


THE 2D INFANTRY DIVISION AT THE BATTLES OF WONJU AND CHIPYONG-NI STAFF RIDE (KOREA, 1951)

STUDY INSTRUCTIONS & READINGS (Exportable)



Combat Studies Institute

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THE 2D INFANTRY DIVISION AT THE BATTLES OF WONJU AND CHIPYONG-NI

STUDY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE CHIPYONG-NI VIRTUAL STAFF RIDE

CORE READINGS:

1. The Korean Peninsula
2. The First Five Months of the Korean War
3. Ridgway's withdrawal to Line D
4. The First Battle of Wonju, 6-7 January 1951
5. The Second Battle of Wonju, 8-12 January 1951
6. Operation Wolfhound. 15- 7 January 1951
7. Operation Thunderbolt, January to February 1951
8. Ambush at the Twin Tunnels, January 1951
9. The Battle of the Twin Tunnels, 31 January to 1 February 1951
10. Operation Roundup, 29 January to 5 February 1951
11. Into Chipyong-ni, 9 February 1951
12. Patrols at Chipyong-ni, 4 – 11 February 1951
13. The Battle of Hoengsong, 11-13 February 1951
14. The Battle of Chipyong-ni, 13-15 February 1951
 - a. Ridgway's Decision to hold Chipyong-ni,
 - b. Chipyong-ni, 13-14 February
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 - d. Task Force Crombez and the Relief of Chipyong-ni
 - e. Casualties at Chipyong-ni
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15. The Third Battle of Wonju, 13- 20 February 1951
 - a. Wonju Line
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 - e. The 9th IN relieves the 38th IN
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16. UNC Resumes the Offense and Stalemate on the 38th Parallel

SPECIFIC READINGS / ANNEXES

Annex A: The 2nd Infantry Division and its Commanders

Annex B: The 23d Infantry Regiment

Annex C: Colonel Paul LaMarch Freeman Jr., Commander 23d Infantry Regiment

Annex D: US Weapons at Chip' yong -ni

Annex E: The French Battalion and General de Corps d'Armee Ralph Monclar

Annex F: Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, Command US 8th Army

Annex G: Major General Edward M. (Ned) Almond. Commander X US Corps.

Annex H: The Chinese Communist Forces- CCF

Study instructions for the Chipyong-ni Staff Ride (Korean War)

1. Overview:

- a. This Army University Press-Combat Studies Institute virtual staff ride examines the actions of 2nd Infantry Division in the Korean War. The staff ride provides a brief overview of the Korean War prior to the combat at Chipyong-ni and then focuses specifically on the combat actions of the division from 27 January – 15 February 1951. These actions include: the Battle of the Twin Tunnels (31 January – 1 February 1951); The Battle of Chipyong-ni (12-15 February 1951); and the three Battles of Wonju (8 to 20 February 1951).
- b. The material in this packet is designed to assist in preparing for the virtual staff ride and consists of core readings for all the staff ride participants and specific readings (annexes) for key historical characters and units in the battles. The readings provide context for the operations of the division in early 1951 and give the participants the details of the operations that will be covered during the virtual staff ride. It is highly recommended that participants read all of the material and take notes for use during the staff ride.
- c. The staff ride is not a lecture; it will be a facilitated discussion. The better prepared the participants are, the better the staff ride will go.

2. Divide the staff ride participants into 6 groups:

- **Group 1: The Chinese Communist Forces (this should be a small group).** This group will have significant participation during the entire staff ride.
 - **Read all the core readings.**
 - **Read Annex H: The Chinese Communist Forces- CCF**
- **Group 2: Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway, Commander US 8th Army, United Nations Forces (also be a small group).** Although LTG Ridgway is not physically present at any of the combat actions, his leadership and decisions had a significant impact on the tactical actions.
 - **Read all the core readings.**
 - **Read Annex F: Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, Command US 8th Army**

- **Group 3: Major General Edward M. (Ned) Almond. Commander X US Corps (also a small group).** Although MG Almond is not physically present at any of the combat actions, his leadership and decisions had a significant impact on the tactical actions.
 - **Read all the core readings.**
 - **Annex G: Major General Edward M. (Ned) Almond. Commander X US Corps.**

- **Group 4: Major Generals McClure and Ruffner, and the 2nd Infantry Division (can be a larger group).** [Note: This group is responsible for much of the Battles of Wonju]
 - **Read all the core readings.**
 - **Read Annex A: The 2nd Infantry Division and its Commanders.**
 - **Read Annex D: US Weapons**

- **Group 5: Colonel Paul Freeman and the 23d Infantry Regiment (can be a larger group).**
 - **Read all the core readings.**
 - **Read Annex B: The 23d Infantry Regiment.**
 - **Read Annex C: Colonel Paul LaMarch Freeman Jr., Commander 23d Infantry Regiment**
 - **Read Annex D: US Weapons**


- **Group 6: Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Monclar and the French Battalion (also a small group).**
 - **Read all the core readings.**
 - **Read Annex E: The French Battalion and General de Corps d'Armee Ralph Monclar**
 - **Read Annex D: US Weapons**

THE BATTLE OF CHIPYONG-NI

Staff Ride

The Korean Peninsula: Excerpt from CMH Pub 19-6, *The Korean War – The Outbreak* (Center of Military History), 1-5

Korea is a mountainous peninsula jutting from the central Asian mainland with a shape that resembles the state of Florida. Water outlines most of this small country, which has more than 5,400 miles of coastline. The Yalu and Tumen Rivers define much of its northern boundary, while major bodies of water are located on its other sides: the Sea of Japan on the east, the Korea Strait on the south, and the Yellow Sea on the west. China lies above the Yalu and Tumen Rivers for 500 miles of Korea's northern boundary as does the former Soviet Union for some eleven miles along the lower Tumen River. Korea varies between 90 and 200 miles in width and 525 to 600 miles in length. High mountains drop down abruptly to deep water on the east where there are few harbors, but a heavily indented shoreline on the south and west provides many harbors. Summers are hot and humid, with a monsoon season that lasts from June to September, but in the winter cold winds roar down from the Asian interior. A rugged landscape, a lack of adequate roads and rail lines, and climatic extremes make large-scale modern military operations in Korea difficult. In 1950 the country's population totaled about 30 million: 21 million south of the 38th Parallel, with 70 percent of the people engaged in agriculture, and 9 million north.



The First Five Months of the Korean War: Excerpt from *CMH Pub 19-9, The Korean War – Restoring the Balance* (Center of Military History), 5- 7.

By December 1950 the Korean War was five months old. The invasion by North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) in June 1950 had driven the UN forces into a headlong retreat to the Pusan Perimeter. In a spectacular reversal of fortune, the amphibious landing of UN forces at Inch’on in mid-September triggered a collapse of the North Korean People’s Army that was only stopped by the enormity of the Chinese intervention in October and November.

The U.S. 2d Infantry Division

On 23 July. Lead elements of the division arrived in Pusan, becoming the first unit to reach Korea directly from the United States. The division was initially employed piecemeal as units arrived. On 24 Aug 1950, the entire division was committed along the Naktong River Line. In the 16-day battle that followed, the division's clerks, bandsmen, technical and supply personnel joined in the desperate fight to hold the perimeter.

From 16-31 Oct, the division participated in the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter and moved north toward Seoul. In the drive north (The Race to the Yalu), the division organized a mechanized task force (TF Indianhead). The TF was the first US unit to enter the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. On 25 Oct, the division assumed the mission of I Corps reserve. (The remainder of the 8th Army continued to drive north toward the Chinese border). The 23d RCT garrisoned a deep water port near Pyongyang, the 9th RCT garrisoned Pyongyang, the attached 187th Airborne RCT garrisoned just to the east of Pyongyang, and the 38th RCT remained near Seoul. The division anxiously awaited the end of the war and being shipped home.

The entry into the war of major Chinese military forces rocked the overextended UN troops and sent them reeling back into South Korea. Eighth Army’s withdrawal from the Chinese border led to one of the greatest ordeals ever suffered by the U.S. Army.

The U.S. 2d Infantry Division

Chinese forces established a strong roadblock below the town of Kunu-ri and took positions on the hills along the road on which the 2d Infantry Division was moving. On November 30, already weakened by several days of combat in bitter cold weather, most of the division literally had to run a gauntlet of fire that tore units apart. Emerging from the gauntlet with about one-third of its men dead, wounded, or missing and most of its equipment lost, the division staggered back into South Korea to refit.

For a time it seemed that the UN forces might have to abandon the peninsula, resulting in a complete Communist victory. Only by trading space for time and by pummeling the advancing Chinese with artillery fire and air strikes did the new UN commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, halt the enemy.

Ridgway's withdrawal to Line D: Excerpt from *CMH Pub 19-8, The Korean War – The Chinese Intervention* (Center of Military History), 28-30.

Before Ridgway could fully restore the 8th Army's confidence, the Chinese attacked again. Beginning on 26 December, the CCF struck hard at UN units on the western approaches to Seoul. Supporting attacks occurred as well in the central and eastern parts of the line. The Chinese hit the ROK units hard, and again several units broke... Ridgway reluctantly ordered a general, but orderly, withdrawal, with units instructed to maintain contact with the enemy during their retreat, rather than simply giving up real estate without inflicting losses on the enemy.

Initially, Eighth Army pulled back thirty miles to a defensive line along the Han River to protect Seoul. By 2 January both I and IX Corps had successfully concluded the new withdrawal and, with extensive firepower at their command, their chances of holding the city were good. However, there was a distinct danger that the two corps could be outflanked to the east and forced to defend Seoul with their backs to the sea. Ridgway, unwilling to risk the loss or isolation of so much of his combat power, reluctantly ordered the retreat of both corps to "Line C," just south of the Han. For the third time in the war so far, Seoul was to change hands.

Followed by hordes of refugees hauling their loved ones or a few personal treasures on their backs or on ox carts, I and IX Corps began withdrawing from Seoul on 3 January. The loss of the capital was again a bitter pill for everyone to swallow. The cold froze refugee and soldier alike as the long UN columns snaked southward again. As the Han River began to freeze solid, refugees braved the treacherous ice to reach the temporary safety of UN lines. However, the freezing of the river threatened the entire UN position, since the same ice that held refugees could hold Chinese infantry intent on heading off the American withdrawal. Before such attacks could occur, however, the movement south was completed.

On the whole, the allies accomplished the evacuation of Seoul with minimal casualties... Finally, on the morning of 4 January, despite the continuing stream of desperate refugees, Eighth Army engineers blew the three pontoon bridges and the main railway bridge over the Han to prevent their use by the pursuing Chinese. The withdrawal to Line C was complete. However, even as units were moving into position on this defensive line, plans were being executed to withdraw some thirty-five miles farther south to Line D, running from P'yongt'aek in the west, northwestward through Wonju to Wonpo-ri.

The freezing of the Han River limited the defensive capabilities of UN troops scattered along Line C. In addition, the ROK III Corps in central Korea had virtually collapsed... As a result Ridgway ordered the U.S. X Corps, still recovering from its near-disaster in northeast Korea, to move up and take responsibility for some thirty-five miles in the center of Line C. Almond was to have control of the U.S. 2d and 7th Infantry Divisions and whatever remnants that he could gather of the ROK 2d, 5th, and 8th Divisions. To the right of X Corps, the ROK III and I Corps would extend Line C to the eastern coast. However, the staying power of this new defensive line was problematic.


Ridgway assessed the situation and, after the withdrawal from Seoul was completed, ordered the entire Eighth Army to withdraw again to Line D, which was somewhat redrawn to run straight

east from Wonju to Samch'ok instead of northeastward to Wonpo-ri. Beginning on 5 January all five corps of Eighth Army pulled back to this line. Despite its losses, the Eighth Army situation was thus much improved from the last days of November, with better coordination between units and fewer open flanks. The enemy attacks, however, were not over. The rejuvenated NKPA opened a two-corps assault on X Corps positions near Wonju in the center of Line D on 7 January.

The First Battle of Wonju, 6-7 January 1951: Excerpt from: Billy Mossman, *Ebb and Flow*, November 1950-July 1951, (Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, 1990), 219-220.

To seize Wonju itself, the North Korean plan called for a two-division frontal attack by the V Corps. The Wonju attack was to be assisted by the enveloping effect of other V Corps attacks farther west and by the II Corps advance on the east. Moving down from Hoengsong during the night of the 6th, General Pang's 6th and 27th Divisions before dawn were poised just above Wonju for the frontal attack. Ahead of these two forces, Pang's 12th Division, previously in the Hongch'on-Hoengsong area, had crossed from the east to the west side of Route 29 and had come south to a position northwest of Wonju, just north of the 10th Regiment of the ROK 8th Division. On the opposite side of Route 29, General Choe's 2d and 9th Divisions had marched from Hongch'on to the area northeast of Wonju, and the 10th Division, coming from Ch'unch'on, was approaching Wonju for the II Corps' thrust through the unoccupied mountains.

Wonju sits in the bottom of a bowl in the valley of the Wonju River. Hills forming the rim of the bowl begin to rise about a mile from town. To defend the town and an airstrip at its southeastern edge, General McClure had established the 23d and 38th Regiments in an inverted U atop the bowl rim. The 23d was deployed across Route 29 and in an arc to the west and southwest, and the 38th was similarly aligned north, east, and southeast of town. Bulging out as this position did at the northeastern corner of the X Corps line, and, for the time being, the Eighth Army line, McClure's two regiments, in the words of the Eighth Army G-3, occupied an "unenviable salient."




