


# **STAFF RIDE WALKBOOK**

## **The Battle of Chipyong-ni (Korea, 1951)**



**Combat Studies Institute**  
**The Army University Press**  
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**February 2020**



## **Chipyong-ni Staff Ride**

**Stand 1: Overview of the Korean War (June 1950 to Jan 1951)**

**Stand 2: Operation Thunderbolt and the Lost Patrol**

**Stand 3: The Battle of the Twin Tunnels**

**Stand 4: Into Chipyong-ni**

**Stand 5: Patrol Actions at Chipyong-ni**

**Stand 6: Isolated and Encircled (13 & 14 Feb)**

**Stand 7: Isolated and Encircled on the Second Night (14 & 15 Feb)**

**Stand 8: The Second Day of Siege (15 Feb)**

**Stand 9: UNC Resumes the Offense and Stalemate on the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel**

**Yellow highlighted text refers to terrain movements on the virtual terrain.**

**Blue highlights refer to visual aids to be displayed from the PowerPoint visual aids package.**

**Page not used**

**STAND 1**  
**Overview of the Korean War**  
**June 1950 – January 1951**

**VISUALS**

Visual
Visual 1A : Korea
Visual 1B: Phase I, June to September 1950
Visual 1C: Phase II, September to November 1950
Visual 1D: Phase III, November 1950 to January 1951

**ORIENTATION**

**Virtual View: No virtual view for Stand 1.**

**Orientation: Not needed for Stand 1.**

**DESCRIPTION**

**VISUAL 1A: KOREA.** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is Excerpt from CMH Pub 19-6, *The Korean War – The Outbreak* (Center of Military History), 1-5 [The PPT builds on the Visual are IAW the discussion below.]

**1. The Korean Peninsula**

- a. Korea is a mountainous peninsula jutting from the central Asian mainland with a shape that resembles the state of Florida.
  - (1) Korea varies between 90 and 200 miles in width and 525 to 600 miles in length.
  - (2) Water outlines most of this small country, which has more than 5,400 miles of coastline and thousands of small islands.

- b. The Yalu and Tumen Rivers define much of its northern boundary, while major bodies of water are located on its other sides: the Sea of Japan on the east, the Korea Strait on the south, and the Yellow Sea on the west.
  - c. China lies above the Yalu and Tumen Rivers for 500 miles of Korea's northern boundary as does the former Soviet Union for some eleven miles along the lower Tumen River.
  - d. High mountains drop down abruptly to deep water on the east where there are few harbors, but a heavily indented shoreline on the south and west provides many harbors.
  - e. Summers are hot and humid, with a monsoon season that lasts from June to September, but in the winter cold winds roar down from the Asian interior.
  - f. In 1950 the country's population totaled about 30 million: 21 million south of the 38th Parallel, with 70 percent of the people engaged in agriculture, and 9 million north
2. A rugged landscape, a lack of adequate roads and rail lines, and climatic extremes make large-scale modern military operations in Korea difficult.

**PHASES OF THE KOREAN WAR, JUNE –SEPTEMBER 1950.** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from CMH Pub 19-6, *The Korean War – The Outbreak* (Center of Military History), 5-25 **[The PPT builds on the Visual are IAW the discussion below.]**

1. **(Visual 1B: June to September 1950):** The invasion by North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) in June 1950 had driven the UN forces into a headlong retreat to the Pusan Perimeter.
  - a. 25 Jun: The Attack.
  - b. 27 Jun: Captured Seoul.
  - c. 5 Jul: Battle of Osan (TF Smith): Communist forces brushed aside a token force of US troops at Osan.
  - d. On 20 July they crushed a more determined stand at Taejon.
  - e. 1 Aug - 14 Sep: Pusan Perimeter.
    - (1) At Pusan US reinforcements arrived and, with ROK troops established a 200-mile defensive line in south-eastern Korea, around the port of Pusan.
    - (2) One of early reinforcements was the 2d Infantry Division which included the 23d Infantry Regiment.
      - (a) 5 Aug: The 23d Infantry disembarked at Pusan.

- (b) 19 Aug: Fought in the Battle of Taegu to stabilize the perimeter.
  - (c) 1- 14 Sept: Participated in the heavy fighting along Nakong River Line.
2. **(Visual 1C: September – November 1950):** In a spectacular reversal of fortune, the amphibious landing of UN forces at Inch'on in mid-September triggered a collapse of the North Korean People's Army.
- a. 15 Sep: US amphibious force from Japan stormed ashore at Inchon.
  - b. 16 Sep: Pusan Counter-Attack - UN forces broke out of the Pusan Perimeter and attacked to the north.
  - c. 26 Sep: Liberation of Seoul.
  - d. 19 Oct: Capture of Pyongyang.
    - (1) The UN, after some hesitation, mandated MacArthur to invade North Korea.
    - (2) On 19 October, UN troops captured the North Korean capital of P'yongyang.
  - e. 26 Oct: Chinese Border - ROK forces in the east pushed north to the Chinese border.
  - f. The 2d Infantry Division (and the 23d Infantry Regiment) played a major role in this phase of the Korean War.
    - (1) 16 – 31 Oct: The 2d Division (and the 23d Regiment) fought in the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter and the drive north.
    - (2) By 1 Nov, the 23d Regiment was on garrison duty at a port near Pyongyang and anxiously awaited the end of the war and being shipped home.
3. **(Visual 1D: November 1950 – January 1951):** The collapse of the North Korean People's Army was only stopped by the enormity of the Chinese intervention in October and November.
- a. **Chinese Intervention:**
    - (1) 14 Oct: Chinese Attack: The entry into the war of major Chinese military forces rocked the overextended UN troops and sent them reeling back into South Korea [note: U.S. 2d Infantry Division (and the 23d Regiment) sustained heavy casualties fighting as the Corps rearguard during the retreat].
    - (2) 24 Nov: UN Central Front collapsed and started a fighting retreat through horrible winter weather.

- (a) At Thanksgiving the 2d Division (and the 23d Regiment was about 60 miles south of the Yalu River.
  - (b) Initially the 2d Division tried to contain the Chinese attack, but soon joined the fighting retreat..
  - (c) The 23d Regiment served as the 2d Division rear guard and suffered significant losses in men and material.
- (3) By mid-December, the UN forces had organized a defensive line roughly on the 38th Parallel. There they braced for the expected offensive by Chinese and new North Korean divisions.
- (4) LTG Walton Walker killed in a vehicle accident
- (5) LTG Matthew Ridgeway assumes command of the 8<sup>th</sup> Army.
- (a) Inherits a defeated and dispirited Army.
  - (b) Instills a ***“Lead from the Front”*** attitude to rebuild the fighting spirit of the UNC forces.
    - (1) ***“I don’t want to hear your withdrawal plans – I want to hear your attack plans.”***
    - (2) ***“The job of the commander was to be up where the crisis of action was taking place. In time of battle, I wanted division commanders to be up with their forward battalion, and I wanted corps commanders up with the regiment that was in the hottest action. If they had paper work to do, they could do it at night. By day their place was up there where the shooting was going on. I held to the old-fashioned idea that it helped the spirits of the men to see the Old Man up there, in the snow and sleet and the mud, sharing the same cold, miserable existence they had to endure.”***
- (6) Ridgeway’s Guidance and ***“Meat Grinder Tactics”***<sup>1</sup>
- (a) Units off their vehicles and on the hills.
  - (b) Troops to construct tight defensive perimeters for night fighting, while expanding the perimeters during daylight.
  - (c) Use the UNC advantage in airpower, artillery, tanks, and flak wagons to grind down the communist forces.

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<sup>1</sup>Kenneth Hamburger’s “Leadership in the Crucible.”



- (d) Punish the Chinese by killing as many as possible –not concerned with fighting for real estate.
  - (e) No more *"bug outs."* Units would stay in position and fight surrounded if need be, holding out until a relief force could get to them the next day.
  - (f) At night, destroy the enemy with artillery and flak wagons, and using tanks to support the infantry, then call in air strikes during daylight hours.
  - (g) *"A spirit that cannot be imposed from above but that must be cultivated in every heart, from private to general. It is rooted, I believe, in the individual's sense of security, of belonging to a unit that will stand by him, as units on both sides and in the rear stand by all other units too. Good training should help a soldier get rid of that awful sense of alone-ness that can some times overtake a man in battle, the feeling that nobody gives a damn about him, and that he has only his own resources to depend on. Americans, I think, are often more self-sufficient than soldiers of other nations. But still they need help in cultivating that assurance that they belong to a group that will return their loyalty no matter what danger threatens."*
- (7) The soldiers (tired of retreating) welcomed Ridgway's leadership.
- (a) He was a warrior. He carried a carbine and a grenade always taped to his right shoulder strap (a theatrical but soldierly gesture). The soldiers joked about the grenade and speculated as to whether the grenade had powder in it.
  - (b) Soldiers noted that Ridgway had tremendous reservoir of personal courage.
    - (1) Lieutenant Robert Curtis remembers seeing him drive through mortar fire to reach the 23d Regiment, then walk along the line of riflemen through mortar and small-arms fire, talking to individual soldiers.
    - (2) Captain Ansil Walker, the 1st Battalion's heavy weapons company commander, saw Ridgway striding erectly across a valley through a hail of small-arms fire, and was impressed that a general would take such risks.

## **b. The 1951 Communist Offensive**

- (1) 31 Dec: 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel Attack
  - (a) Ridgway had only a few days to influence the 8<sup>th</sup> Army before the North Koreans and Chinese attacked.
  - (b) On the evening of December 31, 1950, the North Koreans and Chinese launched a massive attack against South Korean forces along the 38th parallel.

- (2) 3 Jan: Evacuation of Seoul: Ridgway interpreted the Sino-Korean attack on the central front as an attempt to surround the UN defenders at Seoul, and he immediately ordered the evacuation of Seoul on January 3.
- (3) On January 5, Ridgway ordered all UN forces to withdraw to the 37th parallel to set up a new defensive line, dubbed "Line D. "
- (4) 5 – 7 Jan: 1<sup>st</sup> Battle of Wonju (US 2d IN DIV)
  - (a) Prior to the Communist Offense, Ridgway had already ordered the US X Corps to reinforce the South Korean defenses near Wonju.
  - (b) Most of the US X Corps was still assembling at Pusan, the only unit that was available in the Eighth Army's reserve was the US 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division, which was still recovering from its earlier losses in the retreat.
  - (c) The Communist main effort was against Seoul. However, Ridgway declared that the village of Wonju was "only second to Seoul" in importance, and therefore must be defended at all cost.
  - (d) In the First Battle of Wonju, the US 2d Infantry Division (and the 23d Regiment) was pushed south of Wonju.
- (5) 8 – 20 Jan: In the Second Battle of Wonju – US 2d Infantry Division battled to retake Wonju.

