

MUSTERING FOR WAR

MICHAEL G. ANDERSON



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Mustering for War

Army National Guard Mobilization for the Global War on Terrorism

Michael G. Anderson



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Preface
Mustering for War
Army National Guard Mobilization for the
Global War on Terrorism

Historically, one of the most difficult aspects of waging war is getting the nation's soldiers prepared for and into the fight. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were no different. Mobilization of a reserve component is a complex process with myriad factors, events, diverse players, and entities impacting and influencing it at each stage. On top of this, mobilization methods evolved during the course of the Global War on Terror, altering significantly to address critical shortfalls, rectify identified problems, and meet the operational demands of a different kind of war. Experience grew across the total Army through what became a protracted, rotational war, the first of its kind, involving the wholesale rotation of units within an all-volunteer force instead of individual replacements supported by conscription. The Army force structure altered, moving from a division-centric force to one revolving around brigade combat teams (BCTs). The readiness model shifted from a tiered system to a progressive one within a new force generation model. The vicissitudes of the operating environment forced the Army Guard to transition from a strategic reserve force to a more operationally-responsive component, through resourcing, modernization, extensive use, and developed experience. During the Global War on Terrorism, the Army identified problems with the mobilization process for the war it was fighting, implemented solutions to address the issues, and continually refined and adjusted to meet the operational demands. The Army transitioned from a disjointed, seemingly-chaotic process to a steadily-predictable one.

The complexities of the issues faced by the Army National Guard during its mobilization experiences from 2001 to 2011 are too numerous for complete coverage by an interim study. However, as an interim study, the four major categories of issues are addressed, these include problems associated with manning the force, equipping the force, health readiness, and training the formations for overseas service. The purpose of this study is to examine the changes implemented to address these four categories, understanding the evolving nature of mobilization process over the course of the wars. To understand the larger picture, policy, procedure, regulations, force structure, and force generation are broadly touched on, illustrating the intricate relationships between planning and execution.

Any history work is one of collaboration if it is to be successful and survive. This project on the Army National Guard's mobilization experiences is no exception. An incredible, diverse group of individuals and organizations ceaselessly and expeditiously supported my many questions and every inquiry. First and foremost, I thank Gen. Frank Grass, Chief of the National Guard Bureau (2012-2016), for affording me the opportunity to helm this project, and Dr. Donald P. Wright, Ph.D. with Dr. Kate Dahlstrand, Ph.D. along with the editorial team at the Army University Press. Their professionalism and support seeing this work through to publication made preserving this part of history possible and available to its audience. A special thanks goes to the Center of Military History for hosting me during the initial drafting of the work in 2014-2015. Dr. Richard Stewart, Ph.D., Chief Historian and acting Director of the United States Army Center of Military History during the drafting of this manuscript, and Dr. James McNaughton, Ph.D., the Director of Histories Division have my sincere appreciation in supporting the initial research and drafts.

The team at the National Guard Bureau stands out for their unequivocal support and opportunity they presented me to work on this project. The unwavering faith and assistance from Col. Les' Melnyk and Col. Scott Sharp, both deservedly enjoying their retirements, were critical to the depth of the project, as was the support from Lt. Col. Jeff Larrabee in the Army National Guard's Historical Division during the writing of this project. The responsiveness, patience, and dedication of the team of professionals across the National Guard Bureau's directorates in fielding repeated questions and requests for information from the staffs of the Office of the Surgeon, the G-1, G-3, G-4 and G-8 made the analytical depth of the project possible.

The team at the US Center of Military History provided not only a space to work and an atmosphere of scholarly dedication, but provided constant encouragement with insightful comments. The team of professional historians greatly aided the end result. Colonel Shane Story (retired), Col. Jon Middaugh, Lt. Col. Sharon Tosi-Lacey, Dr. Nicholas Schlosser, Ph.D., Dr. Jeffrey Seiken, Ph.D., and Dr. Mark Sherry, Ph.D. of the Contemporary Studies Team, and Dr. William Donnelly, Ph.D. through review and discussion, helped this project mature. No history project is the result of one historian's efforts.

Many organizations and individuals outside of the main entities of NGB, AUP, and CMH that saw this project through were also important to its completion. First Army's Mr. Robert Saxon, Public Affairs Specialist for Training and Mobilization, was a critical conduit of information and

commentary from Ms. Jimmie Ring, Deputy G-3/5/7 and Col. Dale Kuehl, First Army Chief of Staff during the drafting of this work. Likewise, various state historians from Oklahoma, Louisiana, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Georgia and others also took their time to help with the project. Mr. Frederick Wham from the Joint Interagency Lessons Learned Information System (JILLIS) was instrumental in his great and timely assistance with providing guidance and assistance in collections from the JILLIS repository of documentary resource.

Although a great many individuals and organizations assisted in the development of this project, of course, any and all errors are mine alone.

Introduction

When Army National Guard soldiers gathered for their military drills and training, they traditionally called it their “muster.” This gathering of citizen-soldiers, who live scattered among various communities, was historically the first, crucial step for guardsmen preparing to go to war. In modern times this is likened to mobilization, which the Department of Defense (DoD) defines as “the process by which the Armed Forces of the United States or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency, which includes activating all or part of the Reserve Component as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and material.”¹ When called upon to mobilize, these guardsmen dutifully interrupt their lives, stepping away from their civilian careers or pursuit of education and leave their families behind.

The United States Army is comprised of two elements, the active component—the active duty Army—and the reserve component. The reserve component further divides into two parts—the Army National Guard, the focus of this study, and the United States Army Reserve (USAR). Both of these elements have commonalities in their responsibilities and duties requiring them to train typically one weekend per month and at least two weeks a year, often in the summer months. However, a critical difference between the Army Guard and the USAR is the Army Guard, with its legacy as a state militia force, operates in a Title 32 United States Code (USC) function under the authority and direction of its respective state leadership. It was after the Korean War in August 1956 that Congress reorganized all the laws governing the Army Guard and its dual status to state and federal authorities by creating Title 10 USC for laws addressing federal military forces and Title 32 USC governing administration and regulations while under state authority.²

The governor of each state is in essence the commander-in-chief of their respective Guard with the state’s adjutant general (TAG) as the senior military officer until the president federalizes, “calls up,” the Army Guard, by placing them under Title 10 USC active federal service. The predominate purpose for which the Army Guard is federalized under Title 10 is for deployment, however, it can be applied when the Army Guard is used for Defense Support to Civilian Authority (DSCA), or other federal missions in the homeland. Title 32 status is the authority under which the Army Guard trains for its federal wartime mission with federal funding and guidance. In contrast, the USAR is a Title 10 federal force even while in an inactive duty status, such as during their weekend training.

For the Army Guard this adds a thin layer of complexity. It fundamentally has dual-purpose missions: a local, domestic state mission under the governor while in state active duty status or while under Title 32 authorities and a federal mission under the United States Army when activated and placed under Title 10 authorities. This dual mission adds additional strain and demand on the Army Guard with its use and response to domestic emergencies, such as hurricanes, wild fires, support to the United States Customs and Border Patrol, and homeland defense missions, in addition to deployments overseas. A balance of use and prioritized considerations is critical to the integration and readiness of the Army Guard.

The Army National Guard traces its long-standing history as the nation's oldest military institution. Starting as the colonies' original militia force, the Army Guard evolved over the years, its citizen-soldiers playing an integral part in each of the early conflicts, and with the birth of the new nation, the militia and volunteers served as the base for the nation's early wars in light of the American reluctance for a large, standing, professional army. The Army National Guard began to take its modern form with the Militia Act of 1903, commonly referred to as the Dick Act after Ohio representative Charles Dick who championed it through Congress. This legislation increased federal oversight and involvement in the volunteer militias thus sparking their gradual transition into what is now known as the National Guard. With federal funding and equipment came additional requirements. The Army Guard, for the first time, conformed to federal standards for training and followed federal organizational structure. The Organized Militia, today's Army National Guard, began its journey as a dual-missioned force answerable to both the governor and the federal government, with required training (or "drills") and longer periods of training in the summer. For the first time these citizen-soldiers received pay for their training—although at first it was only for the summer training period. This organized force now trained with the active duty Army, received formal inspections from them, and were subject to involuntary federal mobilizations. However, the original law restricted their use to domestic support.³

The National Defense Act of 1908 amended the Dick Act, removing the geographic and duration limitations of their use.⁴ The National Defense Act of 1916 further defined and matured the militia system into today's Army National Guard, even coining the term "National Guard," officially replacing the title of "Organized Militia." This act also provided the clear authority for the federalization of the Army Guard by the president.⁵

The active duty Army, the Army National Guard, and draftees largely comprised the United States Army of the world wars and Korean War,

while the Army Reserve mostly served as individual replacement officers and specialty soldiers. In both world wars, the president federalized the entire Army Guard. Federalization integrated the Army Guard into the United States Army, on 5 August 1917 during the First World War and similarly during the Second World War began the phased activation on 31 August 1940. It removed obligations of the Army Guard to the states and incorporated it fully into the United States Army for each conflict's duration. Guard units slowly intermingled, integrating active duty officers, soldiers, and draftees into its ranks. Likewise, officers and soldiers from the Army Guard transitioned into active duty formations and filled units created for the growing draftee army.⁶

The Army Guard further contributed to the nation's war efforts in Korea when on 1 August 1950, the United States Army alerted the first four Army Guard divisions. The Army formally activated and federalized these Guard Divisions later that month, beginning a partial mobilization of the Army Guard. This partial mobilization encompassed 138,600 guardsmen, nearly a third of the Army Guard at the time. Forty-three Guard units served in Korea. Two Guard divisions mobilized and deployed, supporting the five active duty divisions and one United States Marine Corps division defending South Korean independence, while an additional two Guard divisions went to Germany to reinforce European deterrence efforts.⁷ The minimal participation in the Vietnam War remained an outlier of Army Guard major involvement in the nation's wars. President Lyndon B. Johnson's aversion to activating the reserve component stemmed from a fear of potentially escalating the war in Vietnam by provoking Communist China and Soviet Russia. Initially, the Army limited individual volunteers from the Army Guard and USAR to deploy; however, after the Tet Offensive in 1968 the president authorized a small, partial mobilization. Of the 13,633 mobilized guardsmen, 2,729 across eight units deployed to Vietnam during the conflict.⁸

The modern integration of the United States Army's reserve component found its beginnings in the turmoil of the Vietnam War. In August 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird first announced his Total Force concept. The concept centered on the reserve components filling the approaching void resulting from the draft ending, while maintaining an immediate source of manpower to complement the active component in a tight fiscal environment. In the realities of congressional budget cuts and the termination of the draft, the concept of 1970 became the DoD policy in 1973. When the draft ended that same year, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger converted the Total Force concept to the Total

Force policy.⁹ This implemented the “Abrams Doctrine,” named after its proponent then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. The Total Force policy and the Abrams Doctrine intended to fully integrate the use of the reserve component with the active component in future wars, providing a cost-effective means to maintain a large force while ending the unpopular draft, and ensuring the nation went to war unified, including its citizen-soldiers.¹⁰ Over the following decades, the Army went through a series of programs to achieve better integration between its components by implementing the new Total Force policy. While first used in Operation Desert Storm, the true test of this policy would be the protracted, rotational-based, multi-theater, high demand during the Global War on Terrorism.

A study of the tremendous change due to higher demand the Army National Guard mobilization process underwent in the decade following the 9/11 attacks, adds an important chapter in the historiography of the US Army’s military mobilization history. The US Army has a range of mobilization studies covering the nation’s early years and great detailed works focused on the Second World War. Three volumes of the definitive US Army’s official history of the Second World War, colloquially known as “the Green Books” due to their distinctive bindings, painstakingly record the history of the manning, equipping, and training of soldiers for the Second World War’s mass mobilization efforts.¹¹ The US Army also published two pamphlets on the mobilization topic, one focused on the Second World War with overview of the experiences of the First World War contrasting different approaches and the foresight of early mobilization and federalization in the Second World War.¹² The second pamphlet, “History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945,” published in 1955, provides a foundational examination of Army mobilization history from the Revolutionary War to the Second World War, critical to understanding an overview background to the Army’s mobilization story.¹³ Additionally, the Combat Studies Institute Press published “Gathering at the Golden Gate: Mobilizing for War in the Philippines, 1898.”¹⁴ This work focused on relevant lessons from moving large formations across the vast continental United States, working with local governments and businesses, and highlighted the Army’s introduction to cross-ocean force projection. This publication also provides a detailed and informative account of the mobilization of a largely volunteer Army in contrast to the other studies which are dominated by the examination of large-scale mobilization or mostly conscript armies for overseas service.

This historical analysis intends to bridge the gap in a reserve component-focused mobilization study on a protracted conflict across multi-

ple theaters with an all-volunteer force. It is intended as an introductory examination of the Army National Guard experiences, the largest organization within the reserve component and the nation's primary combat reserve. With the unabated growing national reliance on the Army Guard, it is vital to understand the answer to this study's central question: how did the Army National Guard's mobilization process evolve over the course of the Global War on Terrorism? Understanding this process is critically important to national civilian leadership and both US Army and National Guard senior leadership as guardsmen regularly continue to be relied upon and prepare for deployment around the world serving their integral part in the National Defense. It is important to note this is not an analysis or examination of the Army National Guard performance or role in the Iraq or Afghanistan theaters. It is a mobilization study, an examination of the Department of Defense and US Army's pre-deployment processes to man, equip, and train the Army Guard from the states and deliver them to the combat theaters. It is not an operational history; therefore, the study ends with the departure of Army Guard units from the mobilization stations for deployment to the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters.

The design and conduct of the modern Army National Guard mobilization process profoundly changed between 11 September 2001 and 2011. The Guard went from an "alert-mobilize-train-deploy" sequence to a "train-alert-deploy" process, significantly reducing the time required to get an Army Guard unit overseas. The health readiness of the Guard improved from one of the most difficult problems faced by mobilizing units to virtually disappearing as an issue by the time a unit arrived at mobilization station. In the early stages of the War on Terror, policy and regulations addressing personnel management for mobilizing units led to critical shortfalls that required alteration and reinterpretation to keep the units manned. Tiered readiness, a system that organized resources based on where a unit fell within a set of structured, prioritized categories, gave way to progressive readiness, where all units rotated through the prioritized categories based on a timetable. The resulting change produced cyclical, rotational mobilizations as the norm. With this shift in readiness came an organizational restructuring during the Army's modular transformation initiative. Thus, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan saw the Army's reserve component transformed from a strategic reserve into a more operational reserve force to answer the nation's call.

In a discussion on mobilization, understanding the different roles reserves served either as an operational or strategic force, is important. An operational reserve serves as a responsive force: timely, flexible, capa-

ble, and with adequate experience and resourcing to support high levels of readiness. This force effectively integrates itself with the active force with minimal difficulty while still serving as a means for national fiscal responsibility. A strategic reserve is a force demanding lengthy time, deliberate planning, and choreographed implementation before effective use. With limited resourcing, resulting in lower levels of readiness, this force requires massive infusion of training and support before effective integration, while it maximizes cost-saving measures before use.

Long maintained as a strategic reserve, the Army Guard found itself called to deploy repeatedly, with many guardsmen serving multiple tours overseas. Units suffered from critical readiness issues in manning, equipping, health, and training. As an intended interim study, this work is meant as an introduction to a highly complex but increasingly important topic. While striving to adhere to the professional standards of objectivity and a balanced account, it is impossible to cover every aspect of modern mobilization over the period of the long war studied. However, to examine the evolution of the Army Guard's mobilization during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, several sub-questions must be addressed in addition to the main pillars of manning, equipping, health, and training. These additional questions include, how did policy changes, procedural adjustments, and funding levels ensure the Army Guard could meet its overseas military assignments? What were the impacts of the new Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model and the various medical reforms? To answer these questions within an introductory study, the scope is necessarily limited. The focus of this mobilization examination is on larger formations, battalion and above, and distinctly focuses on combat arms units and specialized forces, such as aviation and engineers, which inherently place higher demands on the mobilization process. Large units and combat arms formations along with specialized personnel and equipment units, historically pose the most difficult mobilization issues for the US Army, providing for the best examination of cases within a limited scope. Similarly, the focus of this study is limited to the Army National Guard mobilizations in support of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. During the timeframe covered in this study, the Army Guard faced additional demands on its manpower and unit inventory with domestic responses, such as hurricanes and wild fires, and homeland defense mobilizations, including those along the nation's southern border and protecting critical infrastructure. Additionally, the Army Guard also supported deployments outside of the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters globally, in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific. However, deploy-

ment to active combat theaters, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, demanded the largest amount of Army Guard mobilizations and inherently had the most stringent requirements for deployment, presenting the ideal focus for this study and most relevant for future leaders' understanding.

The following analysis of the Army Guard's mobilization experiences during the Global War on Terrorism up to 2011 is broken into three narrative chapters and a conclusion. Chapter One: Guard Mobilizations before 9/11 discusses the Army Guard finding its place in the Total Force Policy in the 1990s. The Army Guard's experiences in Operation Desert Storm illustrated the difficulties of maintaining operational readiness. As a result, Congress passed the "Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992." During the late 1990s, the Army Guard effectively supported relatively low demand peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Sinai. This chapter concludes with a review of where the Army Guard stood on 10 September 2001.

Chapter Two: Going Over There—Breaking the Force, September 2001–December 2004, examines the initial ad hoc mobilization processes in response to the growing operational demands and multiple theaters. Post-9/11 Department of Defense (DoD) policies and the Army Guard's readiness levels proved problematic when faced with the operational demands on the reserve component as a result of the Total Force Policy. By the end of 2004, the Army National Guard and the USAR faced a breaking point as they strained to support the various requirements.

Chapter Three: The Tipping Point—The Mid War Period, January 2005–January 2007 analyzes the development of the ARFORGEN model and establishing the TRICARE Reserve Select program. These changes intended to address manning, health, and equipping readiness shortfalls. First Army underwent organizational changes as well to address training concerns identified over the first years, struggling to improve pre-deployment training and reduce mobilization time. These initiatives worked to push the mobilization cycle towards sustainability while striving to meet operational demand.

Chapter Four: Keeping up the Fight—The Later War Period, February 2007–December 2011 focuses on the dual impact of ARFORGEN implementation and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's "Utilization of the Total Force" memorandum on the mobilization process. The 2007 memorandum addressed critical manning and training issues. US Army readiness, across all components, shifted from a tiered system to a progressive one under the new ARFORGEN model, creating a more mutually supporting

and sustainable force. The Army Guard's mobilization process evolved from an *ad hoc*, unsustainable system into a predictable cycle benefiting the Total Force.

The conclusion opens with a summary of the improvements seen over the course of the wars and a cautious acknowledgement and identification of remaining struggles and concerns for Army Guard mobilization within a rotational, protracted conflict with high operational demand. The conclusion leaves the reader with suggestions for further mobilizations topics and considerations not covered, which additional and expanded mobilization studies would benefit.

While some struggles still remained, notably in manning and training, the Army made marked improvements from 2001–2011 across all major issues, especially in health and equipping. During the era of an all-volunteer force, with the Army National Guard as the largest and primary combat reserve force, it is critical for leaders, both uniformed and civilian, to adequately understand the major issues associated with large scale, regular mobilization of a reserve component force over an extended period. This understanding allows for current and future Army leaders to anticipate, adequately plan for, or be prepared to address the systemic problems with examples of historical approaches to the issues of manning, health, equipping, and training an effective reserve component force.

Notes

1. Joint Publications 1-02: *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, dated 8 November 2010 (amended 15 November 2015).
2. Michael D. Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 207.
3. Public Law 57-33, "An Act To promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes," Chapter 196, 32 statute 775, enacted 21 January 1903, known as the "Militia Act of 1903" or the "Dick Act."
4. National Defense Act of 1908, chapter 204, 35 statute 399, enacted 27 May 1908, known as the "Militia Act of 1908."
5. National Defense Act of 1916, chapter 134, 39 statute, 166, enacted 3 June 1916.
6. Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 152 and 174.
7. Renee Hylton, *When Are We Going?: The Army National Guard and the Korean War, 1950-1953*, National Guard Bureau, Historical Services Division, 3, 13, and 23.
8. Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 223-225.
9. Doubler, 277-279.
10. Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2007), 15.
11. The Green Book volumes on mobilization include, R. Elberton Smith, *United States Army in World War II: The War Department—The Army and Economic Mobilization* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1991); Robert R. Palmer, Bell I Wiley, and William R. Keast of the Historical Section Army Ground Force, *United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces—The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1991); Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, *United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces—The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1987).
12. See Frank N. Schubert, Center of Military History Publication 72-32 *The US Army in World War II 50th Anniversary's "Mobilization."*
13. See Merton G. Henry and Marvin A. Kreidberg, Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 20-212 "History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945," (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1955).
14. See Stephen D. Coats, *Gathering at the Golden Gate: Mobilizing for War in the Philippines, 1898* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006).

Chapter One

Guard Mobilizations Before 9/11

Operation Desert Storm in 1991 was the first test to rapidly mobilize Army National Guard combat power for a contingency operation and included combat brigades. The Army approached the Desert Storm mobilizations through the affiliation program, namely the Roundout Program. While Desert Storm was a resounding success by expelling Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait in February 1991 and vindicating the Total Force policy, it revealed serious issues with the expeditious mobilization of Guard combat power. Operation Desert Storm foreshadowed many mobilization issues the Army National Guard faced in subsequent decades, involving manning, unit equipment, health readiness, and training.

Over the decade between 1991's Desert Storm and the attacks on 11 September 2001, the Army identified issues with the large-scale mobilization of Army National Guard units. During this time, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Army worked to address these issues with reforms, even as the Army's operational demand increased for Guard units to serve in the Middle East and the Balkans throughout the 1990s. The implementation of the Total Force concept critically impacted the Army in its growing reliance on Guard deployments with continued global responsibilities prior to the September 11th attacks.

The Total Force policy emerged from Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger converting previous Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird's "Total Force" concept of 1970 into policy in 1973.¹ The policy intended to integrate the active component with the reserve component, facilitating more ready use of reserve combat power, giving birth to the Roundout Program in 1973. The program aligned individual Army National Guard brigades as a third maneuver brigade with active component divisions. By 1990, six roundout brigades were associated with active component units, five from the Army Guard and one a part of the United States Army Reserve (USAR).² Each roundout unit received priority within the Army National Guard to obtain the same modern equipment as its parent active component division. However, within the restricted fiscal environment of the time, the Guard brigades soon received permission to designate old equipment, not matching that of their active component partners, as "authorized substitutes" to serve as a bridge until the acquisition process provided the modern equipment to the Guard units. By 1976, the Army affiliation program, including its roundout brigades, linked 89 separate Army

National Guard battalions to active component parent units for training support and oversight.³

For Operation Desert Storm, 398 Army National Guard units with 62,411 soldiers mobilized in small, incremental groups, many serving state-side or replacing European-based active units that had deployed to the desert. Of the total mobilized, 37,484 National Guard soldiers from 297 units deployed to the desert.⁴ Under the DoD definition “activation” for a reserve component was the “order to active duty (other than for training) in the federal service.”⁵ A deployment, according to DoD, meant “the rotation of forces into and out of an operational area.”⁶ Many guardsmen were activated and then mobilized, but not all deployed. Of the mobilized Guard, 97 percent of activated units met the Army deployment standards, and nearly half of them served outside the United States. Of those that deployed outside the United States, 25 percent departed within 20 days, 31 percent did so in 30 days, and over 66 percent left within 45 days.⁷ Some units arrived in the Arabian Gulf region only 15 days after arriving at their mobilization station. For the larger formations, such as battalions and brigades, the average mobilization timeline spanned just over a month before departure to theater. In some cases, the length of time resulted from lack of dedicated air or sealift capacity. This left some Army Guard units ready, simply waiting for transportation.⁸ The Army Guard mobilization process for the first war against Saddam Hussein established a precedent for what lay ahead.

A combination of mobilization timeline standards and the mobilization authority utilized to activate the reserve component affected Army Guard mobilizations in late 1990. Department of Defense standards for mobilization varied from 30 to 90 days from alerting an Army Guard unit of mobilization to deploying it into theater.⁹ President George H.W. Bush’s Executive Order 12727 on 22 August 1990, invoked the mobilization authority of Title 10 United States Code, Section 673(b). This mobilization authority, known as the Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC), limited by law the mobilization of reserve component soldiers to 90 days, with a possible 90-day extension.¹⁰ The timeline for mobilization and unit arrival in theater were critical aspects influencing mobilization authorities.

Three mobilization laws within the United States Code (USC) are pertinent to this study: Title 10 USC 12301(d), Title 10 USC 12302, and Title 10 12304.¹¹ None of these crossed the threshold beyond a “partial mobilization,” which kept them within the authority of the president to authorize. Full mobilization and total mobilization required congressional approval. Figure 1.1 further compares three mobilization authorities available to mobilize the Army Guard.

Mobilization Authority	Type	Length	Limitation	Issuing Authority
12301(d) (Volunteerism)	Voluntary—with consent of the member and the governor for National Guard	Unlimited, based on volunteered period	Individually based volunteers, no overall limit	Presidential or congressional declared state of emergency or war
12302 (Partial Mobilization)	Involuntary—without consent of the member of any unit or one not assigned to an organized unit	For 24 consecutive months	No more than 1,000,000 on active duty at one time	Presidential or congressional declared state of emergency or war
12304—formerly 673(b), renumbered in 1994 (Presidential Reserve Call-up, formerly known as the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up until 1998)	Involuntary—without consent of the member of any unit or one not assigned to an organized unit	For 90 days, amended in 1994 to 270 days and amended in 2006 to 365 days	No more than 200,000 on active duty at one time, of which no more than 30,000 may be from the Individual Ready Reserve	Presidential call up (under 12304(b) service secretaries can call up units but not individuals)

Figure 1.1. Comparison of Mobilization Authorities for Reserve Components. Source: Title 10 USC Sections 12301, 12302 and 12304.

The total cap of 180 days with extension, allowed by use of the Presidential Reserve Call-up immediately created an issue with effectiveness in mobilizing the reserve components for Operation Desert Storm. In order to maximize time in theater, the reserve component units had to be able to mobilize and deploy overseas extraordinarily fast compared to past mobilization timetables without the 180-day limit. The time limit deeply affected the larger combat arms units which often required the higher range of the 30 to 90 days mobilization period per DoD standards. The transition from Operation Desert Shield to defend Saudi Arabia to offensive plans in Operation Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait along with congressional pressure led the administration to activate select Army Guard combat units. With congressional approval, President Bush issued Executive Order 12733 on 5 November 1990, extending reserve component duty beyond the 180 days limit to a total of 360 days.¹² The Bush order led to the first call up of Army Guard combat units- three roundout combat brigades and two field artillery brigades- which already faced a steep curve to mobilize and get into theater to participate. The selected roundout brigades were the Georgia Army Guard's 48th Infantry Brigade, Mississippi's 155th Armored Brigade, and Louisiana's 256th Infantry Brigade along with Arkansas's 142nd Field Artillery Brigade and Tennessee's 196th Field Artillery Brigade.¹³

Upon mobilization, readiness issues arose within many of the Army Guard units. "Cross-leveling," a process of taking both personnel and equipment from one unit not mobilizing and transferring the personnel and equipment to a unit mobilizing, became a precedent to rapidly bring mobilizing Guard units up to deployment standards.¹⁴ The roundout brigades exemplified a problem with cross-leveling, as units experienced equipment shortfalls upon their mobilization. In part, the shortfalls were due to transferring equipment to units mobilized before them, creating a harmful cascading effect in successive mobilizing units.¹⁵ Personnel cross-leveling to fill the ranks of mobilizing units followed a similar mold, with similar results.

Health readiness, both medical and dental, stood out as the primary reason guardsmen were non-deployable upon arrival at mobilization stations, and required extensive efforts to rectify. In the end, 94 percent of guardsmen were fit for duty, and only six percent were rejected for training and health reasons.¹⁶ These positive numbers were made possible by the mass leveraging of resources needed to quickly rectify deficiencies. For example, the 48th Brigade sent back 250 soldiers from its training at the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, California to Fort Stewart, Georgia for serious medical treatment. A General Accounting Office (GAO) review identified soldiers over 40 years of age most at risk of hav-

ing significant health issues not previously identified prior to mobilization that either kept them from deploying, or required extensive efforts to clear them for deployment.

Overall, dental health emerged as the number one readiness concern affecting the mobilizing units, and combat units within the Guard stood out as the most affected. Studies through the 1980s already identified a direct link between dental readiness issues and soldiers' pay grade- those within the lowest ranks realized a higher dental readiness failure rate. This may have been tied to poor hygiene habits, problems exacerbated by relatively-low income, or a combination of both. A study in 1986 identified numerous dental deficiencies in the reserve component, with more in the Army Guard compared to the Army Reserve. Dental readiness issues in the Guard were just over 31 percent, and higher at 34 percent in Army Guard combat units.¹⁷ Once mobilization began in late 1990, health exams identified 14,000 soldiers as non-deployable, requiring serious dental work within the next year. However, through extensive effort, all but two soldiers received dental treatments that qualified them for deployment.¹⁸ The overall rate in the mobilizing Army Guard units rested at 27.2 percent in a non-deployable dental category, but in the roundout brigades the percentage ranged between 30-36 percent, or about 4,000 soldiers. The question remained one of cost-effective health insurance, most notably dental, being available or provided to reserve component soldiers. The question of cost-effective health insurance, especially dental, and observation of availability and provision for reserve component soldiers to impact mobilization efficiency reemerged in the post-9/11 period and received diligent attention, with distinctive results. Although dental issues failed to keep significant numbers from mobilizing, the Army achieved this only through Herculean efforts. These efforts cost time and interfered with mobilization training through follow on treatments and appointments, along with great pains to multiple soldiers losing teeth and undergoing a multitude of expedited dental procedures.¹⁹

Training became another point of contention. The National Guard Bureau's report on its experiences in Operation Desert Storm concluded that unstated deployment criteria hindered validation for units. By not having established, stated, and defined deployment requirements, or at least a previously agreed upon set of requirements for the units to train and prepare for, the Army Guard units arrived at mobilization stations at an inherent and unavoidable disadvantage, costing them time and expending unnecessary efforts. Furthermore, the units themselves were not involved in consideration of training plan development.²⁰ The General Accounting

Office reached the same conclusion that the Army had no specified, objective validation criteria, but rather used subjective assessments based on personal judgments coming from first-hand observations and input from trainers and senior staff of the active component organizations involved in the training. The active component units' training plans incorporated events such as rotations to Fort Irwin's NTC and Iraq-specific training, which were not in the original mobilization training plans and timeline developed by the Guard units.²¹ This significantly affected the timelines as NTC only accepted one brigade at a time when three roundout brigades were mobilizing. Common issues concerning the training length included time spent on new equipment training, most notably affecting Louisiana's 256th Brigade, which was still adjusting to the Bradley Fighting Vehicles they recently received. Other issues included duplication of training events, such as repeated weapons qualifications, and time spent traveling from mobilization stations to NTC and back.²² Total training times varied: equaling 91 days for the 48th Brigade, 106 for the 155th Brigade, and 135 for the 256th Brigade.