- Probing attacks begin on the Outpost Line of Resistance (OPLR)
- 0230: 2-38 IN S-2 ambushed near the railroad and highway crossings
- 0400: 2-38 IN's mortar platoon has visual contact with a platoon-sized element near the river dike
- 0400: F/2-38 IN attacks a roadblock at the railroad underpass
- 0500: 2-38 IN's mortar platoon attacked by the platoon sized element
- Daybreak: G/2-38 IN cannot maintain its positions; it is relieved and withdrawn into Kamaji
- 0530: Infiltrators reach the center of Wonju; 2-38 IN CP is unsuccessfully attacked
- 0615: I/3-38 IN ordered to secure the 2nd BN CP; engages two company-sized enemy elements en-route
- 1-38 IN counterattacks through Wonju and clears remaining enemy from the perimeter

The leading forces of the North Korean 6th and 27th Divisions punctured the salient before McClure's men realized it. About 0530 on the 7th, some four hundred enemy troops disguised as and intermingled among civilians merely walked down Route 29, by outposts in other areas, and even through some main positions. Their identity was not discovered until they opened fire on two battalion command posts in the rear. McClure's forces, once alerted, rapidly screened out the infiltrators, captured 114, and broke up several assaults that followed against their main defenses. But almost simultaneously with these assaults, the North Korean 12th Division to the west attacked and pushed the 10th Regiment of the ROK 8th Division out of position, leaving the 2d Division's Wonju salient even more unenviable.

As the North Korean attack developed, General McClure sought General Almond's approval of a withdrawal below town. Almond, having himself foreseen a possible need to adjust the 2d Division's line, agreed to a withdrawal provided McClure placed his forces on the hills edging the town on the south so that they would still control the road hub. McClure, however, assumed a latitude of decision Almond had not really given him and allowed his two regiments to make a substantial withdrawal to the southwest down the Wonju- Mokkye-dong road. By evening of the 7th the 23d Infantry held a line four and a half miles below Wonju, and the 38th Infantry was aligned in depth near the village of Mich'on, another three miles to the south. From these positions, McClure's only chance of controlling Wonju was by artillery fire.

Almond had no intention of depending on artillery alone. Wonju, in his judgment, was so important and indeed so rare a road junction that any force controlling it had gone far toward controlling central Korea. After learning of the 2d Division's deep withdrawal he ordered

McClure to send at least one infantry battalion at first light on the 8th to clear the town and airstrip, to occupy the high ground directly south of Wonju with no fewer than four battalions, and not to withdraw from that position unless Almond himself gave the order.



3A Second Battle of Wonju 8-12 JAN 1951



- 08 JAN 0900: 2-23 IN advances toward Wonju with 3 companies
- G/2-23 IN enters the woods to the right of the MSR, and advances 1.5 miles
- E/2-23 IN makes visual contact with a concentration of enemy troops in the village; artillery strikes kill approximately 200 enemy
- The artillery strikes alert a nearby regimental-sized enemy unit, which moves against 2-23 IN's flanks
- 08 JAN 1500: 2-23 IN withdraws to their attack positions

The Second Battle of Wonju, 8-20 January 1951: Excerpt from: Billy Mossman, *Ebb and Flow*, November 1950-July 1951, (Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, 1990), 220-222.

McClure gave the Wonju assignment to the 23d Infantry, instructing Colonel Freeman to use one battalion in the attack. Lt. Col. James W. Edwards' 2d Battalion started for Wonju at 0930 on the 8th, moving over the road in a column of companies with Company E leading and with four aircraft overhead in close support. Around noon, as Company E passed Hill 247 overlooking the road from the east two and a half miles below Wonju, the leading riflemen spotted and fired on several North Koreans, who quickly scattered. A half mile farther, they discovered North Koreans asleep in buildings. Finding them was like bumping a beehive. Some of the first to awaken gave an alarm that stirred a swarm of soldiers out of other buildings and carried to troops located in nearby heights. The 2d Battalion killed two hundred during the melee. But Colonel Edwards at the same time discovered that he was being flanked on both the east and west by what he estimated to be a regiment and pulled his battalion out of range to a position south of Hill 247. To the west, in the meantime, the North Korean 12th Division again hit the 10th ROK Regiment and forced it back almost on line with the 38th Infantry at Mich'on. Since this left the west flank of the 23d Infantry, above Mich'on, wide open, General McClure instructed Colonel

Freeman to pull the 2d Battalion all the way back to the regimental line and emplace it on the exposed flank.

Convinced by reports of heavy enemy losses and moderate enemy resistance that a successful attack on Wonju could be made, General Almond ordered McClure to resume his effort to clear the town and airstrip by noon on the 9th. Almond directed that two battalions with air and artillery support make the renewed advance and repeated his previous instruction that four battalions occupy positions just south of Wonju.

McClure attached two battalions of the 38th Infantry to the 23d to provide Colonel Freeman sufficient forces to hold a defensive position as well as make a two-battalion advance. For the Wonju mission Freeman organized a task force with the 2d Battalion of the 23d Infantry and 2d Battalion of the 38th Infantry, placing Lt. Col. James H. Skeldon, commander of the latter battalion, in charge. In snow that canceled close air support, Task Force Skeldon started over the road toward Wonju at 1000 on the 9th.

As Skeldon's column approached Hill 247 at noon, fire struck the task force from that peak and heights to the west. Skeldon deployed a battalion on each side of the road and attacked, but by late afternoon his forces bogged down part way up the near slopes of the enemy position. Colonel Freeman considered Skeldon's position unsound, especially after learning that North Korean 12th Division forces to his west again had hit the ROK 8th Division and advanced deep to his left rear before the South Koreans contained them. But, under pressure to clear Wonju and occupy positions just below the town, he held Skeldon where he was for the night, reinforced him with the bulk of the French battalion, and planned to resume the attack on the 10th.

Frequent snowstorms on the 10th again eliminated close air support, and the ground troops suffered also from far lower temperatures caused by a northerly wind shift. Freeman, personally taking charge of the attack, pushed his forces another half mile into the 247 mass but met increasing opposition and faced a repeated need to spread forces farther west and east to meet North Korean counterattacks.

Around noon he notified General McClure of the growing resistance and of the constant danger of being outflanked, and he advised against continuing the attack. [The east flank was also threatened. 2d Division assigned the entire 9th Infantry regiment to cover the flank and they fought a multi-day fight to stop the infiltration of NK guerrillas.] McClure agreed but instructed Freeman to hold his position. Freeman could adjust the disposition of his troops, but he was to do nothing that would appear to be a withdrawal.

Freeman's change to a defensive stance was followed by hard North Korean attacks that did not subside until well after dark and after Freeman's forces had inflicted, in their estimate, two thousand enemy casualties. Although control of Hill 247 vacillated through the afternoon, Freeman still commanded a good defensive position at the close of the engagement.

Continuing North Korean attempts to shove Freeman's forces out of the 247 mass on the 11th and 12th had similar results. Reinforced by more of the French battalion and part of the Netherlands battalion and helped by strong air support (including a B-29 attack on Wonju) after


the sky cleared around noon on the 11th, Freeman's forces broke up the assaults and killed more than eleven hundred North Koreans. Two weak and failing attempts against Freeman's position early on the 13th ended the V Corps' effort to drive south of Wonju.

Regardless of this stand at Hill 247, General Almond was dissatisfied with the 2d Division's performance. Largely as a result of the initial withdrawal so far south of Wonju and what Almond considered to be inefficient staff work, poor employment of weapons (especially artillery), improper organization of defenses, and an exorbitant rate of non-battle casualties (mostly from trench foot, frostbite, and respiratory diseases), Almond on the 13th asked General Ridgway for authority to relieve General McClure. Ridgway was not fully convinced that a relief was warranted. His own impression of McClure, formed in part after a visit to Wonju on 2 January, was of a hard-hitting, aggressive commander. He also considered McClure's assignment at Wonju to be a "hot potato" that could burn a person no matter how he handled it. But he felt more strongly that he had to back his corps commander in this instance and gave Almond the authority he asked for... Almond selected the X Corps chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, and on 14 January sent him to take command of the 2d Division.

Operation Wolfhound: Excerpt from *CMH Pub 19-8, The Korean War – The Chinese Intervention* (Center of Military History), 31-33, and Excerpt from Billy Mossman, *Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951*, (Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, 1990), 220-222.

The North Korean success at Wonju and the dangerous penetration of the ROK III Corps by the NKPA II Corps threatened to unhinge the entire UN line. However, the harsh winter weather and logistical challenges, coupled with newly aggressive patrolling by UN soldiers, began to take their toll on the attackers' momentum. The defensive line was reestablished just south of Wonju, cutting off the weakened NKPA divisions that had penetrated the line. The 1st Marine Division was sent up from reserve to conduct a systematic anti-guerrilla campaign against the scattered forces and in three weeks managed to destroy virtually one entire NKPA division. By the end of January a new defensive line had been established from the Han River, running just south of Wonju to Samch'ok on the eastern coast.

While X Corps was dealing with the potentially disastrous penetration in the center, I and IX Corps were busy stabilizing their positions and instituting a series of aggressive reconnaissance-in-force patrols to their front. General Ridgway, dismayed by the continuing poor showing of his battle-weary units, demanded that unit commanders lead the way in restoring an aggressive spirit. To help rebuild the still shaky morale of Eighth Army, he ordered I Corps to plan a major reconnaissance-in-force in its sector to test the measure of Chinese resistance. Operation WOLFHOUND used troops from the U.S. 25th Infantry Division (especially the 27th Infantry Regiment, the "Wolfhounds," from which the operation drew its name), the U.S. 3d Infantry Division, and the ROK 1st Division. Maj. Gen. Frank W. "Shrimp" Milburn, commander of I Corps, directed it along the Osan-Suwon axis, twelve to twenty miles to the north, supported by artillery and tanks.




The reconnaissance began on 15 January. The 3d Infantry Division units involved were quickly immobilized by enemy defensive positions, but the rest of the forces met little opposition until near Suwon. There, Chinese troops forced the WOLFHOOUND units to turn back just south of their objective, but they were able to establish an advance corps outpost line along the Chinwi River, south of Osan, by late on 16 January, while inflicting some 1,380 enemy casualties at the cost of 3 killed and 7 wounded of their own. More important, they had showed both the Chinese and themselves that the Eighth Army continued to have an offensive spirit.

Almost immediately, two other reconnaissances-in-force sallied out from UN lines: another from I Corps and a one-day action in the IX Corps sector, both on 22 January. The reconnaissance in the IX Corps sector consisted of a tank-heavy formation called Task Force Johnson after its commander, Colonel Johnson. The immediate results of both operations were small, but the ground was being laid for a return to the offensive by the entire Eighth Army in the near future.

Operation Thunderbolt: Excerpt from *CMH Pub 19-9, The Korean War – Restoring the Balance* (Center of Military History), 5- 7.

Operations on the eve of the renewal of full-scale UN offensive operations, the Eighth Army consisted of 178,464 American soldiers and marines, 223,950 ROK Army troops, and UN ground contingents from Australia, France, India, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. These forces were organized into five corps, from west to east: I, IX, and X and the ROK III and I. In general, ROK forces held the more easily

defended, rugged terrain in the east, while U.S. forces were positioned on the lower, flatter areas in the west, where their greater mobility and firepower were more decisive.




Arrayed against the UN forces were some 290,000 Chinese and North Korean soldiers. The Chinese were organized into seven corps size armies and twenty-two divisions, 204,000 strong, primarily holding the western and central portions of the front. About 52,000 North Korean soldiers, in turn, organized into three corps and fourteen understrength divisions, held the eastern sector. In addition, an estimated 30,000 North Korean guerrillas were still behind UN lines in the mountainous areas of eastern South Korea. Although the Chinese had halted their offensive after heavy casualties, they had no shortage of manpower. Supply difficulties, rather than casualties, had stopped the Chinese Communists' drive south, encouraging American commanders, in turn, to resume their own offensive north.

On 20 January 1951, General Ridgway, Eighth Army commander, issued a directive designed to convert his current reconnaissance operations into a deliberate counterattack. Since the enemy situation was still unclear, the action, codenamed Operation THUNDERBOLT, was designed to discover enemy dispositions and intentions with a show of force. The operation had the additional objective of dislodging any enemy forces south of the Han River, the major estuary running southeast from the Yellow Sea through Seoul and beyond. The projected attacks did not represent a full-scale offensive. Phase lines—lines drawn on maps with specific reporting and crossing instructions—would be used to control tightly the advance of the I and IX Corps. The units were to avoid becoming heavily engaged. To accomplish this, each corps would commit only a single U.S. division and ROK regiment. This use of terrain-based phase lines and of

limited advances with large forces in reserve was to become the standard procedure for UN offensive operations for the rest of the war.

The first, or western, phase of Operation THUNDERBOLT lasted from 25 to 31 January. The I and IX Corps moved up to twenty miles Corps sector, and on the twenty-ninth Ridgway converted THUNDERBOLT into a full-scale offensive with X Corps joining the offensive on its eastern flank. The I and IX Corps continued a steady, if slow, advance to the Han River against increasingly more vigorous enemy defenses.




Ambush at the Twin Tunnels (The Lost Patrol): Excerpt from: Billy Mossman, *Ebb and Flow*, November 1950-July 1951, (Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, 1990), 248.

When General Almond received General Ridgway's 30 January question on an X Corps-ROK III Corps operation similar to THUNDERBOLT, he was in the process of extending the X Corps' diversionary effort ordered earlier by Ridgway. Having achieved the Yoju-Wonju-Yongwol line against little opposition, Almond was planning a strong combat reconnaissance fifteen miles above this line. Searching that deep at corps center and right could apply pressure on the North Korean V and II Corps concentrated above Hoengsong and P'yongch'ang. At the same time, the 2d Division, due to move north along the corps left boundary as far as Chip'yong-ni, eight miles east of Yangp'yong, could protect the right flank of the IX Corps as the THUNDERBOLT operation continued.