## ANALYSIS

1. **LTG Ridgway believed his greatest challenge was to rebuild the fighting spirit of the army.**
  - a. He stated: *“a spirit that cannot be imposed from above but that must be cultivated in every heart, from private to general. It is rooted, I believe, in the individual's sense of security, of belonging to a unit that will stand by him, as units on both sides and in the rear stand by all other units too. Good training should help a soldier get rid of that awful sense of alone-ness that can some times overtake a man in battle, the feeling that nobody gives a damn about him, and that he has only his own resources to depend on. Americans, I think, are often more self-sufficient than soldiers of other nations. But still they need help in cultivating that assurance that they belong to a group that will return their loyalty no matter what danger threatens.”*
  - b. Analyze his decision to focus on the elements of basic soldiering through the chain of command to rebuild the fighting spirit of the army.
2. **LTG Ridgway did this for an Army, how does this focus on basic soldiering impact upon other echelons of command (Platoon, Company, Battalion, Brigade, or Division)?**


## STAND 2

### Operation Thunderbolt and the Lost Patrol

#### VISUALS

Visual
<u>2A: OPERATION THUNDERBOLT AND THE LOST PATROL</u>
<u>2B: AMBUSH AT THE TWIN TUNNELS</u>
<u>2C: THE RELIEF</u>

#### ORIENTATION



#### Virtual View - Twin Tunnels Overview.

1. **This is a birds-eye view of the road leading north to the village of Sinch' on.**
2. Currently located about 1.25 kilometers south of the small village of Sinch' on (Green Star on Visual 2A and 2B).
  - a. The road to the north leads to the Twin Tunnels.

- i. The tunnels are about 1.5 miles to the north.
- ii. One of the tunnels passes below the large hill to the north (Hill 333)
- b. To the west is Hill 453 and to the east is Hill 404.
- c. The road will eventually take you to Chipyong- ni, about 6 miles to the NW.
- d. To the south is the road to Iho –ri. The UN front lines are about 15 miles to the south.

## DESCRIPTION

**VISUAL 2A: OPERATION THUNDERBOLT AND THE LOST PATROL:** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from *Ebb and Flow, Nov 1950- July 1951*, Center of Military History and *The Korean War – Restoring the Balance*, Center of Military History and details from the “Leadership in the Crucible,” by Kenneth Hamburger. Pages 105-125). ). **[The PPT builds on Visuals are IAW the discussion below.]**

1. **By the end of January 1951, The Eighth Army occupied defensive positions along the 37th parallel.**
2. **LTG Ridgeway directed the 8<sup>th</sup> Army to send feeler patrols northward to locate the enemy again and reestablish contact.**
  - a. In the east, the US I and IX Corps initiated Operation Thunderbolt and pushed north toward the Han River in a strong reconnaissance in force.
  - b. Prior to Ridgeway issuing guidance to resume offensive action, General Almond had already made preparations for X Corps to conduct operations similar to THUNDERBOLT.
  - c. The X Corps had by this time had occupied the Yoju- Wonju- Yongwol line against little op- position as part of their mission to protect the IX Corps flank.
3. **Almond was planning a strong combat reconnaissance fifteen miles above this line.**
  - a. Searching that deep at corps center and right could apply pressure on the North Korean V and II Corps concentrated above Hoengsong and P’yongch’ang.
  - b. At the same time, the 2d Division, due to move north along the corps left boundary as far as Chip’ yong-ni, eight miles east of Yangp’ yong, could protect the right flank of the IX Corps as the THUNDERBOLT operation continued.

4. **On 29 Jan 51, a joint motorized patrol from the 2d (X Corps) and the 24th Division (IX Corps) moved north out of the Yoju area on the east side of the Han toward the twin tunnel.**
  - a. The patrol was IAW the X Corps responsibility to protect the right flank of Operation Thunderbolt.
  - b. The patrol consisted of three officers and forty-one men, most of whom were rifle platoon from C Company 23d IN.
  - c. The patrol also had heavy weapons from D Company, and a detachment from the 21<sup>st</sup> IN (24<sup>th</sup> Division).
  - d. **All told 60 men.**

**VISUAL 2B: AMBUSH AT THE TWIN TUNNELS:** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from *Ebb and Flow, Nov 1950- July 1951*, Center of Military History and *The Korean War – Restoring the Balance*, Center of Military History and **from** the “Leadership in the Crucible,” by Kenneth Hamburger. Pages 105-125). ). **[The PPT builds on Visuals are IAW the discussion below.]**

<p><b>Instructor Note: If needed the discussions for Visuals 2B and 2C can be significantly shorten. The key information is that the patrol found a significant enemy presence in the Twin Tunnels area.</b></p>
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**Virtual View:** IAW the discussion move down to the road and then drive along the road to the location of the next Green Star near the railroad tracks. Then move to the high ground above the east tunnel.

1. **The patrol moved north along the road to the rail road tracks and made contact with the enemy just to the north.**
2. **Chinese on Hill 453 quickly cut the patrol’s route of withdrawal, forced the group into hasty defenses on the high ground above the tunnels.**
  - a. Unfortunately the patrol had to abandon most of its heavy weapons and made it to the high ground with only their rifles, BARs, and one MMG.
  - b. A regimental liaison plane over watching the patrol immediately reported the patrols situation and the regiment initiated action to rescue the patrol.
3. **The patrol had to fend off repeated assaults against their small perimeter throughout the rest of the day and through the night.**

4. **Air strikes called in by the pilot of an observation plane forced the Chinese to back off somewhat – the observation plane also dropped ammo to the beleaguered patrol.**
5. **As soon as it got dark the Chinese again attempted to overrun the patrol.**

**Virtual View:** IAW the discussion rise up in the air and point out the road used by F Company and Hill 453.

**VISUAL 2C: THE RELIEF:** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from *Ebb and Flow, Nov 1950- July 1951*, Center of Military History and *The Korean War – Restoring the Balance*, Center of Military History and **from** the “Leadership in the Crucible,” by Kenneth Hamburger. Pages 105-125). ). **[The PPT builds on Visuals are IAW the discussion below.]**

1. **Meanwhile, regiment organized a reinforced motorized company of infantry to rescue the patrol.**
  - a. The company had to fight its way through to the trapped men – first seizing Hill 453.
  - b. At one point, the company commander believed he was too late and the Lost Patrol had been overrun.
  - c. However, he soon got word that the patrol was still holding the hill top.
2. **The relief company finally made contact about 0330 on the 30th.**
3. **The patrol’s strength at the start of the action was 60 men.**
  - a. 13 KIA.
  - b. 30 WIA.
  - c. 5 MIA.
  - d. 80% casualties, only 12 remained physically unscathed.

### ANALYSIS (stand 2)

1. What was the significance of the “Lost Patrol” action?
2. What valuable intelligence did the “Lost Patrol” action provide to the X Corps?

## STAND 3

### The Battle of the Twin Tunnels

#### VISUALS

Visual
<b>3A: The Return to the Twin Tunnels</b>
<b>3B: The Battle of the Twin Tunnels</b>
<b>3C: Operation Roundup &amp; The X Corps Plan</b>

**Instructor Note: If the group has watched the Army University Press documentary on the Twin Tunnels, then this stand can be great truncated. Then move quickly to the analysis.**

#### ORIENTATION

**Virtual View: Return to the Twin Tunnels Overview** (See Screen Shot with Stand 2)

- 1. Assume a bird's eye view from just to the east of Hill 453. The Goal is to see the Twin Tunnel Area.**
- 2. Point out the twin tunnels.**
- 3. The road north to Chipyong-ni.**
- 4. The village of Sinchon.**
- 5. The road south to Iho-ri. The UN lines are now about 10 miles to the south.**
- 6. More on the terrain later in the stand.**

## DESCRIPTION

**VISUAL 3A: THE RETURN TO THE TWIN TUNNELS.** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from *Ebb and Flow*, 248-249. Additional details from the “Leadership in the Crucible,” by Kenneth Hamburger. Pages 105-125). **[The PPT builds on Visual 3A are IAW the discussion below.]**

**Virtual View: None.**

1. **On 30 January, LTG Ned Almond (X Corps commander) ordered the 2d Division to send a regiment to seize the high ground at the twin tunnels and clear the area of enemy forces.**
2. **In turn, the 2d Division directed the 23d Regiment to move to the Twin Tunnels (minus the 2d BN which was the division reserve).**
  - a. Brigadier General George C. Stewart, the assistant division commander, decided to go with the regiment.
    - (1) West Point class of 1923 with considerable combat experience in World War II.
      - (a) Stewart saw his job as being the division commander's eyes and ears.
      - (b) He may have also wanted serve as a buffer between the regiment and corps commander. Stewart recognized that Almond often bypassed the chain of command with orders that were not well thought out, and he knew Freeman resented it when those orders affected his regiment.
    - b. When he arrived at the 23d Regiment's CP, Stewart found Freeman angry at the order to move to the Twin Tunnels area, ten miles beyond the division's front lines and out of range of divisional artillery support. *"They're going to murder my regiment,"* Freeman said.
    - c. Stewart considered Freeman *"one of the best fighting commanders you ever saw, but kind of temperamental."*
3. **The regiment moved out at 0630 hours on 31 January. Freeman moved to the twin tunnels with only the 3d Battalion, the French Battalion, and elements of the regiment's separate companies.**
4. **Two additional artillery units that were attached to the 23d, the 37th Field Artillery Battalion and Baker Battery of the 82d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, accompanied the column.**



- a. Freeman positioned the field artillery battalion three miles south of the Twin Tunnels - he left all the accompanying vehicles with the artillery, and gave the drivers the mission of strengthening the artillery battalion's defenses by fighting as infantry.
  - b. Freeman detailed the 1st Battalion to hold key positions along the road from the artillery position to the rear to insure that the regiment's supply route remained open.
  - c. The regiment's 2d Battalion served as the Division's reserve.
5. **The regiment's infantry battalions were similar to today's infantry battalions – however they were much larger.**
- a. The US battalion was 917 men (Today, an infantry battalion in the 10<sup>th</sup> or 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry division numbers less than 700 men).
  - b. The French battalion:
    - (1) a battalion of volunteers made up of active and reserve French military personnel sent to the Korean Peninsula.
    - (2) It had the same organization as a US battalion, but was authorized 1,017 men. - French Battalion of the United Nations Organization

**VISUAL 3B: THE BATTLE OF THE TWIN TUNNELS.** (Unless noted this portion of the overview Excerpt from: Billy Mossman, *Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951*, (Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, 1990), 248 – 249. [The PPT builds on the visuals are IAW the discussion below.]

