**CHANCELLORSVILLE INSTRUCTOR NOTES**

In this lesson, your students have been provided a case study of the battle of Chancellorsville, which occurred during the American Civil War. (May 2-5 1863). The Cadet text has been broken down in sections, but generally following the progression of the battle. Each section is preceded by a short explanation of the POW that is best illustrated by that piece of the battle. However, different POWs can be applied throughout. This class is intended to allow the instructor to describe the battle, and to lead discussion on how to best utilize the POW in analysis of a battle, and emphasize the importance of implementing these principles in all future missions. These instructor notes are designed to give the instructor enough information to build his/her own lesson plan. Since the Cadets will have already received a class on the Principles of War in their MS II year, the POW definitions are meant as only a review, and the majority of the time in this class should be spent on the Chancellorsville case study.

The instructor can conduct the class in several ways: he/she may lead the discussion of the battle, or can allow specified cadets to discuss assigned portions of the class. Also, you can lead in with the particular principle of war, and follow it with the historical example, or visa versa. The instructor is encouraged to utilize the discussion questions and allow the cadets to explore why a certain application or disregard for a particular POW resulted in success or failure. The instructor is also not limited to those discussion questions listed. Due to the nature of the POWs, the instructor is encouraged to expound on the insights given, or create additional/alternate discussion questions.

It must be emphasized that the POWs are not a recipe for success or failure, but a set of tools that not only can be used to analyze any battle throughout history, but are also the bedrock of our doctrine, and should always be considered when formulating plans and operations for the future.

Note: Doctrine definitions are directly out of FM 3-0. Also, *underlined* and *italicized* words should be used in the discussion to emphasize the actual definition of the POW that is being discussed.

1. **Principles of War Background**:

a. For nearly two and a half millennia, soldiers have been trying to identify and use enduring principles, or basic truths, for the conduct of war. Of the early attempts to do so, the best known was by the legendary Chinese general and military theorist, Sun Tzu, who lived about 400-500 B.C. Also about the same time, in ancient Greece at the Battle of Marathon in 490 B.C., the Athenians, under the battlefield command of Miltiades, routed the Persians. Although he was not thinking specifically in terms of the nine modern principles of war, Militiades’s conduct of the battle nonetheless demonstrated the expert application of the principles of mass and economy of force. Much more recently, the campaigns of Napoleon I (Bonaparte), Emperor of France, further inspired exploration for principles of war. Of the soldiers who attempted to interpret Napoleon’s way of war, the Swiss-French-Russian general and military theoretician Antoine Henri Jomini, declared: “There exists a small number of fundamental principles of war the application of which has been in almost all time crowned with success.” According to Jomini, an army succeeds when it:

(1) Operates against its enemy’s lines of communication.

(2) Masses its force against a fraction of the enemy’s.

(3) Attacks the enemy’s weakest point in force.

(4) Attacks the enemy speedily at the right place and time.

b. World War I provided the final impetus for the formulation of modern principles of war. It was suggested that a set of pseudo-scientific principles might help to prevent the apparent inefficiency and inconclusiveness that characterized World War I. The British General John Frederick Charles (J.F.C.) Fuller published a 1916 military journal article entitled “The Principles of War, With Reference to the Campaigns of 1914-1915,” which was the first detailed enumeration of eight modern principles of war.

c. Following World War I and building on Fuller’s principles, the War Department published its 1921 Training Regulations No. 10-5, which was the U.S. Army’s first official publication outlining nine principles of war. Soon after, then-U.S. Army Colonel William K. Naylor, a World War I veteran, published three articles in *Infantry Journal* clarifying and defending the nine principles. Both the British and American versions of the principles drew strong criticism and by 1930 had been deleted from the doctrine of both nations. Shortly after World War II, however, the nine principles, slightly retitled and for the first time officially defined, reappeared in the 1949 Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations. For a brief period after the Vietnam War, from 1976-1982, when Army doctrine emphasized the defense, the principles of war disappeared again from FM 100-5 but reappeared again when the offensive orientation of AirLand Battle was introduced in the 1980s. The nine principles of war have remained as the foundation of Army doctrine ever since and can be found in FM 3-0, the successor to FM 100-5

1. **Principles of War List:**

a. The nine principles of war recognized by the US Army today are below. They are general guidelines for battle analysis and planning operations whether you are a platoon leader or a theater commander. The discussion that follows will give the Army’s current definition of each principle, followed by an historical example drawn from the handout covering the 1863 Chancellorsville campaign.