In the recent course of protecting the IX Corps right, a joint motorized patrol from the 2d and 24th Divisions on 29 January had moved north out of the Yoju area on the east side of the Han to a pair of railroad tunnels and a connecting bridge standing east and west athwart a narrow valley four miles south of Chip'yong-ni. Chinese in the high ground overlooking the tunnels quickly cut the patrol's route of withdrawal, forced the group into hasty defenses on the nearest rises of ground, and opened a series of assaults. The Chinese finally backed away after air strikes were called in by the pilot of an observation plane who spotted the ambush and after a motorized company of infantry reinforced the group about 0330 on the 30th. The waylaid patrol had suffered 13 dead, 30 wounded, and five missing out of a total strength of sixty.



5B
The Battle of the Twin Tunnels
31 January – 1 February 1951



The Battle of the Twin Tunnels: Excerpt from: Billy Mossman, *Ebb and Flow*, November 1950-July 1951, (Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, 1990), 248 – 249.

At the discovery of Chinese at the twin tunnels General Almond ordered the 2d Division to identify and destroy all enemy units in that area. The 23d Infantry received the assignment. On 31 January Colonel Freeman sent his 3d Battalion and the attached French battalion to the tunnels after placing the 37th Field Artillery Battalion within a thousand yards of the tunnel area in direct support. [The 1st Battalion held key positions along the road from the artillery position to the rear to keep open the LOC. The Regiment's 2d Battalion served as the 2d Division reserve.]

The infantry battalions reached and established a perimeter around the tunnel complex without sighting enemy forces. But from farther north Colonel Freeman's forces themselves were

observed by the 125th Division, 42d Army. That night communist forces skirmished with the French on Hill 453 and U.S. forces near Sinchon.. At dawn on 1 February, the 375th and 374th Regiments attacked from the north and northeast, respectively, and after daylight the 373d Regiment assaulted the perimeter from the northwest and southwest. In hard, close-in fighting lasting all day, the defending battalions, relying heavily on artillery fire, barely held the line. In the afternoon, the Chinese renewed their attacks and seized high ground in the northeast and northwest and almost broke through the perimeter. A lucky break in the cloud cover allowed the air-support to intervene and avert the crisis.

Freeman's forces counted 1,300 enemy bodies outside their perimeter and estimated total enemy casualties at 3,600. Their own losses were 45 killed, 207 wounded, and 4 missing.

General Almond's Visit and General Stewart's Foray: Details from Kenneth Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible*, 105-125.

Brigadier General George Stewart, the 2d Infantry Division's assistant commander, accompanied the regiment. He was a 1923 West Point graduate and saw considerable combat in World War II. Stewart considered himself the "*eyes and ears*" of the division commander. He possibly saw himself as a buffer between the regiment and corps commander. General Almond frequently bypassed the division and issued orders directly to the regiments. Stewart considered Freeman "*one of the best fighting commanders you ever saw, but kind of temperamental.*" Freeman was not comfortable with the mission and stated, "*They're going to murder my regiment.*"¹

Late on the afternoon of 31 January, General Almond visited the 23d Regiment's command post. He was surprised that the regiment had not yet made contact with the enemy, and was disappointed that Freeman had not continued north into Chipyeong-ni. General Stewart explained that Freeman was operating IAW the division's orders to clear the twin tunnels area and move with caution. He also explained that due to the lateness of the day the regiment needed to occupy a tight defensive perimeter for the night. Nonetheless, General Almond ordered Stewart to "*put Chipyeong-ni under fire.*" After Almond left the area, Stewart commandeered a tank and moved toward Chipyeong-ni. At Chipyeong-ni, he saw no sight of the enemy, but still fired a burst of machine gun fire over the village. He returned to the regimental perimeter and reported through division to the corps that the regiment had "*taken the village under fire.*"

Freeman voiced his anger at Stewart for Almond's questionable order and for broadcasting the regiment's exposed position to the CCF with machinegun fire. One of his company commanders remembers Freeman saying: "*I don't mind the corps commander being around and there's no problem with him telling me what to do. He should as a courtesy go through the division commander, but that's between those two. What I can't accept is his telling me how to do it, especially if I think his way is dangerous to my command and mission. If Almond wants to be a regimental commander, damn it, let him take a reduction to brigadier colonel and come down and be one.*" Stewart admitted the order was "*ridiculous,*" and his action was "*unwise.*"

Nonetheless, he probably protected Freeman from Almond's wrath and known penchant for relieving officers who did not precisely carry out his orders.




6A

Operation Roundup

29 January - 5 February 1951

- Operation Thunderbolt (I and IX Corps).
- 29 Jan: Transitions to 8th Army Offense.
- X Corps Plan
 - US X Corps to Hoengsong and Chipyeong-ni.
 - ROK III Corps pass-through and onto Hongch' on.
- 2 Feb: X Corps liberated Hoengsong.
- 3 Feb: 23d RCT moved toward Chipyeong-ni.
- Status on 5 Feb:
 - East: I and IX Corps pushed to the Han River.
 - The 2d Infantry Division.
 - The 23d Infantry at Chipyeong-ni.*
 - The 38th Regiment at Hoengsong.
 - The 9th Regiment Wonju to Yaju.
 - The 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment in the center.
 - The 7th Infantry Division on the X Corps' right-flank (Pyongchang, forty miles east of Chipyeong-ni).
 - 5th and 8th ROK Divisions attacked north toward Hongchon against increased resistance.*
- Meanwhile, Chinese and North Korean forces started to mass in the central sector north of Hoengsong seeking the opportunity to counter-attack.



Operation Roundup: Excerpt from *CMH Pub 19-9, The Korean War – Restoring the Balance* (Center of Military History), 8- 9.

The I and IX Corps continued a steady, if slow, advance to the Han River against increasingly more vigorous enemy defenses. On 2 February armored elements of the X Corps reached Wonju, located in the central section fifty miles southeast of Seoul. Other elements of the X Corps recaptured Hoengsong, ten miles north of Wonju, the same day.

As part of the I Corps attack, the U.S. 25th Infantry Division advanced against stiff enemy resistance in high ground south of Seoul. On 9 February the enemy defense opposite I and IX Corps gave way. Soon UN units in the west were racing northward. The U.S. 25th Infantry Division retook Inch'on and Kimpo Airfield as elements of I Corps closed on the south bank of the Han opposite Seoul.


While the three U.S. corps advanced west and into the center, General Ridgway decided to expand the offensive to the east by committing additional elements of the X Corps and the ROK III Corps (under X Corps control) in an operation code-named ROUNDUP. ROUNDUP's object was the expansion of the offensive to the central sector of the front. The X Corps' ROK 5th and 8th Divisions were to retake Hongch' on, fifteen miles north of Hoengsong, and in the process

destroy the North Korean forces in that vicinity. U.S. forces supporting the movement included the 2d and 7th Infantry Divisions and the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (RCT). ROUNDUP would also protect the right flank of THUNDERBOLT. Farther east, the ROK III Corps, on X Corps' right flank and still under its control, would also advance north. The operation commenced on 5 February, with both the X and the ROK III Corps attacking steadily, but against increasing enemy resistance.



6C: Chip'yong-ni Bowl

- Twin Tunnels
- Road hub vic Chip'yong-ni
- Hill 397
- Hill 248
- Hill 229
- Hill 348
- Hill 506
- Hill 159
- Hill 319




Into Chip'yong-ni: Excerpt from Billy Mossman's, *Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951*, 249.

Judging from the sharp action at the twin tunnels, the Chinese were determined to retain control of Chip'yong-ni. They had good reason. The town was so situated that the force occupying it could control movements over Route 2 to the west, over Route 24 to the northeast, over Routes 24 and 24A below town, and thus through the Yangp'yong-Ch'ungju segment of the Han valley stretching to the southeast behind it. Eighth Army possession of Chip'yong-ni, furthermore, would pose a threat of envelopment to enemy forces opposing the I and IX Corps below the Han. For these same reasons General Almond planned to seize Chip'yong-ni and incorporated this plan in his overall recommendations for an operation styled after THUNDERBOLT.



7A: The Chipyong-ni Patrols 1 to 11 February 1951



Patrols at Chipyong-ni: Excerpt from Billy Mossman's, *Ebb and Flow*, November 1950-July 1951, 263.

The nearest of the 2d Division defenses around Chip'yong-ni stood twelve miles to the southwest. After securing Chip'yong-ni, the 23d Infantry had established a perimeter around the town, and Colonel Freeman had run patrols east, west, and north. Between 1 and 5 February, the patrol encounters with enemy forces were mostly minor. Then on 6 February, an Easy Company patrol had a stiff fight with the enemy on Hill 363 about 4 kilometers east of the village. On 7 February, Freeman sent the 2d Battalion to the same area to development the situation. That patrol also withdrew after getting into a fight with a large enemy force near Sanggongsong. Between 7 and 11 February one particularly strong position was discovered on Hill 444 some 11 kilometers east of Chip'yong-ni. Freeman sent a battalion east, and the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, came north from the Yoju area to reduce the enemy strongpoint. The latter battalion occupied the height on the 11th and thus held the 2d Division position closest to the ROK 8th Division.


The Battle of Hoengsong: Excerpt from *CMH Pub 19-9, The Korean War – Restoring the Balance* (Center of Military History), 8-10.


While UN forces in Operation THUNDERBOLT advanced to an area just south of the Han against only minor resistance, Chinese and North Korean forces were massing in the central sector north of Hoengsong seeking to renew their offensive south. On the night of 11–12

February the enemy struck with five Chinese *People's Liberation Army (PLA)* armies and two North Korean corps, totaling approximately 135,000 soldiers. The main effort was against X Corps' ROK divisions north of Hoengsong. The Chinese attack penetrated the ROK line and forced the South Koreans into a ragged withdrawal to the southeast via snow-covered passes in the rugged mountains. The ROK units, particularly the 8th Division, were badly battered in the process, creating large holes in the UN defenses. Accordingly, UN forces were soon in a general withdrawal to the south in the central section, giving up most of the terrain recently regained.



8B





The Battle of Chip'ong-ni

Ridgway's Decision to hold Chip'ong-ni: Excerpt from Billy Mossman's, *Ebb and Flow*, November 1950-July 1951, 283-285.

While arranging the deeper withdrawal of the South Koreans, Almond decided also that the 23d Regimental Combat Team should withdraw from its advanced position at Chip'ong-ni on the corps west flank to the Yoju area fifteen miles south. He could move Colonel Freeman's force that far back and still meet his continuing Operation THUNDERBOLT responsibilities of maintaining contact with the IX Corps at Yoju, preventing enemy movements south of the Yoju-Wonju line, and making north. diversionary efforts to the north.

Almond's decision to pull the 23d Regimental Combat Team back to the Yoju stemmed from General Ruffner's insufficient strength to man all of the 2d Division's twenty-mile front between Wonju and Chip'ong-ni. There was, as a result, a twelve-mile gap between the 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry, the westernmost unit defending Wonju, and the 23d. This gap left Freeman's force isolated and in danger of encirclement. The 2d Division reconnaissance company, sent out earlier to patrol Route 24, the combat team's main supply route, was some six miles south of Chip'ong-ni blocking a pass two miles out on a lateral road branching eastward from Route 24 at the village of Chuam-ni. But although the company thus stood at the midpoint of the gap, it could scarcely be counted on to prevent a strong enemy force from moving behind and trapping the combat team.

Indications that the Chinese would exploit the gap already had appeared, the first on 12 February when the 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry, then holding Hill 444 four miles east of Chip'yong-ni, received an attack by two Chinese battalions and withdrew to its present position northwest of Wonju. Air observers noted other Chinese movements toward the gap during the morning of the 13th, some toward the 2d Division reconnaissance company east of Chuam-ni. At General Ruffner's direction, Company L of the 9th Infantry reinforced the reconnaissance company around noon, arriving just ahead of an attack from the northeast. When the Chinese pulled away late in the afternoon and moved north in an apparent attempt to encircle the blocking force, Ruffner ordered the two companies west into a new blocking position on Route 24 at Chuam-ni.

The Chinese, now at least within two miles of Route 24, probably would cut the 23d Regimental Combat Team's main supply route. An alternative arterial road, Route 24A, lay nearer the Han, its lower segment resting in the IX Corps sector. But on the 12th Chinese had skirted the Chip'yong-ni position on the west and driven off a 24th Division outpost on the alternate route at Koksuri, four miles south of Chip'yong-ni. Route 24A was now likely blocked.

General Almond's decision to withdraw the 23d Regimental Combat Team, however, was about to be reversed. At noon on the 13th General MacArthur landed at Suwon airfield for his second visit to Korea since General Ridgway had assumed command of the Eighth Army. Ridgway took the opportunity to check once more with him the fundamental basis of his operations, namely that the acquisition of terrain meant nothing except as it facilitated the destruction of enemy forces and the conservation of his own. MacArthur agreed-but added that Ridgway should hold strongly to the line of the Han River.


Holding at the Han was part of MacArthur's latest report to Washington, submitted on 11 February, evaluating what could be achieved in Korea based on the policy of confining the fighting to Korea and on the general belief-with which he now agreed-that UNC forces could withstand all enemy attempts to drive them off the peninsula. "It can be accepted as a basic fact," he reported, "that, unless authority is given to strike enemy bases in Manchuria, our ground forces as presently constituted cannot with safety attempt major operations in North Korea." His long range plan, therefore, was to continue a ground advance until his forces developed the enemy's main line of resistance or determined that no such line existed south of the 38th parallel. Should the latter prove the case, he would request instructions from Washington.

While he now believed that the Chinese could not achieve a decisive victory, he judged that as long as "Manchuria is immune to our attack," they had enough offensive power to force UNC withdrawals. Consequently, his immediate plan was to hold the line of the Han up to the point of a major and decisive engagement. "It is impossible to predict where, once we withdraw from this line, the situation will again stabilize," he reported, "but stabilization will be certain. The capability of the enemy is inversely and geometrically proportionate to his distance from the Yalu."

