assume lead agency responsibilities for stabilization and reconstruction operations.45

This institutional victory, however, is pyrrhic for three reasons. First, although the State Department created an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) as early as 2004, the Obama administration replaced it with the Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) Bureau in 2011, ostensibly because the “S/CRS was not performing as intended.”46 Shortcomings were alleged to stem from State Department resistance to staffing it, poor funding, and regional bureau and top leadership resistance.47 At a planned maximum strength of 250 active members from across the federal government, less the Defense Department, a 2,000-person standby capability, and a 2,000- person private citizen reserve, these numbers have never been reached.48 By early 2012, numbers actually declined from 2011 highs to 131 active members, 590 in the standby component, and the unfunded reserve component was scrapped for a volunteer Expert Corps.49 Second, even at maximum planned strength, the CSO would be undersized compared to a projected need for a combined 5,000 active and standby component and a 10,000 person reserve.50 Third, even if fully capable at the larger numbers, the collective action, unified action/unity of effort in military terms, problem remains. The State Department envisions a *capital centric* force suitable for a unified *national* state. While useful for many strategic objectives, it is wholly inadequate for the provincial and *local* post conflict requirements of a failed or deliberately collapsed state. Successful occupations are lengthy affairs.51

Finally, the current military establishment is undersized to conduct prolonged stability operations and as already established, averse to them by narrative and strategic framework. For example, the 2012 *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* bluntly opts out of extended stability operations due to shortages in force structure.52 The 2015 *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (NMS) likewise commits to limited stability operations, while relying on “credible regional partners,” the other interagency instruments of power, and unnamed international organizations.53 The NMS simultaneously recognizes that stability operations are in fact not short but *lengthy* and that subnational conflicts are the most *probable* for the foreseeable future.54 The combination of force structure shortages and disinterest in institutional responsibility for lead agency obligations suggests the Defense Department will resist structural reforms.

**Political Inertia**

Put bluntly, near-to-midterm structural reforms of the federal government are doubtful. Although government reform is a common topic in the discourse of presidential campaigns, detailed proposals and post-election follow-through are rather uncommon. Absent a president committed to making it their one and only legacy, or a systemic shock on the scale of 9/11 or larger, strategic dysfunction
is likely to continue.\textsuperscript{55} Beyond the president, the four-instrument framework is also a common narrative among the legislative organs as well as their notoriously entrenched oversight committees. Legislatively-initiated reforms such as those of Goldwater-Nichols face steep challenges and no apparent champions are pushing change. Former National Security Advisor James L. Jones is a prestigious technocratic advocate, but his proposed reforms are unlikely absent political backing.\textsuperscript{56} Even if implemented, they are likely to have marginal operational effect due to their equal partner nature.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The contemporary strategic framework divorces the military instrument of power from political outcomes. Contrary to the original three-instrument of power concept and Clausewitzian admonitions, the current four-instrument of power model changes war from a diplomatic tool into a domain distinct from and coequal with the military instrument of power. Rather than preventing the dilution of military capabilities and supplementing the realization of strategic endstates, it created a collective action problem.

Olsen’s research on the problems of collective action was prescient. When it comes to conflict and war, from initiation through to the establishment of sustainable post conflict governance, it is not about cooperation among coequal instruments of power. It is about a lead agency paying the bulk of the costs – physical, mental, and organizational. The interagency unity of effort problem remains unsolved in spite of presidential direction, shared threats, legalistic executive branch and legislative remedies, harmonious personal relationships, and the cooperative intentions of key leaders. Certainly there is a cooperative role for the other organs of government and the private sector, but it is not in the realm of setting policies, objectives, or the responsibility for results.

No department is capable of or willing to embrace post-conflict governance. The operational effects are most evident in the stability and transition phases of campaigns executed in deeply divided and collapsed states – the very places deemed likely threats to national security. In accordance with the strategic framework, the military instrument of power has insufficient capability and, more importantly, no sense of ownership for the political problems of stability operations. The diplomatic instrument of power likewise has no capability and a questionable sense of ownership. This situation would be acceptable but for the 21st century ability and likelihood of ungoverned spaces to impact national security.

The outlook is bleak for successful complex stability operations and institutional reforms for the near to midterm future. The current situation is the State Department leads with no physical capability and nascent planning and organizing skills. The Defense Department supports with developed planning and organizing skills, an insufficient but still considerable physical capability, and a strong apolitical ethos.

\textbf{Implications}

Reverting back to Carr’s three-instrument of power framework is the first step to minimizing intragovernmental collective action problems in the formulation and implementation of strategy. This would give diplomacy primacy for bilateral and multilateral negotiations among states, but reduce State Department responsibilities at subnational levels in conflict zones. This is not unreasonable since State’s raison d’etre is to negotiate and its capabilities to change conditions on the ground are aspirational at best. Second, the creation of viable post-conflict states requires a Defense Department lead. The military must embrace an expanded role in counterinsurgency, post-conflict governance, and the transition to and development of indigenous governance. Developing the capability will be
challenging, perhaps impossible, in the face of reduced force structures. Nonetheless, expectations other departments will lead or of effective interdepartmental, or even less likely international, collaboration are misplaced.

**Military Reforms**

In the long term, the military must educate and reframe strategy and war within the context of politics. Specializing in the mastery of violence is insufficient. Political outcomes are in the nature of war. Sowing the seeds for long-term evolution is possible and may be built around three axes. First, the military recognizes the utility of stability operations and the requisite capabilities. In an era otherwise characterized by force reductions, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade was reactivated as an active duty unit in 2007, part of the Army’s commitment to an additional 3,700 soldiers for Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations. The Defense Department also declared stability operations a core mission, requiring “proficiency equivalent to combat operations” and an ability to lead operations to “establish civil security and civil control,” without mention of governance, until they can be transferred to other instruments of power.

Second, similar to counterinsurgency, civil affairs doctrine has enjoyed a revival. In 2013, *Joint Publication 3-57: Civil Military Operations* revived a definition for military government. To those familiar with the centrality of definitions to joint doctrine, this sanctions the ability to at least discuss a topic. Comparison of current joint doctrine and the Army’s *ATP 3-57.60: Civil Affairs Planning* with the immediate post World War II era *Field Manual 27-5: United States Army and Navy Field Manual of Civil Affairs* [and] *Military Government* reveals substantial parallels. The fundamental difference is in the cabinet department leading the operation.

Lastly, military education may be used as a tool to reintroduce the overlap between political and military endstates. This can be justified as both a historical United States military mission and as Clausewitzian. While doctrine and Defense Department directives are curricular staples, military education is not, or at least ought not to be, exclusive of other topics and professional examination. Over time, Lykke’s article was fundamental to the development of generations of officers. New perspectives could have similar consequences. Furthermore, military education could put the feared occupation narrative into perspective. Anxiety over the hostile framing effects of the word itself may be hamstringing operational outcomes. In effect, this enables opponents to derail American strategy through mere discourse.
Notes


3. For my purposes, literatures’ use of narrative, culture, or metaphor are essentially equivalents of the term frame.


7. The term international environment is intended to describe strategic level political interactions among primarily states but increasingly subnational or supranational actors. International system is often used synonymously in literature. Joint Publication 1 uses the terms strategic security environment and global environment but the definitions are not well developed.


20. For clarification, Lykke was not attempting to capture the entire strategic process in the strategic environment, simply defining his concept of military strategy as a lesser included element.


22. Lykke cites Liddell Hart’s concern about the military being assigned impractical tasks. Lykke, “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” 181; Robinson et al., *Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War*, 34.


33. Arguably, the reverse is also true with the diffusion of diplomacy between Defense and State.


40. Borton, “Preparation for the Occupation of Japan,” 210-211.


Chapter 4
A Troubling Trend: Raising the Bar for Flag Officers Who Choose to Work for Defense Contractors, the Pentagon, or Both
Dr. John H. Modinger

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. … We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense.

– Excerpt from President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Farewell Address, 17 January 1961

We are changing the perception and maybe the reality of what it means to be a general… The fundamental question is whether this is shaping the acquisition system and influencing what the Pentagon buys. I think the answer is yes.

– General Robert “Doc” Foglesong

I think it’s absolutely wrong for somebody to have one foot in both camps. I don’t see how somebody can be on some (corporate) board, and then be a senior mentor – whereby he is learning information that could advantage his company – and say that’s ethical.

– Major General Waldo Freeman

Despite reflexive praise for all things joint, an overly-complex, service-centric approach continues to pervade Department of Defense (DOD) acquisitions. A drastically different paradigm is required. This approach requires far more accountability and cost-consciousness than was the norm for almost the entire Cold War and the so-called “New World Order” that emerged in its wake. The days of Congress issuing a blank check to the military are behind us, regardless of the unsustainable increase the new Trump Administration has proposed. Our spending dwarfs that of other nations, particularly in terms of weapons systems and personnel. Clearly, our obligations are greater; but unrestrained and ambitious visions, hallmarks of a bygone era, are likely a thing of the past for the foreseeable future. This change is a contingency to which DOD must adjust.

In the wake of the Cold War, the military has evolved slowly, strategically-speaking. Yes, our forces are outfitted with some fantastic equipment and training, and services adjust doctrine from time to time, but from a strategic standpoint, the DOD has struggled to crystallize a true strategy. One egregious example of that failure to adjust has been in the realm of the profession’s fiscal responsibilities. Pundits blame many things for the acquisitions debacle, but much of the blame belongs to the military for failing to properly balance performance and cost.1 During his tenure, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates routinely lamented the Pentagon’s “culture of endless money.”2 For decades, the military sought to maximize performance with an untamed zeal that routinely trumped cost considerations. But that abandonment of fiscal responsibility carries with it greater
strategic implications with each passing year. Can anyone argue the current acquisition process is sustainable or even sane? The acquisition fiasco has gotten so bad that by one estimate – projecting out the reduced-quantity curve for fighter aircraft due to ever-rising costs – by 2054, the services will be able to afford only one aircraft per year – to be shared among all the services! As ridiculous as that sounds, current trajectories suggest just that. The DOD must begin acting as if the contingency for fiscal restraint is a reality, for it will be soon enough, without drastic changes to the way it does business.

This chapter will not make a case for the many sweeping changes or contingencies becoming more and more likely as the horizon grows closer. Instead, it will focus on one malignant problem within the larger context of a needed paradigm shift in how the DOD conducts itself going forward.

As for unified action, it boils down to the synchronization of policies and plans to achieve a coordinated effort and achieve stated goals. With that in mind, the DOD should re-think the current time prohibition constraining flag officers from immediately going to work for defense contractors and being mentors to individual military services. The current “system” is woefully inadequate, compromising the profession’s integrity and failing to deliver measurable benefits when contrasted with alternative approaches; indeed, it may exacerbate problems.

A relatively recent surge in individual services relying on retired flag officers, often referred to as mentors, has created a new class of individuals who enjoy even more access than a typical retired officer; they are compensated by both the taxpayers and by industry, with little to prevent their private employers from using knowledge the officers obtain as mentors in seeking government work. “Nothing is illegal about the arrangements. In fact, there are no Pentagon-wide rules specific to the various mentor programs, which differ from service to service.”

Disparate, service-specific mentoring procedures must be replaced by an overarching DOD policy, applicable to all services, agencies, and retired flag officers to better mitigate conflict-of-interest issues and demonstrate greater acuity regarding the optics attendant to leveraging senior officer expertise at considerable cost to the taxpayers. There should be adequate leeway given to tailoring such mentoring to the needs of the service, but not at the expense of transparency and reasonable fiduciary responsibilities.

While this chapter does not argue DOD has done nothing, it contends most of the existing legislation is ineffectual due to loopholes, loose interpretations, arbitrarily short prohibition periods, and piecemeal enforcement. The best policy would be one which removes any hint of ambiguity and establishes a stark chasm between those who held flag rank and the entities that so desperately want their greatest asset – ACCESS. As one general who was intimately involved in mentor programs and consulted for defense contractors belatedly admitted, “Keeping (defense) consulting separate from mentoring is important, and we probably need to make the rules much more visible and appropriately restrictive.”

To date, no concrete evidence suggests the American taxpayer or the military gets the most, or even more, bang for the buck through the latter’s increasing reliance on the guidance of retired flag officers, despite the relatively high cost of that counsel. The Pentagon has never released any assessment to show military mentor programs achieved stated goals. Undoubtedly, several retired flag officers could provide anecdotal stories to support their endeavor; but the fact remains there is no way to measure their claims or duplicate the supposed results. Furthermore, the practice, if handled inappropriately – as has been the case before – has the making of an ethical quagmire and financial boondoggle.
This chapter addresses the all-too-pervasive habit of retired flag officers going to work for defense contractors or creating their own contracting businesses shortly after their mandatory abstention has ended. On its surface, leveraging the experience of those who served in positions of great responsibility as advisors on strategy, policy, and purchasing seems logical; however, upon closer examination, the established revolving door is an abomination to ethical standards, corrodes professionalism, and delivers no tangible proof of being a superior approach to improving defense acquisition or appreciably improving training. Indeed, some evidence suggests their involvement in the process makes the situation worse, leaving aside the ethical morass it creates.

A viable solution involves abandoning the current conflict-of-interest prohibition period, which is rather arbitrary, minimalist, and largely ineffectual. In its place, establish a 10-year ban on flag officers working for a defense contractor. This ban would in no way eliminate a retired flag officer’s ability to advise DOD on a “pro bono” or “fee-for-service basis,” but would effectively remove the possibility – by accident or design – of leveraging former rank, contacts, and know-how to steer contracts toward current/future employers. A variety of schemes and shell games allow the circumventing of the present maximum two-year prohibition; schemes wherein these retired flag officers are corralled and temporarily serve in some non-defense-related holding pen post until they can begin legally leveraging their number one asset: access to those who make spending decisions inside the E-ring.

But that is not enough, as Senator Jack Reed, a military veteran and West Point graduate, has acknowledged. “We can draft all kinds of rules, but the officer corps ultimately must police its ranks... Be they obvious or subtle, the revolving door abuses corrode ‘the heart of the military profession.’” Furthermore, DOD should require “mentors” (i.e., contractors) to abide by the same disclosure rules federal employees must comply with; currently, when hired, there are no mandatory limits on what contractors can be paid. While there is no ethical problem with the high compensation rates per se, there is little to suggest the pricey fees constitute money well spent, since the assorted programs are largely an accounting black hole and lack the most basic metrics to ascertain effectiveness. Rather, the various programs persist largely due to unsubstantiated claims about their efficacy.

Putting aside the effectiveness issue, consider a stunning fact about greater accountability applicable to the mentorship program. When Secretary Gates, responding to outside pressure, mandated that mentors file public financial disclosure documents, 98 percent of the mentors quickly dropped out of the program. While government bureaucratic paperwork can be onerous, one can surmise the real reason for the departure of nearly all the mentors at that time: it would illuminate some very shady connections between mentors, defense contractors, and the DOD. And did the military collapse minus advice from 98 percent of its former mentor pool? It did not. This fact raises the question, “Were they ever necessary?”

Some may argue it is not possible or fair to enact such an edict, but it is completely doable with enough sustained political will, girded by an informed electorate. Admittedly, those are both towering challenges, but nevertheless possible. As to the fairness issue, a 10-year moratorium on retired flag officers working for defense contractors utilizes much the same principle at work with active-duty service commitments for specific training or education. Generally, those commitments are somewhat capricious. Why this many years for X? Or that many years for Y? Examples abound: 3:1 payback for certain schools; two years for a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) move; six to eight years for flight training. In short, they constitute returns on investments, albeit somewhat arbitrary ones, but address a need to retain talent long enough to recoup a particular investment. And
It must be emphasized, again, such a change in legislation would not impact a retired flag officer’s ability to work in countless other venues and lead all sorts of organizations; it would, however, eliminate one sliver of the economic bonanza awaiting them upon retirement.

Ultimately, should a 10-year ban go into effect, it would be a flag officer selectee’s choice to forgo promotion to O-7 and beyond and keep open a defense contracting future or preclude that narrow band of employment in exchange for flag rank and myriad possibilities connected with it. Such legislation would not preclude their ability to advise the Pentagon, only establish a more impermeable divide between very senior military leaders and the means of production profiting from their decisions (and those who were sometimes their former bosses).