(1) Objective

(2) Offensive

(3) Mass

(4) Economy of force

(5) Maneuver

(6) Unity of command

(7) Security

(8) Surprise

(9) Simplicity

1. **Chancellorsville Case Study: Background. *(This background information is not included in the assigned reading. However, it should be covered with the students to better understand the battle and as a lead in to teaching the 1st POW.)*** 
   1. During the American Civil War, the year1862 ended poorly for the Union. The month of September witnessed America’s single bloodiest day at the Battle of Antietam where the Union Army of the Potomac (AOP) repelled the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) from Maryland, but failed to defeat it decisively. Following this marginal victory, President Lincoln replaced several of his army commanders, with the one notable exception of U.S. Grant. As Lincoln stated: “I can’t spare this man, he fights.” This shakeup in army commanders was intended to revive fighting spirit and spurn on a simultaneous three pronged campaign aimed at three of the Confederates’ major cities. The Army of the Tennessee under Grant was to take Vicksburg; the Army of the Cumberland under the new command of General Rosecrans was to take Chattanooga, and finally, General Burnside was to command the Army of the Potomac and destroy the Army of Northern Virginia (under General Robert E. Lee) and eventually take the Confederate Capital of Richmond. By the end of 1862, none of these Armies had succeeded in their goals, and Burnside’s attempt resulted in the December battle of Fredericksburg, which is widely considered as the most lopsided Union defeat of the entire war. Burnside had formed the Army of the Potomac into three “Grand Divisions” (GD) of 2 Corps’ each. During the battle, Burnside gave each GD commander extremely vague orders which sent each GD on separate frontal attacks that were not mutually supportive. To complicate matters, Burnside often bypassed his GD commanders and communicated directly with corps commanders. The result of the battle was not only the repulse of the Army of the Potomac, but also the loss of over 12,500 men as compared to 5,500 Confederate losses. Robert E. Lee was said to have commented during this battle that: “It is well that war is so terrible – we would grow too fond of it.” Following the Battle of Fredericksburg, Lincoln once again decided to replace the commander of the AOP. His choice was one of the GD commanders, Major General “Fighting Joe” Hooker.
2. **Hooker’s Reorganization of the Army of the Potomac.**
   1. **UNITY OF COMMAND:** Doctrine:

***For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.***

* + 1. Applying a force’s full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective. Cooperation may produce coordination, but giving a single commander the required authority unifies action.
    2. The Joint, multinational, and interagency nature of unified action creates situations where the military commander does not directly control all organizations in the AO. In the absence of command authority, commanders cooperate, negotiate, and build consensus to achieve unity of effort.
  1. **UNITY OF COMMAND**: Chancellorsville
     1. When the Lincoln administration appointed MG Hooker to command the AOP in January 1863, that army was fresh from defeat the month before at Fredericksburg. With morale low and desertions high, Hooker and his chief of staff, the former V Corps commander MG Daniel Butterfield, began an extended, much-needed reorganization of the AOP. They scrapped the Grand Division scheme, which had interfered with the army commander’s ability to command the various corps by introducing an unnecessary command layer. Hooker and Butterfield returned the AOP to its previous corps structure, seven in all, and grouped all of the cavalry into an eighth corps, all reporting to Hooker, who thus came to exercise direct command over the army’s maneuver elements and could assure their working together toward a common objective. When the reorganization was complete by the spring of 1863, the AOP outnumbered the ANV by 2-to-1 and held a 3-to-1 superiority in artillery. With his army revitalized and ready to fight, Hooker himself appeared and sounded confident and belligerent.
  2. **DISCUSSION**:
     1. *How does the reorganization of the AOP relate Unity of Command/Unity of Effort?* - Compare/contrast Burnsides mistakes at Fredericksburg with the new command structure. The GD concept could have worked given the right commanders: An Army Commander that could give clear, concise orders/guidance without interfering in the management of each GD and Grand Division commanders that could execute those orders with the ability to coordinate their efforts with one another. This structure, however, is difficult at best to insure unity of effort. The extra layer of command was simply unnecessary and just gave another possibility to confuse and stray from the objective of the army. Hooker’s reorganization allowed him to directly control each corps so that each corps commander answered to one person and thus, the army as a whole worked toward one man’s vision.

- Cavalry reorganization: The creation of the Cavalry Corps gave Hooker a great new asset for the AOP. Instead of each Corps giving separate missions for their independent Cavalry units, (which were often poorly utilized due to corps commanders’ ignorance of proper cavalry use) Hooker could now give the cavalry a focused mission that was directly related to accomplishing the objective of the rest of the Army.