Ridgway assured MacArthur that. He fully intended to keep the I and IX Corps at the Han. Working against Ridgway's intention was an increased likelihood that the Chinese now in and

west of Hoengsong would attempt to enter the Han valley and envelop his western forces. A 23d Regimental Combat Team withdrawal from Chip'yong-ni would remove a principle strongpoint blocking Chinese access to the valley. Ridgway therefore wanted Chip'yong-ni held, and so instructed General Almond. Next, in countermove against a possible Chinese sweep through the gap between Chip'yong-ni and Wonju, Ridgway reached for two IX Corps units not engaged at the enemy bridgehead below the Han. He ordered General Moore to move the ROK 6th Division and the British 27th Brigade to Yoju, where they were to pass to X Corps control and be deployed in the gap.”

Chip'yong-ni in the meantime was likely to become an isolated post under siege. Route 24A appeared to be blocked at Koksu-ri and Route 24 about to be cut at Chuam-ni, and 23d Regimental Combat Team patrols ranging up to three miles beyond Chip'yong-ni through the day reported enemy forces approaching from the north, east, and west. Should Colonel Freeman's force be cut off, Ridgway directed, Almond was to attack north to relieve it.



Chipyon-ni, 13 – 14 February: Excerpt from Billy Mossman's, *Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951*, 285-285.

Chip'yong-ni straddles a stream in the lower end of a small valley hugged on the northeast by a low mountain mass, Pongmi-san, and by the foothills of Mangmi-san, a higher ridge to the south. From a mile out, the peak of Mangmi-san, Hill 397, dominates Chip'yong-ni from the south. Elsewhere, from one to two miles out, Hill 248 dominates from the southwest, 345 from the northwest, 348 from the north, 506 from the northeast, and 319 from the southeast. Colonel

Freeman considered the terrain well suited for defense by a force the size of the 23d Regimental Combat Team, which was made up of the 23d Infantry; French battalion; 1st Ranger Company; 37th Field Artillery Battalion; Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion; Battery B, 82d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion; and Company B, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion. He developed a perimeter based on the Pongmi mass and Mangmi foothills and otherwise tracing lower hills inside the dominating heights. So locating his main position facilitated the organization of defensive fires, construction of obstacles, and resupply. Furthermore, Chinese occupying the distant higher ground around the position would not be able to deliver effective small arms fire on the perimeter but would themselves be vulnerable to the combat team's supporting fires.

Freeman deployed the bulk of the 1st Battalion on the northern arc of the perimeter, the 3d on the east, the 2d on the south, and the French battalion on the west. Company B and the Ranger Company were in reserve close behind the 1st Battalion line. Gaps in the perimeter were mined, blocked by barbed wire, or covered by fire. Twin 40s, quad 50s and regimental tanks were in position to add their direct fire to the defense, prearranged artillery and mortar concentrations ringed the perimeter to the maximum range of the weapons, and a tactical air control party was present to direct air strikes.


All day on the 13th Freeman kept enemy formations approaching his position under artillery fire and air attacks. Against the probability that the Chinese would attack after dark and the possibility that they would penetrate his position, he meanwhile marked out a second ring of defenses inside his perimeter to be manned at nightfall by Company B of the 2d Engineers and by battalion and regimental headquarters troops. Since his main supply route appeared about to be cut, he requested that a resupply of food, ammunition, and signal and medical items be airdropped on the 14th.

Distance signal flares went up around Chip'yong-ni late in the afternoon and in the evening. After dark, men of the 1st Battalion on the north sighted a line of torches about two miles out and watched the bearers maintain their line despite artillery and mortar fire as they brought the torches south within a half mile of the perimeter. Just after 2200 machine gun and mortar fire struck Company C astride Route 24 in the valley and on the western nose of Pongmisan. Enemy artillery fire joined the bombardment, striking Freeman's heavy mortars, artillery, and regimental command post as well as the outer perimeter. A cacophony of whistle, horn, and bugle blasts preceded an attack on Company C about 2330. The discordant signals later sounded all around the perimeter and were followed by attacks on Company G in the south, at two points in the French sector on the west, and near the center of the 3d Battalion position on the east.

Freeman's tight perimeter prevented the Chinese from fixing a position and flowing around its flanks. Pushing frontal assaults against the wire and through heavy defensive fires, they managed one penetration in the Company G sector but were blunted by reinforcements from Company F and help from the regimental tank company. Following a strong but failing effort against the 3d Battalion at 0630 and another against the French an hour later, the Chinese withdrew into the dominating heights around Chip'yong-ni.

By daybreak on the 14th Colonel Freeman's casualties numbered about a hundred. Freeman himself had suffered a leg wound from a mortar fragment. General Almond had X Corps G-3 Col. John H. Chiles flown into Chip'yong-ni during the morning to take command, but Freeman, though he required hospitalization, refused immediate evacuation and remained in command.

High winds and enemy mortar and artillery fire striking the perimeter intermittently through the day inhibited and finally stopped the helicopter evacuation of other casualties. The poor flying weather also delayed close air support. Three flights of fighters eventually arrived after 1430 and in combination with the combat team's mortars and artillery kept Chinese troops digging in on the surrounding high ground under fire. Over a three-hour period starting around 1500, two dozen C-119s of the Far East Air Forces' Combat Cargo Command flying out of Japan dropped the supplies requested by Freeman the day before. The Chinese meanwhile opened no daylight assaults, but captives taken the previous night claimed the attack would be renewed after dark. Four regiments appeared to have sent assault forces against the perimeter during the initial attack. Since these regiments represented four different divisions, the 115th, 119th, 120th, and 126th, and, in turn, three different armies, the 39th, 40th, and 42d, the renewal predicted by the prisoners might be considerably stronger than the first attack.



Chip'yong-ni, 14-15 February: Excerpt from Billy Mossman's, *Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951*, 285-285.

The XIII Army Group commander clearly had chosen not to push southwest in strength through the gap but to concentrate on eliminating the Chip'yong-ni position. His forces around the 23d Regimental Combat Team reopened their attack with mortar fire after dark on the 14th. Near midnight both mortars and artillery began an hour-long barrage on the regimental command post and other installations inside the perimeter, and a hard assault off Hill 397 to the south struck Company G. Assaults next hit Companies A and C on the north, then Companies I and K on the east. Sharp, close fighting in the 1st and 3d Battalion sectors abated around 0400 with no more than the temporary loss of one position by Company I and ceased altogether about daylight. But in the south, where the Chinese had decided to make their main effort, persistent pressure slowly carried enemy troops through the Company G area.


Weak counterattacks by artillerymen from Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, whose 155-mm. howitzers were in position close behind Company G, and by a squad drawn from Company F on line to the east failed to restore the breaks in the Company G line. Around 0300 the company surrendered the rest of its position and withdrew to a rise just behind the 503d's howitzers. The artillerymen followed suit, as did tankers and antiaircraft gunners, and joined a continuing exchange of fire with Chinese holding the original Company G position. The defensive fire discouraged the Chinese from advancing on the artillery pieces, which rested in a hollow between the two firing lines.

Lt. Col. James W. Edwards, the 2d Battalion commander, organized a stronger counterattack, reinforcing Company G with a platoon of Company F, the total of his own reserve, and a platoon of Rangers obtained from regiment. Attacking around 0400, the composite force regained part of the lost ground but then was driven back and heavy casualties. By daylight Company G occupied positions on a low ridge a quarter-mile behind the former Company G position, as did members of Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion. The battery's guns remained near the center of the quarter-mile no-man's land. Immediately west of Company G, French troops, who had attempted unsuccessfully to assist the counterattack, also pulled back to refuse the French battalion's left flank.

Colonel Freeman, who remained at Chip'yong-ni and in command until finally evacuated at midmorning on the 15th, released Company B and the remainder of the Ranger company around 0800 for a stronger effort. This release committed all available troops save the company of engineers, although by that hour action elsewhere on the perimeter had ceased. At 1000, behind a mortar barrage and supported by fire from tanks and antiaircraft weapons, Company B tried to retake the Company G position alone but was kept off the crest by fire from Chinese on the southern slopes where the preliminary and supporting fires had chased them.

Air strikes requested by Colonel Edwards during the morning began somewhat tardily at noon. Edwards meanwhile ordered tanks accompanied by Rangers south on Route 24A beyond the attack objective so the tank gunners could fire east onto the southern slopes. After mines previously placed on the road were removed and several Chinese armed with rocket launchers killed or driven off, Edwards' tanks reached a point on the road from where they could hit the Chinese. About 1630, as the tank fire in combination with artillery fire and air strikes began to break up the Chinese position, Company B regained the rest of the objective. Almost at the same time, the head of a tank column came into view on Route 24A to the south. After a moment of

surprise, Edwards' men realized the tanks were part of the 5th Cavalry relief force which had started toward Chip'yong-ni the day before.



Task Force Crombez and the Relief of Chip'yong-ni: Excerpt from *CMH Pub 19-9, The Korean War – Restoring the Balance* (Center of Military History), 11-12 and

Maj. Gen. Bryant E. Moore, the commander of the IX Corps, initiated the primary effort to relieve Chip'yong-ni on 14 February. That day, the 5th Cavalry, detached from the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, was taken out of IX Corps reserve and assigned the relief mission. For the task, the three infantry battalions of the 5th Cavalry were reinforced with two field artillery battalions, two tank companies, and a company each of combat engineers and medics. Initially the relief force advanced rapidly, making half the twelve-mile distance to Chip'yong-ni from the main U.S. defensive line on the first day. Damaged bridges and roadblocks then slowed movement. On the morning of the fifteenth, two of the infantry battalions assaulted enemy positions on the high ground north of the secondary road leading to Chip'yong-ni. When the attack stalled against firm Chinese resistance, Col. Marcel Crombez, 5th Cavalry commander, organized a force of twenty-three tanks, with infantry and engineers riding on them, to cut through the final six miles to the 23d Infantry. The tank-infantry force advanced in the late afternoon, using mobility and firepower to run a gauntlet of enemy defenses. Poor coordination between the tanks and supporting artillery made progress slow. Nevertheless, in an hour and fifteen minutes the task force reached the encircled garrison and spent the night there. At daylight the tanks returned to the main body of the relief force unopposed and came back to

Chip'yong-ni spearheading a supply column. With the defenders resupplied and linked up with friendly forces, the siege could be considered over.

Casualties at Chipyong-ni: Excerpt from Billy Mossman's, *Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951*, 299-300.

Casualties inflicted on the Chinese by the 23d Regimental Combat Team, counted and estimated, totaled 4,946. Colonel Crombez judged that his task force inflicted over 500 more. The perimeter troops also captured 79 Chinese who at interrogation identified five divisions from the 39th, 40th, and 42d Armies as having taken part in the attacks. The attack force itself, however, appeared to have been no more than six regiments, one each from the 115th, 116th, 119th, and 120th Divisions and two from the 126th Division. These six had not attacked in concert, nor had any of them thrown a full strength assault against the perimeter. Almost all attacks had been made by company-size forces, some followed by a succession of attacks of the same size in the same or nearby places. This kind of successive small unit assault had permitted the Chinese to invest the Company G position on the southern arc of the perimeter.

Colonel Chiles, having been fairly resupplied with ammunition by airdrop, was anxious for the arrival of the ambulances. Casualties in the 23d Regimental Combat Team now totaled 52 killed, 259 wounded, and 42 missing. Chiles had been able to evacuate only a few of the wounded by helicopter after daybreak on the 16th before fog and snow grounded the aircraft.

Ridgway's Assessment: Excerpt from Billy Mossman's, *Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951*, 300.


As the battle of Chip'yong-ni climaxed, General Ridgway felt that the Eighth Army had reached a turning point, that it had substantially regained the confidence lost during the distressing withdrawals of December and early January. In his judgment, the successful defense of Chip'yong-ni by an isolated combat team without grievous losses against a force far superior in strength symbolized the revitalization. Task Force Crombez, in its relief role, epitomized the offensive spirit. Although being forced to place infantry aboard the tanks had proved costly, Ridgway judged Colonel Crombez' decision to advance with armor when his infantry moved too slowly to be one of the best local decisions of the war. With renewed spirit, as evidenced at Chip'yong-ni, Ridgway considered his forces quite capable of further offensive operations, which he immediately proceeded to design.

The Third Battle of Wonju

The Wonju Line:

While the 23d Infantry Regiment fought to hold Chip'yong-ni (13-15 February), the remainder of the 2d Division fought near Wonju. (About 25 miles southeast of Chip'yong-ni). Major General Almond ordered the 2d Division to hold Wonju at all costs. On 13 February, the remnants of Support Forces 7 and 21, and the 38th Infantry Regiment established new defensive positions above Wonju. General Ridgeway refused to allow the withdrawal of the 23rd RCT from Chipyong-ni, and ordered General Almond to attack if the 23rd was cut off. In turn, Almond

believed the main Chinese attack would be at Wonju. BG George Stewart, 2ID assistant division commander, was ordered to take command of all units in the Wonju area and organize the defense.



**10C: Third Battle of Wonju, 14 FEB 1951
0345 - 0655**

- 14 Feb 0345: The Chinese attack K/3-38 IN with “hundreds of Chinese”, and achieve a breakthrough
- I/3-38 IN’s OP on Hill 255 is forced to withdraw
- 14 Feb 0540: The Chinese are heard digging on Hill 342; artillery and mortars are fired against it.
- F/187 IN repositions into the gap between 3-38 IN and 187 IN RCT
- 14 Feb 0655: 3-38 IN is relieved by 2-38 IN

Wonju, 13-15 Feb 1951:

The Wonju Line sits on the high ground about 3.5 kilometers north of the city. The Dutch Battalion held the left, followed by 3-38 IN, and anchored on the right by two battalions from the 187th. 2-187 IN was maintained as the division reserve. 18th ROK Regiment held a blocking positions east of the highway, and ROK Rangers held blocking positions west of the Dutch Battalion. The defensive positions were established without disruption. However, consolidation and reorganization after the fight at Hoengsong was difficult.