**Virtual View: Terrain Orientation – Initially from the Twin Tunnels overview. May zoom in closer to discuss the terrain features. (See Screen Shot with Stand 2).**

- **Assume a bird's eye view from just to the south of Hill 453. The Goal is to see the Twin Tunnel Area.**
- **Point out the twin tunnels.**
- **The road north to Chipyong-ni.**
- **The village of Sinchon.**
- **The road south to Iho-ri. The UN lines are now about 10 miles to the south.**
- **More on the terrain later in the stand.**

1. Freeman's plan was dictated by the terrain.

- a. In Korea, proper utilization of the crests of hills or mountains often determined the success of a unit's actions.
  - b. The Chinese had proved adept at hiding units in villages, caves, and tunnels during daylight hours and attacking at night.
  - c. As a result, UN forces were forced each night to construct tight perimeters on high ground, as impregnable as possible, in anticipation of an attack during the hours of darkness.
2. Ridgway wanted offensive action and the standard TTP was:
- a. To take a defensive perimeter on the hills in one area, and then advance to another hilltop defensive perimeter within a day or two.
  - b. It was a slow procedure, but the only relatively safe one.

**Virtual View : Point out the eastern ridge.**

3. Freeman's Defensive Perimeter: The 3d Battalion secured the eastern ridge.

**Virtual View: Point out Hill 453 and then the western ridge**

4. Freeman's Defensive Perimeter: In the French Battalion sector:
- a. 1st Company occupied the commanding Hill 453 to the south, isolated and not tied in to any other unit.
  - b. The remainder of the French Battalion held the western ridge.
5. There were two dangerous gaps in the line – one in the north and another in the south:

**Virtual View: Move down to the gap in the north – Green Star 1**

- Point out the French on the west Ridge
- Point out the 3d BN on the east ridge
- Point out the vulnerable gap between the two ridges.

6. To the north, a tank-mounted roadblock covered the territory between the French 3d Company and the 23d's Love Company;


**• Move to th gap in the south –Green Star 2**

- Point out the French on the west Ridge
- Point out the French company on Hill 453
- Point out the 3d BN on the east ridge
- Point out the vulnerable gap between the French and U.S. BN

7. To the south, the French heavy weapons company covered the gap between King Company and the French 2d Company.
8. Terrain dictated company frontages. At the Twin Tunnels, company fronts varied from a few hundred meters to over a thousand.
9. This scheme stretched Freeman's forces as far as they could go. It left him without a regimental reserve, although the French Battalion kept a platoon from its ROK Company and its engineers out of the line.
10. Nonetheless, the terrain around the Twin Tunnels left Freeman with no alternative. Giving up any of the ridgelines or Hill 453 would provide the enemy an open entryway into his perimeter.
11. By late afternoon, the soldiers were in position, digging in for the cold night ahead – no sign of the enemy.
12. But from farther north Colonel Freeman's forces themselves were observed by the 125th Division, 42d Army.
13. Late on the afternoon of 31 January, General Almond visited the 23d Regiment's command post. He was surprised that the regiment had not yet made contact with the enemy, and was disappointed that Freeman had not continued north into Chipyong-ni.
14. General Stewart explained that Freeman was operating IAW the division's orders to clear the twin tunnels area and move with caution. He also explained that due to the lateness of the day the regiment needed to occupy a tight defensive perimeter for the night.
15. Nonetheless, General Almond ordered Stewart to ***"put Chipyong-ni under fire."*** After Almond left the area, Stewart commandeered a tank and moved toward Chipyong-ni. At Chipyong-ni, he saw no sight of the enemy, but still fired a burst of machine gun fire over the village. He returned to the regimental perimeter and reported through division to the corps that the regiment had ***"taken the village under fire."***
16. Freeman voiced his anger at Stewart for Almond's questionable order and for broadcasting the regiment's exposed position to the CCF with machinegun fire.
  - a. One of his company commanders remembers Freeman saying: ***"I don't mind the corps commander being around and there's no problem with him telling me what to do. He should as a courtesy go through the division commander, but that's between those two. What I can't accept is his telling me how to do it, especially if I think his way is dangerous to my command and mission. If Almond wants to be a regimental commander, damn it, let him take a reduction to bird colonel and come down and be one."***
  - b. Stewart admitted the order was ***"ridiculous,"*** and his action was ***"unwise."***


**Virtual View: From the overview show Sinchon and Hill 453.**

17. That night communist forces skirmished with the French on Hill 453 and U.S. forces near Sinchon..



**Virtual View: Fly north to the vicinity of the Regimental CP and then look north above L Company then to the east above I Company**

18. At dawn on 1 February, the 375th and 374th Regiments attacked from the north and northeast, respectively.



**Virtual View: From the vicinity of the Regimental CP look NW over the 3d French Company and then SW over the 2d and Weapons Companies of the French Battalion.**

19. After daylight the 373d Regiment assaulted the perimeter from the northwest and southwest.
20. In hard, close-in fighting lasting all day, the defending battalions, relying heavily on artillery fire, barely held the line.

**Virtual View: From the vicinity of the Regimental CP look NW over the 3d French Company and then East the US I Company.**

21. In the afternoon, the Chinese renewed their attacks and seized high ground in the northeast and northwest and almost broke through the perimeter.
22. A lucky break in the cloud cover allowed the air-support to intervene and avert the crisis.

#### 1. Casualties:

- a. Estimated that the Chinese, about eight thousand strong when they began the battle, left about 1,300 corpses around and inside the perimeter.
  - (1) A wounded prisoner identified the unit PLA's 125th Division, a part of the Forty- second Army.
  - (2) All three regiments of the division had participated in the fight.
- b. Intelligence estimated total Chinese losses at thirty-six hundred, or almost half the starting strength of the enemy division.

- c. Freeman's losses were 45 killed, 207 wounded, and 4 missing.
2. After the fighter-bombers finished, fourteen cargo transports- C-119 "Flying Boxcars" - dropped supplies of all types into the valley.
3. After dark, the 1st Battalion began arriving, having marched all afternoon.
4. Everyone expected the Chinese to make another all-out effort to overrun the regiment that night. Weary soldiers tried to remain alert for probes, but none came.
  - a. After a quiet night, there was no sign of the enemy at daylight.
  - b. At dawn, patrols ranged into the surrounding hills looking for the enemy - neither ground nor aerial patrols found any sign of the Chinese.
5. With the arrival of the 23d RCT's other elements, Freeman felt confident of its ability to fight off further Chinese attacks so long as his ammunition held out – but no more attacks came.
  - a. Supplies had run perilously low in only one day of hard fighting.
  - b. He knew that unless the 2d Division and X Corps resupplied the unit every day, particularly after night engagements, the Chinese could emerge victorious merely by surviving and outlasting the defenders' ammunition.
  - c. The regiment was dangerously far from friendly lines for resupply by ground vehicles to be a sure thing, and the weather was sufficiently unpredictable for aerial resupply to be assured.
6. Meanwhile MG Almond prepared to push north with X Corps IAW LTG Ridgway's guidance.

**VISUAL 3C: OPERATION ROUNDUP & THE X CORPS PLAN.** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from *Ebb and Flow*, 248-249. Additional details from the "Leadership in the Crucible," by Kenneth Hamburger. Pages 105-125) **[The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below]**

**Virtual View: Raise up from the vicinity of the regimental CP and look toward Chipyong-ni.**

1. Following the Twin Tunnels, the 23d received a new mission: *"Dominate the road center of Chipyong and occupy the high ground in the vicinity so as to protect the right flank of the IX Corps and establish the western anchor of a X Corps line of departure for the offensive."*

- a. This mission would support the X Corps plan for Operation Roundup and seize Hongchon.:
    - (1) The 23d Infantry holding the corps' left flank
    - (2) The 38th Regiment held Hoengsong, twenty miles to the east.
    - (3) To the right of the 38th Infantry, the 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment would protect the division's right flank.
    - (4) The corps' right-flank unit was the 7th Infantry Division, at Pyongchang, forty miles east of Chipyong-ni.
    - (5) As soon as the American forces were in place, the 5th and 8th ROK Divisions would attack north and take Hongchon, fifteen miles north of Hoengsong.
  - b. The operation would jump off on 4 February.
2. On Saturday morning, 3 February 1951, the 23d Infantry set out for its rendezvous with destiny at Chipyong-ni.

## ANALYSIS

1. What was the significance of the Twin Tunnels fight?
2. "What lessons learned" could the 23d Regiment take from its experience at the Twin Tunnels?
  - a. (From the 23d REGT AAR) Tight perimeter defense is essential. A smaller perimeter on possibly less desirable ground is better than a large/loose perimeter on desirable ground.
  - b. (From the 23d REGT AAR) A RCT properly equipped and entrenched, with sound leadership, is a strong force, and is capable of defending itself when being resupplied from the air.
  - c. (From the 23d REGT AAR) Concentrated defensive fire made the CCF attack to expensive even for their great numerical superiority.
  - d. (From the 23d REGT AAR) Well-led and trained troops can endure the mental stress of being cut-off and surrounded.
  - e. (From the 23d REGT AAR) There is no such thing as impassible terrain for infantry (friendly or enemy).
  - f. (From the 23d REGT AAR) Ground resupply is problematic when dangerously far from friendly lines and the weather can be unpredictable for aerial resupply to be assured
  - g. Other possible considerations

- (1) Meat Grinder Tactics are very demanding on the logistical situation and required daily resupply if in contact.
    - (a) Supplies had run perilously low in only one day of hard fighting).
    - (b) The Chinese could emerge victorious merely by surviving and outlasting the defenders' ammunition.
  - (2) Airpower can be decisive. (Without airpower the regiment might have been overrun).
3. How did the Battle of the Twin Tunnels support General Ridgeway's vision of "Meat Grinder Tactics?"



## STAND 4

### Into Chipyong-ni

#### VISUALS

Visual
Visual 4A: 23 <sup>rd</sup> RCT movement into Chipyong-ni
Visual 4B: Chip'yong-ni
Visual 4C: 23 <sup>rd</sup> Infantry Regimental Combat Team
Visual 4D: 23 <sup>rd</sup> RCT perimeter
Visual 4E: The Second Battalion Perimeter

#### ORIENTATION

**Virtual View:** Birdseye view then move north generally following the 23d RCT route to Chipyong-ni. At Chipyong-ni shift to the south side of town looking north with a Birdseye /overview of Chipyong-ni looking to the north.

**Note:** Orientation of the village of Chipyong-ni and the surrounding terrain is provided in the discussion.

#### DESCRIPTION



**VISUAL 4A: 23<sup>RD</sup> RCT MOVEMENT INTO CHIPYONG-NI** [The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below]

1. At 31 0630 January 1951, the RCT started movement out of the Assembly Area.
  - a. The attacking battalions crossed the Line of Departure at 1000.
  - b. Intermediate objectives were secured without a fight.
  - c. The defensive perimeter was established at 1630.

**VISUAL 4B: CHIPYONG-NI - THE VILLAGE AND THE SURROUNDING TERRAIN.**

**[The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below]**

1. Chipyong-ni is in an oval-shaped valley or bowl 3 miles wide and six miles long. Surrounding hills are mostly barren and range from 100-400 meters elevation.