1. **Hooker’s Intelligence and Counterintelligence Reorganization.**
   1. **SECURITY:** Doctrine:

***Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.***

* + 1. Security protects and preserves combat power. It does not involve excessive caution. Taking calculated risks is inherent in conflict. Security results from measures a command takes to protect itself from surprise, interference, sabotage, annoyance, and threat surveillance and reconnaissance. Military deception greatly enhances security.
  1. **SECURITY**: Chancellorsville
     1. During his reorganization of the AOP, Hooker implemented a number of thoughtful and effective measures to improve his army’s security. Finding no means, organization, or effort to gather, interpret, or disseminate intelligence and counterintelligence information, Hooker created the Military Intelligence Bureau, appointed Colonel George H. Sharpe to its command, and for administrative purposes placed it under the AOP’s Provost Marshal. In short order, Sharpe put together an efficient organization. For intelligence operations, Sharpe continued to use spies, signalmen, and observation balloons to gather information and added specially selected cavalry and infantry scouts to augment that process. For counterintelligence, he and Hooker set up a system that required newspaper reporters to clear stories through army headquarters or be expelled from the army area. This measure was to prevent the Confederates from resorting to their usual practice of mining northern newspapers for detail concerning the AOP’s state and operations. Hooker’s security reforms had their greatest effect during the Chancellorsville campaign’s Union cavalry operations. The AOP’s cavalry commander, Brigadier General (BG) George Stoneman, began his raid behind Confederate lines with recently gathered intelligence data indicating the strength and location of the ANV’s cavalry corps. In addition, Stoneman successfully confused his counterpart, MG Jeb Stuart, by allowing false messages to fall into Confederate hands, with the result that Stuart erroneously believed that Stoneman was headed for the Shenandoah Valley rather than in the direction of Richmond.
  2. **DISCUSSION**: Combine the Security discussion with the Objective discussion below.

1. **Hooker’s Plan**
   1. **OBJECTIVE:** Doctrine:

***Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.***

* + 1. At the operational and tactical levels, objective means ensuring all actions contribute to the higher commander’s goals. The principle of Objective drives all military activity. When undertaking any mission, commanders should have a clear understanding of the expected outcome and its impact. At the strategic level, this means having a clear vision of the end state the President establishes. This normally includes diplomatic and economic factors, and may include informational aspects. Commanders need to appreciate political ends and understand how the military conditions they achieve contribute to them.
    2. Military leaders cannot divorce objective from considerations of restraint and legitimacy, principles of Joint operations, particularly in stability operations. The amount of force used to obtain the objective must be prudent and appropriate to strategic aims. Means used to accomplish the military objective must not undermine the local population’s willing acceptance of a lawfully constituted government. Without restraint or legitimacy, support for military action deteriorates, and the objective becomes unobtainable.
  1. **OBJECTIVE:** Chancellorsville
     1. Hooker’s original plan was to utilize his cavalry to draw Lee out of position and then trap him with infantry. The inability of Stoneman to cross the Rappahannock in a timely manner however, forced Hooker to alter his plans. This change resulted in a rather complex series of movements:
     + Three corps conducted a turning movement crossing the Rappahannock at Kelly’s Ford.
     + One corps (Couch) supported the turning effort at Banks Ford. (Couch later joined the main body south of the Rapidan)
     + Three corps (under Sedgwick) staged a demonstration at Fredericksburg to fix Lee *(military deception greatly enhances security)*

- One of these corps (Sickles) acted as the Army Reserve and eventually moved to support the turning movement via the US Mine Ford

