Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations

Lieutenant Colonel David P. Cavaleri, US Army (Retired)
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Foreword

Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations is another in the Combat Studies Institute’s (CSI) Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Papers series. The impetus for this series that concerns topics relevant to ongoing and future operations came from the Commanding General, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, V Corps commander in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, directed CSI to examine historical topics that would benefit American and coalition soldiers and planners in both Iraq today, and in the broader GWOT spectrum now and in the future. One of those topics was the transition from combat (Phase III) operations to stability (Phase IV) operations, to use the current phasing construct familiar to campaign planners. Mr. David Cavaleri, a retired Armor lieutenant colonel and current CSI historian, has produced a study that examines nine critical factors that should be addressed in stabilization planning and execution. Mr. Cavaleri then presents a case study of the US occupation of Japan after World War II, followed by a parallel analysis of the case study and ongoing stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq through the lens of the critical planning factors.

This study cautions against the misuse and overuse of “lessons” learned from historical case studies. Yet, the critical analysis of operations using relatively timeless planning factors has proven to be a valuable tool to aid our understanding of where we are and where we are going. The Japan of 1945 is not the Japan of today, much less the Iraq of tomorrow; however, the contemporary problems faced by military and civilian planners remain very similar. Stability operations are with us now and for the foreseeable future. For the professional officer and campaign planner, then, it is instructive to revisit prior US experience in this critical arena.

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Preface

I designed this study to serve as a bridge between the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) found in stability operations “how-to” manuals and the broader military operations other than war (MOOTW) concepts found in joint doctrine. My purpose was to identify key themes that merit consideration when planning or conducting transitions between combat operations and stability operations. I identified these themes by combining a review of joint and US Army stability operations doctrine with a specific case study analysis of the US occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952 and then extrapolated those themes to current stability operations to assess their applicability. The Japanese occupation is useful as a case study because it required that occupation forces address several challenges similar to those facing current stability operations in the Middle East, such as a fundamental change in governance philosophy, a long-term democratization program, a critical regional security challenge, and a complex economic reconstruction challenge. This analysis is not designed to serve as a “one answer fits all challenges” solution set, but rather as a practical vehicle for informing time-constrained professionals operating at the tactical and operational levels.

One can easily identify several instances where the US Army has faced stability operations challenges; Cuba, Germany, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Vietnam immediately come to mind. Each case involved stability operations challenges unique to its environment, but only one time during the 20th century did the United States take the lead in stabilizing the entire infrastructure—political, economic, industrial, military, educational, and even societal—of a former enemy. During this complex stability operation, the US Army implemented a number of planning themes related to transitioning between the full spectrum operations components of offense/defense and stability/support. These themes were applied, depending on the US Army’s ability to manipulate each, with varying degrees of success.

A RAND Corporation study published in 2003, titled *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, developed six such themes, traced each through seven case studies, and concluded by drawing implications for future US military operations. The study was headed by James Dobbins, Director of the RAND Corporation International Security and Defense Policy Center, and contains an endorsement by the former Coalition Provisional Authority administrator, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, for its utility as
a reference during his Operation IRAQI FREEDOM transition planning efforts. Another useful treatment of the complexity of post-hostility operations can be found in a Strategic Studies Institute monograph by Drs. Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill titled *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*. This particular analysis is especially valuable for its insight as a pre-OIF Phase III (decisive operations) study.

Using a methodology somewhat similar to the RAND study but focused more on the tactical and operational planning levels, I identify nine stability operations planning themes. By applying these themes to Japan I highlight the cause and effect relationship between actions taken and results achieved by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) staff. This analysis should drive home the complexity of, and necessity for informed stability operations planning nested in a larger geo-political context.

The title of this study may lead the reader to assume I am an advocate of a deliberate phasing approach to transitions, though nothing could be further from the truth. Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM are replete with examples of units conducting combat operations and stability operations sequentially, simultaneously, and more often than not, in a repeatedly iterative manner, all in the same battle space. A deliberate phasing transition model does not adequately address the realities of the contemporary operational environment (COE); thus, it is my desire that this study cause the reader to appreciate the complexities of the COE more deeply and consider these themes and their impact on current and future stability operations.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

“The object in war is to attain a better peace. . . . If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect. . . . it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.”

B.H. Liddell Hart

When Phase III (decisive operations) of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) commenced in March 2003, the entire world was watching thanks to embedded media personnel and their ability to transmit near-real time reports from the area of operations. Throughout the course of this phase we saw the challenges, the failures, and the victories experienced by coalition forces practically as they occurred. On 1 May 2003, when President George W. Bush declared an end to combat operations, one could almost hear the global sigh of relief from a world naively assuming that the hard work was done. However, it was clear for those in a position to appreciate the complex operational environment that the hard work was far from finished. Some aspects of the shift from OIF Phase III to Phase IV (stability operations) proved to be as challenging, if not more so, than the conduct of combat operations itself.

US Military Joint Publication (JP) 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, describes a situation that, some have argued, prompted the National Command Authority to authorize OIF:

When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations. . . . In such cases the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities in terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners.

“Win quickly” the coalition did, if one defines winning only in terms of defeating an enemy’s conventional combat capabilities. JP 3.0 acknowledges a more complex environment, however, when it states that “successful military operations may not, by themselves, achieve the desired strategic end state. Military activities across the full range of military operations need to be integrated and synchronized with other instruments of national power and focused on common national goals.”

The Army currently finds
itself involved in the full range of operations primarily because Congress, in accordance with United States Code Title 10 (2003), must “provide an Army that is capable, . . . of [among other capabilities] implementing the national objectives, and overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.” Consequently, the Army conducts stability operations as well as decisive combat whenever both are required to implement national objectives.

In his speech on 1 May 2003, President Bush publicly declared that a transition was occurring in the Central Command (CENTCOM) Theater of Operations, a transition from combat operations to military operations other than war (MOOTW). This transition is described in JP 3.0 as one component of the journey to the desired end state of a given campaign:

There may be a preliminary end state—described by a set of military conditions—when military force is no longer the principal means to the strategic objective. There may also be a broader end state that typically involves returning to a state of peace and stability and may include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military conditions.

Does this transition business sound complicated? Recent events, as well as historical US military campaign experience, have proven it is just that.

**Historical Experience**

Given the sometimes violent nature of the ongoing OIF transition we see in the news, one cannot help but wonder if our military has ever encountered these types of challenges before. And if so, how did our American military forces address them? What worked? What did not work? A quick survey of US military operations since the mid-20th century identifies numerous examples where the US Armed Forces (the Army in particular) have faced these transition challenges. This list includes Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Bosnia, and Kosovo. A more detailed study reveals the Army operating as an instrument of national power in environments quite foreign in culture, climate, and character, in environments that require balancing all four elements of full spectrum operations (offense, defense, stability, and support) simultaneously across multiple theaters of operation. These transition-related challenges have existed in the past and will likely continue to face our military in the future with increasing frequency. With this in mind, this author submits that there exists a collection of planning themes relevant to the US Army’s ongoing efforts
to transition between combat operations and stability operations in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). These themes have been developed from historical case study research and the author’s personal experiences gained during a career in the Army. Chapter 2 will discuss these themes in greater detail, but for quick reference purposes they are: legitimacy, security, commitment, situational understanding, unity of effort, infrastructure, economic status, planning effort, and the media.

**Organization of the Study**

This work already references joint and US Army doctrine and will continue to do so, especially in Chapter 2, because doctrine is the framework within which our military operates; it is the “concise expression of how Army forces contribute to unified action.”10 A thorough review of stability operations doctrine would reveal the detail needed to formulate plans, but that type of review consumes a great deal of time, and that is a commodity not always available to those actually planning or executing a transition. Time-constrained planners and commanders might be better served by a study such as this that places applicable doctrine in a historical context, enabling them to see the doctrine evolve and, more important, determine which doctrinal aspects should be adapted to their specific operational environment.

Chapter 3 is a case study of the US occupation of Japan from 1945-1952. The chapter begins with a historical overview that includes specific information about the occupation plan and then uses a collection of analytical questions to drive a detailed discussion. Chapter 4 builds on the discussion of the occupation by focusing on how the nine transition planning themes played a role in Japan and relating them in general terms to the OEF and OIF campaigns, while Chapter 5 concludes the study with a short list of stability operations planning “take-aways.” Armed with this information, the reader should then be in a better position to refine transition plans and address stability operations challenges as they surface.

As we begin the actual case study in Chapter 3, the following eight questions will help frame our analysis of the occupation. Like the stability operations planning themes themselves, these analytical questions were derived from historical research and the author’s military experiences, and each is designed to highlight key aspects of the occupation environment and ongoing stability operations. The analytical questions are:

- What was the form of government?
- What was the relationship between the military and the government?
• What was the status of the economy?
• What was the influence of indigenous religious practices?
• What was the influence of media (both US and international)?
• What was the role of the international community?
• What was the status of civil support infrastructures?\textsuperscript{11}
• What was the impact of societal dynamics/schisms on stability operations?

If some of these questions appear immaterial it may be because Americans are, as a general rule, routinely uncomfortable interacting with non-Western societies. One goal for this study is that it empowers the reader to recognize that full spectrum operations, and successful transitions between combat operations and stability operations in particular, require that planners and commanders view their situation from a broadened perspective.
Notes


2. US Military Joint Publication (JP) 3.0: *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 10 September 2001), Chapter III, page III-19. JP 3.0 identifies four phases of a joint forces commander’s (JFC’s) campaign plan: deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive operations, and transition. Based on this sequential listing, the author associates the ground/air combat operations of OIF with Phase III.

3. President George W. Bush, “President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended,” Remarks by the President from the USS *Abraham Lincoln* At Sea Off the Coast of San Diego, California, 1 May 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html. On 1 May 2003, President Bush spoke from the deck of the USS *Abraham Lincoln* and declared that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country.”

5. Ibid., Chapter I, page I-4.
9. FM 3.0: *Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June 2001) Chapter I, page I-4. FM 3.0 defines full spectrum operations as “the range of operations Army forces conduct in war and military operations other than war.”
10. Ibid., Chapter I, page I-14.

11. This study will make use of the “elements of infrastructure” found in FM 3-07, Figure 1-6: vital human services (such as hospitals, water supplies, and police/fire services), civil administration, communications and information mediums, transportation and distribution networks, energy, and commerce. Note that “military” is not a component of this category. In the author’s opinion the military element is best addressed as a stand-alone analytical question and is actually better suited for consideration under the transition themes of legitimacy and security.
Chapter 2  
Doctrine Overview and Planning Theme Discussion

The COE is a complex construct. Consider the diverse challenges facing our military in Afghanistan and Iraq, then think about a dissimilar area such as the Korean Peninsula. It quickly becomes clear that no doctrinal publication could serve as a “one size fits all” template for any type of operation. US Army Field Manual (FM) 3.0 acknowledges this when it describes doctrine as “rooted in time-tested principles but . . . forward-looking and adaptable.”1 Put another way, doctrine serves the military’s needs best when it is applied creatively by technically and tactically competent commanders and planners who are historically informed. This chapter will briefly review three key doctrinal publications (Joint Publication (JP) 3.0: Doctrine for Joint Operations, FM 3.0: Operations, and FM 3-07: Stability Operations and Support Operations) and assess how they apply to the transition challenges that come with establishing post-combat stability. All are needed to understand the relationship between three essential elements that shape the stability operation environment. These elements are political objectives (determined by the National Command Authority [NCA]), end-state definition (a clear description of what the final environment will look like), and war-termination criteria (those criteria that define the end of Phase III operations).

Three Elements in Literature

This study has already noted how JP 3.0 describes the use of military power to achieve political objectives. Other sources in addition to DoD publications contribute to the discussion as well. For example, authors Keith Bonn and Anthony Baker, writing in their tactical Guide to Military Operations Other Than War: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Stability and Support Operations Domestic and International, make two important points. First, they advise all military personnel (engaged in MOOTW) to understand the political objectives that caused their deployment and the potential impact inappropriate actions by any member of the military force may have. Second, they advocate that leaders recognize when changes occur, either in the operational situation or in the operation’s political objectives, that may warrant a different approach.2 Bonn and Baker emphasize the need for planners and commanders to define end-state goals clearly and to integrate them constantly into combat planning and execution. John T. Fishel, in his study “Beyond Jointness: Civil-Military Cooperation in Achieving the Desired End State,” explains the relationship
between end-state definition, war termination, and stability operations planning in these terms:

War termination and transition to a post-conflict peace-building development effort are *phases of military operations that must be planned in full coordination with war fighting*. To be successful, its *objectives need to be defined in end state terms* with clear, supporting objectives that are both military and civil-military in nature (emphasis added).³

JP 3.0 is the DoD capstone document that provides “fundamental principles and doctrine that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in the conduct of joint and multinational operations.”⁴ It describes the relationship between these three elements like this:

Because the nature of [conflict] termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations or groups, it is fundamentally important to understand that termination of operations is an essential link between National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and end state goals.⁵

JP 3.0 also clearly applies to the challenges associated with stability operations, an assertion supported by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton in his introductory letter.⁶ JP 3.0 acknowledges the challenges involved in conducting successful Phase III/Phase IV transitions when it states transitioning between combat operations and stability operations “includes matters such as military government, civil affairs, . . . and requires early planning, liaison, and coordination both at the national level and in theater among diplomatic, military, and political leadership.”⁷ These tasks require experienced leadership; the person charged with supervising military peacetime activities and decisive and stability operations in a given area of operations is the joint force commander (JFC).

The Role of the JFC

The JFC is responsible for “modify[ing] existing plans or develop[ing] campaign plans as appropriate” when responding to NCA direction to conduct military operations.⁸ According to JP 3.0, the JFC and his staff (which includes his political adviser, or POLAD) can, by applying the strategic estimate process to existing plans, clarify the end state and then issue guidance for execution.⁹ This point reinforces the JFC’s critical responsibility
for synchronizing planning efforts and the use of military force in support of national military strategy and political objectives.

JFCs help incorporate political objectives into campaign plans and clearly define war-termination goals. One of JP 3.0’s 12 fundamentals of campaign planning states that plans are “the basis for subordinate planning and clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination objectives and potential post-hostilities activities.”10 The JP 3.0 discussion on operational art, in particular the discussion about ending combat operations, further supports the need for the JFC to conduct early and detailed stability operations planning. Doctrine clearly directs the JFC to incorporate political objectives and situational understanding into transition plans when it states that the “underlying causes of a particular war—such as cultural, religious, territorial, or hegemonic—must influence the understanding of the conditions necessary for termination of hostilities.”11 In short, JP 3.0 requires JFCs to develop campaign plans based on strategic and political objectives, informed by situational understanding, with clearly defined termination objectives. The Army’s operations doctrine builds upon this framework when it addresses full spectrum operations.

**Army Operations**

Recognizing the complex nature of full spectrum operations, FM 3.0 implies that units must possess a sophisticated level of tactical and operational agility to function successfully, and simultaneously if need be, across all elements of the operational spectrum (offense, defense, stability, and support missions).12 The Army’s mission essential task list (METL) contained in FM 3.0 identifies six tasks by which the Army supports a JFC campaign. The two most applicable to this study are METL task #5 (Dominate Land Operations) and METL task #6 (Provide Support to Civil Authorities).13 The doctrine defines stability operations as those that “promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities, and coercive actions in response to a crisis.”14 Later, FM 3.0 more simply defines stability operations as “promote[ing] and sustain[ing] regional and global stability.”15 Either definition works as we now shift to discussing the different types of stability operations.

FM 3.0 identifies 10 types of stability operations: peace operations, foreign internal defense, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, support to insurgencies, support to counter-drug operations, combating terrorism, non-combatant evacuation operations, arms control,
and show of force.\textsuperscript{16} A quick review of the list reveals that OEF and OIF have Army forces involved in at least five, maybe even six, of the 10. Doctrine acknowledges that stability operations are not a stand-alone phase of any operation but, instead, can occur “before hostilities, in crises, during hostilities, and after hostilities.”\textsuperscript{17} This implies the need for detailed and continuous planning. In fact, Army doctrine acknowledges the symbiotic relationship between combat operations and stability operations.\textsuperscript{18} FM 3.0 offers the following caution concerning the nature of stability operations: “Determining the military actions necessary to achieve the desired political end state can be more challenging than in situations requiring offensive and defensive operations; achieving the end state may be just as difficult,”\textsuperscript{19} and it characterizes stability operations as normally non-linear, often time- and manpower intensive, and routinely conducted in a non-contiguous battle space.\textsuperscript{20}

FM 3-07 builds on the information contained in FM 3.0 and discusses, in greater detail, the nuances of planning and executing stability operations. For example, FM 3-07 clearly explains why the military conducts stability operations: “To deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, strengthen democratic processes, retain US influence or access abroad, assist US civil authorities, and support moral and legal imperatives.”\textsuperscript{21} The real contribution of FM 3-07, however, is its expanded discussion of stability operations planning from two perspectives: mission-enemy-terrain- (weather) troops available-time-civil considerations (METT-TC) and battlefield operating systems (BOS). The manual discusses innovative ways to apply the elements of METT-TC to the military decision-making process (MDMP) and invites the reader to consider how stability operations impact plans and execution orders.\textsuperscript{22}

\textit{Innovative METT-TC Characteristics and Stability Operations}

The following list of stability operations characteristics appears in FM 3-07. With a little creative thinking one can see a METT-TC element reflected in all nine. Additional questions have been included by the author to highlight the complexity of the transition challenge.

1. Political objectives (MISSION: What are the objectives and how have they changed since planning began?)

2. Modified concept of the enemy (ENEMY: Is the enemy easily identified or something more conceptual, like the threat of famine or violence?)

3. Joint/interagency, multinational coordination (TERRAIN/WEATHER: What is the strategic environment and the status of strategic-level coordination
efforts?)

4. Risk of mission creep (TROOPS AVAILABLE: What is the likelihood the mission and/or tasks will morph over time?)

5. Non-Combatants (TERRAIN/WEATHER: What will be the impact of civilians on the overall stability operation environment?)

6. Nongovernment organizations (TROOPS AVAILABLE: Who else is participating in this stability operation, for what reasons, and for how long? What organic capability for self-sustainment and security does each bring?)

7. Information intensity (TROOPS AVAILABLE: What is the message? What resources are available to get the message out, and how does one measure its impact?)

8. Constraints (TIME: What are the constraints? Why are they in place? Who can modify them?)

9. Cross-cultural interaction (CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS: Is everyone aware of the “show-stopping” differences between all the cultures involved in the stability operation?)

BOS Characteristics and Stability Operations

FM 3-07’s review of BOS-related considerations also enhances this discussion. Combining the traditional METT-TC elements with stability operations-specific BOS characteristics can help commanders and planners create innovative and informed plans. The following list of BOS-related topics, contained in FM 3-07, is worthy of consideration when planning or conducting stability operations.

1. Maneuver. “Commanders should always plan to have the right mix of forces available to quickly transition to combat operations or evacuate.” (Stability operations will require a more robust combat support or combat service support force composition than decisive operations. This is because during the former, the emphasis is on rebuilding a nation’s infrastructure, while during the latter, the emphasis is on defeating an enemy and, when necessary to achieve war termination, destroying key infrastructure components.)

2. Intelligence. “Commanders must expand Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield [IPB] beyond geographical and force capability considerations.” (Stability operations IPB must include cultural, ethnic, religious, and historical information.)

3. Fire Support. “Fire support assists commanders in carefully balancing
deterrent force with combat power to accomplish the stability operations or support operation and protect the force. . . . Carefully select munitions to minimize collateral damage.” (Rules of engagement for stability operations—especially those in force when transitioning between combat operations and stability operations—may be linked directly to political objectives and end-state definition.)

4. Air Defense. “Air and Missile Defense (AMD) forces. . . may be responsible for protecting the population and facilities of the host nation, NGOs [nongovernment organizations], and international organizations.” (Stability operations demand close monitoring of non-combatants and NGOs in the battle space. Successful AMD employment supports end-state attainment, while failure can jeopardize international support.)