On 14 February, the Chinese attacked. The main attack was against K/3-38 IN at 0345, and a breakthrough was reported after an attack by “hundreds of Chinese”. I/3-38 IN reported high enemy activity, but no contact except for its OP on Hill 255 (which was forced to withdraw.) At 0540 the defenders heard digging on Hill 342, which overlooked a gap between the 38th IN and 187th IN. Artillery and mortar fire was immediately placed on Hill 342. The 187th ordered F/187 into the gap to close up the line between both regiments. By 0655, 3-38 IN was so battered that 2ID ordered its relief in place by 2-38 IN and re-tasked it with a reserve mission. It took 3-38 almost 5 hours to reach its new position near Manjong-ni.

At 1414, the 38th IN was placed under the operational control of the 187th IN. Ironically, the Third Battle of Wonju is a 2d Infantry Division battle, but most of the fighting along the Wonju line was done by the Dutch Battalion and the attached 187th RCT.

The Dutch Battalion at Hill 325:

The Dutch Battalion's defended Hill 325. The Dutch line was almost a mile long, which stretched the two companies on Hill 325 very thin. Company B had its first visual contact with the Chinese at 0730. The haze allowed the enemy to approach within 25 yards before they were seen. Company B was repositioned 400 yards south, and suppressed the Chinese with mortar and artillery fire. By 1235, the Chinese held the north side of Hill 325. Company A and reinforcements from F/38 IN attempted to retake the top of hill. At 1747, Company A reported air strikes on the enemy positions, but ten minutes later the aircraft missed the Company's - identification panels and engaged the Dutch troops. In spite of their efforts, the Dutch could not hold Hill 325. They occupied defensive positions on nearby Hill 200, three-quarters of a mile to the south.

At 1900, A Company is ordered to make a second attempt on Hill 325. Its two small platoons are reinforced with a platoon from Company B, and a platoon from the weapons company. The adjacent F/38 IN is also strengthened with another platoon from 2-38 IN. The second attack starts on 15 Feb at 0235. Ineffective artillery support prevented the force from making an advance. The darkness also made it difficult to identify targets. At 0345, the Forward Observers are repositioned. The artillery support was effective this time, but the attackers were still only able to get no closer than 300 yards from the objective before being pinned down by machine gun fire. Despite their exhaustion, a third attempt was made at 0555 to take advantage of the daylight. White phosphorus (WP) and HE rounds were employed against Hill 325. The WP caused the Chinese to retreat. The Dutch shifted the fires to the reverse slope, and at 0705 a bayonet charge dislodged the remaining enemy. The Dutch consolidated and organized for a hasty defense of Hill 325, but the Chinese made no counterattack.

The 187th Regimental Combat Team (Airborne) at Hill 255:

When the main attack was made against 3-38 IN, 2-187 IN was ordered to relieve them and restore the front line positions. Company E was ordered to recapture Hill 255. At 0830, after receiving the orders, CPT Jack Shanahan of Company E started his attack. They first secured Hill 240 while 3-38 IN withdrew. At 1300, the Hill 240 position was organized and E Company brought Hill 255 under fire (about 600 yards away). Mortars, artillery, and napalm were employed to dislodge the Chinese. The unit planned a 1430 assault on the hill. In the assault, heavy Chinese fire slowed the two platoons making the attack. It took three attempts to seize Hill 255.

Company G assumed the positions on Hill 240, and Company E consolidated its defense on Hill 255. The battalion employed artillery fire and air strikes against the remaining enemy on the reverse slope of Hill 255. At 1800, Hill 255 was secured and the Chinese attempted to disengage. The battalion employed mortar and artillery fires against their disorganized retreat. Company E, 187th IN received the Presidential Unit Citation for its actions on Hill 255, as related by the 187th's Commander, BG Frank Bowen, Jr.: *In this attack on Hill 255, Company E pressed a*

relentless attack against an enemy who was numerically superior and had the advantage of prepared positions for defense. The unparalleled determination displayed by the company's repeated attacks on this objective in the face of such odds represents the most daring act performed in mass in this command. Bold, aggressive action coupled with great courage and a keen desire to close with the enemy and destroy him enabled Company E to rout this decisive number of the enemy, which was identified as elements of the 40th Chinese Division. Intelligence reports indicated that this Chinese division had the mission of seizing and holding Wonju at all costs. The unusually heavy casualties inflicted on the Chinese Communist Forces by Company E broke the back of their main effort to seize Wonju and dampened their enthusiasm for combat with our forces. (Bowers, William T., ed. 2015. *The Line : Combat in Korea, January-February 1951*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. Accessed April 25, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central)

The 9th IN relieves the 38th IN:

By 15 February, the defense of Hill 240 had exhausted 2-38 IN, and 2ID ordered the 9th IN to relieve it in place. 2-9 IN took over for 2-38 IN, and the 38th. By 16 February, the entire 38th IN was in reserve, consolidating and reorganizing for the third time since the Chinese began their offensive.

Though General Almond expected a Chinese strike south of the Hoengsong, and designated Wonju as the main effort of the defense, the Chinese made no concerted effort to seize the town after the 14th. At Wonju there was some skirmishes along the front on the 15th, but on the 16th contact lightened and faded out.

The Chinese and NK continued with infiltration against the South Korean divisions on the 17th and 18th but made no permanent gains. On the 18th, the ROK 5th Division was able to make minor advances. On the 18th, a battalion from the 31st Infantry patrolled 8.0 km ahead of ROK lines before encountering a KPA position. At first it appeared that the KPA had backed off to reorganize for new attacks; but it was later determined to be part of a general withdrawal.

Operations Killer:

With the enemy withdrawing, Ridgway immediately ordered an advance by the IX Corps, while the X Corps moved to destroy the Communist forces around Chech'on in the central sector. By the nineteenth the initiative had completely shifted back to the United Nations Command. The new offensive became formalized on 20 February as Operation KILLER. Ridgway hoped that the name would help encourage an offensive spirit in the Eighth Army. The IX, X, and ROK III Corps were directed north toward a line, named Arizona, running from Yangp'yong east to positions north of Hoengsong and along the eastwest portion of the Wonju-Kangnung highway, all about twelve to fifteen miles above the current front line. The operation was designed to enhance the damage to enemy forces and in practice proved methodical, often slowed by the spring thaw and heavy rains that swelled streams and turned roads into seas of mud. By 28 February all units had reached their KILLER objectives, in the process finally eliminating all enemy forces south of the Han River. Nevertheless, many enemy units escaped by withdrawing north under cover of inclement weather.

UNC Resumes the Offense and Stalemate on the 38th Parallel

UN Offense (20 Feb – 22 April 1951): Excerpt from *CMH Pub 19-10, The Korean War – Years of Stalemate* (Center of Military History), 3- 5. Additional information from *Chapter 8, The Korean War 1950-1953 from American Military History, Volume II* (U.S. Army Center of Military History), 241-253.

By mid-February the Chinese offensive had run out of steam, and on the UNC troops resumed the offensive to liberate Seoul. On 14 March 1951, I Corps recaptured Seoul, and by mid-April Ridgway's forces had reached 'Line Utah', just inside North Korea. After a dramatic disagreement over the issue of widening the scope of operations against China, President Truman replaced the legendary Gen. MacArthur with Gen. Ridgway, who in turn passed the US 8th Army Command to LTG. James Van Fleet.

Although the two principal parties to the conflict - the governments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea)—were more than willing to fight to the death, their chief patrons—the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States and the United Nations (UN) on the other—were not. Twelve months of bloody fighting had convinced Mao Tse-tung, Joseph V. Stalin, and Harry S. Truman that it was no longer in their respective national interests to try and win a total victory in Korea. The costs in terms of men and materiel were too great, as were the risks that the conflict might escalate into a wider, global conflagration. Consequently, they compelled their respective Korean allies to accept truce talks as the price for their continued military, economic, and diplomatic support.



Stand 11 UNC Resumes the Offense and Stalemate on the 38th Parallel (Feb 1951 – Mar 1953)

A. Feb – April 1951


- UNC transitions to the offense.
- 15 March: Liberation of Seoul.
- Mid June: UNC line 20 miles north of the 38th Parallel.

B. Communist Spring 1951 Offenses

- First Spring Offense
- Second Spring Offense
- Line Wyoming
- 23 June 51: Soviet Union Proposed a Cease Fire.

C. Stalemate (June 1951 - July 1953)

- Negotiations suspended - Give and take along the 38th Parallel (Heartbreak Ridge: Sept – Oct 1951).
- Negotiations resume (Oct 1951)
- Battle of the Outposts – “Meat Grinder Tactics”
- Armistice (27 July 1953)



For the soldiers at the front and the people back home, the commencement of negotiations raised hopes that the war would soon be over, but such was not to be. While desirous of peace, neither side was willing to sacrifice core principles or objectives to obtain it. The task of finding common ground was further complicated by the Communists’ philosophy of regarding negotiations as war by other means. This tactic significantly impeded the negotiations. And while the negotiators engaged in verbal combat around the conference table, the soldiers in the field continued to fight and die—for two more long and tortuous years.

Specific Readings / Annexes

Annex A: The 23d Infantry Regiment

Annex B: Colonel Paul LaMarch Freeman Jr., Commander 23d Infantry Regiment

Annex C: US Army Weapons at Chip' yong –ni

Annex D: The French Battalion and General de Corps d'Armee Ralph Monclar

Annex E: Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander US 8th Army

Annex F: Major General Edward M. (Ned) Almond. Commander X US Corps.

Annex G: The Chinese Communist Forces- CCF

Annex A: 2d Infantry Division and its Commanders.

- April 50 – December 50: Major General Laurence Keiser
- December 50 – January 51: Major General Robert McClure
- January 51 – August 51: Major General Clark Ruffner

In December 1950, Major General Laurence B. Keiser, the commanding general of the 2nd Infantry Division was relieved for the division's performance during the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River.

Major General Robert B. McClure Commander 2d Infantry Division.	Major General Clark L. Ruffner, Commander 2d Infantry Division.
<p>Major General Robert B. McClure (15 September 1896 to 15 September 1973) was a senior United States Army officer who served in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War.</p> <p>He was born in 1896. He entered the United States Naval Academy in 1916, but was unable to maintain the academic requirements necessary to remain in the academy. He then enlisted in the United States Army in 1917. At America's entry into the war, he was commissioned and 2d Lieutenant and served on the Western Front. During the First World War, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. In World War II, he served as a regimental commander during the Guadalcanal and New Georgia campaigns. He then commanded the "Americal" Division during the Bougainville Campaign.</p> <p>In the Korean War he replaced Laurence B. Keiser as commander of 2nd Infantry Division. Major General Almond (X Corps Commander) relieved him of his command after only a month due to the division's perceived poor performance during the First and Second Battles of Wonju. He retired from the army in 1954 and died in 1973 at the age of 77.</p>	<p>General Clark Louis Ruffner (12 September 1903 to 26 July 1982) was a senior officer in the United States Army who served in World War II as well as the Korean War. He was born 12 January 1903, in Buffalo, New York, and graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 1924. His early career was spent in various cavalry units. In World War II, he served as Assistant Chief of Staff and then Deputy Chief of Staff for VII Corps from 1942 to 43. From 1943 to 44, Ruffner was the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for the Hawaiian Department, and then became the Deputy Chief of Staff, Central Pacific Area. He then served as the Chief of Staff for the U.S. Army, Pacific until after the end of the war.</p> <p>At the beginning of the Korean War, Ruffner was Chief of Staff, X Corps. On 14 January 1951, he took command of the 2nd Infantry Division after the relief of Major General Robert McClure. Ruffer commanded the 2nd Infantry Division during the fighting at the Twin Tunnels, Chipyeong-ni, Hoengsong, and the Third Battle of Wonju. After his command of the 2nd Infantry Division, Ruffner spent the remainder of the war in Washington working in the office of the Defense Secretary on International Security Affairs Committee.</p>
<p>Biography</p> <p>Enlisted 1917</p>	<p>Biography</p> <p>Second Lieutenant 1924</p>

<p>Second Lieutenant 1917 (Infantry) First Lieutenant and Captain</p> <p>102nd Infantry Regiment, 26th Division - American Expeditionary Force. Wounded at during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive (October 1918) and awarded the Distinguished Service Cross</p> <p>Post World War I Captain, Major, and Lieutenant Colonel</p> <p>1927 to 1933, Tientsin, China with the 15th Infantry Regiment (fluent in Chinese)</p> <p>1938, U.S. Army War College</p> <p>G-4, 25th Infantry Division</p> <p>World War II Colonel, Brigadier General, and Major General.</p> <p>35th Infantry Regiment (Guadalcanal and New Georgia Campaigns, and the capture of Vella Lavella.</p> <p>Commander 84th Infantry Division.</p> <p>Commander 23rd "Americal" Infantry Division (Bougainville Campaign)</p> <p>November 1944, Chief of Staff of the United States forces in China.</p> <p>Field commander Chinese Combat Command</p> <p>Korean War</p> <p>Commanding General, 2nd Infantry Division. Relieved after little more than one month in command.</p> <p>Commanding General, 6th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California</p> <p>Retired 1954 (37 years of service)</p>	<p>Served with 11th Cavalry Regiment 1924-28 Served with Staff, Cavalry School 1928-29 Served with 2nd Cavalry Regiment 1929-</p> <p>First Lieutenant 1930 Served with 10th Cavalry Regiment -32 Served with 5th Cavalry Regiment 1932-33 Served with Civilian Construction Corps 1933 Plans & Training Officer, 5th Cavalry Regiment 1933-37</p> <p>Captain 1935 Assistant Professor (Military Sciences & Tactics), Norwich University 1937-40 Student, Command & General Staff School 1940-41</p> <p>Major 1941 Lieutenant Colonel 1941 Assistant Chief, Plans & Liaison Branch, Public Relations Office 1941</p> <p>Colonel 1942 Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 (Personnel) VII Corps 1942 Deputy Chief of Staff VII Corps 1942-43 Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department 1943 Deputy Chief of Staff, Central Pacific Area 1943-44</p> <p>Brigadier General 1944 Chief of Staff, US.Army-Pacific 1944-46</p> <p>Major General 1945 Member, Personnel Board, War Department 1946-47 Chief of Legislative Affairs 1947-50 Special Projects Officer to the Chief of Staff, Far East Command 1950 Chief of Staff, X Corps 1950-51</p> <p>Commanding General, 2nd Infantry Division 1951 Deputy to the Assistant Defense Secretary (International Security Affairs) 1951-52 Military Assistant to the Assistant Defense Secretary (International Security Affairs) 1952-54 Deputy Commanding General, U. S. Army-</p>
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
	Pacific 1954 Commanding General, U.S. Army-Pacific 1954 <u>Commanding General, 2d Armored Division</u> <u>1954-56</u> Chief, Military Assistance Group, Germany 1956-58 Lieutenant General 1958 Commanding General, 3rd US.Army 1958-60 General 1960 US. Representative to NATO Military Staff Committee 1960-62 Retired October 31, 1962
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The US Army division was the smallest unit that included all the essential arms and services, and could conduct substantial military operations with its own resources. The authorized strength (T/O&E 7N of 1948) was 18,804 officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers. **(958 officers / 49 warrant officers / 17,797 enlisted men).**

The division's Command and administrative elements were grouped into a headquarters and headquarters company. The primary combat power lay with its three infantry regiments (**2nd IN Div: 9th, 38th, and 23rd**). The division artillery had three artillery battalions with 105mm howitzers and one battalion with 155mm howitzers. The division artillery also contained one Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons (self-propelled) [AAA AW (SP) Battalion. Other combat elements included: a tank battalion with the M4A3E8 (also known as the Easy 8 Sherman Tank), combat engineer battalion, and a reconnaissance company. The support elements includes: a medical battalion, signal company, military police company, ordnance/maintenance company, and a replacement company. Most Korean War US Infantry Divisions also had a Ranger Company – the 2d division had the 1st ABN Ranger Infantry Company.