Both the 48th and the 155th completed their training validation, but neither made it to the combat theater prior to the end of the conflict, having activated and mobilized but not deployed.²³ The 48th Brigade specifically met its requirements, 91 days after it was alerted for its mobilization, with 76 days of training, 30 of which were on Iraq-specific tasks that active component units received once in Saudi Arabia. The 48th Brigade's original training mobilization training plan had estimated a 42-day train-up period prior to deployment.²⁴

Units did not arrive completely ready, nor was that the intent. Overall, the Army Guard's training had struggled in the years preceding the Gulf War. In two of the roundout brigades, nearly 600 soldiers- or roughly eight percent- in over 42 different jobs required basic qualification training in their military occupation. Many had some initial training but were not fully qualified for their military jobs, for instance, 673 soldiers (15 percent) of the 155th Armored Brigade and 834 (19 percent) from the 48th Infantry Brigade. This can occur in the Army Guard due to soldiers filling vacancies on unit rosters immediately upon enlistment, whereas in the active component, the individual reports to the unit fully qualified before they fill a vacancy. This nuance in how the different components assign and report personnel results in Army Guard units consistently having soldiers assigned and reported on their manning documents while cycling through their initial entry training, advanced individual training, and other professional military education and qualification schools, balancing state

training budget limitations, and availability with their civilian occupation to be away for lengthy military training. Additionally, Guard units training budgets drastically increase once they enter the pre-mobilization period, allowing individuals who were held back by budget concerns to attend their training. Once mobilized, trainers identified a need for additional leadership training for non-commissioned officers, junior leaders, and the unit staffs. Training exercises revealed peacetime training as ineffective and unrealistic. The main shortfalls concerned operating at night, gunnery tables, and live-fire exercises. These shortfalls resulted from lack of training areas, support during peacetime training events, proper equipment to train with prior to mobilization, and shortfalls in personnel which affected small unit cohesion and internal training support, such as personnel to role play the enemy.²⁵ These shortfalls combined issues from a lack of resources and funding from the Army to the states, the inherent difficulties the reserve component faces in manning itself, and the training realities of one weekend per month and two weeks each summer.

Despite these obstacles, many Army Guard units overcame them and deployed. In contrast to the roundout brigades, the two Army Guard field artillery brigades mobilized and deployed, seeing combat service in the Gulf. The 142nd Field Artillery Brigade reached Saudi Arabia one month after mobilizing. In part they managed this because in contrast to the roundout brigades, the artillery units were not required to attend an NTC rotation, which saved time in transit to and from California as well as the actual 30-day rotation at NTC. The 142nd fired its first shots on 16 February 1991 in support of active component divisions and the British 1st Armored Division and other coalition partners.²⁶

Even though the Army saw the Operation Desert Storm experience as validation of the Total Force policy, the mobilization problems led to reviews and reports resulting in changes to Army National Guard readiness and structure, specific to mobilization. The Pentagon's Total Force Policy Report to Congress on 31 December 1990—a report incidentally submitted before the Gulf crisis ended—removed the expectation that reserve component forces be available for immediate deployment. The report replaced the “roundout” concept of using reserve component combat brigades to fill out under strength active component divisions with the “roundup” concept, where aligned reserve component combat brigades became coordinated reinforcements to specific active component divisions. While the roundout program used reserve component brigades to fill active component division formations that did not have their full complement of assigned brigades, the roundup program aligned reserve com-

ponent brigades with full active duty divisions as their initial source for reinforcement, not to complete their formation to begin with.²⁷

The most profound change to Army Guard mobilization between the Persian Gulf War and 9/11 came in the form of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992. Part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of Fiscal Year 1993, this legislation enacted changes in readiness ratings reports, health reforms, and training, drawing on lessons learned in the Gulf crisis. For readiness rating reports, the reform act required reporting of the unit's percentage of required personnel present and deployable, as well as the percentage of critical military occupational specialties (MOS), based on the unit's defined mission. It also required reporting the total number of all primary MOS-qualified soldiers. For equipment, it directed commanders to report gear required for a deployment, but only count equipment the unit specifically possessed on hand. It also required annotation of the effect substitute items had on mission readiness with an assessment of the effect any missing components, sets, or parts had on readiness of major pieces of unit equipment. Although this initially reduced readiness reporting levels for various units, it provided a more accurate reflection of pre-deployment equipment status and gave commanders a regulatory requirement to present such accurate reporting.

In regard to health reforms, the act addressed military physical examination standards. It stated 90 days after identifying a soldier who did not meet minimum physical standards for deployment that soldier was to be moved to a non-deployable personnel account, so as not to be counted against the unit's manning. Health screenings were to be an annual occurrence for all members, both medical and dental. Soldiers over 40 years of age required a full medical physical every two years. The reform act demanded a dental readiness plan identified for all designated "early deploying units," those included in contingency plans for rapid deployment along with the active component. These requirements, while a positive step to address early detection of health and dental issues affecting deploying soldiers, impacted the reserve component soldiers' limited time in uniform. The soldiers completed these examinations during their military obligation time, taking time away from conducting other activities, such as training. This provided an early example of the Army's ongoing attempts to prioritize and balance requirements for reserve component soldiers leading up to mobilization by trying to focus on the most contentious mobilization issues. At this point, these health and dental requirements were not benefits provided to the reserve component soldiers outside of their duty, nor was it tied to any civilian occupation provided health care and dental plans.

The act intended better alignment of Army Guard combat units' training with their active component affiliates. To address the length of post-mobilization training time, which had averaged from 90-130 days for the three roundout brigades, the reform act emphasized pre-mobilization training by Guard combat units to focus on individual and collective training up to the squad level. For maneuver training, units would train to the platoon level. The commands and staffs received guidance for annual multi-echelon training events to practice those skills associated with the command and control of multiple units in combat. The reform act stipulated new responsibilities for the active component affiliated unit as well. The active component commanders for brigades and higher organizations now were responsible for associated Army Guard unit's training plans, reviewing their readiness reports, assessing resource requirements, and validating compatibility of the units' readiness with that of the active component units. The reform act instructed the affiliated units complete these requirements annually.²⁸

Additionally, in 1992, national war planning changed for the reserve components, shifting units from assignment to specific wartime active component units within a specific war plan, to a purely training alignment between reserve component units and their active component affiliates. This decision broadened the focus from training for one specific wartime mission in one theater to training for any possible mission across the globe. Instead of training for a specific wartime contingency, they were training to simply fight.²⁹

Capitalizing on the success of Operation Desert Storm and the post-Cold War peace dividend, President William J. Clinton's Secretary of Defense Les Aspin conducted the Bottom Up Review. Released in the fall of 1993, the review resulted in the elimination of all vestiges associated with the roundout and roundup programs. It adjusted the Total Force policy towards a fully tiered readiness structure in the Army Guard, exemplified by the formation of the enhanced Separate Brigade (eSB) system on 1 September 1993. The Army National Guard would have 15 eSBs at the top of their tiered system, including the former roundout brigades. The enhanced brigades were separate and independent from direct affiliation with the eight Army National Guard divisions or with active component divisions. Instead, the enhanced brigades were parts of "Integrated Divisions," a combination of active component training support and readiness for Guard enhanced brigades. In a tiered readiness system, these enhanced brigades received priority in personnel staffing, modernization, and training ahead of all other Army Guard combat formations. The enhanced brigades, though not specifically




Figure 1.2. Army National Guard Enhanced Separate Brigades. Source: Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 302.

“rounding out” any active component division, were to be deployable in no more than 90 days as compared to the standard expectation of 150 days for later deploying combat brigades.³⁰ The enhanced separate brigade concept remained in effect into the Global War on Terrorism. (See Figure 1.2 (above) for listing and locations of the Enhanced Separate Brigades and Figure 1.3 (page 12) for the Army National Guard Divisions).

In responding to the precedent of requiring a resolution that allowed President Bush to mobilize selected reserve components to 360 days, Congress altered Title 10, Section 673(b) in 1994. Congress renumbered it to become Section 12304 and amended the authorization to allow 270-days as the standard mobilization under the Presidential Reserve Call up. The final amendment came in 2006 when Section 12304 mobilization limit increased to 365 days.

Army Guard mobilizations in support of the nation steadily continued in the years following Operation Desert Storm, as guardsmen participated in more peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. One of the enduring peacekeeping missions in which guardsmen participated was the Multi-national Force of Observers- Sinai (MFO-Sinai) in the peninsula separating Egypt from Israel. The mission initially used a composite unit, the 4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, activated in 1994, and comprised of 70 percent guardsmen and 30 percent from the active component. Consisting completely of volunteers, this force deployed to the Sinai for six months from January to July 1995. It served as an example of combined formations between active and Guard components.³¹ The peacekeeping rotation to the Sinai also demonstrated the Guard's ability to conduct peacekeeping operations, a mission they would perform with increasing frequency over the next 15 years. Other peacekeeping missions the Army Guard contributed to overseas included the Balkans, both in Kosovo and Bosnia. From 1994 to 1999, approximately 13,400 guardsmen served across the world in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations including Haiti, the Sinai, and the Balkans as well as the restive Persian Gulf. These deployments even included Army Guard combat companies, which had not been mobilized since the artillery brigades deployed to the Persian Gulf War.³²

Company C, 3rd Battalion, 116th Infantry Brigade, 29th Infantry Division was one of the Army Guard infantry companies mobilized for Operation Joint Guard in Bosnia from September 1997 to April 1998. This marked the first time since the Vietnam War that an Army National Guard infantry company deployed organically overseas. The experience of the Virginia Army Guard infantry company demonstrated the pattern previously set by the Army Guard's mobilization process and foreshadowed some problems that resurfaced during the evolution of Guard mobilization during the War on Terror.

The company continued the cross-leveling process demanded by the inherent resource restrictions Guard units experienced. Transferred equipment from multiple units filled voids in the infantry company. Around 30




Figure 1.3. Army National Guard Divisions. Source: Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 302.

percent of the company personnel were new transfers to fill the unit’s ranks. The 38 new soldiers came from Virginia’s own infantry battalions, with 80 percent coming from the company’s own parent battalion.³³ For a small-scale deployment during low operational demand, this precedent succeeded, minimizing effects across the Guard and magnifying them only in one battalion and one brigade. This sort of success, however, was misleading and unsustainable in a large-scale, high-tempo environment. The process used to mobilize the single infantry company strained state resources, essentially through equipment and focused personnel cross-leveling. This process exposed the state equipment stores and the strength of the infantry brigade to high risk if the brigade or other units were mobilized while Company C remained in Bosnia with the cross-leveled gear and personnel.

Similarly, the company’s training processes revealed some issues that surfaced during the more demanding War on Terror. The company trained

for a bridge security mission over the Sava River, in the village of Slavonski Brod on the border between Bosnia and Croatia. The infantrymen from Virginia trained locally in Virginia, then in Fort Polk, Louisiana before deployment to Bosnia.³⁴ Over this period they had multiple sets of trainers from First Army, the main active component training command for mobilizing reserve component soldiers east of the Mississippi River. This caused some confusion for the Guard unit, resulting in repeated training with differing standards while in Virginia and then in Louisiana, an issue that remained since the mobilization experience for Operation Desert Storm. The company, operating within the restrictions of the Presidential Reserve Call-up for a 270-day mobilization, had to find ways to maximize its mobilized time, which led to conducting extensive pre-mobilization training. This minimized time at the mobilization site prior to deploying overseas, something that became a major initiative in the later wars.³⁵ Many of the Virginia infantry company's experiences anticipated those of the Texas Army Guard's 49th Armored Division headquarters when it next mobilized in 2000.

The Texas division headquarters deployed for Operation Joint Forge to Bosnia, supporting the local elections as Task Force Eagle and Multi-national Division-North from March 2000 to October 2000.³⁶ It was the first Army Guard division to deploy and command active component units since the Korean War, as well as the first Guard division to control allied forces. The Army Guard division also served as an example of the many benefits of early notification and increased mobilization funding that later became the goal during the coming wars. Its early notification in September 1998 for a mobilization in March 2000, combined with increased training funds provided the Texas division headquarters the keys to a successful mobilization. When the 49th Armored Division headquarters prepared to mobilize to take over the United States' sector in Bosnia, it did so with three times the normal reserve component training time allocated to them in the year prior, over 108 days of training compared to the normal 39 days. The division headquarters switched from the standard mobilize-train-deploy model, where they did not conduct mobilization-specific training until after they arrived at mobilization station, to a train-mobilize-deploy model. The 49th Division headquarters' model remained the exception, and only later, after the struggles in the early days of the War on Terror, did it become the standard. However, mobilization issues remained as the division cross-leveled personnel from across the state to fill vacancies for its mobilization.³⁷

As the Total Force policy evolved from concept to policy with the end of Vietnam War and the termination of the draft, it matured further after

Operation Desert Storm. The policy continued the regular, deeper involvement of the Army Guard in multiple mobilizations, supporting humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. The resulting mobilization process indicated that many critical issues remained concerning Guard unit mobilization, involving policy, personnel management, equipping, health readiness, and training. These formed the main core issues that challenged the Army mobilization of the Guard forces in the high operational tempo and demand that emerged in the dynamically changing security environment of the Global War on Terrorism. Over several contingency operations, the DoD and the United States Army, along with the Army National Guard, adjusted to the evolving mobilization process to effectively meet national security demands with the Total Army force available.

The Army National Guard on 10 September 2001

The Army Guard at the turn of the 21st Century effectively met its mobilization requirements around the world, fulfilling a growing demand for more involvement. The Guard expanded its role in the rotational deployments for the major peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and the Sinai with commitments of more Guard division headquarters after the 49th Armored Division's successful tour in 2000. In addition, more combat arms units rotated for duty similar to Company C, 3rd Battalion, 116th Infantry of the Virginia Army Guard. Even if the Army Guard did not send combat units above company-level, its experience foreshadowed the future mobilization demands on the Guard's ground combat forces. The hurdles the Guard faced concerning personnel manning, health readiness, equipping the force, and training units for mobilizations in the decade before 9/11 would reemerge with exponential impact on Army Guard mobilization supporting the War on Terror.

Even as it increased its commitments to peacekeeping rotations, the Guard remained resourced as a strategic reserve. Within the US Army's priority-based resourcing, the Guard faced significant preparedness issues. Restricted budget and the national strategy focused on defeating a major nation-state adversary placed the Army Guard in tiered readiness, providing a cost-effective means for maintaining a large force in reserve for use in future major wars. The nature of reserve-component duty provided less expensive means to maintain a military force, with typical training involving one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer. The reserve component stood as a vast pool of trained units available to call in time of war to expand the active component at a fraction of the price. Sustaining a large portion of the available forces in a strategic reserve status was possible with the intention they would have a longer mobilization period.

The longer mobilization period allowed the necessary time required for units, other than the designated early deploying units such as the Enhanced Separate Brigades (eSB), to bring their readiness to acceptable levels.³⁸

The allocation of resources between early deploying units and later follow on forces in the Army Guard focused on six main areas. Tiered resourcing prioritized the support provided to the following: vacancy fills (personnel strength), fulltime staff personnel support for the unit's day-to-day activities, equipment, maintenance, access to individual military schooling and training qualifications, and extra funding for additional days to train beyond the standard thirty-nine days a year the Guard conducted.³⁹ For example, the eSBs received 80 percent of required maintenance funding while the lower tiered Guard divisions received 74 percent in the fiscal year leading up to 9/11.⁴⁰

Tiered readiness bred an environment of the “haves” and “have-nots” between the large Army Guard divisions and the eSBs. The Guard divisions' readiness funding varied between 65-74 percent for authorized strength (personnel) and 65-79 percent for authorized equipment.⁴¹ Authorized resourcing failed to tell the entire story. In Fiscal Year 2000, even among the priority-tiered eSBs only 13 of 15 enhanced brigades met the deployable criteria of the Defense Planning Guidance, and these were the Army Guard's main focus for readiness efforts. In comparison, the same year the Guard divisions' overall training and resources dropped 3.5 percent across Military Occupational Specialty Qualification (MOSQ) rates, equipment maintenance levels and unit training.⁴² The following year eSBs participation in rotations for Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia increased, resulting in even more priority resourcing. This brought the number up to 14 of 15 eSBs reaching the Defense Planning Guidance deployable criteria. The eSBs received a 7 percent increase in equipment on hand while the eight lower tiered divisions saw an overall 5.1 percent decline in unit resourcing and training.⁴³

On the eve of 9/11, the Army Guard continued to meet and expand its support to the peacetime demands of the US Army. Within the construct of tiered readiness, the Guard continued the pattern of balancing priority resourcing and funding to the designated early deploying units as well as major efforts focused on the units specifically slated for deployments overseas. The tiered readiness system necessitated the precedent of cross-leveling personnel and equipment to fulfill its mobilization requirements. By mid-2001, the Guard already faced a growing demand for participation in peacekeeping operations but managed to meet this demand through previously acceptable practices such as cross-leveling.

Notes

1. Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 277-279.
2. Frank N. Schubert and Theresa C. Kraus eds., *The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995) 70; John J. McGrath, *The Brigade: A History Its Organization and Emoyment in the US Army* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004) 77-79.
3. Schubert and Kraus eds., *The Whirlwind War*, 34; Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 241.
4. Doubler, 329.
5. Joint Publications 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
6. Joint Publications 1-02.
7. Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 306-307; Headquarters Department of the Army, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, "Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report (AAR): Volume III, Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS) Reports," September 1991, 23-24.
8. Headquarters Department of the Army, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, "Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report (AAR), 24-25, 27-28.
9. United States General Accounting Office, *National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), 10.
10. Headquarters Department of the Army, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, "Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report (AAR), 29; Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 329. The Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) was known as the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) until it was amended by Congress in 1998 to the PRC.
11. Title 10 USC 12304 was formerly Title 10 USC 673(b) before renumbered in 1994 and was the authority used for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and various peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.
12. Schubert and Kraus eds., *The Whirlwind War*, 71-72; Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 310.
13. Les' Melnyk, *Mobilizing for the Storm: The Army National Guard in Orations Desert Shield and Desert Storm*, (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, Office of Public Affairs Historical Services Division, 2001), 9, 12-14; Schubert and Kraus eds., *The Whirlwind War*, 71-73.
14. Headquarters Department of the Army, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, "Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report (AAR), 53-54; GAO, "Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare," 10.
15. Melnyk, *Mobilizing for the Storm*, 20.
16. Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 307; GAO, "Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare," 45.

17. Gary W. Allen, "Dental Health in the Army Reserves and National Guard—a Mobilization Problem?" (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1992), 4-5.
18. GAO, "Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare," 21-22.
19. Allen, "Dental Health in the Army Reserves and National Guard," 17-18.
20. Headquarters Department of the Army, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, "Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report (AAR), 33-34.
21. GAO, "Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare," 27, 48.
22. Headquarters Department of the Army, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, "Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report (AAR), 77, 94-95; GAO, "Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare," 13-14; Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 315-317.
23. GAO, "Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare," 25-26, 28.
24. Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 331.
25. GAO, "Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare," 4, 14-16.
26. Melnyk, *Mobilizing for the Storm*, 23; Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 319-322.
27. Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 16, 19.
28. "Army National Guard Combat Reform Act of 1992," in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, 102d Congress, H.R. 5006, enacted 1992.
29. John Sloan Brown, *Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the US Army, 1989-2005* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 117; Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 336.
30. Brown, *Kevlar Legions*, 180-181; Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 349-351; McGrath, *The Brigade*, 103-104.
31. Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 354-355. Later the MFO-Sinai mission reverted to regular units, discontinuing the combined active and reserve component volunteer composite unit, and after 9/11 the mission became a regular mobilization rotation for Army National Guard combat units.
32. Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 357.
33. Steve Rader et al., *Mobilizing an Infantry Company: The Experience of Calling Up C/3-116th Infantry (Virginia Army National Guard) for Operation Joint Guard*, (McLean: Science Applications International Corration, 1998), 1, 27-28, C-2.
34. Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 287, 307.
35. Rader et al., *Mobilizing an Infantry Company*, 1, 14.
36. In 2000, while no high demand existed for division-level deployments, and the Active Component had divisions available, the Army National Guard filled the Bosnia requirement. In cases like the 49th Armored Division, it is usually one, or a combination of, reason(s) why the Army leadership and the Army Guard select a Guard unit in place of available Active Component units. These reasons can include Army prioritization of available forces for maintaining

flexible responses to contingencies; Army Guard volunteering for missions for experience and for demonstrated relevancy in a budget restricting or downsizing period; or simply the Active Component passing on a deployment not desirable but still a requirement to the Army Guard.

37. “49th Armored Division (Texas Army National Guard) Operation Joint Forge, SFOR-7 After Action Report,” dated 2000, IV, 6, 8-9, 16, Historians Files; Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD*, 367.

38. Government Accounting Office, “Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions,” 2004, 9; Michael D. Doubler, *I AM THE GUARD: A History of the Army National Guard, 1635-2000* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 301.

39. Government Accounting Office, “Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve Forces,” 2003, 33.

40. Christopher N. Koontz, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 2001* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 36.

41. GAO, “Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare,” 9.

42. Army National Guard, *The Army National Guard Annual Financial Report – Fiscal Year 2000* (Arlington: Government Printing Office, 2000), 7.

43. Koontz, *DAHSUM, FY 2001*, 34, and Army National Guard, *The Army National Guard Annual Financial Report—Fiscal Year 2001* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 6-7.

Chapter Two

Going Over There

Breaking the Force, September 2001–December 2004

The 9/11 Responses

On 11 September 2001, the United States entered its first war of the 21st Century when terrorists flew two passenger airliners into the Twin Towers in New York City. A third flight struck the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. and a fourth plane crashed in a rural Pennsylvania field. The Army Guard responded immediately. Across New York City, soldiers flocked to the scene as volunteers and official first responders. Likewise, in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia Guard units responded to the attacks. In fact, National Guard soldiers were counted among the casualties in the Pentagon and, as civilian employees, at the World Trade Centers.

In the aftermath, the Guard undertook an unprecedented commitment to support one of its main missions: homeland security. They served across the nation in various active duty statuses. Many initially began on state active duty (SAD) orders before transitioning to Title 32 orders. As the Guard joined the overseas response to 9/11, they served on Title 10 orders.¹ The variety of active duty statuses served by these men and women directly attributed to the dual role of the Army National Guard, fulfilling both federal and state missions.

On 14 September 2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order (EO) 13223 invoking his authority under the Title 10, USC, to activate the reserve component for a partial mobilization. By issuing a partial mobilization order, the President called the soldiers and units to active duty for no more than 24 consecutive months by law.² This formally brought the Army Guard into the War on Terror.

Before the end of the 2001, Army National Guard Special Forces units were already mobilizing to support the war on terrorism. In December 2001, only months after the devastating attacks and the President's EO 13223, the 19th Special Forces Group, headquartered in Utah, mobilized for war. A month later, the Guard's only other Special Forces Group mobilized as well, the 20th Special Forces Group headquartered in Alabama.³ In only 30 days, elements of the 19th Special Forces Group, formed around the core of its 2nd Battalion from the West Virginia Army National Guard with companies from sister battalions in Utah and Colorado, deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).⁴ Even these small, spe-

Status	Description	Example of use
State Active Duty	State funded, under state control of the governor according to state laws	Such as natural disasters, civil disturbances
Title 32	Federally funded, under state control to prepare for federal missions	Such as, homeland security missions, any training associated with federal mission
Title 10	Federally funded, under federal control for federal missions	Such as, overseas deployments or in other uses for federal mission

Figure 2.1. National Guard Active Duty Statuses Explained. Source: GAO Report "Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare."

cialized units recorded struggles with their mobilization, but as it had before, the Army Guard overcame their obstacles and met operational demands. The Guard Special Force’s primary concerns included the lack of active duty Special Forces cadre to assist their mobilization due to the high numbers of Special Forces already deployed, the integration of new equipment they had never seen, the shortages of other equipment, and a chronic lack of ammunition for training. Some of the Special Forces companies went through the mobilization process multiple times, transferring from one Army Guard battalion to another that had just started the process.⁵

The 2nd Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group, completed many individual mobilization tasks prior to reporting to its first mobilization sta-



Figure 2.3. Maj. Gen. James F. Fretterd, the Maryland National Guard adjutant general, speaks with members of the state's 200th and 290th Military Police Companies on 22 August 2002 during their redeployment ceremony after spending nearly a year protecting the Pentagon after the 9/11 attacks.

tion at Fort Knox, Kentucky in December 2001. This cut its mobilization time from an estimated week to only three days, allowing the Special Forces battalion to move to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where it joined the active duty 5th Special Forces Group that it would support in Afghanistan. Here, the Army Guard Special Forces competed for precious training resources and ranges with tenant units at Fort Campbell and non-mobilizing reserve units with previously scheduled training exercises. The previously anticipated training ammunition went to these units rather than the newly arrived, mobilizing Army Guard Special Forces, a major impact on the Guard unit's training. From arrival at Fort Campbell in mid-December until mid-January 2002, the battalion was unable to fire a single bullet in training.⁶

The issues faced by these elite formations were common among all early mobilizations. Many of the problems stemmed from the reliance on activated Army Reserve units to perform the mobilization process for other reserve and Army Guard units. In many cases, reserve units assigned to mobilize the deploying reserve component units arrived after the units they were meant to process had already arrived at the mobilization station. Since widespread mobilization of the reserve component is an intermittent requirement, only occurring during contingencies or

large-scale wars, the Army relied mostly on Army Reserve units to fulfil this role. In an attempt to maximize efficiency, the Army Reserve units could be kept in a reserve status and only activated as needed. In light of this, the specialization and use of active component units for mobilization station activities would be inefficient, as they would have no consistent, use for daily activities on active duty outside of a contingency or large scale combat operation involving mobilization of the reserve component. Such occurrences, combined with competition for time and resources with resident active component units and other formations preparing to deploy, resulted in a disjointed effort.⁷

Though few large Army National Guard units mobilized for deployment to Afghanistan immediately after the 9/11 attacks, many Guard soldiers mobilized supporting homeland security in Operation Noble Eagle. During these stateside call-ups many Guard units supported increased security at key locations such as bridges, airports, and power stations. For overseas mobilizations, the focus was on individuals, small detachments, and high-demand specialty capabilities. The Army drew from the National Guard's specialized and highly skilled individuals to augment its deploying forces and increase training output in critical fields such as intelligence and linguistics. October 2001 saw multiple intelligence units drained of personnel across the nation, starting with the Utah Army National Guard's 142nd Military Intelligence Battalion mobilizing nearly two dozen specialized soldiers. Soon, the Army widened their reach, calling up individuals, based on their skill sets, from Guard units across the nation. This, deepened the impact felt by the affected Guard units losing significant portions of, or highly-specialized soldiers from, their ranks to deploy while the rest of the unit remained stateside. In addition to these high-demand forces—Special Operations, intelligence, and linguists—the Army also mobilized Army National Guard units to perform garrison duties at posts in the United States and Europe. Backfilling forward-deploying active component units represented the majority of federal mobilizations for the Army National Guard early in the war. During the first year of the war, over 2,000 guardsmen, under Task Force SANTA FE, deployed to Europe from Kansas, Illinois, and Kentucky, allowing active component forces to head to Afghanistan.⁸

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Guard responded, but did so with problems created by peacetime readiness levels. As of 30 September 2001, the Army Guard reported that 87 percent of 1,527 reporting units met the peacetime (tiered) readiness goals, which were lower than wartime unit readiness levels required by theater commanders. By Septem-

ber 2002, only one year into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), 71 percent of non-deployed units met the lower peacetime readiness equipment standards due to excessive cross-leveling of equipment to deploying units.⁹ As the Guard continued adjusting to its support for the war effort in Afghanistan, the operational demand placed on the Army Guard grew larger in the newest theater of the war: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Mobilizing for the New Front

In the aftermath of the rapid collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and its remnants in retreat, the US military turned its focus to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. While operations continued in Afghanistan, planning for the invasion of Iraq began in earnest. The Army Guard mobilized for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from late 2002 to early 2003. Over 31,800 guardsmen from 45 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico—170 units in all—mobilized to support the invasion of Iraq. Most of the mobilizing units were either combat support or combat service support units such as engineer, military police, and transportation formations.¹⁰ Seven infantry battalion-sized elements from the Guard also mobilized. The 1st Battalion, 293rd Infantry from Indiana was the only Army Guard infantry battalion to mobilize as a complete battalion, marking the first time since the Korean War an Army Guard infantry battalion entered combat as a whole unit. The other infantry battalions broke up after mobilizing to serve as security for various other units, like Patriot Air Defense Artillery batteries and supply lines.¹¹

During this first large mobilization to support the initial invasion of Iraq, uncertainty and lack of understanding on use of Guard forces manifested, illuminating the lack of experience senior Army leadership had with large scale incorporation and use of the Guard. Since the Korean War, with a slight, short-term deviation in Operation Desert Storm, the Army had not had to rely on the mass use of the Army Guard and instead only used Army Guard for limited, or minor requirements not as an integral part of an operational plan. In one example, four Illinois transportation companies were alerted, moved to their mobilization station only to then after a few months be sent back home, told they would not be needed. Even as this happened, Maj. Gen. Henry Stratman, Deputy Commanding General—Support for Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) the headquarters overseeing the ground campaign into Iraq, noted those same units may be recalled in a few months due to the increasing demands on transportation in theater.¹² With escalating violence after the fall of Saddam's regime, the plan to contract logistical support failed to meet reality.