Critics can assert imposing this dilemma upon the best and brightest penalizes them and means we settle for the next best, but this is a hollow argument on two counts. First, it penalizes no one; it simply demands a choice regarding priorities. Second, as anyone who served long enough in the military recognizes, many officers are not selected for the next level of command—not because they lacked the skill, but because their pedigree was not valued as highly, the vacancies were not there, and tough choices had to be made regarding who ascended. It stands to reason, then, that should a flag officer selectee opt not to accept the promotion, other capable officers can fill the billet. Furthermore, the servicemen and women in question would weigh this choice far in advance of any nod. Quite incidentally, it might also broaden and diversify the flag officer ranks by allowing for the rise of some with more unconventional pedigrees.

For decades now, there has been an all-too-cozy relationship between many Washington insiders, defense contractors, and senior military leaders. Once upon a time, retired flag officers almost never went to work for a defense contractor. After World War II, many top generals were in high demand. General George Marshall became President of the American Red Cross; Dwight Eisenhower became President of Columbia University; General Omar Bradley became the Chairman of Bulova Watch; General Matthew Ridgway became Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Mellon Institute and board member for Gulf Oil; General Lucius Clay became Chairman of Continental Can; General Lauris Norstad was President of Owens-Corning Fiberglass; General Alfred Gruenther became President of the American Red Cross. Notice anything strange about the list, which is not exhaustive? None of these gentlemen went to work for a defense contractor. Not one. Pierre Sprey, co-designer of the F-16 air-to-air fighter and A-10 ground attack aircraft, and a highly-regarded, often cynical Pentagon insider, recalls “there was a time when retiring flag officers … thought it dishonorable to accept a job for a munitions maker.”

How things change! By contrast, today the vast majority of retired flag officers go to work, in some capacity or another, for companies with vested interests in the defense budget shortly after retirement, or sit on the board of directors for some of the very companies they interacted with while in uniform, even if only indirectly. This presents a potentially huge ethical dilemma. While certain prohibitions prevent former generals and admirals from immediately trekking over to the offices of those who have ongoing financial ties to the Pentagon’s budget and with whom they have dealt, those prohibitions are largely ineffective, preventing the most egregious ethical violations, but impotent in the face of more veiled approaches.

While some do their best to argue their vast experience is engaged to facilitate the best defense at the best cost, such claims fail to resonate. Above all else, these retired officers are hired for their access to senior military leaders still on active duty. While they possess a wealth of experience, what the companies they work for are most interested in is their ability to reach out to, and potentially influence, active-duty decision makers. This is unseemly, and could undermine the intent of
the competitive bidding process. On the flip side of the coin: a senior leader might pull punches to protect or preserve a future lucrative or useful liaison. While this may not happen frequently, it should concern us. Regrettably, there are more than a few notable instances of corruption and fraud related to defense contractors seeking advantage via politicians and/or military members. And many more relationships have come to light that, while not illegal, are ethically dubious.19

But beyond any individual corruption issue lies a far more dangerous threat: our security could be jeopardized in at least one of two ways. First, through relaxed scrutiny of contracting issues; second, through insufficient veracity on the part of senior military leaders when it comes to consultations with influential political functionaries (and their constituents, corporate or otherwise) in a position to make strategic decisions and dole out political plums in the future to those who stay in their good graces verses those who generate headaches.

In a hard-hitting expose, The Boston Globe’s Bryan Bender delivers an exhaustive and distressing array of incidents involving former flag officers transitioning from uniform to pinstripe suits in short order. The questionable circumstances surrounding their employment by defense contractors and the solicitations made by those retired officers to those still in uniform is troubling, to say the least. Increasingly, more and more generals and admirals enter into what would, in many other realms, strike an observer as a clear conflict-of-interest. In this case, it pits the duties of a uniformed flag officer against the interests of a potential future employer. “[S]uch apparent conflicts of interest are a routine fact of life at the lucrative nexus between the defense procurement system, which spends hundreds of billions of dollars a year, and the industry that feasts on those riches. And almost nothing is ever done about it.”20

Analyzing the career paths of 750 of the highest-ranking flag officers retiring over two decades, Bender discovered that most found such lucrative defense contractor employment irresistible.21 In Washington, the game has come to be known as the “rent-a-general” business. Here are just a few sobering facts and statistics uncovered:

- Between 2004 and 2008, 80 percent of the retiring three and four-star officers went to work as consultants or defense executives; less than 50 percent followed the same path from 1994-1998.

- In some years, the percentages are even higher; in 2007, nearly 90 percent were found to be working in defense-related roles.

- Dozens of retired generals employed by defense firms maintain unparalleled levels of influence and access to inside information on DOD procurement plans.

- The feeder system from some commands to certain defense firms is so powerful that successive generations of commanders have been hired by the same firms or in the same field.

- When a retired general arrives at the Pentagon, that general is often treated as if still wearing the uniform, which can greatly increase one’s effectiveness as a rainmaker for an employer.22

Apparently disgusted by the trend, one retired general scornfully exclaimed, “We are changing the perception and maybe the reality of what it means to be a general. . . . The fundamental question is whether this is shaping the acquisition system and influencing what the Pentagon buys. I think the answer is yes.”23 And he is not alone in finding such practices repugnant. Having witnessed this revolving door for many years, Senator Reed notes “When I was an officer in
the 1970s, most general officers went off to some sunny place and retired. Now the definition of success of a general officer is to move on and become successful in the business world.\textsuperscript{24}

Some members of Congress who served in the military believe the system requires stricter disclosure rules. Unbelievably, with few exceptions, all the DOD demands is for retired officers to wait a year before directly advocating for a contract intended for the specific military branch in which they served.\textsuperscript{25} Pennsylvania Representative Joe Sestak, a retired three-star admiral, recalled his experience in the military with former retired flag officers returning to solicit business:

Rank [even when retired] did mean something. … There is a hesitancy to question them. If there isn’t transparency or knowledge of who they are working for when they are advising the Pentagon, you are building a military that is not all it can be.\textsuperscript{26}

One general among this growing crowd of retired flag officers, actively engaged on behalf defense contractors, attempted to “put lipstick on a pig” by contending “Access sounds sleazy, but brings a value. I am interested in doing things that I think the … [Defense Department] might benefit from.”\textsuperscript{27} If the flurry of cost overruns and cancelled projects over the past couple of decades is any indicator of how well that “advice” is paying off, the military should maybe re-think where it gets its counsel. While many of these retired senior officers insist they do not substantially influence the findings of studies into what procurements the military should make, the validity of those claims is difficult to ascertain. However, there is little doubt these retired flag officers are privy to privileged information which could help their clients get additional business. Another retired general sought to shake off potential concerns by insisting his background alone prevented conflicts of interest. “You spend 35 years in an ethical place … You don’t leave that at the door.”\textsuperscript{28} Unfortunately, that has not stopped other military veterans, even a war hero, from doing it; regardless of background, one is still susceptible to temptation, bad judgment and exerting undue influence.\textsuperscript{29}

The public is left to trust the word of these retired flag officers that they do not inappropriately leverage their influence and access because these retired flag officers are almost never required to divulge their clients, or say how much they get paid. The scant rules that do cover peddling Pentagon influence forbid only a very narrow band of activities. The one-year moratorium on flag officers making direct sales pitches to their former branch of service and the two-year ban on them participating in contracts valued at more than 10 million dollars that were instigated under their command leaves wide open other forms of participation. For example, and quite amazingly, new editions of older weapons systems are not prohibited. The flag officers in question, who traverse these ethical minefields, insist they are capable of balancing potential conflicts without oversight thanks to their integrity – “You have to have a firewall in your head.”\textsuperscript{30} And yet, there is ample evidence attesting to the fact some do not.\textsuperscript{31}

Other retired generals, though, express frustration over the permissiveness of the system and refuse to exploit their Pentagon contacts to win clients. “I always felt uncomfortable dealing with former generals working for [defense contractors]. Sometimes I felt like they were relying on a past friendship to get me to do something.”\textsuperscript{32} Former Admiral William J. Fallon stated he turned down consulting offers after discerning these potential clients of his were seeking “insider information” from inside the E-ring – “I didn’t want to be a walking Rolodex.”\textsuperscript{33} One former senior Pentagon acquisition official acknowledges how defense companies profit by deploying retired generals: “They are useful in opening doors.”\textsuperscript{34}

One particularly blatant example of how many former flag officers are leveraging their clout is duly named The Four Star Group. This collection of former four-star Air Force generals and
high-powered DOD appointees unashamedly tout their previous command authority, offering up their influence and corporate knowledge of the Pentagon to build an equity investment business. According to Bender, The Four Star Group has an exclusive arrangement with a private equity firm, Gores Group, which, in turn, awards them an equity stake in companies acquired by Gores, based on their advice. The Gores Group benefits by getting information on companies developing technologies that will be in demand by the Pentagon. As a result, and troubling as it may be, The Four Star Group could have future stakes in the very companies making equipment for military personnel in the field. Retired Army General Wesley Clark, now employed as a lobbyist and investment banker for companies seeking alternative energy contracts, believes the insatiable appetite among private equity firms and Wall Street investors for retired generals is the result of a broader phenomenon: the escalating importance of the military to America’s industrial base – “It is the militarization of the economy.”

In addition to defense contractors leveraging retired flag officers as consultants, the services do the same. Starting in the 1980s, the services instituted various “Senior Mentor” programs whereby retired generals were hired back as consultants offering advice to former colleagues. Such programs have mushroomed of late, as have the salaries they are paid. Unfortunately, we do not always know precisely how much they are paid because the rules governing disclosure are almost non-existent for contractors, the legal category they are retained under. While retired senior officers have always enjoyed continued access, this breed of consultant is actually paid – handsomely – while being afforded access. And many of these folks are, at the same time, paid employees of or consultants for defense contractors, so they are compensated by both the taxpayer and industry, to say nothing of their retirement. “This setup invites abuse,” says Jane Wedel, a George Mason University public policy professor and author of a book on government contracting. “Everyone in this story is fat and happy. Everyone, of course, except the public, which has virtually no way of knowing what’s going on, much less holding these guys to account.” Senator Claire McCaskill, who launched an investigation into the practice, insists if retired flag officers advising the Pentagon also are:

being paid by someone who wants to make money off the government… it’s important the public know that… so the people have confidence that the decisions are being made based on merit, and not based on inside baseball.

In conclusion, this chapter proposes three things, requiring both contingency planning – albeit for an unconventional, and largely unrecognized, hazard – and unified action by all the services:

1. Time prohibitions regarding flag officers working for defense contractors should be extended significantly; this chapter suggests a flat, across-the-board 10 years; admittedly, this might be a bridge too far, but ultimately, the prohibition must be lengthy enough to derail shenanigans inside the Washington Beltway which feed the insidious growth of this cottage industry that serves neither the taxpayer nor the military well. There will be voices arguing for a more graduated system, connected to rank attained. Regrettably, with a graduated system – like the current one – there are unending attempts to short circuit it via liberal interpretations of the rules. Therefore, DOD should create a ban with teeth and clarity, and enforce it.

2. The Secretary of Defense needs to consolidate the patchwork of mentor programs for adequate oversight, standardization and, most importantly, transparency. In short, sunlight is the best disinfectant.

3. The services themselves must become accountable for what they spend on such programs and ensure the mentors fully disclose their business and financial interests as part of an
overall DOD-wide emphasis on accountability and fiscal responsibility. The world is still these flag officers’ oyster in so many ways, but the unbridled atmosphere needs to be tamed, beyond the piecemeal reforms made thus far.
Notes


7. This is also tied to the military’s increasing reliance upon think tanks, the influence they now wield, and their place in the national security apparatus.


10. Smithberger, “Congress Reins In Excessive Pensions for Top Brass.”


12. Smithberger, “Congress Reins In Excessive Pensions for Top Brass.”


20. Bender, “From the Pentagon to the private sector.”

22. Bender, “From the Pentagon to the private sector.”

23. General Robert “Doc” Foglesong, USAF (Retired), as quoted in Bender, “From the Pentagon to the private sector.”

24. Senator Jack Reed, (D-R.I.), as quoted in Bender, “From the Pentagon to the private sector.”

25. Bender, “From the Pentagon to the private sector.”

26. Representative Joe Sestak, as quoted in Bender, “From the Pentagon to the private sector.”

27. General Gregory “Speedy” Martin, USAF (Retired), as quoted in Bender, “From the Pentagon to the private sector.”

28. Lieutenant General Joseph L. Yakovac, USA (Retired), as quoted in Bender, “From the Pentagon to the private sector.”


32. Lieutenant General Kenneth E. Eickmann, USAF (retired), as quoted in Bender, “From the Pentagon to the private sector.”

33. Admiral William J. Fallon, USN (Retired), as quoted in Bender, “From the Pentagon to the private sector.”

34. Tom Christie, a former senior Pentagon acquisition official, as quoted in Bender, “From the Pentagon to the private sector.”

35. Bender, “From the Pentagon to the private sector.”

36. General Wesley K. Clark, USA (Retired), as quoted in Bender, “From the Pentagon to the Private Sector.”


38. Senator Claire McCaskill (D-MO), as quoted in Brook, et al, “Military’s ‘Senior Mentors’ Cashing In.”
Chapter 5
CIA Covert Action Planning: Are Plans Really Useless?
Dr. John G. Breen

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recruits and handles human assets, produces finished intelligence, and conducts Presidentially-directed covert action. Failed or morally dubious covert action programs have been well documented, most recently exemplified by the public discourse over CIA’s Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program (RDI) and the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques,” such as waterboarding, on prisoners in CIA custody. Elements of effective covert action programs have been identified, along with attributes that historically lead to program failure. It is unclear, however, that these attributes are systematically considered and incorporated into current CIA covert action planning. In this chapter, I will propose that the CIA adopt elements of military operational art in order to enhance the quality of covert action campaign planning.

In a November 2014 presentation in an open forum at the School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Dr. David Robarge, the CIA’s Chief Historian, presented a lecture on CIA and Covert Action. Quoting the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, he provided the definition of covert action as “an activity or activities of the US Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the US Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” He further delineated a variety of activities that might make up such programs, namely propaganda, political action, paramilitary, and economic. While he noted that these programs were historically a small share of CIA’s budget, he allowed that they were politically sensitive and potentially embarrassing, subject to close congressional scrutiny since the 1970s, and often misunderstood and misused. He did however note that they could be effective when employed properly. But what does “properly” constitute?

According to Dr. Robarge’s study of declassified programs conducted since the establishment of the CIA in 1947, covert action was most effective and thus employed properly when it was strategically conceived as part of an overall policy, implemented early in the policy initiative, had small footprints and used flexible methods, allowed field officers wide latitude to adapt to changes, exploited preexisting views and trends and didn’t try to create attitudes or magnify fringe elements, gave locals the prerogative to choose outcomes, and were based on sound counterintelligence, reliable current intelligence, and extensive knowledge of the target. Conversely, these programs were ineffective when they were not coordinated with overt policies, started late in the policy initiative, heavily managed from CIA Headquarters, put many officers in the target country, did not fit the target’s political culture, employed proxies seen as illegitimate, when the target government had popular support and/or kept control with a security service, or when the covert action was used to salvage an otherwise failing US foreign policy.

On balance, Dr. Robarge’s research suggested that historically greater than 50 percent of covert action programs could be considered failures. Of these, paramilitary/violent operations were most likely to fail, while political action & propaganda efforts were only likely to succeed approximately 60 percent of the time. Less than 30 percent were long-term successes.

Separately, Mark Mazzetti of the New York Times reported in October 2014 that an internal CIA study of covert action demonstrated “many past attempts by the agency to arm foreign forces covertly had a minimal impact on the long-term outcome of a conflict.” The classified study’s results reportedly “led to deep skepticism among some senior Obama administration officials about the wisdom of arming and training members of a fractured Syrian opposition.” And as Mazzetti noted,
President Obama had commented earlier in the year in a separate interview that “very early in this process, I actually asked the CIA to analyze examples of America financing and supplying arms to an insurgency in a country that actually worked out well. And they couldn’t come up with much.”

Of note, later in this same interview and seeming to leave open the possibility of covert action, President Obama reinforced the need for a cognitive approach from his national security leadership, to develop strategies focused on dealing with the complex, wicked problems he was facing:

But how we approach those problems and the resources that we direct toward those problems is not going to be exactly the same as how we think about a transnational network of operatives who want to blow up the World Trade Center. We have to be able to distinguish between these problems analytically, so that we’re not using a pliers where we need a hammer, or we’re not using a battalion when what we should be doing is partnering with the local government to train their police force more effectively, improve their intelligence capacities.