1C: The 2d Infantry Division



From <https://history.army.mil/documents/Korea/2id-KW-IP.htm>: The 2d Infantry Division, initially organized in France during World War I, was stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington, engaged in reservist and ROTC training, when, on 9 July 1950, it was alerted to prepare for movement overseas. The first elements sailed on 17 July, and on 29 July the division began landing at Pusan, South Korea. At the time Eighth Army was fighting desperately to maintain the small Pusan perimeter into which it had been forced by the North Korean offensive begun a month before. The division's regiments were thrown into the line as they arrived. With the landing of the last regiment on 20 August, the division, operating as a whole for the first time in Korea, was given responsibility for a 60-kilometer stretch of the Nakong River.

On the night of 31 August, the North Koreans launched an aggressive attack, crossing the Nakong at five points along the 2d Infantry Division's front. The 2d Division's counterattack finally pushed the enemy back across the Nakong by 17 September, and the next day elements of the division crossed the Nakong in pursuit. As the division broke out of the Pusan perimeter it drove forward, capturing Hyopch'on on 25 September and Koch'ang the next day. A rapid 73-mile advance resulted in the capture of Chonju on 28 September.

The 2d Division spent October 1950 conducting mopping-up operations and rear area security missions in southwestern Korea. In November, when it became clear that Chinese Communist forces had joined the fighting in North Korea, the 2d Infantry

Division was ordered to move north. Crossing the 38th Parallel and reaching the Ch'ongch'on River, the 2d Division entered the line and prepared for a planned Eighth Army offensive. On the night of 25 November a large-scale Chinese assault overwhelmed the division. In the ensuing battles one of the regimental command posts was overrun and the division was nearly enveloped, escaping complete destruction only by doggedly fighting through a series of roadblocks in its retreat to the south. Suffering from very heavy casualties and the loss of most of its equipment, the 2d Division was placed in reserve on 1 December.

In January 1951 the 2d Division went back into the line in the vicinity of Wonju. There, in mid-February, the division helped stop an attack by twelve Chinese divisions (Battles of Wonju and Chip'yong-ni). As Eighth Army went back on the offensive, the 2d Infantry Division recrossed the 38th Parallel in early April. In May the Chinese launched another major assault, one explicit objective of which was to destroy the 2d Infantry Division. The part played by the 2d Division in repulsing this attack earned it the Presidential Unit Citation. On 8 June the division moved into reserve in the vicinity of Hongch'on and began a period of intensive training.

With the momentum gained in the last counterattack, the UN line again moved northward. The beginning of armistice negotiations in July 1951 stopped the advance, but not along any well-defined, militarily defensible line. For much of the next two years the 2d Infantry Division, as the rest of Eighth Army, fought to secure various advantageous terrain features along the front line. The first of this series of actions came following the division's relief of the 1st Marine Division north of the Soyang River on 16 July 1951. On 26 July divisional elements captured Hill 1179, a key piece of terrain in the center of the X Corps area.

On 18 August the division began a series of battles for control of Hill 983 and two adjoining hills, which together would become known as "Bloody Ridge." Not until 5 September was the division able to retain the heights. On 13 September the 2d Division attacked another series of hills just north of Bloody Ridge. These hills were soon designated "Heartbreak Ridge." Very well dug in, the North Koreans on Heartbreak Ridge poured withering machine gun and small arms fire into the infantry columns attempting to scale the slopes. After two weeks in which repeated piecemeal assaults made little progress, attempts to take Heartbreak were called off on 27 September to allow the division to prepare for a more coordinated operation. On 5 October the 2d launched a new attack on Heartbreak Ridge, with all three infantry regiments operating in concert and supported by extensive artillery, armor, and Air Force fighter-bombers. Although it was still a hard-fought battle, by 13 October the 2d Division was in possession of Heartbreak Ridge. Casualties for the period 13

September to 15 October were heavy--3,700 for the division and its attached units--but enemy casualties were estimated at 25,000.

Following the capture of Heartbreak Ridge, the 7th Infantry Division relieved the 2d, which went into corps reserve near Kap'yong until mid-December. By 18 December the division was back at the front, having relieved the 25th Infantry Division near the so-called "Iron Triangle" formed by the towns of Kumhwa, Ch'orwon, and P'yonggang. There the division conducted aggressive patrolling, bunker-destruction operations, and heavy artillery bombardments through March 1952.

In mid-April the 38th Infantry was detached from the 2d Division and sent to the island prisoner of war camp of Koje-do for guard duty. On 26 April the division was again relieved by the 7th Division and placed in reserve near Kap'yong. During this period many of the division's subordinate units were detached and used for a variety of missions throughout Korea.

In July 1952 the 2d Division was again ordered to the front, this time in the I Corps sector where it relieved the 45th Infantry Division, occupying positions along the Yokkok River north of Chongjamal. During July divisional elements fought see-saw battles for control of the crest of "Old Baldy," an important strong point on the division left, which was finally secured on 31 July. During the period from August through December 1952 the division was regularly engaged in sharp patrol clashes. The division also expended much effort in strengthening its defensive positions and defending its outposts on Old Baldy and Porkchop and T-Bone Hills. The division spent January 1953 in corps reserve conducting training and security missions.

Reentering the front line at the end of January, the division was again engaged in aggressive patrolling and improving defensive positions until 9 April when it went back into reserve. From April to mid-July the division returned to an exhaustive schedule of training and security duties, participating in several large training exercises. Various divisional elements were also detached for front-line assignments. In mid-July 1953 the entire division returned to the front, relieving the 3d Infantry Division in the Ch'orwon-Kumhwa sector. Again engaged primarily in patrolling actions and countering enemy patrols, the division fought off an enemy attack on 17-19 July in hand-to-hand combat.


When the armistice became effective on 27 July 1953, the 2d Division began withdrawing to positions agreed to at the truce table. The division remained in Korea until late September 1954 when it returned to Fort Lewis.

Annex B: The 23d Infantry Regiment/Battalion/Company/Platoon. Details from Donald Boose, *US Army Forces in the Korean War 1950 -53.*

The three infantry regiments (9th, 38th, and 23rd) were the largest maneuver elements of the 2d Infantry Division. Each regiment consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, a service company, three infantry battalions, a tank company, a heavy mortar company, and a medical company. Below are the details for the 23rd Infantry Regiment.



4B: 23rd Infantry Regiment (1951)




(T/O&E 7-11IN, 1948)

The infantry battalions (1st, 2^d, and 3^d) were the largest maneuver element of each regiment. Commanded by a lieutenant colonel, the infantry battalion was composed of a headquarters and Headquarters Company, three rifle companies, and a heavy weapons company. It had a strength of 917 at the beginning of the war.



4C: Infantry Battalion (1951)



(T/O&E 7-15IN, 1948)

The rifle companies were the largest maneuver element of the Infantry Battalion. Each battalion contained 3 infantry companies: 1st BN: A, B, and C companies. 2d BN: E, F and G companies. 3d BN: I, K and L companies. (There was no J Company). A Captain normally commanded the company. The company consisted of a headquarters section, three rifle platoons, and a weapons platoon.

The three rifle platoon were the major combat power of the rifle company. Each platoon had a five-man headquarters consisting of a platoon leader (lieutenant), platoon sergeant (master sergeant), assistant platoon sergeant (sergeant first class), and two messengers (privates first class); three nine-man rifle squads; and a nine-man weapons squad.

Three rifle squads made up a rifle platoon. Each squad consisted of a squad leader (sergeant first class) and assistant squad leader (sergeant), both armed with a .30 -cal. M1 Garand rifles; an automatic rifleman (corporal) armed with a .30-cal. M1918A2 Browning Automatic rifle (BAR). The remainder of the squad consisted of; an assistant automatic rifleman (private first class) and five riflemen (three corporals and two privates first class). All armed with the M1 Garand rifle. One of the riflemen served as ammunition bearer for the BAR, and one carried an M7 grenade launcher. One man in the squad was sometimes designated by the squad leader to by squad sniper and was armed with the MIC sniper rifle.


The **platoon weapons squad** consisted of a squad leader (sergeant first class), a four-man team with one M20 3.5 in. Rocket/Bazooka launcher and another four-man team with an M1919A6 light machine gun. Each squad had one corporal and three privates.)

The **company weapons platoon** contained a headquarters, a mortar section with three 60mm mortars, and a recoilless rifle section with three 57mm recoilless rifles.

The **Regimental Combat Team (RCT)** was how the regiment normally maneuvered with the direct support artillery battalion and other elements, such as a combat engineer company and an antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battery attached to form a RCT for a particular mission. At Chip'yong-ni, the 23d Regimental Combat Team included: the French Battalion, a ranger company, a combat engineer company, an antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battery, additional medical assets, and a direct support artillery battalion (105mm) with an attached 155mm howitzer battery.



4D: 23rd Regimental Combat Team



*Approximate numbers of personnel and equipment.

Annex C: Colonel Paul LaMarch Freeman Jr., Commander 23d Infantry Regiment.

Only two days prior to its deployment, COL Paul L. Freeman, Jr. took command of the 23rd Infantry Regiment. The new commander did not have much time to evaluate the battle-readiness of his soldiers and equipment before deploying. Freeman, however, proved a wise choice for commander of the 23rd. He had spent most of his youth in East Asia and then, after graduating in the West Point class of 1929, served with the 15th Infantry Regiment at Tientsin [T-en-sin], China. While in China, he attended language school and became the assistant military attaché at Chungking [Chongchim]. During the Second World War, Freeman first served as the supply officer for General Joseph W. Stillwell, commander of the China-India-Burma Theater. He later participated in more covert operations that further put his language skills, regional expertise, and cultural knowledge to good use. Following the war, Freeman was stationed in Brazil, where he first met and worked with General Matthew Ridgway, his future commander in Korea.

Even though Freeman was only with his unit for a short amount of time prior to the deployment, the leadership attributes he exhibited would serve him well once the 23rd reached Korea in the summer of 1950. The Soldiers respected Freeman because he led from the front, sharing the same conditions and dangers as his men. Also known for his calm demeanor, even during combat, Freeman projected confidence when the situation was bleak—which was often the case in Korea.¹

Biography²

- Born on 29 June 1907 in the Philippines where his father, a US Army Colonel, was stationed.
- In 1929, he graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and was commissioned in the infantry.
- Assigned to the 15th Infantry in China (1929-1936).
 - Served as an observer in the Second Sino-Japanese War, and as a military attaché.
 - Learned to speak Chinese.
 - in Chongqing (Chungking), China
- Assigned to Fort Washington, Maryland and served as a company commander in the 12th Infantry Regiment
- Reassigned to Fort Benning for the Tank Course.
 - Company command again
 - Battalion Maintenance Officer with the 66th Infantry Regiment.
- WW II:
 - Assigned to China as Assistant Military Attaché at the American embassy.

¹ Army University Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Korean War Documentary Series, Twin Tunnels. Published 7 Jun 2019.