**Virtual View:** Remain in the virtual overview of Chipyong-ni. Look towards the key features IAW the list below.

## 2. Key Features

- a. Road hub vic Chipyong-ni
  - i. Key roads to the SE and S.
  - ii. Also road west into the Han River Valley and the flank of the IX Corps.
  - iii. A road to the north also connects with a key east/west road.
- b. Hill 397
- c. Hill 248
- d. Hill 345
- e. Hill 229
- f. Hill 348
- g. Hill 506
- h. Hill 159
- i. Hill 319

### **VISUAL 4C: 23<sup>RD</sup> INFANTRY REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM [The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below]**


1. The **Regimental Combat Team (RCT)** was how the 23d Regiment operated at Chipyong-ni.
2. A RCT normally maneuvered with the direct support artillery battalion and other elements, such as a combat engineer company and an antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battery attached to form a RCT for a particular mission.
3. At Chip'yong-ni, the 23d Regimental Combat Team included: the French Battalion, a ranger company, a combat engineer company, an antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battery, additional medical assets, and a direct support artillery battalion (105mm) with an attached 155mm howitzer battery.
  - c. Total strength of the Regimental Combat Team in February 1951 was about 5,719 men.

### **Visual 4D: THE 23<sup>RD</sup> RCT PERIMETER [The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below.]**

1. The RCT perimeter ceded the high ground to the Chinese (Hills 345, 348, 506, 159, 319, 397, 129, 248)106612

- a. An entire division would have been required to secure a perimeter that included those hills.
  - b. Instead he decided to establish a tight perimeter around the village.
  - c. COL Freeman, the RCT commander, ordered daytime patrols of those hills to check for enemy positions or movement on them.
  - d. Additionally, COL Freeman stressed continuous position improvement of the fighting positions.
  - e. The perimeter as “a school solution as nearly as the time and materials permitted.”
2. The 23<sup>rd</sup> RCT Perimeter can be described as a clock – starting at about 0800 in the seam between the 23d 2d Battalion and the French Battalion. [

- The regimental perimeter is marked with fighting positions. The instructor will need to rehearse flying from fighting position to fighting position.
- Occasionally assume a ground hug at fighting positions to show fields of fire.
- Use key spots along the route to help orient to the map – examples include:
  - Railroad station at Star 2
  - Road at Star 4 and between Stars 5 and 6.
  - Railroad tunnel visible from Star 8.



- a. **Virtual View: Overview Star 1 looking north along the French line,** French Battalion – 23 RCT:

**Virtual View:** Fly along the French line. Consider pausing at one of the fighting positions looking to the west to show their fields of fire

(1) 1<sup>st</sup> Company at 0800.


(2) 3<sup>rd</sup> Company at 0900

**Virtual View:** Point out the railroad station and the fields of fire toward Hill 248 and the road between Hills 248 and 345.

b. **Star 2,** French ROK Company at 1000 and 2<sup>nd</sup> French Company at 1100.

**Virtual View:** Fly almost due north toward Star 3. At any one of the fighting positions assume a ground hug position and point out the field of fire toward Hill 345.

c. **Star 3,** 1-23 RCT:



d. **Virtual View:** Fly toward Star 4. At any one of the fighting positions assume a ground hug position and point out the field of fires.

e. **Star 4,** C/1-23 was positioned at 1200.

**Virtual View:** Fly toward Star 5. At any one of the fighting positions assume a ground hug position and point out the field of fires.

f. **Star 5**, A/1-23 was positioned at 0200.

(1) RCT Reserve was position behind the 1-23 RCT

(2) B/1-23 was on Hill 210 behind A/1-23

g. Ranger Company was behind C/1-23

**Virtual View:** Fly toward Star 6. At any one of the fighting positions assume a ground hug position and point out the field of fires.

h. **Star 6**, 3-23 RCT. L/3-23 was positioned at 0230.

**Virtual View:** Fly toward Star 7. At any one of the fighting positions assume a ground hug position and point out the field of fires.

i. **Star 7**, I/3-23 was positioned at 0300 and K/3-23 was positioned at 0400.

**Virtual View:** Fly toward Star 8. Point out how 2-23 elected to put their MLR along the low ground with secondary positions on the high ground. At any one of the fighting positions assume a ground hug position and point out the field of fires.

j. **Star 8**, 2-23 RCT: 2-23 occupied 0500 to 0700 in the perimeter. LTC James W. Edwards, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion commander, wrote a detailed narrative of his battalion's actions at Chip'yong-ni.

**VISUAL 4E: THE SECOND BATTALION PERIMETER** (This portion of the discussion is from LTC Edwards unpublished narrative Edwards, *The Siege of Chipyong-ni*. The narrative is found in The Staff Ride Read Ahead Packet, Battle of Chipyong-ni, by U.S/ Eighth Army Staff, Seoul: 2d Infantry Division, 1990). **[The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below.]**

- **There are 11 Stars provided on this visual, but it is not necessary to go to all of them.**
- **Only use those that you feel are necessary.**


1. In his narrative, LTC Edwards confidently stated, *“Each platoon defensive area was dug-in for all-around defense in case of a break-through. It was almost a perfect Fort Benning solution.”*

2. **E/2-23 was positioned astride the railroad on the battalion's left flank. 2-23 was the Regimental main effort and E was the battalion's main effort.**

a. The E Company defensive line is was one the strongest along the perimeter.

(1) The company's left flank was on the southern slope of Sawyer Hill (Captain Sawyer – the company commander) and the right flank was astride the railroad and road leading into Chipyong-ni from the southeast.

- (2) The company's defensive line was typical of all the rifle platoons along the perimeter.
- (3) Edwards stated:



**Virtual View:** Fly toward Star 1 and assume a ground hug position at one of the fighting positions and point out the field of fires.

- (a) **Star 1**, *“On the MRL, the primary positions of the machine guns were on low ground so that they could fire FPL fires along the wire....”*
- (b) *“[Most of the] foxholes along the MIR and most of the alternate foxholes were of the two-man standing type foxholes... [and] all foxholes had overhead cover. Two-man foxholes were SOP in the Battalion. Men fought better when they were not alone...”*

(1) Even though the BN commander had ordered that all fighting positions Lt McGee, a platoon leader in G Company, remembered:

(2) *“We did not have anything to build cover with, and we didn't have the time to go out and get it. The only cover, I had on my hole was four little round sticks that we drove into the ground and attached a stick across each corner from corner to corner above the top of the hole and covered it with straw and libs and our ponchos. All that was for was to keep the snow out, but it wouldn't stop any type of fire. (High Tide, 128).*

(c) **Left and right view,**

(1) *“They were also placed in the double-apron, barbed wire fence that had been erected in front of [Company E].”*

- (2) *“Trip-flares, antipersonnel mines, and booby-traps had been sown copiously in front of all positions and in the draws leading down from HILL 397 towards the Battalion MLR.*
- (3) *“At night, each company sent out 2 or 3 two-man groups about 50 to 75 yards in front of the MLR to act as listening posts.”*

**Instructor Note: You will probably need to go to only one of the locations marked as Stars 2, 3, and 4. Star 3 is the recommended location.**

**Virtual View:** Fly toward Star 2, 3, or 4 and assume a ground hug position at one of the fighting positions and point out the field of fires

- (d) **Star2,** *“Alternate positions, high up on the hills: were occupied by the machineguns during the daytime so that long-range fire could be placed on Chinese groups on the high, distant peaks which could not be seen from the MLR.”*
- (4) The E Company position was heavily reinforced with RCT and battalion assets.
- (a) Edwards stated, *“Tank and Anti-aircraft Vehicle machineguns covered some sections of the Battalion MLR.”*
    - (1) **Star 3,** on the southeast slope of Sawyer Hill were two Quad 50 half-tracks.
    - (2) **Star 4,** on the south slope of the Sawyer Hill were two tanks.
    - (3) **Star 5,** another tank and Quad 50 were on the west side of the tracks.
  - (b) E Company also had a section of heavy machineguns and two 75mm RRs from Company H.

**Virtual View:** Fly toward Star 5 and assume a ground hug position at one of the fighting positions and point out the field of fires.

- b. **From Star 5,** E Company’s center platoon (2d) was in a rice paddy astride the road and railroad tracks leading into Chipyong-ni.
  - (1) LTC Edwards stated, *“The platoon struck sub-surface water after digging down about two and one-half feet... [and they] built two-man breastwork, with overhead cover behind the rice paddy dykes.”*
  - (2) *“Strange as it may seem it was always difficult to get grazing fields of fire in the rice paddies. This was due to the fact that each rice paddy was sub-divided into numerous little plots, each of which was terraced a few feet above or below the adjoining plots... Therefore, the machinegun bullets were able to sweep one plot of about 50 or 75 feet before hitting the dyke of the next terraced plot....”*



- c. The company's right flank (3d platoon) was at the base of the high ground just to the west of the railroad tracks.

**Virtual View:** Fly toward Star 6 and assume a ground hug position at one of the fighting positions and point out the field of fires, then point out the alternate position on the high ground.

- (a) **Star 6,** A section of two 75mm RRs from Company H was on the company's right flank.


- (b) LTC Edwards stated, *"In addition, in accordance with Battalion SOP, each section carried two 50 caliber machinegun with it. After dark the 50 caliber machineguns were set up and manned, as no accurate shooting could be done with the 75mm recoilless rifles at night... The recoilless rifles were excellent weapons for shooting at distant enemy groups. Therefore, alternate positions high up on the hills were occupied by some of these rifles during the daytime..."*

**Virtual View:** Fly toward Star 7 and assume a ground hug position at one of the fighting positions.

- 3. **Star 7, F/2-23** occupied the center of the BN sector.

- a. Had no attached AFVs.
- b. The company perimeter was very similar to E Co's positions with the primary fighting positions along the low ground and alternate positions on the high ground.

**Virtual View:** Fly toward Star 8 and assume a ground hug position at one of the fighting positions.



4. **Star 8**, G/2-23 was on the BN west flank and connected with the 1<sup>st</sup> French Company.
  - a. G Company occupied a bulge in the line to allow room for Battery B, 503d FA (6X 155mm)
  - b. G Company had no attached AFVs.
  - c. However, the 2d section, of the battalions 75mm recoilless rifle Platoon was attached to the company (2x 75mm RRs).

**Instructor Note: Stars 9, 10, and 11 are optional.**

5. **Star 9**, 2d Battalion Mortar Platoon. LTC Edwards recalled: *“The 81mm Mortar Platoon was in G/S. It had dug in tis weapons in the Railroad Cut on Waggoner Hill... Due to the shortage of personnel the 81mm Mortar Platoon was only able to man 5 mortars and two Forward Observer groups. One FO Group was sent to Company G and other to Company E... The 37<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery Battalion furnished 3 FO parties to the Battalion and one of these was sent to each one of the rifle companies...”* [The platoon was only authorized 4x 81mm mortars, most units acquired additional mortars].