* + - The Cavalry Corps conducted a raid to destroy the ANV lines of communication.
    1. All these movements are in support of one Objective – Turn Lee, put him at a disadvantage and destroy his army. While he never specifically stated his exact intent, Hooker constantly boasted throughout preparations and initial movements that he would destroy Lee’s Army. (Instructor Note: There is some historical controversy as to what Hooker’s original intent was. Some historians argue that allowing Lee to escape was Hooker’s intent all along, but for the sake of this lesson, we shall assume destruction of the ANV was his original, overall Objective).
  1. **DISCUSSION**:
     1. Instructor Note: The instructor may want to briefly discuss all of the forms of maneuver either prior to the class, or at least, prior to this Objective section. This particular form of maneuver, turning movement, is a form of maneuver in which the “attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy’s principle defensive positions by seizing objectives to the enemy rear and causing the enemy to move out of his current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat” (FM 3-0).
     2. *Was Hooker’s operation directed to a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective?* Hooker adhered to two of the three elements of this definition. Given the two to one force ratio the AOP had over the ANV, and the well designed plan that successfully put Lee in a very vulnerable position, Hooker established a very attainable and decisive objective. He had the force capable of destroying the ANV, and he established a plan that was designed to decisively destroy it. However, it is the 3rd element, *clear definition of the objective*, where Hooker appears to fail. He was very secretive in his intent, and only gave his subordinates short direct orders that did not give them the full picture of Army movements or how their elements fit into the higher scheme of maneuver. While this aided in the overall Security of the operation, his corps commanders had very little latitude to adjust Hooker’s orders since they had no clear understanding of the higher goals.
     3. *Hooker has apparently made a choice to emphasize Security over a clearly defined Objective. Was this choice wise given the nature of a turning movement?* In order for Hooker to get the turning force into the ANV’s rear area, it was critical that Lee remained unaware of the AOP’s main body movement. The demonstration by Sedgwick and Hooker’s operational security measures were intended to mask the movement of the turning force. While the demonstration failed to fool Lee, the security efforts appear to have worked. Therefore, we could conclude that Hookers decision to keep his corps commanders in the dark was appropriate. However, we should also note that the movement was somewhat free of any complications, and Hooker’s subordinates were capable enough to make unopposed movements without much trouble. The fog of war that so often interferes with the best plans did not drastically interfere with the AOP’s movements, and the lack of a clear commander’s intent did not hinder the corps commanders’ ability to accurately carry out Hooker’s orders. Hooker was very fortunate in his first movements, but his fortune, in relation to his practice of strict control, ran out as the battle commenced. *(Instructor Note: We will see later that when Hooker reached Chancellorsville and began to contact the enemy, he began to alter his intent. Prior to May 1st, success was the destruction of the ANV. After May 1st, Hooker added that success could also be the withdrawal of the ANV. This altered Objective will be part of his undoing, as we shall see in Offensive)*
  2. **ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION**: You may want to cover Lee’s failure with Security. Upon conclusion of Hooker’s turning movement, Lee had *permitted the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage*. While Lee was not fooled by Sedgwick’s deception operation, Lee’s reconnaissance/ intelligence collection was not able to properly track the movement of the Union main body. This may have been a result of the previous reliance on Union newspapers, among other factors.

1. **Hooker’s Turning Movement**
   1. **MANEUVER:** Doctrine:

***Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power.***

* + 1. Maneuver concentrates and disperses combat power to place and keep the enemy at a disadvantage. It achieves results that would otherwise be more costly. Effective maneuver keeps enemies off balance by making them confront new problems and new dangers faster than they can counter them. Army forces gain and preserve freedom of action, reduce vulnerability, and exploit success through maneuver. Maneuver is more than just fire and movement. It includes the dynamic, flexible application of all elements of combat power. It requires flexibility in thought, plans, and operations. It skillfully applies mass, surprise, and economy of force to produce shock.
  1. **MANEUVER**: Chancellorsville:
     1. For what became the Chancellorsville campaign, Union MG Hooker crafted a conceptually bold plan calling for grand-scale maneuver. In general terms his plan followed the tried and true pattern of “fix and flank.” In the main effort, three of Hooker’s corps were to conduct a turning movement by ascending the Rappahannock River on the north bank behind covering and concealing terrain. Once they were far enough up the river, this maneuver force was to cross to the south bank, proceed to and cross the nearby Rapidan River, and descend upon Lee’s left flank, in the process prying him out of Fredericksburg and into close battle presumably on ground or terms of Hooker’s choosing. Simultaneous with the turning movement were two other supporting operations. One involved the AOP’s cavalry corps striking far behind Lee’s front and severing the ANV’s LOC, thus potentially bringing on the deep battle as the Confederates withdrew to fight for their logistical link southward to the southern capital at Richmond, Virginia. The other entailed the “fix” portion of Hooker’s plan. In it four corps were to engage in a variety of activities, including crossing the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg and demonstrating against the Confederate entrenched lines from Marye’s Heights to Prospect Hill, and seizing and holding Banks’ Ford upstream from Fredericksburg to shorten the Union LOC as Hooker and the maneuver force closed in on Lee from the west.
  2. **DISCUSSION**:
     1. *Was Hooker successful in the accomplishing the maneuver as it is defined in FM 3-0* (see Paragraph 6)? He was. As a Grand Division commander, Hooker had been witness to the carnage involved at the Fredericksburg disaster of December 1862. Wanting to avoid another disastrous frontal attack, Hooker attempted to force Lee out of his seemly impregnable position at Marye’s Heights without having to storm them. Through increased security measures, enhanced by a fixing and deception effort, Hooker successfully put half of his army in Lee’s rear. Lee was thus put in a *disadvantageous position* due to Hooker’s *flexible application of combat power*. Lee was forced to react.
     2. *Lee’s dilemma: How should he counter Hooker’s turning movement?* The ANV was in danger of being cut off from its Line of Communication (LOC) (the road network between the ANV and Richmond) and being attacked from the front and rear. What options does Lee have: (Instructor Note: Hooker’s operational success can best be illustrated by the options Lee had to choose from. Each option contained considerable risk. Cadets can discuss them, and then you can present the following options using the animated arrows on the slide)
        1. Withdraw to another location: This Course of Action (COA) would have been considered an automatic defeat, and Lee would have the dilemma of finding another location for his already weaker forces to defend. However, this option has the least risk of losing his force and could have allowed him time to possibly link up with MG Longstreet’s forces to the south – keeping the ANV alive keeps the Confederacy alive.
        2. Attack Sedgwick and hold Hooker’s turning force: This does not solve the LOC problem and attacking Sedgwick is wrought with the problems of attacking through Fredericksburg and crossing a river.
        3. Attack Hooker and hold Sedgwick. While easier than COA 2, due to the already strong defensive position at Fredericksburg to hold Sedgwick, Lee would have to divide his already inferior numbered forces and attack the AOP with a lower force ratio. An attacker almost always needs a higher attack ratio to be successful, so this COA contains tremendous risk. However, since Lee was an aggressive commander and knowing the AOP’s poor track record, this is the COA that Lee executed.
     3. Lead-in to the next section (Offensive): *Was Hooker able to exploit his operational success?*