The inefficient use of Guard forces by calling them to mobilization stations only to turn them back home again was not the only example of the Army's lack of experience in using the reserve component forces. The miscalculation of the time required for reserve component unit mobilization effected initial movement into theater, as the preponderance of logistical units critical to opening a theater for additional forces' arrival, such as port units, fuel units, and transportation assets, resided in the reserve component. Without swift and early identification and activation of these specific, specialized units—which did not come until December 2002 for most—limited the speed with which they could mobilize into theater to support the flow of follow on forces. Maj. Gen. James D. Thurman, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), the headquarters for the invasion of Iraq, stated the emphasis previously for readiness was in the enhanced brigades, the Army Guard's combat formations. He noted that the Army needed to prioritize mobilization of theater logistics forces from the reserve component to support movement of the bulk of Army forces into the theater, not combat units.¹³ Unfortunately, the reserve component's logistical units were not sourced for rapid mobilization. At this early stage in the wars, Army leadership displayed their inexperience in the intricacies of Guard mobilization, such as administrative, training, and resourcing requirements. It also revealed their lack of understanding the impact call ups to mobilize and then be sent home, only to be potentially called again, might cause for these citizen soldiers who had jobs and families not accustomed to military life, potentially affecting morale and retention. In communities spread across the nation, many far from military installations and rarely all even in one town, the families of National Guard soldiers did not possess the same family support system as their active component counterparts had with their posts and habitual family readiness group meetings and social support interactions. In many cases, these families faced additional strains financially when soldiers left better-paying civilian jobs. The sudden stress for families not used to long-term separations also had a significant impact on Guard soldiers' lives. It had not been since the Korean War that such a large-scale mobilization of the Army Guard had occurred, taking so many soldiers away from their families, careers, and other pursuits. The now anticipated, but unknown, struggles of re-integration upon their return was a source of anxiety for soldiers, families, and employers.

One of the unique missions Army Guard infantry units conducted during the initial invasion of Iraq was security for Army Special Forces, supporting the Florida Army Guard's Company C, 2nd Battalion, 124th



Figure 2.4. Untitled, oil on canvas, Elzie Golden, 2005. This painting by Florida Guardsman Elzie Golden depicts the Florida Army Guard's Company C, 2nd Battalion, 124th Infantry breaching the berm on 19 March, 2003 to allow Special Forces to cross into Iraq to start the invasion.

Infantry claim of the first conventional unit to enter Iraq. They earned this distinction early on 19 March 2003 when under cover of darkness, they breached the sand berm separating the coalition forces from Iraq, allowing elements of the 5th Special Forces Group to pass into Iraq.¹⁴

From activation to deployment, the initial mobilization for Operation Iraqi Freedom averaged 33 days per unit, although the majority of the units were smaller elements (below brigade and only limited battalion-sized) and were mostly non-combat units, which historically mobilized faster than combat units who had additional—and more complicated—training requirements with lengthier validation exercises.¹⁵ These Army Guard units deployed with the understanding their activation was for a total of 365 days, but previous deployments had been managed around six month timelines.¹⁶

However, the swift collapse of the Iraqi regime did not signal the end of US military presence in Iraq, but the beginning of a long occupation in which the Army Guard would be deeply involved. Enemy attacks nearly doubled from 250 in June to nearly 500 in July 2003. In July, the improvised explosive device (IED) emerged as the weapon of choice against US forces. A truck bomb exploded, destroying the United Nations (UN) headquarters on 19 August 2003, leading to a highly-public withdrawal of the UN presence from Iraq.¹⁷ During the summer of 2003 the situation spiraled out of control, and the coalition forces quickly had to adjust in response.

On 8 September 2003 the Combined Joint Task Force–7 (CJTF-7), the new US headquarters in Iraq, announced that the Army Guard units mobilized for the invasion of Iraq would extend their deployment to 12 months “boots on ground.” The extension altered the Guard units’ understanding of 12 months total mobilization, which would have counted the time spent in training stateside prior to overseas deployment.¹⁸ Col. Ronald Westfall, a state mobilization officer, reflected this resulted in some confusion and uncertainty for Army Guard units in theater as some were already redeploying based off the 365-day mobilization order while others had their orders changed to keep them in Iraq for 12 months in theater.¹⁹ The uncertainty associated with the confusion between 12-month total mobilization, which counted the time at the mobilization station before and after overseas duty, or 12 months specifically in country deeply affected the Guard soldiers and their families who for them military service was an interruption in their normal lives, interruption in their civilian employment and their life routine. Additive stress also came from maintaining communication and relationships with soldiers’ civilian employers, or in remotely overseeing their personally owned small businesses, all while also managing expectations with families not used to military life. Next, in an unanticipated move in an unexpectedly lengthening war, the Army Guard called for three combat brigades to mobilize for OIF II. This signaled a definitive shift towards a more extended commitment in contrast to previous United States Army Reserve (USAR) and Army Guard experiences with peacekeeping operations and Operation Enduring Freedom. Troop numbers from the Army Guard increased from 30,000 in OIF I to 40,000 in OIF II for the first rotational deployment, marking a clear change.²⁰

The first Operation Iraqi Freedom unit rotation was the largest in US Army history. In previous wars, America’s Army either mobilized and deployed units for the duration, such as the two World Wars, or rotated individual replacements out of units remaining in theater as in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The only experience the US Army had with unit rotations were the low demand, limited-scope peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, which paled in comparison to OIF and OEF rotations. More than 244,000 soldiers rotated into and out of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) area between March and June 2004 for the transition to OIF II.²¹ At this point the US Army reluctantly began to embrace a long (rotational) war, compared to small-scale interventions and planned for limited commitment. Rooted in the Total Force policy, the Army Guard possessed a critical role in precisely this kind of long-term commitment in the War on Terror.

Mobilizing for a Rotational War

The beginning of a rotational war ushered in the management of longer-term mobilization of the reserve component by the DoD under Title 10 and within the guidance of the Secretary of Defense. In a series of memorandums dating from 1 November 2002 to 9 July 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld enunciated a desire to shift away from a strict Total Force policy of the previous century, even as the commitment to the two wars increased. In his initiative to rebalance the force structure more effectively across the active and reserve components, Rumsfeld expressed his intent that, “every time we want to do anything we don’t have to activate Reserves.”²² Even as Rumsfeld emphasized how he saw the future with his initiative to rebalance the force, the immediate present, and unforeseen future, saw the Army Guard increasingly called upon.

Beyond the public law Title 10 codes, DoD policy affected Army Guard mobilization. An important factor in the developing policy and procedures for mobilization of the Army Guard included “judicious and prudent” use. As mobilization policy developed, Secretary Rumsfeld made this factor a paramount consideration. The base of “judicious and prudent” use was in the Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1235.10 covering the “Activation, Mobilization and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve.”²³ The directive served as one of the primary policy documents affecting Guard mobilizations under Title 10. Until the Office of the Secretary of Defense codified updated policies for the notification, number of tours, and voluntary versus involuntary call-ups of the reserve component on 23 September 2004, the DoDD 1235.10 dated 1 July 1995 governed the period.

One of the policies influencing Guard mobilizations early in the war was the “consecutive” versus “cumulative” time limit. The policy interpretation of the 24-month limit under 12302, not as “consecutive” time limit, but as a “cumulative” time limit, came from a mobilization-policy memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness dated 20 September 2001. It stated, “No member of a reserve Component called to involuntary active duty under 10 USC 12302...shall serve on active duty in excess of 24 months...as long as the total combined periods of service... does not exceed 24 months.”²⁴ The interpretation especially complicated personnel mobilization for the Guard. By following these restrictions, the Army Guard had a finite pool of individuals it could draw from and a concrete amount of time for their use. However, once their involuntary mobilization exceeded the 24-month cumulative limit, they could still be a member of the Guard but were unavailable, without

volunteering, for additional mobilizations in the war on terror.

A method that circumvented the entire issue championed voluntary mobilization rather than involuntary. The difference existed within Title 10 mobilization regulations between a 12301(d) voluntary mobilization and a 12302 involuntary mobilization. 12301(d), known as “volunteerism,” became the preferred method. Although it helped alleviate the pressure found in policy limitations of involuntary remobilization and length of mobilization (the cumulative versus consecutive interpretation), volunteerism had severe consequences elsewhere, exacerbating the crisis that developed in the early years due to the practice of cross-leveling. The DoDD 1235.10 of July 1995 stated, “Volunteers from Reserve component units shall not be used in numbers that would degrade the readiness standards of their parents Reserve units.”²⁵ This passage limited volunteerism at the expense of the donating unit. In the reality of fulfilling the operational requirements and meeting the demand, however, an Army National Guard mobilization After Action Report (AAR) stated in no uncertain terms, “This policy obviously has been ignored since the events of 9/11.”²⁶ The practice of cross-leveling both personnel and equipment that had successfully supported Guard mobilizations in the recent past was reaching crippling levels. From 9/11 to July 2004 the Army Guard cross-leveled 74,000 individuals. In addition, by May 2004, it cross-leveled 35,000 pieces of equipment.²⁷

The Guard took action to address the growing personnel crisis. In early 2003, Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, Chief of National Guard Bureau, implemented a restructuring of the various state headquarters. It was his first month into his new position when General Blum made it clear he desired streamlining and modernization of the state headquarters’ in line with the move of the active component towards centralized, joint-combined headquarters. Operation Noble Eagle and the use of Army National Guard soldiers across the nation to protect key infrastructure led



Figure 2.5. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld speaking to troops at Manas Airbase in Kyrgyzstan, a common transition point for units to pass through on their way to Afghanistan.

to manning new 24/7 Joint Operations Centers (JOC). Previously, the state headquarters were composed of three distinct staffs, one for the adjutant general—the head of the state’s National Guard—, and one each for the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard state forces. This resulted in 162 different headquarters in the National Guard prior to Blum’s intended transition to a joint headquarters. Speaking at the Pentagon, Blum spoke in his characteristically blunt manner saying it was “too much headquarters...too much overhead...too much duplication.”²⁸ Blum’s program sought efficiency in Guard manpower management, not a reduction, looking for ways to alleviate personnel issues in units while modernizing the states’ headquarters.

Blum’s emphasized program streamlined the organizations into Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) eliminating two-thirds of the personnel slots. Instead of removing these personnel from the Guard completely, the Guard transferred them to fill standing unit shortfalls.²⁹ Although this helped, it only temporarily filled the personnel-readiness void. The restructuring of the state headquarters into Joint Force Headquarters, however, did more than increase efficiency in personnel management. It aligned the National Guard state-level command and control apparatuses with the evolving active component’s use of joint headquarters and task forces in the growing war. By October 2003, the states came around to Blum’s message of change. With National Guard Bureau (NGB) support and additional resources, they converted their traditional state headquarters over to the new model, with completed conversions among the 54 states and territories’ National Guards reaching 89 percent by the end of 2005. These JFHQs critically supported homeland activities like natural disasters, security initiatives along the border, and at critical infrastructure sites across the country.³⁰

While the rebalancing-forces initiative identified the severe impact of cross-leveling on readiness and unit cohesion, cross-leveling remained the way to meet demand in the Guard. The mobilizing units struggled as teams were broken up and rebuilt and leaders came and went during training. Formations that remained behind lost their most capable and prepared soldiers as well as their equipment to support deploying units, even as they themselves had to prepare for their place in the rotational war.³¹ NGB provided the new state JFHQs cross-leveling guidance, emphasizing that when mobilizing a unit the state should fill the personnel shortages within their ability and only after exhausting the state’s capabilities should they turn to the Bureau for personnel requests.³²

The equipment issue, alone, threatened the Guard’s ability to fulfill its state response and homeland security missions. Early in the war, equip-

ment cross-leveling resulted in non-deployed units lacking up to 33 percent of their essential items. By June 2004, even with the massive effort to cross-level equipment to deploying units, thus stripping non-deploying units, the Guard still had to request the active component to provide 13,000 pieces of equipment to raise its deploying units to the equipment readiness standard.³³ The equipment drain across the Army Guard, even then still requiring additional active component assistance to get mobilizing units to deployment readiness standards, provides an example of the result from a low resourced Guard continually used on a large-scale during the opening years of war. A legacy of substitute items, readiness resourcing, and prioritization revealed this stark reality.

While the Army Guard adjusted to the new demands made by a deepening commitment in Iraq, it simultaneously supported the war effort in Afghanistan. As the Army addressed the new requirements coming out of OIF, it shifted certain missions, which were outside a unit's normal training and organizational focus, from active component rotations to the Army Guard. One of these non-standard missions given to the Guard was the Task Force Phoenix training and advisory mission to the Afghanistan National Army. The 45th Enhanced Separate Brigade from Oklahoma illustrated the resulting problems the Guard faced managing personnel readiness and the Army's routine assignment of non-standard missions to the Guard.

In September 2003, the 45th Infantry Brigade mobilized out of Fort Carson, Colorado to take over responsibility for Task Force Phoenix from the active component and the Special Forces. Initially, the Special Forces managed the training for the Afghanistan National Army, but the growing size and scope of the mission soon outpaced their organization and structure. Following the Special Forces, the Army deployed a brigade from the 10th Mountain Division to take over the mission; however, with the increasing demand for combat brigades in the Iraq war the mission transitioned to the Army Guard brigades.

The brigade trained for 45 days before deploying to Afghanistan. The 1,100 soldiers from 19 different states were hand selected to be trainers and advisors to the Afghan Army. In addition, 150 active component troops and US Marines later joined the force to fill vacancies.³⁴ As the Guard prepared to increase its unit deployments to support OIF II, the strain caused by missions such as these—pulling specific, skilled individuals from across the Army National Guard—clearly affected the readiness levels for the parent units. The policies developed regarding multiple involuntary mobilizations and the cumulative 24-month interpretation exac-

erated the personnel issue. Even when these individuals demobilized and returned to their parent units, the policy effected personnel management if that unit was now involuntarily mobilizing for its rotation.

An impact from the “cumulative” versus “consecutive” interpretation occurred with the 39th Infantry Brigade in Iraq during OIF II. Three Army Guard combat brigades were in the OIF II rotation, including the 39th Brigade of the Arkansas Army National Guard.³⁵ The brigade already suffered from personnel shortages and it took an entire infantry battalion from the Oregon Army National Guard’s 41st Infantry Brigade to round out its structure. Two of the infantry battalions assigned to the 39th Brigade had four hundred soldiers combined who had reached their cumulative twenty-four-month limit from service in MFO-Sinai in 2002. Only seven months after arriving in Iraq, these two battalions faced a personnel crisis. They had to develop incentives to keep the soldiers on as “volunteers” under the auspices of 12301(d) “volunteerism” rather than the 12302 involuntary mobilization under which they were activated.³⁶ When the 24-month limit arrived, less than one-quarter remained as volunteers to finish out the tour. In some cases, nearly entire platoons departed, forcing significant restructuring in some companies. The fracture caused upheaval as some stayed, and others left, requiring replacements coming primarily from Arkansas and Oregon. While there was no standard across the Army Guard for how this nuanced, personnel crisis was handled, as it depended case by case with each state and specific unit’s degree of “volunteers,” the struggles of the 39th Brigade was not an isolated incident during this time, signaling a need for addressing for a continued, reuse of Guard soldiers in a prolonged war,

The replacements mainly came straight from training or other assignments that had kept them from taking part in the original mobilization. They had limited experience in general and none like those their predecessors had developed over seven months in Iraq. Junior leaders shifted to higher levels of responsibility when the original leaders elected to return home after reaching their limit. The policy removed a few even in the middle of a deployment, in one case including an infantry company commander.³⁷ The Arkansas infantry brigade was not unique in facing a personnel crisis from the 24-month cumulative policy, but it experienced more drama in having it occur mid-stride during a deployment.

Across the Army Guard, units struggled with personnel problems resulting from the cumulative time policy. This was especially true during the preparations for mobilization, as in the case of the 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry “Fighting 69th” from New York in 2004. The New York infantry battalion served as an example of the Guard’s diverse responses to 9/11.

The “Fighting 69th” had portions of its companies serve on federal orders guarding the United States Military Academy at West Point (USMA), while other 69th units also served on State Active Duty immediately following 9/11 at Ground Zero and New York City, and they later protected key infrastructure throughout the city, such as bridges and tunnels.

Originally bounced around from MFO-Sinai to Balkan assignments, the increasing demand for Iraq brought the 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry into an Operation Iraqi Freedom rotation, slated for May 2004. The average 18-month mobilizations for OIF/OEF rotations for Guard units—compared to the 10-month average for peacekeeping missions—meant that over 150 veterans of the 69th’s federal duty at West Point would surpass the 24-month limit before completing their Iraq rotation. They had to volunteer to accompany the already thin ranks of the battalion to Iraq. Nearly 80 percent did so.³⁸ Although the dedication of the New Yorkers circumvented the personnel policy issue and addressing it during mobilization avoided many struggles the Arkansas brigade experienced, the strain was clear. Even maintaining the volunteer ranks, the one New York battalion broke apart four other battalions from the state and took numerous individual volunteers from across the country, taking the best from the units left behind. Over half of the personnel going to Iraq were new to the battalion.³⁹

The 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry “Volunteers” from Oregon, which filled out the 39th Brigade, illustrated the cyclical downward spiral for readiness the Army Guard experienced. Elements of this battalion supported its parent brigade, the 41st Infantry Brigade, when the battalion cross-leveled individuals to the 1st Battalion, 162nd Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry for their deployments to the Sinai and Iraq. When the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry received its alert for mobilization, the battalion executive officer concluded only 370 soldiers in the unit were deployable, whereas the battalion needed over 700 to fulfill its OIF II mission. To fill these gaps the 41st Infantry Brigade cross-leveled personnel to the Volunteers from multiple units, including the very units to which the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry had provided personnel previously. Entire platoons formed and, similar to the “Fighting 69th,” nearly one-half the battalion was new when it reported to Fort Hood, Texas for mobilization.⁴⁰

This cyclical cross-leveling drained and exhausted the Army Guard’s manpower reserves at startling rates. This drain applied to the specific pool of deployable guardsmen, not to the overall Army Guard numbers, leading to an additional aspect of mobilizing a unit for war. Before even addressing any other requirements, units simply had to have the personnel and these personnel had to be available and healthy.

Health of the Force

Reserve component health readiness had been one of the principal problem areas and focus of reform efforts pre-2001 after Operation Desert Storm. Even with these changes, health readiness—medical and dental—remained a critical issue for mobilizing Guard units. In early 2001, to support the enforcement of the previous reforms, the Army began utilization of the Federal Strategic Healthcare Alliance (FEDS_HEAL) Program to support the Guard in enacting the health readiness changes. A collection of private and Department of Veterans Affairs doctors and dentists formed FEDS_HEAL to augment the Army’s internal healthcare capabilities to support the Guard’s medical requirements, which called for medical physicals once every five years for soldiers under 40-years old, every two years for those over 40, and the annual dental classification screenings for all soldiers. Prior to the FEDS_HEAL, guardsmen had to use military treatment facilities, which were often far from the average American communities typical of Guard units. FEDS_HEAL alleviated some of the strain on the active duty installations’ medical community and made it easier for guardsmen to adhere to the policy. However, government studies still showed that even with this step the Army poorly maintained health records for the reserve component and struggled to enforce health readiness standards.⁴¹ These standards, which the studies concluded were already not being enforced, were further added too as health readiness immediately became an issue again for mobilization.

In 2004, DoD policy further brought the Guard health readiness standards up to par with the health readiness requirements of the active component; however, its effect would take time to manifest. A DoD policy that sought “to provide a healthy and fit force” directed DoD Components to:

Provide health assessments and wellness interventions to all military personnel, that must include at least: a complete health assessment and wellness interventions for new service members; routine annual health, medical and dental assessments...; annual assessments of individual medical readiness; pre-and post-deployment health assessments.⁴²

This held the reserve components to the same standards as active duty personnel, and through FEDS_HEAL, the Army increased guardsmen accessibility to medical and dental providers outside of military installations to meet the standard.

Specific to mobilizations, the guardsmen qualified for medical insurance through TRICARE, which was the system that managed active duty

health care, with the same access as active component peers once they were on federal active orders for over 31 days, and this policy authorized early enrollment up to 90 days prior to the start of their orders.⁴³ This early enrollment into TRICARE intended to facilitate addressing health issues identified prior to mobilization. Interestingly, according to the Health Care Survey of DoD Beneficiaries (HCSDB) for October 2003, 85 percent of reserve component members had health insurance coverage before mobilization, two percent above the national average.⁴⁴

Mobilizing personnel had access to both military installation medical support and approved network contracted support through FEDS_HEAL, but still the Guard struggled with health readiness. Held to the same requirements as active component soldiers, guardsmen's health status still posed a major problem, even though they typically owned medical insurance before the pre-deployment access to free military health insurance. Specifically in regards to dental health, the Army National Guard identified dental class III and IV soldiers as the largest non-deployable category at the end of 2003.⁴⁵ Dental readiness remained a problem, even though on 1 February 2001 the TRICARE Dental Program (TDP) was in place as an extension of the earlier TRICARE Selected Reserve Dental Program. All reserve component members and their families were eligible for the TRICARE Dental Program premium-based dental insurance program.⁴⁶ The TRICARE Dental Program intended to provide cost-effective dental insurance to encourage reservists to maintain dental health at their own cost, thereby helping the military address the dental readiness issues they had experienced from previous mobilizations.

The Army attempted to make it easier for the Army Guard to attain the same level of health readiness as the active component. The degree of command focus placed on healthcare prior to mobilization, with emphasis on execution and enforcement, stood as a critical factor in a mobilizing unit's health readiness level. The 42nd Infantry Division of the New York Army National Guard, the "Rainbow Division," exemplified command involvement on health readiness.

The Army selected the 42nd Division headquarters to assume command of Multi National Division-North Central (MND-NC) in Iraq during the third troop rotation to Iraq. Mobilizing in mid-2004, it was the first Army National Guard division headquarters to deploy to a combat zone and command active component units in combat since the Korean War.⁴⁷ In April, the division had a total assigned strength of 68 percent. Even after drawing personnel from six other states, the division reached a strength of only 82 percent manning, of which 77 percent of those were deployable.

The division looked to NGB and First Army to bring its strength up to 96.4 percent for the deployment.

Even within this personnel crisis and extensive cross-leveling, the division surgeon lauded the medical readiness of the division. The command emphasis for years prior to the alert, in the form of the “Rainbow Readiness” Program, paid off during the mobilization.⁴⁸ During the preceding years, the unit had identified issues and addressed them, thus maximizing the unit’s health readiness. This resulted in minimizing Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) and mobilization station “surprises.” According to the division surgeon, this program sharply minimized the amount of personnel lost due to health reasons after arriving at mobilization site, as well as maximizing time and focus on training without health readiness-related distractions.

Units that did not have the same command emphasis as the 42nd Division, resulted in statements concerning SRP like that found in the Fifth Army survey summary, “...if the SRP training would have had more Command emphasis instead of a check the block mentality we would not be in this mess.”⁴⁹ The importance rested in the fact most medical and dental issues identified were addressed at mobilization stations, not counting major health conditions such as heart or respiratory, and the soldiers were able to continue on the deployment. However, although soldiers largely achieved acceptable health levels for deployment through intensive mobilization station medical efforts, the mobilization process suffered in multiple ways from this, chiefly in lost time, focus, and unit frustration.

Training the Force

Guard mobilization training was fraught with frustrations. Although mobilizing supposedly followed a pattern of strict personnel and health readiness enforcement and monitoring before individual and collective validation training, commanders commonly rushed to focus on training their units for the actual deployment mission. In this haste, they often spent energy and precious time on certifying individuals and teams that, through health and personnel readiness losses, ended up not deploying or at least not validating with the original team. This resulted in an additional expense of energy and planning to train and validate the replacements and cross-levels arriving later in the mobilization cycle. To an extent, this was unavoidable. The short notice of deployment, by DoD policy intended to be between 30 to 90 days, meant units had only a few weekends to conduct pre-mobilization readiness drills, and hold a pre-mobilization station SRP, much less have time to address any deficiencies identified therein.⁵⁰ Once




Figure 2.6. Major Army Mobilization Training Sites in 2004. Graphic created by Army University Press staff. Data courtesy of the author.

at their mobilization station, a strict timeline existed to get units overseas for their time in country. The Training Support Battalions (TSBn) had to keep the mobilizing units going through the line to meet the unit-based rotational timeline. The units moved through the mobilization stations like an assembly or processing line: unit arrived, unit processed, unit deployed—new unit arrived, repeat process. If they did not maintain this process the whole orchestration of rotational timelines, time in country, and transportation assets to and from theater were at risk for interruption and breakdown.⁵¹ As First and Fifth Army faced this delicate orchestration, enormous efforts resulted in units receiving validation for readiness and ability to accomplish assigned deployment missions.

During this period, the First Army's and the Fifth Army's responsibilities included mobilizing, training, validating, and deploying reserve component units. Responsibility divided geographically along the Mississippi River. First Army oversaw the eastern United States and Fifth Army the western half.

Mobilizing Guard units experienced multiple types of active duty trainers during their time with either First or Fifth Army. The longest relationship developed was between the units and their assigned unit assistants. The training formations attached unit assistants (UA) to support the pre-mobilization training of alerted Guard units through subordinate training brigades and battalions. The unit assistants often accompanied the units to their post-mobilization training at the various sites used across the nation. After a unit arrived at the mobilization station, the primary instructors came from the supporting First Army or Fifth Army Training Support Brigades (TSB). During mobilization, when the units attended the combat training centers (CTC) rotations as their final collective validation exercise—known as a Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE or MRX)—the primary training came from training center’s resident Observer-Controllers/Trainers (OC/T).

Training organizations, such as TSBns, were not new to the Army Guard after 9/11.⁵² They existed prior to 9/11 and supported guardsmen training, usually during the two weeks a year training typically conducted each summer when most Guard units executed collective training. Although the training units were not in a Guard unit’s chain of command, they were instrumental in their validation and supervision of the unit’s training. Diversity marked these training support units, with their staffs coming from a mixture of active component soldiers with Army National Guard and Army Reserve fulltime staff as well as mobilized reservists once the wars began.

The unit assistants, training support brigade personnel and OC/Ts universally faced criticism from mobilizing units. A Fifth Army mobilization survey summary stated, “Unit Assistors overall received extremely poor comments...from UA was never there to UA did not know what was going on, UA was a waste of time and non-productive.”⁵³ Likewise, the TSBn and combat training center OC/Ts suffered criticism on their experience and knowledge. The 1st Battalion, 120th Infantry of North Carolina, part of the first Guard combat brigades to deploy in OIF II, described their TSBn instructors at Fort Stewart, Georgia as unqualified in what they taught. They claimed they lacked relevant experience and deployments, regularly hearing the instructor state, “I read the POI [Period of Instruction] last night for this task.”⁵⁴ The 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry from Oregon shared similar stories from Fort Hood. This critique of First Army TSB instructors at Fort Stewart lacking qualifications echoed the results of the Fifth Army survey and observations from Fort Hood, signifying this experience existed across the Army training formations.

Guard units even criticized combat training centers' training during their preparations for the OIF II rotations. The 1st Battalion, 120th Infantry also criticized the OC/Ts from their Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation for their final exercise as lacking experience, showing in their unrealistic scenarios and "FOB [Forward Operating Base] life portrayal."⁵⁵ Similarly, the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment from Tennessee noted similar "less than ideal" forward operating base training at Fort Irwin's NTC, although they noted NTC excellently recreated "Iraqi Villages."⁵⁶ The soldiers from North Carolina went on to praise the conditions and training they received at Camp Blanding, Florida—a state National Guard training facility—as superior to Fort Stewart and better organized, the "most realistic training to date."⁵⁷

The criticism and frustration with inexperienced trainers must recognize the limited deployments the Army had seen since 9/11, indicating an unavoidable lack of experience and deployments for trainers to draw on for the current wars. Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, even before the North Carolina unit's OIF II rotation, very few active component units had deployed as only a select few combat brigades had gone to Operation Enduring Freedom. The majority were Special Operation Forces and the units that had gained experience in the initial invasion of Iraq were largely waiting for the OIF II rotation to relieve them.

Even among these complaints against the First and Fifth Army trainers and combat training center staffs, other Guard units experienced positive interactions. The 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry claimed their JRTC rotation, in the same period as the North Carolina unit, was productive, and they learned from their OC/Ts who they found experienced.⁵⁸ When the 42nd Infantry Division headquarters mobilized for Iraq in 2004, the division surgeon had high praise for the support received from the counterpart First Army surgeon for, "mentorship, guidance and support during mobilization and deployment."⁵⁹ In addition, the TSB commander accompanied the Guard division commander on his Pre Deployment Site Survey (PDSS) visit to Iraq to meet with the unit the division would replace. The site survey allowed the incoming unit to see and assess the ground and situation they would face while they still mobilized. When they returned, the training support brigade commander worked with the division commander to adjust the training plan according to how things had looked. This procedure later became standard for the supporting training unit commanders to accompany the units on their site survey.

The subordinate Army Guard combat brigades mobilizing to deploy with the 42nd Division (the 116th Cavalry Brigade from Idaho and 278th

Armored Cavalry Regiment from Tennessee) did not experience the same flexibility in their training. Due to the flag officer level of the 42nd Division headquarters, the division received training plan development and guidance authority from the First Army as it mobilized east of the Mississippi River, allowing it to affect the 278th ACR's training. However, the Idaho-based 116th Cavalry Brigade mobilized west of the Mississippi River, falling under the Fifth Army's guidance, and the division had no direct line of authority to influence the mobilization process of one of its subordinate brigades.⁶⁰

All involved in the mobilization process shared the frustration involved in post-mobilization command relationships from a lack of clearly defined policy or regulation. In many cases, the command relationship between mobilizing units and supporting units varied from mobilization station to station as far as command, control, and reporting procedures. In the trickle-down effect, this left some mobilizing units unsure of the actual chain of command during mobilization.

This issue with communication was not limited to struggles between mobilizing subordinate units. Communication across the whole spectrum of unit assistants, mobilization stations, mobilizing units, and state JFHQs caused stress and frustration. The effects of poor communication struck the mobilizing 42nd Division headquarters in the middle of its equipment struggles. The 42nd Division mobilized without all necessary equipment; a common circumstance given its lower priority for resources applied to Guard divisions when compared to the enhanced separate brigades. When it arrived at the mobilization station, the division brought equipment according to its traditional or "legacy" Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). When ordered to mobilize with full legacy MTOE and not just the mission necessary equipment, it scrambled to fill the gaps. Once mobilized, the division found out it had to ship back over 700 pieces of equipment that were either outdated or not needed for the deployment.⁶¹

Further complicating the problem, the training support brigades worked outside unit chains of command with requests. Mobilizing units received redundant required reports asking for the same information from their higher headquarters and from the training commands. Commonly, these report formats were not compatible, requiring excess time and effort for the units to accomplish during mobilization training, submitting multiple reports covering the same information to various entities in non-compatible formats.