5. Mobility/Counter-mobility/Survivability. “Planners consider all available capabilities, to include other services, multi-national forces, contractors, and troop units.” (Unsafe roads, inoperative airfields, and unreliable rail systems can lead to a humanitarian crisis, an international community unwilling to invest in economic rejuvenation, and a distrustful local population.)

6. Logistics and Combat Service Support. “Because the logistics requirements in stability operations vary widely. . . no standard arrangement fits all situations. Host nation support, contracting, and local purchases are force multipliers.” (During stability operations, contractor support becomes critical to this battlefield operating system, and FM 3-07 observes that “commanders can expect that contractors will be involved in stability operations. . . management and control of contractors differs from Department of the Army Civilian command and control—terms of the support contract define the C<sup>2</sup> relationship.”)

7. Command and Control. FM 3-07 observes that traditional command and control relationships are complicated during stability operations: “One factor that distinguishes stability operations . . . from offensive and defensive operations is the requirement for interagency coordination at the task force level and below.” (Soldiers at the task force level will interact with, provide support to, and represent the JFC in front of NGOs, private volunteer organizations (PVOs), coalition forces, the media, and US government agencies. Accordingly, they deserve the right training and equipment to accomplish those tasks.)

The Nine Transition Planning Themes

A doctrinal review alone will not inform commanders and planners to the degree needed to develop effective stability operations transition plans.
However, by analyzing the Japanese occupation in terms of nine transition planning themes, one can contrast current stability operations with a historical example and then better appreciate the complexities involved. By focusing on one case study, the reader can delve deeper into the nuances of an operational environment similar in many respects to Afghanistan and Iraq. As is the case facing the United States today in the Middle East, the Japanese occupation required that US forces interact with a nation defined by a foreign culture, a foreign language, and a foreign view of the world and its place in it.

This author’s methodology combined case study analysis with personal experiences and information contained in the RAND study to develop a list of nine transition themes of particular value to stability operations planners. This study offers the following nine stability operations transition planning themes for consideration:

1. **Legitimacy.** Sociologist Max Weber defined legitimacy as a state of being that “arises from voluntary obedience to a leader, a tradition, or a legal code.” This theme applies to the form of governance and also the mandate for the occupation/stabilization force and the host-nation security forces as well. Edwin Corr and Max Manwaring consider this theme one of three that “contribute most directly to the allegiance of the population and the achievement of [a sustainable peace].” Thomas Adams asserts that legitimacy empowers but also limits a government’s right to coerce its citizens, ultimately resulting in an atmosphere of faith and trust. He further relates the importance of legitimacy to successful stability operations by explaining that social control becomes that much easier if widespread obedience is “voluntary, consensual, and self-enforcing.” Our interest in this theme extends beyond the theoretical to the practical. How do stability operations planners establish the perception of legitimacy? On what basis does one claim it? And how does one maintain it?

2. **Security.** This theme focuses on the idea that stability operations forces have an inherent responsibility under the provisions of the Law of Land Warfare to plan for and provide a secure environment for the host-nation population and all others legitimately residing there. As proof of this theme’s importance, within hours of the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government on 26 June 2004, international news media were listing security as the single most critical factor facing the fledgling government.

3. **Commitment.** This theme encompasses the long-term commitment of a variety of resources. Ambassador William Walker strongly emphasized
this theme by saying: “If you can’t stay the course, don’t go in. And ‘the course’ will likely include commitment and attention well beyond dealing with the immediate threat, and recognition that the issues at play are more complex, difficult to resolve, and resource intense than previously imagined.”31 Planners must factor levels of international, national, regional, and military commitment into stability operations planning and execution efforts.

4. **Situational understanding**. This complex theme demands continuous and dedicated application. FM 3.0 defines situational understanding as the “product of applying analysis and judgment to the common operational picture to determine the relationships among the factors of METT-TC.”32 Manwaring and Corr encourage us to redefine the concepts of enemy, power, and victory. They state that once the transition has been announced, the enemy as traditionally perceived is no longer a viable entity, but rather becomes the much more complex notion of violence and its causes. During decisive operations, power is embodied in the combat power collected by the JFC, but during stability operations, power is “multi-level and combined political, psychological, moral, informational, economic, social, military, police, and civil activity that can be brought to bear.”33 Planners must aggressively pursue situational understanding to effectively tailor stability operations plans to unique environments.

5. **Unity of Effort**. This theme entails the idea that no stability operation can succeed unless it draws on multi-level commitment and support and, when applied to stability operations, the sheer complexity of the operational environment makes this theme critical. Max Manwaring and Kimbra Fishel are of the opinion that unity of effort and legitimacy emerge as the two most critical dimensions to explaining the strengths and weaknesses of traditional peacekeeping.34 From a planner’s perspective, this theme emphasizes the need for all entities committed to a stability operation to be unified in their collective approach to achieving end-state goals.

6. **Infrastructure**. Each stability operation has unique infrastructure issues compounded by cultural considerations and resource constraints. A paramount planning factor associated with this theme is the expectation on the part of the indigenous population that the end of combat marks the beginning of infrastructure improvement. Planners must consider the impact of tactical and operational decisions made during Phase III regarding infrastructure on the long-term stability effort.

7. **Economic Status**. Efforts to improve the host nation’s economic status take on increased importance during stability operations. As commanders
and planners envision the post-combat battle space, they should consider the following basic tasks that await first stability forces and then the legitimate government: assisting in the repair of infrastructure; generating meaningful jobs; providing financial and technical assistance necessary to regenerate and expand the domestic economy; and emplacing appropriate reforms, models, strategies, and relationships for economic growth and economic justice.\textsuperscript{35}

8. **Planning Effort.** The preceding doctrinal review reveals a significant number of complex concepts that go into planning transitions between combat operations and stability operations. Subsequent chapters of this analysis will examine the scope of these planning efforts to compare pre-transition planning to successful program implementation; doing so will highlight to contemporary planners the relationship between dynamic situational understanding and effective pre-transition planning efforts.

9. **Media.** The media’s presence and influence during stability operations is well-established. Commanders and planners should consider how to leverage the instant, global access available through the media to bolster unity of effort and showcase successes as they occur.

This concludes our doctrinal review and overview of the transition planning themes. We now move on to Chapter 3 and its Japan case study by starting with a brief historical background and then discussing the occupation in terms of the analytical questions outlined in Chapter 1. Chapter 4 will follow with a discussion of the occupation, OEF, and OIF from the perspective of the nine planning themes to track how they affected, and in the case of the latter two continue to affect, these stability operations.
Notes


3. John T. Fishel, “Beyond Jointness: Civil-Military Cooperation in Achieving the Desired End State,” in Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations, eds. Max G. Manwaring and Anthony J. Joes (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 129. Fishel concludes this train of thought with the statement, “This, in turn, suggests that civil-military operations in the post-conflict period—post-conflict activities—may be a necessary condition for victory,” implying that planners should consider post-conflict end-state conditions while planning combat operations to develop a seamless transition plan. This also implies that non-military agencies should play a significant role in the planning effort as well.


5. Ibid., Preface, i.

6. Ibid., Chairman’s Letter. General Shelton indicates that JP 3.0 represents a “comprehensive document [that] addresses all key aspects of joint warfighting in war and military operations other than war, where many of today’s military activities are focused.”

7. Ibid., Chapter I, page I-12.

8. Ibid., xii.


10. Ibid., Chapter III, page III-8. For additional information about the campaign planning process refer to JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, and JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning.


12. FM 3.0., Chapter 1, page 1-16. “When conducting full spectrum operations, commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, stability and support operations to accomplish the mission. Throughout the campaign, offensive, defensive, stability and support missions occur simultaneously. As missions change. . .the combinations of and transitions between these operations require skillful assessment, planning, preparation, and execution.”

13. Ibid., Chapter 1, pg. 1-4. The six US Army mission-essential tasks are: Shape the Security Environment, Respond Promptly to Crisis, Mobilize the Army, Conduct Forcible Entry Operations, Dominate Land Operations, and Provide Support to Civil Authorities.
15. Ibid., Chapter 9, page 9-1.
16. Ibid., Chapter 9, page 9-6.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid. “Following hostilities, stability operations can provide a secure environment that allows civil authorities to reassume control.”
19. Ibid., Chapter 9, pg. 9-4ff.
20. Ibid. “Stability operations are inherently complex and place great demand on small units. Often, stability operations require leaders with the mental and physical agility to shift from non-combat to combat operations and back again.”
21. FM 3-07, Chapter 1, page 1-2.
22. FM 3-07 is especially valuable because it expands on the rather general guidance contained in the following statement, found in FM 3.0 (Chapter 9, paragraph 9-13, page 9-5): “Stability operations often require commanders to apply the elements of METT-TC differently than they would when conducting offensive or defensive operations.”
23. FM 3-07, Chapter 1, Figure 1-17, page 1-15.
24. Ibid., Chapter 2, page 2-1ff.
25. Ibid., Chapter 2, page 2-12.
28. Adams, 42.
29. Ibid.
30. FM 27-10, Law of Land Warfare (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Change 1, July 1976), Chapter 6, paragraph 363, contains this direct quote of Article 43 of the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), 18 October 1907: “Duty to Restore and Maintain Public Order: The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country."


32. FM 3.0, 11-15.


Chapter 3
The Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952

The decisive-operations phase of the US military’s war in the Pacific lasted three years and nine months (1,364 days, 5 hours, and 44 minutes to be precise) from the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor to the surrender ceremony on the deck of the USS *Missouri* anchored just 4.5 miles north-east of Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s historic 1853 landfall. Over the course of almost four years, the Allies pursued a campaign that ultimately brought Japanese Emperor Hirohito to a point where he, in an unprecedented event, personally invoked his cabinet and the Japanese citizenry to “bear the unbearable” and surrender in compliance with his will and in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration. That event marked a transition between combat operations and stability operations on a grand scale.

In contrast, the US occupation of Japan between 3 September 1945 and 28 April 1952 lasted six years and eight months, approximately 2,500 days, or roughly 83 percent longer than the decisive-operations phase. During that period, the Japanese nation transitioned from a belligerent combatant whose political and social fabric had been manipulated by militaristic diplomats intent on Far Eastern hegemony, to a democratically based example of economic rejuvenation and political renovation. Ambassador William Sebald, General Douglas MacArthur’s political adviser during the occupation, described the remarkable transition in Japanese society this way:

In less than one generation, from 1925 through 1951, the Japanese actually lived through a complete epoch. They moved swiftly from relative tranquility to war and defeat and back to stability; from temporary military triumph to hunger and despair, then to revived vitality and confidence.¹

Since US-occupied Japan evolved from defeated enemy on the brink of economic collapse to emerging regional power in less than seven years, it presents a fitting case study for identifying planning themes associated with the transition between combat operations and stability operations.

Background

The chronology of the war in the Pacific is so well-documented that for our purposes only a few key dates are necessary to establish a reference baseline. The 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor obviously marks the
beginning of US combat in the Pacific Theater, and the 2 September 1945 surrender ceremony marks the formal conclusion of those combat operations. We need to include two additional important dates: 26 July 1945 and 15 August 1945.

On 26 July 1945, Allied leaders Harry Truman, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin collectively issued the Potsdam Declaration that demanded Japan’s unconditional surrender, broadly defined the two post-surrender Allied occupation goals, and established an initial occupation exit strategy. This document had its roots in a series of meetings between the Allies that began in 1943. It was relatively brief, but its 12 paragraphs described, in no uncertain terms, the Allies’ requirements for concluding combat operations in the Pacific Theater. The Potsdam Declaration’s two primary goals were the complete demilitarization of the Japanese military complex and the democratization of Japanese society. In its final form, it constituted strategic planning guidance for the areas of political end-state definition, economic restructuring, social reform, government revision, and post-conflict security measures. The Declaration not only set expectations, it also subsequently helped legitimize General MacArthur in his role as Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) responsible for administering the Japanese occupation.

The second of our additional key dates, 15 August 1945, is noteworthy for several reasons. It marks the date when Japan’s notification of surrender was received in the United States, whereupon almost immediately President Truman announced the end of the conflict in the Pacific. That same day Emperor Hirohito made his historic radio broadcast to the Japanese people, instructing them to obey his will, accept the terms of the surrender, and receive the occupation force without opposition. In addition to the press announcements, on this date President Truman officially named General MacArthur as SCAP and very clearly charged him with meeting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration without delay. Army Chief of Staff, General of the Army George C. Marshall quickly issued operational instructions to MacArthur, at which time MacArthur set into motion the occupation plan known as Operation BLACKLIST that his staff had been working on since May 1945.

The conclusion of combat operations in the Pacific Theater might not have come as a surprise to MacArthur and his staff, but the near-instantaneous shift from an invasion mind-set to a peaceful occupation mind-set left little time to bask in a honeymoon transition phase. Granted, the United States had some recent stability operations experience as it was
involved in the ongoing occupation effort in Germany; however, there it functioned as one of four occupying nations with administrative responsibility for only a percentage of a defeated country. The situation in Japan was fundamentally different. The United States, empowered by the Potsdam Declaration and working through SCAP, assumed sole responsibility for implementing the surrender requirements and the post-combat stabilization of Japan, going so far as to overrule any Soviet attempt to establish a significant military presence on the islands.

In August 1945, Japan, with its governmental structure fully intact, only agreed to surrender and accept a US occupation because of Emperor Hirohito’s personal involvement. Its military was more than capable of continuing the fight in theater. Estimates of the size of Japan’s ground forces prepared to defend the homeland range between 3.6 and 4.3 million armed troops, with as many as 3.5 million more dispersed throughout China, Korea, and the Pacific Islands. But while the government and military might have remained functional, the general state of the Japanese civilian population was in shambles. Not including the atomic bomb damage to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Allied bombing campaigns had left an estimated nine million people, approximately 30 percent of the urban population, homeless; in Tokyo alone roughly 65 percent of the homes had been destroyed. More than three million Japanese civilians had been stranded overseas in Manchuria, Korea, China, and Formosa, the overwhelming majority of whom would need future repatriation. And do not forget the several million Japanese troops stationed overseas who required repatriation once the military was disarmed and demobilized in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration. Ambassador William Sebald’s own words paint a depressing, but somehow contemporarily familiar picture when describing the state of the Japanese people immediately after the surrender:

The Japanese people shocked me most. They were, unmistakably, a beaten people, momentarily despairing and hopeless. I saw the sad degeneration of humbled pride. Men and women, who once had preserved the appearance of neatness as a matter of honor, were slovenly, often dirty, mostly ill-dressed. The fields were ragged, the picturesque thatched roofs, upon closer inspection, needed repairs, and the houses sagged. The factories [on the road between Yokohama and Tokyo] were marked by the locked hands of twisted steel girders. Of the wood and paper houses which had distinguished this predominantly middle class area, only powdered ash remained. For miles there was
no sign of habitation and no sign of life. The fire bombs had scoured the land. For the Japanese [in Tokyo] daily living became a constant battle of overcrowded street-cars, long food queues, unheated homes and offices, and growing shortages of every essential from water to food. A capital once too proud to permit beggars on its streets, now Tokyo was filled with the homeless and the ragged. Food was the constant worry of all urbanites during that troubled period.9

The civilian population’s plight compounded a tenuous economic situation. After operating on a wartime footing since 1939, the termination of combat operations in the Pacific and the associated loss of its empire left Japan with a shaky foundation upon which to rebuild. It had insufficient food sources to feed its surviving civilian population, let alone the soon-to-be repatriated civilians and troops; inadequate quantities of raw materials with which to begin rebuilding its industrial infrastructure; and no merchant fleet (it had either been sunk or sold for indemnities). As a country it had lost 80 percent of its cotton textile production capacity. With 25 percent of its total industrial capacity destroyed and another 30 percent significantly damaged, its overall industrial production capabilities hovered at pre-1930s levels; to compound the situation, Japan had not been a self-sufficient food producer since 1912, relying instead on its empire to feed the homeland.10

Post-Conflict Turnaround

Demilitarization, although operationally complicated, was a relatively straightforward task for the United States to execute; within 60 days of the signing of the surrender document the entire Japanese military had been demobilized.11 The United States knew democratization of the Japanese Government and society could be pursued over time, given the right environment and clear guidance. However, the loss of its empire, compounded by an inadequate agricultural base, an industrial complex insufficient to the task, and the impending increase in its population resulting from civilian and military repatriations, meant starvation loomed large for Japan—a starving population is not necessarily amenable to wide-sweeping social, political, and economic reforms.

Given these conditions, how does one account for the remarkable post-conflict turnaround and subsequent economic revival that has become synonymous with late-twentieth century Japan? The country appears to have rapidly and completely recovered from its World War II-induced economic
and infrastructure challenges. By the mid-1950s industrial production had recovered to prewar levels, and from that point Japanese industrial output surpassed the growth rates of earlier periods. By the mid-1960s manufacturing, mining, construction, and infrastructure concerns (none of which involved military production efforts) collectively employed over 41 percent of the labor force. Twenty years later, around 1985 and roughly two generations after World War II, Japanese industry accounted for over 32 percent of the country’s gross domestic product, and Japan’s per capita gross national product (US $23,616) was number one among industrial nations. The country now boasts a 99 percent literacy rate where schooling up through the ninth grade is both compulsory and free and 94 percent of students go on to attend grades 10 through 12.12

Most important, the Japanese Government is a stable constitutional monarchy that is viewed by the United States as an important Pacific Rim ally. The contrast between this new Japan and the one described by Ambassador Sebald is striking; it provides a suitable entry into a detailed discussion about the occupation plan, the overall environment, and the methods by which SCAP implemented and, as needed, modified Operation BLACKLIST.

**Occupation Planning Efforts**

Occupation planning began in early 1941 when the Department of State (DOS) established the first full-time research unit intended to develop postwar policy. Known as the Division of Special Research, its initial objectives included defining surrender terms, identifying routine problems associated with implementing military government in an occupied territory, and analyzing the broad goals of security and reform. After 7 December 1941, this effort underwent three distinct stages, each building on the previous in terms of specialization and intensity.

During the first phase between 1942 and 1943, the planning group conducted research and developed position papers on such subjects as creating a framework for a new world order and identifying basic principles for how to treat defeated enemy countries (it was during this phase that the dual concepts of demilitarization and democratization were developed). DOS expanded the initial group considerably during the second phase (between 1943 and 1944) by incorporating representatives from the War Department, the Treasury, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), and the Office of War Information (OWI). DOS desired that this phase represent a more specialized and focused period, but the inclusion of the additional agencies...
with their individual agendas somewhat diluted that effort.

During the final postwar planning stage, as the Allies began to see clearly what the final outcome of their military operations would be, DOS established the State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) to give “broader and more efficient interdepartmental consideration to postwar policy formation.” The end result of this four-year long effort was a collection of research, analyses, and policy recommendations that informed occupation plans for both Germany and Japan. Perhaps the most critical point to grasp from all this is that the initial occupation concepts, strategies, and end-state objectives were developed by DOS experts but then handed off to commanders in the field for application to unique situations. General MacArthur and his SCAP staff benefited from the work headed by DOS as they refined Operation BLACKLIST for rapid implementation in September 1945.

In its final form, Operation BLACKLIST projected a progressive occupation of approximately 14 geographic areas in Japan and between three and six geographic areas in Korea. This plan called for a significant commitment of military strength to include upward of 22 divisions and associated air and naval forces and also provided for the additional allocation of forces from outside the Pacific Theater if warranted. A significant aspect of the occupation plan was its recognition that the most efficient means of administering an occupied Japan was through its existing administrative and governmental infrastructure. Certain factors such as language barriers, population density, cultural awareness limitations, and available troop strength, when analyzed in combination, led to this appreciation. This strategic trade-off—administrative efficiency in exchange for reduced troop commitment, actually translated into almost immediate legitimacy for the Japanese Government in the eyes of its citizens because SCAP would have to rapidly implement an advisory superstructure that would ensure compliance with the Potsdam Declaration, establish an environment for governmental and societal reform, and set Japan on the road to economic recovery, and do all this from behind the scenes.