6. **Star 10**, 3 Platoon, F Company was the battalion reserve. It was positioned behind F Company.
7. **Star 11**, 2d Battalion CP: LTC Edwards, “The Battalion CP was located in a three-room Korean Mud house. The room on the East end of the house was used as an operations Room and was sandbagged on the outside to height of six feet.”
  - a. *“The vehicles of the Battalion Headquarters Company and Company H were in the Battalion Motor Pool which was established in the rubble between the Battalion CP and Company H CP... All vehicles were well dispersed. The four wheels of each vehicle were protecte4d by sandbags or piled up rubble...”*
  - b. *“The Battalion had the P and A Platoon, the Intelligence Section, Company Headquarters Group and a few soldiers from Battalion Headquarters, which could be used as a reserve in case of emergency; however, all of these units were at about 60% T/O strength.”*

### ANALYSIS

1. Evaluate the Col. Freeman’s decision to not occupy Hills 345, 348, 506, 159, 319, 397, 129, and 248.
2. Evaluate the French BN position. Defending low ground and observed from the high ground – but they have outstanding fields of fire. Any attack has to come across 1000 meters of flat ground.
3. Evaluate the 2d BN commander’s decision to defend from the low ground.

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**STAND 5: Patrol Actions at Chipyong-ni**  
**(5 – 11 Feb)**

**VISUALS**

Visual
<b>5A: THE CHIPYONG-NI PATROLS</b>
<b>5B: COMMUNIST COUNTER-ATTACK AGAINST OPERATION ROUNDUP</b>

**ORIENTATION**

**Virtual View: Take up a position in the center of the village and then rise up in the air and look to the East.**

1. As stated earlier, Chipyong-ni is ringed by Hills.
2. Hill 348 the large high ground to the NE of the village tappers off to the south and almost due west is Hill 363.
3. Hill 363 was a large ridge the blocked visibility into a large valley that contained the village Sanggosong.
4. From 4 to 11 February, much of the enemy contact near Chipyong-ni would be in the Sanggosong Valley.


**DESCRIPTION**

**VISUAL 5A: THE CHIPYONG-NI PATROLS** (Excerpt from Billy Mossman's, *Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951*, 263. **[The PPT builds on the visuals are IAW the discussion below.]**


1. While MG Almond X US Corps and ROK III Corps advanced toward Hoengsong the 23d RCT consolidated in position at Chipyong-ni.

2. Col Freeman recognized that his RCT was isolated with an almost 12 mile gap between him and the next X Corps unit to the east.
3. After securing Chip'yong-ni, the 23d Infantry had established a perimeter around the town, and Colonel Freeman had run patrols east, west, and north.
4. Between 1 and 5 February, the patrol encounters with enemy forces were mostly minor.

**Virtual View: Move to the vicinity of E/23 IN on visual 7A looking towards Hill 363. [Note Hill 363 has an observation plane above the ridge]**



5. Then on 6 February, an Easy Company patrol had a stiff fight with the enemy on Hill 363 about 4 kilometers east of the village.



**Virtual View: Move to the top of Hill 363 [below the observation plane] and look toward Sanggosong.**

6. On 7 February, Freeman sent the 2d Battalion to the same area to development the situation. That patrol also withdrew after getting into a fight with a large enemy force near Sanggosong.

**Virtual View: Remain at Hill 363 and look east toward Hill 444.**

7. Between 7 and 11 February one particularly strong position was discovered on Hill 444 some 11 kilometers east of Chip'yong-ni.
  - a. Freeman sent a battalion east, and the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, came north from the Yoju area to reduce the enemy strongpoint.
  - b. The latter battalion occupied the height on the 11th and thus held the 2d Division position closest to the ROK 8<sup>th</sup> Division.

**VISUAL 5B: COMMUNIST COUNTER-ATTACK AGAINST OPERATION ROUNDUP**  
(Unless noted details from Leadership in the Crucible, 144-148). **[The PPT builds on the visuals are IAW the discussion below.]**

1. At the same time as the 23d Infantry conducted aggress patrolling around Chip'yong-ni, the X Corps continued to attack toward Hongch' on as part of Operation Roundup.
  - a. The 23d IN continued with the mission to protect the Corps left flank at Chip'yong-ni
  - b. By the 11<sup>th</sup> the 5th and 8th ROK Divisions were in the vicinity of Hongch' on.

- c. The 2d US Division followed in support at was in the vicinity of Hoengsong.
2. **11- 13 Feb: The X Corps fought the Battle of Hoengsong to stem the communist advance.**
- a. The communist Offensive pushed the ROK Divisions back to Hoengsong.
  - b. The communist main effort was to push toward Wonju, however the offense also set the condition for other units to isolate Chipyong-ni.
  - c. Early morning 12 February (0215), the 23d RCT received word that CCF and NKPA units had initiated a massive counter attack near Hoengsong (approximately 20 miles NE of Chipyong-ni) and that the X Corps and ROK III had been hard hit. – Actual message:  
  
**From Div: 3d Bn 38<sup>th</sup> Inf being attacked from North & West. 21<sup>st</sup> ROK coming down to the South hit a roadblock and are in a mess. Don't know results. They have wounded. 21<sup>st</sup> ROK is falling back 2000 yds. 23d ROK Regt also falling back thru 187 RCT. Higher HQ putting out the order to 9<sup>th</sup> Inf to be prepared on 3 hrs notice to assemble at YOJU. A similar order is given to the 38<sup>th</sup> Inf to asssemble at WONJU. They might be two reason for this order, to support us or to establish blocking psn along line MUNMANG-NI to HUNGHO-RI. This is a warning order.**
  - d. Col Freeman at Chipyong-ni recognized the significance of the WO. **If the 1/9<sup>th</sup> IN currently on Hill 444 and if they pull back the gap between 23d RCT and X Corps could be as much as 12 miles.**
  - e. Freeman made the decision to curtail the aggressive patrolling and to prepare the perimeter for a deliberate defense.
  - f. On 12 February, 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion's I&R Platoon patrolled to the north and discovered the Chinese massing in large units.
3. **The 2d Division fought a delaying action to the south and by 13 Feb was defending the Wonju Line**
- a. During the withdrawal, both 2d Division and the X Corps requested permission to withdraw 23d IN from Chipyong-ni
  - b. However, LTG Ridgeway was adamant that the 23d IN needed to protect the right flank of the IX Corps and ordered the 23d to defend Chipyong-ni.
  - c. By the 12<sup>th</sup> of Feb, Col Freeman recognized that the 23d US IN would be besieged at Chipyong-ni.

<b>ANALYSIS</b>
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1. What was the significance of the 23d Regiment's aggressive patrolling?
  - a. Provided the regiment with a significant understanding of the terrain beyond the defensive perimeter.
  - b. Delayed the CCF attack against Chipyong-ni for one or more days. Col Freeman pulled all units into a tight perimeter by the end of the 12<sup>th</sup> and expected an attack that night. The CCF did not attack until the night of the 13<sup>th</sup>.
    - a. Delayed the CCF by several days in establishing supply sites near the perimeter to support artillery and mortar fire against the American position.
    - b. Also delayed the CCF by several days in collecting intelligence on the defensive perimeter.
    - c. Baker Battery, 503d Field Artillery Battalion (Six towed 155-mm howitzers – African American Unit) joined the perimeter on the 12<sup>th</sup>.
    - d. Provide time for the 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry to organize a relief effort (arrived the night of the 14<sup>th</sup>).
2. **ACCEPT PRUDENT RISK: 2-24.** Commanders accept prudent risk when making decisions because uncertainty exists in all military operations. Prudent risk is a deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when the commander judges the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment as worth the cost (ADP 6-0). Opportunities come with risks. The willingness to accept prudent risk is often the key to exposing enemy weaknesses. **Evaluate Ridgway's decision to hold Chip'yong-ni IAW today's doctrine of "Prudent Risk."**

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**STAND 6  
Isolated and Encircled  
13 & 14 February 1951**

**VISUALS**

<b>Visual</b>
Visual 6A: The First Night, Chinese Attacks On 13 Feb
Visual 6B: The Night Attack Against the 2d Battalion, 13 Feb
Visual 6C: 14 Feb at Chipyong-ni (Early Morning Attacks and Daytime Resupply)

**ORIENTATION**

**Virtual View:** Birds Eye overview of Chipyong-ni from the south looking to the north.

- 1. No change from previous orientation**

**DESCRIPTION**

**VISUAL 6A: THE FIRST NIGH, CHINESE ATTACKS ON 13 FEB** [No PPT builds]

- 1. 23<sup>rd</sup> RCT Mission.**
  - Task: Defend vic Chipyong-ni
  - Purpose:
    - Deny enemy use of the road net.
    - Hold the left flank of line 2-2 until 3<sup>rd</sup> ROK DIV (X Corps Reserve) can deploy and attack to the north.
- 2. 12 February.**
  - During the day aerial observers reported “major movements” around Chipyong-ni.
    - 155mm howitzers engage CCF artillery and pack trains north of the town.

(2) Patrols return with Chinese prisoners; interrogation identifies elements of 5 Chinese divisions in the area.

b. Except for minor probing night attacks, there are few engagements with the Chinese.

### 3. Daylight - 13 February.

a. COL Freeman holds a meeting with his commanders.

(1) He tells them *“that the regiment was probably surrounded but that he intended to stay and fight it out.”*

(2) CPT Bickford Sawyer, Easy Company’s commander, remembers *“When Colonel Freeman said at Chipyong, ‘We’re surrounded, but we’ll stay here and fight it out,’ we supported him with enthusiasm. There was never a doubt in our minds. We knew we were going to succeed.”*

b. The last replacements from division arrive before the fighting starts.

(1) LTC Edwards personally briefed his *“new men not to leave their positions until ordered out.”*

(2) Vignette: Private Seymour Harris, 2-23 RCT:

*Again it is bitterly cold. The snow creaks loudly underfoot. Even the tree limbs crack and make strange noises. The word is out. Tonight we will have 100% alert. Tonight is the night. There is no place to run, no place to pull back to. Our backs are to the wall. Colonel Freeman and Lieutenant Colonel Edwards have checked and rechecked our positions. They have personally checked fields of fire and made corrections where necessary.*

*Jesus I am praying. Not for my life but for the guts it will take to see me through this. I pray that I will not let anybody down. That I will be able to do what I came here to do...*

*Suddenly off to the southeast I hear automatic weapons fire. I do not recognize what kind of weapon that is firing...I see the tracers arcing through the night sky and hear the sound of bugles and shepherds’ horns.*

### **VISUAL 6A - CONTINUED: THE FIRST NIGHT, CHINESE ATTACKS ON 13 FEB**

**[The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below.]**

**Virtual View: Birds Eye overview of Chipyong-ni from the south.**

1. **Optional Chaplin Vignette:** In the 2d Battalion sector, the unit called upon the Chaplin to help with the preparations for defense. The battalion commander, LTC James Edwards recalled:

*“As the regiment prepared to defend the 2d Battalion grimly prepared for the worst, several of the officers asked the unofficial chaplain of the Battalion, Father Frank, to "Get on that direct line to J. C. Father Frank was a Roman Catholic Missionary priest who had been in KOREA for 15 years. He had become acquainted with the Battalion Commander when he had served a previous tour in KOREA When the Battalion had landed in PUSAN on 5 August 1950, Father Frank had been on the dock. In his thick Irish brogue he had asked the Battalion Commander if he could become the Battalion’s chaplain. He had escaped the invading Reds by five minutes and his mission had been burned to the ground. Since the Regiment was short of chaplains, the Battalion Commander had quickly secured the permission of the Army authorities and Father Frank the permission of his superior. Being an Irish neutral he could receive neither pay nor rank. In emergencies he conducted both Catholic and Protestant services. He was loved by all the officers and enlisted me. He was accused of having a "direct line to J. C. (Jesus Christ)", whereas the ordinary layman had to always go through too many switch board to get to J.C. When the Battalion got into a "hot spot" someone invariably asked Father Frank to get on that direct line to J. C. His answer now, as always, "Don't worry. The Man Above is on our side.” (Edwards, *The Siege of Chipyong-ni*).*

**Virtual View:** IAW the discussion below move to Star 1. At the 3d bunker up the hill from the road between C/1/23 and A/1/23 you can see the cows. See screen shot with Stand 4 for details on the bunker and road.