No universally accepted post-mobilization standard for documentation existed, resulting in conflicting criteria and acceptance of unit training

for certification. A clear reluctance or even outright denial by different mobilization station trainers accepting another site's training certifications cost time and caused extraordinary frustration and pressure on mobilizing units when personnel had to transfer between various subordinate formations mobilizing at different stations across the area. Guard units revalidated tasks at the mobilization site they completed during pre-mobilization, even in circumstances where a unit assistor had validated the training. During pre-mobilization with enough early notification, units performed training events at their unit's home station or local training area, such as mandatory briefings, individual, team—and squad-level collective tasks, to minimize post-mobilization time and increase time spent near families. Instead, the mobilization sites repeated the training. Multiple units reported that regardless of circumstances, such as the presence of a unit administrator or mobilization representative, the mobilization site required all training be conducted onsite for validation.⁶² For example, the 42nd Division, which had achieved a successful health readiness status due to a command emphasized pre-alert program, completed multiple SRPs simply because its alert and deployment dates kept shifting and it needed to maintain the SRP within thirty days to remain validated.⁶³ This affected morale and the all-important resource of time.

Training plans inefficiently scheduled by instructors, and poor coordination of resources, cost mobilizing units time, lengthening their stay at mobilization stations. The Tennessee 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment commented that limited available space to conduct training contributed to their six-month protracted mobilization training. Poor time management, such as having 300 soldiers arrive for identification cards when card making stations were only able to process four cards an hour, had soldiers waiting in line all night.⁶⁴ The 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry further illustrated this case by enduring a nearly 150-day mobilization training, including a three week NTC rotation.⁶⁵ The competing demands between garrison units and mobilizing units for finite resources affected mobilization training and timeline. Competition for ranges and combat training center rotations influenced mobilization training, as in the case of the 30th Armored Brigade. When the brigade rotated through JRTC at Fort Polk, Louisiana the training site could only accommodate one North Carolina battalion at a time, making the others wait in line to rotate through.⁶⁶

The conduct of the training reflected the problem of inexperienced trainers. Three pervasive critiques of the training tasks appeared early: too generic tasks, irrelevant tasks, and out-of-date tasks. Some attributed the generic, one-size fits all approach to training as a “knee jerk” reaction to

validation training reforms from the past and other events like the Pfc. Jessica D. Lynch unit ambush in the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom.⁶⁷ Units sought more mission-specific tasks as well as mission-specific instructors. One unit decried the use of an infantry instructor for their transportation unit, saying he “went through the motions with absolutely no help in bettering the unit because of lack of transportation knowledge.”⁶⁸ Generic tasks accompanied by generic instruction were not the only training experience affecting a unit’s effective preparation.

Units across the mobilizing spectrum experienced inapplicable training for what they would end up conducting overseas. As late as mid-2004, the 42nd Division experienced irrelevant tasks during its mobilization training, including extraction from a minefield.⁶⁹ Other units made bold claims about their training, one saying, “ALL training received at FT Riley had nothing to do with the mission in Iraq.”⁷⁰ At the same time, units emphasized a lack of focus on relevant tasks, which included convoy operations, realistic live fire exercises while traveling in vehicles and incorporation of the latest equipment and associated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), and in-depth briefings on subjects such as rules of engagement (ROE). An Army focus on safety in training limited some desired realism, such as the aforementioned convoy live-fire exercise.

The desire to have the latest equipment, an up-to-date understanding of what was happening, and the best practices included in the training had a distinct impact on units operating once deployed. Elements of the 42nd Division did not utilize the latest remote-controlled counter-IED equipment installed in their vehicles in Iraq. Lacking stateside training, they made a conscious decision to disregard the equipment’s use due to its interference with their communications. The same division’s staff experience showed another side. The staff received significant and effective contractor supported training on equipment as the staff transitioned from analog systems to digital systems during preparations for Iraq. Although personnel needed this new equipment training, it offset and greatly affected the staff’s ability to conduct collective and individual training requirements.⁷¹ The key remained to find the correct balance.

Out-of-date training tasks not reflecting what unit’s would experience once deployed presented another issue of concern. The troops in theater already had discarded TTPs that the mobilizing unit was learning. The lag time for transferring lessons learned from theater to training units was unfortunate and potentially costly; however, war environments were rapid, constantly evolving situations.⁷² In many cases units stated that the scenarios they faced in their final unit collective training exercises did not match

at all what they faced in country. In most cases, the scenarios for these MREs conducted at mobilization stations and the two stateside combat training centers were traditional scenario-based and not contemporary to the theaters.⁷³ For example, the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment said the NTC evaluators did a good job but that they still used a “force-on-force” model not particularly applicable to what the cavalry troopers experienced in Iraq.⁷⁴ These traditional force-on-force scenarios harkened more to an Operation Desert Storm-type of conflict versus an occupation or stability operation. This early in the war the Iraq conflict in particular still experienced radical changes, from the initial major combat operations to stability operations amidst a growing insurgency. With these battlefield changes came the increased demand on the Guard for rotational deployments.

The Growing Demand

Over the course of September 2001 to the end of 2004, the Guard’s readiness steadily and precipitously declined. Since July 2002 overall unit readiness—that is combined readiness of personnel, health, equipment, and training readiness levels—decreased by 27.6 percent across the entire Army Guard force. The focused efforts to surge personnel and equipment to the select deploying forces, whose number exponentially grew after January 2003, and dual wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, resulted in a drain on these resources. Demonstrating the growing demand to support the war effort, in the first quarter of fiscal year 2004 three Guard combat brigades mobilized, but then in the third and fourth quarter of 2004 six combat brigades and a division headquarters received notification of pending activation.

Readiness concerns could not be overstated. In less than two years (2002-2004) overall readiness, to include personnel, equipment on hand, and training readiness, declined 14 percent to 22.6 percent. Equipment readiness of gear the Guard physically possessed dropped 6.4 percent to support the 54 percent of the Guard that served on active orders overseas, in homeland security, or state missions, or for some units a combination of them.⁷⁵ The reserve component had missed its October and November 2004 recruiting goals, showing a weak start to the new fiscal year after a difficult end to the last one. For the entire year the Army National Guard failed to meet its mandated end strength in 2004 by 7,082 individuals.

During this period in response to expressed concern from governors, General Blum articulated his plan to keep at least half of the National Guard at home for emergencies and homeland security. Blum strove to balance the dual missions of the National Guard in light of the growing

demands resulting from one-quarter of the force deployed, one-quarter training to deploy and the rest in either reset from deployment or ready for stateside duty. In February 2004, he presented his plan to the adjutants general of various states and territories to address domestic crisis and readiness concerns.⁷⁶

On 16 December 2004, Blum requested an additional \$20 billion to replace vehicles and equipment and to support recruiting efforts over the next three years. Blum sought the money to support recruiting and retention by tripling retention bonuses and nearly doubling first time enlistment bonuses. The money would also increase the number of Guard recruiters on the streets and support a change in the recruiting marketing message. Previously the Guard had recruited 50 percent of its force from transitioning active component soldiers, but the proportion of veterans joining the Guard had dropped to 35 percent, Blum said. The drop in active component soldiers transitioning to the Guard indicated the strain across the Total Force from the first, long-term, all-volunteer war. After making the additional funding request to the Pentagon, General Blum addressed the media outside and referring to the funding request said, "Otherwise, the Guard will be broken and not ready the next time it's needed, either here at home or for war."⁷⁷

Nor was the Guard alone in this crisis. In December 2004, Lt. Gen. James R. Helmly, chief of the Army Reserve, strongly articulated the readiness crisis in a memorandum to the US Army chief of staff, warning of a "broken force" in the Army Reserve if nothing changed. His concerns mirrored those of Lieutenant General Blum, referencing the negative impact of "current policies, procedures, and practices governing mobilization, training, and reserve component manpower management... and to reset and regenerate its forces for follow-on and future missions."⁷⁸ He highlighted the severe impact cross-leveling had on units, the drain and culture effects from reliance on volunteerism, the consequences of leaving equipment in theater for replacement units, and the management of mobilization time limits.⁷⁹

The measures within the current policies, including the previous pattern of extensive cross-leveling personnel and equipment and post-mobilization emphasized training, coupled with strategic reserve level resourcing drove the Army Guard into an unprecedented crisis. The Guard managed to meet all the requests for forces but struggled in a downward spiral with the effects of policy on personnel, health management, equipping and training the force for war while still fulfilling homeland security and state duties. Something had to be done.

Notes

1. Michael D. Doubler, *The National Guard and the War on Terror: The Attacks of 9/11 and Homeland Security* (Arlington: National Guard Bureau Office of Public Affairs Historical Services Division, 2006) 25-32, 40-46 and 52, 63-72.
2. United States Code, 2006 Edition, Supplement 5: Title 10- Armed Forces. Section 12302.
3. Charles H. Briscoe, et al., *Weapon of Choice: US Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 255-256.
4. Sgt. Maj. David M. Johnston, "2001 OEF Mobilization of WVARNG Special Forces." United States Army Sergeants Major Academy paper dated 17 September 2006, 6-7. A company from 19th SFG's 1st Battalion from Utah Army National Guard and a company from its 5th Battalion from the Colorado Army National Guard rounded out the organic 2d Battalion, 19th SFG units from West Virginia.
5. Briscoe et al., *Weapon of Choice*, 44, 216-218, 371-372; Doubler, Michael D., *The National Guard and the War on Terror: Operation Enduring Freedom and Defense Transformation* (National Guard Bureau Office of Public Affairs Historical Division: Arlington, 2008) 16-17.
6. Johnston, "2001 OEF Mobilization," 7-9.
7. Donald P. Wright, with the Contemporary Operations Study Team, *A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom October 2001-September 2005* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 57-58; Briscoe et al., *Weapon of Choice*, 44, 216-218, 371-372; Doubler, *Operation Enduring Freedom*, 15.
8. Doubler, *Operation Enduring Freedom*, 15.
9. "Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare", 15.
10. Michael D. Doubler, *The National Guard and the War on Terror: Operation Iraqi Freedom* (National Guard Bureau Office of Public Affairs Historical Division: Arlington, 2008) 10.
11. Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 176-178. Doubler, *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 20-22.
12. Interview, Maj. Wm. Shane Story and Maj. Drew Duckett with Maj. Gen. Henry Stratman, former Deputy Commanding General—Support (DCG-S), Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), Kuwait, 3 July 2003, 7, Historians files, US Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, D.C.
13. Interview, Lt. Col. Mark Hall, Col Ronnie Sketo, and Lt. Col. Thomas M. Ryan with Maj. Gen. James D. Thurman, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCS-3), Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), Kuwait, 24 February 2003, 7-8, Historians files.

14. Charles Briscoe, et al., *All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 128-130.

15. Doubler, *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 10. For example, the average number of days more than doubled from OIF I rotation to OIF II, from 33 to 70, in large part due to the three Guard combat brigades in OIF II averaging 102 days for armor units and 88 days for infantry. See “Army National Guard Mobilization After Action Report: 10 September 2001 to 31 December 2003, Global War on Terrorism”, Final Draft 18.

16. John Sloan Brown, *Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the US Army, 1989-2005* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 250.

17. Donald P. Wright, and Col. Timothy R. Reese with the Contemporary Operations Study team, *On Point II, Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003-January 2005*, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 32-33; Doubler, *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 36-37.

18. Doubler, *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 40-41.

19. Col. Ronald Westfall, interview by Maj. Allen Skinner, 28 December 2010.

20. Doubler, *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 40-41.

21. Brown, *Kevlar Legions*, 251.

22. Reserve Forces Policy Board. *Mobilization Reform: A Compilation of Significant Issues, Lessons Learned, and Studies Developed Since September 11, 2001*, (Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 2003) 5-6.

23. Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1235.10, “Subject: Activation, Mobilization and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve”, dated 23 September 2004, 2, Historians Files.

24. USD (P&R) Memorandum, “Subject: Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel and Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks”, dated 20 September 2001, Historians files.

25. Department of Defense Directive 1235.10, “Subject: Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve”, dated 1 July 1995, 5, Historians files.

26. “Army National Guard Mobilization After Action Report”, 20.

27. GAO, “Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare”, 3.

28. Doubler, *Operation Enduring Freedom*, 66.

29. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 21.

30. Doubler, *Operation Enduring Freedom*, 68-69 and 74.

31. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness, Training, and Mobilization), *Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2004), 30.

32. "Army National Guard Mobilization After Action Report," 20.
33. GAO, "Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare", 4-5, and 15.
34. Doubler, *Operation Enduring Freedom*, 34-35.
35. The other two combat brigades from the Army National Guard in OIF II rotation were the 30th Armored Separate Brigade from North Carolina Army National Guard and the 81st Armored Separate Brigade from Washington Army National Guard.
36. The main incentive was a monetary bonus of \$1,000 a month for each additional month in country over the 24-month limit. Monetary reward and later additional accrued leave days were incentives for volunteers serving over the time limit.
37. Amy Schlesing, et al., *The Bowie Brigade: Arkansas National Guard's 39th Infantry Brigade in Iraq* (Little Rock: Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 2005) 66-74; John R. Bruning, *The Devil's Sandbox: with the 2nd Battalion, 162nd INFANTRY at War in Iraq* (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2006), 281.
38. Sean Michael Flynn, *The Fighting 69th: One Remarkable National Guard Unit's Journey from Ground Zero to Baghdad* (New York: Viking, 2007) 80-84, 99, 108, 119-121.
39. Flynn, *The Fighting 69th*, 121-122, and 129.
40. Bruning, *The Devil's Sandbox*, 19-22, 29.
41. Government Accounting Office, "Health Care: Army Needs to Assess the Health Status of All Early-Deploying Reservists", 2003, 7.
42. Department of Defense, Directive 6200.04 "Subject: Force Health Protection (FHP)", dated 9 October 2004, 2, Historians files.
43. "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004", Public Law 108-136, dated 24 November 2003.
44. Natalie Justh, et al., *HCSDB Annual Report 2003: Results from the Health Care Survey of DoD Beneficiaries* (Washington, DC: Mathematica Policy Research, 2004) 32.
45. "Army National Guard Mobilization After Action Report", 22-23.
46. "Summary of Major Changes to DOD 7000.14-R, Volume 7A, Chapter 54 "Tricare Dental Program (TDP), dated February 2002. Effective date 5 June 2001.
47. Doubler, *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 60-63.
48. There remained a constant struggle in the limited amount of time Guard units had with the soldiers on the balance and focus between administrative and health related readiness requirements and those of training. Beyond the importance of personnel and health readiness compared to training readiness, recruiting and retention played a part as well. If the limited time Guard units had with troops was spent primarily doing administrative and health related events and limited time training, the risk remained that soldiers would lose motivation and dedication to the Guard.
49. "42nd Infantry Division Operation Iraqi Freedom III After Action Review Task Force Liberty, May 2004-November 2005", dated 30 November 2005,

4-5, 79, Historians files, CMH; Slide Deck, "Fifth Army Mobilization Survey", dated 8 September 2003, Historians files.

50. Slide Deck, "Fifth Army Mobilization Survey." Eighty percent of units in survey indicated the alert notification was too late. This mainly applied to the early rotations, but to a limited extent later mobilizations as well.

51. Flynn, *The Fighting 69th*, 131, and 142-143.

52. The two CTCs used for post-mobilization final validation for Army National Guard units were either the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, California or the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Polk, Louisiana.

53. Slide Deck, "Fifth Army Mobilization Survey."

54. 1/1-120 IN, 150th Armor Regiment, 30th Brigade Combat Team, Memorandum for Record, "Subject: OIF II AAR", dated 16 October 2004, Historians files.

55. 1/1-120 IN, Memorandum for Record, "Subject: OIF II AAR."

56. "278th ACR OIF III AAR", dated October 2005, Historians files.

57. 1/1-120 IN, Memorandum for Record, "Subject: OIF II AAR"; Slide Deck, "Fifth Army Mobilization Survey"; Bruning, *The Devil's Sandbox*, 35-36.

58. Bruning, *The Devil's Sandbox*, 47. The Idaho cavalry troopers of the 116th Cavalry Brigade also spoke highly of the training received at the JRTC, "Superior training cadre and should continue to be utilized as a MRE location." "116th BCT After Action Review Input", dated 23 February 2005, Historians files.

59. "42nd Infantry Division Operation Iraqi Freedom III After Action Review", 81.

60. "42nd Infantry Division Operation Iraqi Freedom III After Action Review", 25-26.

61. "42nd Infantry Division Operation Iraqi Freedom III After Action Review", 28 and 44.

62. "278th ACR OIF III AAR", "116th BCT After Action Review Input" and "42nd Infantry Division Operation Iraqi Freedom III After Action Review", experiences that spanned both First Army and Fifth Army training sites.

63. "42nd Infantry Division Operation Iraqi Freedom III After Action Review", 80 and 30; 1/1-120 IN, Memorandum for Record, "Subject: OIF II AAR"; Slide Deck, "Fifth Army Mobilization Survey."

64. "278th ACR OIF III AAR."

65. Flynn, *The Fighting 69th*, 141.

66. 1/1-120 IN, Memorandum for Record, "Subject: OIF II AAR."

67. Flynn, *The Fighting 69th*, 130.

68. Slide Deck, "Fifth Army Mobilization Survey."

69. 42nd Infantry Division Operation Iraqi Freedom III After Action Review", 27-28.

70. Slide Deck, "Fifth Army Mobilization Survey"

71. "42nd Infantry Division Operation Iraqi Freedom III After Action Review", 27-30.

72. Bruning, *The Devil's Sandbox*, 37.

73. "42nd Infantry Division Operation Iraqi Freedom III After Action Review", 27-30; 1/1-120 IN, Memorandum for Record, "Subject: OIF II AAR"; Slide Deck, "Fifth Army Mobilization Survey."

74. "278th ACR OIF III AAR."

75. The Army National Guard Financial Report—Fiscal Year 2004.

76. The Army National Guard Financial Report—Fiscal Year 2004; Doubler, *The Attacks of 9/11 and Homeland Security*, 76.

77. James Hendren, "National Guard recruitment drops", in the *Los Angeles Times*, dated 17 December 2004, Historians files.

78. Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, Memorandum for Record, "Subject: Readiness of the United States Army Reserve", dated 20 December 2004, Historians files.

79. Memorandum for Record, "Subject: Readiness of the United States Army Reserve."

Chapter Three

The Tipping Point

The Mid War Period, January 2005–January 2007

The 1st Brigade Combat Team, 34th Infantry Division—the “Red Bulls,” from the Minnesota Army National Guard—received its alert order for deployment to Iraq in July 2005. The brigade mobilized two months later, in September 2005, and completed its training by March 2006.¹ When it deployed, 1,703 of its 4,075 soldiers were sourced from units not normally assigned to the Minnesota brigade. They were, instead, transferred to fill personnel vacancies for the deployment. Forty-two percent came from units outside of the brigade combat team, with 6 percent of the unit—228 soldiers—not even from the Army Guard but from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) recalled for the deployment.² The brigade planned to return home in February 2007, but, as part of the Iraq surge, found itself extended four months, roughly 125 days. While in Iraq, the brigade exemplified the Swiss Army knife-like use of the Army Guard formations overseas, conducting a wide range of activities. They participated in base security, counterinsurgency operations, and convoy security throughout the Iraqi theater. By the end of their tour, the brigade had set a record mobilization of 22 months.³ This nearly two-year mobilization, less than 100 days from the legal limit for mobilization under the partial mobilization authority (10 USC 12302), highlighted the need for better management and control of Guard mobilizations, from manning policies and effects to time spent training. But its extended deployment to support the surge also illustrated the important roles Guard units played. Deployments like the involuntarily extended Minnesota brigade allowed the Army to keep from breaking during the war’s high-water mark as the Army transformed and modernized its brigade force structure.

The Roots of Change

The growing reality of a long war led to a shift towards developing a rotational use of forces. As early as 9 July 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld wanted the reserve component to adopt an involuntary mobilization rotation of one year in six.⁴ Even if such a plan went beyond current capabilities, the level of demand stressed the force, and attempts to address these issues formed early. However, it was several months later in January 2004 when a report by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness, Training, Mobilization) endorsed the rotational concept,



Figure 3.1. Soldiers from Minnesota's Echo Company, 2nd Combined Arms Battalion, 1st Brigade, 34th Infantry Division file into their welcome home ceremony in Hutchinson, Minnesota after their record setting 22-month mobilization, with 16 months spent in Iraq.

if not the actual timeline idealized by Rumsfeld. The report identified the high pay off from “rotational overseas presence” for the reserve component. Providing a rotational framework gave predictability, crucial to the reserve component’s structure, and with predictability came inherent benefits, such as maximizing pre-mobilization training and shortening time between activation and time in theater.⁵

As the DoD saw benefits in a rotational concept, in October 2003 the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s summary on mobilization reform discussed and identified certain struggles in the mobilization of reserve component forces. The board recognized the Guard’s mobilization timeline took too long from identification, validation of need, unit selection, and alert to final mobilization. The board identified cross-leveling personnel as negatively influencing combat effectiveness, unit structure, cohesion and morale, and straining the rebuilding of “donor” units later for additional missions. There were inefficiencies in determining equipment readiness and subsequent equipment cross-leveling and shipping it overseas created issues as well. Inadequate funding to support pre-mobilization training strongly affected units as did medical and equipment readiness tasks. The board highlighted the poor tracking of medically non-deployable personnel and a general failure of the reserve component in health readiness. They also concluded that the 12-month limit on time in country

“reduces flexibility needed by the Active and Reserve Components...”⁶ thus challenging the idea of minimizing use of the reserve component and limiting its time. Overall, the study concluded, “DoD, Joint Staff, and Services mobilization and policy documents, plans and directives are outdated.”⁷ This led to updated and improved policy changes, though taking years to fully implement, paved the way for an improved processes.

Just over a year into the Iraq War, Congress, the Pentagon, and the Army began working to address the wide range of identified mobilization issues. The Office of the Secretary of Defense continued to revise and publish guidance, such as the 24 September 2004 update to the July 1995 DoDD 1235.10 addressing reserve component activation, mobilization, and demobilization policy. These changes were the initial solutions to the various studies’ identified problems. For medical concerns identified, the NDAA of 2004 initiated the TRICARE Reserve Select program. This version of TRICARE allowed limited eligibility for those reserve members on unemployment compensation or otherwise ineligible for civilian employer health care coverage.⁸ To address the overall strain to the force, the Army Campaign Plan 2004 directed, a streamlining the entire process: mobilization, deployment, demobilization, with the intent to reform the pre-mobilization and post-mobilization activities to better maximize reserve component time in theater.⁹ The Army strove to identify problems quickly in order to find solutions early.

The Army National Guard Shift

Beginning in 2005, personnel and qualification rates in the Guard started showing improvement. The Army National Guard expanded its recruiters from 2,700 to 4,600 by the end of 2005, adding higher bonuses for reenlistments and new enlistees; two purposes behind General Blum’s December 2004 request. Even though the Guard still missed its end-strength goal by over sixteen thousand, it finished the year with three consecutive months of net gains, the first time in two years. The Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualification (DMOSQ) standing measured the rate of soldiers qualified for the position they held in their unit and served as a major readiness measurement. Unlike the active component organizations—where enlistees do not count against a unit’s numbers until their arrival after completing initial entry training—the Guard recruits immediately enlist into a unit vacancy and count against that unit’s numbers. The critical DMOSQ rate rose overall to 83.44 percent, excluding those guardsmen who had not attended their initial entry training.¹⁰

In general, Army Guard readiness shifted to a more streamlined approach. The re-focused readiness model went from an alert-mobi-



Figure 3.2. United States citizens take the oath of enlistment in 2006 at Maryland's Fort Meade Military Entrance Processing Station.

lize-train-deploy sequence to a train-alert-deploy. This reflected the movement from peacetime to wartime and a shift from use only in war plans to support for ongoing contingency operations. The new model emphasized that the question had become “when” not “if” a unit mobilized, recognizing that high demand required all Guard units to prepare for a rotation. Now all units trained with mobilization in mind before receiving an official notification or informal warning of impending deployment. The reality in the mid-2000s of every unit and guardsmen facing an inevitable mobilization came from the cumulative 24-months for individual involuntary mobilizations and the DoD discouragement of involuntary remobilizations policies.¹¹

This paradigm shift in focus was not necessarily new to the Army Guard. The Texas 49th Armored Division successfully used a similar model when preparing for the peacekeeping mission to Bosnia in 2000. However, the 49th Division's success, in part, derived from increased training time, funding and priority focus within the Guard's tiered readiness of the late 1990s–early 2000.¹²

The Army Guard mobilized 141,760 soldiers during the 2005 fiscal year. Of these, 104,169 soldiers were mobilized at a given time, with 74,360

overseas in a division headquarters, nine brigades, and multiple smaller supporting units. The balance of those mobilized, but not deployed, during 2005 were those stateside training for deployment, or stateside de-mobilizing from 2004 deployments, and guardsmen activated for federal missions in the United States, including mobilization support and various homeland security missions. This Army Guard “surge” through 2005 allowed the active component to accelerate the refitting of its units and to implement the Army’s modularity transformation during a time of war.¹³

Prior to the modular transformation, the summer of 2003 had exemplified the demands placed on the Army when 73 percent of the Army’s active component brigades and 33 percent of the Army Guard brigades were overseas.¹⁴ The rotational war had shifted the effective tactical-level unit from division to brigade. Deployed commanders attached various supporting units and detached some units to other brigades to accomplish their specific missions. With these actions, they created brigade combat teams that had the necessary maneuver and supporting assets needed under one command structure. This drive to create multiple, self-sustaining brigade combat teams meant drawing even more on the combat support and combat service support structures found in the United States Army Reserve (USAR) and the Army Guard to augment active component brigades. The Army’s modular-based restructure strove to eliminate this through extensive efforts at reorganizing brigades into permanent independent formations, either as brigade combat teams (BCT), functional discipline brigades, or multi-functional brigades. The reorganization also created identical structured units across the total force (USAR, Army Guard, and active component).¹⁵

The Army’s modular transformation affected the Army Guard in multiple ways. Reorganization of the active units naturally expanded the number of brigades through efficient creation of combat teams, offsetting some of the high demand on the reserve component support units by providing the increased number of active component brigades with organic support structures, which was a welcome benefit. This expansion of combat forces largely affected the active component as the Guard actually lost combat brigades in the force restructuring.¹⁶ For the Guard, modular transformation resulted in six less combat brigades than originally planned, as some of the Guard’s combat brigades converted to support brigades during the process. The switch to support brigade structures aimed to undertake more homeland-type missions, but at a time when the Army was heavily involved in the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, this deeply concerned many senior Guard leaders. By reducing the number of Guard combat brigades,

it shrunk the rotation base and could reduce the dwell time for the remaining brigade combat teams.¹⁷ Dwell time describes the amount of time soldiers and units remained stateside between deployments and served as a critical factor in determining length and occurrence of wartime rotations. The Army placed importance on dwell time as a measure of retention and care for soldiers across the force. Reduction in dwell time meant less time for soldiers at home, not just with their families, but also with their careers, education, or other pursuits, which, in turn, negatively affected retention in the Army Guard. More time in uniform for Guard soldiers for a mobilization and deployment carried with it additional considerations active duty soldiers did not have.

During the modularity transformation, the active component needed to rely on the Army Guard to mobilize more units—resulting in the high Guard mobilization numbers for 2005—thereby allowing the Army to take the necessary time to implement changes to the brigades as they rotated through deployments. July 2005 saw 35,500 guardsmen in Iraq out of the total of 113,000 soldiers, making the Guard contribution over a third of the total Army forces in theater. December 2004 and January 2005 marked the peak of the Guard’s contribution to the war on terror, rising to nearly 70,000, roughly 21 percent of the entire Army Guard.¹⁸

Filling the Ranks

The requirements of an Army fighting on multiple fronts did not wait on anyone or any reform concept, such as modular transformation. In mid-2005, many mobilizing units faced a crisis in cross-leveling to fill requirements.

An updated policy emphasized notification of reserve component soldiers, mandating orders at least 30 days prior to the report date but with a goal of 90. Early notification intended to alleviate readiness issues by allowing units to focus on improving health readiness and pre-mobilization training for specific individuals prior to reporting to their mobilization station. While DoDD 1235.10 policy, updated on the 23 September 2004, reinforced the letter of the Title 10 USC, addressing personnel notification policy and cross-leveling, the reality remained that unit notification could not always follow the intended several month lead-time.

Notification timelines were not the only area where policy goals missed the mark. Beyond the intent for early notification, the directive stated, “Multiple use of an [reserve component] mobilization authority to reactivate [reserve component] units or individuals without their consent shall be avoided whenever possible.”¹⁹ This emphasized the secretary of defense’s intent to minimize multiple deployments either individually

through the cumulative 24-month policy or as a unit through multiple involuntary unit mobilizations of the reserve component. The spirit of the policy clashed with the reality of unit readiness and operational tempo for mobilizing Guard units.

The 505th Engineer Battalion of the North Carolina Army Guard served as an example of the enduring personnel struggle. The giving and then taking of personnel from the North Carolina engineers exhibited a common occurrence and one example of how cross-leveling degraded unit cohesion. The Guard engineering unit lost 40 percent of its personnel to fill other deploying units when it received notification for its own unit mobilization in May 2005. When alerted, North Carolina attempted to fill the substantial personnel shortages, but the state soon exhausted its supply of available technical engineers. To fill the entire shortage, the 505th Engineers required an entire company from South Carolina Army Guard's 387th Engineer Battalion along with individual fillers from the Tennessee Army Guard.²⁰

The overall struggle Guard units faced in the early part of the war in many aspects continued into 2005. The commander of the Florida Army Guard's 1st Battalion, 111th Aviation Regiment wrote in his opening comments in his After Action Report (AAR) that his unit's experience mirrored that of the aviation unit the Florida battalion was replacing. He pointedly indicated that nothing had changed from the concerns voiced in the previous unit's AAR, emphasizing that, even after five years of Army Guard mobilizations, from his point of view, many of the same issues still plagued the organization.²¹

Among these included cross-leveled personnel arriving the day before or even the day after the unit mobilized for Iraq at the end of May 2006. This eliminated any pre-mobilization training or readiness screenings for these last minute personnel, all of which required make up sessions at the mobilization station.²² In addition, multiple split deployments hit the unit heavily, where elements of the same unit deployed to separate theaters in simultaneous support of Operations Noble Eagle, Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, and Stabilization Force (SFOR) missions. Critical vacancies resulted in key-leader positions for officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) in operations, logistics, intelligence, and communication sections. It also limited team building and training time between deployments.²³ For example, the aviation battalion's intelligence section lacked four of its five assigned intelligence soldiers for all of its mobilization collective training, receiving the personnel only after the unit completed training.²⁴ Similarly, the 36th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) from the Texas Army

National Guard mobilized in spring of 2006. The 36th Combat Aviation Brigade mobilized with 2,800 soldiers from over 46 different states along with Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Army Reserve fillers.²⁵ A massive conglomeration of cross-leveled personnel from across the nation and Army components brought the units to required wartime staffing.