A brief overview of some of the key elements of Operation BLACKLIST will set the stage for a more in-depth analysis, which will in turn lead to a discussion of the nine transition themes. The SCAP staff, writing after the fact, identified two distinct phases of the occupation. The first consisted of demobilizing and disarming the entire Japanese military structure, and the second encompassed a period of political reform and economic rehabilitation. While these two phases were, in fact,
accomplished sequentially (recall that the entire demobilization effort was accomplished by the Japanese Government within 60 days of the official surrender ceremony), it was quite clear the success of the second phase was predicated on the rapid and complete conduct of the first phase.

Historians of the period, Milton Meyer for example, differ somewhat in their characterization of the phases of the occupation. In his book Japan: A Concise History, Meyer describes the first phase as the “Reform” phase (1945-1948), when SCAP focused on a minimum of six specific areas for the purpose of securing the environment and instituting political, social, and economic reform programs. Meyer describes the second “Recovery” phase (1948-1952) as the period when the Japanese Government built on the programs implemented in the first phase so successfully that MacArthur was ready to declare the occupation goals met and sign a peace treaty with Japan in April 1952.16 What is key about this accomplishment is that SCAP was able to establish a sense of security, not just the perception of it, but the reality that subsequently helped it achieve its goals. Without a secure environment in which to operate, the likelihood of SCAP successfully guiding the Japanese Government to political and economic reform was slim at best. The SCAP plan incorporated key elements like demobilization, demilitarization, and democratization, and as the occupation progressed, SCAP conducted various programs such as land reform, key personnel purges, and economic restructuring initiatives designed to support the achievement of those goals.

Another key element of the SCAP plan worth discussing concerns its organizational structure that initially evolved over time to accommodate changes in the occupation operational environment. The requirement levied on SCAP to work through existing Japanese government and administrative organizations to foster a sense of legitimacy resulted in an administrative superstructure consisting originally of seven sections. There was no mistaking the fact that MacArthur was in charge of the occupation; one record describes him exercising governmental authority through instructions issued directly to the Japanese Government.17 These SCAP instructions (SCAPINS) were written by SCAP staff officers and transmitted to the Japanese Government through a committee of Japanese officials appointed by the Japanese prime minister and US officers assigned by SCAP. The original seven SCAP sections roughly correlated to existing Japanese government bureaus:

- government section
- economic and scientific section
• natural resources section
• public health and welfare section
• civil intelligence section
• legal section
• civil information and education section

Early in the occupation, SCAP added two additional sections: one to serve as the civil property custodian charged with restoring Allied assets taken by the Japanese Government, and the second to serve as the diplomatic section to cultivate a relationship with the Japanese Government as it implemented SCAPINS and worked toward occupation goals. These sections were staffed primarily by US civil servants and military officers transitioning from active duty to government service; at peak capacity in 1948 they numbered approximately 3,500 people.

One final key element of the occupation plan involved an innovative interface mechanism between the SCAP sections and the Japanese population. SCAP organized several thousand occupation troops into “military government teams” to observe the Japanese Government implementing SCAPINS. Distributed across eight regions and 46 prefectures of the countryside, their reports informed SCAP headquarters as to the effectiveness of both SCAP policy and the efficiency of local government administration. The impact of these early civil affairs teams lay not just in their first-order ability to report “ground truth” from the field, but in their second-order visibility. These military teams, through supervising the civilian administration infrastructure, reinforced the perception of legitimacy in the eyes of the local people. Just as important, these teams represented a visible sign of SCAP authority and US commitment.

Eight Analytical Questions

Thus far this analysis has managed to answer the basic who, what, and when questions surrounding Operation BLACKLIST. It turns now to a more in-depth treatment of the “how” by using the analytical questions introduced in Chapter 1 as a framework to explore the unique environment surrounding this occupation/stability operation. After concluding this comprehensive analysis, the reader will be better prepared to review the nine transition themes and assess their relevance.

Question 1: What Was the Form of Government?

The first question asks what form of government existed (both pre-conflict and post-conflict) in the occupied country. In the case of Japan,
one must understand a little about the country’s political history in the 300 years before World War II since the actions of the Japanese Government and its military during the war were very much grounded in the past. The basis of Japan’s wartime government is found in the 17th-century consolidation of power that took place under the Tokugawa Shogunate. The Japanese shoguns were independent military leaders who ruled the country on behalf of the divine emperor. In 1600, the Tokugawa Shogun consolidated his authority over the localized leader groups scattered throughout the country and instituted what would become 200 years of enforced peace based on a collection of complex laws and a rigid social caste system. Concerning this time period, it is important to realize that, in exchange for providing administrative efficiency, the shoguns essentially ruled without interference. They commanded personal armies of samurai, thereby precluding the creation of a national army. When combined with the self-imposed Japanese isolation that obviated the need for a standing navy, a situation resulted where undisputed authority was embodied in one man who spoke for the emperor.

One cannot overestimate the impact some 200 years of authoritative, caste-based military influence had on the psyche of the Japanese people. This administrative system, with the emperor at its head and the samurai at the forefront of the country’s social order, satisfied the Japanese need for internal stability and communal harmony. It was an efficient means of administering an island nation intentionally isolated from the outside world, but it ultimately proved inadequate after Commodore Matthew Perry broke through that wall of isolation in 1853. Commanding a fleet of warships, he sailed into Edo (what is now known as Tokyo) Bay in July 1853 to deliver a letter from the President of the United States to the Emperor of Japan demanding the Japanese open the country to international trade. Rather than returning straightaway to America, Perry and his fleet wintered in Okinawa with a promise to return to Edo in the spring for a reply. Under protest and the watchful eyes of American warships, the Japanese signed a treaty with the United States in February 1854, ending the country’s isolationist stance. Commodore Perry’s brief visit acted as the catalyst for political transformation in a nation predisposed by centuries of history to favor rigid structure and social stratification over democratic freedoms.

For the next 30 years, the shoguns struggled to maintain relevancy in the face of an international situation that demanded a formally constituted Japanese military and a unified political system created along Western lines. Despite their efforts, it became clear by the mid-1880s that, if Japan
wanted to be taken seriously by Western powers and not viewed as a potential colony, it had to adopt, or at least appear to adopt, a more Western approach to governance, as well as develop a modern military capability. In 1889, the world saw Japan transform itself from what was viewed as a second-world entity, politically speaking, into a modern, first-world nation capable of taking its place alongside the Western powers. Japan confronted the immediate need to redefine itself during the latter part of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century by means of what became known as the Meiji Restoration, the hallmark of which was the first constitution ever promulgated in Japanese history.

In February 1889, Emperor Meiji issued what superficially looked like a constitution modeled after the conservative German and Austrian instruments, but was, in reality, designed as a propaganda vehicle to portray Japan as militarily secure and fully equal to any other nation. The constitution ended the Tokugawa Shogunate tradition of local self-government under the loose supervision of the shogun military apparatus, and replaced it with a structured, centralized bureaucracy that perpetuated the divine sanctity of the emperor and ultimately lent support to the rise of a militaristic, nationalistic atmosphere. This particular aspect of the pre-World War II government arose, in part, due to the constitutional guarantee of immediate and unrestricted military access to the emperor; in effect, by the end of the 19th century the Japanese military was on its way to becoming a shadow government, working behind the scenes to project its own agenda. This ever-increasing influence was enhanced in the early 20th century by both the Japanese success during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 and the ascension to the throne of an ineffective and easily manipulated emperor. Discussion of the nest question expands on the relationship between the Japanese military and the government and examines MacArthur’s approach to reforming the Japanese Government.

**Question 2: What Was the Military/Government Relationship?**

To fully appreciate the Japanese Government’s status at the end of World War II, it is worth reviewing some of the actions taken in the years immediately preceding the Meiji Constitution, as well as several key components of the constitution itself. During the early years of the Meiji Restoration, Emperor Meiji enacted several far-reaching changes in the Japanese governmental structure. The Home Ministry, which already controlled the centralized police bureaucracy, now took under its control all local-level government officials throughout the country. The government enacted a new criminal code, and the Emperor created a new peerage
system that, in reality, translated into a 20th-century caste system with old-court nobility and ex-Tokugawa Shogunate daimyo (former military retainers to the shogun) filling prominent advisory roles. In 1885, the Emperor created a European-style cabinet, and three years later organized a Privy Council as the highest advisory board in the nation. Outwardly, it appeared that the Meiji Restoration was transforming Japan along the lines of the other Western powers; however, the reality of Japan’s political situation at the turn of the century was altogether different.

Under the provisions of the Meiji Constitution the Japanese Diet, a legislative body equivalent to the two-party houses found in Western parliaments, controlled the budget. On the surface this placed tremendous control in the hands of the legislative branch, but, in truth, the constitution empowered the emperor with so much control that the Diet was relegated to a minimal role in the years leading up to World War II. Not only was the Diet relatively ineffectual, the cabinet found itself responsible to the emperor alone and not to the legislature. Under the Meiji Constitution, the emperor remained a divine being, serving as the sole source of law, transcending Japanese societal conventions and the constitution itself. The following list illustrates the emperor’s power in the years leading up to and including World War II:

- authority to declare war/conclude treaties/command the Army
- authority to open/recess/dissolve the Diet
- authority to veto legislative decisions
- authority to issue independent ordinances
- sole authority to revise the constitution

This information supports the following conclusions. First, despite an outwardly democratic appearance the Japanese Government firmly remained a monarchy. Second, it was a constitutional monarchy in name only; in practice, the emperor retained significant legal authority that was legitimimized by his standing in Japanese society as a divine being. Third, in the absence of a working political system of checks and balances, and given that so much authority was concentrated in the hands of one man, it is no surprise the emperor’s close advisers wielded tremendous influence. In the words of Japanese historian Conrad Shirokauer, “The Constitution favored the men who had been governing in the Emperor’s name.”

One must recognize an additional three points before we conclude discussing the pre-transition form of Japanese government. First, Emperor Hirohito’s publicly recognized status as the divinely ordained government
head meant that SCAP had to consider his ability to influence post-conflict political reform. Second, SCAP would have to come to terms with the cadre of influential Imperial advisers if it intended to institute political reform. And third, the centralized infrastructure created by the Meiji Constitution provided a mechanism by which the Japanese Government marshaled national resources to further the war effort and an in-place administrative mechanism SCAP could use to implement post-conflict programs.

To conclude this pre-conflict government review, one can see a nation headed by a monarch who ruled by divine right and who was recognized as a divine being. His authority was unquestioned, codified in a sham constitution that only appeared outwardly to satisfy Western expectations but actually empowered the emperor and a close group of advisers with complete control over the bureaucratic and military apparatus. The Meiji Constitution replaced an old form of loosely centralized control with a modern bureaucracy controlled by an undisputed leader, thus setting the stage for unquestioned obedience on a national scale. This obedience would not necessarily have been bad had it not been not coupled with Japan’s hegemonic vision.

This, then, was the political situation in Japan on the eve of the big event in Tokyo Harbor. The formal surrender instrument, dated 2 September 1945, incorporated the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration and the following statement showing the relationship between the Japanese Government and the occupation authorities: “The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.” This instrument clearly established occupation command chains, serving as a source of legitimacy for SCAP, and it intimated a radical change in the Japanese political structure. This study has already identified the democratization of the Japanese Government as one of General MacArthur’s two primary objectives and turns now to a brief overview of SCAP’s political vision and initial reform actions.

General MacArthur was appointed Supreme Commander for Allied Powers and made responsible for implementing the provisions of the surrender instrument and for conducting the post-conflict occupation of Japan. His authority to do so came from four documents. First, the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 required the unconditional surrender of Japan and authorized an Allied occupation of that country until all the Declaration’s provisions had been met. This document could be equated to a modern-day UN Resolution in that it represented the Allied Powers’ opinion regarding war termination and post-conflict objectives in Japan. The second document
was, of course, the September 1945 surrender instrument itself. The third and fourth documents were both US-generated. The first of these was developed as a result of the research and analysis efforts of the DOS-sponsored SWNCC established in 1945. One of the most significant documents produced by this committee was the “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan,” routinely referred to as SWNCC 150-4. This document described, in macro-level terms, an ambitious political and economic reform program, and it informed MacArthur’s staff in its efforts to refine Operation BLACKLIST. The second US document was the “Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Paper,” more commonly known by the title JCS Directive 1380/15. This document, classified SECRET through much of the initial occupation, expanded on the information contained in SWNCC 150-4 and provided the SCAP staff with specific direction for the political-reform program.

By September 1945, MacArthur was well positioned to assume his new duties. He had an unequivocal international and US mandate to enforce the terms of surrender and conduct a deliberate occupation of Japan; he had planning guidance from the DOS and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; his staff had incorporated strategic and national guidance into Operation BLACKLIST; and as this analysis will illustrate later, he possessed a unique level of situational understanding that made him an exceptionally well-qualified choice to lead the occupation. Given that level of guidance and support, the whole transition between combat operations and stability operations probably did not seem too challenging, except for the several million armed Japanese soldiers still spread throughout Japan and the Pacific, and that Japan was economically ruined, without an efficient industrial base and incapable of feeding itself. The peaceful occupation and subsequent political and economic reforms are a testament to MacArthur’s leadership and SCAP’s application of the nine common transition themes offered by this study.

The goals of the occupation were outlined early in the Potsdam Declaration and in detail in both SWNCC 150-4 and JCS 1380/15. Historians Ray Moore and Donald Robinson characterized them in the recent study Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State Under MacArthur in simple terms that could apply to any US stability operation: (1) ensure as far as possible that [Japan] would never again become a “menace” to the peace and security of the world (the demobilization and demilitarization goals identified earlier in this chapter); and (2) encourage the establishment in [Japan] of a peaceful, democratic government (the democratization goal previously mentioned). This study has previously noted how rapidly the
Japanese Government demobilized the Army, Navy, and Air Force in compliance with SCAP instructions; the second goal of the occupation would prove to be both complex and critical to the economic and social reforms envisioned by the Allies.

Early in the occupation, MacArthur received the first postwar Japanese Prime Minister, Baron Kijuro Shidehara, and during the meeting clearly expressed his intent that the government institute a collection of reforms. In his Reminiscences, MacArthur recounted the details of this meeting and listed seven reform categories that subsequently were codified in the Civil Liberties Directive of 4 October 1945. This directive represented a transformational move from the pre-conflict form of government to the post-conflict form because it identified critical civil liberties to a nation that had neither historically possessed them nor politically agitated for them, and it set conditions for a revision of the Meiji Constitution of 1889.

The post-conflict form of government in Japan had its roots in the Civil Liberties Directive of 1945 and was codified in a brand new Japanese constitution that became effective in May 1947. The journey from one to the other was neither smooth nor simple, but it was relatively rapid. As part of the overall goal of democratizing the nation, SCAP identified two key political reform tasks: reform the political system (an immediate task with short-term impact), and reform the education system (an immediate task with significant social ramifications but potentially positive long-term impact). The more emotional of the two, the political system reform, required a revision of the 1889 constitution. In support of that overarching effort, the Civil Liberties Directive of 1945 mandated a release of political prisoners, the removal of limits on freedom of speech and assembly, and the abolishment of the Home Ministry. The Prime Minister implemented these instructions quickly and presented to SCAP a proposed constitution generally viewed by SCAP officials as little changed from the Meiji Constitution. MacArthur rejected the Japanese proposal and instructed the government section of SCAP HQs to draft a new constitution. Within two weeks of receiving the task, SCAP had designed and submitted a new constitution to the Japanese Government for consideration, remaining true to the work-behind-the-scenes approach.

This new constitution, comprised of ideas that were foreign to the Japanese in more ways than one, set the conditions for the post-conflict form of government. First, the concept of the emperor’s divine sovereignty was replaced by the transfer of sovereignty to the Japanese people themselves—the emperor would now be viewed as a symbol of the state, not the
embodiment of Japanese law and authority. Accordingly, the Diet, as the elected representative body of the Japanese people, was now to be seen as the center of national sovereignty. The Civil Liberties Directive regarding women’s emancipation and enfranchisement was codified in the new constitution. And the most well-known aspect of the new constitution was recorded in Article Nine, the constitutional requirement for full and complete disarmament coupled with the renunciation of war and the proscription against maintaining a standing military of any type. In March 1946, MacArthur publicly announced the Japanese Government had developed a new constitution for consideration by the Japanese people (another example of reinforcing legitimacy). And after much public debate in the truest democratic fashion the new constitution was approved by the Japanese Diet and became effective in May 1947.30

A few final details concerning the Constitution of 1947 are worth mentioning to fully appreciate the fundamental differences between the pre- and post-conflict forms of government. The former parliamentary system had been designed along Western European lines, but the new system more resembled the British approach to representative legislation. The constitution abolished all military influence in government, abolished the Privy Council, and replaced the House of Peers with an elected House of Councillors. The other element of the Diet, the House of Representatives, was recognized as having more authority than the House of Councillors and considered the supreme representative body of the Japanese Government. The prime minister was to be elected by the House of Representatives as opposed to being selected by the emperor. In addition to these major revisions, the new Constitution included a host of other innovations that completed the transition from the pre-war “pretend” representative form of government to the post-conflict constitutional monarchy.31

The adoption of the Constitution of 1947 represented a significant milestone in the process of stabilizing postwar Japan and instituting democratic principles among a people unaccustomed to exercising what the West considered unalienable rights. But designing a new constitution was only one aspect of the SCAP plan to achieve its two overarching goals; other elements of the SCAP program had to come together to support democratization and the economy’s revitalization as Japan moved closer to a sustainable peace. One of the more significant challenges facing SCAP was eliminating the influence exerted by the military over the entire country (government, industry, education, and emperor).

It is difficult for Americans to appreciate the level of influence—some
might call it interference—that can be exerted by a country’s military over social, political, and educational programs since the United States has always enjoyed a clear delineation between the government’s role and the military’s role. The latter has always been, and by Constitutional design will always remain, subordinate to the former. That was not, however, the experience of the Japanese people in the years leading up to World War II.

Earlier, this chapter noted the consolidation of government under the military power of the Tokugawa Shogunate that lasted for approximately 200 years until it was replaced by the 19th century Meiji Restoration and the Constitution of 1889. When the 24-year-old Emperor Hirohito assumed the throne in 1926 he inherited a legacy still overshadowed by his grandfather, the Emperor Meiji himself. Not only had Hirohito’s grandfather transformed the government from a shogunate into a constitutional monarchy (albeit not one in the truest Western sense), he also had won the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. This event marked a watershed in Japanese international relations because it forever lifted the veil of isolation and demonstrated the nation was capable of Western-style military action and diplomatic maneuver.