2. About 2200, Captain Ansil Walker remembered the attack began with a surreal incident: *“Dim outlines of three bony cows appeared in front of... A Company. As they tripped over a couple of flares and detonated an anti-personnel mine... The Chinese tactic of herding a few cows and running them into front-line area was well known. By doing so, the Chinese hoped that the defenders would become trigger-happy, and disclose front-line positions. In this instance, a single gun [fired].”* Barron, *High Tide in the Korean War*, 143.
3. Soon after the cow incident, small arms fire and mortar fires against the entire perimeter started about 2207, 13 FEB.
4. Just before midnight, an artillery barrage targets the northern sector.

**Virtual View:** IAW the discussion rise up in the air from the present location at Star 1 and look toward the Chinese Attacks at Star 2 north and Star 2 west.

5. As soon as it lifts, the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion and French Battalion are attacked.
  - a. The Chinese use the railroad tracks to move into position for attacking the French 1<sup>st</sup> Company near the railroad station.
  - b. When they rise over the railroad embankment, the French engage the Chinese with every weapon available.
  - c. The attack spreads until all perimeter units except the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion are engaged.

**Virtual View:** Move to the Quad-Fifty overlooking the railroad tunnel in the vicinity of Star 3.

- d. The Chinese also attacked E Company at about the same time. (Go To Next Slide).

**VISUAL 6B: THE NIGHT ATTACK AGAINST THE 2D BATTALION** [The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below.]

**Virtual View:** From the vicinity of the Quad-fifty (Star 1) look to Stars 2, 3, and 4 as noted in the discussion below. [See stand 4 for screen shot of Quad-fifty].

1. LTC Edwards narrative provides a detailed description of the attack against E Company.
2. At Easy Company's position a platoon-sized enemy force emerged from the railroad tunnel, followed by a company-sized force. (Near Star 2)
  - a. *"At about 2200, 13 February... The listening post in front of all companies came in and reported hearing many enemy massing in front of all units... At 2215 hour, two white flares went up in front of Company E's 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon and in front of Company G's 3d Platoon. Under a very heavy mortar barrage the Chinese attacked at about 2230..."*
  - b. *"A Chinese assault force of about one platoon came through the railroad tunnel in front of the right of the 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon... They were followed through the tunnel and over the tunnel hill by a reinforced rifle company. The entire force advanced down the slope toward the unnamed, four-hut village along the road in front of the 2d Platoon area. FPL artillery, mortar and machine gun fires were brought down and illuminating flares were fired. More Chinese forces appeared on the tunnel hill and fired small-arms at the 2d Platoon and thus gave the attack Chinese force covering fire. One machinegun was set up in the mouth of the Railroad tunnel and it swept the 2d Platoon area. Heavy mortar fire continue to fall on all three of Company E's platoons during the attack. The Chinese first wave assaulted right through the antipersonnel mines, trip flares and booby traps, taking heavy casualties. This wave was mowed down by the U.S. small-arms and machine gun fire. The tank[s] and M-16[s] (quad 50s) laid down a curtain of 50 caliber slugs in front of the 2d Platoon. The Chinese continued to come on in waves until they were all killed or wounded... One of the 75mm Recoilless Rifles of the 1<sup>st</sup> Section on NANCE HILL attempted to knock out the enemy machinegun and fired two rounds of 75mm at the entrance to the railroad tunnel in the light of illuminating flares. This brought down such a heavy concentration of enemy mortar fire upon the rifle, that its crew was forced to move down the hill into their Primary Positions on the MLR. Here they manned their 50 caliber machinegun; both 50 caliber machineguns of this section expended three boxes of ammunition in helping the 2d Platoon to stop the Chinese assault waves.... At 2240 hour, after the Chinese machinegun in the mouth of the Railroad tunnel had been in action about ten minutes, the 3.5" Rocket Launcher team of the 2d Platoon scored a direct hit on it... The light machine gun of the 3d platoon on NANCE HILL helped the 2d platoon to cut down the Chinese waves..."*

- c. *“At 2230 hours the Fougasse, gasoline mine, in the railroad tunnel went off with a bang. Flames spurted from both ends of the long tunnel... A Chinese patrol had tried to sneak through the tunnel again and had set off the Fougasse. The Chinese made no further attempts to use the tunnel for the remainder of the night...”*
  - d. *[About 2320] hour a second assault was launched [against the 2d platoon]. The waves of this assaulting force were cut down just as efficiently as the waves of the first assault had been.”*
  - e. **Near Star 3**, *“Meanwhile, at 2230 hours, 13 February 1951, about a reinforced company of Chinese hit the 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon... Preceded by an intense mortar barrage and supported by a machinegun on HILL 159..., the shrieking waves came up the road and creek bed... FPL artillery, mortar and machinegun fires were brought down in front of the 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon. Here as everywhere else around the perimeter, the first waves rushed right through the AP mines, trip-flares and booby-traps, taking heavy casualties. The veteran riflemen with the tremendous fire support of the 50 caliber machineguns of the two tanks and the two antiaircraft vehicles stopped each assault without any difficulty.”*
3. **Near Star 4:** A half-dozen Chinese corpses were piled up in front of the gully between the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> platoons – they had pushed a Bangalore torpedo under the barbed wire, but were killed before they could detonate it.

**Virtual View:** Move to the vicinity of Star 5 and look up the saddle toward Hill 397:

4. Simultaneously with the attacks against E Company, the Chinese also attack G Company.
- a. George Company’s position was located in a bulge along the Southside of the perimeter. .
    - (1) They had to reposition farther south when the 155mm battery arrived, putting the company on a low ridge that was not as dominant as the other American-held hills.
    - (2) The move also meant less time to prepare than the other companies.
  - b. Again, LTC Edwards’ narrative provides a detailed description of the attacks.
  - c. *“At 2205 hours, 13 February 1951, Company G’s listening posts came in and reported heavy enemy movements down the slopes of the massive mountain, HILL 397, and in the village of MASAN.”*

**Virtual View:** Move to west along the G Company line and look down into the village:

- d. *“At 2217 hours, enemy bugles were heard in front of 3d platoon of Company G. At 2220 hours, two white flares came up from the village of MASAN. Friendly artillery and mortar fire was brought down immediately on the village and slopes of HILL 397.*

*At 2220 hours, CURTS and McGEE HILLS started to receive enemy mortar and small-arms fire.”*

- e. *“At 2230 hours, the first “Manzai” attack was launched by the Chinese against CURTIS HILL. The Chinese charged right through the trip-flares, AP mines and booby –traps , callously taking their heavy casualties... the attack was stopped cold before it reached anywhere near the foxholes.”*

5. **The attacks against the 2d Battalion subsided just after midnight.**

**VISUAL 6C: 14 FEBRUARY AT CHIPYONG-NI (EARLY MORNING ATTACKS AND DAYTIME RESUPPLY) [The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below.]**

**Virtual View:** Move to the center of the village and rise up in the air and look toward Star 1:

1. **At about 0100 14 FEB attacks resume sequentially, first from the north against the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion.**

- (1) Charlie Company is pinned down by concentrated mortar fire.
- (2) The Chinese moved along the “finger” of high ground between Charlie and Able Company, and attempt a flank attack into Charlie Company.
- (3) Charlie’s defenders hold their fire until the Chinese reached the wire in front of their positions, then violently engaged the Chinese with their machine guns, machine guns from the anti-aircraft artillery battery, and tanks in the low ground to the right of the French position.

**Virtual View:** From the center of the village look to the west toward the Star 2 locations:

2. **About the same time as the attack against the 1<sup>st</sup> BN, the Chinese attack the French Battalion.**

**Virtual View:** Move to the vicinity of the RR Station at Star 3 and look to the west.

3. **At the railroad station, the French 1<sup>st</sup> Company endures serious pressure. .**

- (1) The Chinese were probably hoping to overrun the artillery positions behind them.
- (2) The French 2d company had the most exposed positions but good fields of fire.
- (3) Their supporting flakwagons dominated the terrain below Hill 248 as the Chinese tried to make their way across the open ground for their attack.
- (4) Two company-sized assaults rushed his position from the west and southwest and penetrate the line in spite of concentrated automatic weapons fire.
- (5) By 0215 CPT Francois DeCastries requests reinforcements.



- (a) Two squads from the reserve company reinforce him.
  - (b) Later the RCT headquarters provides support from George Company's machine guns and 4 tanks.
4. **Fires in the perimeter (started by Chinese mortar and artillery) silhouette the UNC forces in their positions.**
5. **The Chinese use these fires to improve the accuracy of their barrages.**
- a. Command posts, artillery and mortar positions, supply dumps, and aid stations are hardest hit.
  - b. The shelling impacts the Regimental CP, killing the S2 MAJ Harold Shoemaker.

**Virtual View:** Move back to the center of town and then from a Birds Eye view look toward Star 4"

6. **At 0215 new attacks against Company K in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion sector.**

- (1) King Company's ranks are thin – they are only at 60% strength, but they have more BARs than other companies and their fighting positions are two to four feet deep.
- (2) The Chinese got within hand grenade range, but overthrew them behind the foxholes. King's grenades were rolled down the hill into the attackers.
- (3) Two platoons from Item Company, which was not engaged on King's left, were sent to reinforce King's line.

**Virtual View:** Look toward Star 5:

7. **George Company had defeated an attack against their perimeter earlier in the night.**

- a. About 0230, the communist attacked again.
  - (1) Six separate squad-sized attacks hit the line, and a platoon-sized attack concentrates between the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> platoons from 0230 till 0330.
  - (2) The Chinese made some minor penetrations in the G Company line – but each time were pushed out.e some of the positions before being repulsed.
  - (3) At 0330 the last attack from Hill 397broke through the 3<sup>rd</sup> platoon position.
  - (4) The battalion reserve platoon is committed here and restores the defensive line.