As Robarge has noted elsewhere, referring to the CIA’s covert activities in the Congo during the 1960s, programs such as these:

Achieved success in the short and medium term but sometimes set in train developments that were not always consistent with democratic values. Those outcomes, which characterize some but by no means most of the Agency’s covert action programs, often result from the policy decisions that follow the completion of the operations and are not necessarily inherent in them.

He related much the same view in his SAMS presentation when he suggested that covert action programs fail more often when “not coordinated with overt policies” or “started late in the policy initiative.” The strategic failure of a particular covert action program in some instances may therefore be due to a lack of operational planning integration either early on or, especially, in the transition period, as the covert action program terminates and US foreign policy takes over.

One might argue, for example, that Operation AJAX, the US and UK overthrow of the Iranian leader Mossadeq in 1953, was to a very great degree a covert action success, leading to a little more than two decades of relative peace and free-flowing oil, allowing policymakers time to craft an effective foreign policy to build on that initial success. It was in a sense a failed foreign policy, not the covert action that preceded it by decades, that perhaps led to the events of 1979, and to where we are today with Iran. History also may judge that the turmoil in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan was the result, similar to a lack of effective, coordinated, joint and transitional operational planning between all elements of US power, following otherwise successful early covert action programs.

The best example of this early covert action success, and unfortunately, turmoil in subsequent years (and as of this writing), is Afghanistan. Henry A. Crumpton, leading the CIA’s paramilitary effort from the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) in 2001, later authored a detailed description of the effort to develop a strategic plan for the toppling of the Taliban. Perhaps owing to the jointness of this covert action program – an effort he describes as involving the “interdependence of intelligence, covert action, and war folded into a broader policy strategy” – his description notably includes references to such strategic military thinkers as Thucydides, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu.

He also refers to a very Clausewitzian concept, adopted by the US Army in its planning doctrine, the Center of Gravity (COG):

[COG is] a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. An objective is always linked to a COG. In identifying COGs it is important
to remember that irregular warfare focuses on legitimacy and influence over a population, unlike traditional warfare, which employs direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies.\textsuperscript{11}

Thus, a COG is that element or elements whose effective targeting can lead to “victory.”

Crumpton and the CIA planners in the case of Afghanistan correctly identified that the salient COG for this covert war, rather than geography or military power, was located in the “minds of those widespread tribal militia leaders, who were allied with the Taliban and al-Qaeda out of political convenience or necessity.”\textsuperscript{12} Small teams of CIA and military officers were able to convince these tribal leaders, with overwhelming financial incentive and equally impressive US military capability as backdrop, to in essence switch sides (although perhaps only in the short term). While in hindsight this approach may seem to be common sense, at the time it evolved organically, and uniquely from CIA’s ostensibly deeper cultural understanding of why Afghans wage war. As Crumpton points out, the Afghans wage war as much or more for prestige and honor as for anything else. Much as Robarge stressed the value of the human dimension in his discussion of covert action success, i.e., when programs “allowed field officers wide latitude to adapt to changes,” Crumpton notes that the early Afghan success required “a special brand of intelligence officer who could map the human terrain and lead a multinational collection of tribal elements to fulfill their own unrealized objectives.”\textsuperscript{13}

As the CIA and US military now each engage in covert action and traditional military activity, respectively, in overlapping locales, strategic and operational planning challenges, along with the need for active deconfliction, appear self-evident. Others have reviewed the challenges of CIA/US military operational overlap, focused largely on distinctions between legislative oversight (House and Senate Intelligence and Armed Services Committees) and the legal authorities tied to CIA covert action (Title 50) and/or traditional US Military activities (Title 10).\textsuperscript{14} Notably, testifying about the Global War on Terror (GWOT) before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities of the House Armed Services Committee in 2006, Michael Vickers, soon to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense and then Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD-I), argued that “unity of effort must be achieved in both GWOT planning and execution, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.”\textsuperscript{15} He stressed the value of the planners (again, the human dimension) when he noted that “getting the right people in place to plan and execute the GWOT, moreover, is far more important than developing the right organizational arrangements.”\textsuperscript{16} In the 15 intervening years since 9/11 and that early, successful CIA/Military toppling of the Taliban, and certainly in the 10 years since Vickers’s testimony, both the DOD and CIA have taken significant steps to harmonize their efforts.

To this end, CIA’s Office of Military Affairs (OMA) and the Associate DCI for Military Support (ADCI/MS) were merged into one office, under an Associate Director for Military Affairs (ADMA) in 2007. ADMA was and continues to be staffed by CIA staff officers and uniformed military professionals “operating as one team to coordinate, plan, execute, and sustain joint CIA and DOD worldwide activities based upon priorities established by the Director of the CIA, to achieve National Security objectives.”\textsuperscript{17} The ADMA as of this writing is Vice Admiral and Navy SEAL P. Gardner Howe. His predecessor, Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland Jr., was formerly the Deputy Commander of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).\textsuperscript{18} And before Mulholland, the ADMA was Lieutenant General Raymond A. Thomas III, who led the Fort Bragg-based Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and was then the 11th Commander of
USSOCOM. Thus, military leadership choices have emphasized the connections between the CIA and the US Military Special Operations Community.

Furthermore, military officers at all levels are integrated into the operational offices at CIA involved in the planning and managing of clandestine operations and covert action campaigns, and a significant number of current CIA staff officers today are hired with military service in their backgrounds. As detailed on CIA.gov, the Agency specifically hires officers with military special operations and combat arms experience to be Directorate of Operations (DO) paramilitary case officers. Like a traditional case officer involved in the clandestine recruitment and handling of spies, paramilitary case officers will generally serve in hazardous and austere environments, while using their “media, technical, and/or military experience including aviation, maritime or psychological warfare skills) to conduct and/or directly support CIA operations,” their numbers have increased significantly since 9/11. Additionally, ADMA continues to deploy CIA officers to support combatant commander staffs at USCENTCOM, JSOC, US Space Command, USSTRATCOM, and USPACOM, among others. With this tighter integration of traditional intelligence and military expertise, it would seem to make sense that the planning of future operations, in this case Presidentially-signed covert action campaigns, could benefit from and should share common elements of construction with military planning doctrine.

The US Army’s Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0 provides a comprehensive overview of how the Army plans operations, expanding upon its doctrine publication (ADP) 5-0, The Operations Process. This and other doctrine materials are produced by the Army’s Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Most famously, then CAC Commander Lieutenant General David Petraeus, before his later ignominious downfall as CIA Director, spearheaded the production in 2006 of Army Field Manual FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Fort Leavenworth is also home to the Army’s Command and General Staff Officer’s Course (CGSOC) (which teaches the basics of Army planning methodology), the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) (advanced planning and operational art), and the Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Program (ASLSP), which features a War College-level year of strategic leadership scholarship.

Per ADRP 5-0, the operations process involves: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing an operation. To do this effectively, military commanders must understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and continually assess the plan. Successful planning therefore is the result of conceptual thinking (operational art) leading to more exhaustive formulation and detailed plans. For the US Army, the overarching concept of “planning” can be further thought of as a commander’s cognitive efforts (operational art) communicated in initial guidance to a staff that uses Army Design methodologies and/or (or concurrently) the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) to develop a more detailed operational approach. Within Design, planners will 1) frame the Environment by analyzing the current state and the desired end state, 2) frame the problem by determining obstacles in the way to achieving the desired end state, 3) develop an operational approach, and 4) produce a plan.

MDMP is an “iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operational plan or order.” MDMP consists of Mission analysis, course of action (COA) development, COA analysis (War Gaming), COA Comparison, COA approval and order/plan drafting. According to ADRP 5-0, a Commander may choose to pursue design methodologies in parallel with MDMP, before MDMP, or indeed after. The sequencing of these planning activities is Commander/leadership-dependent and ADRP 5-0, for a doctrinal...
A key, and at times controversial, element within operational art is the concept of a center of gravity (COG). As Crumpton pointed out with regard to early CIA/US military efforts in Afghanistan following 9/11, the accurate identification of the center of gravity (in that case in the psyches of Taliban leadership) and skillful design of operational plans to exploit it should be an integral part of a potentially successful campaign, whether we are talking about traditional military operations or CIA covert action. The idea of a COG as that lever upon which a successful operation or strategy can focus limited resources and exert sufficient force to achieve “victory” is intriguing and at the same time beguiling; temporal, geographic, political and diplomatic variables (among others) may cause once seemingly commonsensical COGs to become illusory. A COG that appears to be effective in one context or at one point in time, may indeed be ineffective later on or in another setting; and second and third order unintended consequences are perhaps impossible to foresee.

Dale Eikmeier, a strategic planner in Iraq in 2005 and who, as of this writing, continues to teach operations and strategy within CGSOC, offered in 2012 an updated, modern definition of center of gravity, along with its identification via a series of sequential steps using an ends, ways and means methodology. He noted that “validating a COG selection is very imprecise” – effective war gaming for example being critical to identifying a truly operative COG. Without presently going into too much detail on his highly accessible methodology, Eikmeier explains how an operational or strategic planner could move from understanding an enemy’s desired end(s), as in end state or a goal it wishes to achieve, to identifying ways the enemy would attain their ends (mostly verbs, critical capabilities), to a list of resources or means (mostly nouns) that the enemy would require to execute its critical capability. The single mean that intrinsically possesses the critical capability the enemy needs to achieve its desired end state is the center of gravity. The remaining means are potentially vulnerable critical requirements that can be targeted by an opposing force, directly or indirectly.

Eikmeier presents as a practical example his own March 2005 experience in Iraq, when he used an ends, ways and means approach to COG identification, while a colleague used a more traditional and doctrinal method, each coming to significantly different conclusions. Eikmeier seems to argue that his method correctly identified the Iraqi populace as the COG, while his colleague identified the Iraqi government, the latter being incorporated over the former in the command’s overall strategy. The sectarian violence that followed the February 2006 destruction of the Samarra mosque and the inability to stem violence seemed to validate Eikmeier’s initial approach, but also ends up reinforcing the imprecision and complexity of identifying COGs, and the planning rigor involved in developing longer-term successful operations and strategy. General Petraeus came in soon after Samarra and famously was able to refocus the strategy on a “population centric counter-insurgency strategy,” seemingly now more in line with Eikmeier’s original COG analysis, the “awakening movement” and a significant diminution in sectarian violence seeming to validate the approach. But this was sadly a short-lived success and Iraq today seems no better and indeed far worse for our efforts. This is not to say that Eikmeier’s COG, at the point in time in which it was first identified, was incorrect. However, it does again point out the overall complexity of operational and strategic planning.

To this end and in the same volume, Eikmeier’s colleague Kurt VanderSteen worried that the challenges of accurate identification and exploitation of COGs might lead to “tilting at windmills.”
He noted that:

We cannot see a center of gravity as a specific, physical property; rather, it’s an abstract concept that enables us to think about what is real. Centers of gravity help us to understand what governs the underlying processes in war.\(^{27}\)

VanderSteen concluded by noting that the military needs to identify multiple COGs for the President, as the President’s choices on which to target become the basis for US strategy. Of course, it seems the intelligence community and specifically the CIA should share responsibility with the military in identifying those strategic COGs, certainly when the CIA is ever more likely to be tasked to target them using the tools of covert action either before, concurrently, or in lieu of traditional military activity. As a recent RAND study on operational art in special warfare noted:

A target list is not a strategy, and treating it as such risks encouraging the default employment of capabilities organic to the planner’s organization, rather than critical thought regarding how a joint or interagency approach might be employed to secure US interests or how host-nation nonmilitary capabilities might be leveraged.\(^{28}\)

Given the demonstrated complexity of identifying centers of gravity, not to mention overall operational planning, how best can the CIA take advantage and learn from the hard-earned experience and knowledge base of the US military? As I noted earlier, the increase in military engagement at the CIA in the form of liaison officers, detailees, and staff officers with military experience, along with the ongoing work of the Associate Director for Military Affairs (ADMA), offers useful opportunities for collaboration and deconfliction. The Special Activities Division (SAD), now designated a Center in the Agency’s ongoing modernization effort, is home to the CIA’s covert action infrastructure, with “expert and dedicated officers devoted to covert action programs” who bring to the fight “specialized capabilities and extraordinary military skills” in “unseen and unacknowledged roles in policy implementation in countless large and small combat arenas, as well as in other hazardous non-war-zone environments.”\(^{29}\) One would imagine that CIA officers hired for their military backgrounds might include those with training and education in operational art, design, and MDMP; the CIA would therefore likely want to employ them in those offices designing and planning covert action campaigns. And with regard to the planning of these campaigns, the Agency seemingly should benefit from having other CIA officers, especially those without military backgrounds, acquire similar operational and strategic planning expertise.

As I noted earlier, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas is the center for Army education and houses the US Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC) with its Command and General Staff Officer’s Course (CGSOC). This Joint Professional Military Education Phase I (JPME Phase I) institute educates, trains and develops leaders for “Unified Land Operations in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational operational environment.”\(^{30}\) The program is focused on junior majors and senior captains (perhaps the equivalent of a GS-12/13 CIA staff officer) as they move from a tactical to operational perspective. The coursework, which straddles the distinctive worlds of training and education, provides insight into strategy, operations and tactics, logistics and force management, history, politics, leadership and the human dimension.

For GS-13/14 CIA officers, the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) is focused on higher-order operational and strategic problems, with the best of CGSOC’s graduates selected for attendance.\(^{31}\) The program’s graduates have been nicknamed “Jedi Planners,” employed so effectively by General Norman Schwarzkopf during Desert Storm.\(^{32}\) Co-located with SAMS, the Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Program (ASLSP), ideally for GS-14/15 CIA officers,
“develops effective planners who help senior leaders understand the operational environment and then visualize and describe viable solutions to operational problems.”

All three programs, CGSOC, SAMS and ASLSP, welcome interagency students. Beyond lectures on doctrine, the students are engaged in practical exercises that test and reinforce their learning, and in collaboration with their military cohort – the same officers they will be working with in the field or on some future joint planning staff. The conclusion one might reasonably draw is that the CIA should take full advantage of this opportunity, specifically in light of the Agency’s increasing covert action responsibilities and tight partnership with the US military worldwide. Unfortunately, the track record for identifying and sending CIA students to Fort Leavenworth has been less than exemplary. In 2015, officers from several interagency partners – State Department, DIA, NGA, Customs and Border Protection, the US Marshals, and USAID, among others – were well-represented in all three programs. For this most recent 2015 to 2016 term, a single CIA student was placed in ASLSP.

Of course Special Forces colleagues apparently have similar challenges, as noted in the RAND Special Warfare study:

Several SOF graduates of the Army’s premier campaign planning school, the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, noted that enrollment was not encouraged and that prolonged separation from Special Forces groups generated significant career risk.

Getting the right, and the right number, of CIA officers into CGSOC, SAMS and ASLSP, and giving them the time and space to truly immerse themselves in the complex art of planning, especially if those same officers would then go back to CIA headquarters and be actively engaged in the planning, management or prosecution of covert action campaigns, would likely do nothing but augment their capabilities, enhance CIA operational effectiveness, and foster professional networks with the next generation of US military leadership.

As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, historic CIA covert action programs are successful less than 50 percent of the time; paramilitary programs were even more likely to fail. A .500 might be a Hall of Fame batting average, but in the world of international and national security, this seems unacceptable. One might argue that the programs Robarge was able to cite in his unclassified study had, by definition and by law, been declassified – so he was certainly looking at only a subset of the CIA’s historic covert campaigns. Additionally, and as I have heard many times, we will of course see only the failures leaked to the press, while the “true” successes remain in the shadows. But even if we allow for these caveats, it seems we can and simply must do better. Perhaps the gradual increase in military presence and influence at CIA since 9/11 is a good thing, at least in terms of building an explicit and indeed tacit knowledge base of military planning expertise. Perhaps a study done by a future CIA historian will show our covert action success rate following this enhanced collaboration moving up into percentages with which we can be more satisfied. But sending a single CIA officer to learn military planning will not have the corporate effect needed to truly make a difference. Furthermore, both the Sherman Kent School (analytical training and education) and the Farm (operational training and education), both within CIA University, should be more actively engaged with the military, not just in joint training, but also in teaching the next generation of CIA officers the value of military planning methodologies. Current information from CIA.gov notes that CIA University “course offerings evolve as threats and challenges in the world emerge and change.” Perhaps a graduate-level education in military planning should be offered within CIA University, or perhaps we could simply send more CIA staff officers to fill currently reserved
and empty interagency seats at CGSOC, SAMS, and ASLSP. The military, for its part, appreciates the value of interagency students and CIA simply needs more and better covert action strategists to handle the constantly morphing threat environment in which we live and operate. After all, as President Eisenhower reportedly said, and during whose term in office CIA toppled the Iranian government in 1953, “In preparing for battle, I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”

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Notes

1. David Robarge, “CIA and Covert Action,” presentation to the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) students and faculty on 12 November 2014.
2. Robarge, “CIA and Covert Action.”
6. Remnick, “Going the Distance, On and off the road with Barack Obama.”
8. Robarge, “CIA and Covert Action.”
16. US House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, “Testimony of Michael G. Vickers.”