Emperor Meiji surrounded himself with constitutionally-empowered military advisers, predominantly veterans of the recently-concluded conflict with Russia. These advisers were not, however, of the traditional samurai mold that valued learning, skill, and use of violence to pursue political objectives. Instead, these advisers represented a new generation of military men, the first generation of Japanese soldiers in the post-Perry era to apply Western tactics and weapons against a Western enemy and win. These military leaders had tested themselves on the battlefield against Russian soldiers, not Japanese samurai or civilians, and had come to believe that *Yamato Damashii*, or Japanese spirit, deserved as much if not more credit for the Japanese victory in 1905 than did the application of mass infantry tactics and modern weapons.\(^{32}\)

The proximity of these “spirit warriors” to the Emperor, combined with his unrestricted constitutional authority, resulted in the growth of an anti-British and anti-American militaristic movement that spread through the government and Japanese society. Through their ability to influence the Emperor, the spirit warriors forced the *Diet* to enact a law requiring Navy and Army members of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet to be active duty officers, thus under the complete control of the spirit warriors themselves. If the spirit warriors disapproved of a cabinet decision, they merely ordered
the military representatives to the cabinet to resign, thereby forcing a cabinet collapse. The second postwar Japanese Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, described the influence of the spirit warriors in this manner:

The primary objective of the various military cliques was the same—to gain power at the expense of those around the Throne and those in responsible positions within the civilian government. . . . These uniformed politicians coupled their pleas for the adoption of anti-British and anti-American policies with enticing proposals to eliminate existing social and political evils at home, and to establish a new order of things in the Japanese homeland.33

By 1923, a full 18 years (or several recruiting classes worth of soldiers), before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Army had manipulated Emperor Yoshihito into establishing a system of military training in all schools that was supervised by thousands of spirit warrior officers. This act effectively resulted in complete military influence over the Japanese public education curriculum, ultimately transforming the public schools into a soldier mill for the military. It is impossible to overstate the significance of this militaristic takeover; Japanese historian Sabura Ienaga described it this way: “Every facet of the curriculum was permeated with Emperor worship and militarism.”34 Time and again Japanese citizens who had served in the military and survived World War II described an indoctrination campaign on a national scale that reinforced the divine status of the emperor and, by association, the legitimacy of any order issued by the spirit warriors.35 Emperor Hirohito fell under their influence early; at three months of age he was placed in a foster home, raised by a retired admiral, and schooled by spirit warriors in accordance with an Imperial Decree. His academic training placed little emphasis on liberal arts, but great emphasis on military subjects. In short, Hirohito received the same indoctrination—minus of course, the Emperor-worship requirement—as did the general population at the hands of the spirit warriors.36

By 1941 the spirit warriors had all the pieces in place to embark on a strategic campaign to solidify Japan’s international status as a great power. The Emperor was surrounded by the right advisers, the government was manipulated by men following the right agenda, the military was staffed with soldiers, sailors, and airmen imbued with Yamato Damashii, and the schools were positioned to feed the military machine with obedient, dedicated, indoctrinated replacements. Clearly, one can see that defeating the Japanese in the Pacific was only one aspect of winning the peace; SCAP
was also faced with the monumental task of eliminating all vestiges of military influence and filling the ensuing void with something that would support the occupation goals. MacArthur recognized the spirit warriors’ influence over Japanese government and society and, informed by this understanding, implemented programs to purge Japan of military influences detrimental to SCAP’s two-plank program of democratization and demilitarization.

MacArthur considered wide-ranging educational reform as a key component of the SCAP democratization plan. Once rid of the spirit warrior emphasis on unthinking obedience and hegemonic expansion, Japan’s educational system could be refocused to provide intellectual support to the development of democratic-minded citizens. The challenge, of course, was in eliminating the spirit-warrior presence in the schools. Recall the previous discussion about MacArthur’s instructions to Baron Yoshida to enact educational reform measures, and it becomes easy to understand the drastic measures implemented by SCAP through the Japanese Government to move the education reform program along.

SCAP required the removal of all traces of Emperor worship, as well as the complete removal of all traces of militarism from classrooms and curriculum. Because there was no time or funding available to replace textbooks, SCAP instructed teachers and students to line out unacceptable language. Government regulations prohibited actions such as saluting the flag, singing the national anthem, or bowing to the Emperor’s portrait. The primary educational reform measures were completed when, in July 1948, the Japanese Board of Education eliminated the Ministry of Education’s control over schools and replaced it with local school boards. The combination of these actions helped protect against the resurgence of a national militaristic movement in the country’s schools and freed the educational system to become a forum for democratization.

The other SCAP occupation goal, demilitarization, required the issue of the spirit warriors be put to rest permanently. Both the Potsdam Declaration and the 1945 surrender document specifically called for the elimination of militaristic influences, and SCAP published a formal instruction, SCAPIN 550, to accomplish that task. SCAP identified the following seven categories of people as requiring investigation:

- war criminals
- all career military and naval officers
- leaders of ultra-nationalistic organizations
• leaders of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association
• officers of companies involved in economic colonization
• governors of occupied territories
• a “catch-all” category consisting of “additional militants and ultra-nationalists”39

One can see by this list that what came to be known as the purge program was applied to multiple elements of postwar Japanese society.

Between May 1946 and April 1948, SCAP convened the International Tribunal in Tokyo to try Japanese citizens for complicity in the war effort. According to one source, 4,200 Japanese officials were found guilty of war crimes, 700 of whom were executed, and an additional 186,000 people were officially purged from their wartime positions regardless of the segment of society in which they worked. In November 1948, seven of the top Japanese wartime leaders, including Prime Minister Hideki Tojo but excluding Emperor Hirohito, were sentenced to death for their actions during the war.40 The purge efficiently eliminated all spirit warrior influence in the post-conflict government and educational infrastructures.

The impact of the post-conflict purge was felt throughout Japanese society. Subsequent discussions will analyze the impact of the purge on the Japanese economic infrastructure; for now, the words of historian Edwin Reischauer warrant consideration. Reischauer’s assessment of the purge, that it was designed to eliminate “from any position of substantial influence in society” all those who were responsible for Japanese conquests, was begrudgingly positive. On the one hand he criticized the program because it was based on categories vice individual actions, and consequently undermined the very Western concept of individual rights that SCAP was implementing through the new constitution. His criticism was also based on the fact that the purge displaced approximately 200,000 people who possessed critical administrative, managerial, security, teaching, or business skills at the very time when the Japanese Government was furiously working to enact SCAP education and political reforms and shift domestic production away from a wartime-footing. On the other hand, his criticism was tempered by the acknowledgement that the purge “did sweep away much of the old leadership, at least temporarily, and made room for new, even if not necessarily better, men.”41 That final observation by itself is worth considering as commanders and planners balance immediate post-conflict security needs with long-term democratization and economic goals.
As we close out the discussion of the second analytical question it is important to recognize that Americans are not socially predisposed to understand how the majority of a nation’s citizenry can succumb to a twisted variation on what might once have been a laudable theme. It happens more often than one might suspect: Japanese society in the years leading up to World War II was molded to conform to the militaristic tenets of the spirit-warrior philosophy; the former Soviet Union was created and subsequently destroyed by the economically skewed political platform of Communism. Current operations in the Middle East reveal how powerful, and pervasive, an influence religious ideology can be. What this reveals is that democratic ideals are not the norm around the world, and one must recognize there are alternative and often competing political frameworks already in existence. With that acknowledgement, this study moves on to a discussion of the Japanese economy in the years immediately preceding and following World War II and its impact on SCAP stability operations planning.

**Question 3: What Was the Status of the Economy?**

The economy of Japan in the immediate pre-World War II period was characterized by agricultural challenges and fledgling labor movements, but without a doubt the defining characteristic was a collection of organizations known as the *zaibatsu*. This term, literally translated as wealth group, represented very powerful industrial or financial combines with clear roots in shogunate history. Often consisting of hundreds of smaller businesses controlled by a larger holding company, the four major *zaibatsu* contained the common characteristic of the primary holding company being owned by a single family.42 But this relatively straightforward definition fails to do justice to the significance of the *zaibatsu*’s tremendous economic, financial, and political influence.

The origins of the *zaibatsu* can be traced to the mid-19th century Tokugawa-era merchant houses. As the overall level of peace in Japan rose in response to the Tokugawa Shogunate’s administrative and legal practices, the prominence of the samurai fell and they were replaced by a class of merchants and financiers whose ability to support the political requirements of the shogunate became more important than the samurais’ ability to provide military service. The *zaibatsu* initially came to prominence in the late 19th century by buying government-owned industrial efforts as they were sold by the cash-starved Meiji Restoration administration; eventually, the *zaibatsu* became intertwined with later governments by supplying money, political support, and business relationships. Many
of the zaibatsu founders could trace their family lineage to pre-Meiji samurai, and thus considered dedication to the emperor and service to the nation to be values paramount to profit-making. This fundamental attitude, combined with growing zaibatsu influence on industry, made it easy for the spirit warriors (supported by zaibatsu houses) to later manipulate the emperor into pursuing a militaristic agenda.

The zaibatsu were clearly positioned to support, and profit from, the war effort. But as is historically the case, it was the Japanese civilian population that bore the brunt of the post-World War II economic collapse. Economic historian Jerome Cohen has compared the impact of the war on the populations of the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, and, concluded that, the Japanese economy experienced the most significant disruption in quality of life. Of all the statistics included in his analysis, perhaps the most telling is this: Within a few months of the surrender, prices in Japan had risen a staggering 295 percent due, in part, to scarcity of materials, government pension fund disbursements, and government efforts to increase the amount of currency in circulation. The Japanese economy, focused for almost a decade nearly exclusively on wartime production and national sacrifice in support of the spirit-warrior agenda, came to a standstill with the surrender. One would think that if SCAP intended to quickly democratize and demilitarize Japan, it would have to implement a comprehensive economic rehabilitation program from the occupation’s start. Interestingly enough, though, that was not the case.

SCAP’s initial instructions about the economic rejuvenation of Japan were simultaneously clear and confusing. On the one hand, SCAP was directed, in no uncertain terms, to adopt a hands-off approach to economic rehabilitation. On the other hand, in January 1947 the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), one of the two international advisory boards designed to provide SCAP with occupation program guidance, published a directive that declared “the peaceful needs of the Japanese people should be defined as being substantially the standard of living previously in Japan during the period 1930-1934.” MacArthur’s staff became embroiled in a debate over how to best democratize the economy. One camp advocated freeing labor unions, destroying any remaining Japanese industrial capacity to produce weapons, and gifting of land titles to peasants. The opposite camp argued for allowing Japanese capitalists to fully participate in any national economic recovery. SCAP was faced with a clear dilemma: remain completely hands-off and risk jeopardizing the occupation goals, especially democratization (hungry, unemployed citizens would
probably not willingly embrace democracy), or undertake an aggressive, comprehensive economic rehabilitation program and risk violating US and international occupation guidance and, more important, risk undermining the Japanese Government’s legitimacy as it worked to rebuild the economy. The SCAP solution: implement a compromise that focused on reform and left the particulars of economic rehabilitation programs to the Japanese Government to design and implement.

MacArthur guided his staff to focus on democratizing economic opportunity. He established as a SCAP goal the following target: Provide the 80 percent of the population without an economic stake in recovery a reason to support it—in other words, institute actions that would motivate the majority of Japanese citizens to accept responsibility for the challenge and embrace democratization as the appropriate solution. By adopting this approach, SCAP linked economic stability with democratization as a means to sustainable peace and legitimizing the Japanese Government.

SCAP engaged in a three-phased plan to restructure the economy by either eliminating economic influences against democratic business practices or modifying Japanese political practices to introduce economic practices that would support democratization and ultimate economic rejuvenation. The first phase of this plan involved the break-up of the zaibatsu influence, the second phase introduced land reform measures, and the third phase manipulated the Japanese political environment to allow for labor union growth. All these elements were radical and not without significant emotional and cultural implications, but at the same time all three were critical to creating an overall environment conducive to furthering occupation goals.

SCAP faced the zaibatsu challenge to economic democratization head on. The initial policy favored a program designed to dissolve the zaibatsu based on the argument that these combines had not only suppressed the Japanese economy by means of low wages, but had also supported Japanese overseas aggression with their search for raw materials and foreign markets. The zaibatsu were also collectively accused of concentrating significant economic wealth and power in the hands of a few families with close ties to the Emperor and senior Japanese government officials, thus making them a clear obstacle to economic democratization and political reform. The SCAP solution was radical: dissolve the zaibatsu. And in a brilliant maneuver designed to support the legitimacy of Japanese-led reconstruction efforts, in October 1945 SCAP approved a plan developed by the Japanese Government in conjunction with the top four zaibatsu
families.

SCAP had previously identified four categories of zaibatsu (industrials/service and distribution/insurance/banks). Under the provisions of the new plan the largest 83 zaibatsu were broken up into component elements, with the government enacting a collection of anti-monopoly laws to prevent the re-establishment of pre-World War II-like monopolies. To compensate for their loss the owners were issued government bonds that could not be negotiated for 10 years. Additionally, the government enacted a capital levy tax that ranged from 25 percent up to 90 percent, effectively wiping out the personal fortunes of the wealthiest zaibatsu families, and then followed that action with the creation of a graduated income tax and an inheritance tax to further preclude wealth accumulation.

In recognition of the complex nature of the Japanese economic landscape, and demonstrating a sophisticated understanding of the financial demands facing the country, the critical financial linkages were left intact, along with roughly 1,200 minor zaibatsu companies remaining untouched by economic reform programs. But to prevent a resurgence of old-line leadership SCAP purged zaibatsu officers: a total of 639 officers from 240 companies were removed from their company positions outright, with another 896 electing to resign rather than face the public humiliation of being ordered to do so. On the one hand, this leadership purge immediately removed influential roadblocks to economic democratization, but on the other hand it represented a tangible loss in terms of experienced leadership when the Japanese economy needed such skills.

As one might expect, the decision to dissolve the zaibatsu and purge such a large collection of economic leaders was met with mixed reaction. James Dobbins stated the breakup led to increased distribution of wealth, which resulted in the formation of new companies, further leading to the creation of more wealth and a more competitive economy. But Edwin Reischauer thought the decisions made regarding the zaibatsu might have been predicated on a flawed foundation when he wrote there was dissolution based on the “questionable Marxist reasoning that great concentration of commercial and industrial wealth [was] not the source of Japanese militarism and imperialist expansion.” Whether the argument was flawed or not was immaterial; the Japanese Government developed a plan to address the economic and political influence of the zaibatsu. SCAP, recognizing the requirement to work reform through the Japanese Government and the suitability of the Japanese plan, approved it for execution. The combined impact of the zaibatsu dissolution and leadership purge significantly
reduced both the wealth and political influence of the zaibatsu, thereby eliminating a roadblock to democratization and setting the conditions for post-World War II economic rejuvenation along democratic lines.

Earlier, this discussion identified the zaibatsu issue as one of three elements of the SCAP program to democratize economic opportunity in postwar Japan. The second plank in the SCAP platform involved the issue of land reform. Before World War II approximately 70 percent of all Japanese farmers rented farmland, and over 50 percent of those farmers rented more than one half of their acreage. When one combines these land ownership statistics with the previous discussion about the state of zaibatsu influence over the economy (specifically the level of production ownership or control exerted by a select few families), it becomes clear that in the period immediately following the surrender only an unacceptably small percentage of Japanese civilians had any economic interest in seeing either political or economic democratization succeed. To counter that imbalance, SCAP instructed the Japanese Government to develop a program of land reform to support the larger democratization effort by mitigating the economic consequences of military demobilization through increased opportunities to own farmland. The primary impact of any such action would be to immediately raise the social status of the Japanese farmer and thereby provide an increased level of personal motivation to succeed; a more subtle, second-order effect would be to increase farmer support for the government’s efforts by giving the farmers a vested economic reason to see the program succeed.

The initial land reform program submitted by the Japanese Government to SCAP for approval fell short of the mark, however. Despite a sense of willingness in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to reform, land owners in the Diet maneuvered to weaken the first effort in November 1945. SCAP staffers re-worked the initial land reform package, and in October 1946 the Japanese Government passed a bill that included the following provisions:

- Absentee landlords were required to sell their farm land to the government.
- The government then made that land available for purchase at a fixed price, with tenants able to finance at low interest rates over thirty years.
- SCAP monitored the redistribution program through the use of its military observation teams.

This action was significant because it empowered an underappreciated
segment of Japanese society. The percentage of owner-operated land increased from 54 percent in 1947 to 90 percent in 1950. Perhaps more important, the percentage of farmers who owned their land increased dramatically from 38 percent in 1947 to 70 percent in 1950.\textsuperscript{52} These numbers validated MacArthur’s belief that if given the opportunity, the Japanese population would embrace the economic democratization process. James Dobbins characterizes the SCAP land reform initiative in the following manner: “Even today, land reform is seen as the single most important factor for quelling rural discontent and promoting political stability in the early postwar period.”\textsuperscript{53} This is a clear example where situational understanding informed stability operations planners as they developed reform programs focused on both immediate and long-term sustainable peace.

The third and final component of the SCAP economic reform initiative involved modifying the Japanese political environment to encourage a significant expansion in the scope and quality of workers’ rights. Eliminating the \textit{zaibatsu} influence was only part of the solution; to be truly productive in the Western approach, the Japanese workers needed to know how to interact with their industry leaders at various levels. To that end, the SCAP Civil Liberties Directive of October 1945 eliminated barriers to union organization. MacArthur instructed the Japanese Government to draft legislation that protected the Japanese wage-earner’s rights. The resulting government legislation, the Trade Union Law of December 1945, guaranteed the Japanese workforce three uniquely Western rights: the right to organize, to bargain collectively, and to strike.\textsuperscript{54} In less than one year, approximately 13,000 enterprise unions existed with a national membership of 3.8 million. By March 1949, seven million workers (50 percent of the labor force) belonged to unions.

This legislation enabled the immediate participation of the unions in the political process. Not surprisingly, there are two interpretations of the legacy of this labor reform initiative. One camp applauds the move as the means of instituting democratic principles across a wide spectrum of Japanese society, while the other camp, whose number includes former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, decries that labor reform legislation afforded what had previously been a very small and inconsequential Communist movement the freedom to agitate and organize without fear of official reprisal. Both interpretations correctly reflect the complexity of reform in a stability operation; planners and commanders will have to weigh the potential short-term risks that political and economic reforms predicated on democratic principles carry with them in exchange for long-term stability. Clearly, the SCAP decision to direct labor reform supported the larger
democratization process and demonstrated to the Japanese a measure of faith in their ability to determine their own future course in this area.

Before concluding this discussion about the occupation economic reform programs, one final observation about the perception of commitment and its impact on an overall stability effort is in order. Recall our earlier discussion about the policy prohibiting SCAP from assuming any responsibility for economic recovery or humanitarian support. The looming food crisis stemming from the worst rice harvest in 35 years, some 45 percent below normal levels, was exacerbated by a broken food distribution system. MacArthur disagreed with the “no involvement” policy on principle and, in no uncertain terms, lobbied Congress for more food to support his democratization program. His 1946-1947 occupation budget included $250 million for food, fertilizer, petroleum products, and medicine, a request that exceeded the combined budgets of the US Departments of Commerce, Justice, and Labor. MacArthur’s determination stemmed from his situational understanding; his success here probably owed as much to his ability to describe the situation and the potential downside of inaction, in clear terms, as to anything else.

The quantifiable impact of the three SCAP economic reform measures has been noted over time. Historian Milton Meyer, for one, credits the postwar programs in general, and the massive direct American aid relief effort in particular, with speeding up the Japanese domestic recovery. What is much more difficult to ascertain, what in fact often takes time, perhaps generations, to determine, is the long-term impact that stability operations economic programs will have on a sustainable peace. In the case of the Japanese occupation, the general consensus is that the Japanese Government’s economic program, built on the three elements of the SCAP economic reform platform and reinforced by a clear demonstration of US commitment to the long-term occupation goals, set the conditions for Japan’s explosive 20th-century revitalization.

The next analytical question focuses on religious practices indigenous to Japan and their impact on stability operations. The analysis will discuss two recognized religions: Shinto and Buddhism. Each had some impact on pre-and post-World War II Japanese society, the former more so than the latter, and consequently SCAP introduced occupation directives to mitigate any potential disruptive influence religious practice might have had on the democratization effort.

Question 4: What Influence did Indigenous Religious Practices have?