**Virtual View:** Look toward Star 6:

8. **From about 0420 until near dawn, the Chinese attempted to break the Charlie Company line – all their attacks were beat back.**

**Virtual View: Look toward Star 7:**

**9. Most attacks had subsided by 0530 except for a final assault against the French 1<sup>st</sup> Company.**

- (1) The Chinese retreated behind a small ridge for a few minutes, but the French jumped out of their holes and charged with bayonets.
- (2) The French take 14 prisoners who are interrogated and confirm Freeman's estimate that the perimeter had been attacked by elements of 5 Chinese divisions with a total strength of about 30,000.

**Virtual View: Look toward Star 8:**

**10. COL Freeman is wounded.**

- a. Near dawn, COL Freeman is trying to catch some sleep in his tent when a 120mm mortar round impacts nearby.
- b. A shell fragment enters his left leg just above the ankle.
  - (1) CPT Robert Hall, the regimental surgeon, removes the fragment and dresses the wound.
  - (2) In spite of standard practice to evacuate a soldier with such a wound, Hall does not recommend it.
- c. In spite of his injury, Freeman and Monclar use the day to visit the fighting positions.
- d. Pvt. Seymour Harris describes Freeman's visit to his position:

*Freeman got down the best he could to check our fields of fire. When he saw the machine guns couldn't be depressed far enough to hit chinks if they got within eight to ten yards of the embankment we were on, he told O'Shell to make sure we had plenty of grenades just in case, and to warn ammo bearers like me to be ready to get out of the bunker and make with grenades and rifle fire.*

*I know he wanted to get in the bunker to see what he could see for himself, but his gimpy leg prevented that. This gives you a good idea of how thorough Colonel Freeman was in making sure everything was just right. He left nothing to chance.*

*As he started to leave that morning he turned to Stew and wished him luck. Stew said, "Good luck to you sir." As he passed me I'm sure he recognized me as a new man. He looked me hard in the eye and said, "Same to you, soldier." I nodded and said, "Same to you sir."*

*Colonel Freeman – I would have followed him into the deepest part of hell. He was a soldier's soldier.*

11. Word of Freeman's injury reaches the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division headquarters and Hall's recommendation against evacuating Freeman.
  - a. COL Epley, the division Chief of Staff, calls to ask about Freeman's condition.
    - (1) Hall tells Epley he believes evacuating Freeman is unwise, because the RCT expects another attack that night.
    - (2) He ***“stressed that morale was high and said he believed that this was because of the great respect and confidence the soldiers had for Freeman.”***
    - (3) He said he thought Freeman's presence was the main reason the perimeter was still intact.
  - b. However, when word of Freeman's injury reaches X Corps, General Almond orders Freeman's replacement without consulting the division commander.
    - (1) General Ruffner. Almond's operations officer, LTC John Chiles, will fly to Chipyong-ni and take command.
    - (2) Freeman is furious when he finds out, and tells Chiles to ***“stay out of his way until he decided to leave.”***
    - (3) He argues with Ruffner over the radio, but a long talk with the assistant division commander, General George Stewart, convinces Freeman to ***“come out – but at a time of his own choosing.”***

**Virtual View:** Look toward Star 9:

## 12. Resupply Challenges.

- a. Fighting results in critical shortages of mortar and small arms ammunition.
- b. At 1515, 24 air drops bring supplies into Chipyong-ni.
- c. Logisticians in Japan didn't send what the 23<sup>rd</sup> RCT needed most.
  - (1) Instead, they got water (which they got in the village)
  - (2) Gasoline (which they weren't consuming quickly because they weren't moving)
  - (3) Artillery ammunition (which they couldn't use at night because the Chinese were too close).
  - (4) No mortar ammunition was received, and all the small arms ammunition was delivered loose, not packed in clips needed for their M1 Garands.

- d. Freeman, who is already furious about being relieved, berates General Almond for the bungled delivery and told him it ***“was his responsibility to ensure the beleaguered garrison received what it needed.”***
- e. Ammunition will have to be rationed to survive the second night.

<b>ANALYSIS</b>
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1. Evaluate the failure of the air-resupply to deliver what the regiment needed.
2. Was Col Freeman correct in blaming General Almond for the botched resupply?

## STAND 7 Isolated and Encircled on the Second Night (14 &15 Feb)

### VISUALS

Visual
Visual 7A: Chinese Attacks the Night of 14 Feb
Visual 7B: G Company's Fight 14 Feb
Visual 7C: 2d Battalion Counter-Attacks

### ORIENTATION

**Virtual View:** Birds eye view from the center of the village looking toward Hill 397 and then to the northeast over I Company.

Same as previous orientations.

### DESCRIPTION

**VISUAL 7A: CHINESE ATTACKS THE NIGHT OF 14 FEBRUARY** [The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below.]

1. As darkness falls around 1900, the Chinese are seen emerging from their daytime hiding places and getting into their assault positions.
  - a. 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion observes movement on Hill 397, and 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion observes movement in the villages to the east.
  - b. Both targets are engaged with tank and artillery fire, the artillery being employed before the Chinese attacks moved inside their minimum range.
  - c. The Chinese have not pulled back far from the perimeter and their approach marches are shorter and attacks begin earlier in the evening.
  - d. The Chinese start with an hour-long barrage of artillery and mortar fire.
2. The Regimental estimate is that the main enemy attack will come in the 2d BN sector.

3. **About 2000, attacks resume around the entire perimeter.**

**Virtual View:** From the center of the village look toward Star 2:

4. **In most cases the attacks are similar to the previous night.**

- a. Wave attacks – mostly at company or platoon level – push through the AP mines up to the perimeter wire.
- b. LTC Edwards described the attack against E Company; *“The main Chinese attack at 2200 came down the draw just West of NO MAN’S Hill directly towards Company E’s 3d Platoon. The Chinese waves hit the wire. Company H’s 2d section of Heavy Machineguns on NANCE HILL and the light machinegun of Company F’s 2d Platoon switched to their FPLs which were along the wire. The 1<sup>st</sup> section of 75mm recoilless rifles on NANCE HILL manning their 50 caliber machineguns, were also firing along the wire from their primary positions near the MLR. The leading Chinese of each wave recklessly threw their bodies over the wire in an attempt to make human bridges, but their sacrifice of life was in vain. Wave after wave suffered the same fate. They just could not get through the bands of machinegun fire... After about 30 minutes of this slaughter the Chinese broke and beat a hasty retreat into the darkness.”*
- c. All along the regimental perimeter, most of the attacks failed to penetrate the wire and are forced back after about 2 hours.
- d. The Chinese then transition to direct and indirect fire against the perimeter and in some places continue to threaten to push forward more wave attacks – this is especially true in the E Company sector.

**Virtual View:** Move to the vicinity of Star 3:

5. **However in the G Company sector the Chinese attacks continued unabated.**

**VISUAL 7B: G COMPANY’S FIGHT, 14 FEB. [The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below.]**

**Virtual View:** From the vicinity of Star 1 look to the SE:

1. **As along the rest of the perimeter, the first wave hit G Company’s 3d platoon about 2000.**
2. **However, unlike the rest of the perimeter the wave attacks continued along the company front unabated for about 4+ hours.**
  - (1) Overtime, the Chinese attacks caused numerous casualties among G Company.
  - (2) LT Heath, the company commander, committed his company reserve, and then sent the clerks and drivers forward to hold the line.

(3) LT Heath, tried unsuccessfully, to get B/503 Artillery to join the fight as infantry.

**Virtual View:** Shift slight to the west to the vicinity of Star 2. Occupy a covered fighting position IAW the discussion below:

b. About 0115, a Chinese demolition squad probed 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> platoons, and seized two foxholes at the left end of 1<sup>st</sup> platoon:

(1) LTC Edwards recalled: *“The attacks against Company G was increasing in intensity. It had continued for hours and the Chinese waves were almost at the MLR, which now had many gaps in it... At 0115 hours [actually about 2200]<sup>2</sup>,... special Chinese assault groups reached the foxholes on the Western nose of McGee Hill. Placing their pole-charges, consisting of 6 blocks of TNT tied to a long pole, on top of the overhead cover of the foxholes and emplacements that blew them in... Overwhelming numbers had triumphed over the gallant defenders.”*

(2) Lieutenant Paul McGee (3d Plt) remembered, *“They’d push that pole right up to the edge of our holes. We stopped a lot of them, but once they got a satchel charge into a hole, it was too late. They were using grenades and small arms to try to keep the occupants of the foxholes down to where they could get close enough to deposit their satchel charges.”* (Barron, *High Tide*, 175).

c. The Chinese set up a machine gun in the captured holes and fire into the 3<sup>rd</sup> platoon’s flank.

**3. The 3<sup>rd</sup> platoon leader, LT. McGee, suspects 1<sup>st</sup> platoon line is broken, but has difficulty getting an accurate assessment. .**

a. McGee calls the company commander – Lieutenant Thomas Heath.

b. Heath is in the vicinity of the 60mm Mtrs and is not aware of 1<sup>st</sup> plt’s situation.

c. Heath calls the 1<sup>st</sup> Plt Ldr, MSG Emory Toth. – Toth had elected to put his command post behind the ridge line and he is unaware of the break in his line.

d. Toth calls SFC Donal Schmitt (the 1<sup>st</sup> Plt Sgt).

e. Schmitt is on the far right flank of the plt and is also unaware the Chinese have broken into his left flank squad.

(1) Within Schmitt’s immediate vision both the right flank and center squad are holding the Chinese at bay and he reports that 1<sup>st</sup> Plt is holding.

**4. The 23d Regiment’s perimeter has been pierced and the only one that understands the gravity of the situation is LT McGee (G Company, 3d Plt Ldr).**

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<sup>2</sup> Barron, *High Tide*, 175 and Hamburger, *Leadership*, 177.

5. **McGee calls to his squad leaders to warn them of approaching Chinese, but the machine gun in 1<sup>st</sup> platoon's former positions has them pinned down.**


**Virtual View: IAW the discussion move along the 3d platoon line toward Star 3:**

6. **The Chinese methodically moving from position to position, exploiting a successful flank attack against the 3d Pt.**
7. **By 2300, the Chinese had pushed LT McGee out of his command post and he no longer had wire communication with the CO HQ, and he sends a runner to the company CP to request men, ammunition, and litter teams.**
8. **LT. Heath (G Company Commander) gets 15 men from the artillery battery to assist McGee, but they faltered getting to 3<sup>rd</sup> platoon – more than once. He recalls yelling at them: *“Goddammit, get back up on that hill! You’ll die here anyway. You might as well go up on the hill and die there!”***
9. **Captain John Elledge, the 37<sup>th</sup> Artillery Liaison Officer, did form a squad of 10 artillerymen with a 50 Cal. HMG and they reinforced the 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon line.**
10. **About 2400, LT Heath finally informs the battalion CP that his MLR has been penetrated.**

**Virtual View: IAW the discussion look toward Star 4:**

11. **Around 0045 (15 Feb) a Fox Company squad from the support platoon arrives and attacks into the saddle between the platoons.**
  - a. **But after 10 minutes of fighting they are all killed or wounded.**
  - b. **At 0100 another Fox Company squad reinforces McGee's Platoon.**
12. **McGee and a Fox Company LT attempt to counterattack and restore the line, but is unsuccessful.**





**VISUAL 7C: 2D BATTALION COUNTER-ATTACKS. [The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below.]**

**Virtual View:** Move from the former position (Star 3, 7B) retreat back to Star 1 (Heath Ridge). The ridge is little more than a barely noticeable inter-visibility line. From the G Company Hill move north back through the howitzers and past the quad 50 halftrack. Soon you will go down a slight incline toward the Chipyong-ni. Then turn around 180 degrees and slowly move back uphill until you can barely see the halftrack. This is the inter-visibility line referred to as Heath Ridge.