Thus, even with the increase in recruiters and bonuses along with strong retention—all factors in improving the depleted end-strength of the Army Guard—the personnel crisis remained. The average percentage of cross-leveling needed to fill one deploying unit from 2003 to 2006 tripled in regards to personnel from 10 percent to over 30 percent (See Figure 3.3).²⁶ To add to the strain faced by the Army Guard, personnel readiness was only a part of the cross-leveling crisis. Equipment cross-leveling also skyrocketed while the war continued, and the Guard commitments grew.




Figure 3.3. Average Percent of Army National Guard Unit's Cross-leveling to Fill Deploying Units with Personnel and Equipment from 2003-2006. Source: "Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Strengthening America's Defense in the New Security Environment," Second report to Congress, dated 1 March 2007, 27.

Equipping the Mission

The policy of leaving equipment behind in theater, unusually high usage reducing equipment life expectancy, and a growing shift to replacing gear as part of the modular transformation combined to create equipment shortages across the Army. The percent of cross-leveling needed to fill one deploying unit from 2003 to 2006 with its necessary equipment grew 20 percent over three years, from 40 percent in 2003 to over 60 percent in 2006 (See Figure 3.3).²⁷ The average number of donor units necessary to support one deploying formation tripled from an average of four units donating equipment per deploying formation in 2002 to 12 units required to cross-level equipment to a deploying unit in 2005. (See Figure 3.4).²⁸ In June 2004, the Army Guard's equipment transfers totaled 35,000 pieces; by July 2005, it rose to 101,000 pieces, nearly doubling the amount cross-leveled in a single year.²⁹




Figure 3.4. Average Number of Units Cross-leveling Equipment to Fill One Deploying Unit from 2002-2005. "Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Strengthening America's Defense in the New Security Environment," Second report to Congress, dated 1 March 2007, 22.

Florida's 1st Battalion, 111th Aviation Regiment transferred critical items, such as night vision goggles and individual weapons, to support a deploying infantry brigade and then found itself alerted for its own mobilization. To fill its needs the aviation unit received items from other units, demonstrating the chain effect of cross-leveling. The Florida aviation battalion's experience represented an equipment version of what happened to the 505th Engineers with personnel.

The equipment transfers included more than personal items, such as the weapons and goggles. The Army National Guard shuffled helicopters from state to state, affecting refit and modernization as a finite amount of helicopters rotated through different units for mobilization, allowing little time for maintenance or updates.³⁰ In fact, the 36th Combat Aviation Brigade had helicopters that, prior to mobilization, had not completed their desert aircraft modifications. Some of the aviation brigade's units showed up to the mobilization station with less than half of the required equipment for the mission even after extensive cross-leveling efforts.³¹

Receiving required equipment lists from theater commands also affected preparations. The Georgia Army National Guard's 48th Infantry Brigade mobilized in May 2005 but did not receive a list of required equipment from the theater command until April, the month before mobilizing. As a result, it packaged multiple vehicles and shipped them overseas, only to have them sent back from theater because they learned they were not needed.³² Similarly, the 2nd Brigade, 28th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from the Pennsylvania Army National Guard struggled without guidance from theater command in establishing its required equipment list. With the assistance of the First Army and NGB, the brigade worked it out but wasted time and effort by having to fill shortages at the last minute.³³

NGB estimated in July 2005 that the Army Guard had only 34 percent of its essential equipment on hand when not counting substitute items, equipment undergoing maintenance, and equipment left overseas.³⁴ Substitute items were equipment authorized by the Army to replace the official listed item in a unit's inventory, but they still counted toward meeting required readiness levels. These items were generally older models and not compatible with newer equipment used on deployments, nor were they supported by supply systems utilized in theater.

As the first Guard units rotated out of Iraq, the Army Guard began leaving certain critical equipment behind in theater for replacement units to use, such as armored vehicles and mission specific equipment like chemical detectors. Between 2003 to 2005 the Army Guard left overseas

more than 64,000 pieces of equipment valued at \$1.2 billion. For example, North Carolina's 30th Armored Brigade left behind 279 High-Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV or "humvee"), equaling 73 percent of what it had prior to deployment. Similarly, 14 Army Guard Military Police companies left over 600 humvees in theater. These filled critical needs for the units in theater, but degraded both stateside training for the Guard units and their stateside mission of domestic emergency response.³⁵ At the time, no identified plan to replace this equipment existed, however, even as the Army moved forward with the plan to leave equipment in theater, it worked to implement a replacement process.

Governors from across the country shared their concerns with the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves in 2006 about the Guard's substantial commitment overseas, leaving a lack of personnel and equipment readily available in their states to support domestic response.³⁶ Testimony from Lieutenant General Blum, chief of the National Guard Bureau, to the same commission in January 2007 summed up the situation from the previous years, "The units that are overseas are magnificently equipped. You can't tell the difference—active, guard, reserve—overseas by their equipment. However, having said that, 88 percent of the forces that are back here in the United States are very poorly equipped today in the Army National Guard."³⁷ The Army invested \$4.3 billion to supply equipment, providing all deployed units the same regardless of component, but units returned with less than their deployment inventory, having left equipment behind.³⁸

When Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in August 2005, it exemplified the governors' concerns, even as they were providing their testimony to the commission. Combined Air and Army guardsmen responding to Katrina over the course of the domestic support totaled 80,000 with a peak of 50,000 at one time in September.³⁹ Although the Guard leadership pointed out its ability to support such a massive response even while maintaining its wartime responsibilities, the emergency taxed the force. Some of the units responding to the hurricane had recently returned from overseas deployment while other units from the states affected by the hurricane, such as Louisiana's 256th Infantry Brigade, were in the midst of a deployment and not available stateside to assist their local communities.⁴⁰

Fit to Fight

Health readiness continued to be a crucial factor in Army Guard mobilization. In an annual report, the Guard stated, "as of August 1, 2006, the [Army National Guard] was only 20 percent fully medically-ready

using [Department of Defense] standards.” The report went on to state that the Guard had deployed over 263,000 soldiers since 9/11, but without increased resources and authority to correct deficiencies found in the more regular screenings, the emphasis placed on routine, annual check-ups did not necessarily lead to increased health readiness.⁴¹ Nevertheless, the DoD continued to increase health readiness requirements for the Guard in an effort to address one of the most prominent mobilization concerns.

On 16 February 2006, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, William Winkenwerder Jr. ordered the annual implementation of the Periodic Health Assessment (PHA) to support the medical screenings required by the DoDD 6200.4 from October 2004. The PHA included a self-reported health status, medical records review, and identification and referral to correct any medical issues, along with a plan to manage health risks. The units documented the results and statuses, thereby improving accuracy of their health readiness status reports.⁴² The Army phased in the PHA policy, completing it by November 2007.⁴³

The Army Guard report noted the absence of “increased resources and authority to correct deficiencies found.”⁴⁴ The PHA policy memorandum had perpetuated this problem when it stated, “Reserve Component (RC) members who are not TRICARE beneficiaries and not eligible for service under any DOD program, but who require further evaluations, treatments, care, or clinical preventative services should be referred to their civilian health care providers.”⁴⁵ This provided little authority or resources to increase the health readiness of Army Guard units. It was one thing for commanders to enforce medical follow ups with government provided resources but another for them to try to force soldiers who may or may not have access to private health care providers to correct health assessment-identified deficiencies. The regular health screenings associated with an annual health assessment requirement allowed units to improve their tracking of health readiness. Even without the ability to improve health readiness beyond referring the soldiers to civilian care, annual health assessments provided an understanding of medical readiness issues to address during the pre-mobilization phase, where the unit had access to more treatment options for the soldiers with previously identified health issues.

The ability to enroll in early TRICARE up to 90 days from the mobilization date was the most effective medical readiness feature for soldiers with orders. This action provided the ability to identify prior to mobilization any health issues with the annual PHAs and then the capability to address them with early TRICARE. Being able to take care of medical

issues, prior to mobilization, remained contingent on timely unit notification and receipt of official orders allowing for early TRICARE enrollment.

As a continued measure to address the gap in health coverage, the Army expanded its TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS) program, begun in 2004 through a series of annual NDAA's. The TRICARE Reserve Select program provided a premium-based healthcare coverage system for the soldier or a soldier plus his or her family. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2005 extended TRS eligibility to soldiers mobilized after 9/11 for continual service of at least 90 days. As a one-time opportunity before their orders ended, demobilizing guardsmen qualified for TRS, which offered them extended coverage for a year. For each additional 90 days of active service, the guardsmen qualified for an additional year's coverage.⁴⁶

The next fiscal year's NDAA further opened eligibility to all selective reservists, who it grouped into tiers based on qualifications. For example, tier-one membership depended on previous mobilizations, and soldiers paid 28 percent of the coverage cost. Tier-two qualifications included those with unemployment status and paid 50 percent of the coverage cost, while tier three cost the soldier 85 percent. This expansion of TRS continued the trend to open up the program as a cost-effective means for soldiers to purchase their own insurance to address health screening-identified medical issues.⁴⁷

In addition to TRS, the TRICARE Dental Program (TDP) remained an option for reserve component soldiers to purchase dental insurance and to maintain dental readiness as identified in health assessment deficiencies. The program exhibited slow growth even as eligibility expanded, a major issue confronting the DoD initiative to increase reserve component soldiers' healthcare coverage through TRS. The Health Care Survey of DoD Beneficiaries (HCSDB) conducted in January 2007 showed that uncertainty among reservists and their families about eligibility and other coverage options contributed to lower enrollment in the program.⁴⁸

Aside from issues with resources, authority associated with the periodic health assessment, and the slow growth and uncertainty with TRS and TDP enrollments, the Army Guard achieved improvements in health readiness with command emphasis and timely notification. North Carolina's 505th Engineer Battalion only had 25 personnel with health issues when it mobilized out of Fort Dix, New Jersey in August 2005 following a three-month pre-mobilization period. Of those 25, serious issues held back 10 soldiers from continuing the mobilization. The rest had their medical issues corrected and deployed with the unit.⁴⁹

Training for the Fight

Training for mobilizing Army Guard units in 2005 to 2006 slowly changed from previous experiences in the first years of the war, but a multitude of the challenges remained the same. Issues lingered regarding communication, training plans, and training resources. Still, the overall trend showed incremental improvements.

Communication and time management remained an issue between training units and mobilizing units. The training support battalions received criticism for managing training too closely and failing to provide training schedules in a timely manner. These schedules were inflexible and at times out of sequence. Some soldiers found themselves scheduled to conduct their collective training in the morning, only to receive training on the associated individual tasks that afternoon. Poor time management on a range made a group spend 14 hours waiting to fire 40 rounds in order to qualify with their assigned weapon.⁵⁰

An excessive burden for coordination and reporting fell on mobilizing staffs from multiple authorities requiring updates and statuses. As one aviation battalion commander said, there were “too many masters.”⁵¹ His battalion had at least six major entities with whom they coordinated and to whom they reported, including First Army trainers, the garrison support team, NGB, and their state JFHQ. At various times these entities contradicted each other, causing difficulty and lost time. This added stress to the mobilizing unit as well as the associated mobilization support units.⁵² Through it all, units lacked clearly defined mobilization training lists, which were intended to outline which training to conduct prior to mobilization and which was required after mobilization. As a result, units retrained, duplicating efforts at the mobilization site to validate many of the same tasks they performed prior to mobilization.⁵³

Many units met with inflexible training plans after their Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS). The site survey process intended to give the incoming unit the current situation in theater by sending key leaders to visit the unit they would replace. All units above battalion level commonly participated in a site survey prior to deployment. For example, after returning from their visit, the aviators from Texas’s 36th Combat Aviation Brigade found that their site survey did not influence their mobilization schedule or assist developing their post-mobilization training plans, as the training plans were finalized prior to the site survey.⁵⁴

Such inflexibility, however common, was not universal. Some units reported a degree of flexibility in their training to great effect. The 2nd

Brigade, 28th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from Pennsylvania noted the value of an early site survey to give the new unit a firsthand look at their prospective area in the theater and then retuning stateside to adjust training to fit the immediate reality on the ground.⁵⁵

Issues also remained with the personnel assigned to support the mobilizing units. Complaints with the unit assistors (UA) and the training support battalions (TSBn) echoed those of units mobilized in the preceding years and the Army moved to resolve these. Unit assistors received AAR comments mentioning them as uncoordinated and unhelpful in supporting the units because they worked as individuals and not as an advisory team. They focused their help on individual companies and not on the performance of the overall mobilizing battalion.⁵⁶ By doing so, they hindered uniformity in reporting and documentation across the battalion and in lessons learned. As late as 2005, the Guard still commented about trainers who had never deployed training guardsmen who in some cases themselves had already deployed.⁵⁷ Consequently, in 2006, the Army strove to improve the quality and experience of the training cadre and consolidate the training management for the reserve component.

Even so, the most distinct improvement manifested in the quality of the trainers as wartime and experience training exponentially grew. Addressing some of the issues raised by Army Guard units about their trainers, the First Army initiated a new program called Operation Warrior Trainer (OWT) in late 2005. This program took reserve component volunteers demobilizing from a deployment and extended them on temporary orders to serve as Observer-Controller/Trainer (OC/T) or to serve on training support unit staffs to train other mobilizing reserve component units. The volunteers, who were all Army Reserve or Army Guard officers and non-commissioned officers, served up to three years on orders after returning from a deployment. They filled a crucial need for fresh and relevant knowledge of the theater, including current Army and enemy tactics and techniques, with corresponding best practices. The program grew exponentially with an acceptance rate of 95 percent for applicants. The trainers' recent deployment experiences complemented the training provided by the resident instructors who had either never deployed, not deployed recently, or had deployed to a different theater than the unit they were training to mobilize.⁵⁸ The warrior trainer program grew to 1,500 trainers and the First Army assessed it as "essential to First Army's ability to execute the levels of sustained training and mobilization needed to support [combatant commanders] requirements."⁵⁹



Figure 3.5. Sgt. Maj. Theodore Amburgy, an Operation Warrior Trainer, demonstrates the latest combat lifesaving techniques learned in Iraq from his previous deployment in a class for mobilizing soldiers at Fort McCoy 12 January 2007.

In an effort to centralize reserve component training, on 16 January 2006 the Army consolidated the Fifth Army's training responsibilities for units west of the Mississippi River, with those of the First Army, which trained all units east of the river. The First Army public affairs office issued their new mission, "First US Army's training mission is to execute training, readiness oversight and mobilization for US Army Reserve and National Guard units throughout the Continental United States and two US territories."⁶⁰ Beginning in October 2006, the Mississippi River now served as the divide between Training Support Division (TSD) West and TSD East.⁶¹ The change made possible a standardized training chain of command and focused the mission for the active component training command purely on mobilization support. Before this shift, the First Army and the Fifth Army had balanced geographic-based training responsibilities and domestic civil support responsibilities, such as when the First Army served as the active component's headquarters for coordinating the federal response to Hurricane Katrina. After the shift in 2006, the Fifth Army transformed into Army North and took over civil support while the First Army assumed the full training and mobilization mantle.

Even with the change, mixed experiences continued to characterize the training received. A divide appeared between the mobilization station training and the various validation readiness exercises, whether mission rehearsal exercises (MRE), aviation training exercises (ATX) or a rotation at a combat training center (CTC). Most criticism fell on the mobilization station training while the final readiness validation exercises received mostly positive evaluations.

Among those who made the most criticisms of the training were Army guardsmen training to serve on embedded training teams. The embedded trainers were selected guardsmen from various units placed together in small teams to serve as trainers and advisors to Afghanistan security forces. When asked if any piece of training at Camp Shelby, Mississippi was useful, an officer training to be an embedded trainer replied, "No. There wasn't enough time spent on the ranges to achieve any competency... I never saw the radio systems or the [Blue Force Tracker communication and GPS system] until I got into theater. The training on the up-armored vehicle was extremely limited."⁶² Another officer in the same training said, "They squeezed 10 days of training into 60...very rudimentary and just an absolutely unworthy experience."⁶³ Soldiers' frustration with training is commonplace, however, it was distinctly re-occurring from even experienced field grade officers when it came to the advisory training.

In particular, embedded training teams criticized the cultural training, the generic non-mission specific training and the poor new equipment training they received. Cultural training was central to the mission of embedded trainers with their daily and close interactions and relationship building with Afghanistan partners. One embedded trainer quoted a cultural instructor saying, "This is really for Iraq but Iraq is similar to Afghanistan."⁶⁴ Maj. Daniel Lovett, training for the same type of mission, recounted hearing from his cultural awareness trainer, "Iraq, Afghanistan. It's the same thing."⁶⁵ While the preponderance of experiences weighted against the cultural training received, while rare, a few units acknowledged beneficial cultural training and just the right amount of time dedicated to it. This usually stemmed from units that had time to focus extensively during pre-mobilization on their mission, such as some of the embedded teams who knew what mission they had so they could better prepare before they mobilized and received the official training, or had the adaptability to self-train while mobilizing, while other units saw little issue with it whose missions were generally not as culturally demanding.⁶⁶

A common training complaint was a “one size fits all” training model based on Iraq, even when the soldiers were bound for Afghanistan.⁶⁷ The trainers had experience from Iraq and many of the generic training objectives were Iraq-theater focused, a practice that drew a universal critique from an Iowa embedded training team rotation in 2006. One field grade officer commented, “Ninety-five percent of training at Fort Riley was Iraq focused. The trainers were from Iraq, and had not accomplished ETT missions there.”⁶⁸

The emphasis placed by trainers on Iraq is understandable in part due to the majority of Guard units deploying in support of Iraq operations. In May of 2006, 35,000 guardsmen were serving in Iraq, compared to 12,000 in Afghanistan.⁶⁹ This represented the overall Army’s manpower focus on Iraq. In addition, the trainers had gained their personal experience in many cases during tours to the Iraqi theater. However, Maj. Diego Davila, a Puerto Rico Army Guard officer mobilizing as an embedded trainer, commented that some common, good lessons could be taken for operations in Afghanistan even from the Iraq-centric training.⁷⁰

In the case of the Iowa guardsmen, they were confident they had the skills to address training deficiencies among themselves, as many had previously deployed. They struggled, however, to find time to conduct additional internal training after a 12– to 14-hour day of required scheduled training, much of which they found useless. Other guardsmen going through the embedded training team instruction mentioned additional unit-led training after hours further prepared them for the deployment. The criticism did not rest solely on the mobilization station for the mobilizing training teams. Some characterized their state’s pre-mobilization training as “poor” with an over-reliance on the post-mobilization training to fill in gaps.⁷¹

Aviation units also mentioned the loss of more relevant and realistic training at the expense of mandatory training. The Florida Guard unit, 1st Battalion, 111th Aviation Regiment, wrote in its AAR, “‘Every Soldier is a Rifleman’ goes without saying but an Aviation unit is ineffective if it doesn’t get the time needed to train for its mission.”⁷² The 36th Combat Aviation Brigade also shared its dissatisfaction with spending 50 days on non-aviation training.⁷³ When the Florida aviators requested flight training with night vision goggles after a full workday, the training command denied their request. Their first time flying under such conditions would be in Iraq, although night flying under those conditions was a commonplace occurrence in theater. Likewise, the 36th Combat Aviation Brigade commented on rigid and choreographed ranges that did not reflect the realities of gunnery in combat, such as high speed and reactionary door gunnery while flying.⁷⁴

Aviation units were not alone in their desire for more realistic ranges. The 2nd Brigade, 28th Infantry Division also lamented unrealistic and strict ranges that failed to prepare the troops for combat situations. The armored brigade wished training centers had more diverse ranges, covering situations such as firing under stress and transitioning between weapon systems. Essentially, they wanted ranges oriented towards combat rather than just marksmanship.⁷⁵ The 505th Engineers experienced varied quality training during their mobilization. The most consistent observation remained the absence of relevant unit and mission-specific training. For the engineers their training lacked focus on tasks such as crater and road repair, and forward operating base (FOB) construction, but other aspects they acknowledged were beneficial for preparing them to survive, such as individual fighting skills.⁷⁶

A major flaw in the training was the lack of new equipment exposure without lessons on its use, while spending time receiving training on outdated and unused equipment or methods. This was critical because guardsmen depended on these new weapons, gear, and vehicles for survival in theater. The issue with training on the new equipment was twofold: dedicated training time and equipment availability.

Time was a sensitive subject for Army Guard mobilization in many aspects. The predicament involved taking enough time to ensure the guardsmen were trained but not take too long doing so, keeping them away from family and employers as well as ensuring they had enough time on their mobilization “clocks” to make their deployment beneficial to the Army’s mission. Guard units experienced both these extremes, the need to ensure enough time to effectively train on new equipment while not making the mobilization excessively long. In the case of the 2nd Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, the extensive fielding of dozens of new systems, including communication and navigation systems, and weapons significantly contributed to the six month planned post-mobilization training period the brigade endured prior to its Iraq deployment.⁷⁷ The 36th Combat Aviation Brigade fielded 29 new systems after it mobilized. However, their training focused on the basic, mandatory training without incorporating training focused on the new systems.⁷⁸ The Florida aviation battalion likewise stressed it needed more training on new gear, such as weapon optics, navigation tools, and even radios that were lifesavers in theater but unavailable for training during normal weekend drills. When they did receive limited training on the gear it was technical-oriented, classroom-based and not operationally focused or in a dynamic field environment.⁷⁹

The Army faced an issue of equipment availability. With the primary focus on supplying the units overseas in the fight, limited amounts

of new equipment remained stateside for training. The Army pushed the most modern weapons, gear, and vehicles to deploying units when they deployed and, in many cases, these units were required to leave the equipment behind for their replacements. As a result, the training sites lacked new equipment as well as qualified trainers, both were overseas in the war. Soldiers instead received training on items not used in theater. For example, soldiers headed to Task Force Phoenix in Afghanistan trained on the Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR) but deployed with the newer Defense Advance GPS Receiver (DAGR). They received training on the older global positioning system because not enough qualified trainers were available for the newer one. Similarly, the Pennsylvania combat brigade received training on old radios and methods not used in Iraq. In many instances, priority to ship the latest armored vehicles to combat resulted in limiting driver's training with the scarce quantity remaining stateside.⁸⁰

Steady improvement remained concerning the training provided in the final validation exercises. When compared to the mandatory training, the final validation exercises continued to receive favorable comments as in the previous years. Mobilizing units conducted these as final field training events at mobilization stations or as rotations to either Fort Polk's Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) or Fort Irwin's National Training Center (NTC). Battalion-sized and larger combat formations were the normal Guard units selected for training center rotations, while smaller or non-combat arms units conducted their final validation exercises at their mobilization sites. The aviation units praised their specific Aviation Training Exercises as well as the final validation Mission Readiness Exercise; typically, they conducted these exercises at Fort Rucker, Alabama or Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Units identified this training as valuable and applicable to their missions in theater. The Florida aviation battalion even mentioned that a representative from the unit they replaced attended the training, greatly improving its value.⁸¹

Ground combat units also benefited from rotations to the combat training centers. The 2nd Brigade, 28th Infantry Division went to NTC in May 2005 prior to its counterinsurgency deployment to Al Anbar Province, Iraq serving alongside the United States Marine Corps (USMC). Even though the training center rotations generally focus on the combat-oriented scenarios, the Pennsylvania unit's support personnel noted with appreciation the more equitable balance between maneuver and battlefield survival training. They noted learning specific, technical tasks applicable to their supporting role for the brigade. They praised the NTC experience and the lessons learned there.

The combat forces from the Pennsylvania brigade felt that they had received quality training prior to their deployment to Iraq. Although they stated that their NTC rotation could have been more tailored to their mission, they valued the training overall. When leaders became so specific to suggest combined training with US Marines at the Fort Irwin combat training center and substituting tank section gunnery in an urban environment for platoon gunnery, it was because they received solid training and were only looking to make it even better.⁸² As a self-proclaimed learning organization, begun with the implementation of the after-action review and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), the Army must not rest on its laurels once it has found success or met a standard, but continually strive to improve and raise the standard, especially with regards to training for combat deployments.

To add to the positive momentum coming from the Army Guard experiences at the combat training centers and during the final validation exercises, the Guard started a new training event. The eXportable Combat Training Center (XCTC) served as an alternative for the limited rotations Army Guard units received at NTC and JRTC. The XCTC offered a transportable training capability, allowing training and support structure typical for collective events, such as large-scale, live-fire exercises conducted at other posts, made available to various Army Guard locations for training. This training concept allowed more Guard units to practice the higher level of intense training associated with combat training center rotations. In July 2005, a battalion-level training event marked the first use of the XCTC format. The following summer at Camp Atterbury, Indiana, the state's 76th Infantry Brigade in 2006 imitated the combat training center experiences units had through NTC and JRTC rotations. The exportable model received the assessment of being "extraordinarily realistic training."⁸³ The positive response to the exportable training and increased funding led to the model becoming a common training event for the Army Guard, focusing on platoon-level validations.

In an example of the Army learning as an organization, the mobilization training reports submitted by the embedded training teams received consideration, resulting in adjusted training for future teams. Many of the early struggles experienced by both the guardsmen and their trainers in the initial years of the embedded trainer program resulted from the newness of the concept for both groups. Major Daniel Lovett, a Tennessee Army Guard officer, termed his embedded trainer mobilization course as "discovery learning" by both the guardsmen going through the training and the First Army instructors.⁸⁴ Just as the guardsmen had never been embedded

trainers before, the instructors had never deployed as embedded trainers nor run a course for training embedded teams.

Over time, the Army standardized its transition team training—previously as an ad hoc non-standard mission it had lacked specific training requirements. With the backing of the Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, by fall 2006 the Army had centralized all embedded trainer's post-mobilization instruction at Fort Riley, Kansas, with generally positive feedback for the new training regimen. The positive feedback revolved around standardization, balance of mission-specific tasks with mandatory training, and overall treatment of the trainees through the process.⁸⁵ This new program focused on individual training, which included weapons, first aid, and cultural training and ended with team collective training. Maj. John Hollar, undergoing the three-month revamped embedded trainer course of instruction for a deployment later in 2007, praised the weapons training and communication training he received. Specifically, he noted the increased hands on training in communication equipment, inaccessible during normal Army Guard training drills but critical for use in Afghanistan. However, cultural training, so critical to the embedded training mission still showed room for improvement, Hollar commented, "Some of the cultural training was good." He went on to emphasize that training offered too little time dedicated to prepare for the degree of the cultural interaction an embedded mission demanded.⁸⁶

The issues Guard units faced with manning, equipping, and training all were tied with the First Army as it oversaw the mobilization. In 2006, the First Army identified a distinct trend from 2003 through 2006 as the number of training days increased from an average of below 100 for the initial invasion of Iraq to stabilizing at 130 days by the 2006 rotation for battalion and larger combat organizations. The First Army recognized a trend, with the increase in training days corresponding to a rise in fielding and training new equipment and the number of new units attached to the deploying headquarters unit. The newer soldiers that were cross-leveled and new equipment provided to the units, the more time was necessary for post-mobilization training. The amount of mobilization training time steadily increased as the numbers for new equipment and the need to acclimate more non-habitually assigned units rounding out a deploying unit rose as well. In the same study, the First Army observed a growing issue with approximately 64 percent of personnel and 44 percent of all units in the 2007 rotation facing non-standard requirements for personnel and equipment. Army Guard units had been mobilized in non-standard mission units such as security force units, provincial reconstruction teams,

and non-Military Police units tasked to serve as MPs. These units' deployment requirements required more than their normally assigned personnel and equipment, causing a strain on the unit and on First Army support.⁸⁷

Both Army Guard unit personnel issues and the First Army's manpower affected training. One Guard brigade in 2005 required over four training support brigades (TSB) with a 1:7 ratio of trainers to guardsmen at Camp Shelby, totaling 520 Observer-Controllers/Trainers (OC/Ts). In addition to the OC/Ts at Camp Shelby, eight training support brigades devoted 60 UAs to the Guard brigade during the course of its mobilization.⁸⁸ As the war progressed, the First Army staffing had to meet the high demand with less trainers due to funding and the numbers of mobilizing Guard units slowly decreasing over the course of the war from its peak in the 2004-2005 period.⁸⁹ In one year, from May 2007 to May 2008, active component officers at the First Army decreased by 22 percent. The rank of captain specifically fell to a low of 52 percent of vacancies filled, with only 67 percent of officer extension requests approved for continuing into 2007. In comparison, 92 percent of enlisted vacancies remained filled.⁹⁰

Planning for the Future

The genesis of one of the most significant developments in Army Guard mobilizations came in 2005 based on guidance from the Army Campaign Plan of 2004. This plan directed the Army Reserve to "develop force rotation plans to support current operations."⁹¹ A later change ordered the Army Forces Command to develop a rotational plan applicable across the total Army.⁹² This plan matured into the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model.

Leading the way, the Army Reserve began developing a rotational-based Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF) model for internal management of its stretched forces. The five-phase process intended to prepare Army Reserve units for mobilization once every five years. The phases broke down sequentially into an equipping, manning, and administrative phase, an individual training phase, unit training phase, validation phase, and stand-by/mobilize phase.⁹³

Soon after the Army Reserve's concept, the new force generation model took hold across the total Army, bringing all the components into one corresponding training and readiness cycle. The phases and the intent were similar to those outlined by the Army Reserve's model with the initial ARFORGEN concept composed of three phases: Reset/Train, Ready, and Available.⁹⁴ It replaced the linear model of tiered readiness units, deployed sequentially for a sustained conflict. This "legacy system" had




Figure 3.6. Linear versus Rotational Models. Source: Slide Deck, Maj Gen Mark A. Graham, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 FORSCOM, “ARFORGEN Overview,” dated 14 October 2009, Historians files, CMH.

been a construct of the Cold War security environment and mentality. The new ARFORGEN concept provided a rotational model of progressively readied units for “cyclical” deployments, providing a greater degree of predictability for soldiers, families, and employers.⁹⁵ As the new Army force generation concept solidified from 2005-2006 with incremental implementation, the Army began full transition to the process in 2007.