1. **Lee Takes the Offensive.**
   1. **OFFENSIVE:** Doctrine

***Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.***

* + 1. Offensive action is vital to achieving decisive results. It is the essence of successful operations. Offensive actions dictate the nature, scope, and tempo of an operation. They force the enemy to react. Commanders use offensive actions to impose their will on an enemy or control a situation. Offensive operations are essential to maintain the freedom of action necessary to achieve success and exploit vulnerabilities. It helps commanders respond effectively to rapidly changing situations and unexpected developments.
  1. **OFFENSIVE**: Chancellorsville
     1. During the night of 1-2 May, GEN Lee and his most trusted corps commander, Lieutenant General (LTG) Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson, met to discuss what course of action the ANV should take the next day. Not long into their discussion, MG James Ewell Brown, “Jeb,” Stuart, the ANV’s cavalry corps commander, joined them and announced that his troopers had learned that the AOP’s right flank was exposed and could be enveloped. Combined with earlier intelligence that Hooker’s now five-corps-strong maneuver force was entrenching around the Chancellorsville crossroads and considering that the small Confederate force left back at Fredericksburg to delay a Union advance from that direction was already being threatened, Lee decided to go over to the offensive as the most expedient means of defeating the enemy. To Jackson’s great delight, Lee directed him to lead his corps, with Stuart screening, on a flanking march to crush Hooker in place.
  2. **DISCUSSION**:
     1. *Offensive shifts from Hooker to Lee: Prior to 1 May, Hooker clearly retains the initiative. How or why does the initiative shift to Lee?* While Hooker executed a superb operational offensive, he was leery of the tactical offense. His orders to subordinates continuously reflected a desire to choose proper ground and prepare defenses prior to decisive engagement with the enemy. In an order to one of his corps commanders, Hooker states: “If the enemy should be greatly re-enforced, you will then select a strong position and compel him to attack you on your ground….” The flaw in these orders was that the corps commander’s ability to *compel* an enemy to do *anything* was severely limited. Therefore, after the successful operational turning movement, Hooker decided to establish a large defensive line and let Lee either attack it frontally, or wait for Lee to withdraw. This appeared to be a shift from his original Objective of destroying the ANV. However, this shift in Objective resulted in the initiative passing from the AOP to the ANV. Once Hooker relinquishes the initiative to Lee, he violates the principle of Offensive. Lee is now free to execute his own option and *impose his will on the enemy*.
     2. *Understanding Hooker’s desire to be operationally offensive, but tactically defensive, how could he have kept the initiative?* Hooker had essentially created two defensive positions on either side of the ANV, and gave Lee the option to conduct a frontal attack against his prepared defenses, or withdraw. However, once Lee seized the initiative away from Hooker he had the freedom to create a third option. With two stabilized Union positions, Lee had freedom to act between them. However, given the Union’s superior numbers, Lee cannot be strong everywhere. Hooker needed to let his superior numbers decide the battle for him. Constant pressure on Lee with all of his forces would have allowed Hooker dictate the next move. Even if Hooker felt compelled to deploy his entire main body on the defensive, an earlier movement of Sedgwick’s force into Lee’s rear would have forced Lee to react to Hooker, instead of allowing Lee to retain the freedom of action.