For generations before World War II the Japanese, for the most part,
adhered to one of two primary religious faiths. Shinto refers to an assortment of beliefs and practices that are pantheistic in nature—the Shinto universe consists of a collection of spirits and gods, all with varying degrees of power. The Shinto philosophy focuses on transcending a polluted world by rigorous mental and physical purification rituals. This emphasis on rituals served well a society intent on maintaining harmonious co-existence in a crowded environment. An interesting aspect of Shinto is that its incorporation of a pantheon of gods actually supported the Imperial family’s claim of divinity based on the Japanese legend tracing the origin of the Emperor as a descendent of the Sun Goddess. Perhaps the most significant point to be made about Shinto in the pre-World War II period is that, over time, during the Tokugawa Shogunate and the subsequent Meiji Restoration, Shinto was transformed into a state religion in direct support of the practice of Emperor worship.59

The second significant religion, Buddhism, arrived in Japan after Shinto had begun to develop, and consequently had some measure of influence on Shinto in the process. Buddhism was introduced into Japan in the 6th century A.D. via traders from Korea and China. It introduced the concepts of rebirth and karmic causation and emphasized unity of experience to a people already predisposed to believe in a larger universe exerting influence over their daily lives. Perhaps, because of Buddhism’s more complicated nature, the Japanese ruling class adopted it more readily, and to a greater extent, than the rural Japanese population. Buddhism gained favor in the urban areas and enjoyed official recognition more than the rural Shinto practices, as is evidenced by the collection of Buddhist monasteries and statuary in and around Japanese cities. During the Tokugawa Shogunate the advent of Zen Buddhism, with its emphasis on meditation and austere lifestyle in pursuit of enlightenment, became the hallmark of the samurai.60

Of the two religions, Shinto was the more popularly practiced, and from an occupation perspective the more potentially disruptive. Because it recognized Emperor Hirohito as a divine being, SCAP eliminated Shinto’s status as the state religion as part of the larger program to demystify the Emperor and democratize the government. Though no longer officially recognized as the state religion, in postwar Japan Shinto shrines remained open, Shinto priests continued to perform family and institutional rites, and Shinto weddings remained popular.61 Neither of these religions was violent by nature; both advocated peaceful pursuit of social harmony and personal enlightenment. As historian Milton Meyer observed, “Japanese understand situational ethics and prescribed modes of proper behavior,"
but they draw little of substance from Shinto, Buddhism, or other forms of worship in terms of fundamental religious or humanistic grounding.” Accordingly, occupation planners certainly had to consider the influence of indigenous Japanese religious practices, but religion was not nearly the destructive catalyst it currently is in the stability operations in the Middle East today.

Question 5: What Was the Influence of Media?

The next question pertains to the role the media played in occupation plans and policies. Occupation planners eventually implemented a program that involved two distinct components: censorship and dissemination, the former of militaristic propaganda and the latter of democratization messages. In the years immediately before and during World War II the Japanese Government exercised much control over the Japanese media. The British OSS published an analysis of Japanese media controls that characterized the actions of the Japanese Cabinet Board of Information as “repressive and extensive, covering the press, radio, motion pictures, phonograph records, and the theater.” Beyond this study, however, little was known about Japanese media practices, control measures, or the real messages being disseminated by the media. Based partly on the OSS analysis and partly on a determination to efficiently execute its democratization program, SCAP implemented an aggressive censorship plan that not only included censoring civilian communications but also explicitly guided the Japanese about mass media practices. The fundamental reason for adopting a practice that, on the surface, would appear contrary to basic democratic principles, is summed up well by historian Marlene Mayo: “The victors, determined to avoid another war with a resurgent Japan, believed they must censor and guide Japan’s media until their enemy could get rid of wrong ideas and acquire better ones—replace militaristic and aggressive ideas with democratic and peace loving ones.”

MacArthur received detailed initial and long-term planning guidance from Washington that built on problems identified, techniques applied, and lessons learned arising from the information-control policy implemented in the American Zone of occupied Germany. While not a bad starting point, it does raise the question of situational understanding and cultural awareness. In early summer 1945, the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department issued a series of directives that instructed SCAP to “prohibit the dissemination of Japanese militaristic, National Shintoistic, and ultra-nationalist ideology and propaganda in any form.” Later, in August 1945, these directives were softened to reflect the requirement to establish “minimum control and censorship of civilian communications . . . as may
be necessary in the interest of military security.”

SCAP designed a media-control program that applied the strategic guidance originating from Washington in support of the occupation goals of demilitarization and democratization. In support of the former goal the media-control plan eliminated from all Japanese media and civilian communications ideas or controls that were objectionable to the United States or in opposition to the demilitarization effort, a program that involved the implementation of strict censorship practices. On the positive side, the SCAP program called for the introduction of approved radio scripts, books, and other publications that could be used to educate and orient the Japanese about democratic principles.66 The SCAP plan regarding censorship called for 400 officers, 1,500 enlisted personnel, and 2,500 civilians to act as media and civilian communications censors. To develop a minimum standard of technical competency and situational understanding, the officers were to undergo three months of civil censorship training as well as six months of Japanese language and culture training.67 Over time, as the political and social environment stabilized and democratization took hold, SCAP allowed the Japanese Government to relax the restrictions.

There is an important lesson to be learned about the second- and third-order effects that certain actions can have when conducted in an environment where the media has freedom. This author likes to call the lesson “tactical actions and their strategic implications” because all too often commanders and planners, focused on the immediacy of a specific mission, fail to really consider the long-term consequences of an act or a decision. One can find several examples—both positive and negative—of this phenomenon in this case study. MacArthur’s staff noted that the disciplined and dignified conduct of American occupation troops made a positive impact on the Japanese press, and by extension the Japanese people, thereby supporting the perceptions of legitimacy and security so important to SCAP: “The Japanese press, which at first had been inclined to be dubious about American behavior, now voiced unanimous praise.” Specifically, the Tokyo newspapers Tokyo Yomiuri and Tokyo Shimbun, “which had been the worst offenders, completely revised their attitude.”68 MacArthur credited the decision to lift restrictions on free speech with empowering the Japanese people to comment on the draft Japanese constitution that was circulated for a month before the final vote; a situation that was made all the more effective by the Japanese Government’s ambitious political education program conducted in the newspapers and over the radio.69 Also bear in mind the food shortage situation MacArthur personally resolved over the initial objections of the US Congress. MacArthur’s
decision had far-reaching implications, not only with regard to avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe but, just as important, for the long-term development of a sustainable peace, and the Japanese press picked up on the positive message.\textsuperscript{70}

If there is a single lesson one should learn about the media, it is this: It exists to tell a story. That story can be one you want told or one you might rather not be told, but stories are the \textit{raison d’etre} for the media. Positive stories can reinforce long-term goals and work in support of stability operations; the opposite, however, can be just as true. Ambassador Sebald, for example, commented on the constant struggle among the Allies, the FEC, the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) (another international advisory board), and the US Government with regard to evolving occupation policies and goals—not so much that the struggle occurred, but more so that the “fantastic tugging and pulling went on incessantly beneath a barrage of international press coverage. This continued at a high pitch because the experiment in Japan was sufficiently unusual to constitute news for an extraordinary length of time.”\textsuperscript{71} MacArthur’s mandate, persona, situational understanding, and geographic separation allowed him the freedom to execute his duties as SCAP with relative disregard for international opinion; contemporary commanders and planners, working in an environment of real-time press coverage and global communications, will not necessarily enjoy that luxury in the future.

One last example of a “tactical action with strategic implications” is worth noting. In this case the tactical action took the form of a comment made by a senior Administration official, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall. During a visit to Japan to inspect the occupation effort, Royall made what he believed to be a “not-for-attribution” comment to a group of American correspondents. One thing led to another, and very quickly a series of stories broke in the Japanese press implying that, according to an unnamed high US official, the United States probably intended to abandon Japan as a liability in the event the United States went to war with the Soviet Union. The press further quoted the official as saying America was not obliged to stay in Japan, a position that, while technically correct from a Potsdam Declaration standpoint, flew in the face of everything SCAP was trying to accomplish in terms of legitimacy and security. Royall denied ever holding the press conference, and further denied making the comments as reported; however, it was the widespread perception that counted more than the facts. Ambassador Sebald characterized the situation as “temporarily disastrous to our policies, not only in Japan but in the entire Far East.”\textsuperscript{72} Ultimately, SCAP recovered from the embarrassment
and continued with its democratization program; if anything, this situation reinforced to the Japanese people the dynamic environment available to a nation that endorsed free speech and a censor-free media. But in the short term, this situation served as another example of the power of the media and its ability to endow a tactical action with strategic implications.

**Question 6: What Was the Role of the International Community?**

Our next question involves what role the international community plays in stability operations. With respect to the case study at hand, the international community’s influence fell off dramatically after the Potsdam Declaration was issued and the surrender was signed. That is not to say the United States had no interaction with or input from the international community, it only means the Allies made their most significant contribution to preparing for the occupation well before SCAP took over.

In December 1945, the United States agreed to the formation of two international oversight bodies, one headquartered in Washington, and the other located in Tokyo. The former, the FEC, consisted of representatives from the 11 countries that had fought against Japan. It was to formulate policies that enabled Japan to fulfill the terms of surrender and to review SCAP policies and directives, but it was severely limited by its own requirement for majority agreement before approving policy.\(^73\) It had no authority over military operations or territorial questions and technically had no authority over MacArthur.\(^74\) While it appeared on the surface to be a body capable of bringing much international influence to bear, in reality it had no direct influence over SCAP or the Japanese Government. MacArthur, for all practical purposes, ignored the FEC, calling it at one point “little more than a debating society.”\(^75\)

The second international advisory group, the ACJ, consisted of four members: the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and China. It was designed to serve as an advisory group for SCAP, and it was headquartered in Tokyo to be close to the occupation administration. In terms of organization, SCAP assigned a US representative to serve as the ACJ chairman (a post initially held by MacArthur himself but one he quickly relinquished to Ambassador Sebald). In theory, the ACJ represented a forum where the international community could voice an opinion about the occupation and rehabilitation of Japan; in reality, because SCAP was not obligated to either consult with the ACJ or abide by any ACJ opinions, it too was a largely ineffective instrument.\(^76\) The net impact then of these two international bodies was negligible, and MacArthur directed the occupation as he saw fit in pursuit of the approved goals.
Before leaving this topic, it is worth noting a discrepancy between the military perspective and the State Department’s view on the international community’s contribution. MacArthur made no effort to hide his disdain, referring to the ACJ as “an unwanted intrusion into the Occupation and an undesirable vehicle for Soviet propaganda,” but that was not a viewpoint espoused by Ambassador Sebald. Sebald’s exposure to and interaction with the ACJ was significant; SCAP General Order No. 16 designated him the SCAP Deputy on the ACJ and Chief of Diplomatic Section. Since he was the US representative to the ACJ Sebald was, by default, the advisory body chairman. Sebald and MacArthur must have had some interesting conversations about the ACJ because Sebald viewed it not as an “unwanted intrusion” but as a “highly important element in the regimen of control of occupied Japan and a useful organization for the United States.”

This important point illustrates that the military and diplomatic communities bring two different perspectives, and these are critical perspectives that commanders and planners should consider to effectively use both force and diplomacy.

**Question 7: What Was the Status of Civil Support Infrastructures?**

The next to last analytical question involves the status of critical civil support infrastructures and how the occupation stabilized, replaced, or rebuilt them. Commanders and planners need to consider all civilian infrastructure components when developing and conducting stability operations. This study has noted, for example, that Japan’s internal transportation network was inadequate for even transporting food supplies, let alone rebuilding an industrial capacity. The previous discussion of the role of the media described an element of civil infrastructure that was, though restricted by occupation censors, in place and operational. The firebombing campaign that preceded the surrender significantly damaged several Japanese cities and their associated fire-protection and health-care systems. And, unquestionably, Japan’s economic infrastructure was affected by the war, as we saw in the previous discussion about the zaibatsu’s impact on the wartime economy and the associated occupation program working to dissolve those monopolistic combines and purge the leadership.

Ambassador Sebald provided an interesting statistic that gives insight into the relationship between Japanese politics, economics, and family and the impact the purges had on key Japanese infrastructure: By March 1948 the SCAP Government section had screened 717,415 people for possible elimination from positions of economic or political influence. Of that number, well over 200,000 were actually purged. The significance of this
action went beyond the sheer number: Any relative within three degrees of a person purged was prohibited from assuming that person’s position. This meant, in effect, no immediate member of a purgee’s family could assume the leadership or management of any business interest, and no member of a politician’s immediate family could fill that purgee’s post. This action had an impact, albeit comparatively minor, on Japan’s reform effort because SCAP was highly engaged in that program. But the purges had a large impact on a struggling economy searching for management skill and experience, and the Japanese civil support infrastructure elements of industry, banking, and insurance suffered significantly.79

Another element of civil support infrastructure also merits discussion since it is related to one of the most critical transition planning themes: security. The 1945 SCAP Civil Liberties Directive dissolved the Home Ministry “Special Higher Police” that had enforced restrictions on speech and thought. The SCAP purge program further reduced police numbers by eliminating all militarists and specifically prohibiting the police from interfering in labor affairs. In 1947, SCAP formally abolished the Home Ministry and the Japanese Government reorganized the police as a decentralized force. Over time, however, the government grew uncomfortable with the idea of a decentralized police force given the absence of a state-controlled military capability. This discomfort was compounded by the 1950 deployment of a large percentage of the US occupation force to Korea, and so the Japanese Government agreed to a US proposal to constitute a National Police Reserve of approximately 75,000 men as a defense force capable of responding to domestic unrest.80 When the occupation formally ended with the signing of the 1952 peace treaty, the Japanese Government re-centralized its police force. Prime Minister Yoshida considered this event, the decision of the Japanese Government to take responsibility for its own domestic security, and the recognition by SCAP that democratization had taken root to the extent that the Japanese were ready to do so, as “one of the most significant to occur during the final years of the occupation era.”81

Question 8: What Was the Impact of Societal Dynamics/Schisms?

Our final analytical question concerns the impact, if any, of societal dynamics such as tribal alliances or caste systems. This question is not as significant when analyzing the occupation of Japan as it might be when discussing a stability operation in the Middle East or Africa. Japanese society during the Tokugawa Shogunate molded itself along general class lines that clearly placed the emperor at the top as a divine being, followed
by members of the ruling shogun’s house who ruled in the emperor’s name, followed next by the samurai responsible for keeping the peace, and then the rural farmers who were responsible for feeding the nation. As the Tokugawa period progressed, and the need for a warrior class solely focused on military craft faded, a subtle class shift occurred when the samurai transformed themselves into a collective group along the lines of renaissance men; they still outwardly appeared to be warrior-like, but many took up teaching, farming, or crafts to supplement an ever-dwindling government subsistence stipend.

The social status formerly enjoyed by the samurai was inherited by a growing class of merchants. During the Meiji Restoration, the role of the samurai was embraced by an expanding class of military officers who tried to balance the idealized combination of Confucianism and feudal ethics known as Bushido, or “way of the warrior,” with Western technology. The Constitution of 1889 gave complete sovereignty to the emperor and divided political power between groups of elites. These groups included political parties, the military, members of the bureaucracy, the leading industrialist zaibatsu, and a select group of imperial adviser and all vied for influence over the emperor. After only a few generations, the last vestiges of the samurai class had been replaced by the spirit warriors, and by the end of World War II it was clear Japanese society had stratified itself into only a few layers: the Emperor and his family, surrounded by his military advisers, supported by the zaibatsu interests.

MacArthur recognized this societal dynamic and, mindful of the Japanese traditional desire for social harmony and administrative efficiency, encouraged the government to enact policies that eliminated disruptive social schisms and replace them with democratic opportunities empowered by civil liberties. This approach worked in Japan primarily because Emperor Hirohito set the tone for the occupation when he told his nation to accept the surrender terms and conduct a peaceful transition to stability operations. Had he not done so, it is possible that one or more of the existing social groups might have soldiered on, or opposed the occupation at every step. Commanders and planners in other operations might not enjoy that level of popular acceptance, and should strive to clearly understand all pre-existing societal dynamics as well as identify the key social and political players who might factor into their plans. With the conclusion of Chapter 3, we are now prepared to assess how the nine planning themes apply to the Japanese occupation and infer their level of applicability to OEF and OIF.
Notes

1. Ambassador William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation* (NY: W.W. Norton, 1965), 12. Ambassador Sebald’s perspective on the occupation of Japan is unique and informative. He spoke fluent Japanese, served two military tours in Japan as a naval intelligence officer, was qualified to practice Japanese law, and was validated by MacArthur to serve as the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) political adviser (POLAD) following the death of the original SCAP POLAD, George Atcheson, in August 1947 as a result of a plane crash.


3. “Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, July 26, 1945,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conference of Berlin, (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, vol. 2. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [USGPO], 1960), 1474, cited in Sebald, Appendix C, 303-304. The Declaration required a complete “elimination of the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest,” (paragraph 6) and subsequently authorized an occupation of Japan until such time as the Declaration goals were met. A thorough review of the Declaration reveals four significant challenges awaiting SCAP: the complete disarmament of the Japanese military, the conduct of war crimes trials, the conduct of purges of all unacceptable economic, military, and social persons of militaristic influence, and the institution of basic political, economic, and social reforms acceptable to a democratic environment. Paragraph 12 of the Declaration very clearly identified a military occupation end state and provided the foundation of a military exit strategy with these words: “The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.”


in the Pacific (Washington, DC: USGPO, January, 1966), 444; hereafter referred to as *Reports, Volume I*. The term SCAP applies equally to both the man (MacArthur) and the occupation staff.

6. *Reports of General MacArthur, Volume I Supplement: MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase* (Washington, DC: USGPO, January, 1966), 2 and 12; hereafter referred to as *Reports, Volume I Supplement*. MacArthur’s staff had several conflict-termination plans under development. Operation plans (OPLANs) OLYMPIC and CORONET addressed decisive operations in the form of a military invasion of the Japanese Islands to force a Japanese surrender. “Operation BLACKLIST” was MacArthur’s plan to occupy Japan in the event of a sudden governmental collapse or unconditional surrender of the Japanese Government and High Military Command. Staff work on Operation BLACKLIST began in May 1945; the plan was distributed on a very restricted basis in July 1945, and the final editions of the plan were dated 8 August 1945. It called for a “maximum but discreet use of existing Japanese political and military organizations” in the execution of occupation tasks pursuant to the Potsdam Declaration. President Truman emphasized the urgency of MacArthur’s mission by charging SCAP with “taking all the steps he deemed necessary and proper to effectuate the surrender terms with the least practicable [sic] delay.”

7. *Reports of General MacArthur, Volume II, Part II: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area* (Washington, DC: USGPO, January, 1966), 752-753; hereafter referred to as *Reports, Volume II, Part II*. In another section, MacArthur’s staff clarifies the estimate of troops prepared to defend the homeland from invasion. Out of an estimated 4.9 million people potentially available to defend the homeland, approximately 1.7 million were regular Japanese troops augmented by upward of 3.2 million civilian defense volunteers (*Reports, Volume I Supplement*, 4). Imagine the challenges associated with planning an invasion opposed by more than 3 million civilians, armed and prepared to honor the Emperor and defend Japan to the death. Understanding the influence of the Emperor Hirohito over both the military and civilian population makes it very clear why MacArthur chose to ignore public clamor to try him as a war criminal and, instead, involve him in the stabilization efforts of the occupation. Doing so accomplished much more than pacifying an anxious Japanese population; it showed a keen sense of situational understanding that empowered the SCAP staff to work through the existing Japanese government infrastructure in pursuit of occupation goals.


10. Ibid., 89-90.

11. Dobbins, 34. MacArthur accomplished this remarkable feat in part due to his decision to allow the Japanese to demobilize themselves under SCAP supervision. The Japanese Government responded to this challenge by first abolishing Imperial Headquarters, then dissolving the Combined Fleet and Navy Headquarters,
followed by the dissolution of Army General Headquarters. None of these actions would have been as efficiently conducted had not SCAP reinforced the legitimacy of the Japanese Government by allowing it to take charge of its own demobilization.