The concept promoted a supply-based model with a demand-based process as one of the improvements to the mobilization system. Unlike the rigid, sequentially-tiered readiness model that had cracked under the dynamic post-9/11 security situation, the cyclical, progressive-readiness model provided flexibility for the current wars. The structure’s target timeline envisioned reserve component units arriving in the “available” pool once every five years for deployment while active component units reached this point once every three. To address any “surge” requirements, the ability to shorten its phases existed through adjusting dwell times for the rotational units along a spectrum from a “partial” to a “full” mobilization or a war “for the duration.” Additionally, the “surge” capacity inherently affected the intended dwell times by shortening them while extending the unit’s time in country, or its “boots on the ground.”⁹⁶

In a time of war with its pressing demands, Army units did not fall into the new force generation model instantly. Certain units did not immediately reach the anticipated dwell times, but as the model matured and the cycle continued, the concept would catch up with reality. The plan meant to utilize the Reset/Train phase of the cycle to implement the modular transformation of Army brigades, thereby incrementally instituting the new force generation concept.⁹⁷ For example, the North Carolina Guard’s 30th Armored Brigade began transformation to the 30th Heavy Brigade Combat Team as it entered its Reset phase in 2005 after returning from its deployment to Iraq in 2004.⁹⁸

The heart of ARFORGEN concept organized the units into three Expeditionary Force packages associated with each step of the cyclical process. The Ready Expeditionary Force (REF) consisted of the units in the Reset/Train pool, corresponding to the lowest readiness state, which lasted three years for reserve component units. After passing through the Reset/Train phase while progressively increasing personnel, equipment, and training readiness, the unit entered the Ready phase, which included improved training. A year later, reserve component units entered the Available phase, meaning they were prepared to enter the mobilization process. If the unit cycled through both the Ready and the Available phase without selection for a mission, it then reverted to the Reset/Train phase and ramped down




Figure 3.7. Arforgen "Surge" Capacity. Source: Slide Deck, Maj Gen Mark A. Graham, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, FORSCOM, "ARFORGEN Overview," dated 14 October 2009, Historians files, CMH.

its readiness as other units passing through the cycle were ramping up theirs. The Ready and Available phases shared two Expeditionary Force packages: the Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) and the Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF). These two differed only in that a contingency package prepared for a generic mission and conducted collective training with no deployment notification, while the deployment package unit conducted collective training specific to a pending deployment.⁹⁹

Equipping units exemplified the intent for progressive readiness in the ARFORGEN model. The Army developed three equipment sets to correlate with the three force generation phases. Units had a baseline equipment set during the Reset/Train period. The fielding of the training set provided during the Ready phase steadily increased equipment readiness. Once a unit reached the Available phase, or received an alert order, this designated it as a Deployment Expeditionary Force, even if still in the Ready portion of the cycle. In each of these cases, the standard remained for the unit to receive the full set of equipment for deployment. The concept planned for all units to cycle through the model. There no longer existed a delineation between early deploying units and later deploying units, making the entire force continuously and progressively available. In reality, while the new force generation model matured, most units still received much of their new equipment at the mobilization station as the new equipment fielding system and the high-deployment tempo eclipsed the model's concept and timeline due to its initial implementation during wartime.¹⁰⁰

The progressive readiness of the units flowing through the ARFORGEN model increased predictability, improved availability of forces, and generated continuous rotation of brigades while maintaining a "surge" capacity. These were all improvements across the total Army and even more so in the Army Guard, due to added benefits such as predictability for families, civilian employers, and student-soldiers.¹⁰¹

In addition to the fundamental change ARFORGEN introduced into the mobilization process, January 2007 saw the last major modification to the Guard mobilization process in the war on terror. The 19 January memorandum from President Bush's second Secretary of Defense, Robert H. Gates, titled "Utilization of the Total Force" resulted from a months-long departmental study started prior to Secretary Gates' tenure. This study led Secretary Gates, "based on this assessment and recommendations of our military and civilian leadership," to clearly articulate new DoD policy on mobilizations.¹⁰² It codified a significant shift in Guard mobilization,



Figure 3.8. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates speaking at the annual National Guard Association of the United States Convention, 22 September 2008.

pointedly and directly addressing critical areas in manning and markedly changing Guard mobilization training.

The main points of the short but influential memorandum established concrete policy on the length of mobilizations, management of personnel mobilizations, goals for dwell times, and instructions to establish incentives for the force. Starting immediately, Gates limited any single mobilization to a maximum of one year “at any one time.” This removed the “cumulative” rule, solving a critical personnel issue, and returned the interpretation of the Title 10 USC to “consecutive.” The new policy allowed the same guardsmen to deploy an infinite amount of times as long as each one totaled no more than one year in length, a major change to constrained Guard personnel management system.

Beyond this adjustment of the individual mobilization clock, the memorandum changed mobilization management from focusing on the individual to managing cumulative times based on unit. Now the mobilization management revolved around unit clocks based on dwell time within the ARFORGEN-cycle, allowing for “great cohesion and predictability.”¹⁰³ This tied directly into the Army-wide focus on dwell time management.

Gates’ memorandum reaffirmed the intended one year mobilized for every five years at home for reserve component units—a longstanding

goal of the DoD—with exceptions based on operational demand. The acknowledgement of exceptions indicated the realities of the wartime tempo, phased implementation of the new force generation model, “surges,” and manpower management. To assist in this new reality of multiple deployments for individuals, the memorandum also directed establishment of a new program to incentivize and compensate such individuals who mobilized repeatedly without meeting intended personnel dwell ratios of the one in five.

Gates wrote, “Just as we are asking the active forces to do more in this time of national need, so we must ask more of our Reserve components.”¹⁰⁴ This was a massive shift in acknowledgment of the deliberate reliance on the Reserve component in contrast to the initial stages of the war where the DoD took the complete different stance to avoid use of the reserve component. Even under Secretary Rumsfeld, the DoD had sought to provide reserve component soldiers with an adequate dwell time of one in five years, but dwell time issues rarely effected reserve component soldiers prior to Secretary Gates’s memorandum. Until the “cumulative” interpretation reverted to “consecutive” for the 24-month limitation, guardsmen seldom needed dwell time since most could only mobilize a second time as volunteers under the 24-month cumulative interpretation, in which case as volunteers dwell time limitations did not apply.

The “Utilization of the Total Force” memorandum fundamentally altered the approach to Guard mobilizations with corresponding consequences, resulting in additional directives and policy clarification developing over the following several months and years on how to enact this guidance. The memorandum offered the first clear effort to move towards adjusting policy to meet the growing reality of an operational Guard, of which its results would be significant in the evolution of Guard mobilization in the Global War on Terrorism.

By the end of 2006, the Army Guard was 38 percent of the total Army and received 12 percent of the total Army budget even as it transitioned from a “strategic” to an “operational” reserve. As an operational reserve, the Army Guard deployed more often than as a strategic reserve and was relied on to support the active component *en masse* in a contingency operation—whereas a strategic reserve saw use only in time of major conflict. Additionally, an operational reserve required faster mobilization comparative to the allowable lengthy mobilization of a strategic reserve. The manner in which utilized abroad also factored in to the change with a growing shift as the Army Guard in some cases backfilled

and shared equal roles of the active component; all thirty-four Guard combat brigades had at one time mobilized in support of the war on terror. In other cases, the Army Guard became the sole force provider for specific roles, such as the Task Force *Phoenix*. Shifting to an operational reserve came at a demanding cost and strain to the organization, which the DoD and the Army strove to navigate and alleviate through policy and reforms.

The Army Guard's deployments in OIF and OEF were in addition to contributions to missions in Africa and the Pacific, while simultaneously supporting domestic emergencies and homeland defense, including the Hurricane Katrina response, Operation JUMP START support to the Customs and Border Patrol, and Operation Noble Eagle support to the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) and key critical infrastructure security. Readiness in the Army Guard continued to struggle due to the tempo of overseas operations and domestic responses, exemplified in the continued cross-leveling. Although the Guard failed to meet its mandated end-strength of 350,000 by 4,000 soldiers, recruiting and retention continued showing improvement. A larger recruiting force with financial incentives—including the Guard Recruiting Assistance Program (G-RAP) and Every Soldier a Recruiter (ESAR) that paid current soldiers a cash bonus to assist recruiters with new prospects—powered a steady improvement, from the low point of barely over 333,000 in 2004.¹⁰⁵

A strained and stretched Army began implementing changes strongly affecting Army Guard mobilizations. Major evolutions to the Army from modular transformation to progressive, cyclical readiness in the ARFORGEN concept were important and though the effects were not immediate, the impact over time showed the effects. With modular transformation, health readiness reforms, a new force generation concept, and “Utilization of the Total Force” memorandum policy changes, the Army had identified major struggles within the mobilization process and initiated solutions to address them. Although by early 2007 the organization felt a sense of improvement and steady movement in the right direction, significant struggles remained within the Guard mobilization process. Issues lingered across the board in personnel, equipping, and training while processes and implementation of new policies and procedures and concepts improved all aspects of the mobilization from personnel, health, equipping, and training readiness. The following years revealed the extent of improved benefits from the increased health initiatives, and the manning, equipping, and training changes that came with the paradigm shifts in the progressive

readiness cycle of ARFORGEN and the DoD policy guidance found in the January “Utilization of the Total Force” memorandum.

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7. Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Mobilization Reform*, 3-5.
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Chapter Four

Keeping up the Fight

The Later War Period, February 2007–December 2011

In an effort to blunt the Taliban gains of the previous years, the Iowa “Red Bulls” combat brigade deployed to Afghanistan as part of President Barack H. Obama’s “Afghan Surge.” From the end of 2010 to the summer of 2011, the 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 34th Infantry Division of the Iowa Army National Guard fought in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan. Based at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Gardez, the battalion occupied combat outposts across the province. Its soldiers wore the latest camouflage pattern the Army issued for Afghanistan, the Operation Enduring Freedom—Camouflage Pattern (OEF-CP) commonly referred to as “multicam.” The battalion’s parent brigade was the first unit in the Army to get the new pattern for service in Afghanistan, an overt commitment by the Army to field the latest gear and equipment to deploying units regardless of component.

The brigade experienced a change in its mission during the mobilization process, resulting in a shift of focus in training and preparation. Alerted for its Afghanistan deployment at the end of 2009, the Iowa battalion originally received orders to support Task Force Phoenix as combat advisors. During the pre-mobilization training, however, the brigade received orders to conduct counterinsurgency operations across multiple provinces. The 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry Regiment deployed to Paktya Province, which straddles the border with Pakistan, and was attached to a series of active component brigades for command and control.¹ From the brigade’s early alert to their pre-mobilization training mission change and their up-to-date gear fielding, the Iowa brigade exemplified many improvements as well as some of the issues remaining with Guard mobilization.²

The Operational Guard

By 2007, many of the previous years’ initiatives began to show results. The number of Army Guard recruiters nearly doubled from 2,700 to 5,100 since the poor recruitment year of 2004. In addition, higher retention bonuses and larger initial recruitment bonuses went into effect.³ These were mainly the results of General Blum’s request at the Pentagon in December 2004 for an increase in the budget to address personnel shortfalls.⁴ Many bonuses doubled or even tripled. This resulted in the Army Guard’s



Figure 4.1. Col. Benjamin J. Corell, 2nd Brigade, 34th Infantry Division commander, takes cover wearing the latest uniform and equipment for the Afghanistan theater while a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter lands during a mission in Laghman, eastern Afghanistan.

personnel end-strength steadily climbing to 90 percent in 2007, 98 percent in 2008, and over 100 percent in 2009 and beyond.⁵

Between 2007 and 2008, the Army Guard completed its modular transformation, modernizing the force along the same lines and standards as the active component. The Guard converted its formations into 28 brigade combat teams⁶, seven artillery-based fires brigades, nine sustainment brigades, six new intelligence-centric battlefield surveillance brigades, eight combat aviation brigades, four theater aviation brigades, one theater aviation group, 38 mission-specific functional brigades, and 16 maneuver-enhancement brigades, while maintaining its two Special Forces Groups.⁷

As the Army Guard absorbed the influx of personnel and transformed its force structure to modular formations while adjusting to ARFORGEN, Army policy toward mobilization underwent change as well. Secretary of Defense Gates' January 2007 memorandum "Utilization of the Total Force" was the single most significant change in mobilization policy during the war. Providing specific guidance and intent, the memorandum broadly altered the use of the Total Force, alleviating certain issues while raising others. It triggered a series of service-specific memorandums to establish policy as well as specific Department of Defense directives, both original

and updates to existing ones. The policy discernibly shifted, reflecting the reserve component's move from its pre-9/11 posture as a strategic reserve to a post-9/11 status as an operational force in the Total Force concept.

A little over seven years after 9/11, the DoD started codifying in directives and policies the major adjustments addressing the difficult mobilization process. On 29 October 2008, the DoD released directive 1200.17 "Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force." It described the operational role of the reserve component, stating, "The [reserve components] provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict." The same directive stated the goal being "Active Components (ACs) and [reserve components] are integrated as a total force."⁸ Further, the document stated the reserve component "is a necessity in an era of persistent conflict and global engagement."⁹ The document, as with others, outlined policy and reaffirmed the guidance from Secretary Gates' original memorandum by emphasizing the management of the reserve component required keeping policies in place to support health readiness and encouraging voluntary duty to meet the operational requirements.¹⁰

The DoDD 1235.10 "Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve" served as the pillar of mobilization policy and experienced major revisions based on the shift in policy after January 2007. The directive issued three main guidelines, defining judicious and prudent use, voluntary service, and predictable involuntary service. The revised directive 1235.10 emphasized the need for predictability and cyclical nature of the reserve component.¹¹

It viewed predictability, notification up to two years in advance, and a rotationally ready force as a means to achieve judicious and prudent use. It further stated that to "maintain an operational [reserve component] force" there needed to be consideration of other options besides overuse of the reserve components, such as contractors. In addition, the directive instructed that the reserve component deploy only for important purposes to support critical mission requirements, in roles that suited its specialties and training throughout the duration of its mobilization.¹² This addressed claims of misuse of reserve component units called up to do jobs that the active component did not want to do and that were not part of the mobilized unit's specialty or purpose. The directive further stated repeat mobilizations were to follow the stipulations for dwell time and mobilization timeline limitations as imposed by Secretary Gates' memorandum and further emphasized in existing Department of Defense directives.¹³ The change supported fears that without a cumulative cap for how often

guardsmen deployed, with only a consecutive time limitation for mobilizations, the personnel policy changes allowed possible overuse of multiple deployments of reserve component units or individuals beyond retention and recruitment sustainability.

Providing the manpower for continual mobilizations served as a key first step. Without the personnel or policy to mobilize the necessary soldiers, the equipping, health readiness, and training of the force were ancillary points. In this way, a great deal of the policy changes addressed maintaining voluntary service and emphasized predictability for involuntary service.

Manning the Force for the Continuing Fight

As the Army Guard neared a culminating crisis of staffing its deploying ranks with volunteers, or soldiers who were within their cumulative 24-month window, Secretary Gates altered the situation. In one move, the Department of Defense removed the issue of balancing the involuntary 24-month limit with lengthy mobilization processes. Change in policy not only ended the cumulative interpretation and returned it to consecutive 24 months, which allowed for multiple involuntary mobilizations of less than 24 consecutive months, but removed the issue entirely by also limiting all reserve component mobilizations to 12 months in total. This way no guardsmen would mobilize for more than 12 months at any one time, keeping them well within the 24-month consecutive limitation, allowing involuntarily mobilization multiple times, for multiple rotations beyond an involuntary limit of cumulative 24 months. Balancing the intended dwell time with the allowance for multiple involuntary mobilizations—for reserve component forces, one year mobilized for every five years stateside—and the limitations on total mobilization period, did not always work in the fluid demands of the Global War on Terrorism. Reliance on volunteers continued as the Army's priority for filling deploying units.

Even as the policy shift qualified more guardsmen for multiple involuntary mobilizations, it raised significant related issues. The Army needed to maintain a constant flow of volunteers to balance multiple involuntary tours for others, while finding ways to keep those serving multiple involuntary tours from leaving the Army. One of the first effects of Secretary Gates' policies from the "Utilization of the Total Force" memorandum was to place the force under new personnel mobilization guidelines. On 18 April 2007, the Army instituted two major incentives and compensation policies for volunteers and those involuntarily mobilized for more than one year or re-mobilized before reaching the stipu-

lated dwell time. The incentives were the new Post-deployment/Mobilization Respite Absence (PDMRA) program and the continued, expanded Assignment Incentive Pay with extra hardship-duty compensation. The PDMRA program provided administrative absence for soldiers mobilized for longer than one year, in practice providing additional leave days accrued or paid out after completion of the mobilization. The rate of additional leave derived from calculating each month or portion of a month a soldier mobilized beyond the 12-month limitation or re-mobilized prior to reaching the dwell time. Likewise, additional incentive pay compensated soldiers for time extending beyond the stipulated limitations and expectations. This continued similar policies of incentive pay previously given to soldiers who volunteered to mobilize beyond the previous cumulative 24-month limitation.¹⁴

The directives of the period repeatedly emphasized providing incentives for volunteers and compensating involuntary re-mobilized soldiers. DoDD 1200.17 stated that to maintain volunteerism, the DoD would offer soldiers monetary and non-monetary incentives and the option to choose between the two.¹⁵ DoDD 1235.10 “Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization”, published a month later, directed the secretaries of the military departments that “monetary and non-monetary incentives may be used... to attract volunteers.”¹⁶ This directive most directly discussed the voluntary and predictable involuntary service policies. In regards to voluntary service the policy remained that “Volunteers shall be encouraged to the extent possible given operational consideration” and volunteer’s time for mobilization counted towards their dwell time clock.¹⁷

Involuntary service saw the most change in the new policy. The maximum one year mobilization and the stipulated dwell time limited the newly termed “predictable involuntary service.”¹⁸ This led to the solidification of the train-mobilize-deploy model with an inherent demand placed on pre-mobilization training to maximize the time for overseas usage within the limited 12 months total mobilization period. The policy ensured units maximized time spent in theater during their 12 month-long mobilization through adequate resourcing and focus on pre-mobilization training. The force generation planning meant to support available units, trained and resourced in regards to “personnel, training and equipment to ensure employment readiness.”¹⁹ The directive went on to address the ever-present issue of cross-leveling, stating that “cohesion and predictability in how [reserve component] units train and deploy” meant that mobilizations were unit based and, “cross-leveling of personnel shall be minimized.”²⁰ Little room remained for low levels of readiness in a unit to be useful for

a deployment cycle in a 12-month window. This resulted in a constant struggle between maintaining unit stability within the ARFORGEN cycle and the emphasis on volunteers over involuntary remobilizations. Through development of models such as ARFORGEN and the application of new policies, the Army took steps to prepare the Guard for operational use.

The 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team from Oklahoma was among the first Guard brigades to mobilize after Secretary Gates instituted the new policies. They had a 180-day alert period before their October 2007 mobilization date. The low number of states needed to resource the Oklahoma brigade indicated the shift in personnel management over the course of the war and the implementation of new procedures and policies. Oklahoma relied on only two states outside of the home state to fill the rosters for the brigade's Iraq deployment. Personnel and cross-leveling issues remained, however, even if at a lower degree under the new policies. One of the battalions came from Kansas, and arrived 87 personnel short, resulting in notable cross-leveling.²¹

Realities of mid-war changes always affected some units, and personnel policy changes after the January 2007 memorandum were no exception. The mobilization of the 34th Infantry Division headquarters to serve in southern Iraq served as an example. Notified in January 2008 for rotation as the second Army Guard division headquarters to mobilize for the war, the Minnesota division had 13 months to prepare. The issue with personnel for the Minnesota division stemmed from the 1st Brigade Combat Team providing much of the staff who had just finished a 22-month mobilization in mid-2007. Previously this would have resulted in a personnel nightmare and mass cross-leveling. Under the new policy, however, the emphasis remained on volunteers over multiple involuntary tours. At the same time, with applicable compensation, guardsmen mobilized again, even after having served a 22-month long mobilization. By March 2008, Maj. Gen. Richard Nash, division commander, had the "Red Bull" division effectively staffed, with its ranks reaching 110 percent of the requirement, a testament to both the continuing strain and demand placed on repeated mobilizations of guardsmen and the success of the policy eliminating the cumulative cap on involuntary mobilizations.²²

The steady increase in Guard end strength, coupled with the new policy ending cumulative limitations on guardsmen's involuntary mobilization time, fixed many of the issues associated with personnel. Manning remained challenging, however, resulting in residual cross-leveling throughout the period. Remaining challenges included the fact that the overall Army Guard end strength numbers failed to tell the complete sto-

ry in regards to impact on actual units. This occurred because, although Army Guard end strength increased, even exceeding 100 percent over the course of the 2007-2011, each state within the Guard was its own sub-entity, with varying degrees of personnel end strength in specific units. In the case of the 1st Battalion, 161st Field Artillery from Kansas supporting the 45th Brigade Combat Team, it still needed 86 additional cross-leveled personnel.

The ongoing emphasis on volunteers continued to inhibit unit stability during mobilizations. Even though policy changed to allow for repeated involuntary re-mobilizations of less than twenty-four consecutive months, the official policy also heavily emphasized the use of volunteers or finding other individuals who had not yet mobilized before to replace anyone facing multiple involuntary mobilizations. This meant that even if the unit staffed itself according to the new policy, volunteers or someone not previously mobilized were the primary source to draw from if they were available. Here a conflict arose between unit stability through involuntary remobilization and the reliance on volunteers.

Another factor continuing to challenge Guard personnel management for mobilizations was the amount of non-standard missions given to the Army Guard in theater. These non-standard missions included security force (SECFOR) and Task Force Phoenix assignments, which forced reorganization of standard combat formations. The creation of other ad hoc units formed solely for the deployment also influenced Guard manning capabilities, such as provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) for both theaters and agricultural development teams (ADTs) for Afghanistan. These non-standard mission units created a demand for extensive cross-leveling of both personnel and equipment from other units. The specific nature of these units meant they relied heavily on the Army Guard, especially the ADTs—a Guard-centric creation. Specifically, agricultural development teams drained personnel and equipment from the state that “hosted” the formation of an agricultural team, causing complications throughout the mobilizations due to the lack of a foundational or “standing” unit model to follow.²³

The second brigade-sized deployment of the 39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team from Arkansas to Iraq demonstrated the stress a security-force mission placed on staffing. Previously deployed to Iraq in 2004 as an infantry brigade, the Arkansas “Bowie Brigade” mobilized again in 2008. The second time around, the brigade mobilized for a non-standard mission to conduct security in Iraq. The assignment caused significant staffing issues with the combat brigade as it restructured from its infantry

brigade combat team configuration to the non-standard SECFOR model. The uncertainty over the human resources required of a non-standard unit displayed itself painfully to the Arkansas brigade as the required numbers for the mission fluctuated over time from 2,100, to 2,800, to 3,166, changing again as late as the pre-deployment site survey when the final number rested at 3,370 soldiers. The brigade managed to fill the ranks first through in-state soldiers as non-standard missions meant job descriptions were more flexible. Where specific slots in an infantry brigade allowed only those qualified as infantrymen, in a security forces unit multiple different qualifications sufficed, allowing a wider pool from which to draw. In the case of the 39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, their struggle with reaching the growing personnel requirement necessitated a last minute influx of three hundred in-theater volunteers extending to serve with the Arkansas unit while the brigade processed through Kuwait.²⁴

The experience of Task Force Phoenix in Afghanistan illustrates another major non-standard mission that the Army Guard filled during the period. The Army National Guard took over the mission from the active component prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The 33rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team's 2009 mobilization to support Task Force Phoenix and fulfill security force requirements around the theater showed the strain these types of missions caused for unit manning. The Illinois combat brigade deployed 2,729 soldiers by forming six Embedded Training Teams, 44 Police Mentorship Teams, a Training Assistance Group, a force protection battalion, five security force platoons for PRT support, a Logistics Task Force, a stand-alone security force battalion, and a headquarters company for administration. This array of formations came from a standard organization of an infantry brigade combat team, which is composed of a brigade headquarters, two infantry battalions, one cavalry reconnaissance squadron, one brigade support battalion, and one brigade special troops battalion. The diversity of requirements and spectrum of missions required a massive redistribution of personnel and disrupted unit cohesion.²⁵ In the case of finding personnel equipped to meet these demands, the conversion of the combat brigade to its non-standard mission "essentially fit a round peg into a square hole" according to the unit's historical review.²⁶

The importance of understanding the impact of non-standard mission units for Army National Guard mobilization meant as the wars progressed and policy was adjusted for many of the earlier challenges, inherent tasking of these *ad hoc*, non-standard formations continued to place a strain on the Guard's mobilization personnel management. From 2007 to 2011, seventeen Army Guard brigade combat teams mobilized for security force

Funding for Army National Guard Equipping by Fiscal Year					
Fiscal Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Congressional NGREA	\$744 million	\$1.074 billion	\$1.236 billion	\$768 million	\$575 million
Army Procurement	\$5.5 billion	\$6.3 billion	\$7.2 billion	\$5.2 billion	\$4.7 billion
Total Funding	\$6.2 billion	\$7.4 billion	\$8.4 billion	\$6 billion	\$5.3 billion

Figure 4.2. Funding for the Army National Guard Equipping by Fiscal Year, 2006-2010. Source: Plans and Integration Branch Materiel Programs Division Army National Guard.

missions and three for Task Force Phoenix missions, compared to six as standard combat brigade missions.²⁷ Even as these non-standard formations played havoc with personnel management from fluctuating numbers requirements and job duties, they also affected equipping Guard units for mobilization. Just as the personnel-mobilization process had seen some improvements over the course of the war, so did the procedures for equipping Army Guard units.

Equipping the Force for the Continuing Fight

Although official policy and memorandums definitively labeled the Army Guard as an operational force, budgetary allocations lagged. In 2007, the Department of Defense proposed spending that would only bring the Guard up to 75 percent of its intended equipping readiness levels, which did not indicate an operational force, but rather reflected the resourcing of the National Guard at pre-9/11 levels. In response to concerns over the poor equipping of non-deployed units that grew during the repeated rotations and policy of leaving gear behind in theater since 2004, Congress and the Army moved forward to increase spending on new equipment. This would improve non-deployed unit levels up to 77 percent for equipment on hand over the span of 2008 to 2013, supporting unit training and increasing ability for domestic emergency response.²⁸

A massive influx of funding from the congressional National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) program served as a major source supporting the modernization and equipping of the Army Guard. In 2007 and 2008, the Guard received over a billion dollars for equipment, and although funding tapered off in the following years, it remained

high in conjunction with Army National Guard mobilizations overseas.²⁹ (See Figure 4.2). Importantly, NGREA funds were not the only source for equipping the National Guard. The Army itself budgeted billions towards procurement for the Army Guard during this period. The rise and fall of this funding was similar to that of NGREA and the flow of the wars.³⁰

Although policy discussions addressed improved funding and equipment issues, units still faced excessive equipment transfers to prepare for mobilization. For example, two years early in its ARFORGEN cycle while still in the Reset phase, the Arkansas 39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team received an alert for another mobilization. On top of this early alert, the brigade received a non-standard mission as a security force brigade. The alert resulted in the infantry brigade combat team's standard assigned equipment being both insufficient and inapplicable for the mission requirements, including an extraordinary lack of vehicles. In a typical infantry brigade combat team, only one of the four infantry companies in an infantry battalion is fully motorized, the rest being dismounted infantry companies without enough of their own vehicles assigned to move entirely mounted. At the time, only in the vehicle-based heavy brigade combat teams and the one Army Guard Stryker brigade did entire units have their own motorized transportation. This posed similar personnel complications for units faced with non-standard missions. The Arkansas "Bowie Brigade" conducted intense equipment cross-leveling as a light infantry unit converted to a motorized security force structure. Like Georgia's 48th Infantry Brigade in 2005, the "Bowie Brigade" did not receive its mission-specific required equipment list from its theater command until December 2007, a month before it had to mobilize. As a result, the brigade had to secure all required cross-leveled gear before movement to their mobilization station—a period of less than 30 days. Lacking equipment right up to mobilization had further ramifications, resulting in the units training at mobilization with limited gear, requiring them to share and pass around weapons and vehicles for training.³¹ Ohio's 37th Infantry Brigade Combat Team also faced the same situation of mobilizing as a security force brigade with equipment shortages influencing training. Although they received the necessary training on new equipment, they lacked the necessary gear in time for the mobilization.³²

The experiences of these brigades were not unique. Upon alert, the Indiana Guard's 38th Combat Aviation Brigade's subordinate units' strengths in equipment varied from 43-60 percent of their assigned equipment. Extensive work at cross-leveling a large influx of new equipment brought the unit up to 90 percent by the time the brigade mobilized, largely due

to the unit's prior experience and knowledge of the mobilization process for equipping mobilizing units. Having deployed previously, the unit possessed familiarity with necessary coordination for equipment transfers and removing unneeded equipment from the list.³³ The 37th Infantry Brigade Combat Team and its mobilization support structure—the National Guard Bureau, its First Army Training Support Brigade, and the garrison support units—uniformly agreed that time and mission changes were the number one cause of equipping struggles. Short notice provided the unit limited time to cross-level equipment, refit or collect assigned equipment and then transport needed items. Last minute mission changes from standard to non-standard, in the case of the 37th Brigade less than 60 days from its “boots on the ground” date, only exacerbated the difficult situation.³⁴

Equipment cross-leveling also did not always address unit equipment needs. For example, when Oklahoma's 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team mobilized in 2007 to Iraq for a security force mission, it did so on such short notice that it did not inspect most of the cross-leveled equipment received from other units. When the unit began training, it found that many units had transferred defective equipment, including 26 percent of the light machine guns. Similarly, 700 of 790 handguns came without technical inspections, although fortunately only nine percent proved unserviceable. Similar problems emerged with heavy machine guns and automatic grenade launchers. Repairing this equipment took time, detracting from training and adding unnecessary work on the mobilizing unit and its support structure.³⁵

The Army Guard's equipment rate on hand for its traditional mission saw increasing numbers from 77 percent in 2007 to 87 percent by 2011.³⁶ Understanding the status of Army Guard equipping for mobilizations, however, involves an understanding that the larger Army National Guard formations predominantly mobilized in non-standard missions, producing complications in personnel and equipment requirements that differed from the standard equipment they received. The Guard saw an influx in equipment resourcing even as the missions it received for mobilization caused continued cross-leveling.

A Force Fit to Fight

The Army Guard experienced significant dividends in health readiness during the later years of the war due to policy and regulations changes, leadership experience, and budgetary support for health care programs. The combination of annual Periodic Health Assessments, early TRICARE availability upon notification, and command emphasis

Medical Readiness Categories			
Classification	Requirement	Deficiency	Status
MR 1	Meets all requirements	No deficiency	Deployable
MR 2	Requirements can be met in 72 hours	Common immunizations, Dental Class 2, blood test	Deployable
MR 3A	Requirements can be resolved in 30 days, resourced for alerted Reserve Component soldiers	Dental class 3, on temporary medical profile, less than 30 days	Non-deployable
MR 3B	Requirements exceed 30 days	On permanent profile or profile exceeding 30 days, pregnancy	Non-deployable
MR 4	Requirements unknown, missing or incomplete PHA/Dental screening	Unknown	Deployable based on specific details

Figure 4.3. Medical Readiness Categories. Source: Office of the Surgeon General, "Medical Readiness Leader Guide," dated March 2011, 16.

on health readiness played major parts in the improvement, all supported through financial and policy backing. Ancillary support came from increased TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS) availability and increased end strength.