1. **Jackson’s Plan for Enveloping the Union Right**
   1. **SIMPLICITY:** Doctrine.

***Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.***

* + 1. Plans and orders should be simple and direct. Simple plans and clear, concise orders reduce misunderstanding and confusion. The factors of METT-TC determine the degree of simplicity required. Simple plans executed on time are better than detailed plans executed late. Commanders at all levels weigh the apparent benefits of a complex concept of operations against the risk that subordinates will not be able to understand or follow it.
    2. Multinational operations put a premium on simplicity. Differences in language, doctrine, and culture complicate them. Simple plans and orders minimize the confusion inherent in this complex environment. The same applies to operations involving interagency and nongovernmental organizations.
  1. **SIMPLICITY**: Chancellorsville
     1. As Lee and Jackson conferred about what course of action to take in the half light of early morning on 2 May, Major Jedediah Hotchkiss, Jackson’s cartographer, returned from a personal reconnaissance of Hooker’s lines about Chancellorsville. Hotchkiss reported that there was an open roadway through the thickets of the Wilderness to Hooker’s open right flank. Having picked Jackson to make the attack, Lee asked him his plan. Jackson responded with utter simplicity by saying that he planned to “go around here [the Union right] . . . with my whole corps.” Aware of the risks inherent in such a maneuver but nonetheless calculating that Hooker’s recent adoption of the defensive at Chancellorsville would continue and thus permit Jackson’s flank march and attack to occur and succeed, Lee responded, “Well, go on.” Though simple in conception, the execution of the plan was difficult indeed. It required Lee to stay behind with two divisions and deceive and potentially hold off Hooker, who had all or portions of five corps with him, while Jackson conducted the march. On Jackson’s part, his corps had to cover 12 miles along second-rate roads, without his intent being revealed and his column thus attacked by Hooker’s larger force, and then deploy for and launch the main attack, all before daylight expired.
  2. **DISCUSSION**: Combine the discussion of Simplicity with that of Mass below.

1. **Jackson Attacks the Union Flank**
   1. **MASS:** Doctrine:

***Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time.***

* + 1. Commanders mass the effects of combat power in time and space to create shock and achieve both destructive and constructive results. Massing in time applies the elements of combat power against multiple targets simultaneously. Massing in space concentrates the effects of different elements of combat power against a single target. Both can overwhelm enemies or dominate the situation. Commanders select the method that best fits the circumstances. To an increasing degree, Joint and Army operations mass the effects of combat power in both time and space. Massed effects overwhelm the entire enemy defensive system before the enemy can react effectively.
    2. Army forces can mass effects quickly. This does not imply that they accomplish their missions with massed fires alone. Swift and fluid maneuver based on accurate situational understanding complement firepower. Often, this combination accomplishes in a single operation what formerly took an entire campaign.
    3. Commanders mass the effects of combat power against a combination of elements critical to enemy forces to shatter their coherence. Some of these may be concentrated and vulnerable to operations that mass in both time and space. Others may be spread throughout depth of the AO, vulnerable only to massing effects in time. Commanders combine simultaneous and sequential operations to mass effects in time and space.
  1. **MASS**: Chancellorsville**.**
     1. For his turning movement up the Rappahannock River from Fredericksburg, Hooker initially massed three of the AOP’s seven infantry corps (eventually augmented to six of seven) into a maneuver force and set out on 27 April. Three days later, that force, reinforced once already to four corps, had secured the Chancellorsville crossroads, fought the ANV to a standstill just beyond the eastern limits of the Wilderness, and forced Lee out of strong fortifications overlooking the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg. With the turning movement a success and while receiving and summoning still more reinforcements, Hooker was now ready to consolidate his position at Chancellorsville and prepared to fight the decisive, set-piece battle with Lee.
     2. Lee, on the other hand, observed that the AOP was strong in numbers and was well fortified. At Chancellorsville, Hooker had gradually assembled over 70,000 troops in his main body, while Lee was only able to gather 43,000 troops to oppose him. With this force ratio, any frontal attack on the AOP prepared positions would have been extremely risky. He therefore decided to utilize Maneuver and outflank his opponent. The result is that Lee is able to Mass his smaller force against only a portion of the Union Line. He concentrated Jackson’s Corps of 26,000 against O.O. Howard’s exposed right flank corps of 12,000. Lee had successfully turned a 2 to 3 disadvantage into a 2 to 1 advantage in numbers of troops.
  2. **DISCUSSION**:
     1. Utilizing the POW’s Simplicity and Mass, have the cadets discuss how and why Lee was able to mass his forces and use such a simple plan to accomplish this very risky maneuver:
        1. Simplicity: Lee knew Jackson’s immense capabilities and trusted his judgment. Orders can be kept simple if you understand that your subordinate is capable of conducting his own fight, knowing the commander’s intent. A lesser subordinate may need more detailed orders to keep in line with the intent.
        2. Simplicity: Time is critical. Lee did not yet know Hooker’s capabilities and was unsure of what he would do. To accomplish this very risky attack, Lee needed to keep his orders/plans short, and execute a simple plan now, rather than create a more complicated plan which may lose the opportunity of attacking a flank.
        3. Mass: Lee had little interference from his enemy who had few screen elements (loss of Security) and basically relinquished the initiative to him. Lee dictated the timeline and was given the freedom to move his troops (*flexible application*) at will to *concentrate* his *combat power* at the *decisive place*.
        4. Mass: Lee/Jackson/Stuart identify a road that is well concealed from the union lines. This security measure allows freedom of movement and gives Jackson the opportunity to Mass his corps without interference. (lead in to the next POW – Surprise)
     2. Instructor Note: Instructor should emphasize that while in the Civil War, mass is usually measured in numbers alone, modern warfare can utilize many combat multipliers to achieve mass.