33. US Army Combined Arms Center, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), *Converting Intellectual Power Into Combat Power*.

34. Dan Madden et al., *Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare*, 143.


Introduction

With the advent of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the inherent role that the US military and interagency play in conducting economic related activities, a great deal has been written on considerations of the “how to” in conducting these activities. Many of these actions focus on performing or facilitating the employment of economic enhancers once an understanding of the factors shaping the operational environment are established. Various systems approaches have been designed to gain the necessary insight in order to plan and act. They consist of methods such as the US Agency for International Development’s “Conflict Assessment Framework,” the military’s use of Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT), and Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events (ASCOPE) nodal and links approach. The US Army has even written doctrine (FM 3-07 Stability Operations) on how to conduct stability operations. What is lacking is a holistic macroeconomic contextual framework in which these systems/approaches operate.

Economics is fundamental to peace and prosperity. Understanding where a nation is in its development and the associated characteristics of that phase of development is an important backdrop for planners. Without an understanding of the macroeconomic development picture, we cannot reasonably be sure that the economic actions taken will facilitate the long-term economic viability of the country in conflict or under duress. This chapter proposes a hybrid economic development contextual framework within which the military, interagency, and others charged with planning and executing economic activities can more effectively operate.

Economic Development Modeling

Over the years, there have been a number of economic development theories explaining how nations move up the economic ladder, attempting to bring descriptive understanding, reason, order, and predictability to why nations develop as they do. The two most renowned were postulated by Americans, Walt W. Rostow and Michael E. Porter.

In 1960, Rostow postulated a five-stage linear growth model to explain the economic growth and development of a nation. In Stage One, “The Traditional Society,” a country is at its most primitive. It primarily exists and operates at a subsistence level, using traditional means of production, whereby producers consume agricultural output and commerce is conducted through a barter system.

Stage Two, “The Transitional Stage,” is marked by education in society that leads to capital mobility and the development of primary manufacturing and transportation infrastructure. In turn, this links producers with consumers, and is marked by the emergence of currency and banking and a growing number of entrepreneurs resulting from income, savings, and investment. Manufacturing production output and efficiencies lead to some export income. This stage is when investment should notably occur.

Stage Three, “The Take-off,” is led by the expansion of the manufacturing base passing from production output by way of traditional means to contemporary means. During this stage, manufacturing surpasses agriculture as the primary source of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Growth
is concentrated in few areas in the country and investment exceeds 10 percent of GDP. Growth becomes self-sustaining and political and social institutions are broadened and matured through tax revenue. This stage may last 10 to 50 years.

Stage Four, “The Drive to Maturity,” is characterized by diversification of the economy with individual sectors at different levels of maturity. The country becomes less reliant on imports. Technological innovation occurs, leading to greater economic diversification, employment, income and investment prospects. Mean income rises taking more and more people out of poverty thereby enhancing quality of life.

Stage Five, “High Mass Consumption,” is a period of wealth and indulgence. The consumption of higher-end durable goods and services is balanced against national security and social welfare interests. Rostow’s model has critics who say his model is merely a classification system applying only to the Western experience and offers little in the way of explaining or assisting small countries going forward.3

In 1990, Michael E. Porter put forward another linear model addressing stages of economic development. Porter’s model consists of four stages.

Stage One, “Factor-driven,” in this stage, a nation has some level of competitive advantage based on natural resources, agricultural land, and cheap abundant labor. This combination of factors drives development.

Stage Two, “Investment Driven,” is the time when host governments, the private sector, individuals, and foreign entities invest in modern industrial facilities to take advantage of cheap labor and other resource endowments. These investments are primarily in sectors producing goods for export rather than for domestic consumption.

In Stage Three, “Innovation Driven,” countries actively create new technologies, new products and services, and add new markets in which to sell.

Stage Four, “Wealth Driven,” is a conspicuous time when nations reach a level of affluence that reduces their drive to succeed. Complacency is prominent especially among the young. This undermines innovation and investment and is the stage of decline.4

Porter’s model rings more loudly than Rostow’s in today’s increasingly interconnected and globalized world. Therefore, I propose a four-phase linear hybrid development model (with associated characteristics) more specifically based on Porter’s model than Rostow’s that will help military, interagency planners, and others better understand an economic environment of interest.

PHASE I: Resource Dependent, Infrastructure Poor, and Conflict Prone

The first phase of development is foundational and the most difficult to emerge from. Countries at this point in development have annual per capita income of less than US $2,000, as well as many of the following characteristics:

1. High birth rates.
2. Low life expectancy.
3. Low literacy rates.
4. Economy dominated by subsistence farming (crop and livestock).
5. More rural than urban.
7. Geographically challenged (e.g., land-locked, extreme climatic conditions, limited endowments, poor and conflict-ridden neighbors).
8. Debt burdened government and a poor credit rating with loans denominated in other currencies and little to no foreign currency reserves to make loan payments.
9. Negative balance of trade and/or payment issues.
10. Inefficient and under-employed workforce lacking trade skills (e.g., mechanics, electricians, plumbers, heavy equipment operators).
11. Very low per capita income to GDP ratio.
12. Few natural resources.
13. Unsustainable monetary and fiscal policy, with a currency not readily exchangeable.
14. Severely under-developed socio-economic infrastructure (e.g., banking and commerce system, hospitals, universities, electricity, telecommunication and transportation networks, clean water and sanitation).
15. Difficulty governing and enforcing the rule of law.
16. Rudimentary tax system.
17. Membership in few international organizations/institutions.
18. Corruption is widespread in government and the private sector.
20. Relatively large number of government employees.
22. Recipient of little foreign direct investment (FDI).
23. Mono-exporters (e.g., oil, various unprocessed agricultural products).
24. Weak international clout as a nation or as a member of various international organizations and institutions.
25. Prone to externally-induced destabilizing activities from terrorist organizations or insurgents looking to overthrow the existing government.
26. Rely extensively on the international community, the World Bank (WB), United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), regional development banks, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) for basic life and government sustaining assistance.
27. Experience far more brain drain of intellectual human capital than brain gain.
28. Possess little investment capital.
30. Import trade volume likely greater than export trade volume.
31. High inflation the norm.
32. Black market economy is integral and well-entrenched, making up a large portion of GDP.
33. Often, have major conflict with neighboring countries.

Not all of these characteristics are necessarily bad in their own right; however, the aggregation of many of them makes it hard for a country to gain meaningful economic traction. Having too many of these characteristics creates a very problematic environment for social stability and governance. These factors are inherently destabilizing in the long-run and often lead to civil strife, government coup, or civil war. Conflict scholar Paul Collier notes that countries with annual GDP per capita below US $700 have a 14 percent likelihood of falling into civil conflict within the next five years.5

Nations at Phase 1 have little room for error in allocating their limited resources. Corruption combined with poor economic decisions could set the country back many years in its development. An example would be committing the country’s meager income and financing from international financial institutions (IFIs) to build infrastructure in support of industrial development, and not generating enough revenue from the projects to pay the loans. The world is riddled with these types
of miscalculations. Some have led to country insolvency or bankruptcies, making it hard to garner future financial support from IFIs, acquire bilateral country loans, or get commercial loans.\(^6\)

Having a small voice in geopolitical and international economic matters compounds the obstacles facing countries at this phase of development. They are consumers of World Bank and IMF loans and at the mercy of their lending policies.\(^7\) Historically, they have had little say in trade matters within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and have benefited very little from formal trade talk outcomes.\(^8\)

An ongoing issue that exemplifies this situation is subsidies given by developed countries to their inefficient agricultural producers.\(^9\) This practice undermines the development of most Phase I countries that rely on agricultural outputs for domestic consumption and international income via trade. It further undermines fair competition and takes away the primary means by which these countries derive foreign currency to buy needed capital goods, make payments on their foreign denominated debt, build a currency reserve to back their own currency, and positively affect their international credit rating and stature.

Phase I single-export countries of natural resources are vulnerable to extreme fluctuations in commodity prices. As a primary means of government income, it can have devastating domestic economic consequences. For example, oil exporting countries have seen the price of oil go from $114 a barrel in July 2014 down to $27 per barrel in February 2016.\(^10\) Most of these countries planned their government budget based on oil prices ranging from $60-$120 per barrel!\(^11\) Without reliable income sourcing, countries cannot make the socio-economic investments necessary to grow and advance to the next phase of development.\(^12\)

Another, extreme example of challenges faced by countries in this phase of development is the case of Rwanda. Rwanda’s situation pitted excessive population growth against shrinking family farm parcels in a subsistence-based agricultural economy.\(^13\) These economic stressors, a poorly prepared government and IMF response, coupled with the suspicious death of the Rwandan president (a Hutu), broke the cold peace between the country’s Hutu and Tutsi population. The result was genocide committed by the country’s Hutu majority population against the minority Tutsi population.\(^14\)

Economical disconnection is a common trend among countries in this phase. They typically have fewer than 2,000 miles of paved road, thus limiting most commerce to regional activities within the country. This is particularly true for perishable goods and heavy bulk commodities. Under these circumstances it is possible that people in one region of the country can be starving while another region has excess crops with no economically viable means to get them where needed. This is a story that has repeated itself far too often in countries such as India, Somalia, and Ethiopia.

Countries in this phase eventually proceed to a point (US $1,400-$1,700 annual per capita income) where they either advance in their economic development or slide into chaos. Getting over the proverbial development “hump” requires many positive activities including the involvement of the host government, private sector, IFIs, FDI, World Bank, IMF, regional development banks, foreign aid, debt forgiveness, the WTO, the United Nations, and bilateral and multilateral government arrangements, including defense promoting programs such as security cooperation. This is not an all-inclusive list. It merely emphasizes how difficult, complex, and enduringly involved the international community must be for favorable economic outcome to occur at the macro level. Some 53 of 194 countries have an annual GDP per capita of less than US $2,000.\(^15\) When considering the limited resources available from potential donor countries
and development-focused international financial institutions, addressing Phase I country needs is a monumental task.

Few countries ever emerge from this phase of development and habitually transition in and out of crisis, unless supported by a hegemonic power (e.g., the US support of South Korea’s economic development). When a society seeks other options to better their situation, often those seizing power spend the country’s resources trying to remain in power through defense expenditures, which often includes consolidating power and stymying business development out of fear of losing control. This leads to a downward economic spiral causing the loss of financial and intellectual capital making it even harder to develop the economy in the future. Countries in this phase include Ethiopia, Madagascar, Niger, and Sierra Leone. Countries emerging from this phase include Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Uzbekistan.

PHASE II: Striving Growth

If a country reaches this phase, it is less likely to deal with civil conflict. Countries at this point have annual income per capita income between US $2,000 and $20,000, as well as many of the following characteristics:

1. Low birth rates.
2. Rising life expectancy and aging population.
3. Rising literacy with an increasing number of college graduates from local and international universities.
4. An economy no longer dominated by subsistence farming (crop and livestock), diversification occurs into the industrial and service sectors.
5. Becoming more urban (centered around one or two large and growing cities) than rural.
7. Learning to leverage their economic endowments and embracing technologies that enhance economic development.
8. Declining/manageable government debt, a better credit rating, a more convertible currency, and growing foreign currency reserves.
9. Export trade volume likely equal to, or greater than, import trade volume
10. Rising employment in nonagricultural sectors and a growingly skilled workforce.
11. Rising per capita income.
12. Quickly developing the labor skillsets to support and advance the functioning of a growing economy.
13. Improving monetary system and more sustainable fiscal policy.
14. Improving socio-economic infrastructure (e.g., banking and commerce system, hospitals, universities, electricity, telecommunication and transportation networks, clean water and sanitation).
15. Better equipped to govern and enforce the rule of law throughout the country.
16. Evolving rudimentary tax system.
17. Increasingly a functioning part of international organizations/institutions.
18. Corruption less prevalent.
19. Purposely undervalued currency to promote exports and accrue foreign currency reserves.
20. State-centered approach to development, predominately state-run industry.
21. Relatively large number of government employees, particularly in state-run industry.
22. Increasing privatization of industry.
23. Recipient of increasing levels of foreign direct investment (FDI).
24. Diversifying the types and quantity of exports.
25. Growing international political and economic clout.
26. Less prone to destabilization by externally induced forces, safer security environment.
Government stability increases exponentially as per capita income rises. Investment instruments appear to leverage growing individual savings. Government targets industry for development and incentivizes investment, including in human capital. Government and the private sector becomes internally/externally interconnected. Almost fully resourced government. Loss of intellectual human capital to external sources stabilizes, then declines. Black market economy becomes far less prevalent or necessary. Inflation is better managed. Often experiences various forms of conflict with neighboring countries. Wealth concentration dissipates (Lower Gini Index score). Democratic principles become more prevalent and embraced. May subsidize publicly consumed items, such as bread, rice, electricity, housing, and gasoline.

Throughout this phase, new development initiatives as well as most established development activities make progress. Private sector and government revenues rise propagating consumption, investment, savings, and private sector growth. Government and foreign direct investment remains an essential part of industrial development. In the mid to latter part of this phase, government should be divesting and privatizing state-run industry. In the long run, the private sector runs businesses better than government. If government maintains control of industry too long, then inefficiencies arise that cost the government financially. Workers become complacent, develop a sense of entitlement, become inefficient, relatively overpaid, and problematic to let go because they are a voting constituent. At some juncture during this phase the country becomes less reliant on government, institutions, entities, and undertakings noted as critical to development in Phase I.

For most of this phase, the industrial sector makes up the largest portion of GDP followed by the service sector, government, and agriculture. By the end of this phase, the economy is more service-based than industrial or agricultural. The state-centered approach gives way to market-driven forces. Here, we also see the beginnings of some Phase III (Prosperity) activities (e.g., developing and applying technologies to produce innovative products). The country enters into multiple multilateral economic arrangements and joins all top-level international trade and financial organizations – leveraging them for their growth advantage. However, the country does remain vulnerable to domestic and international economic forces that can lead to economic development regression such as increased competition and changes in product input costs.

The security situation improves to a point when the country may actively participate in joint/combined training exercises, providing forces in support of external peace/security, and combat operations in order to protect its own security interests. It also is a time when nations build defense capabilities through growing national income to protect geopolitical and economic interests outside their own borders. This pattern of activity, associated with development, can cause tensions between nations (e.g., India and China, India and Pakistan, China and its Southeast Asian neighbors, and Russia and its former USSR Eastern European republics).

Phase II may last between 20 and 50 years. Countries in this phase of development include Russia, Brazil, India, and Malaysia. Countries leaving this phase include South Korea, Taiwan, Slovenia, and China.
PHASE III: Growth to Prosperity

If a country reaches this phase, it is far less likely to deal with civil conflict. Countries at this point have annual income per capita income greater than $20,000, as well as many of the following characteristics:

1. Lower birth rates.
2. Rising life expectancy.
3. Rising literacy rates, along with advanced education levels in needed fields to fuel economic growth.
4. Diverse and highly skilled labor force.
5. More urbanized population than rural.
6. No longer tribal-centric and are much more assimilated.
7. Created endowments through innovation and are leveraging them as growth instruments.
8. Manageable government debt and a high credit rating.
9. Equalized to positive international trade balance, with a readily exchangeable currency, and adequate foreign currency reserves to trade and make payments on debt obligations.
10. Rising employment in the service sector with waning numbers now in the industrial sector, agriculture sector subsidies and protection measures take hold, employment numbers go down, while sector income rises.
11. Rising per capita income and personal disposable income.
12. Wealth concentration dissipates (Lower Gini Index score).
13. Normalized monetary system and fiscal policy.
14. More advanced socio-economic infrastructure (e.g., banking and commerce system, hospitals, universities, electricity, telecommunication and transportation networks, clean water and sanitation).
15. Fully equipped to govern and enforce the rule of law throughout the country.
16. Fully implemented and comprehensive tax system.
17. Completely integrated into international organizations/institutions.
18. Far less prone to government corruption in both occurrence and magnitude.
20. State-centered approach to development is far less prominent and narrowly focused.
21. Government employees now focused on running government and government institutions.
22. Privatization of industry is complete.
23. Foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country less prominent in turns of net value relative to GDP.
24. Diversity of exports and volume of exports peek relative to GDP.
25. Growing international clout in and out of international organizations and institutions.
26. Less prone to destabilizing externally induced forces, safer security environment.
27. Corruption less prevalent in both government and the private sector.
28. Investment instrument options are diverse and widespread.
29. Government targets industry for development and incentivizes investment, including human capital, in targeted areas.
31. Democratic principles become more prevalent and embraced.
33. Export trade volume is likely equal to, or more than, import trade volume.
34. Fully resourced government.
35. Inflation kept in check.
36. Black market economy is a mere fraction of the overall economy.
37. Country plays an active role in international organizations and institutions,
including providing financial support.