14. *Reports, Volume I*, 437. MacArthur’s staff specifically observed that Operation BLACKLIST “provided for the maximum use of existing Japanese political and administrative organizations since these agencies exerted an effective control over the population and could obviously be employed to good advantage by the Allies. If the functioning governmental machinery were to be completely swept away, the difficulties of orderly direction would be enormously multiplied, demanding the use of greater numbers of Occupation forces.”


16. Meyer, 213-217. According to Meyer, the six SCAP focus areas during Phase I were: purges (military and civilian), new constitution, education, zaibatsu reform (see the discussion of the “economic” transition theme for details), labor organization, and land reform. These six focus areas combined to support the SCAP initial goals of demilitarization and democratization. Meyer’s analysis of the second phase of the occupation includes a discussion of the controversy between MacArthur and the FEC over the timing and composition of the peace treaty that officially ended the occupation (see the discussion of the “unity of effort” transition theme for details concerning the purpose of the FEC.)


20. Ibid., 30.

22. Ibid., 116-123.


24. Ibid., 132.


26. Dobbins, 30 ff. As further evidence of the authoritative mandate under which MacArthur operated during the occupation, Dobbins cites a 1946 Department of State source that records President Truman’s operational instructions to SCAP as: “You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission . . . . Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any questions on the part of the Japanese as to its scope” (Dobbins, 88-89).


28. Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences*. (New York: de Capo Press, 1964), 294-295, 304. MacArthur describes telling Baron Shidehara that he expected the Prime Minister to rapidly institute reforms in the following areas: emancipation of women; unionization of labor; child labor practices; education; free thought, speech, religion; democratization of the economic infrastructure; and government intervention to avoid disease, starvation, housing shortages. MacArthur viewed the emancipation of Japanese women as exceedingly important from a political perspective (he later indicated 13 million Japanese women voted for the first time in Japanese history in the first ever national election in April 1946) and a security perspective; he felt that if Japanese wives and mothers were able to exercise their right to political expression the nation would not as easily embark a militaristic path towards war. One can see when viewing these reforms collectively that SCAP identified them as critical to preparing the country for democracy, and MacArthur’s instructions to the Japanese Prime Minister indicated that the occupation’s highest levels knew reform could only succeed if it was undertaken by the legitimate Japanese Government and not forced on the population by victorious Westerners. This situation exemplifies a clear application of the transition themes legitimacy and situational understanding. In MacArthur’s own words: “I knew better than to present this as an order . . . . Nothing that was good in the new Japanese government was going to be done because I imposed it, or because of fear of me and what I represented. These things had to come from the Japanese themselves, and they had to come because the Japanese sincerely wanted them.” He understood this relationship between public opinion, the perception of legitimacy, and SCAP efforts to achieve a sustainable peace in accordance with occupation goals, and went so far as to instruct his staff to “scrupulously avoid interference with Japanese acts merely in search for a degree of perfection we may not even enjoy in our own country.”

29. Dobbins, 43-44.
30. Ibid.

31. Reischauer, 191-192. Reischauer details specific differences between the Meiji Constitution and the Constitution of 1947. Some of the additional constitutional innovations included: 31 articles devoted to the identification of “fundamental human rights,” the banning of discrimination based on age or sex, labor movements were authorized to begin organizing and collective bargaining, and the creation of a Supreme Court intended to exercise judicial review on the constitutionality of legislation.


34. Sabura Ienaga, *Japan’s Last War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931-1945* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 327, cited in Bradley, 35. Ienaga’s description of the extent of the militaristic permeation is at once disturbing and informative: “War and patriotism were to be stressed in every subject. In ethics the teachers were to discuss ‘the meaning of the imperial edict declaring war, the imperial edict on the course of the war, the exploits of valiant Japan and our valiant military men, the special behavior expected of children during the war, and the duty of military service.’ Teachers were to show war-related pictures provided by the government to spark discussion. Arithmetic classes were to do ‘calculations about military matters.’ The topics for science were ‘general information about searchlights, wireless communication, land mines and torpedoes, submarines, military dirigibles, Shimonese explosives, …cannon, mortars, machine guns. . . .’ Physical education would include ‘character training and war games.’ Music classes were to reverberate with war songs.”

35. Bradley, 35 and 320. While researching his recent history about the capture and execution of American pilots shot down over the island of Chichi Jima, Bradley interviewed several Japanese soldiers who had negotiated the spirit warrior-administered public school system and subsequently served as spirit warriors in the Pacific. Their descriptions of the indoctrination programs, both in school and in the Army during World War II, are chilling, but also inform the reader of the value of long-term commitment to educational reform in support of democratization and stability operations. An enlisted soldier, Masayo Enomota, stated: “The Emperor was a god, and therefore we had to obey whatever the Emperor said. . . . We had been taught such things since we were very young. I did believe that he was a god. I was prepared to serve the Emperor in any way possible.” Captain Masau Yamashita recalled that he was “educated since I was young to give absolute obedience to orders. I carried it out much against my will as I did not have any other alternative.” Private Taniyama said, “We did not have any freedom at all to judge the right or wrong of given orders. We were all puppets who had been deprived of our own free will and freedom.” And finally, Ensign Takao Kojana stated: “I know my actions were wrong [but] I believe I have done right
as a military man [because] the carrying out of orders from superior officers was more important than death.” These last three men (Yamashita, Taniyama, and Kojana) were all accused of war crimes. Ensign Kojana was so overcome by remorse as a result of his actions he committed suicide; his comments cited above were recorded in his suicide note. In September 1947 a US military tribunal, acting in accordance with SCAP instructions, convened a trial of the spirit warrior-garrison of Chichi Jima. Five of the senior leaders were hanged and buried in unmarked graves on Guam; most of the other accused, lower-level soldiers and sailors were sentenced to prison terms. Such was the significant influence of the military on Japanese society that men were coerced into thinking atrocities, committed in the name of the emperor and in accordance with lawful orders, were legitimate acts of war.

36. Ibid., 33 ff.
37. Dobbins, 44-45. Educational-system decentralization was a component of the larger democratization program. Dobbins described its importance by stating, “Decentralization of education was viewed as essential to permanent removal of the ability of the government to indoctrinate Japanese students in the narrow form of Japanese nationalism that was believed to have sustained support for the war.” Dobbins was, of course, referring to the influence of the spirit warriors in initiating and subsequently maintaining support for the war effort.

38. Hans H. Baerwald, “The Purge in Occupied Japan,” in Wolfe, 188-197. SCAPIN 550 was titled “Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office” and its interpretation of paragraph 6 of the Potsdam Declaration served as the basis for all the post-conflict occupation purges.

39. Ibid.
41. Reischauer, 190.
43. Schirokauer, 142-144.
44. Jerome B. Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), 102. Cohen provides the following statistics as evidence of the degree of influence exerted by just 15 of the zaibatsu over the Japanese economy: these 15 zaibatsu produced 51 percent of the total Japanese output of coal, 69 percent of aluminum, over 50 percent of the pulp and paper, 88 percent of the steam engines, 69 percent of the steam locomotives, 88 percent of the soda, 43 percent of the synthetic dyes, and 33 percent of the soap. In the financial sector these zaibatsu were even stronger: they controlled 57 percent of the assets and 71 percent of the loans and advances of all Japanese ordinary banks. Their savings banks had 99 percent of all savings bank assets, and their trust companies controlled 69 percent of all trust company assets. One could say that the influence of the largest of the zaibatsu approached monopolistic
levels. For example, the House of Mitsui controlled 35 percent of the national coal production, 21 percent of cement production, 25 percent of heavy electrical machinery production, 5 percent of shipbuilding, and 14 percent of ordnance manufacture. This specific data is from Eleanor M. Hadley, “From De-concentration to Reverse Course in Japan,” in Robert Wolfe, ed., *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 138-154. This information paints a picture of a cultural aspect of Japanese society that exerted tremendous economic, and by extension political, influence in the pre-World War II period, especially in an environment gearing up for military operations.

45. Ibid., 416-418. Cohen’s analysis compared the changes in annual purchases of all consumer goods and services on a per-capita basis. In the United States and the United Kingdom the majority of price change in consumer goods and services came before 1941, and actually reflected a period of relative stability between 1941 and 1944. In contrast, the relatively inadequate industrial and agricultural foundation of the German and Japanese economies resulted in a severe decline in civilian purchasing power during and immediately following the war. In Japan, specifically, between 1941 and 1944, the average Japanese civilian lost 29 percent of his prewar purchasing power, and by the end of the war that percentage had grown to 31 percent.

46. Ibid., 417. Cohen cites the very specific guidance included in the “Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan, November 8, 1945” that states: “You will not assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the strengthening of the Japanese economy. You will make it clear to the Japanese people that you assume no obligation to maintain any particular standard of living in Japan.”

47. Ibid., 419.


49. Ibid.

50. Reischauer, 193-194; see also Hadley, 142-144, and Dobbins, 47-48.


52. Ibid.

53. Dobbins, 50.


55. Ibid., 37.

57. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 306-307. MacArthur disagreed with the application of general US policy in this matter regarding the specific situation concerning food shortages. MacArthur’s own words are as applicable to any contemporary stability operation that follows decisive operations as they were almost 60 years ago: “Of the four home islands . . . not one was capable of feeding or supplying its population with any of the necessities of life. Only 16 percent of the land in Japan was capable of cultivation. Rice was imported in large amounts, but as the war progressed the imports ceased. [This problem was compounded by the breakdown in the transportation system.] One of the first things I did was to set up our Army kitchens to help feed the people. Had this not been done, they would have died by the thousands. I had to move fast to prevent disaster, so I immediately imported 3,500,000 tons of food from the supplies the United States Army had built up in the Pacific Area. The effect upon the Japanese was electrical.” When Congress demanded he justify the expenditure of military supplies, his response showed a truly sophisticated sense of situational understanding: “The great lesson and warning of experience is that victorious leaders of the past have too often contented themselves with the infliction of military defeat upon the enemy power without extending that victory by dealing with the root causes which led to war as an inevitable consequence. To cut off Japan’s relief supplies in this situation would cause starvation to countless Japanese—and starvation breeds mass unrest, disorder, and violence. Give me bread or give me bullets.”

58. Meyer, 237. Meyer’s specific comment: “Massive direct American aid programs during the occupation totaled more than $2 billion. Subsequent American offshore military procurements in Japan during the Korean War were twice that amount and promoted the construction and the re-tooling of machinery. These factors helped speed up the domestic recovery form the terrible wartime destruction visited on the home islands and the immediate postwar doldrums.”


60. Ibid.


62. Ibid.

63. Mayo, 287. The OSS report further described the censorship situation in this manner: “The Japanese press was subject, for example, to prepublication censorship by police censors attached to newspapers. Publishers of magazines were required to send post-publication copies to the Home Ministry for scrutiny. Radio scripts were checked prior to broadcasts, and films before screenings.” All these actions occurred while attempting to present the public with a picture of a successful Japanese military effort.

64. Ibid, 263.

65. Ibid., 281.
66. Ibid., 287. Mayo continues this analysis by providing the following information about an August 1945 media policy paper produced by SCAP that identified two specific goals for military use of the media: first, “the immediate objective of communicating orders and explaining to the Japanese the purposes of the Occupation,” and second, “the long-term objective of eliminating militarism, re-orienting the Japanese toward a more international outlook, and creating the conditions for continued freedom and expression in the post-Occupation period” (288). Both of these goals are clearly applicable to current and future stability operations.

67. Ibid., 271.


69. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 300.

70. Ibid., 285. MacArthur noted that the Allied naval and air blockades had been very effective and that Japanese food supplies were woefully inadequate to the task. MacArthur knew that Japanese occupation policy required conquered Japanese territories to feed Japanese troops and that the populace would expect Americans to demand equal logistical support. So when he provided emergency food supplies and prohibited American troops from eating those supplies, it must have sent a very powerful message to the Japanese Government and population about America, democracy, and the level of US commitment to the success of the occupation. In his own words: “But as soon as the complete exhaustion of Japanese food resources was confirmed, I issued an order forbidding the consumption by the Occupation forces of local food and requested Washington to begin at once shipment of relief supplies. The effect was instantaneous. The Japanese authorities changed their attitude from one of correct politeness to one of open trust. The press, which had been dubious at first, now began to voice unanimous praise.” Once again, one is reminded of the relationship between tactical actions and strategic implications.

71. Sebald, 75.

72. Ibid., 80-82. Sebald recalled that MacArthur later told him “the incident had deteriorated into a ‘liar-calling contest’ which was a body blow to United States prestige throughout Asia. At least, the United States had been penalized again for the national custom of airing our disagreements in public. To many Japanese, Soviet power immediately became far more formidable.”

73. Dobbins, 29.


75. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 292-293. MacArthur’s opinion of the FEC
was less than flattering: “The very nature of its composition eventually made the Far Eastern Commission ineffective. All four of the major powers had a veto. It took time for the commission members to convene, and it took an even longer time for them to make a decision. . . . From the start, the Russian member tried to turn the commission into a propaganda instrument for derogatory speeches and statements designed to obstruct orderly government in Japan. Not one constructive idea to help with the reorientation and reconstruction of Japan ever came from the Far Eastern Commission or its satellite, the Allied Council. . . .”

76. Dobbins, 29. MacArthur’s opinion of the ACJ was no better than that of the FEC: “[the ACJ] was, by its terms of reference, solely advisory and consultative. But it was neither one nor the other, its sole contribution being that of nuisance and defamation” (MacArthur, Reminiscences, 293).

77. Sebald, 62.

78. Ibid. Sebald brought to his post an appreciation of the potential that the ACJ represented, whereas MacArthur saw the ACJ as a source of interference. Sebald recognized that the ACJ exercised no executive authority, but it nonetheless served as a “safety valve for the release of pressures created by the aftermath of war.” Under the new freedom-of-speech rules the Japanese press attended and reported on the meetings, and the Japanese Government detailed a representative to attend all meetings and report back to the prime minister and Foreign Office on the deliberations. In fact, Sebald states that the ACJ provided the Japanese people with “the only forum in which their problems and their future were discussed openly and freely.” These meetings then served as a forum for high-level information exchange and let the Japanese see democratic exchange in action.

79. Ibid., 85.

80. Dobbins, 35 and 42.

81. Yoshida, 42.

Chapter 4  
Nine Planning Themes in Action

Armed with the information gained from our analytical question analysis, we turn now to a detailed discussion of the nine planning themes. Doing so provides the opportunity to assess how applicable the themes are to a specific case study and should also demonstrate their validity as contemporary stability operations planning themes.

Planning Theme 1: Legitimacy

On several levels the ability to establish the perception of legitimacy, claim it, maintain it, or transfer it from one governing body to another was essential to the occupation’s success. At the international level, the Potsdam Declaration represented a legitimate mandate authorizing SCAP to conduct the occupation. The creation of the Far Eastern Committee (FEC) and the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) served as additional sources of international legitimacy for the occupation mission. At the strategic level, it was the combination of surrender documents and State Department directives that legitimized SCAP authority, not to mention the personal legitimacy given MacArthur by both President Truman and the General of the Army, George C. Marshall. From the Japanese perspective Emperor Hirohito remained the nation’s legitimate leader, despite being demystified by the SCAP program; consequently, his unreserved support of SCAP policy endorsed the occupation’s legitimacy, which, in turn, later transferred legitimacy back to the Japanese Government through the postwar constitution.

MacArthur successfully balanced SCAP’s responsibility to develop occupation directives with the US requirement to work through the Japanese Government to implement those directives. By doing so, he simultaneously provided oversight and reinforced, from the very beginning, the Japanese Government’s legitimacy, a masterful performance that did not go unnoticed.1 Many of the SCAP programs (constitutional reforms, education program revisions, zaibatsu leadership purges, and humanitarian assistance efforts, to name but a few) were designed to address an immediate occupation goal and were implemented with an eye towards either maintaining SCAP legitimacy or helping to transfer legitimacy to the Japanese Government in preparation for an eventual peace.

The political restructuring process in Afghanistan consists of three distinct efforts—the first, a temporary interim administration, the second,
a longer-duration transitional administration, and ultimately a third, permanent administrative design. The success of the Afghan Government, whatever its final form, will depend on its ability to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the populace, restore social trust in the government and judicial system, and provide vital, essential services; to that end, continued commitment of US military forces remains critical. In Iraq, the United Nations proposed a plan for an interim administration even before Phase III operations were done. Three elements of this plan validate our selection of legitimacy as a stability operations planning theme: the interim plan was designed by a non-US entity, it included a provision that members of the caretaker government be selected by the United Nations and not the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, and it included a specific transition timetable. The CPA complied with this plan, effected the transfer of authority two days ahead of schedule, and Ambassador Bremer’s immediate departure from the country signaled that the coalition fully endorsed the Iraqi Interim Government. As is the case in Afghanistan, commitment of US forces and economic support will remain essential to the Iraqi government’s efforts to establish and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens and the world.

Planning Theme 2: Security

The Japanese case study provides several examples of how important security is to stability operations commanders and planners. SCAP’s demilitarization programs eliminated the possibility that a resurgent Japanese military would rise up and jeopardize a peaceful occupation. This effort satisfied not only specific Potsdam Declaration and surrender stipulations, but it also had second-order impact on the domestic security and economic environments. Demilitarization came at a price, however. MacArthur’s initial plan, predicated on the assumption that Japanese capitulation required an invasion followed immediately by a hostile occupation, projected the need for approximately 685,000 soldiers. Once it realized Japan’s relatively benign environment, SCAP revised this number to roughly 315,000 US and 45,000 UK soldiers. By the end of 1945, the United States’ deployment of approximately 354,675 troops throughout Japan as security forces and members of the military observation teams represented a substantial commitment of military manpower dedicated to securing a country little more than three-fourths the size of Iraq and less than two-thirds the size of Afghanistan (Iraq is roughly the size of California and Afghanistan is roughly the size of Texas). This number is even more significant given that the Japanese people were not violently opposed to the occupation; as a whole they obeyed the Emperor’s injunction to accept and comply with
the occupation. Consider this: The Japanese Government in 1950 decided to create, at the suggestion of SCAP, a 75,000-man paramilitary National Police Reserve to respond to large-scale domestic disturbances. This in a country where social harmony and polite interaction were highly valued! Clearly, the need to establish a secure environment rapidly, maintain it, and when appropriate transfer responsibility for it was vital to the occupation’s programs.

In June 2004 Afghan President Hamid Karzai appeared before Congress and acknowledged the support US security forces had provided, emphasizing the importance of security to his larger program by stating “the Afghan people demand and insist on disarming and demobilizing private militias.” He further acknowledged that Afghanistan would continue to require a commitment of international security forces, especially as national elections grew closer and the country worked to improve its infrastructure. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a 5,000-man international peace-keeping contingent, is stationed in Kabul and operates under UK command. Supporting the ISAF are 18 countries that help it to secure the capital, conduct mine and unexploded ordnance disposal, and train the Afghan army as it undergoes reconstruction. Several factors complicate the Afghan security situation: an immature democratically based political system; a power vacuum filled in remote regions by warlords with independent militias; an inadequate transportation infrastructure available for rapid response to security crises; and an underdeveloped police and military infrastructure. In Iraq, the security challenges revolve around establishing and maintaining a collection of mechanisms by which the Iraqis can “replace discredited Iraqi policing, internal security, and judicial [infra]structures.” While coalition forces remain in theater, the likelihood of large-scale violence is low, although coalition troops are faced daily with deadly situations interspersed with less-dangerous routine stability operations tasks. Coalition troops eliminated one organized security apparatus—the Ba’ath Party and its control over the Iraqi military, police, and judicial systems. The struggle now is for planners to determine how best to fill the resulting security vacuum with acceptable and effective alternatives.