The NDAA of 2007 made the final major adjustment to the TRS program, which meant to provide reserve component soldiers access to affordable healthcare regardless of mobilization orders. The act of 2007 expanded TRS eligibility to all reserves for the duration of their service, eliminating any service agreement. It ended the tier system, placing all eligible members into the premium-based Tier 1 category, where soldiers covered 28 percent of coverage costs. This reduced enrollment uncertainty, an identified major cause for low enrollment, and the cheaper premium

compared favorably with other civilian plans, therefore serving to encourage TRICARE coverage.³⁷

The NDAA of 2010 further enhanced the benefit of early enrollment in TRICARE for mobilizing reserve component soldiers. Previously, soldiers who had received orders for mobilization could enroll in TRICARE 90 days from their mobilization date, something extremely beneficial with an annual health assessment. It allowed soldiers within 90 days of mobilization to address health issues through no-cost TRICARE. Many units commented that while the 90-days policy significantly helped, it failed to address certain major issues, specifically lengthy wait times for dental procedures.³⁸ The NDAA of 2010 expanded the enrollment period from 90 days to 180 days prior to mobilization, doubling the amount of time units had to get their soldiers medically deployable on TRICARE. The important impact of increased early TRICARE rested in the new 12-month total mobilization time limit reducing the amount of time available at mobilization station to address non-deployable issues.³⁹

Between the implementation of annual health assessments, the expansion of eligibility for TRS, and the benefit of early TRICARE enrollment for mobilizing units, the major pieces were set for comprehensive health readiness reform for the reserve component. Those soldiers in deployable status steadily climbed from mid-2008 onwards, from just over 20 percent to 70 percent, with indications of a continued climb as the new programs, policies, and procedures took effect. Data from 2009 through 2011 showed both annual health assessments and adherence to dental requirement increased medical readiness classification results, with the latter resulting in the greatest correlation. As compliance increased over the years so did the medical readiness classifications across the Army Guard.⁴⁰

In each of The Army National Guard Annual Financial Reports from 2008 through 2011, NGB singled out the increasing health readiness improvement due to funding provided to address PHA-identified issues and an Army Guard health readiness emphasis. Both the fully medically ready rate (MR 1 and MR 2 classifications) and the dental deployable classification rate when arriving at mobilization station climbed, beginning at 22 percent fully medically ready in 2007 and rising to 70 percent in 2011. Dental deployable personnel upon arrival at mobilization station ranged from 85 percent to 94 percent in 2011. Where dental factors in the early war period stood as the number one reason for non-deployable soldiers, guardsmen now arrived at mobilization stations with nearly 100 percent deployable rates in dental readiness. Dental readiness had four categories. Categories 1-2 were “deployable with no further treatment” or “non-ur-




Figure 4.4. Army Guard Health Readiness 2008 through 2011. Graphic created by Army University Press staff.

gent routine treatment.” Categories 3-4 were “non-deployable without treatment” for urgent conditions likely to cause a dental emergency within 12 months or there was simply no examination documented within the last year. While the average for the Army Guard as a whole, including both mobilizing and non-mobilized units, lowered slightly to 80 percent in 2011 compared to the 94 percent for those mobilizing, this remained a drastic improvement, focused on bringing mobilizing units up to deployable readiness.

The 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team mobilized in 2007 after a 180-day alert, although some of its companies only received 60-days notification before the mobilization date. This latter case exemplified how a breakdown in timely information hindered the effectiveness of reforms addressing mobilization issues. Five of the brigade's companies with the 60-day alert were unable to conduct pre-mobilization Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP), which included the periodic health assessment, resulting in higher than normal medical and dental deficiency rates upon arrival at mobilization station. To add to this, the units that did conduct the SRP and health assessments did so with only one dental contractor for pre-mobilization support, due to funding. Even with these variables, the 45th Brigade had only a 5 percent failed rate, with 139 soldiers out of 2,630 (5 for administrative reasons, 1 for dental, and 133 for medical). The results were less than the historical 7 percent commonly seen by the First Army. The original dental readiness rate at mobilization station was a significant 27 percent (714 soldiers) initially non-deployable, but efficient and effective treatment during mobilization reduced that to the single dental non-deployable soldier by the time the unit departed for Iraq.⁴¹

The 39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, from Arkansas, also had significant struggles with its health readiness, but successfully overcame them. Alerted in April 2007 for a January 2008 mobilization date, the brigade conducted an administrative processing review for its 4,225 soldiers with 3,091 of these cleared to move on to Camp Shelby, Mississippi for pre-mobilization training. At Camp Shelby, the brigade lost another 502 soldiers through subsequent personnel processing. Only five of those lost were for administrative reasons; the rest were medical-related losses. This had repercussions severely affecting last minute cross-leveling of personnel. The 39th Brigade tried to use the FEDS_HEAL program to bridge the gap to the 90 days from mobilization TRICARE window. Once the transition to early TRICARE occurred, the brigade actually experienced more difficulties getting medical support, due to the limited capabilities of the local civilian medical community and limited military treatment facilities trying to handle the influx of the Arkansas guardsmen. This served as an example for the need to the increase from the 90 days for early TRICARE to 180 days, allowing more time to process guardsmen for treatment. The success the brigade did have resulted from heavy leadership involvement and an emphasis for soldiers to get whatever care and treatment was possible.⁴² The aggressive involvement of unit leadership to emphasize utilization of TRICARE and other programs, such as FEDS_HEAL, to remedy annual health assessment-identified health deficiencies prior to mobiliza-

tion, remained a common observation across multiple units and was seen as critical to the success of those programs and reforms.⁴³

Health assessments saw fluctuation based on which medical providers were doing the screenings, presenting another issue plaguing the Arkansas brigade. Where a soldier passed one screening or received a certain medical or dental classification, a subsequent screening could classify him lower and declare him non-deployable. For example, screenings by Camp Shelby health providers downgraded 100 soldiers, or approximately 25 percent of those soldiers classified dental class 2 (deployable) by Arkansas medical personnel prior to mobilization to dental class 3 (non-deployable). This resulted from differing professional opinions and interpretations of health regulations. These changes in deployable health statuses further effected training, equipping, and preparing soldiers who passed earlier screenings only to fail at the mobilization station. If the non-deployable could not be fixed, then units had to abruptly find and bring in new soldiers and restart the entire process with the replacements. As a testament to an overall shift in improved medical readiness, the Camp Shelby mobilization staff claimed the 39th Brigade experienced the lowest non-deployable rate of any brigade they had processed.⁴⁴

The overall process continued to improve. The 37th Infantry Brigade Combat Team mobilized at the same time as the Arkansas brigade and did so with a low rate of 33 non-deployable out of 2,478 soldiers due to multiple SRPs and use of early TRICARE with the revamped FEDS_HEAL program, now termed the Reserve Health Readiness Program. In late 2008, the Illinois 33rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team mobilized for Afghanistan with a less than two percent medical non-deployable rate, due to concerted efforts by state-directed unit leadership focused on health readiness.⁴⁵ Even later in the period, Indiana's 38th Combat Aviation Brigade mobilized in June 2009 with only one medically non-deployable out of 1,200 soldiers.⁴⁶ In the fall of 2009, the Guard's then-only Stryker unit, Pennsylvania's 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, mobilized with less than 5 percent of its personnel medically non-deployable, after receiving over 1,000 soldiers within 30 days of mobilizing.⁴⁷ With health readiness making large strides, and both personnel and equipment concerns addressed through policy and procedure, training remained the last major aspect of the mobilization process to be improved.

Readying for the Fight

Where health readiness had improved the most from the reforms, training for Army National Guard mobilizations saw a more mixed result



Figure 4.5. President George W. Bush walking with Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, commander of First Army, 5 September 2005, after the President's arrival in Baton Rouge, LA.

from policy changes and reforms. Changes addressing personnel, equipping, and health readiness problems affected training in a trickle-down fashion, as training typically occurred last prior to deployment. Resulting from Secretary Gates's 19 January memorandum, the emphasis on pre-mobilization training shifted responsibility to the state level for effective time management.

Evaluating the impact of Secretary Gate's policies, Lt. Gen. Russel L. Honoré, who completed his tenure as commander of the First Army at the end of January 2008, noted several major "musts" units should achieve before arriving at mobilization station and a few "realities" the First Army had seen from the initial Army National Guard brigades at the mobilization stations. He determined the pre-mobilization training by the states *must* focus on individual—and crew-level training. The units *must* also complete all equipment issues and equipment training prior to arrival.⁴⁸ Many Guard units concurred with this assessment in their comments on the importance of training and the lack of time in particular for equipment training during pre-mobilization.⁴⁹

The brief went on to state units *must* arrive fully medically deployable and with pre-mobilization tasks complete. Honoré noted many of the first

five brigades to mobilize under the new policies arrived without all pre-mobilization tasks completed, forcing the trainers to incorporate make-up training along with the training and validation already planned, all within the short window to capitalize on the 12-month total mobilization.⁵⁰ For example, Arkansas's 39th Brigade arrived at its mobilization station with 88 percent of its pre-mobilization training completed. Due to only six months alert time in which to complete the tasks prior to mobilization, 73 percent of Ohio's 37th Brigade arrived with only half of its tasks complete.⁵¹ The First Army commander also noted the need for an Army directed pre-mobilization standard, a view many Guard units echoed as standards changed or were unclear.⁵² As a result, the First Army dealt with units arriving in various stages of task certification and training readiness for validation. Consequently, the First Army created a wide variety of post-mobilization training plans, addressing each unit's pre-mobilization training deficiencies, as well as the already planned collective training intended for post-mobilization under the new policies.⁵³ First Army identified a positive overall trend in pre-mobilization training from observing the first six Army Guard brigades tasked with meeting the pre-mobilization training requirements prior to arrival at mobilization station, illustrating the adaptive nature and receptive learning environment existing in the Army.⁵⁴

Personnel policy limiting the ability of units to stop personnel transfers out of mobilizing units prior to 90 days from mobilization made the final impact on training. The first five brigade combat teams suffered on average a loss of 59 soldiers a month from the time they received their alert notice until they reached the 90-day stabilization window. This wasted precious resources and required the unit to accept replacements who had not received the pre-mobilization training or health and administrative actions.⁵⁵

Based on the policies in Secretary Gates' memorandum, the Army directed TAGs for their respective states to train and certify their mobilizing units prior to the start of the 12-month total mobilization window to maximize time deployed overseas.⁵⁶ Gates's instructions led to the formation of the Pre-mobilization Training Assistance Element (PTAE) program for each state and territory. A National Guard Bureau-funded program begun in 2007 to address the need from Secretary Gates' policy change, the program minimized the time spent at mobilization station while accomplishing required training and validations during pre-mobilization.

This policy initiative shifted the status in which Army Guard units conducted the majority of their pre-deployment training. Previously, when Army Guard units conducted most of the pre-deployment training it was in a Title 10 USC status during their post mobilization. This was done

while on their deployment orders, federally funded, while under fulltime active duty management and control at an Army mobilization site. With the change to emphasizing specific training approved for conduct under certification of the state TAGs prior to the unit's transition to fulltime active duty, more pre-deployment training by Army Guard units occurred in a Title 32 USC status. Under Title 32, the units conducted these training activities tied to their upcoming mobilization while under the management and control of their state while using federal funds, just like normal reserve compo-

nent training for any unit, only now it was specific training linked directly to a unit's mobilization and not just standard unit training.

The state's National Guard leadership now conducted and certified more training, reducing the amount of time training took from the limited cumulative 12-month long deployment order. The change allowed Guard units to spend more of the cumulative 12-month activation time actually overseas, but time limitations still effected training. This "shelf life" meant various training had differing amounts of time before it had to be re-validated, demanding scrutiny to training dates and times leading up to the mobilization and transition from Title 32 to Title 10 for the actual deployment. If these times were not managed, or training was done out of sequence, it could result in training being repeated under Title 10 when on active duty at the mobilization site. The Army intended the PTAE program



Figure 4.6. New York Army Guard PTAE instructs mobilizing soldiers at Fort Drum, NY, 8 August 2008.

to provide assistance to state and unit leadership in balancing and choreographing the time management of training with TAG-certified validations holding until mobilization.

New York was one of the first states to form a PTAE program in April 2007. The New York PTAE in 2008 was typical in its composition. It included all combat veterans certified as Army instructors and graduates of the First Army Academy, the same requirements of First Army trainers. Fulltime guardsmen made up these organizations, assisting mobilizing units to complete pre-mobilization training focused on individual, leader, and crew tasks as well as theater-specific training before validation at mobilization sites. They served as the certifying officials for tasks validated by state Adjutants General.⁵⁷

After the establishment of the state PTAEs, the training pipeline started with pre-mobilization training and PTAE certification in home states. Once at a mobilization station, the units went through the Operation Warrior Trainers (OWTs), the First Army trainers, and resident OC/Ts for validation exercises. In addition to the administrative support of UAs, guardsmen interacted with up to four different sets of trainers during the mobilization process.

Even with the multiple trainers, interactions with them and the improvements resulted in increased praise. As units, trainers, and assistants passed through the process multiple times, the previous experiences paid dividends. Initially, even new institutions, such as the PTAE, struggled through the transition period, but the First Army and the various state trainers learned to work with each other in documenting training, transferring records from the states to the First Army upon mobilization, and establishing pre-mobilization standard tasks. Pre-mobilization tasks moved to a standard common denominator some likened to a return to “basic training.” Although it caused some frustration with guardsmen as even senior officers and NCOs were required to validate simple tasks, it provided a universal baseline prior to mobilization.⁵⁸

As it matured, the PTAE program along with the OWT support received positive feedback from mobilizing units for professionalism and usefulness.⁵⁹ The Illinois 33rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team historical review identified the PTAE support as “instrumental in the success of the brigade.”⁶⁰ Unit assistants received harsh criticism from earlier unit rotations, but Arkansas’s 39th Brigade complimented its unit assistants for helping make the transition from pre-mobilization training to post-mobilization training smooth, while still recommending closer coordination between unit assistants and state trainers.⁶¹

Even though issues remained as training experiences varied between mobilization stations and states, the overall trend stayed positive when it came to the quality of the trainers. For example, during the summer of 2008, the Illinois 33rd Brigade mobilized at two sites, Fort Riley, Kansas and Fort Bragg, North Carolina with their assessment of training being highly positive for Fort Riley and starkly negative for Fort Bragg. The brigade recounted the training at Fort Riley focused more specifically on the embedded training mission while the Fort Bragg training focused on standard combat operations and did nothing to prepare the unit for its training and advisory role.⁶² In fact, the unit stated that when it arrived at Fort Bragg it immediately started a training plan “that was nothing short of organized chaos.”⁶³ The unit went on to state that the overall disjointed training did not focus on preparing the unit for its advisory mission. The training plan followed no pattern, moving from individual training events to squad-level collective events, only then to return to team-level and back to individual training.⁶⁴ Many units complained about a sense of a “check the box” mentality to the training they received at Fort Bragg. Others criticized the limited flexibility in the training, the “one-size fits all” criticism, with dictated, set training events. Although in some cases units could modify the training plan somewhat, most units experienced inflexible training regardless of unit input, experience, or requests.⁶⁵ Overall, the training trend at mobilization sites showed improvement over time just as the comments for combat training centers (CTC) had over the course of the earlier years.⁶⁶

Mobilization station training also saw an upturn in positive feedback, although still receiving some harsh criticisms, especially in the case of certain rotations through Camp Shelby and Fort Bragg. Camp Shelby earned mixed reviews from many units, from its initial use in summer 2004, until it closed as a mobilization site in spring 2014. Except for the platoon and company gunnery qualifications conducted at Camp Shelby, the 30th Heavy Brigade Combat Team from North Carolina concluded its two months in 2009 there were “of little value to mission success.”⁶⁷ During its training at Camp Shelby in 2010, Iowa’s 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 34th Infantry Division reported out-of-date training on subjects such as rules of engagement and escalation of force prior to their combat deployment to Afghanistan.⁶⁸ Both brigades commented that pre-mobilization tasks they had already completed required revalidation at Shelby, where they retested at a lower standard than the one they had achieved during pre-mobilization.⁶⁹ Aside from the above criticisms and comments that training took too long, Camp Shelby received positive comments




Figure 4.7. First Army Major Training Sites in 2008. Graphic created by Army University Press staff.

from the Iowa brigade, and only praise from the Arkansas 39th Brigade.⁷⁰ In fact, the 39th Brigade reported the training built up confidence in their ability to execute their mission, and “replicated the reporting and battle rhythms in theater” with the training events being “truly multi-echelon training events only limited by safety and time.”⁷¹ These comments balanced the criticisms Camp Shelby received from other rotations.

Beyond Fort Bragg and Camp Shelby, other mobilization sites also received criticisms. The Wisconsin-based 2nd Battalion, 127th Infantry Regiment commander, Lt. Col. Brad S. Anderson, praised Fort Bliss, Texas for the collective training provided to his unit for its 2009 Iraq deployment, but noted the training battalion lacked preparation for his unit’s arrival with completed pre-mobilization tasks. This resulted in excessive wasted time from inflexibility and limited training opportunities outside the pre-planned training schedule that included blocked time for individual training.⁷²

As for combat training center rotations, the comments from two brigades that rotated through Fort Irwin’s National Training Center (NTC) echoed the earlier experiences of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 28th In-



Figure 4.8. Soldiers from Maryland's 1st Battalion, 175th Infantry Regiment participate in readiness and training evaluation at Fort Dix, New Jersey for upcoming deployment to Iraq, 24 July 2007.

fantry Division from Pennsylvania in early 2005. The brigades commented on the excellent training but mentioned a desire for more specific mission-oriented events. The Iowa brigade wanted more air operations and training for specialized attachments, whereas the North Carolina brigade said the training focused too much on combat-oriented tasks and needed more training in stability operations, such as conducting talks with local leaders. The brigades mentioned the preponderance of NTC training for combat units at the expense of specific training for their combat support units, although the support units did mention they received some good training as well.⁷³

The pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) procedure still received complaints, but the procedure evolved to include other effective practices. Colonel Anderson also complained of inflexibility in adjusting training based on results from the pre-deployment site survey.⁷⁴ Still, the process saw improvements in other areas in what one battalion commander called a "reverse PDSS" when the unit in theater sent a team back stateside to share the latest information from its deployment to the replacing unit during its training. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Leshner, one of the battalion commanders of the Hawaii-based 29th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, emphasized the value of this event for its 2008-2009 mobilization, compared to its absence for its first deployment in 2004.⁷⁵ Other units had practiced

this “reverse PDSS” as early as 2006 with positive results, most commonly in aviation units.

Two other variables affecting the training quality received were the experience those training support brigades (TSBs) had for the mission and the size of unit being trained. The 34th Infantry Division headquarters’ 2009 mobilization out of Fort Lewis, Washington serves as an example. The 34th Division was the second Army Guard division headquarters to deploy, and the trainers at Fort Lewis had never validated or trained a Guard division headquarters. This accounted for much of the Minnesota unit’s struggles during its mobilization training. Where the division noted that the Fort Lewis training plan adequately prepared brigade-sized elements and smaller, it did not fit the needs for a division.⁷⁶ Although training varied due to the multitude of factors from competence and experience of trainers, to training infrastructure and support, and training site location, many trends continued across the board from previous years.

Mobilization stations remained overburdened with units for training or had poor training plans, or suffered from a combination of both, resulting in excessive wait times. For instance, on one occasion Minnesota’s 34th Infantry Division headquarters waited six hours at a range for thirty minutes of marksmanship training.⁷⁷ Reporting formats still constantly changed, and units mentioned they had too many entities asking for the same information.⁷⁸ One of the most difficult things for units to handle was re-training on tasks already completed, which remained a common occurrence. Even with the institution of the PTAE, some pre-mobilization training required repeated validation, because records were lost or training certification improperly documented for First Army standards.⁷⁹

The training itself received criticism as being too generic and not relevant for the current operations, while taking time at the expense of more relevant training, although some improvements were noticeable in Afghanistan-centric training. Units rotating to Afghanistan still complained of the dominant Iraq-themed training, but some units acknowledged progress.⁸⁰ Units overall continued to complain concerning a “check the box” mentality to training and too generalized training. During this period, the Army, through a series of orders such as Execution Order (EXORD) 150-08, solidified command relationships during mobilization training, and coordinated training across pre-mobilization and mobilization with establishment of a Pre and Post Mobilization Training Concept. A part of this reform helped synchronize training based on categorizing unit requirements based on the amount of time a unit spent outside of established bases once overseas. The more a unit’s mission involved serving outside a

major base, the more numerous and rigorous the training requirements became, often also resulting in longer post-mobilization training timelines.

Units with more unique missions struggled even more than typical Guard units did with standardized training. Aviation units shared similar views on training with previous rotations. They complained of generic, standard instruction not applicable to aviation at the expense of flight specific training. Similarly, they wanted more realistic aviation training, such as in-flight live fire gunnery, to match that conducted in theater rather than the use of standard ranges. In addition, they wanted more training on modern theater-used digital systems. Just as in the past, the combat aviation brigades praised the aviation training exercises (ATXs) and the support received from members of the units they replaced.⁸¹ The aviation units were not alone in frustrations with the one-size fits all training for specialized units. The agricultural development teams also sought focused training and fewer standardized tasks not relevant to their missions or role.⁸²

Lack of equipment training sets and its impact on training also received repeated mention from virtually every unit mobilized.⁸³ The First Army was fully aware of the lack of training sets and the detriment to training it caused, and attempted early on to fill this need. In 2007, the First



Figure 4.9. Wisconsin's 32nd Infantry Brigade soldiers receive instruction on MRAP vehicle operations at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin prior to mobilization during their training, 12 September 2008.

Army instituted a program to provide the latest, theater-specific equipment to deploying units for training. At its inception, this program had eight thousand items spread across thirteen training sites, and over the following years increased to eighteen thousand, including vehicles, updated navigation training aides, and communications sets.⁸⁴ The operational tempo of the wars and the demands in theater for the latest vehicle and gear held higher priority, leaving the mobilization stations with limited quantities. By 2007, through strenuous efforts, First Army obtained some for familiarization, such as the new Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles or surrogate replacements.⁸⁵

When it came to adjustments to the 12-month limitation on mobilizations, there developed a by-exception alternative to the limitation it placed on training. Contiguous training model was a method to extend the training of 12-month mobilization under Title 10 with extended weeks or months of Army National Guard unit training under Title 32 in addition to the now new normal use of regular Title 32 weekend training being used for pre-deployment tasks. With the federal funded, state managed Title 32 funds used to train the Army Guard for its federal mission, the Army Guard units conducted mass, continuous pre-mobilization training right up until the federal Title 10 mobilization funding and actual mobilization “clock” began. The 39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team executed this type of training plan for its second brigade deployment to Iraq. The brigade claimed it needed the consecutive extra time to meet the new pre-mobilization standards, pointing out its mobilization occurring two years early in its ARFORGEN cycle. Starting in October 2007, it trained for ninety consecutive days in a Title 32 status, immediately preceding the beginning of its Title 10 mobilization orders in January 2008, seamlessly,—contiguously—transitioning from Title 32 orders to the mobilization Title 10 orders. The entire brigade went on active orders to consolidate and focus on executing the required pre-mobilization tasks. The brigade identified the benefits to this contiguous training, among them maximizing the time soldiers had with families through consolidating the training, providing leaders more active duty time to gain experience in their positions, and assisting in team building through leaders training their own soldiers. The brigade’s contiguous training resulted in validating 88 percent of all individual tasks by its mobilization date.

A downside to this training plan was cost and inefficiency. The brigade’s own report concluded it could have accomplished in thirty days what it took ninety to accomplish if the unit had conducted the training at a mobilization site, such as Camp Shelby, with its additional training

resources. The reasons for inefficiency resulted from the lack of training infrastructure at local training areas plus time lost from guardsmen's daily commutes and make up training, including follow up health appointments. The brigade concluded soldiers' time spent with families and the reduced strain on civilian employers offset the price tag of \$50 million for the 90 days spent on contiguous training.⁸⁶

The 30th Heavy Brigade Combat Team also conducted contiguous training for its second rotation to Iraq. The brigade went through seventy consecutive days of Title 32 training before mobilizing in early 2009 on Title 10 orders. The brigade trained at Fort Stewart, Georgia, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Pickett, Virginia, before reporting to Camp Shelby for mobilization. The justification for the North Carolina brigade leadership centered on the need for extra, consolidated training time to effectively prepare for counterinsurgency and combat operations, while meeting the restricted mobilization timeline policy. Like the Arkansas brigade, the North Carolina brigade indicated contiguous training reduced stress on families, employers and the soldiers by consolidating training together with the mobilization instead of having multiple short duration pre-mobilization training events leading up to the 12-month mobilization. It allowed soldiers to focus on mission preparation and training, after being able to spend quality time with families, while allowing civilian employers to hire replacements for a consolidated fifteen month absence instead of multiple short absences and then a 12-month long mission.⁸⁷

The North Carolina Guard leadership strongly supported the contiguous training model. The 30th Brigade's commander, Col. Gregory A. Lusk, said,

The contiguous pre-deployment training concept was the best course of action... It stabilized the formation, allowing us to build the team, and synchronize it with training... It also proved to be the most honorable and humane recognition of the sacrifices and support provided by our employers and their families...[and] provided predictability and maximized their ability to plan and manage their expectation.⁸⁸

Likewise, the North Carolina Adjutant General, Maj. Gen. William E. Ingram Jr., believed that brigades with combat missions could not follow pre-formatted plans, since they had different and more difficult requirements. He supported contiguous mobilization as "the most effective, most efficient way...and the efficient use of [North Carolina National Guard] support staff and resources."⁸⁹ Specific to training, the state PTAE com-

mented in contrast non-contiguous training “increases crew instability, [and] unpredictability for family members.”⁹⁰

Echoing the sentiments of the North Carolina PTAE, multiple Army Guard units indicated a desire to conduct contiguous training prior to their next mobilization. Ohio’s 37th Brigade mobilized in 2008, indicating that one of their “lessons learned” was to revamp their pre-mobilization training plan to incorporate contiguous training. The Ohio brigade promoted it “in an effort to reduce turmoil for families and employers, enhance soldiers focus and proficiency, team building, as well as completing a final SRP,” and the Wisconsin 2nd Battalion, 127th Infantry commander in 2009 reflected that contiguous training option would have eased hardship on his soldiers and their employers.⁹¹

In a series of annual studies, the First Army strongly supported the concept of contiguous training. In an update brief, the First Army stated, “contiguous mobilization remains [the] preferred pre-mob model.”⁹² The First Army identified contiguous training as a leading factor for units arriving at mobilization sites with pre-mobilization tasks completed. It agreed with assessments of the North Carolina leadership, which asserted more complex mission sets required more lengthy training than the 12-month mobilization window authorized. In sentiments shared by the Arkansas brigade, the First Army noted personnel and equipment issues “forces units into contiguous [mobilization]”⁹³ and agreed with the Army Guard that non-contiguous training placed strains on units, soldiers, families, and employers.⁹⁴

Ground combat units were not the only ones in favor of contiguous training. Two combat aviation brigades, Indiana’s 38th and Minnesota’s 34th, also noted the negative aspects of multiple training events with extended breaks in between, adding stress to unit training, families, and employers.⁹⁵ Contiguous training was costly and challenged the concept and purpose behind limiting the mobilization to 12 months.

After granting the secretary of the Army limited exception to authorize contiguous training against the 2007 12-month mobilization limit in November 2009, Secretary Gates initiated a study by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Dennis M. McCarthy. It focused on the “use of contiguous training and its impacts on minimizing extended post-mobilization training requirements.”⁹⁶ Based on this study and “input from our Reserve Component military and civilian leaders”,⁹⁷ Secretary Gates upheld his 12-month limit and revoked authorization to grant exception to the policy. This memorandum of 14 March 2011 effectively ended



Figure 4.10. Sgt. Andrew Dixon conducts PTAE training at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, supporting pre-mobilization training for mobilizing Pennsylvania Army Guard units in 2010.

contiguous mobilization as an exception to policy. In its place, Secretary Gates further specified that unit collective training within ninety days of the mobilization date could not exceed forty-five days for aviation units or thirty days for all other unit types. Excluding typical monthly weekend training, any duration of training within ninety days required approval by the adjutants general of the states.

Gates's memorandum ending contiguous training also addressed concerns that had led to the requests for contiguous mobilizations. He directed the service secretaries to develop plans to "minimize the number of training events that take service members away from their families and employers for multiple extended periods of time during the year prior to the mobilization."⁹⁸ He also directed, "when training is scheduled in close proximity to the mobilization date, the break between training and the mobilization date will be minimized wherever possible"⁹⁹ all of which were within his January 2007 memorandum's guidelines.

Even within the struggles remaining with mobilization training, noteworthy improvements remained. First Army identified a downward trend in post-mobilization training time starting in 2006 when it stood at an average of 125 days for ground combat units. In 2008, the average fell to 78 days, the following year to 62, and by 2010 averaged only 52 days. All unit types saw an average decrease of 60 percent, with maneuver units conducting counterinsurgency type missions typically taking the longest of any type of unit. Experience and stability of new policies and understanding led to this success.¹⁰⁰ General Charles C. Campbell, the commander of Forces Command (FORSCOM) which oversaw management of ARFORGEN and First Army, claimed in late 2009 through “a cumulative effect of cyclical deployments, the Army’s pre—and post-mobilization training order, and recommendations from a number of studies, we have reduced post-mobilization training time for [Army National Guard] combat brigades by about 81 days.”¹⁰¹ He stated the reserve component reached post-mobilization readiness levels faster than any time before during the conflict, a significant improvement for the total Army.¹⁰²

Meeting the Demand

The various reforms and policy changes continued to impact the Guard mobilization process. Even in the later stages of the war, room remained for improvement even as the new processes took hold. Programs and policies implemented earlier, such as those involved in health readiness reform, had largely stabilized by 2011. The Army continued adapting to ARFORGEN and the new mobilization policies originating in Secretary Gates’s January 2007 memorandum “Utilization of the Total Force.”