38. Less inclined to have any major conflict with its neighbors.

39. Highly skilled labor force.

This phase marks the economic competitive peaking and maturing of a country’s economy. Phase III countries are generally considered leaders in the international community of nations and active members within the most prominent international organizations and institutions (e.g., the United Nations, WTO, IMF, G20, and NATO). Economic efforts focus on preserving as much of the less competitive industrial sector, while investing in high technology/high value added products and services seen as the future growth of the economy. These countries place greater emphasis on the education of the workforce and the development of physical capital. Government expenditures increase focusing on nurturing, facilitating, and empowering companies that are innovating in new areas/fields, those creating new jobs, and new markets. The idea is to enhance the competitive growth of the domestic economy while expanding internationally.

Those possessing the needed job skillsets experience significant wage growth. Workers displaced from the noncompetitive industrial sector find employment in lower paying service-based jobs, or become underemployed or unemployed. The shift from an industry-based economy to a service based economy is rife with challenges addressing displaced workers needing retraining and/or advanced education. Some of the workforce simply gets left behind, unable or unwilling to make the necessary adjustments to compete in a more demanding job market. Disenfranchised portions of this population act out in subversive and criminal ways while others become another type of financial drag on the economy.

The Gini index begins to rise, indicating greater income disparity. Government begins to take on a greater role in providing services that the private sector can no longer afford to provide its workers while remaining globally competitive, such as medical services/insurance. Individual industries begin to show some Phase IV (Complacency and Decline) characteristics. The agriculture sector begins to lose its competitive edge to Phase I and II producers leading to government provided subsidies and protection against competition.

Military budgets and governmental interagency activities peak as nations bilaterally and multilaterally seek to protect their geopolitical and economic interests at home and abroad. Furthermore, an aging population and the social welfare costs associated with this segment, coupled with a smaller work force, puts added productivity and tax pressures on those in labor force. Toward the end of this phase, countries struggle with developing, acquiring, or maintaining the necessary infrastructure, human capital, time, and investment resources to remain competitive relative to other countries competing within the same market domain.

These countries rarely face domestic civil conflict of any significance. Domestic military efforts typically focus on combating terrorists and rogue group activities. International military efforts are collaborative, bilateral and multilateral in nature designed to train/equip, advise/assist, and defend other countries ill-equipped to defend themselves.

Phase III can last 20-100 years. Countries in this phase of development include Germany, the United States, and Singapore. As a means for comparison, the US became a phase II country around 1900 and a phase III country around 1945. Countries leaning toward Phase IV are Japan, France, and Italy.
PHASE IV: Consumption, Complacency, and Decline

If a country reaches this phase, it is likely to deal with domestic socio-economic issues rather than civil conflict. Countries at this point have annual income per capita greater than US $20,000, as well as many of the following characteristics:

1. Low birth rates, below death replacement rate.
2. Rising life expectancy.
3. High literacy rates and highly educated society (but not in fields needed to fuel economic growth).
4. Economy becomes overwhelmingly service-based.
5. Highly urbanized population located in multiple cities.
6. No longer tribal-centric and is much more assimilated.
7. Create few endowments through innovation, leveraged as growth instruments.
8. Excessive government debt, 100 percent or greater debt to annual GDP, and an eroding credit rating.
9. Negative trade balance and shrinking foreign currency reserves, along with an overvalued currency.
10. Very high employment in the service sector with waning numbers in the industrial sector, agricultural sector employment numbers go down while aggregate income rises, government becomes the second largest component of the economy.
11. Rising per capita income but lower personal disposable income.
12. Wealth concentration notably increases (Higher Gini Index score).
13. Normalized monetary system and fiscal policy, with a weakening currency, increases in government debt and eroding balance of payments situation.
14. Mature socio-economic infrastructure (e.g., banking and commerce system, hospitals, universities, electricity, telecommunication and transportation networks, clean water and sanitation), but struggling to maintain/upgrade due to budgetary challenges relative to competing priorities.
15. Fully governed and enforcing the rule of law throughout the country.
16. Fully implemented and comprehensive tax system, but struggling to draw in needed levels of revenue to pay for growing government expenditures to meet social welfare programs and economic enhancers for private sector growth.
17. Completely integrated in international organizations and institutions but financial contributions are waning due to more pressing domestic needs.
18. Far less prone to government and private sector corruption.
19. Democracy is rooted in government; however, socialist principles and socialism is a growing presence.
20. State-centered approach to development reappears in order to protect industry and to promote economic competitiveness in the international market place.
21. Government employee numbers increase in order to support the added roles and functions of government.
22. Government reappears in industry, purchasing some level of ownership of inefficient companies/industry to protect domestic jobs.
23. Foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country is less prominent in terms of net value relative to the country’s annual GDP and FDI leaving the country grows.
24. Diversity of exports and volume of exports is in decline relative to annual GDP.
25. Waning international clout, while other countries begin to pass them in annual GDP.
26. Relatively safe security environment, with lower defense expenditures, but rising vulnerability to terrorist attacks (domestic and international).
27. Corruption is less prevalent.
28. Investment instrument options are diverse and widespread, yet domestic savings and income increasingly leaves the country.
29. Government targets industry for development and incentivizes investment, including human capital, in targeted areas.
30. Become internally or externally interconnected.
31. Brain drain reappears due to job shortages in select sectors of the economy.
32. Export trade volume is less than import trade volume.
33. Become more trade protectionist than liberalist.
34. Government increasingly funded by incurring debt.
35. Government makes up second largest portion of GDP, only behind service sector.
36. Less inclined to have any major type of conflict with its neighbors.

During this phase, the country is in economic decline. Countries rest on past laurels, losing their drive to innovate, consuming their accrued wealth, and relying more and more on government intervention to protect businesses from foreign competition and business takeovers. FDI increasingly leaves the country, along with domestic savings. Complacency, with failure of government and the private sector to position the economy and reestablish its competitive edge, leads to greater role expectations of government by society. Socialism takes root and governments become financially exhausted meeting the social welfare expectations of a growing portion of the population, including those of the private sector looking for protection against growing competition.

Defense budgets shrink due to competing social welfare issues, such as those associated with an aging population. Financial support to international organizations gradually declines. Military forces become hollow, leaving limited capability to deploy and sustain combat forces. Nations are less inclined to support any type of external military endeavor. Peaceful conflict resolution is sought through governments and their respective inter-agencies. Domestic military planning largely focuses on combating terrorists and rogue group actions designed to destabilize the government. Unemployment rises significantly with little hope or prospects for future full employment. Agriculture largely survives on government subsidies. Governments begin to receive financial support from the very institutions they used to contribute to. Government debt-to-GDP ratios typically exceed 100 percent with no end in sight. Interagency efforts focus on collaboration within international organizations, institutions, and bilateral/multilateral forums, in an effort to better position the country economically (e.g., terms of trade). Countries in this phase of development include Greece and Portugal.

Conclusion

There are a multitude of factors influencing economic development. The phased characteristics provided above capture the most notable macroeconomic variables that promote or retard development. Although this is a linear model, it does not mean that a country completely fits into a particular phase of development. Every country will have one or more economic components or market segments in another phase of development. For example, the US auto industry was arguably in Phase IV, but is now back in Phase III after recent US government market intervention and financial assistance. Of particular note, countries cannot skip a phase of development. Each phase builds upon the previous.

Knowing what phase of development a country is in gives planners of all types a contextual understanding of the economic environment—a generic lens of visualization and an economic starting point to plan, ask questions, and gather information in building a complete economic operating picture. A future article on this framework will address the questions and information to gather.
Notes


Chapter 7
Global Water Insecurity and US Military Doctrine
Mr. Jeffrey D. Vordermark

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the need for development of expanded US doctrine necessary to address potential contingency operations as a result of global water insecurity.1

Across the globe demands on the readily available water resources to provide water for drinking, agriculture, and industry have been tapped. Many of the most accessible river and ground water resources have been interrupted, degraded, or depleted, meaning water is becoming an increasingly scarce resource. The world is undergoing a fundamental paradigm shift in terms of water availability exacerbated by population growth, mass migrations of people, and competition for fresh water necessary for drinking, agriculture, and power generation. Addressing water insecurity is thus increasingly becoming a national versus local issue, and the potential for conflict over fresh water is rising commensurately. The implications for the United States military to become embroiled in such a conflict is becoming more likely as a result.2

Although national strategic concerns over water-related issues are not captured in documents such as the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, US military missions today encompass a much broader range and will likely include action in direct response to water insecurity in the future. Because of this, it is incumbent upon military planners to understand the parameters, potential issues and challenges related to water in this era of persistent conflict. A significant aspect includes the ability of military planners to reference cogent doctrine versus developing responses on the fly, and also to frame these problems using the most accurate terminology. In addition to discussing the need for more doctrine specific to water insecurity and the terminology necessary to be able to understand the language of global water issues, this chapter will also posit a framework useful for considering water-specific security issues and discuss impacts pertinent to the operating environment.

Implications for the Military Planner

What does the emerging issue of water insecurity mean for the military planner today? The role of the US military has greatly expanded in the post-Cold War years. As an instrument of national power, the military has increasingly been called upon to intervene in operations outside the traditional realm of conventional combat. Due to a well-earned reputation as a global “first responder” in times of crisis, those in the profession of arms are victims in some ways of their own success. An example of this is calls by some policymakers to use the military to help contain the British Petroleum oil leak during the summer of 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, offers a discussion on the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) that captures evolving mission sets of military forces (see Figure 7.1). Potential water issues are not identified, but

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Range of Military Operations: The range of military operations is another fundamental construct that provides context. Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity across a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and campaigns. Use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities helps shape the operational environment and keeps the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence. Many of the missions associated with crisis response and limited contingencies, such as counter drug (CD) and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) may not require combat.

Figure 7.1 Range of Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (August 2011).
should perhaps be specifically addressed as part of deliberate and crisis action planning for future operations.

Water scarcity implies competition, and such competition may play out in ways we can neither predict nor fully appreciate. Potentially fractious water insecurity issues are currently spread across the globe, presenting every regional combatant command with unique challenges which have not been part of their traditional mission set. Growing demand from industrialization, population growth, migration of peoples due to climate issues or conflict, climate change, and pursuit of competing national interests all test what are only recently being perceived and acknowledged as finite fresh water resources. The challenges today are vastly more complex and include water as a potential weapon or a source of leverage in addition to being a factor of instability. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM presented military planners with the need to address this issue of leverage involving water, which resulted in the commitment of troops to prevent a potential catastrophe and is illustrative of the need to expand understanding of military planners in order to be able to successfully address water insecurity issues.

Seizing the Haditha Dam: Operation Iraqi Freedom

In 2003, US Army Rangers were dispatched to protect the Haditha dam during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM after valid concerns surfaced that Iraqi forces would unleash the “dangerous forces” behind the dam. The dam was important for numerous reasons. In addition to storing water for agriculture in Iraq and holding back a huge volume of water, it was also a hydroelectric power generation facility that produced a substantial amount of electricity – necessary over the long term to help Iraq return to normalcy following Operation Iraqi Freedom combat operations.

When US Army Rangers seized the Haditha Dam and hydropower complex on the Euphrates River on 1 April 2003 to prevent its possible destruction by Iraqi forces, a potentially non-traditional weapon of “mass destruction” had been eliminated from the Iraqi arsenal. The possible destruction of this critical hydropower facility, located about 125 miles northwest of Karbala, posed potentially catastrophic effects throughout the country. In addition to its impact on the war, the resulting flooding as an immediate aftermath and lack of water supply during the summer months would have added to the hardships experienced by the Iraqi people.

Concern over the Haditha Dam remains. More recently, the Islamic State terror group, a non-state actor in riparian (residing alongside transboundary waters) concerns, launched a concerted effort to seize the same dam in an effort to expand influence and demonstrate their ability to wield power. Although their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, the implications are clear. Water is something to be fought over for influence and leverage, especially in areas where control of the resource extends control to a political level.

As water is an increasingly constrained resource, the issues illustrated by the Haditha Dam examples must be considered when addressing instability during future operations, not only in armed conflict, but also in natural disaster and humanitarian relief situations. Non-state actors such as Al Qaeda have already explored attacks on hydro facilities as a method to create terror and have consistently proven their ability to gain footholds in areas of instability and chaos. Efforts such as this have captured the attention of the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and their efforts to systemically address the threat will form the basis of how a military planner might approach similar issues later in this chapter. Deployment of some form of a military shielding force would yield benefits far beyond preservation of the target site. It would generate leverage over any aggressor requiring access to the resource, or prevent its seizure by a hostile party attempting to use the facility for leverage to suit their own ends. Preservation would also be tangible evidence of good will to
local residents who depend on the site. Finally, it represents protection and preservation of a valuable facility, obviating any need for stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) efforts to be expended on expensive and time consuming reconstruction or repair.9

Alternatively, a deployment of military force could deter a riparian country from conducting a provocative act which could lead to armed conflict and regional instability. Bear in mind such an act may seem innocuous to an outsider, but plans to build a hydroelectric facility on a transboundary waterway can be construed as a threat to a riparian country whose own supplies to fresh water may be threatened by such a development. The Nile River Basin, which shares Nile River resources among 11 different countries, provides a superb case study in this regard. Neither existing Army nor Joint doctrine address the potential for addressing a contingency like the Haditha Dam, but continuing changes to the operating environment as well as broadened employment parameters for US military forces as outlined in the ROMO implies that water insecurity must be specifically considered in future actions.

Inland waterways, such as the Euphrates River on which the Haditha Dam is located, are not part of the global commons, but represent waterways and facilities which belong to sovereign nations.9 In the current operating environment such areas should be incorporated into doctrine by identification as key or critical infrastructure and thus be considered as a potential consumer of military forces to meet protection requirements. Bilateral or multilateral protection of identified water supplies ultimately may redound to US military involvement, or that of coalition partners or allies, and in today’s operating environment will likely not be tied to conventional combat operations. With the expansion of military options today, planning activities must anticipate a broader range of potential missions well beyond what has been traditionally assigned. Dams important to local economies for electricity and water can be damaged by earthquakes. Persistent drought conditions may lead a downstream riparian actor to precipitate action that may threaten an upstream facility in another country. In either event, protection of the facility may be outside the capability of local forces. Such issues can elevate concern over water insecurity from the focus of a single nation-state to others involved in the outcome of what may be longstanding practice or management of shared water resources. Often referred to as transboundary water management, this can quickly turn in to a multinational diplomatic issue, versus being simply a military one.10 To ensure stability and discourage destabilizing action by third parties protection of these key facilities is a paramount planning factor.

Water and Water Facilities – Expanding the Protection Function for Critical Infrastructure

The discussion of the protection function outlined in the latest Army doctrine remains linked to “preserving” the force, and does not lead an inexperienced planner to infer that water-related critical infrastructure may fall under the parameters provided. Chapter 3 of the recently released Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, states that:

The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (friendly combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United States, host-nation, and multinational military and civilian partners.11

A narrow interpretation of this doctrine may lead one to exclude the long-range implications of protection of critical infrastructure in the pursuit of near-term goals consistent with preserving combat power, expressed in terms of personnel and equipment. While US Army Field Manual 3-07 articulates the main doctrinal discussion regarding water, the discussion is useful mainly to tacticians, being
insufficient in scope for those conducting joint and multinational operations in response to a specific crisis. This FM relies on the term Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academics, Trash, Medical, Safety, and Other Considerations (SWEAT-MSO) to offer troops in the field a practical guide in the conduct of humanitarian operations. Aside from FM 3-07, a paucity of doctrinal guidance is available regarding water insecurity and water infrastructure, and most of what now exists has only been developed to address domestic security concerns within the geographic confines of the United States, and not global contingencies. Any discussion of critical infrastructure that would lead planners and operators to include such items in the process is lacking. However, this is shortsighted since the failure to do so can have long term implications on overall mission accomplishment.