1. **Union Neglect; Confederate Surprise**
   1. **SURPRISE:** Doctrine:

***Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared.***

* + 1. Surprise is the reciprocal of security. It is a major contributor to achieving shock. It results from taking actions for which enemies are unprepared. Surprise is a powerful but temporary combat multiplier. It is not essential to take enemies completely unaware; it is only necessary that they become aware too late to react effectively. Factors contributing to surprise include speed, operations security, and asymmetric capabilities.
  1. **SURPRISE**: Chancellorsville
     1. Confederate LTG Jackson’s flank march of 2 May resulted in one of the greatest examples of surprise in U.S. military history, and Union operations to that point contributed much to its success. For one, the Union cavalry corps’ raid deprived Hooker of the very organization he would need to screen his maneuver force’s turning movement. The result was that screening and scouting fell to Union infantry formations to perform. Those formations did bring Hooker word of movement seemingly toward the Union right. Throughout the day, Hooker vacillated between correctly and incorrectly interpreting the information. Also inadvertently aiding the Confederates, one of Hooker’s corps commanders secured his permission to probe Jackson’s column. The probe became an assault, which drew more Union elements into it, including the commander, MG Oliver O. Howard, and the reserve brigade of the XI Corps, Hooker’s right flank formation. With its commander and reserve absent and no definitive information about the movement and intent of the Confederate column having reached it, the XI Corps was unprepared for an assault. Meanwhile, Jackson’s corps had used nearly ten hours to make the 12-mile march around Hooker’s right and deploy for attack. The early evening fury of Jackson’s onslaught fell upon Howard XI Corps, swept it from the field, and endangered the integrity of Hooker’s entire position at Chancellorsville.
  2. **DISCUSSION**:
     1. Have Cadets recap all the elements that resulted in Surprise:
        1. Lack of reconnaissance for the Union.
        2. Disregard of the reports of Confederate troop movements.
        3. Confederate operational security (finding a concealed route).
        4. Rapid formulation and initiation of the plan.
        5. Massed troops on an exposed flank. (mainly due to seizing the initiative)
     2. Results: Shock. The panic of the defenders multiplies the effectiveness of the massed attack.
     3. This may also be a good time to compare and contrast the differences between Security and Surprise, to insure proper understanding of how they are connected:
        1. Proper security can nullify the enemy’s ability to surprise you, while at the same time, allow you to establish the conditions to achieve surprise against the enemy (Hooker’s turning movement). Security can be considered a constant requirement throughout an operation, while surprise may only be achieved temporarily but can be recreated on multiple occasions.
        2. Conversely, poor security will leave you vulnerable to being surprised. A good plan is formed on good intelligence, and the more the enemy knows of your disposition, the more likely he is capable of attacking you in an unexpected manner.
        3. These two Principles are not specifically tied to each other (in other words, you do not *have* to posses one to achieve the other) but the success/failure in one, will increase the probability of success/failure in the other.