General Charles Campbell commented on ARFORGEN as an ever-evolving concept, “Throughout the first three years of implementation, the Army has continually matured the model and refined the process.”¹⁰³ A considerable change as it matured was the emphasis placed on the reset of a unit by making “Reset” a distinct stand-alone phase. This served to focus the unit’s energies on reintegration, manning, and equipment with limited individual training. The resulting impact shifted most training into a pairing with the Ready phase. Before it had been, Reset/Train phase, Ready phase, and Available phase, now it cycled through Reset, Train/Ready, and Available. Campbell went on to state his belief the Iraq “surge” in large part vindicated the new force generation model by its ability to support the unplanned increase in brigades in 2007. He believed the previous process could have worked but would have been more difficult, slower, and less certain.¹⁰⁴

As ARFORGEN stood in October 2009, the Available pool offered the Army leadership one corps headquarters, five division headquarters, and twenty brigade combat teams with an additional 90,000 supporting personnel. From the total of 170,000 soldiers in the 2009 Available pool, 60,000 were from the reserve component. They provided an operational reserve for a five year cycle of one year Available to four years in the Reset and Train/Ready phases. Institutionalizing the new Army force generation model began as well with the codification of its force generation processes through writing and publications of regulations, pamphlets and updated or brand new policies even as it continued to mature as a new system. This was a major step in solidifying the new force generation model as a replacement of the previous force model.¹⁰⁵

ARFORGEN was not a perfect system, although its implementation proved its worth for the wars it was applied. For example, one senior Army National Guard officer noted in a paper that much had changed in the Army Guard mobilization process over the course of the war, but residual issues and even new issues remained in response to the enacted adjustments. In the case of ARFORGEN, the new process felt the effects of other policies, namely the policy limiting mobilization time for Army National Guard units to 12 months total. This resulted in a large portion of the training pushed to the states to conduct during pre-mobilization. In order to fulfill this requirement and have the mobilizing units in the Available pool of the ARFORGEN cycle ready, the states had to use the limited resources available. This meant other units in other phases of their force generation cycles suffered. New York's 27th Infantry Brigade Combat Team's pre-mobilization training prior to its January 2008 mobilization represented this disruption when other units supported the 27th Brigade's three separate, multi-week training periods at the expense of their own required training. The units brought in to support the training of the 27th Brigade, though critical to its successful pre-mobilization training, were unable to accomplish the required training events for that year based on their status in the ARFORGEN cycle.¹⁰⁶

Just as ARFORGEN continued to evolve, so did policy further refining the mobilization process. From 2007 to 2011, policy still had to evolve to match the operational reality of Army usage of the Army National Guard, for example the mobilization of the Arkansas 39th Brigade earlier than intended in its ARFORGEN cycle. Much as the challenges addressed in 2004 took a few years to see results, the policy changes instituted in 2007 took years to mature. Finally, in February 2010 the Department of Defense issued directive 1235.12 "Accessing the Reserve Components (RC)," to

re-emphasize the policy changes from 2007-2008 period as well as further specify guidance.

Directive 1235.12 fleshed out the continuing evolutionary nature of the mobilization process. The directive confirmed the mobilization time limit to one year at any one time, and the ratio of one to every five years for mobilizations. It also adjusted unit timelines to alert notifications for units two years out, with a minimum of 30 days notification for involuntary service and for physical mobilization orders 180 days prior to mobilization date. It also reinforced the guidance of resource allocation “in form of manpower, training, equipment, and compensation to fulfill role and missions as both a strategic and operational force, that is a fully integrated part of the national defense strategy.”¹⁰⁷ Resourcing the “operational force” included maintaining and “incentivizing when necessary” qualified soldiers to meet the requirements, and being “equipped to ensure full interoperability and unit effectiveness.”¹⁰⁸ In addition, it echoed the statement of directive 1200.17 “Subject: Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force” by stating, “The [reserve component] provide an operational capability and strategic depth in support of the national defense strategy.”¹⁰⁹ The directive provided a committed policy adjusting for use of the Army Guard as an operational force and laid out the required changes to sustain such status while identifying through its re-emphasis other elaborations regarding ongoing issues.

Staffing alerted units voluntarily, in lieu of the involuntary mobilizations, lingered as an issue. The directive 1235.12 added more layers of requirements for multiple involuntary service for personnel and for units with less than one in four ratio of mobilized to time stateside since the goal was one in five ratio of deployed versus stateside. When this intended timeline was not met, the directive required the first general officer in the chain of command confirming that “qualified volunteers, individuals never mobilized, and those with at least 1 to 4 mobilization-to-dwell ratio were considered...prior to the involuntary mobilization of anyone with less than 1 to 4.”¹¹⁰ No individual with less than 12 months stateside could be involuntarily mobilized; they had to volunteer.¹¹¹

Over the course of the war, the Army bureaucracy also improved. The Army G-3/5/7 Operations for Operations, Contingency Plans, and Mobilization brief in 2008 highlighted the institutional experience gained since 9/11 and the improvements in the bureaucratic mobilization process, which in turn affected the actual unit experiences. The focus on what had changed from the Army operations view included issuing timely notification, creating official orders in a more streamlined way, processing packets

for cross-levels and volunteers in a more efficient manner, and accomplishing all these task with less personnel than before under the evolving doctrine with experienced leaders and personnel.¹¹²

General Campbell wrote in 2010 as FORSCOM commander, “Returning the reserve component to a strategic reserve role may yield short-term savings but will, ultimately, cost the nation much more and squander what today is widely recognized as a national treasure—a seasoned, combat-capable Army National Guard and Army Reserve not seen since the end of World War II.”¹¹³ By 2011, large strides resolved many of the personnel issues that had lingered at the start of the war with their roots in past practices, changing strategic environment, and outdated mobilization processes and policies. Army Guard modernization and equipping both for its domestic and overseas missions showed significant progress through increased budgeting, force generation and transformation initiatives. The right application of reforms and new policies corrected virtually all medical and dental problems, removing a primary reason for guardsmen not mobilizing and making it a secondary concern. Training improved from 2007 to 2011 as well, but suffered from various secondary affects resulting from reforms and policy adjustments meant to address other mobilization issues. The Army National Guard, through its service in the Global War on Terrorism, embraced its operational role as the mobilization process evolved from an *ad hoc*, unsustainable system to a predictable cycle that benefited the total force.

Notes

1. “History of the 1st BATTALION, 168th INFANTRY REGIMENT, 2nd BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 34th INFANTRY DIVISION, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 2010-2011 REVIEW 1 January 2010—10 July 2011,” dated 4 July 2011, 5-6, 29, Historians files. The 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 34th Division based out of Bagram Airfield conducted full spectrum operations across Regional Command—East in Afghanistan while 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry was attached to 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division and after their transfer of authority the battalion served under 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, demonstrating, as had been the case in Iraq, that Guard and active component units were interchangeable for overseas combat missions.

2. “History of the 1st BATTALION, 168th INFANTRY REGIMENT, 2nd BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 34th INFANTRY DIVISION, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 2010-2011 REVIEW 1 January 2010—10 July 2011” and slide deck, “IBCT Warfighters’ Forum: Post-Rotation Combat Leader Interviews Out-brief, Commander 2-34 IBCT IAARNG, 15-25 July 2011,” Historians files.

3. Lt. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, “Army National Guard: An Integral Part of Army Strong,” *ARMY* (October 2007) 135.

4. John R. Maass, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 2007*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2013), 34.

5. See Appendix C, Army Guard Personnel by Year.

6. The Army Guard brigade combat teams after initial modular transformation were composed of seven Heavy Brigade Combat Teams centered around mixed forces of armor and infantry units, twenty Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, and one Stryker Brigade Combat Team from Pennsylvania.

7. Maass, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 2007*, 33.

8. Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, “Subject: Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” dated 29 October 2008, 1, Historians files.

9. DoD Directive 1200.17, “Subj: Managing the Reserve Component,” 3.

10. DoD Directive 1200.17, “Subj: Managing the Reserve Components,” 2 and 4.

11. Department of Defense Directive 1235.10 “Subject: Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve,” dated 26 November 2008, 2, Historians files. “Predictability of the [reserve component] forces is maximized through the use of defined operational cycles and utilizing force generation plan to provide advanced notification that allows the implementation of the train-mobilize-deploy model.”

12. DoD Directive 1235.10 “Subj: Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization,” 5.

13. DoD Directive 1235.10 “Subj: Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization,” 5.

14. David S.C. Chu, Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, "Subject: Programs to Support Utilization of the Total Force," Dated 18 April 2007, Historians files.
15. DoD Directive 1200.17 "Subj: Managing the Reserve Component," 7.
16. DoD Directive 1235.10 "Subj: Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization," 10.
17. DoD Directive 1235.10 "Subj: Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization," 6.
18. DoD Directive 1235.10 "Subj: Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization," 7.
19. DoD Directive 1235.10 "Subj: Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization," 7.
20. DoD Directive 1235.10 "Subj: Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization," 7.
21. Slide deck, "45th IBCT M-RSOI AAR," dated 27 November 2007, Historians files.
22. Maj. Gen. Richard Nash, interview by Lt. Col. Ed Jacobsen, Center for Army's Lessons Learned, 27 January 2009.
23. "TX ADT-02 Mobilization AAR Comments," dated 22 February 2009, 1-2, Historians files.
24. "39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team: Mobilization and Deployment Journal, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," *Newsletter No. 09-39*, (Fort Leavenworth: Center Army Lessons Learned, 2009) 5-9.
25. "33rd IBCT Historical Binder 29 SEP 08-29 SEP 09," 397-400, Historians files.
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27. Mobilization and Readiness Division, Army National Guard G-3 National Guard Bureau, slide deck, "ARNG BCT Mob History," dated 8 December 2014, Historians files.
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35. Slide deck, "45th IBCT M-RSOI AAR."

36. Slide, “ARNG MTOE EOH 2001—Present” provided by Army National Guard Readiness & Integration Team (ILS-E) on 9 December 2014.

37. “John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.” Public Law 109-364, dated 17 October 2006; “Tricare Reserve Select Issue Brief,” fielded January 2007, 2.

38. Lt. Col. Robert Leshner, interview by Lt. Col. Philip Tripp, 5 May 2009.

39. “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,” Public Law 111-84, dated 28 October 2009.

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41. Slide deck, “45th IBCT M-RSOI AAR.”

42. “39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team: Mobilization and Deployment Journal,” 9-11.

43. “39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team: Mobilization and Deployment Journal,” 11; Slide deck, “37th Brigade Combat Team: Pre and Post Mobilization Training AAR,” Slide deck, “Task Force 34: Mobilization Challenges and Successes,” n/d, Historians files; Slide deck, “TF 38 First Army AAR,” n/d, Historians files.

44. “39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team: Mobilization and Deployment Journal,” 11-12.

45. “33rd IBCT Historical Binder 29SEP08-29SEP09,” 159.

46. Slide deck, “37th Brigade Combat Team: Pre and Post Mobilization Training AAR;” Slide deck, “TF 38 First Army AAR.”

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50. First Army slide deck, “2004-2007, Exit Brief.”

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61. "39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team: Mobilization and Deployment Journal," 26.
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63. "33rd IBCT Historical Binder 29SEP08-29SEP09," 164.
64. "33rd IBCT Historical Binder 29SEP08-29SEP09," 164.
65. "30th HBCT Collection Report," 90 and 93; Slide deck, "56th IBCT D+60 Mobilization AAR," dated 27 January 2009, Historians files; Slide deck, "56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team AAR," dated 7 January 2009.
66. "39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team: Mobilization and Deployment Journal," 28; slide deck, "IBCT Warfighters' Forum: Post-Rotation Combat Leader Interviews Out-brief, Commander 2-34 IBCT IAARNG, 15-25 July 2011"; Slide deck, "56th IBCT D+60 Mobilization AAR."
67. "30th HBCT Collection Report," 93.
68. Slide deck, "IBCT Warfighters' Forum: Post-Rotation Combat Leader Interviews Out-brief, Commander 2-34 IBCT IAARNG."
69. Slide deck, "IBCT Warfighters' Forum: Post-Rotation Combat Leader Interviews Out-brief, Commander 2-34 IBCT IAARNG; "30th HBCT Collection Report," 93.
70. Slide deck, "IBCT Warfighters' Forum: Post-Rotation Combat Leader Interviews Out-brief, Commander 2-34 IBCT IAARNG; "39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team: Mobilization and Deployment Journal," 28.
71. "39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team: Mobilization and Deployment Journal," 28.
72. Lt. Col. Brad S. Anderson, interviewed by Lt. Col. Eddie Jacobsen, 7 December 2009.
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104. Campbell, “ARFORGEN: Maturing the Model, Refining the Process,” 50-54.

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Chapter Five

The Conclusion

Throughout the Global War on Terrorism, the Army National Guard mobilization process evolved dramatically and out of necessity. It shifted from an *ad hoc*, unsustainable system designed for a different kind of war to a predictable, maintainable model for a protracted, rotational war. These changes were difficult and wrought with hard lessons. The critical shift from a mindset tied to tiered readiness towards progressive readiness reshaped both the concept and execution of Guard mobilization. The deployment of the Army Guard as an operational, rather than a strategic, reserve required large-scale changes in thinking, policy, procedures, and organization.

The mobilization process from 11 September 2001 to the end of 2011 saw improvement in three major areas: developed experience, policy, and funding. During the long war, the Army Guard, like the total Army force, acquired wide-ranging experience from its repeated service. With each mobilization, Guard units, as well as the organizations supporting their mobilization, developed in experience, gaining knowledge and better understanding. This allowed for the identification of issues associated with large-scale, repeated mobilization of Guard units. The importance of accumulated experience through multiple rotations cannot be overstated for both the Guard and for the supporting structure of the mobilization process, such as the First Army and the Department of Defense (DoD).

Identifying many of the issues, the Department of Defense and the Army altered policy and procedure. All parties involved conducted multiple studies, resulting in various reforms implemented through laws, regulations, and departmental directives. This brought myriad interpretations and reinterpretations of mobilization regulations, a restructured force, reform of health readiness, and development of a new force generation model, serving to streamline the process.

At the same time, increased funding made the policy adjustments and procedural changes possible. Over the course of the war, the Army Guard received substantial increases in funding for a variety of issues associated with improving readiness. Funding increases came through previous programs supporting equipping, such as the congressional National Guard and Reserve Equipping Appropriation (NGREA); budget appropriations specific to supporting wartime spending, such as Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) financial support; and Army base budget increases in funding.

The increases in spending, enabled by the necessary and timely budget overhauls, significantly improved all aspects of the Guard mobilization process. Although other factors played a part, changes in spending levels directly influenced readiness. The impact of money on readiness, and how those organizations managed the responsibility with increased funding, was not unique to the Army Guard. Funding levels affected all Army components. In personnel management, increased funding supported the Army Guard through helping recruiting and retention with bonuses and providing incentives for volunteers. As for equipping, funding provided the means for the Guard to transform itself into the most modernized force in decades and aided its integration into the new force generation cycle. Funding greatly assisted in improving the health of the Guard by providing the ability to identify deficiencies for soldiers prior to mobilization and to provide a way to fix them. More money supported Guard training prior to mobilization, allowing the Guard units to fulfill the requirements necessary to implement the progressive readiness of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. Funding provided more schooling and training for soldiers as well as supporting events like eXportable Combat Training Center (XCTC), which offered realistic training up to platoon-level validation. This additional training was especially important in light of limited Guard rotations to permanent combat training centers.

Coming full circle, leaders and soldiers across the Army were the key to these changes. Soldiers across the total force were the critical component in achieving the relative predictability of mobilizations in the later years. Policy and procedural changes and funding increases were ineffective without an experienced, professional, and knowledgeable force to implement them. As a learning organization, the Army took time and effort to adjust; identifying the problems, implementing solutions, and assessing the results with continual refinement. The Army proved itself adaptable even through the rigors and difficulties of wartime, making adjustments to fight the current war and not the war for which it had been prepared or structured. Identifying the need for progressive readiness allowed the Guard to support its wartime demands through meeting cyclical, rotational force generation.

The four major issues of personnel, equipping, health readiness, and training showed positive degrees of change over time. Although no single solution existed, and problems remained in the later years of the war, the Guard showed improvement in all four areas. Some difficulties were nearly eliminated, such as health readiness, while others still required refinement, like personnel and equipment cross-leveling. Others, such as training,

showed improvement mainly through gained experience, but also encountered consequences from solutions implemented to address other problems. For example, limited mobilization timelines of 12 months helped with personnel management at a cost to available post-mobilization training time. The overarching trend was one of improvement, albeit with room for further progress. These changes proved applicable to the specifics of force generation and readiness of the Guard for a rotational war.

Personnel levels of the Guard units for mobilization dramatically improved over the course of the war. Manned below deployment levels based on the pre-9/11 threat environment, the Guard resorted to personnel cross-leveling to fill the deploying units to acceptable wartime levels when they were activated after 9/11 to support overseas contingency operations. Very quickly, all concerned recognized the negative effects of cross-leveling on Guard units and the developing personnel crisis. The 2007 policy changes that established the maximum mobilization limit at a consecutive 24 months while also adding a 12-month maximum mobilization policy at any one time allowed for multiple mobilizations, easing some of the burden while still emphasizing volunteers. Improvements in health readiness yielded positive effects on manning by keeping fit soldiers in units for deployment. The Guard's increasing end strength through recruiting and retention also helped in the struggle to fill the ranks. These efforts made an impact on the drain that cross-leveling had created.

Policy adjustments, improvements in health readiness, and raising Guard end strength to meet the high demand of a prolonged rotational war significantly reduced, but failed to eliminate, cross-leveling of personnel and equipment. New developments in force generation addressed cross-leveling even as the demand for Guard units decreased, combining to result in a smoother execution during the later period of the war. The policies instituted through ARFORGEN and the "Utilization of the Total Force" memorandum of 2007 provided stability, predictability, and efficient use of the Guard for the type of war faced after 9/11. However, cross-leveling still remained throughout the war.

Due to its structure, the Guard was better suited and prepared for providing specialized non-standard units such as agricultural development teams (ADTs), meeting individual requirements for provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), or reorganizing units for missions for which they were not organized, like an infantry brigade restructured for a security force mission. These missions and *ad hoc* units were critical to the war effort and filled an important void in standard organizations. The Guard supported these requirements but did so at a cost to personnel readiness.

In addition to fulfilling non-standard missions, cross-leveling remained with the continued reliance and emphasis on prioritizing volunteers over involuntarily remobilization of guardsmen. The policies in the Guard to balance lives as citizen soldiers required constant adjustments, balancing consideration between manning mobilization ranks through volunteerism or through involuntary remobilizations in a long war. The dual mission nature of the Guard, with its federal as well as its domestic and state responsibilities, also influenced the mobilization experience in regards to balancing requirements and demands. Where previously cross-leveling was done out of necessity to get a unit out the door, now it served more as a method, or choice, on how to utilize the available force.

Only a few years into the war the Army was already equipping the mobilizing Guard on an equal priority with active component deploying units. The major struggle was equipping the Guard units that were not mobilizing and those in preparation with the necessary gear to train prior to their activation. The modular transformation conducted across the entire Army, including the Army Guard, advanced Guard modernization to levels it had not seen in years. The ARFORGEN model's progressive equipping readiness program and the force organization transformation benefited the Guard immensely, but it came at a significant financial cost to maintain at a sustainable level. Cross-leveling declined in the later years of the war as compared to the early crisis years when the practice was ubiquitous. Much like personnel, the equipment cross-leveling still continued principally due to non-standard missions requiring amounts and types equipment not normally associated with the mobilizing units. Additionally, equipping the Guard throughout the time period remained a challenge because of modernization, wear and tear on equipment through multiple usage without refit, the practice of leaving equipment overseas after a deployment, and the use of dual-purpose equipment for the Guard's domestic mission.

Health readiness reflected the most pronounced improvement in the mobilization process. During this period, health readiness- both medical and dental- improved in a steady climb from the beginning of 2006 and through the end of 2011, reaching 86 percent by 2014.¹ Specifically, dental readiness went from the National Guard Bureau's identified number one cause for non-deploying soldiers in the first years of the war to a virtually non-existent problem at mobilization during the latter years. Health issues with guardsmen did not just go away over time, rather units addressed them prior to mobilization through changes and lessons learned in policy, regulation, and command emphasis. These reforms and policies included the annual health assessment implementation, the increase

Fiscal Year	Medical Readiness Budget	Additional Funding from OCO/ Supplemental funds	Dental Procedure Budget
2008	113.6 million	14.8 million	20 million
2009	126.5 million	9.5 million	21.2 million
2010	154.7 million	28.6 million	11.3 million
2011	138.5 million	17.2 million	51.3 million

Figure 5.1. Medical Readiness Budgeting 2008-2011. Source: Compiled from *Army National Guard Financial Reports, Fiscal Year, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011*.

in pre-mobilization TRICARE access up to 180 days from mobilization, the FEDS_HEAL/Reserve Health Readiness Program, and the availability of TRICARE Reserve Select and TRICARE Dental Program. All these programs and changes, which provided the ability for unit leadership to address health issues, only became effective through adequate funding to support enforcement.

The linking of health readiness to funding serves as a clear example of the role and importance in the process that adequate funding had on the improvement of the Guard mobilization process during the period. In its annual financial reports, the Army Guard repeatedly gave credit for its steadily improving health readiness levels to increased budgetary funding, but always indicated the use of supplemental and OCO-type funds to fill any gaps.² As the war carried on, the OCO funding followed the war's ebb and flow. This meant that while the Guard turned to these funds to compensate for any budgetary deficit affecting health readiness, or other readiness areas such as training expenditures, that source of funding began to decline as the tempo declined. This made sense in response to demand, but did not guarantee the future ability to maintain the levels of readiness the Guard had achieved without the supplemental or OCO-type funding. (See Figure 5.1).

Training saw the most mixed improvements during the war period. Even though training Guard units for mobilization saw varied results, secondary effects from reforms addressing problems associated with manning, equipping, and health largely influenced training. The effects of these changes were both positive and negative, influencing training as the final step in the mobilization process prior to deployment. The quality of the training benefited from the increased experience of all involved, including the trainers of the guardsmen, the guardsmen themselves, person-

nel at the support structures at the mobilization sites, and the overseeing authorities. The Adjutants General of the states and their Pre-mobilization Training Assistance Elements (PTAEs), and First Army all developed critical experience through repetition. Lessons were learned and heeded through multiple rotations of instructors training guardsmen and guardsmen going through training, deployments, and coming back again, each group knowing better what to expect. The crowning achievement of this learning through experience was the reduction of Guard unit post-mobilization times from nearly six months during the early years of the war to several weeks by the end, largely due to the shift towards validated, pre-mobilization training conducted by earlier notified Guard units prior to mobilization. These reductions were true even for the units typically with the longest training times, such as the combat brigades.

The inclusion of reserve component trainers to assist and augment the First Army active component manpower was another major factor improving training. It began with the Operation Warrior Trainer (OWT) program. After Secretary Gates' memorandum limited total mobilization of reserve components to twelve months, the states with support from the National Guard Bureau, created the PTAE. The implementation of the OWT and later PTAE programs crucially assisted in the mobilization process with its support in providing additional trainers to aid the First Army. The struggle with manpower and end strength concerned the Guard and First Army, as during the course of the war First Army faced issues with manning, affecting Guard mobilizations. Although it remained, minimizing cross-leveling of personnel and equipment, while also adding stability and predictability of rotations, eased many training burdens.

The reduction in total mobilization to twelve months remained one of the unresolved, ongoing struggles with training. While this policy adjustment helped in other areas, it had ripple effects on training. First Army now faced units arriving in various states of pre-mobilization training readiness-levels and validation, resulting in a variety of post-mobilization training requirements and models, all of which had to be completed within the twelve-month total mobilization window. In a similar vein, equipping guidance, with the corresponding new equipment fielding and training timelines built into ARFORGEN, was not strictly followed, resulting in units arriving for their limited post-mobilization training timeline with new equipment and requiring the associated training. The gradual implementation of the model and the pace of the wars resulted in the struggle to maintain the fielding and training timelines. In many cases, mobilizing some units outside their position in the ARFORGEN model complicat-

ed the already condensed post-mobilization training period. Even though Guard units and First Army approved the exception to policy of the contiguous training model, the secretary of defense removed the stopgap measure as an option, which had allowed, in special cases, Guard units to combine federally funded state training days with federally funded mobilization training. These were among the biggest issues facing Guard units and First Army throughout the period.

Even among the many complex and dynamic aspects of mobilization with exceedingly difficult issues to resolve, such as cross-leveling, training stands out as the most troublesome and resistant to full solution. Training can always be better or more realistic. Those trained will always have criticisms to improve on their experience, even if it is already good training. The interpersonal relationship—the human element—between trainer and trainee means there will always be some subpar as well as outstanding experiences. Over time the goals of the trainees changed as well, forcing the training organization to adapt in order to support the units. Early in the war, with out-of-date doctrine, the guardsmen wanted to be taught techniques and procedures relevant to the current fight. Later in the war, Guard veterans remobilizing wanted to learn the newly-established doctrine and not specific techniques, allowing them to apply their personal experience and nuanced techniques and procedures to doctrine during validation.³ Even with these considerations and this multifaceted experience, training improved over the course of the war, although not to the complete satisfaction of either trainers or mobilized units.

The wars revealed a need to balance wartime demand with the supported readiness for the reserve component. The policies, reforms, procedural adjustments, budgeting, and force generation developed over the period were applicable for an operational Guard in a prolonged, rotational conflict. Once the Army identified what it needed from the Guard, it created the environment in which the Guard could best fulfill its role, although the change required a difficult transformation, during a time of protracted conflict. The Army's use of the Guard in its wartime role provided the Guard the benefit of experience. This experience, with the increased funding and changes in thinking to support the transformation, brought the total Army to where it rested in 2011 regarding the mobilization process for a rotational war.

To fully understand the evolution of the Guard mobilization process over the course of the Global War on Terrorism, many additional factors should be considered that were not within the scope of this introductory study. The broad topics of manning, equipping, health readiness, and train-

ing touched on the key issues involved in any discussion on Guard mobilization, but further research and analysis could lend more understanding to these topics. In addition, other factors that impacted readiness include the use of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the manning and funding for Guard unit fulltime staffs, such as Active Guard Reserve (AGR) and military technicians, and the influence of employer and family support on Guard mobilization readiness. For a broadened understanding, further research and analysis could examine the experiences of the United States Army Reserve (USAR), experiences similar to the Guard but different in many ways. Further study could also compare the use of active component locations for mobilization with those reserve component-operated, and concurrent mobilization experiences including the Horn of Africa, Multi-National Force-Sinai, Balkan operations, and Operation Noble Eagle domestic mobilizations. Using this study as a starting point, the critical goal of understanding the complexities and intricacies of mobilization can be further refined, informing and educating as well as preserving experience and knowledge for all those involved with, and touched by, the dynamic process of mobilizing for war.

Notes

1. "CNGB Read-ahead Slides for Iraq Study Group," slide deck, dated 20 October 2014, Historians Files.
2. *Army National Guard Financial Reports, Fiscal Year 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011.*
3. "30th HBCT Collection Report," 90-92.

Appendix A

National Guard Organization

Pre-modular transformation force structure circa 2000	Post-modular transformation force structure circa 2008
8 Divisions	14 (includes division headquarters and command headquarters for military police, theater sustainment, army air and missile, expeditionary sustainment and theater aviation)
15 Enhanced Brigades	28 Brigade Combat Teams (includes infantry, armor, and Stryker)
2 Separate Brigades	48 Multifunctional Brigades (includes maneuver enhancement, battlefield surveillance, fires, sustainment, and combat aviation)
1 Scout Group	48 Functional Brigades (includes engineer, air defense artillery, military police, chemical, signal, explosive ordnance disposal, theater aviation brigade, and regional support group)
2 Special Forces Group (19th and 20th SFG)	2 Special Forces Group (19th and 20th SFG)
	17 Tactical Combat Forces (includes unaligned infantry, armor and cavalry battalion-sized elements)

Figure A.1. Army National Guard Organization. Source: Doubler, I AM THE GUARD, 315; "The Rebalance of the Army National Guard, Association of the United States Army Torchbearer Information Paper, January 2008.

Active Component Division	Reserve Component Associated Roundout Brigade
1st Cavalry Division	155th Armored Brigade
4th Infantry Division	116th Cavalry Brigade
5th Infantry Division	256th Infantry Brigade
6th Infantry Division	205th Infantry Brigade (USAR)
9th Infantry Division	81st Infantry Brigade
10th Mountain Division	27th Infantry Brigade
24th Infantry Division	48th Infantry Brigade

Figure A.2. Reserve Component Roundout Brigade Program circa 1990. Source: Drawn from Schubert and Kraus eds., *The Whirlwind War*, 71.




Figure A.3. Peacetime Command and Administrative Relationship circa 2002. Graphic courtesy of the author.




Figure A.4. Wartime Command and Administrative Relationship circa 2002. Figure courtesy of the author.




Figure A.5. Peacetime Command and Administrative Relationship circa 2006. Figure courtesy of the author.




Figure A.6. Wartime Command and Administrative Relationship circa 2006. Figure courtesy of the author.

Appendix B

Army National Guard Personnel




Figure B.1. Army National Guard Personnel Mobilized by Month September 2001-September 2002. Graphic created by Army University Press staff.




Figure B.2. Army National Guard Personnel by Year 2003-2011. Source: Army National Guard, Human Resource Management Division. Graphic created by Army University Press staff.




Figure B.3. Percentage of Assigned Strength and Assigned DMOSQ. Source: Army National Guard Bureau, Human Resource Management Division Graphic created by Army University Press staff.

Appendix C

Army National Guard Deployments




Figure C.1a. Army National Guard Combat Brigade and Division Deployments 2004-2011. Source: Mobilization and Readiness Division, Army National Guard, slide deck, “ARNG BCT Mob History,” 8 December 2014. Graphic created by Army University Press staff.




Figure C.1b. Army National Guard Combat Brigade and Division Deployments 2004-2011. Source: Mobilization and Readiness Division, Army National Guard, slide deck, “ARNG BCT Mob History,” 8 December 2014. Graphic created by Army University Press staff.




Figure C.1c. Army National Guard Combat Brigade and Division Deployments 2004-2011. Source: Mobilization and Readiness Division, Army National Guard, slide deck, “ARNG BCT Mob History,” 8 December 2014. Graphic created by Army University Press staff.

Appendix D

Army National Guard Medical Readiness




Figure D.1. Army National Guard Medical Readiness 2006-2011. Source: Army National Guard, Office of the Surgeon, slide deck, "Army National Guard Medical Readiness," 8 December 2014. Graphic created by Army University Press staff.

Appendix E

First Army Mobilization and Training Sites




Figure E.1. First Army Major Mobilization and Training Sites in 2012. Graphic created by Army University Press staff.



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