DHS discusses the term “Critical Infrastructure,” or CI. It is defined as: “the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof.” The next step then is to capture this terminology for the planner by using the term “Water-Related Critical Infrastructure (WRCI).” This definition is useful and can certainly be extrapolated to fit situations similar to the Haditha Dam scenario or others, where possible control of infrastructure critical to stability or security, such as desalination plants, hydroelectric generation facilities, or aqueduct systems, needs to be factored in to any military planning.

Alongside this DHS definition is the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, or NIPP, which discusses the framework used to assess and establish goals, priorities, and requirements for infrastructure protection. The NIPP introduces the Risk Management Framework (see Figure 7.2) that is potentially useful to planners since it measures or considers physical aspects of CI. It also introduces the term Key Resources and links the two in an effort to paint a more comprehensive picture. Applied in the planning process, the result of this application could be a water-specific set of assets to be considered or defended.

United States military doctrine, as previously noted, typically addresses concerns over protection and employment of US and coalition military forces. Available doctrine does not readily translate into concerns for a sovereign facility or other water issues in the operating environment of a given country. As an example, when Patriot Missile Air Defense assets were deployed to Israel during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991, political concerns mandated their inclusion, ultimately competing for lift assets planned for other forces. Fearing Iraqi provocation might trigger a unilateral Israeli response and fracture a fragile coalition of Arab allies, these assets were deployed in
an effort to forestall unilateral Israeli response and protect Coalition unity, enabling a unified response against Iraqi aggression. Israeli cities that were not specifically in the Area of Operations became a form of CI, and were allocated defense assets above and beyond the initially anticipated protection needs in theater. This protection was, however, an afterthought based on emergent political issues in the operating environment and not specifically anticipated. Protection of WRCI could present a similar case in the future.

Joint Publications come closest to a discussion of protection of critical assets in referencing the DAL, or, “Defended Asset List,” which, according to doctrine is specified only for defensive counter air operations, but described as, “a listing of those assets from the critical asset list prioritized by the joint force commander to be defended with the resources available.” Although doctrine only applies to defensive counter air, the DAL provides a useful framework for prioritizing what must be protected with limited resources available. The clear requirement for protection of employed forces remains key even today, thus the question the planner needs to ask in this instance is, “would additional forces be required to protect identified critical infrastructure (or WRCI) in support of the anticipated operation?” Such critical infrastructure may even be remote or non-contiguous to the anticipated area of operations for tactical troops, thus requiring an expansion in the scope of the protection function.

Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support, also discusses Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), but again the references are specific to US domestic critical infrastructure, and the discussion is not necessarily applicable to US force involvement or planning for a foreign area operation. The doctrine presented is thus a starting point for assessment, but falls short of providing a template useful to the military planner for a contingency on the African continent, Latin America, or southwest Asia. While this may be developed over time, the planner is thus left short in terms of doctrinal guidance regarding water issues. The following discussion may serve to assist in anticipating and defining requirements when the lines between policy and military operational goals are blurred or ambiguous.

Making Sense of it All

Any effort to tie operational military doctrine to issues surrounding water insecurity issues or WRCI can be problematic. However, there is already a planning tool that addresses some of the key aspects of any conflict to a useful and broadly-recognized assessment framework. The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) provides a useful set of metrics that can reconsidered a starting point for the planner to frame the operational environment, and in a manner that is consistent with planning parameters outside the traditional realm of the military yet familiar to other interagency players. This framework has been in use since 2008 and presents a commonly-accepted methodology which translates easily for use in understanding WCRI issues and the operating environment for water insecurity. The ICAF is especially cogent given that water issues may require the introduction of US military forces to address what are first and foremost problems requiring an interagency effort if they are to be preserved and protected while longer-term concerns are met. The main considerations under ICAF are:

**Step One:** Evaluate the Context of the Conflict

**Step Two:** Understand Core Grievances and Social/Institutional Resilience

**Step Three:** Identify Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors

**Step Four:** Describe Opportunities for Increasing or Decreasing Conflict
Using the information supplied in this chapter, and drawing upon the basic ideas listed in the ICAF model, a proposed set of analysis parameters for a water issue may thus look something like the illustration in the following figure:

![Figure 7.3 Sample Water Conflict Assessment Framework](image)

Figure 7.3 Sample Water Conflict Assessment Framework, generated by the author. Refer to end notes for a discussion of terms included in the chart.

Perhaps the key distinction between the ICAF model and the Water Conflict assessment model is the need to understand the language specific to issues of water. The operational environment that has as its canvas a backdrop of water insecurity issues will be very difficult for an inexperienced operator to define. A fundamental understanding of the terms discussed within this model, a sampling of which have already been presented in this chapter, assist the operator in knowing what questions to ask. Properly understood, these assessment frameworks can become very valuable tools in the kitbag of the practitioner of operational art.
This Water Conflict Assessment model then allows the military planner to address potential drivers of conflict specifically related to water insecurity. What extant sources of water in the region might also be available, if there is any history of conflict over water sharing, and who the major actors are in the issue might be are among the considerations framed within the model. More importantly, the lexicon necessary to understand the parameters of the issue is thus “operationalized” in order for planners to thoughtfully and thoroughly understand the overall problem.

This effort will allow the planner to capture aspects of a water insecurity problem which can then be used to inform development of the operational approach with either the identification of decisive points, or inclusion of a separate Line of Effort (LOE) for the given problem. In the areas of responsibility of the various geographic combatant commands, the problem sets are unique, so merely plugging information into the framework is insufficient for the military planners to grasp the complexities of a given problem. Issues on the African continent may not have near the potential for a serious regional conflagration as a similar problem between nuclear armed Pakistan and India, so it is incumbent on the planner to understand the depth of the problem at hand. Their efforts at understanding may be enhanced by looking at each problem via the addition of a separate methodology that may serve to provide the planner with a more sophisticated view of the issue.

Another angle from which to examine the same problem, and perhaps a method that pairs well with the proposed Water Conflict Assessment, is the methodology which was introduced by Dale Eikmeier in an article titled “Design for Napoleon’s Corporal.” The identification of relationships, actors, functions, and tensions (RAFT) is a useful companion in defining the complex operational environment that may pit many disparate national-level, and non-national level entities against one another, along with the consideration of transnational or tribal groups, while taking into account the Political, Military and other aspects of water insecurity. Operational level planners are familiar with the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (PMESII) system analysis tool. The introduction of the WRCI language and synthesis of PMESII, RAFT, and Water Conflict Assessment tools will aid future operational level planners in responding to both deliberate, and more importantly crisis-action planning efforts; this will better inform planning, frame better advice to commanders, and ultimately, result in a more efficient application of military force anywhere in the world.

As planners, understanding of these key elements of the pending operational environment becomes pertinent to adequately frame the problem and effect a sound resolution when water insecurity is identified as one the key drivers of instability.

Conclusion

“The West is where water has the same value as blood.”

Water insecurity and water control issues are no longer concerns that can be ignored in today’s increasingly complex environment. The US military is seen as a competent and capable international actor and has been used frequently in operations well outside the traditional realms of conventional combat. Concurrently, the global challenges regarding competition for dwindling resources, specifically water, demand that available doctrine is expanded to provide the tools necessary to approach a complex problem at the heart of which may be water rights or availability.

This chapter has attempted to illuminate the broad range of water-specific challenges that could become part of the current operational environment and also offers some options for considering these challenges. This includes potential considerations for planning at the operational level in deriving de-
cise points and lines of effort, as well as a practical discussion of the protection function and WRCI that may be necessary for the commander to include in the defended assets list.

In the future it is highly likely that instead of water issues being a subset of US military operations, they may actually be the proximate cause. Our lexicon, approach, and our doctrine all need to reflect these emerging dynamics in our operational environment. The practice of considering water insecurity and WRCI must become integral to planning, and not incidental.
Notes

1. Water insecurity: The United Nations (UN) website defines “Water security” as the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability. For this chapter, the term water insecurity is thus any condition within the operating environment that presents a threat to access to/availability of water. Similar, but not synonymous terms include “water scarcity” and “water stress.” Accessed 22 March 2017, http://www.unwater.org/topics/water-security/en.


3. Water scarcity: when a country or region’s annual water supply is less than 1,000 cubic meters per person per year. Global Water Security, Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) 2012-08 (2 February 2012).

4. According to the Geneva Convention, Article 56: Protection of Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces: Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dikes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.

5. Hydroelectric power generation is the process of using the power of flowing water to turn turbines that then produce electricity. In terms of understanding the operational environment, any construction or contemplation of construction of a power generation facility on an existing inland waterway injects tension for downstream riparians who also rely in unimpeded flows of water for their own needs. Any construction will not only affect river flow, but also impact the navigability of the waterway.


7. Riparian: For the military planner, this term connotes any grouping or entity (tribe, transnational group, or nation-state) residing alongside transboundary waters.


9. Inland waterway: A navigable river, river system, or other body of water that is part of a contiguous river basin area which may or may not contain transboundary waters.

10. Transboundary water management: Surface and ground water systems such as rivers, aquifers and lakes in developing countries often cross national borders, which require coordinated approaches to manage the economically very precious waters. As a result, conflict over shared water resources in politically and economically asymmetrically shaped world regions such as the Nile or the Mekong basin may occur if states do not cooperate over water use and allocation. Transboundary water management is an instrument in development that seeks to induce cooperation between states over shared water systems. Agriwaterpedia, Transboundary Water Management, accessed 22 March 2017, http://agriwaterpedia.info/wiki/Transboundary_water_management.


14. Water-related Critical Infrastructure (WRCI): The assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, of an inland or transboundary waterway so vital to extant riparians that incapacitation, denial, or
destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, economic stability, public health or safety, or any combination thereof. Water-related Critical Infrastructure would thus be considered to include navigable inland waters, desalination plants, hydroelectric generation facilities, or aqueduct systems.

15. Desalination (also desalinization): The removal of salt or other chemicals from something, such as seawater or soil. Desalinization can be achieved by means of evaporation, freezing, reverse osmosis, ion exchange, and electro dialysis. For more information see: Dictionary.com, Definition of desalinate, accessed 22 March 2017, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/desalination. This process remains an expensive method to produce water, but with technology improvements and increased demands for the ability to desalinate water, costs are decreasing. Still, many countries cannot afford desalination plants in order to produce drinking water.


17. Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2012). Paragraph 3-26 discusses the warfighting function of protection. This discussion is specific to “tasks and systems that preserve the force.”


21. Aquifer: a geologic formation that will yield water to a well in sufficient quantities to make withdrawal of water feasible for beneficial use; permeable layers of underground rock or sand that hold or transmit groundwater below the water table. See: Global Water Security, Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) 2012-08, 2 February 2012. Fossil aquifer (fossil water): Fossil Aquifers are large underground reserve of water that were established under past climatic and geological conditions. They can underlie present-day semi-arid environments, and provide key source of groundwater in otherwise water scarce regions. Agriwaterpedia, Fossil Aquifers, accessed 22 March 2017, http://agriwaterpedia.info/wiki/Fossil_Aquifers#What_are_Fossil_Aquifers. An important consideration regarding these aquifers is that they do not replenish quickly, if at all, and are subject to contamination by seawater if close to the shores of seas or oceans. This has been a specific issue of concern in unstable areas like Israel and the West Bank, which suffer from water scarcity, and rely heavily on groundwater sources. This is distinct from traditional groundwater resources. Groundwater: water within the earth that supplies wells and springs; water in the zone of saturation where all openings in rocks and soil are filled, the upper surface of which forms the water table. Global Water Security, Intelligence Community Assessment ICA 2012-08, 2 February 2012. Navigable Waters: Waters that provide a channel for commerce and transportation of people and goods. The Free Dictionary, Definition of navigable waters, accessed 22 March 2017, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Navigable+Waters.


Chapter 8
The Challenges of Strategic Sealift and the Impact for Planners
MAJ Chris Henry

If one were to ask a citizen of any nation on Earth what the strongest military on the planet is, chances are they would name the US military. This belief is largely based on images of carrier battle groups patrolling the Earth’s oceans, B-2 bombers executing show of force flights over South Korea, Marines conducting amphibious operations with their Filipino counterparts in combined exercises, and Army forces aiding Iraqi counterparts conducting operations in the city of Mosul. While these images are certainly intimidating, they hide a simple truth very few people consider. In order to project force across the globe, one must first get there. This is a daunting feat for all the services, but for the Army it is an especially difficult undertaking. The Air Force, Navy, and Marines can largely self-deploy to a zone of conflict, but the Army is reliant upon a limited number of strategic sealift ships to deploy its force.

It is necessary to understand that the Army is comprised of three distinct elements: the active component (AC), the Army Reserve (USAR), and the Army National Guard (ARNG). By the end of fiscal year (FY) 2016, the Army will have approximately 475,000 AC and 540,000 USAR and ARNG members. Since 2012, the Army has cut 80,000 Soldiers and deactivated 13 Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). It is anticipated that an additional 40,000 Soldiers will be cut by the end of fiscal year 2018. Currently, Army leadership estimates that only one-third of Army BCTs are prepared for a high-intensity conflict with a near-peer competitor such as North Korea or Russia. The long-term goal is to have 70 percent of BCTs ready for combat against this type of adversary. In July of 2015, the Army announced plans to reduce the number of brigade combat teams from 32 to 30 by the end of fiscal year 2017. The two brigade combat teams that are slated for reduction would be reduced to battalion task forces. Each of the two units in question would be reduced from approximately 4,000 Soldiers to 1,050 Soldiers.

To translate the number of BCTs into personnel terms, if the cuts are fully implemented as forecast, the Army would have approximately 137,000 Soldiers in brigade combat teams available to commit to combat operations. Due to current readiness challenges, this number is further reduced to 41,000 Soldiers or approximately nine BCT equivalents that are theoretically available to deploy (this figure does not subtract for forces committed to other operations). The vast majority of these forces are stationed in the continental United States. Only two BCTs are permanently stationed outside the United States. An additional BCT is assigned to the 2d Infantry Division in South Korea on a permanent rotational basis. A new BCT will be assigned every nine months.

For the scenario used here, we assume four brigade equivalents will be deployed at any given time to support security cooperation activities and other operations. (Examples of this include training exercises that occur in the Pacific Pathways Program, Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq, and Operation Freedom Sentinel in Afghanistan). This means that at any given time, it is reasonable to assume that the strategic sealift ships of the United States are transporting four BCT equivalent equipment sets across the globe. After accounting for these global transport requirements, the challenge then becomes determining the residual amount of strategic sealift available to transport Army forces to a major combat operation. This will fulfill the requirement presented in the 2015 National Military Strategy that mandates that the Army must be prepared for high-intensity conflict (defeating an adversary is priority three of the Joint Force Prioritized Missions).
BCTs are the backbone of the United States Army. They are the primary force used to fight an enemy of the United States across the land domain. While BCTs are a deadly tool, they do not act alone. BCTs require a number of enabler units such as artillery, aviation, engineers, intelligence, mission command, and sustainment in order to operate effectively. Without these enabling units, BCTs would have no ability to conduct operations. While the importance of enabling units cannot be understated, the concentration of research for this discussion was the BCT and other maneuver forces. This chapter does not include a larger number of enabling units because the majority of combat support and combat service support assets are located in the USAR and ARNG. It takes these units approximately 90 to 120 days to mobilize and deploy. This chapter will only examine the first 100 days of conflict.

Before analyzing the number of US Army forces that can be transported using US strategic sealift assets, it is necessary to briefly discuss the relationship of the AC forces to the USAR and ARNG. In a recent article, General Milley, the US Army Chief of Staff, stated that he wanted three lines of defense. The first line of defense is the active Army. The AC is the part of the total Army force that will be the first deployed in the event of a larger contingency operation. The second line of defense are those ARNG BCTs, ARNG enablers, and USAR enablers that will replace or augment active duty forces. Currently, it takes approximately 100 to 120 days before those units are ready for deployment. The final line of defense is deploying a proposed train-and-advise brigade that has a core of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers. If adopted, this unit will be used primarily for security cooperation and other low-intensity operations. In the event of major combat operations, this type of brigade could be augmented with junior officers, junior non-commissioned officers, and new enlistees.