Planning Theme 3: Commitment

Aside from the troops provided by the United Kingdom and the efforts of the FEC and ACJ advisory bodies, the level of international commitment helping to rebuild Japan was relatively small compared to the United States’. The US commitment of seven years, several billion dollars, over
350,000 thousand troops, and untold intellectual energy resulted in a tremendous payoff: an ally in the Pacific who continues to grant military basing rights, functions as a major international trading force, and exemplifies how Western democratic principles can be successfully adapted to a non-Western society willing to pursue peace. SCAP reinforced the perception of US commitment in several ways. The presence of American troops provided a visible sense of security and reinforced the public perception of US commitment—MacArthur’s provision of emergency food assistance tangibly demonstrated a level of compassion totally unexpected, but graciously accepted by the Japanese; and SCAP’s willingness to work through the Japanese Government’s administrative structure showed commitment to the principles of democratic governance.

An additional measure, albeit somewhat intangible, was the US decision to assign MacArthur as the SCAP for the occupation. On the surface this made operational sense; MacArthur had commanded Allied operations in the Pacific and was capable of transferring that authority over to the occupation. At a deeper level, however, MacArthur’s selection as SCAP showed a remarkable sense of situational understanding and illustrated the level of US commitment to this particular stability operation. That the United States committed one of its most prestigious military commanders to see the occupation through successfully (a man with exceptional cultural and regional familiarity, a strategic thinker and planner whose talents could have been applied in any number of postwar venues) was not lost on the Japanese. The US commitment to the occupation lasted almost twice as long as the decisive operations of World War II in the Pacific simply because that was how long it took, under those circumstances, in that environment, given those resources, to achieve the end-state goal of a sustainable peace.

OEF demonstrated US resolve to destroy Al-Qaeda in-country training capabilities as well as the Taliban government that had supported terrorist efforts. The United States maintains combat forces in Afghanistan and has demonstrated commitment in other ways as well, such as the invitation to President Karzai to appear before Congress and present his case for continued and increased support. The United States has deployed subject matter experts in the areas of military training development, heavy construction and repair, and military doctrine development to assist the Afghan Government in rebuilding its military academy in Kabul. And in a closely related effort, the United States has committed special operations forces to help the Afghans create an army that will serve as what former CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks referred to as
“an essential element of their long-term security.” The ultimate objective of this commitment remains, in the words of one special forces battalion commander, to help the Afghans build a “credible, capable force” in a country where years of civil war had left warlords in command of local militias as the primary visible symbol of armed security.10

US commitment to stability in Iraq is more substantial and, unlike the situation in Afghanistan, includes significant components. The United States has a sizeable military presence in the country and is implementing unit rotation plans to continue that presence for the foreseeable future. Also, the United States is committed to helping Iraq develop critical infrastructure by committing training resources, specifically subject matter experts from its own Military Academy at West Point to help refashion this security component. And of course, there is substantial evidence of financial commitment; as of October 2004 the United States had committed $20 billion to the long-term Iraqi reconstruction effort.11

Planning Theme 4: Situational Understanding

When viewed from a macro perspective, the transition from combat operations to a sustainable peace in Japan was much more efficient because of how much SCAP planners and MacArthur himself appreciated the complexity of this unique stability operations environment. MacArthur’s situational understanding of the Asian environment in general, and the Japanese postwar situation in particular, took root early in his military career. In October 1904 he accompanied his father, General Arthur MacArthur, on a nine-month inspection visit to the Far East to observe the Russo-Japanese War, and during this trip developed an appreciation for the “boldness and courage of the Nipponese soldier” and the “thrift, courtesy, and friendliness of the ordinary citizen.”12 Though young (he was only a lieutenant at the time), he recognized the critical role the emperor played in Japanese society, especially with regard to the military: “His [the Japanese soldier] almost fanatical belief and reverence for his Emperor impressed me indelibly.”13 As historians Ray Moore and Donald Robinson recognize in their study Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State Under MacArthur, “Japan’s public philosophy had to change . . . it had to be transformed, incorporating the people’s emotional attachment to the emperor but explicitly and decisively rejecting the notion that he was the sovereign ruler.”14

Yoshida himself acknowledged that MacArthur’s decision to work through Emperor Hirohito to democratize Japan, based on his understanding of the influence wielded by this one man, paid huge dividends and
greatly impressed the leadership of the postwar Japanese Government.\footnote{15}

MacArthur’s well-developed sense of situational understanding helped him recognize he had to be, in his own words, “An economist, a political scientist, an engineer, a manufacturing executive, a teacher, even a theologian of sorts. I had to rebuild a nation that had been almost completely destroyed by the war.”\footnote{16} MacArthur’s emphasis on educational reform went to the heart of redesigning a core power nexus; if the pre-World War II Japanese educational system was capable of creating a society and military wholly dedicated to militaristic endeavors, then a reformed educational system should be able to provide the same environment conducive to democracy, if given enough time and resources. He owed this appreciation for the value of education to experiences in the Philippines that proved education could function as a critical foundation for efficient civil administration and economic development. Armed with this perspective, he focused on the Japanese educational system as a component of the overall democratization program.\footnote{17}

MacArthur’s education-reform directives to the Japanese Government included initiatives to decentralize control over local schools, to eliminate all militaristic and ultra-nationalistic themes from textbooks, and to reinstate teachers who had previously been dismissed for liberal or anti-militaristic opinions.\footnote{18} In a SCAP survey of Japanese students taken sometime after the education reform programs had begun, it appeared the majority of children were interested in civilian professions instead of military service when the opposite had been the case just a few years before. MacArthur saw this as evidence of the education-reform program building toward democratization. Had it not been for his situational understanding, SCAP may not have prompted the Japanese Government to undertake a reform program that would not realize a return on its investment for at least a decade.

While MacArthur’s situational understanding informed SCAP actions from the top down, another aspect of this planning theme, just as important, was the conduct of the US occupation soldiers and how situational understanding informed their daily interactions with the Japanese civilian population. The great majority of Japanese citizens never saw MacArthur, senior SCAP officers, or even senior Japanese government officials, but interaction with occupation troops was a daily occurrence. As SCAP deployed resources through Japan, overnight several hundred thousand troops had to make the intellectual shift from an invasion mind-set to one of stability operations in a permissive but still potentially dangerous
environment. American troops influenced every aspect of Japanese culture they came in contact with, yet very few disturbances were reported.19

The societal complexities that impact ongoing stability operations in Afghanistan pre-date the political tensions of the 20th century. The Soviets learned this when they invaded in support of a failing puppet regime in 1979. Afghan society by that point reflected “a lack of civil rights, collapsing or non-existing mechanisms for the peaceful adjudication of disputes, and the inability or unwillingness of various regimes to safeguard and nurture diverse ethnic identities.”20 The Soviets failed to appreciate the impact of 20 distinct ethnic groups distributed throughout the area of operations or the influence wielded by local warlords, and their attempts to impose a political and military solution on a society culturally disposed to resist outside influence due to centuries-old xenophobia.

Iraq’s environment is every bit as complex as Afghanistan’s and requires a sophisticated level of situational understanding to appreciate the second- and third-order effects of decisions and actions. For example, in mid-May 2003 the CPA ordered a significant purge of Ba’ath Party members from positions in government, schools, and universities and followed that action by ordering the entire Iraqi military demobilized. On the surface, these actions harken back to the successful SCAP programs of 1945, but the situation in Iraq was different, and the downside of these sweeping changes was not well understood. One US official in Baghdad described the situation resulting from these decisions like this:

All of a sudden we had about 30,000 to 50,000 Ba’athists that had gone underground. We had about 200,000 still armed soldiers that had gone underground. And we had no Iraqi face to tell the Iraqi people what was happening. Within a couple of weeks, the insurgency began to rise, and it kept rising through the summer and into the fall.21

But situational understanding, accurately developed and appropriately applied, can have a tremendous positive impact as well. For example, in early April 2003 a dismounted infantry patrol moved into the town of An Najaf and was quickly confronted by an angry mob. The outnumbered soldiers were faced with a rapidly deteriorating and dangerous situation until the battalion commander applied a well-developed sense of situational understanding and defused the situation. The Army’s operational study of OIF, titled On Point, describes the action as follows:

[The battalion commander] made sure his soldiers understood
cultural differences and the meaning of restraint. With his own rifle pointed toward the ground, he bowed to the crowd and turned away. [He] and his infantry marched back to their compound in silence. When tempers had calmed, the Grand Ayatollah Sistani issued a decree (fatwa) calling on the people of Najaf to welcome [the] soldiers.22

This case, where soldiers recognized the Arab sensitivity to status and adjusted their tactics to avoid a confrontation, exemplifies when situational understanding can support tactical decisions that have strategic implications. It is, therefore, incumbent on planners to identify means by which all levels of their organizations can develop adequate situational understanding of their stability operations environment.

**Planning Theme 5: Unity of Effort**

This planning theme was not as critical to the occupation’s success or the transition to stability operations as some of the others. Clearly, a unified Allied effort was absolutely essential to successful Phase III operations in the Pacific Theater, but when it came to planning for and conducting Phase IV, the international community’s contribution primarily consisted of two elements: lending its support to SCAP’s claim of legitimacy through the Potsdam Declaration and committing several thousand UK troops to occupation duties. Where unity of effort was instrumental in the Japanese occupation was in the unilateral US arena, beginning at the highest levels of American government and extending down through the military teams dispersed throughout the Japanese countryside. Chapter 3 has already shown that MacArthur benefited from the detailed expert planning efforts of the SWNCC before the surrender. In addition, he enjoyed the support of the executive and legislative branches during the seven-year occupation. Within the occupation administration, the SCAP staff understood his end-state goals and interim objectives for demilitarizing and democratizing Japan and, consequently, was able to issue appropriate SCAPINS to the Japanese Government to guide reform programs.

Actions taken in Afghanistan by the international community appear, thus far, to be piecemeal and lacking an overarching unified approach. One critical area that demands international unity involves reconstruction funding. Analyses conducted by Afghan delegates to the Bonn Conference estimated funding needs ranging between $22 and $45 billion, while an independent needs assessment estimated total requirements at $15 billion. Despite this, the 60 nations who attended the Tokyo Conference of donors...
only pledged $4.5 billion, and even that amount has been slow to materialize.\textsuperscript{23} On the positive side, the international community is approaching several key Afghan reconstruction projects with a unified effort. In late March 2002, the United Nations enacted UNSCR #1401 directing the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to integrate all UN actions in country.\textsuperscript{24} Under the provisions of this resolution, Germany will train the Afghan police force while Italy works with the Afghan Government to rebuild its judicial system in accordance with Westernized, democratic principles. Additionally, the United States is very involved with the training efforts to rebuild both the Afghan National Army and the Afghan Military Academy.

One can find several examples where this transition theme is being implemented, as well as undermined in Iraq. In late October 2003, 58 nations met in Madrid to discuss reconstruction funding. The US estimate for reconstruction requirements was in the neighborhood of $55 billion over a five-year period. The United States had already committed $20 billion to the effort, while another 29 nations or international agencies combined to pledge an additional $21 billion in loans and/or grants.\textsuperscript{25} Of note was the deliberate decision on the part of Germany, France, and Russia to withhold funding for this massive effort, citing concerns at the time over the slow transfer of power from the CPA to an Iraqi Interim Government—a collective decision not likely to be forgotten or forgiven by the Iraqis.\textsuperscript{26} One final example of positive unified international support effort can be found in the numbers and nationalities of troops on the ground helping to secure Iraq. In June 2004, the Saudi Government announced a plan to deploy Muslim troops to supplement multi-national forces in Iraq. Despite pressure to withdraw its troops, Poland remains committed to its role in leading the 6,200-man multi-national force deployed in south-central Iraq. Azerbaijan’s 150 troops deployed to Iraq represent the first Muslim contingent to provide armed support to the effort, and in August 2004 the United Nations decided to extend the UN mission in Iraq for an additional year.\textsuperscript{27} Clearly, the concept of a unified effort at all levels is one that planners should strive to apply to stability operations planning.

**Planning Theme 6: Infrastructure**

Key components of the Japanese infrastructure either had been destroyed or damaged to the point of inefficiency (for example, the manufacturing and transportation industries); or had been corrupted by the ultra-nationalistic movements (the military, the media, key political advisory councils, the centralized education system and, to a certain extent, the economic
Infrastructure embodied in the *zaibatsu*; or had been rendered nearly inconsequential by the war (specifically, the role of religion in Japanese society). SCAP, working through the Japanese Government, initiated aggressive programs to rejuvenate these critical infrastructure elements. The purges (economic, political, and military), paved the way for the reform. Immediate humanitarian assistance in the form of food shipments fed the Japanese population until food-production capabilities and transportation infrastructures were restored. Political reform focused on emplacing both leaders and policies designed to rebuild a governmental infrastructure that complied with the mandate of the Potsdam Declaration and also set the stage for long-term democratic development. The sweeping educational-reform programs undertaken at MacArthur’s direction strongly supported democratization on a national level. The Japanese environment, in the period immediately following the surrender, reflected a collection of interdependent infrastructure components, and because the occupation plan applied unique and adaptable solutions informed by situational understanding, the end result is widely recognized as an unqualified success.

Infrastructure components characteristic of a modernized state, such as a comprehensive medical system, a capacity to feed itself, and a transportation infrastructure capable of supporting supply distribution and security force deployment, remain absent from the Afghanistan environment. During the Soviet occupation and the Taliban regime that followed, the country proved incapable of resourcing a comprehensive health-care system; several international medical agencies like Doctors Without Borders have worked for years to compensate for this, and the country relies on the compassion of the international community to provide basic health-care services to its rural population. The nation has not yet developed the capacity to feed itself, and even if it could, the road network (approximately 6,600 miles of roads exist of which only 1,700 are paved) is woefully inadequate to the task.28

Conversely, because the Iraqi Government had exercised several decades of continuity before OIF, it developed an administrative bureaucracy capable of managing a national infrastructure. Where the Afghan economy was, and to a great degree remains, grounded on illegal opium production and distribution, the Iraqi economy is firmly grounded on oil production.29 In fact, recognition that the security of Iraq’s oil production infrastructure was critical to the success of follow-on stability operations factored prominently in the decision to begin decisive ground operations.30 This decision-making criterion represents a good example of how situational understanding of a country’s infrastructure can result in an appreciation of
how Phase III plans and decisions will impact Phase IV efforts.

**Planning Theme 7: Economic Status**

The *zaibatsu* purges during the occupation demonstrated that SCAP saw the need for immediate and decisive action. Conversely, this study also noted SCAP’s policy of refraining from providing overt, dedicated support to the Japanese Government’s economic rejuvenation program. On the home front, President Truman and Congress were sensitive to the political dangers associated with funding two occupation efforts on opposite sides of the globe. The Japanese industrial base had been severely damaged but not destroyed, and while the *zaibatsu* purges eliminated a certain percentage of experienced business, finance, and industry leaders, enough remained to create a foundation upon which the Japanese Government could rebuild. It might have been more efficient in the short term to have invested billions of dollars to jumpstart the Japanese economy, but such a policy would have alienated US domestic support and, more important, insulted the Japanese work ethic and undermined the Japanese Government’s efforts to rebuild its economy. The Japanese legacy of economic vitality, sophisticated government bureaucracy, and highly developed financial systems did not disappear during World War II, and SCAP wisely limited its reform programs to only purging those elements opposed to economic reform.31

In 1981, Afghanistan’s gross national product (GNP) was between $3 and $4 billion dollars, which translated into a GNP per capita of roughly $135. After 20 years of Soviet occupation, civil war, Taliban rule, and OEF operations, that indicator hovered between $150 and $180, and one source estimated that by 2002 between 60 percent and 80 percent of the population existed below the international poverty threshold of $1 per day.32 International per capita financial assistance to Afghanistan since 2002 has only amounted to $150, a figure barely adequate to maintaining the poverty-level status quo, and certainly not able to stimulate vibrant growth.33 Afghanistan’s economy is not based on agriculture or industrial production, but rather on opium production and distribution. One source estimated that in late 2001 the Taliban/Al Qaeda/Pakistani warlord drug conglomerate controlled a raw opium stockpile approaching 2,800 tons. When processed into heroin and sold on European streets, Interpol and UN officials estimated its wholesale value as somewhere between $40 and $80 billion dollars—13 to 26 times the entire GNP.34 Strategic planners at the JFC-level should consider these facts when developing long-term stability plans for the region.
In Iraq, the key to successful economic reconstruction is oil production and distribution. In 1987 oil revenues in Iraq totaled approximately $11 billion. If oil production matches that of almost 20 years ago (roughly 2.5 million barrels per day), and the price of crude oil continues to hover between $45 and $50 per barrel, Iraq’s oil industry is capable of generating over $40 billion annually.35 These numbers represent a potential economic windfall for the country, but it will take detailed planning and a unified international effort to turn the potential into reality.

Planning Theme 8: Planning Effort

The Japanese case study presented clear evidence of a dedicated, informed planning effort, initially led by the SWNCC and ultimately taken up by MacArthur’s SCAP staff. Political scientist Robert Ward believed that the occupation “was perhaps the single most exhaustively planned operation of massive and externally directed political change in world history.”36 Ambassador Sebald’s perception of the SCAP’s staff’s ongoing planning was, however, less than flattering. He stated that senior SCAP officers were “hopelessly divided on how to approach the difficult political questions,” struggling over basic differences such as how severely to treat Japanese war criminals and the extent/speed of political and economic reforms.37 He felt that SCAP HQs did not adequately solicit Japanese views when establishing initial occupation policies, and further observed SCAPINS too often presented directives that were “conspicuously geared to American, rather than Japanese, psychology.”38

It would appear that two factors affected the deliberate planning effort associated with OEF: first, the short period of time that separated the September 11, 2001 attacks and the beginning of decisive combat operations, and second, the rapid elimination of organized Taliban rule. Historian Angelo Rasanayagam believes the combination of a successful air campaign and the speed with which coalition forces captured main Afghan cities resulted in a situation where the long-term strategy for a transition to a representative government, as well as the implementation of a definitive reconstruction program, was “overtaken by events.”39 He also asks several insightful questions that directly apply to the Afghanistan situation and reinforce the importance of this transition planning theme to any stability operation:

Would the new transitional government, representing the collective will legitimized by a Loya Jurga [a council of leaders], have the necessary muscle and the material resources to build a new Afghan state . . .? Would the plans
for the political, economic, and social reconstruction of Afghanistan envisage the possibility of building, from scratch, the first ‘civil society’ in the Muslim world? (emphasis added)\textsuperscript{40}

The authors of *On Point* provide clear evidence of deliberate planning efforts for OIF Phase III and Phase IV activities in their description of the coordinated efforts between Central Command (CENTCOM), European Command (EUCOM), Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and Space Command (SPACECOM). The OIF ground maneuver plan required the two operational corps (V Corps and 1 MEF) to “control liberated portions of Iraq as they progressed toward Baghdad to minimize the damage to infrastructure, ensure security of lines of communication, assist with the exploitation of sensitive sites, and control the populace” (emphasis added). The Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) execution order, dated 20 March 2003, provides additional evidence of early planning efforts with the following mission statement: “CFLCC attacks to defeat Iraqi forces and control the zone of action, secure and exploit designated sites, and removes [sic] the current regime. *CFLCC conducts continuous stability operations to create conditions for transitions to CJTF-Iraq*” (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{41} The challenge for planners will be striking a balance between the timing, quality, and quantity of stability operation planning efforts.