1. **Confederate MG Early’s Delaying Action**
   1. **ECONOMY OF FORCE:** Doctrine

***Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.***

* + 1. Economy of force is the reciprocal of mass. It requires accepting prudent risk in selected areas to achieve overwhelming effects in the decisive operation. Economy of force involves the discriminating employment and distribution of forces. Commanders never leave any unit without a purpose. When the time comes to execute, all units should have tasks to perform.
  1. **ECONOMY OF FORCE**: Chancellorsville
     1. One of the most effective Confederate economy of force operations conducted during the Chancellorsville campaign was the result of Lee’s attempt to deceive Hooker about how the ANV was reacting to the AOP's turning movement of late April. As Jackson was leaving Fredericksburg to join Lee at Chancellorsville, he left behind MG Jubal A. Early’s division, augmented by one brigade. Early’s mission was to occupy the formidable Confederate fortifications atop Marye’s Heights and Prospect Hill and to deceive and delay Union efforts to advance westward from Fredericksburg. Early’s opponent, MG John Sedgwick’s Union VI Corps, outnumbered him four to one. On 3 May, Sedgwick attacked and seized the key terrain of Marye’s Heights on the fourth try. Early withdrew to the west and with still another brigade fought a delaying action along the two main roads connecting Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville. It was during this activity that Lee’s main force attacked and nearly overran Hooker’s Union maneuver force in the vicinity of Chancellorsville. Recognizing the danger that Sedgwick’s advance posed, Lee dispatched MG Lafayette McLaw’s division from Chancellorsville. McLaws, along with Early’s reinforced division, fought Sedgwick to a standstill at Salem Church, several miles short of Chancellorsville.
  2. **DISCUSSION**: You may want to have the Cadet’s recap all the Economy of Force (EOF) occurrences throughout the battle:
     1. (27-30 April) Hooker left Sedgwick at Fredericksburg as a fixing force, while the main body conducted a turning movement.
     2. (1 May) Lee was forced to split his forces and leave MG Early at Fredericksburg, while his Main Body engaged Hooker at Chancellorsville.
     3. (2 May) Lee was left with two divisions to face the bulk of the AOP while Jackson’s Corps conducted a flank attack.
     4. (4 May) Lee left Stuart (who took command of Jackson’s force after his wounding) to fix Hooker while Lee attacked Sedgwick.
     5. *In the first instance, proper Union implementation of Security and EOF results in a successful turning movement. What POW assists the Confederates when they successfully employ all three of their EOFs?* Offensive. In each case, Lee exploits one of his greatest assets: taking and holding the initiative. Together with constantly employing the principle of offensive, his EOF efforts allowed him to achieve *overwhelming effects* to defeat the Union.
  3. **ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION**: LEADERSHIP. Previously, in the Objective section, we learned that Hooker executed orders with strict control over his subordinates. This leadership technique is reverse of the example we witnessed between Lee and Jackson, where Lee only gave broad guidance to his most trusted subordinate. While it is not implied that Hooker’s command style was wrong (in some cases, it may be quite appropriate), the style has flaws that should be pointed out. Since Hooker conducted such control over his corps, giving little latitude to the corps commanders, the Army relied too heavily on the performance of one man. When Hooker was active, we see great success (the turning movement). But once the battle began, and Hooker faltered, and was even knocked unconscious for a time, he caused the rest of the army to falter with him. Hooker had become incapable of shaping the battle, and even at one point suggested in an order that he wanted Lee to attack him! This was a request that Lee obliged him, not in the area Hooker had chosen, but an area Lee had chosen. The Union corps commanders, who on many occasions had the ability to take the initiative back from Lee, were stifled by the strict command relationship.

1. **Limitations of the Principles of War** –Discuss the analysis of the limitations of the principles of war.
   1. In terms of the planning for or conduct of successful military operations, the nine principles of war are not a prescription, formula, recipe, or checklist, and they provide no pat answers to challenges and dilemmas encountered along the way.
      1. They may be followed and either win or lose.
      2. They may be violated and either win or lose.
      3. They may be both followed and violated and either win or lose.
      4. They are but guidelines for applying critical thinking and decision making to planning and the entire spectrum of operations that follow, from combat operations to non-combat operations.
   2. As we have seen in this case study, some principles can be incorporated with each other. MG Hooker, consciously or not, utilized the elements of Security in favor of (or at the expense of) a well defined Objective. We cannot prove that Hooker was right or wrong in this case. This combination serves him well in the first half of the campaign, yet continued adherence contributes to his failure in the second half. There is no set standard to how much emphasis any one principle of war should be given in a battle, nor should they be used to ultimately prove the key to success or failure on the battlefield. But by analyzing Hooker and Lee with these set standards, we appreciate their motives, strengths and shortcomings. With this knowledge, we ourselves can be better officers.