If deployment optimization between the ARNG, USAR, and AC is achieved, the Army could save a significant amount of money. For example, a USAR and ARNG member who serves 39 training days per year only costs 15 percent of the cost of an AC member. Even when mobilized, each ARNG and USAR member only costs 80 to 95 percent, when compared to an AC member. Unit costs are also lower for the ARNG and USAR. The cost to maintain an AC Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) at home station is $277 million (94 percent is personnel cost). There is an additional $8 million to prepare for deployment for a combined total of $285 million. The average cost for an ARNG IBCT is $66 million (81 percent is personnel cost). When activated, it takes $97 million to prepare this unit for deployment. The combined cost for an ARNG brigade is $163 million. This represents a potential savings of $122 million. Again, the tradeoff for this monetary savings is the time it takes ARNG and USAR assets to mobilize, train, and deploy.

To help determine the optimization of AC to USAR and ARNG forces during deployment for a major combat operation, Army force packages will be calculated by creating a force package comprised of a corps headquarters, division headquarters, a mix of BCTs, and a limited number of enabling units such as engineer, signal, and chemical assets. The model will assume full mobilization of all US strategic sealift roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) assets found in the Ready Reserve Force (RO-RO ships that are used for prepositioning Army and Marine equipment) and the active fleet of Large, Medium-Speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) vessels that are operated and maintained by the Military Sealift Command (MSC). As stated earlier, the geographic destination used in this scenario is South Korea. First sealift turn averages are based on transport times from Charleston, South Carolina to Busan, South Korea. A large number of transport ships are located along the Gulf of Mexico and the East Coast of the United States. They will be required to travel through the Panama Canal on the first sealift turn. Additional turns from CONUS to South Korea will directly ship
out of West Coast locations which will dramatically shorten shipping times. Initial shipping times from Charleston, South Carolina to Busan are approximately 25 days one way. Travel time from Busan to San Diego, California is 13 days.\(^9\) The model will deduct a small percentage of available strategic sealift for sister service use, ships in maintenance, and ships that are unavailable due to other operations. The number of active duty units transported within the timeframe before USAR and ARNG assets become available will inform discussion of the proper sizing and readiness of the CONUS based AC, USAR, and ARNG forces. This study examines how many “turns” a sealift ship can make until the 115th day after a deployment operation begins (C-Day is when a deployment operation begins).

The United States Army operates six Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) locations around the globe.\(^\text{10}\) In the event of conflict on the Korean peninsula, it is likely that APS-4 equipment set and APS-3 equipment set would be utilized during the initial stages of conflict. APS-3 is afloat and consists of an infantry brigade combat team equipment set with select enabling units.\(^\text{11}\) If activated, this unit could sail to Korea and marry up with CONUS based troops. APS-4 consists of an armored brigade combat team equipment set with select enabling units.\(^\text{12}\) When this equipment is married up with CONUS based troops, these two unit sets will provide the joint force commander with a division minus of combat power within the first days of a major conflict on the Korean peninsula.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units Arrive in Korea</th>
<th>Available BCTs</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-Day</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rotational BDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C+10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>APS4 and APS3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C+45</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>First Sealift Turn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C+75</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Second Sealift Turn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C+115</td>
<td>~5–7</td>
<td>Third Sealift Turn (AC “All-In”)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.1 Available BCTs. Graphic created by author.

Figure 8.1 lists the total number of BCTs available for each sealift turn until C+115. This includes brigades that are available as part of the rotational force, ones that fall in on prepositioned equipment, and those that arrive by strategic sealift. Figure 8.2 lists the various ships that make up the RO-RO sealift assets available to the US military. The most important factor to examine is the total amount of square footage available. At the end of Figure 8.2, the total sum of all square footage is listed. It shows that there is enough square footage available on sealift assets to initially deploy two divisions comprised of three BCTs each with a limited number of enabling units. An additional two brigades are available when counting the ABCT that is part of APS-4 and the IBCT which is part of APS-3. This represents a potential total of nine BCTs that are available when the first sealift turn forces are offloaded in Korea on or about C+45 including the rotational brigade.
that is stationed in South Korea. There are also unit sets within APS to provide a limited number of enabling units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship Name</th>
<th>Year Built</th>
<th>Total Sq. Ft</th>
<th>Ship Set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADMIRAL W. M. CALLAGHAN</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>141,843</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE DECISION</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>167,339</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP DIAMOND</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>167,339</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE DOMINGO</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>167,339</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE DOUGLAS</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>167,339</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP DUCATO</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>167,339</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE EDMONT</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>167,372</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE HENRY</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>214,365</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE HORN</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>214,365</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE HUDSON</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>214,365</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE INSCRIPTION</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>149,088</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE INTREPID</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>149,088</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE ISABEL</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>149,088</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE ISLAND</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>149,088</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE KENNEDY</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>146,896</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE KNOX</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>146,896</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE ORLANDO</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>118,780</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE RACE</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>176,313</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE RAY</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>176,313</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE RISE</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>176,313</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE TAYLOR</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>115,619</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE TEXAS</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>117,887</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE TRINITY</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>117,887</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE VICTORY</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>131,265</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKAPE VINCENT</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>131,265</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE WASHINGTON</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>295,958</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE WRATH</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>295,958</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTAIR</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>199,362</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTARES</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>199,362</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLLUX</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>199,362</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALGOL</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>203,000</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELLATRIX</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>203,000</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGULUS</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>203,000</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPELLA</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>206,963</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENEBOA</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>206,963</td>
<td>RRF-MARAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Gordon</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>334,055</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Gilliland</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>334,055</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Strughart</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>312,461</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Yano</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>312,461</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Bob Hope</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Mendonca</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Brittin</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Bernavidez</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Fisher</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Watson</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>393,000</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.2 Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships of the Department of Defense. Graphic created by author.
The model assumes that only 65 percent of available square footage will be used. This planning factor is used because of force packaging. This means that unit sets are deployed together in order to minimize the time needed for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration at

![Figure 8.3 Notional First Sealift Turn. Graphic created by author.](image-url)

The model assumes that only 65 percent of available square footage will be used. This planning factor is used because of force packaging. This means that unit sets are deployed together in order to minimize the time needed for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration at
After the amount of available deck space is reduced we factor in a 20 percent reduction for sister service use for each sealift turn. This study plans for Army assets to receive the largest amount of square footage, but other service requirements must be factored into the equation. An additional 1.6 million square feet is subtracted to account for ships that are laid up for maintenance or are in use for other operations around the globe (1.6 million square feet is akin to approximately four LMSRs). Figure 8.5 lists those ships that are in the preposition program and are unavailable for use during the initial round of deployment from the continental United States for the first sealift turn. As Figure 8.2 indicates, the total amount of square footage is reduced to approximately 3.5 million square feet for Army assets. While this may seem severely constrained, it must be noted that this only represents the first sealift turn from CONUS. Over two million square feet of useable deck space will become available after the prepositioned assets disembark their cargo and return to the continental United States.

Figure 8.4 RRF Ship Locations. Graphic courtesy of US Maritime Administration.

Figure 8.3 lists the unit types built to fill out the available square footage for the first sealift turn. There are many different ways to fill available deck space. Some may be better, but this design is for a general understanding of the constraints of strategic sealift. The type of units that will fill these ships will depend on global force readiness data that can change dramatically over time; for example, at a certain point in time there may be more ABCTs available than IBCTs, etc. Before fully turning to the study of the transport capabilities it is necessary to briefly examine the US military’s strategic sealift assets and prepositioned forces that are available to initially respond to a major contingency.

The US military, in conjunction with the Department of Transportation, operates and maintains a number of vessels that are used to transport rolling stock, various classes of supply, and containers
to locations around the globe. Approximately one-half of the US government owned surge sealift capability is found in the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). The RRF was created in 1976 as part of the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) which is operated by the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration (MARAD). Ships are expected to be ready to sail within 5 to 10 days after notification. The other major grouping of ships is found in the Military Sealift Command. The Military Sealift Command operates 19 LMSRs. While this number may fluctuate slightly over time, approximately eight ships are assigned to the Department of Defense prepositioning programs supporting Army and Marine Corps forces. Figure 8.5 lists an example of the prepositioning ships. LMSRs are notable because each one can carry an entire US Army Task Force consisting of 58 tanks, 48 other tracked vehicles, plus an additional 900 wheeled vehicles. This would equip an armored battalion and other units. With the acquisition of the LMSRs, the US military was able to add five million square feet of capacity. Approximately two million square feet is devoted to prepositioned assets and three million is used for surge sealift.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship Name</th>
<th>Year Built</th>
<th>Square Feet</th>
<th>Ship Set</th>
<th>Prepo For:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USNS Pililaau</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
<td>Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Seay</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
<td>Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Sisler</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>393,000</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Dahl</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>393,000</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Red Cloud</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>393,000</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Charlton</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>393,000</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Watkins</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>393,000</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Pomeroy</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>393,000</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Soderman</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>393,000</td>
<td>LMSR-MSC</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Shipping Square Footage</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,511,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load Configuration Reduction (.65 of total)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,282,150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Unavailable for first sealift due to forward deployment.

Figure 8.5 Department of Defense Preposition Ships (APS and MPSRON). Graphic created by author.

The APS program is comprised of five parts. These parts are: unit sets of equipment that enable a given unit type to fall in on a set of equipment that is similar to one found at home station; operational project stocks which are material designed and tailored to achieve specific strategic capabilities; Army War Reserve Sustainment Stocks which enable the force to replace major end items and satisfy demand until wartime production and supply lines are established; War Reserve Stocks for Allies which provide select capabilities to US allies; and activity sets which enable CONUS-based forces to execute training events and exercises.

It is anticipated that the CONUS-based combat force will arrive in Korea around the C+35-45 timeframe. Most ships in the RRF will take 5 to 10 days to prepare for operation. It will take approximately 25 days for the units to travel to South Korea. An additional five to ten days is estimated for the normal friction occurring during deployment operations to include shipping unit
equipment from home station, issues at CONUS seaports, etc. Once downloaded, it is estimated that it will take these ships 15 days to return to CONUS and receive new units at their respective seaports of embarkation. This means the second sealift turn will begin on or about C+55-60 timeframe. Additional lift becomes available when all preposition ships are off-loaded and return to CONUS. These ships represent an additional two million square feet of lift. The initial round of enabling units that are found in the USAR and ARNG will become available within this timeframe as well. While the proportion of enabling units to maneuver units will start to increase, the additional two million square feet of space that becomes available once preposition equipment sets are delivered will compensate for this increase and allow sufficient deck space for both maneuver and enabling units. In short, the total Army force should theoretically be able to continue to build both combat power and the forces needed to sustain and enable those combat forces.

With the addition of the ships that were performing preposition duties, approximately 12 BCTs could be transported on the second sealift turn with room to spare for enablers. With the addition of the first sealift turn units, the APS-4 brigade, and the APS-3 brigade; it is theoretically possible to have approximately 20 BCTs with a limited number of enablers in Korea on or about C+75. This represents approximately two-thirds of the brigade combat teams found in the AC.

Assuming that the second sealift turn is off-loaded and departs Korea on or about C+75, it will return to CONUS on or about C+90 in order to load the remainder of any forces remaining in the AC and transport them to Korea. It is highly likely that available square footage will exceed the forces left in the AC and will go unused unless it is filled by units from the USAR and ARNG forces. As demonstrated, it is theoretically possible to transport up to 20 brigade combat teams within two sealift turns if all strategic sealift assets are mobilized. With only 30 brigade combat teams forecasted to remain in the active inventory by fiscal year 2018, this means only six BCTs would remain to deploy (assuming four are deployed to other theaters). Within the C+105-115 timeframe, the ships comprising the third sealift turn will arrive in Korea and offload their assigned unit equipment. It is within this timeframe that the AC will be “all-in” and have to pass the baton to the USAR and ARNG if additional capacity and capability is needed. It must be reemphasized that many of the forces being sent on the second and third sealift turns would be brigades in a lower state of readiness. A significant amount of risk would be incurred by the joint commander if these forces were employed in major combat operations.

This study demonstrates that the United States has an adequate amount of strategic sealift ships to successfully transport elements of the AC to support one major contingency operation. It seems there is a surplus of sealift available when this capability is balanced against the number of brigades that are currently trained and ready to deploy. As previously stated, only about one-third of BCTs are considered fully ready to deploy at this time. To put this in perspective, it is likely that the AC would not be able to fill all available strategic sealift assets once these assets are fully mobilized within the C+5-C+10 timeframe. Thirty-three percent readiness translates into approximately 10 brigade combat teams being available to deploy. It was determined that the AC could field up to eight brigades no later than C+45 by utilizing APS and by delivering forces on the first sealift turn. However, this figure does not consider other global commitments. It is more likely that the Army would only be able to deliver a maximum of five to six BCTs by C+45 when other global commitments are considered. The AC has reached the minimum number of BCTs that would be needed to respond to one major contingency. No additional cuts beyond those anticipated for FY18 should be made. In order to fully employ the remaining capabilities within the AC, additional resources need to be available to increase readiness levels to the 70 percent threshold. If higher levels of readiness
are reached, it becomes feasible for the AC to realistically meet the deployment timelines for the first two sealift turns examined in this chapter.

Deployment timelines must be accelerated for enabling units found in the USAR and ARNG. This chapter has demonstrated that the AC is realistically only capable of filling two sealift turns to respond to one major contingency operation if higher levels of readiness are achieved. In order to effectively fill strategic sealift ships for the third sealift, higher echelon units within the USAR and ARNG that have complex collective training requirements need to be ready to load at their port of embarkation on or about C+90. A percentage of select enabling capabilities such as bridging, transportation, and fuel assets that are primarily found in the USAR and ARNG need to be ready to load at their seaport of embarkation by C+10 and C+45 in order to fully enable their AC counterparts. While this chapter demonstrated that a large amount of combat power can be transported to a theater using existing strategic sealift assets, this combat power becomes irrelevant unless it can be projected with a minimum number of enabling units. Recently, the Army has identified this shortcoming and will examine ways to better align these enabling capabilities with the units that provide combat power.¹⁸

Finally, a suggestion for further research within this area is an examination of how the United States Army and Navy will meet future strategic sealift requirements. While this study demonstrated that the United States currently has enough strategic sealift assets to transport CONUS-based Army forces for one major contingency and a limited number of minor operations, this capability is quickly approaching the end of its operational lifespan. A large number of RO-RO ships will be retired by 2023.¹⁹ The other services will also suffer when Army enabling units are not available to assist them with services such as transportation, military police, or refueling. If the Army and Navy do not find ways to reinvest in this capability in the near future, the nation will have a very limited capability to project land power from the continental United States.

In order to understand the challenges of strategic sealift, this chapter conducted a survey of the US Army’s ability to deploy to Korea and highlights the capabilities and limitations of America’s force for projecting power across the land domain. This chapter was developed, in January 2016, using open source information that describes the state of the Army and unclassified transportation data published in late 2011. Military force structure and readiness is a continually evolving thing, so this study only represents a snapshot in time. Although the exact force structure and readiness data may have changed, the author feels that the analysis, conclusions, and suggestions for further research will have import for many years to come.
Notes

15. Department of Transportation-Maritime Administration, Map of Current RRF Outporting Locations (23 January 2015).
Chapter 9
The Looming Economic Crisis Among Oil Exporting African Countries
Dr. David A. Anderson

The precipitous decline in oil prices resulting from excessive production output relative to waning global demand is an economic windfall for US consumers of gasoline and related products. However, aside from the displacement fallout of US oil production among higher cost producers, it is an emerging crisis for developing world oil exporting countries who count on substantial oil revenue to pay for their respective annual government budget expenses. This imminent crunch is most notable on the African continent where numerous developing countries derive over 50 percent of their government revenue from oil sales. Not only are many of them losing their cost competitiveness in the international market place, they need significantly higher oil prices to pay their bills. The socio-economic fallout from this forthcoming predicament looms large in all these countries. This research will bring to light the magnitude of the impending problem in order to inform US interagency and military interests on necessary preventive shaping measures while also planning for possible intervention to stabilize a situation gone awry.

The Global Oil Environment

Global oil production increased from 70.3 million barrels per day in 1995 to 93.2 million barrels per day, by the end of 2014.1 Until 2014, oil production barely kept pace with global demand, thus placing a price premium on this high demand commodity. In June 2014, the price of a barrel of oil was $114. By the end of 2014, oil production exceeded demand by 2 million barrels per day, leading to a steep decline in price. In January 2016, a barrel of oil sold for as little as $27. The collapse in world oil prices owes its origin to an increasingly complex global geopolitical and economic environment. The slowdown in the world economy and energy efficiency has led to lower demand. Global GDP growth has gone from 4.9 percent in 2010 down to 3.1 percent in 2015.2 Other factors influencing the downward pricing pressure on oil include: the discovery of new oil deposits among nontraditional producers, an increase in export competition, alternative sources of oil (e.g., shale oil and tar sands), advancement in oil extracting techniques (e.g., fracking), and Saudi Arabia’s attempt to secure its global market share in an increasingly competitive environment. Furthermore, the lifting of economic sanctions on Iran and its oil exporting capacity with its need for export revenue, does not bode well for an increase in oil prices going forward.