**Planning Theme 9: Media**

The occupation case study has illustrated the significance of this particular planning theme. Recall the Japanese media’s role during the war in filtering the truth about Japanese operations; also, recall the SCAP civil censorship programs created in response to that influence. One should remember MacArthur’s comment about the shift in Japanese media support once humanitarian relief supplies arrived soon after the occupation began. And finally, recall the increasingly active role the Japanese media took with regard to political reform, beginning with the wide coverage it provided about the new Japanese constitution. One could say SCAP manipulated the Japanese media in support of democratization. The issue of media control was sensitive; historian Marlene Mayo states that “by one set of standards, civil censorship and propaganda dissemination in occupied Japan were highly successful in the overall reorientation goal. . . .”, but she also raises the contemporary issue of the United States’ apparent hypocrisy as a power, working to foster democratic principles during stability operations, that engages in media censorship.\textsuperscript{42}
OEF stability operations efforts have slipped off the mass media scope, which is something of a surprise, given that President Karzai recognized even before the Taliban was removed the importance of a deliberate information campaign capable of broadcasting a collection of stability operations-related messages.\textsuperscript{43} And although there has been no lack of media coverage during OIF, its focus has not been on stability operations activities. The decision to embed reporters in combat units gave the world the opportunity to marvel at the speed, complexity, and violence of tactical operations. The use of various media during Phase III in Iraq proved very supportive to the operation. In an analysis of the armored “thunder runs” conducted into the heart of Baghdad by the 3d Infantry Division, Walter Boyne writes in his study \textit{Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why}, “Never did the morale, information, and propaganda value of embedded reporters prove to be of greater value than in this almost arrogant plunge into the heart of the regime. The armored spearhead... burst the bubble of media and public discontent over the ‘slow progress’ of the war.”\textsuperscript{44}

In another example, Army psychological operations conducted radio broadcasts and a deliberate leaflet campaign focused on encouraging defending Iraqi soldiers to protect the oil production and processing infrastructure, thereby contributing to the avoidance of an environmental and economic disaster—a clear demonstration of how one planning theme (media) was employed in support of at least two others (infrastructure and economics).\textsuperscript{45} The \textit{On Point} authors recommend that the Army “put into practice systems that will enable smooth embed operations in future contingencies and major operations.” This study challenges commanders and planners to apply this transition planning theme and learn to view the media as a Phase IV combat multiplier.\textsuperscript{46}

\textbf{Historical Legacy and Key Lessons}

The occupation of Japan ended when the United States and Japan signed a peace treaty and a separate security agreement that ensured continued US basing rights in return for US military assistance if Japan were attacked. MacArthur publicly announced in 1947 that the occupation’s two primary goals of demilitarization and democratization were complete, and both he and the State Department began working in 1949 to broker a peace treaty that would free US troops for other missions. The original Operation BLACKLIST planners anticipated needing three years to achieve the two goals; MacArthur may have believed those aims had been achieved ahead of schedule, but political, environmental, global security, and economic
conditions dictated a lengthier occupation.  

A variety of interpretations exist about the historical legacy of the occupation and its associated stability operations. Ambassador Sebald’s opinion about the occupation’s success depended on the specific reform program being discussed. From an overall perspective, he had this to say: “Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the occupation was the fact that, from the outset, it was benevolent and non-vindictive, despite the overtones of the Potsdam Declaration and the harshness of initial policy statement,” a clear endorsement of the planning theme of situational understanding. He gave positive marks to the two primary occupation objectives, as well as a third, lesser but still important political objective—maintaining a free and democratic Japan in the face of Communist expansion. He believed the land reform program, creation of a Supreme Court, civil and criminal code revisions, public health service improvement, and the development of a Japanese constitution all were positive initiatives that benefited Japan. Historians Moore and Robinson echoed Sebald’s assessment of constitutional reform and credited SCAP and the Japanese post-World War II government for its success. Moore’s and Robinson’s assessment shows how key legitimacy is as a planning theme and illustrates that developing a democratically based political system is linked to the larger effort to establish, transfer, and maintain the perception of host-nation legitimacy.

But Ambassador Sebald was not entirely pleased with all occupation programs. He faulted the occupation for interfering with Japanese societal structures, and he disagreed with the zaibatsu initiative due to its decentralizing and disruptive impact. He strongly disagreed with the purge effort (not in principle, but in practice) by faulting the unwarranted severity used and because it was based on categorical assessments instead of individual assessments. He felt some of the SCAP civil code revisions weakened aspects of the traditional Japanese family system, and he thought the abolition of Shinto’s status as a state religion actually reduced the emperor’s ability to act as a social restraining force. And, being a career diplomat and politician, he disagreed with disbanding the emperor’s Privy Council on the grounds it prevented the Diet from drawing on the wisdom and experience of previous senior administration officials. It is interesting that one of MacArthur’s staunchest supporters found so many points of disagreement with SCAP policies, but this just shows how complex stability operations really are.

In all fairness to the Ambassador, this study should use his own words to sum up his perspective of the occupation:
Whatever its shortcomings, the Occupation, for better or for worse, has left its imprint, and there is much of America in evidence in the Japan of today. Aside from the noteworthy rise in the standard of living, the rapid growth in physical wealth throughout the country, a healthier and seemingly happier people, and a general Westernization of life and mores in the larger cities, some of the influences left behind by the Occupation are less obvious. But it is interesting to note that the most vocal critics among the Japanese of the present system of government . . . owe their very existence and capability of demonstrating to those rights of assembly, free speech, and permissible political agitation gained during the Occupation.51

It is only fitting that, having placed much of the occupation’s success squarely on MacArthur’s shoulders, this study affords some of his contemporaries the opportunity to comment on his legacy. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek sent this message to Ambassador Sebald concerning the occupation: “I have the highest admiration for the manner in which General MacArthur has conducted the Occupation of Japan and the administration of the conquered country. It has been and still is one of the greatest exploits in history.”52 Herbert Hoover, who oversaw the European Allies’ massive aid program in 1919, sent MacArthur a personal note stating “I think I have a realization—as perhaps no one else has—of the difficulties with which you have been confronted and of the amazing service you have been to the American people.” Labor historian Mary R. Beard noted MacArthur’s appreciation for the complex interdependent relationship between various aspects of the democratization process and its impact on the occupation stating:

There is something in General MacArthur’s determination to enfranchise the women of Japan indicative of the family as the core or heart of society, and of woman as its prime guardian, which I would almost have to go back to Confucious for comparison. That he should associate the care and nutrition of the family with political democracy—and do this in his own mind, not just by pressure from another mind—gives him a standing in my mind which is at the top of my judgment of statecraft. The whole procedure in Japan is so superior in intelligence to the occupation in Germany that General MacArthur’s leadership shines with brilliant illumination.53
These endorsements exemplify the type of analysis and assessment that awaits ongoing and future stability operations. Interestingly enough, MacArthur himself may have inadvertently provided the Japanese with the most powerful lesson in democracy and, by extension, with a ringing endorsement of the principles of the occupation. When he was dismissed in April 1951, the initial Japanese reaction was a mixture of shock and apprehension in anticipating a change in American policy toward Japan, but when this turned out not to be the case, the Japanese viewed the dismissal as an object lesson in democracy. It made a tremendous impression upon the Japanese to see democratic principles applied without favoritism by their mentors. In the words of historian Edwin Reischauer, “MacArthur’s unintentional last lesson in democracy for the Japanese was by no means his least.”

Analysis of the occupation of Japan makes a strong case for utility of the nine stability operations planning themes. In each area the reader can see how the theme was related to a corresponding effect, sometimes positive, sometimes negative, depending on the environment and the level of sophistication exercised by MacArthur, SCAP planners and leaders, and the Japanese themselves. This analysis also reveals that the nine planning themes have utility now and in the future. The nuances of a specific environment will, of course, affect the emphasis each of the themes receives, but taken collectively they represent the foundation of a valuable analytical framework.
Notes

1. William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation*, 53. “In practice, MacArthur relied almost entirely upon the Japanese authorities to run the country and to carry out American directives, but his authority was always visible.”


3. Cohen (1987), 60, cited in Dobbins, 30. The original required strength estimates reflected 315,000 United States, 135,000 United Kingdom, 60,000 Nationalist Chinese, and 175,000 Soviet troops.


5. President Hamid Karzai, excerpts from a speech to US Congress 15 June 2004, found at http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/06/15/karzai/index.html titled “White House Hosts Afghan President,” last accessed 15 June 2004. During the course of his visit, President Karzai went to the Pentagon to invoke NATO for more peacekeeping troops to augment the 20,000 US troops on duty in his country at that time. He also told PBS’s Jim Lehrer that he recognized the fight against the remnants of terrorism in Afghanistan would continue for some time—perhaps for years. Accordingly, he anticipated that “Afghanistan will continue to have security incidents as it builds it security institutions.”


7. Dobbins, 170 and 195-199. The RAND study identifies six factors that impact Iraq’s security environment: social and ethnic unity of the society and the propensity of a society to internal violence; nature of the political settlement; nature and extent of demobilization and security/intelligence agencies; regional influences on and interference with internal security climate; size, deployment, posture, command and control of occupation forces; and extent of organized crime.

8. During a briefing from Iraq to family members of deployed soldiers Colonel
Russ Gold, a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commander, detailed the magnitude and variety of his unit’s tasks. According to Colonel Gold, the BCT had, as of 6 February 2004, “Detained over 11,000 personnel, 800 criminals and weapons violators, 53 terrorist bomb makers and foreign fighters, 127 former regime elements and 15 blacklist personnel from the deck of 52 cards. . . conducted over 25,000 patrols, 1,000 traffic control points, over 400 cordon and searches, over 200 raids, neutralized over 100 improvised explosive devices and neutralized two vehicle-borne IED suicide bombers in cars. [The BCT] has established the first mayoral advisory councils and district advisory councils, restored over 187 schools, and brought water, power, and sewer to areas that never had it even pre-war.” Fort Riley News release 6 February 2004, titled “Families Hear Good News,” by Ryan D. Wood, 19th PAD.


13. Ibid.


15. Yoshida, Memoirs, 51. Prime Minister Yoshida, the second postwar Japanese Prime Minister, had this to say about MacArthur’s level of situational understanding and its impact on occupation programs: “The fact remains that the respect and understanding shown by the General [MacArthur] towards the Throne, and his decision to exculpate the Emperor from all and any relationship with war crimes, did more than anything else to lessen the fears of the majority of the Japanese people in regard to the Occupation and to reconcile them to it. I have no hesitation in saying that it was the attitude adopted by General MacArthur towards the Throne, more than any other single factor, that made the Occupation an historic success.”


17. Ibid., 24. “In education, a free public-school system with a normal school, a school of arts and trades, and even a school for the deaf and blind was established. The natives were astounded at the American Army displaying such
an interest in the affairs of education. While some countries conquered by means of the Cross, and others subjugated by means of the sword, it remained for the United States to colonize through the agency of education.”

18. Ibid., 311-312.

19. Sebald, 57-58. Sebald characterized the interaction between occupation troops and Japanese citizenry as follows: “The general behavior of American Occupation troops, especially the combat men who first entered Japan, was particularly impressive. Collectively, they were exceedingly effective as ambassadors of good will. The country was surprised and pleased by the natural manner in which the early Occupation soldiers acted and spoke; by their helpful behavior toward Japanese women and older men, and by the unmistakable pleasure they found in giving presents to the children. These men came close to the Japanese people, and gave them a worthy cross-section of America.”


22. Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 271. During a weekly radio address President Bush referred to this incident and said “this gesture of respect helped defuse a dangerous situation and made our peaceful intentions clear.”


24. Dobbins, 133.


26. CNN article “Iraqi Official Says Limited German, French Help Won’t Be Forgotten,” 24 October 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/10/23/sprj.irq.main/, last accessed 12 August 2004. The decision by these three nations not to lend financial support was termed “regrettable” by then head of the Iraq Governing Council Ayad Allawi, now serving as the Prime Minister of the Iraqi Interim Government. Allawi went on to say that “I don’t think the Iraqis are going to forget easily that in the hour of need, those countries wanted to neglect Iraq.”


30. Fontenot, et. al., 91. “Protecting and preserving the Iraqi oil wells was one of the coalition’s strategic objectives. In fact, it was so important that detecting indications of sabotage was a ‘priority intelligence requirement,’ or PIR for [the CFLCC commander]. Determining if the oil wells were in danger of destruction—before they were destroyed—was a vital question and difficult to answer. The decision on when to start the ground war rested on that answer.” The importance of oil production to Iraq’s overall capability to sustain itself can not be over-emphasized: in 2003 the World Food Program estimated 16 million Iraqis (approximately 60 percent of the total population) relied solely on food rations distributed through the Oil-For-Food Programme to meet household needs. [USAID, “Iraq Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance act Sheet,” No. 24, May 1, 2003, cited in Dobbins, 182.] One can infer that oil production infrastructure is absolutely critical to Iraq’s long-term reconstruction efforts and overall stability.


36. *Japan–A Country Study*, 306. One might also consider Napoleon’s elimination of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 and the subsequent reorganization of the German Empire from 300 states to 36 as a tremendously successful planning
effort, as was the subsequent effort led by Chancellor Bismarck that further reduced the number of states down to three.

37. Sebald, 43-44.
38. Ibid., 44.
40. Ibid., 257.

41. Fontenot, et. al., 44, 55, and 95. Additionally, while it appears no non-military agency was involved in developing CFLCC post-hostility plans, CFLCC planners from at least two separate staffs were involved in non-military organization planning efforts: “There was no direct non-military agency involvement in the development of CFLCC post-hostility planning. The CFLCC C5 (Plans) and C9 (Civil-Military Operations) each participated in the planning and coordination efforts of the Organization for Recovery and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) led by LTG (R) Garner and the other non-governmental and private organizations. C5 worked directly with OHRA in the development of the OHRA planning for later stages of the campaign, primarily after the point where the military moved to a supporting role in the civilian led effort at recovery in Iraq. C9 played a major role in the Kuwait City based Humanitarian Operations Center, which later moved forward to Baghdad. This HOC was a key player in organizing and sustaining the efforts of NCO/PVO efforts [sic] to support the Iraqi people.” (Email correspondence between the author and Colonel Kevin Benson, Director, US Army School of Advanced Military Studies [SAMS] and former CFLCC C5 Plans Officer during OIF Phase III, 6 Sept 2004).


43. Briscoe, et. al., 153. Major Barstow, a US Army special operations forces officer, had the opportunity to meet with Karzai and learn firsthand of the future President’s opinion about the value of the media. Dr. Briscoe’s account in Weapon of Choice describes Karzai counseling Barstow on ways the US information-operations campaign should be tailored to the Afghan population. Barstow recalled that Karzai, himself capable of conversing in six languages, indicated the Air Force EC-130 Commando Solo broadcast programs were effective in terms of music quality, but that the British Broadcasting Corporation and Voice Of America broadcast higher quality programs overall. Karzai urged Barstow to “make the messages more forceful. The people need. . . to be told what they should do about the Taliban and Al-Qaeda who were still in their midst.” Later, he told Barstow to emphasize key themes applicable to long-term stability operations, themes that promoted “a free country and the role of the people in its establishment.” Karzai also provided Major Barstow with additional guidance on focusing the contents of information-operations campaign leaflets to better explain the end-state goals:
“Stress that the Americans have been invited and are not in Afghanistan as occupiers. . . . The people must be able to understand the distinction between the United States that is sending forces to help the country and the Soviets who sent forces to conquer the country.”

45. Fontenot, et. al., 95.
46. Ibid., 421.
47. Dobbins, 35 and 44.
49. Moore and Robinson, 329, 337. In the authors’ assessment, “Constitutional reform was the decisive step in America’s remodeling of Japan and in Japan’s eventual recovery of control over its own political destiny. The politico/religious ideology [in which the Meiji Constitution formally placed the Emperor at the head of state] was incompatible in its pre-war form with constitutional democracy. That this transformation of ideas was ultimately accomplished was a major achievement, and it was a profoundly joint achievement. Neither side could have produced this constitutional revolution alone.”
50. Sebald, 294.
51. Ibid., 298-299.
52. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 289.
53. Ibid., 306.
Chapter 5
Conclusions

“Peace enforcement is wearing everybody out. . . . This is much harder [than combat].”¹

All things considered, it seems that most commanders and planners would rather focus intellectual energy on Phase III actions rather than any other phase. But, truth be told, Phase III operations do not achieve the ultimate political end state goal of a sustained peace—they only set conditions for Phase IV activities. Accordingly, one can legitimately argue that Phase IV deserves as much detailed analysis and planning as does any other phase of a joint operation.

Two questions surface about the collection of planning themes presented in this study. Will the nine stability operations planning themes adjust to the demands of a constantly changing COE? Will they prove as applicable to future operational environments as they were during the occupation of Japan in the mid-20th century? In this author’s estimation yes, but only if commanders and planners are willing to consider the following points.

First, some of these themes will always be more important than others by virtue of their impact on the end-state goal. The ideas of legitimacy, security, and situational understanding are so critical to the long-term success of a stability operation that an inadequate effort in any one of the three areas is sure to result in significant challenges; miscarriage in all three areas will almost guarantee the failure of the entire stability operation itself. The remaining six planning themes (commitment, unity of effort, infrastructure, economic status, planning effort, and media) all deserve consideration on their own merit, but the reality of stability operations planning is that legitimacy, security, and situational understanding are the big three. Every decision made, every resource committed, every negotiation conducted, and every policy implemented should be done only after considering the first-, second-, and even third-order impact of that action on these three themes.

Second, no two stability operations will ever be alike, even if they occur in the same city and especially if they occur in a different region or country. In some respects, the term contemporary operational environment is more applicable to stability operations than any other component of full spectrum operations. It describes a constantly evolving world that encompasses the present while looking to the future, not backward to the past.
The COE evokes the notion of an enemy (and recall that in the case of stability operations the enemy is reflected by the idea of violence and all its root causes) that is constantly learning, adapting, changing, and pushing the envelope of “civilized” conduct. Long gone are the comfortable days when a doctrinal template, a solid IPB, and a stopwatch sufficed as analytical tools; now, especially with regard to stability operations, commanders and planners must apply these planning themes in a dynamic mode to fight for information, intelligence, and situational understanding.

Third, the planning themes work best when commanders and planners recognize the symbiotic relationship that exists between all nine. MacArthur’s masterful application of situational understanding to the Japanese Emperor’s postwar status, and the impact of that application on the security environment and the public perception of the Japanese Government’s legitimacy, is an example of this relationship. The CPA directive to disband the Iraqi military and security forces, and the resulting impact on the security situation and economic reconstruction effort in Iraq, is a contemporary example of the link between situational understanding, security, and legitimacy, as is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s successful intercession with Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr that ended the weeks-long battle in Najaf. The successful conduct of national elections reflects well on the efforts to secure and legitimize the nascent Afghan political environment; likewise, the resurgence of widespread opium production in that country reflects a dearth of legitimate economic options that must be addressed. At any given point, the operational environment will force one of the planning themes to a position of supremacy. In response to these shifting priorities then, commanders and planners should remain flexible in how they apply the nine planning themes in pursuit of a holistic stability operations campaign.

And finally, what must be kept in view is the concept of commitment with its immeasurable value of perceived and tangible dedication to the long haul. The likelihood of one’s decisions, actions, or policies ever receiving any recognition in the form of positive press or public support is slim, but commanders and planners should take heart in knowing that the measure of success for stability operations is found in the future, not the immediate present.

This study ends where it began, focused on doctrine. US Army Field Manual (FM) 3.0 acknowledges the complex nature of stability operations with these words: “Determining the military actions necessary to achieve the desired political endstate can be more challenging [in stability operations]
than in situations requiring offensive and defensive operations; achieving the endstate may be just as difficult.” Recent comments made by the former Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff reinforce this idea:

While our recent combat employments in Afghanistan and Iraq were models of rapid and effective offensive operations, they also demonstrate that neither the duration nor the character of even the most successful military campaign is readily predictable. Especially in wars intended to liberate rather than subjugate, victory entails winning a competition of ideas, and thereby fundamentally changing the conditions that prompted the conflict. Long after the defeat of Taliban and Iraqi military forces, we continue to wage just such campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The On Point study group said it best: “One of the great truths of this (OIF) campaign is that combat operations alone will not attain the desired end state. Operations ongoing now will be decisive, not those that the troops concluded in downtown Baghdad.” Hopefully, this analysis will prove useful to commanders and planners pursuing sustained peace through the efficient transition between combat operations and stability operations.
Notes


2. FM 3.0, Chapter 9, page 9-5, paragraph 9-12.


4. Fontenot, et. al., 433.
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