<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCX9G3c6jkROVZ0tXr4gvUKQ>

² Information from Dr. Spencer Tuckers, *The Encyclopedia of the Korean War*, 280 and Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_L._Freeman_Jr)

- 1942, assigned to the U.S. Military Mission to China
- 1942, Reassigned to the staff of the China India Burma Theater as an instructor to Chinese and Indian Armies.
- 1943, staff officer in Washington D.C
- 1944-1947, assigned to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil as Director of Arms Training for the Joint Brazil-United States Military Commission
- 1947, Army General Staff in Washington D.C. (Latin American Branch of the Plans and Operating Division)
- 1948 to 1950, assigned to the Joint Brazil-U.S. Military Commission.
- Korean War:
 - Commander 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division.
 - Participated in the defense of the Naktong River in the Pusan Perimeter.
 - Participated in the breakout in September and the push northward across the 38th Parallel.
 - Participated in the fighting in the Chongchon River valley north of Kunuri against the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA).
 - Participated in the rear-guard actions after the Chinese intervention.
 - Last regiment in the 2nd Division to withdraw from the northernmost positions.
 - Kunu-ri controversy: Unofficially accused of disobeying orders when he deviated from the division route. 9th and 38th regiments suffered heavy casualties running what was called the gauntlet. Freeman insisted he had permission from the assistant division commander. Nevertheless, his regiment suffered far fewer casualties.
 - Participated in the engagements at the Twin Tunnels and at Chipyeong-ni
 - Wounded and evacuated during the fighting at Chipyeong-ni.
 - Returned to the U.S. to recover from his wounds.
- 1952, National War College
- 1955, assumed command of the 2nd Infantry Division
- 1956, assumed of the 4th Infantry Division
- 1960, Deputy Commanding General for Reserve Forces (CONARC)
- 1962-1965, fourth star, and assigned as Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Europe/Commander, Central Army Group (CINCUSAREUR/COMCENTAG), serving in that capacity until 1965.
- 1965-1967, Commanding General, U.S. Continental Army Command (CG CONARC).
- 1975, Senior Army Member to the Weapons System Evaluation Group in Washington D.C.
- Death Date: 17 April 1988

Annex D: US Army Weapons (Primary source is: <https://www.nps.gov/spar/index.htm> (Springfield Arsenal) for both information and picture. Other sources noted below.



1. M1 “Garand,” U.S. Rifle caliber .30: The basic shoulder weapon of the UN Forces. It was the first gas-operated, semi-automatic service rifle adopted by the U.S Army.

First fielded: 1935 (iconic American shoulder arm of WW2)
Weight: 9.5 pounds.
Effective range: 300 yards.
Rate of Fire: 30 rounds per minute. (Fired an 8-round clip)



2. US Carbine Caliber .30: The M1 Carbine was developed as a “light rifle,” chambered for .30 pistol weight ammunition. Principal arm for officers and senior NCOs.

First fielded: 1941
Weight: 6 pounds.
Effective range: 200 yards.
Rate of Fire: 750 rounds per minute. (15 or 30 round detachable magazine) [Practicable rate of fire with 30 round magazine was far less]

3. Pistol, Caliber .45 M-1911 A-1: the Colt .45 Automatic (M1911A1), was the primary service pistol of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marines by World War II. B

First fielded: 1911
Weight: Slightly less than 2 pounds.
Effective range: 25 yards.
Rate of Fire: 70-85 rounds per minute. (7 round detachable magazine)



4. Browning Automatic Rifle, or BAR: The U.S. Army’s squad level light machinegun in WWII and Korea. (limited use in WWI) Fired the same cartridge as the M-1 Garand.

First fielded: 1918

Weight: 15.98 pounds.

Effective range: 1,500 yards.

Rate of Fire: 500-650 rounds per minute. (20 round detachable magazine) [Practicable rate of fire with 20 round magazine was far less]



5. US Machine Gun, Caliber .30, M-1919 A-4: The standard U.S. Army Light Machine Gun. In Korean War the standard was 1 per platoon. Fired the same cartridge as the M-1 Garand

First fielded: 1919

Weight: 31 pounds.

Effective range: 1,500 yards.

Rate of Fire: 400-600 rounds per minute. (Belt fed)



6. US Machine Gun, Caliber .30, M-1917 A-1 (Heavy/Medium Machine Gun): A heavy/water cooled version of the M1918 LMG. The Infantry Battalion Weapons Company had four of these guns. The mounted element of the patrol had three jeep-mounted 30. Cal machineguns and some of these may have been the M1917.

First fielded: 1917

Weight: 103 pounds.

Effective range: 1,500 yards.

Rate of Fire: 600 rounds per minute. (Belt fed)

7. 50 Caliber Air Cooled MG M2HB: A large-caliber machine gun that was usually mounted of vehicles or positioned in fixed positions. The mounted element of the patrol had 2 mounted M2s, but not present in the defense of the hill top.

First fielded: 1933

Weight: 83.78 pounds.

Effective range: 2,000 yards.

Rate of Fire: 400 to 600 rpm.



8. M20 3.5in Super Bazooka: A man portable rocket launchers, developed in WWI. The Super Bazooka replaced the WWI era 2.36 in Bazooka. A rifle platoon had one bazooka. In the Lost Patrol action the mounted element of the patrol had a Supper Bazooka and it may have been present on the hill top.

First fielded: 1950

Weight: 15 pounds (each shell was additional 8.5 pounds)

Effective range: 75 yards.

Rate of Fire: 575 rounds per minute. (Belt fed)

9. Recoilless Rifles: The 57mm, and 75mm recoilless rifles (RR) fire artillery or tank like shells along a flat trajectory – known as “Pocket Artillery.” The back-blast escapes from the rear of the weapon so that there is no recoil, as with howitzers or cannon. The 57mm RR could be shoulder fired. The 75mm RR was crew-served and mounted on a tripod. The RR’s were effective against infantry and fortifications such as bunkers.



Each infantry company had 3x 57mm M18 RRs. [Note: In the Lost Patrol action the mounted element of the patrol had a M18, but not present in the defense of the hill]

First fielded: Early 1945

Weight: 45 pounds. (Each shell was an additional 5.3 pounds)

Effective Range: 500 yards (area targets out to 4,340 yards).



Each infantry battalion had 4x 75mm M20 RRs in the battalion weapons company. [Note: In the Lost Patrol action the mounted element of the patrol had a M20, but not present in the defense of the hill]

First fielded: Late 1945

Weight: 103 pounds. (each shell was an additional 5.3 pounds)

Effective Range: 1000 yards (area targets out to 3.9 miles).

10. Infantry mortars: The 60mm, 81mm and 4.2in. Mortars were the infantry's organic artillery. They were primarily anti-personnel weapons. The mortar consisted of a sealed-breach tube with bipod and a base-plate. Mortars threw high explosive shells at high angles and were capable of reaching into trenches and other defilade positions that were impervious to direct fire weapons.

- a. M2 60mm mortars (3 each in a rifle company) [Note: In the Lost Patrol action the mounted element of the patrol had a 60mm mortar, but not present in the defense of the hill]
 - (1) **First fielded:** 1940
 - (2) **Weight:** 42 pounds (each shell is an additional 3 pounds)
 - (3) **Effective Range:** 1.1 miles
- b. M1 81 mm mortars (4 each in the battalion weapons company) [May have been with F Co. 1/23 Infantry in the Lost Patrol Action]
 - (1) **First fielded:** 1940
 - (2) **Weight:** 136 pounds (each shell is an additional 6 to 15 pounds)
 - (3) **Effective Range:** 1.9 miles
- c. M2 4.2in mortars (12 in the regimental heavy mortar company) [the 4.2in mortar is similar today's 120mm mortar]
 - (1) **First fielded:** 1928
 - (2) **Weight:** 333 pounds (each shell is an additional 24 to 28 pounds)
 - (3) **Effective Range:** 4.4 miles

Below are other significant U.S. weapons in the Korean War.

- **Not present during the Lost Patrol action.**
- **With the 23d Infantry at the Twin Tunnels and Chipyeong-ni.**

11. Artillery: During Korean operations, the standard US artillery of WWII was employed: the 105mm, the 155mm, and the 8-in howitzers and rifles. Normally Allied forces enjoyed a significant advantage in artillery.



18x 105mm howitzers in the 23rd RCT 37th Medium Artillery Battalion.

Maximum Range: 7 miles



6x in B Battery, 503d Heavy Artillery Battalion (attached to the 37th Artillery Battalion at Chipyont-ni).

Maximum Range: 9 miles

12. Flak Wagons: Normally anti-aircraft weapons. Employed in Korea as anti-personnel weapons.



M16 MGMC - Quad .50: A half-track mounting four 50 cal. HMGs. It was originally developed as an anti-aircraft weapon in WWII. In Korea, it was primarily used as an antipersonnel weapon. It was capable of hurling an immense amount of fire onto hillsides against infantry. US soldiers referred to them as a “vacuum cleaner” or “ridge sweeper” that was capable of sucking the ridge until it was devoid of life. **(8 in the 23rd RCT’s B Battery, 503 AAA AW (SP) Battalion).**

Maximum Range: 4.6 miles against an area target.



The M19 Multiple Gun Motor Carriage (MGMC) was originally developed as self-propelled anti-aircraft weapon on the M24 light tank chassis. It was equipped with two Bofors 40mm guns mounted in a revolving turret. **(4 in the 23rd RCT’s B Battery, 503 AAA AW (SP) Battalion).**

Maximum Range: 7.8 miles against an area target.

13. Armor. The US Army operated several different types of tanks in the Korean conflict. These included M-24 light tank (75mm gun), the M26 Pershing Heavy Tank (90mm gun), and the M46 Patton Medium Tank (90mm gun).



However, the most common US Army tank in the Korean conflict was the WWII era M4A3E8 medium tank (76mm gun), also known as the “Easy 8.” It had a high silhouette, light armor, and an inadequate gun, but it had an excellent power to weight ration and was more maneuverable in Korean terrain than more modern tanks. The 23d Infantry Regimental tank company

Annex E: The French Battalion and General de Corps d'Armee Ralph Monclar
(Information from Leadership in the Crucible and High Tide in the Korean War,64-79)

The French normally referred to it as the Bataillon de Coree, and the Americans called it the French Battalion. It was not an official battalion in the French Order of Battle, but instead a volunteer unit specifically formed to fight in Korea.

The battalion's organization was roughly the same number of men and types of equipment found in a separate U.S. Army infantry battalion (a battalion not part of a regiment). It was authorized somewhat larger numbers of men and a wider range of equipment and had a total of 1,017 men (the 23d Infantry Regiment's Infantry battalions had only 919 men).

The French Battalion had a headquarters company, three rifle companies, and a heavy weapons company. The rifle companies were numbered instead of the U.S. method of lettered companies. The French 1st Company was composed of French Marines. The 2d Company was made up of volunteer soldiers from the regular and reserve French Army. The 3d company was composed of paratroopers and legionnaires from the French Foreign Legion.

Each rifle company had three platoons, each with a light .30-caliber machine gun and three BARs, and a support platoon with two 60-mm mortars and two 57-mm recoilless rifles.

At both the Twin Tunnels and at Chip' yong-ni the battalion had a fourth rifle company composed of South Korean soldiers (the ROK Company). It was organized the same as the other companies.

The heavy weapons company had a machine-gun platoon with eight heavy (water-cooled) .30-caliber machine guns and an antitank platoon with four 75-mm recoilless rifles.

One of the French Battalions greatest assets was its commander – General de Corps d'Armee Ralph Monclar. Ralph Monclar was actually, a *nom de guerre* adopted by General Magrin-Vernery in World War II when he fought with the Free French. In 1950, Monclar was a lieutenant general in the French Army. Although eligible for retirement, he instead requested to lead the French contingent to Korea. To do so he accepted a temporary reduction in rank to Lieutenant Colonel. It was said that he wanted expunge the shame the French Army had suffered at the beginning of World War II.

Monclar had extensive combat experience. He served in World War I and was wounded seven times. In the Great War, he earned eleven citations for valor. In 1924, he served in Morocco with the French Foreign Legion. By 1928, he was a battalion commander in the Legion and continued in that role up to the beginning of WWII. Early in WWII, he commanded a French Brigade in ill-fated invasion of Narvik, Norway. Later in 1940, he joined the Free French forces. In December 1941, he promoted to brigadier general and commanded the Free French land forces in Great Britain. After the war, he was appointed the inspector of the French Foreign Legion and served for a time in French Indochina.

Captain William Guthrie, Dog Company commander in the 23d Infantry Regiment stated, "We all knew his background and felt that he was the titular head of the French contingent, but he provided a backdrop to the Battalion in courage, sacrifice and experience." Guthrie observed, "The French troops were sloppy by US standards, but there was an air of professionalism that stood out - we were glad to have them." Albert C. Metts, another company commander in the 23d, stated, "This brave French General reduced his own rank to Lieutenant Colonel so he could come to Korea and command the French battalion. The unit was comprised of brave men, volunteers who were real fighters." Douglas Graney, a soldier from the 23d's Easy Company remembered, "Saw enough of him that one had to admire his style... Whenever the French were going into the attack he would walk with the attacking column until the attack actually began. His men appeared to admire him as well . . . always cheering and waving whenever he was near them." To the men of the French Battalion he was fearless. Captain Francois DeCastries jokingly remarked to an American officer that it was difficult for Monclar to overcome hiccups, "it is impossible, as no one could ever frighten Colonel Monclar." (Barron, *High Tide in the Korean War*, 34-35)

Annex F: Lieutenant General Matthew Bunker Ridgway, Commander U.S. 8th Army:
Excerpt from CMH Pub 19-8, *The Korean War – The Chinese Intervention* (Center of Military History), 27-28.

“The job of the commander was to be up where the crisis of action was taking place. In time of battle, I wanted division commanders to be up with their forward battalion, and I wanted corps commanders up with the regiment that was in the hottest action. If they had paper work to do, they could do it at night. By day their place was up there where the shooting was going on. I held to the old-fashioned idea that it helped the spirits of the men to see the Old Man up there, in the snow and sleet and the mud, sharing the same cold, miserable existence they had to endure.” - Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway³

The man selected to replace General Walker as Eighth Army commander was Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. At the time Ridgway was serving on the Army staff in the Pentagon as deputy chief of staff for operations and administration. A famed airborne commander from World War II, Ridgway was knowledgeable about conditions in Korea and the Far East and had a strong and dynamic personality. He would need both for the task ahead. His success in turning Eighth Army’s morale around, using little more than a magnetic personality and bold leadership, is still a model for the Army, showing how the power of leadership can dramatically change a situation.

Ridgway landed in Tokyo on Christmas Day 1950 to discuss the situation with MacArthur. The latter assured the new commander of his full support to direct Eighth Army operations as he saw fit. Ridgway was encouraged to retire to successive defensive positions, as currently under way, and hold Seoul as long as he could, but not if it meant that Eighth Army would be isolated in an enclave around the city. In a foreshadowing of his aggressive nature, Ridgway asked specifically that if he found the combat situation “to my liking” whether MacArthur would have any objection to “my attacking”? MacArthur answered, “Eighth Army is yours, Matt. Do what you think best.”