The US is the historical leading consumer of oil and has led the way in expanded oil production. The US is now the leading producer of oil as production has grown from 8.3 million barrels per day in 2006 to 14.0 million barrels per day in 2014. However, US oil consumption has gone from 20.6 million barrels per day down to 19.0 million barrels per day by 2014.3 Oil importing countries have reaped the benefits of lower oil prices. During President Obama’s 2015 “State of the Union Address,” he noted that the average American family would save $750 at the gas pump that year.4 Other benefits realized by oil importing nations include: lower production input costs, lower transportation costs, lower cost for final goods, lower inflation, lower import bills, reduced current account deficits, and appreciation of currencies. To put these benefits into perspective, every 10 percent decline in the price of oil results in a rise up to .5 percent in GDP among petroleum consuming importing countries in Africa.5

The second (Saudi Arabia) and third (Russia) leading oil producing and exporting countries of oil are feeling the financial effects of reduced oil prices. Russia’s original 2015 state budget had oil
selling at $80 per barrel. It adjusted its budget downward based on $60 oil. By year’s end, oil was selling for less than $35 per barrel. This miscalculation resulted in a budget deficit of 4.5 percent of GDP for the year. Russia’s Finance Ministry drew on the country’s Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) to pay its bills reducing its balance from $510 billion to $370 billion by October 2015. The Russian federal budget for 2016 counted on $50 oil. The Russian Finance Ministry stated that if oil prices were $44 per barrel and the Russian ruble was at 62 per US dollar, Russia would run a $14.14 billion dollar budget deficit for 2016. It ultimately ran a budget deficit of $49.7 billion dollars. Currently, oil sells for approximately $45 per barrel and the ruble/dollar exchange rate is approximately 57 rubles to the US dollar. At this price per barrel of oil and dollar to ruble exchange rate, Russia’s primary SWF could run empty in 2017. As of May 2017, it has but $16.34 billion dollars remaining of what once was a $142.6 billion fund back in 2008. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the drop in oil prices throughout 2015 caused a 3.4 percent contraction in Russia’s GDP. The Atlantic Council in Washington believes the contraction is closer to six percent. Depressed oil prices also led to a 3.5 percent reduction in 2016 GDP. Russia did not reduce its production output during 2016. Quite frankly, it needed the revenue.

Saudi Arabia finds itself in a precarious situation since oil revenues account for 90 percent of its state budget. The IMF reports that Saudi Arabia’s budget surplus of recent years has quickly turned into a deficit of 21.6 percent of GDP for 2015. It currently needs oil to sell at $106 per barrel to balance its budget, whereas it only needed $69 per barrel in 2010. This figure disparity is likely to grow even further when considering Saudi Arabia’s need to raise defense expenditures to fight the war with Yemen; its need to address security concerns it has with Syria and Iran; and its need to protect its oil market share.

Saudi Arabia’s currency reserves went from $745 billion in August 2014, down to $635 billion in November 2015. The country rapidly consumes these funds and has no intention of reducing oil production or making significant adjustments to planned government expenditures. Nor is there any indication that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), an organization led by Saudi Arabia, will collectively agree to reduce oil output any time soon.

OPEC, the cartel that historically controls global oil prices finds itself in a “Catch-22” situation. Many member countries are relatively cash poor and would like higher oil prices to better balance their national budgets; however, not at the expense of making unconventional and nontraditional producers more competitive (e.g., US shale oil), leading to a loss of their market share in the long run. For example, US shale oil production ended Nigeria’s oil exports to the US, approximately 1 million barrels per day. As such, even though OPEC’s collective output quota is set at a high level, 30 million barrels per day, its aggregate output is 31 million barrels per day. This indicates even greater production output is likely in order to off-set cheaper prices in an effort to meet government budgetary obligations.

US shale oil production has not seen the dramatic production drop off from lower oil prices OPEC had hoped for. The US Energy Information Administration predicts total US oil production will continue to expand for at least the next couple years. The US currently produces 4 million barrels of shale oil every day. OPEC predicts overall production of oil among non-OPEC members will continue to grow over this same period (e.g., Russia and the US). This forecast does not bode well for many OPEC members (e.g., African members: Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, and Libya) who have done a poor job meeting domestic expectations when oil prices were much higher. Eighty-two percent of Nigerians and 76 percent of Angolans live on less than $2 per day. Other non-OPEC oil exporters in Africa do not fare much better. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
95 percent of its population lives on less than $2 a day, in Niger it’s 76 percent, and Cote d’Ivoire 59 percent, to highlight just a few.\textsuperscript{20}

**The Price Fallout on African Oil-Exporters**

There are 17 notable oil exporting countries in Africa. They are Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan/South Sudan, Congo, Gabon, South Africa, Ghana, Chad, Cameroon, Tunisia, Cote D’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Niger. Many of them derive more than 50 percent of their government revenue from oil sales.\textsuperscript{21} The five largest producers are; Nigeria, producing 2.4 million barrels per day; Algeria, producing 1.7 million; Angola, producing 1.7 million; Egypt, producing 667 thousand; and Libya, 516 thousand.\textsuperscript{22} Oil exports also make up a large portion of their respective total country exports, annual GDP, and government debt. For example, oil exports for Nigeria account for 95 percent of the country’s exports, 35 percent of GDP, and 75 percent of the government’s annual budget.\textsuperscript{23} Algeria is even more dependent on oil revenue. Oil exports account for 97 percent of its exports, 70 percent of GDP, and 90 percent of its annual government budget. Oil exports account for 80 percent of Equatorial Guinea’s GDP and 75 percent of its government revenue. Congo derives 75 percent of its government revenue through the sale of oil.\textsuperscript{24} These figures closely approximate those of the other noted African oil exporting nations.

The prevailing oil price of about $30 per barrel is very problematic for most African oil exporters. For example, Nigeria’s oil production, break-even price per barrel is $31.60 and Angola’s is $35.40.\textsuperscript{25} Since priced at $114 a barrel back in June 2014, estimates are that each 10 percent drop in oil prices led up to a 2.5 percent drop in GDP among those nations most reliant on oil revenue.\textsuperscript{26} This tenuous situation creates significant financial issues for most African oil exporters. Many of these countries leverage oil to secure US dollar denominated loans they struggle to pay. Sub-Saharan African oil exporters struggle to pay $26 billion in foreign currency loans dating back to 2007. Nigeria has only five to six month’s supply of foreign currency reserves, and Angola only one month supply.\textsuperscript{27} These financial challenges adversely impact country currency valuations making it even more difficult to pay down dollar denominated debt. In 2014, while Ghana’s currency value declined 35 percent, it required IMF assistance to help pay its bills.\textsuperscript{28} Nigeria raised interest rates and is buying back its currency on the open market to stabilize its value, but spent 20 percent of its currency reserves to do so.\textsuperscript{29} Imports become more expensive as currency valuation among African oil-exporting countries weakens.

African oil exporting countries are significantly cutting back on oil exploration and production due to lower oil prices relative to production costs. Lost oil revenue has forced them to cut back significantly on social welfare programs and infrastructure projects. Countries such as Egypt and Algeria are cutting back on subsidies – from fuel to food – in order to trim budget deficits.\textsuperscript{30} Algeria and Libya spend 10 percent of their GDP on fuel subsidies. Egypt spends 11 percent on fuel subsidies, which is seven times more than the national health budget and equal to its 2015 budget deficit.\textsuperscript{31} Even if oil prices were to double from the present pricing regime, African oil exporters will not find it nearly adequate to balance their budgets. For example, Nigeria needs oil priced at $123 per barrel to balance its budget.\textsuperscript{32} Algeria needs oil priced at $98 per barrel, Libya needs it priced at $184, Angola $98 per barrel and Ghana, $75 per barrel.\textsuperscript{33} Nigeria has depleted its Excess Crude Account from $8.7 billion in 2012 down to $2 billion in 2015 to pay its bills and stabilize its currency.\textsuperscript{34} Other nations have little in the way of emergency funds. Governments are considering raising taxes as a means of generating revenue. In light of their modest economic base, this is a less than desirable or potentially fruitful option.
Adding further complexity and turbulence to the oil price issue these countries face are inherent political and financial corruption, government instability, externally driven security issues, poor economic outlook, internal civil strife, and terrorist activities. Corruption and mismanagement in government remains very prevalent among these oil exporters. The World Bank produces an index designed to capture the full extent of such problems among all nations. Known as the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) (transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating), it scores countries relative to a set of factors organized into four broad categories: economic management; structural policies; policies for social inclusion and equity; and public sector management and institutions. The scoring scale ranges from 1.0 to 6.0, with a score of 6.0 being the most desirable and a score of 1.0 being the least desirable. The aggregate score by country among African oil exporters ranges from a low of 2.0 for South Sudan, to a high of 3.53 for Nigeria. The mean score for the entire group of African oil exporters is 3.0. The range of scores indicates serious improvement must be made in the conduct of governing within these countries.

The public/private external debt owed to nonresidents and the public debt owed by governments denominated in the country’s own currency further weighs down most of these countries and their economies. Eight African oil exporting countries have debt-to-GDP ratios greater than 80 percent: Niger 83 percent, Ghana 92 percent, Tunisia 93 percent, Cote d’Ivoire 96 percent, Egypt 108 percent, Sudan 129 percent, DRC 144 percent, and Republic of the Congo 192 percent. All eight of these countries have very low levels of foreign currency reserves as well. High debt burden, coupled with little foreign currency reserves makes it difficult to pay outstanding external debt, gain debt refinancing, borrow additional funds or sell government debt instruments. It also causes inflation of the domestic currency, as was the case with South Sudan (110 percent) this past year. Inflation makes it more difficult to buy needed foreign goods as well. Foreign entities become less enamored and willing to exchange goods using the inflation ravaged currency of trade seeking countries. Finally, growing exchange rate differentials between local currencies and needed currencies are price people and governments out of the foreign goods market. Such was the case of Ghana where its currency lost 35 percent of its value in 2014 and approximately 20 percent of its value over the last year.

Seven of the 50 poorest countries in the world are oil-exporting African countries. Two are among the 10 poorest, DRC (2d poorest) and Niger (6th poorest). Seven of the top 23 countries with the highest unemployment rate in the world are oil exporting African countries. They range from DRC’s 46 percent unemployment figure down to Sudan’s 19.50 percent. They all face humanitarian issues, transportation and infrastructure inadequacies, public service challenges, and a shortage of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

Most foreign investment is in the petroleum industry; however, FDI in African oil exporting countries ebbs and flows based on country stability and the prevailing price of natural resources. Investments have been waning because of depressed oil prices. Less than one percent of all US FDI goes into Sub-Saharan Africa, the location of most African oil exporting countries. Eight countries within this group have literacy rate below 75 percent. Niger’s literacy rate is 19 percent, South Sudan 27 percent, and Chad 40 percent. Each of these countries has only one university. Whereas the US has 4.3 million kilometers (km) of paved road, Chad has 206 km, Congo 1212 km, and South Sudan 192 km (constructed with US Agency for International Development funds). Only 30 percent of all Africans have access to electricity.

Among these African oil exporters, the US provides foreign aid to all but Equatorial Guinea. The total sum of aid provided is approximately $3.5 billion, of which $1.46 billion goes to Egypt.
Ninety percent ($1.36 billion) of Egyptian aid supports peace and stability promoting activities. The mere $230,000 that Gabon receives goes toward peace and stability efforts. The same is true for the $150,000 DRC and the $300,000 Chad receives. Forty-three percent ($1.5 billion) of the total aid provided all African oil exporting countries go toward addressing peace and stability issues. Approximately 11 percent ($200 million) promotes economic development. Only five countries (Egypt, Tunisia, DRC, South Sudan, and Ghana) receive aid that promotes economic development. Egypt receives $87 million of this total. African oil exporters receive a total of $1.13 billion in health related aid, equating to 32 percent of the total aid package provided. The remaining 14 percent of US foreign aid provided to this cohort promotes democracy building, human rights, good governance, education and social services, and environment protection/restoration. US foreign aid to these countries has varied widely depending on the immediacy of perceived need relative to US interest.

Civil conflict and terrorism is a continuous challenge among these nations. Nigeria has been dealing with the terrorist group Boko Haram since 2009. Boko Haram committed 662 documented violent acts in Nigeria in 2014 alone. Moreover, Boko Haram’s attacks have spread into Chad, Niger and Cameroon. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has a long history of civil strife. Since 1998, the DRC has dealt with civil war, assassinations, invasions, and insurgencies from the likes of Allied Democratic Forces, Mayi Mai, and other militia groups. Libya finds itself in civil war pitting Libya Dawn against Haftar factions. The Libyan conflict threatens the stability of neighboring countries: Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria. Niger has repeatedly had to deal with coups and assassinations of political leaders. Terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb move through northern Niger, Algeria, and Chad unopposed. Insurgent militias riddle Egypt. Both Sudan and South Sudan are dealing with civil war and insurgent militias. Finally, civil unrest has challenged South Africa for years. These circumstances force nations to make difficult choices between defense expenditures and socio-economic imperatives.

Conclusion

An unintended consequence of increased energy self-reliance is that the US now significantly contributes to the worldwide oil market glut. The US increased production by 41 percent, equating to 25 percent of the added global daily oil production since 1995. Simultaneously, it reduced its domestic consumption by 5 percent and recently lifted sanctions on Iran. In doing so, it has undermined the foundation to which many African oil exporting government loans are collateralized (higher oil prices) and has transferred much needed financial rents from oil producers to oil consumers in a disturbingly abrupt and economically disruptive way. Oil exporters in Africa are financially vulnerable at persisting oil prices. There is a high likelihood that prevailing oil prices will not meaningfully increase in the foreseeable future.

The rapid shift in income has not afforded these oil exporting countries time to make the necessary fundamental adjustments to their economies nor the opportunity to absorb the displacement of jobs and loss of government revenue no longer provided by the oil industry. Countries such as Nigeria may become insolvent in the next 12 to 24 months unless provided financial aid/assistance. What makes this even more problematic is that nations and institutions which historically have been financially available to help alleviate these imbalance of payment issues struggle with their own domestic, economic, and debt overhang issues. For example, the IMF, an organization designed to provide assistance in situations such as this has already exhausted its financial wherewithal assisting other nations (e.g., Greece, once a financial contributor to the fund). Even if the money was available, the neo-liberal structural adjustments mandated by the
IMF to secure the funds would prove problematic in fixing the financial and economic situations of these countries.

Short of making near-term bilateral financial arrangements with countries such as the US and China, economic and financial crisis will rule the day among these African oil exporters, leading to economic chaos and civil strife that will likely need military intervention to stabilize. Like it or not, the US is best postured to assist these nations financially, and as necessary, militarily. In accordance with its National Security Strategy, doing so is certainly within the national security interests of US – promoting peace, security, and economic prosperity among our allies, friends, and those nations seeking to develop and become active contributing members of the international community of nations.

The current oil pricing construct should be a wake-up call for African oil exporters. They need to profoundly restructure and diversify their economies to protect themselves from global forces well beyond their control. It will take long-term financial commitment from an already financially strapped international community of nations, FDI from a risk adverse private sector, and a great deal of patience. Concurrently the US needs to establish or build upon current security cooperation arrangements with these “at risk” countries, expand diplomatic dialogue and anti-corruption efforts, and promote economic development/diversification programs through international financial institutions, the United Nations, and the US State Department and USAID. Finally, the US needs to be more acutely aware of the ramifications in promoting its economic and national security interests. Otherwise, the second and third order effects of those decisions may prove short-sighted, resulting in greater security risks and economic and geopolitical costs than ever imagined.
Notes


10. Sputnik, “Russia’s Budget Deficit Totals 3.5% of GDP.”


23. York, “Nigeria’s Oil-dependent Economy Plagued by Plunging Crude Prices.”
29. York, “Nigeria’s Oil-dependent Economy Plagued by Plunging Crude Prices.”
34. Gallucci, “How the World’s Biggest Oil Exporters are Suffering From $40-a-barrel Crude Oil.”


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