General Ridgway knew that one of his first jobs was to restore the Eighth Army soldiers’ confidence in themselves. To accomplish this he had to be aggressive, despite the hard knocks of November and December, and find other leaders in Eighth Army who were not defeatist or defensive oriented. In practice he proved quick to reward commanders who shared his sentiments and just as quick to relieve those officers at any level who did not. During one of his first briefings in Korea at I Corps, Ridgway sat through an extensive discussion of various defensive plans and contingencies. At the end he asked the startled staff where their attack plans were. The corps G-3 (operations officer) responded that he had no such plans. Within days I Corps had a new operations officer. The message went out: Ridgway was interested in taking the offensive. To aid in this perception he also established a plan to rotate out those division commanders who had been in action for six difficult months and replace them with fresh leaders who would be more interested in attack and less in retreat. In addition, he sent out guidance to commanders at all levels to spend more time at the front lines and less in their command posts in the rear. The men had to see their commanders if they were to have confidence that they had not been forgotten. All these positive leadership steps would have a dramatic effect almost from the first. Eighth Army was in Korea to stay.

³ Kenneth Hamburger’s “Leadership in the Crucible.”

Ridgway, despite his aggressive intent, was also enough of a realist to know that the Chinese were still capable of launching major attacks. He also knew that his Eighth Army still needed time to refit and reorganize. Thus, he immediately began planning to strengthen the defensive lines around Seoul while bringing up X Corps as quickly as possible to strengthen the Wonju sector in the center of the line. Almond's X Corps was no longer independent, but would be just another corps of the Eighth Army, tied into a new defensive line that stretched unbroken from one side of the peninsula to the other.

Ridgway's Guidance for "Meat Grinder Tactics"⁴

- Units off their vehicles and on the hills.
- Troops to construct tight defensive perimeters for night fighting, while expanding the perimeters during daylight.
- Use the UNC advantage in airpower, artillery, tanks, and flak wagons to grind down the communist forces
 - a. Punish the Chinese by killing as many as possible –not concerned with fighting for real estate.
 - b. No more "bug outs." Units would stay in position and fight surrounded if need be, holding out until a relief force could get to them the next day.
 - c. At night, destroy the enemy with artillery and flak wagons, and using tanks to support the infantry, then call in air strikes during daylight hours.

⁴Kenneth Hamburger's "Leadership in the Crucible."

Annex G: Major General Edward M. (Ned) Almond. Commander X US Corps.
Information from Kenneth Hamburger's "Leadership in the Crucible." 89-90.

General Almond had a solid reputation as an aggressive commander. One of his contemporaries noted, "When it pays to be aggressive, Ned's aggressive, and when it pays to be cautious, Ned's aggressive, and he wouldn't step two paces to the rear for the devil himself." He had a good combat record in both World War I, and in World War II. During WWII he commanded the 92d Infantry Division one of only two black divisions committed to combat. However, the division accumulated a questionable combat record in Italy. Many blamed the division's sometimes poor performance on Almond's command style and racist attitudes. As a Corps commander, he maintained a conviction that the black soldier was less capable than the white soldier, and he even directed that a valor award for a black officer be withdrawn.

During the Korean War, Almond initially serve as MacArthur's Chief of Staff. MacArthur then appointed him to command the X Corps. Many historians criticize Almond for dispersing his forces during the pursuit to the Chinese border and his failure to heed local intelligence concerning the Chinese entrance into the war. Historians also believe that it was only Almond's close relationship with MacArthur that prevented LTG Walker from firing Almond after the Chinese intervention. As the X Corps commander he was known for issuing orders directly to regiments and sometimes directly to battalions. His impulsiveness sometimes resulted in unfortunate outcomes because division commanders had no opportunity to coordinate the unit's maneuvers. Nevertheless, he rarely admitted to bad judgment or assumed responsibility for the unfortunate outcomes. Instead, he blamed the subordinate commander for their failure to properly execute his orders. Many veterans believed him to be a martinet who commanded by instilling fear. He was well-known for relieving subordinate commanders and placing his favorites in command positions.

He was a stickler for detail, and sometimes that attention resulted in very favorable outcomes. The best example was, he required the chain of command to submit daily reports that confirmed that the soldiers had changed their socks. The reports were initiated at squad level and then passed up the chain of command to General Almond. The command emphasis dramatically reduced the cases of frostbite in the X Corps.

He maintained and immaculate headquarters, and troops from the field were not welcome there in their dirty vehicles and ragged uniforms. Sergeant Frank Butler remembered visiting the headquarters.

The First Sergeant put me in charge of a quartering party to go to X Corps Headquarters... We went there in our old, battered, dirty jeeps. We, too, were battered and dirty. Corps Headquarters, far to the rear, was spick-and-span. Tents all aligned in rows, paths and driveways marked with whitewashed rocks, everyone in clean uniforms. Upon our arrival, a Lieutenant rushed out of one of the tents and told us to "get those dirty jeeps out of sight." That did not sit too well with us, but we did as we were told and went about our quartering party business.

Annex H: The Chinese Communist Forces- CCF

Organization of the CCF (details from Nigel Thomas' "The Korean War" pages 33-35.

In 1950 the Chinese People's Liberation Army ground forces were referred to as the CCF (Chinese Communist Forces). There were between two and three million troops in four Field Armies (numbered 1st-4th).

A Field Army was 130,000-160,000 strong and normally contained three group armies. It was equivalent to a weak US or British Army.

A Group Army was 30,000-80,000 strong and normally contained two to six armies. It was equivalent to a Western 'corps.

The Army was 21,000-30,000 strong and normally contained three or four divisions. It was about the size of a US or British Division. It was a self-sufficient tactical formation with anti-aircraft, artillery, communications, engineer, reconnaissance, special duty, training and transportation troops.

A division was 7,000 – 10,000 strong with three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and engineer, transport, medical and signals companies. It was equivalent to a US 'light division.

A regiment was in theory about 3,242 men with three infantry battalions (each with three rifle companies, an artillery battery, and guard, mortar, transport, signals, medical and stretcher companies. In the field the rifle regiments were usually significantly understrength.

The Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) (Details from Kenneth Hamburger's "Leadership in the Crucible," pages 47-49)

1. General:

- a. Possibly some of the finest light infantry in modern history.
- b. Leaders at all levels with the CCF had extensive combat experience.
 - i. Fighting for independence continuously in China since 1927.
 - ii. Against the Japanese in WWII.
- c. The CCF adhered to a sophisticated doctrine of mobile guerrilla warfare. Relied upon:
 - i. Hide during the day and attack between midnight and 0300 –this somewhat negated the UNF superiority in artillery and air.
 - ii. Thorough reconnaissance and superb infiltration tactics.
 - iii. Concentrate forces at a decisive point.
 - iv. Surprise night attack.
 - v. Withdraw quickly after victory – to avoid UNF airpower.

2. Equipment and Uniform:

- a. The CCF carried a variety of WWII era light infantry weapons.

- b. Limited artillery and no air-support.
- c. The winter uniform was simple, but very effective. It consisted of a heavy quilted uniform, a padded cap with earflaps, and sandals over layered socks.
- d. The soldiers carried their limited rations and ammunition in a cloth tube carried diagonally across the chest.
 - i. One hundred bullets, and three grenades.
 - ii. Two to ten days of food.

3. Tactics and Procedures:

- a. The average CCF was a peasant in his late teens or early twenties.
 - i. The peasant stock was normally robust and hardy, but lacked technical sophistication.
 - ii. Communist ideology instilled discipline and enthusiasm.
 - iii. Very mobile - daily marches of ten miles over mountainous terrain were the norm.
- b. UNF soldiers noted that the CCF enthusiasm also had a touch of fanaticism.
 - i. The CCF soldiers apparent indifference toward death unsettled the UNF soldiers.
 - ii. Attacks bordered on the fanatical and at times the men in the first wave attacked without weapons.
- c. The CCF organization relied heavily upon the squad.
 - i. Each squad composed of three teams of three men each, plus a squad leader.
 - ii. Because the squad lived, ate, worked, trained, and fought together they usually became an extremely efficient organization.
 - iii. The individual soldiers looked after one another and checked any tendency a squad member might have to deviate from expected behavior.
- d. The CCF predominant tactic.
 - i. Attack in overwhelming numbers.
 - ii. Look for and exploit any hole in the UNF's defensive line.
 - iii. Pour through the hole to envelope the defensive line and cut supply routes to the rear – this normally resulted in the UNF “**bugging out**” and withdrawing.”

4. Communications:

- a. Very limited communication abilities. Normally consisted of noisemakers and light signals-bugles, whistles, shouts, and torches.
- b. Few to no radios and telephones were available only at battalion level.

5. Logistics:

- a. Supplies were normally man-packed.
- b. Resupply columns consisted of coolies bearing loads of seventy to one hundred pounds on A-frame pack- boards.
 - i. A unit's resources allowed it to conduct one or two short attacks without needing resupply.

- ii. Chinese soldier required less than ten pounds of supplies per day (American soldier needed sixty)
- iii. A CCF division required forty tons of supplies per day (US Division needed six hundred tons)

6. Summary:

- a. Historian Kenneth Hamburger stated: “They were serious adversaries, practicing a war of hate, among other motivations. In short, the Chinese infantry were very light, very robust, very aggressive, and very mobile.”
- b. The CCF soldiers respected American weapons. After their first encounter with American forces, one wrote: *"The coordinated action of mortars and tanks is an important factor. . . . Their firing instruments are highly powerful. . . . Their artillery is very active. . . . Aircraft strafing and bombing of our transportation have become a great hazard to us . . . their transportation system is great. . . . Their infantry rate of fire is great and the long range of fire is still greater."*
- c. They had less respect for the fighting skill of the American soldier, for when cut off from the rear: *"American soldiers abandon all their heavy weapons, leaving them all over the place, and play opossum. . . . Their infantrymen are so weak, afraid to die, and haven't the courage to attack or defend. They depend on their planes, tanks, and artillery. At the same time, they are afraid of our fire power. They will cringe when, if on the advance, they hear firing. They are afraid to advance father. . . . They specialize in day fighting. They are not familiar with night fighting or hand-to-hand combat. . . . If defeated, they have no orderly formation. Without the use of their mortars, they become completely lost . . . they become dazed and completely demoralized At Unsan they were surrounded for several days yet they did nothing. They are afraid when the rear is cut off. When transportation comes to a standstill, the infantry loses the will to fight."*

CCF Weapons: The Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) relied primarily upon WWII era weapons. Most of their weapons and ammunition were provide by the Russians. Even though the equipment was WWII vintage it was generally extremely rugged, and very easy to maintain. Therefore it was very suitable for the equipping of peasant armies of the CCF.

CCF Weapons used in the combat action with the Lost Patrol (Primary source is: <https://www.nps.gov/spar/index.htm> (Springfield Arsenal) for both information and picture. Additional sources from the internet also used)



Infantry rifles: Communist forces were equipped with a miscellany of shoulder weapons. Two of the most prominent were the Russian 7.62mm carbine and the Japanese 7.7mm Imperial Army Rifle (both WWII era weapons).

In time, the CCF discarded the rifle in favor of the submachine gun. It was less accurate and had less killing power. However, it gave the peasant soldiers the ability to deliver a much higher volume of fire.



The Shpagin PPSH41 submachine gun (burp gun) was the most common submachine gun:

First fielded: 1941

Weight: 8 pounds without the magazine.

Effective range: 140 yards.

Rate of Fire: Up to 1000 rpm(35-round box

magazine or 71-round drum)



The CCF fielded many Japanese and Russian Light Machineguns. One such LMG was the Degtyaryov Light Machine Gun (7.62mm).

First fielded: 1928

Weight: 25 pounds with the magazine.

Effective range: 879 yards.

Rate of Fire: 550 rpm (30 round overhead round-box magazine)



Chinese hand grenades were significantly different in physical appearance to US grenades. The stick fragmentation grenade was less powerful, and their stick concussion grenade more powerful. In the attack, the CCF ordinarily employed one platoon armed only with grenades to lead the attack.



Machine Guns: Several varieties of medium and heavy machine guns were used by the CCF. One of the most common was the wheel-mounted PM M1910 heavy machine gun (7.62mm).

First fielded: 1910

Weight: 140 pounds.

Effective range: 1500 yards.

Rate of Fire: 600 rpm (belt fed)

Mortars: The CCF used a variety of mortars – mostly of Russian. Because of its ease of transport, the mortar was the most common form of indirect fire-support.

- Communist regiments had six 120mm mortars.
- Each infantry battalion had had nine 82mms or sometimes the more portable 61mms.
- Communist mortars could use US 81mm and 60mm ammunition. US 81mm and 60mm mortars could not use the communist ammunition.
- The CCF forces in the combat action against the Lost Patrol did employ mortars –the size and numbers present are not known. This indicates that at least a BN (-) was employed against the Lost Patrol.

Artillery. Theoretically artillery support for a CCF Division closely followed that of WWII Soviet Division. A division contained twelve 122mm howitzers, twenty-four 76mm field guns, twelve 76mm SU-76 self-propelled guns, and twelve 45mm anti-tank guns. In addition, each of a division's three regiments was issued four 76mm howitzers. However, at Chipyong-ni the CCF divisions probably operated with far less artillery than they were authorized. In the action against the Lost Patrol there is no indication that the CCF employed artillery. The CCF had a marked reluctance to fire interdiction missions on targets they could not observe.




122mm howitzer M1938 (M-30)

Maximum Range: 7.3 miles



76-mm divisional gun M1942 (ZiS-3)

Maximum Range: 8.2 miles



76mm regimental gun M1927

Maximum Range: 2.6 miles

¹ Hamburger, ?