1. About 0200, LT McGee is forced to abandon the position, and he withdraws off the hill with his platoon sergeant and 5 other men, and have to fight their way through Chinese who had gotten behind them.
2. 2d Platoon and 3d Platoon are also forced back.
3. The G Company remnants establish a new line along Heath Ridge (Star 1) – most of the artillerymen continue to hold their guns between the lines.
4. At approximately 0300, LTC Edwards, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion Commander, informed regiment that G Company positioned had collapsed.
  - a. LTC Edwards organized a counterattack force of several squads.
  - b. Col. Freeman sends a platoon from the Rangers.

c. LT Robert Curtis (BN Asst. S-3) was the designated to command the counter-attack.

- (a) Curtis finds a desperate situation in G Company's sector: most of the key leaders are wounded and confusion prevailed.

Vignette: LT Curtis recounts what happened next: *All of the George Company and Fox Company leaders and their men were ready and willing to attack. At that time, we had three 60mm mortars, three tanks, and light machine gun fires to support the attack, plus the possibility of a quad-.50 caliber weapon that was sitting at an angle on a nearby trail but was inoperable in that position. I couldn't find the 81mm mortar observer and the company had lost contact with the [heavy] mortar fire direction center. The crew assigned to the quad-.50 had left the area but I knew the tankers knew how to fire the weapon. I was told we had some artillerymen forward of the command post but that they were guarding their howitzers and I did not count on their assistance in the attack because I didn't know how effective they would be as infantry, especially under the conditions we were in.*

- (b) There are difficulties with the Rangers.

(1) Their company commander (1<sup>st</sup> Lt Alred Herman) was with their platoon, and he did not want to take orders from a staff officer, insisting only COL Freeman had the authority to give him orders.

(2) Herman is ok with the assault, but against staying to hold the line – the rangers have no Machineguns or recoilless rifles –they wanted to attack and return to being the reserve.

(3) Curtis tells them there is no one left, and they will have to hold until later in the morning when they can be relieved.

- (c) Curtis, afraid of wasting more time: *I called Colonel Edwards and explained to him that the Rangers wanted a direct order from Colonel Freeman before they would attack and that they refused to attack under my command since he and his platoon leader outranked me. I told him I had taken command of the breakthrough area and asked him to send a senior captain or a major to the area as soon as possible, either to take command or to back up my orders.*

- (d) Captain Ramsburg, **the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion Intelligence Officer**, arrived and assumed control of the situation. Curtis stays on to assist Ramsburg: *Captain Ramsburg and I proceeded to the George Company CP where he called a commanders meeting and laid out his plan of attack. This still left the rangers on the right flank of the attack. The Ranger Company commander still didn't believe the defense of the area was a suitable mission for his men but Captain Ramsburg straightened him out with a few choice words that left little doubt of who was in command and what was going to take place.*

- (e) Ramsburg eventually orders the Ranger company commander to escort the wounded out of the area, temporarily removing the source of difficulty with the rangers.
- d. It took two hours to organize the counterattack on the Chinese in G Company's sector.

**Virtual View: From Star 1 move back up the hill IAW the discussion below:**

**5. At 0500, the force started up the hill, two hours before sunrise.**

- (1) The Rangers are able to seize their portion of the line before the others, but the Chinese waited until they crested the hill to open fire, resulting in many casualties.
- (2) CPT Ramsburg is wounded by a Chinese mortar shrapnel in the foot. LT Heath, seeing that Ramsburg is wounded, goes up the hill to take charge.
  - (a) After a few minutes, Ramsburg starts up the hill and meets a soldier dragging a wounded man down the hill, and tries to send him back up the hill. But the soldier shows him he is seriously wounded.
  - (b) Ramsburg also asks about the soldier he is dragging. It is LT Heath, seriously but not fatally wounded in the chest.
- (3) Curtis suggests Ramsburg return to the CP to organize the next counterattack, and heads up the hill to take charge.
  - (a) Curtis finds chaos and disorganization at the top of the hill.
  - (b) All the participants were wounded and heading down; only 3 wounded Fox Company soldiers remained who told him they were the last ones coming off the hill.

**Virtual View: Return to Star 1.**

- b. Ramsburg tries to organize another counterattack.
  - (1) He orders Curtis to get any men he can round up to establish a defensive position on the knoll in front of the company CP.
  - (2) The Ranger company commander returned after evacuating the wounded and insists on taking his men back to the rear.
  - (3) Ramsburg, disgusted, orders them all back in spite of the loss of a substantial number of men.

- (4) Curtis is able to find a squad leader and five men from Fox company and eight men from George company, and supplements them with any *“warm body he could find – mortarmen, wiremen, cooks, and radiomen”*, twenty five in all.
  - (a) Puzzled by the low number, he searches the hillside again for survivors.
  - (b) He finds the artillerymen still manning their 155mm howitzers.
    - (1) He informs them there are no infantry to their front, and they reply they will not abandon their guns.
    - (2) Their lieutenant agrees to set up a defensive line in front of their positions and provide supporting fire.
  - (c) Curtis continues his search, but hears digging on the crest of the hill and Chinese voices.
  - (d) He leaves quickly and moves to the tanks on the right flank, positioning them to support a defense against a Chinese attack down the hill.

c. Curtiss delays until dawn.

- (1) When he returns to Ramsburg at the CP, a number of Chinese start down the hill.
  - (a) Thinking it was the lead element of an attack, Curtis suggests Ramsburg get the wounded to the rear.
  - (b) To his surprise, Ramsburg orders everyone back to establish “a new defensive position.”

**Virtual View:** Move to the howitzer. IAW the discussion turn one of the howitzer around to simulate direct fire onto the hill.

- (2) Curtis is unable to stop the men at the CP from following Ramsburg, so he returns to the line he established near the artillery, now reduced to 15 men.
  - (a) After reassuring them they were going to survive, he moves to the artillery position.
    - (1) In a light-hearted exchange with the artillery officers, he asks if they can do anything to help.
    - (2) The artillerymen assemble a gun crew, turn the howitzer towards the crest of the hill where the Chinese were (the reverse slope of the G Company hill) and direct fire six white phosphorous rounds into it.
  - (b) The tanks follow suit and fire into the low valley to the south, ricocheting the rounds off the frozen ground.

(c) Curtis hopes the display of firepower will discourage the Chinese from attacking.

(3) The valley remains silent until dawn.

**Virtual View: IAW the discussion below move back to Star 1:**

(4) Around 0700, the artillerymen abandon their guns and fell back to Heath Ridge.

(5) Just before daybreak, the Chinese enter their empty positions.

**Virtual View: From the present location look toward Star 2:**

d. The French attempt on George Company's hill.

(1) Ten soldiers from the French 1<sup>st</sup> Company, supported by the 3 tanks in the cut between them and G Company's old foxholes, make a run for the hilltop.

(2) Twenty meters from the crest, they get into a grenade fight with the Chinese.

(3) Pinned down by Chinese machine gun fire and unsupported by reinforcements, they withdraw at 0820.

**Virtual View: IAW the discussion below attack up the hill.**

## 6. Daylight and Baker Company's counterattack.

a. COL Freeman orders Baker Company, his last reserve except for the engineer company, to attempt retaking George Company's old positions.

b. Before mid-morning, Baker's commander CPT Sherman Pratt gets a briefing from LTC Edwards at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion CP (which has moved closer to the G Company position), then moves forward to coordinate his attack with the tanks in George Company's sector.

c. Pratt's two platoons start their counterattack at 1000.

(1) LTC Edwards reported, *"Preceded by a ten minute artillery and mortar preparation on SCMITT, McGEE and CURTIS HILLS, Company B jumped off at 1015... As they attempted to go over the crest they were literally swept off the crest by a hail of hand grenades ... and a solid curtain of machinegun bullets."*

(2) The tanks are unable to climb the slope because of the snow.

(3) Baker Company withdraws partway down the hill's northern slope.

d. Baker Company makes another attempt after F-80 airstrikes on the hill, first strafing and then dropping napalm on the Chinese.

(1) The two platoons move up the two small hills.

- (2) They are engaged with small arms fire as they move towards the base of the hills, then mortars impact around them two-thirds of the way up.
- (3) They get within 5 meters of the crest and throw grenades over the top.
- (4) But within a few minutes, the Chinese begin flanking the right platoon.
- (5) The counterattack withdraws under pressure after running out of grenades.
- (6) LTC Edwards recorded, “[I] saw that this was a useless slaughter, so [I] ordered both platoons to withdraw to the base of the two hills and requested air strikes from Regiment.”

### ANALYSIS

**Evaluate the 2d BN’s effort to organize an effective counterattack and why those attacks failed.**

**Page not used**

**STAND 8**  
**The Second Day of Siege**  
**15 February 1952**

**VISUALS**

**Visual**

Visual 8: The Second Day of the Siege

**ORIENTATION**

**Virtual View:** Initially from the Star 1, 7C and look back toward the airfield.

No Change from the previous stand

**DESCRIPTION**

**VISUAL 8, THE SECOND DAY OF THE SIEGE** [The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below.]

**1. Air resupply and evacuating the wounded.**

- a. Air drops resume midmorning, but still do not deliver the critically important mortar or small-arms ammunition.
- b. Army liaison planes dropped some small arms ammunition, this time in the needed clips for fast reloading.
- c. Medical supplies are also dropped, and helicopters start evacuating the wounded.
  - (1) Twenty of the more seriously wounded are carried out by the underpowered machines.
  - (2) One of the wounded is COL Freeman, who finally leaves his regiment around noon.

**2. Keeping pressure on the Chinese.**

- a. LTC Chiles is now in command



- (1) There is little he can do – the last of the regimental reserves have been committed to the 2d Battalion sector.
- (2) He allows RCT XO, LTC Meszar, to continue running the siege.

**Virtual View:** From the Star 1, 7C and look back toward the hill.

- b. Several airstrikes pound the Chinese through the rest of the day, but cannot force the Chinese out of George Company's old foxholes.
- c. The airstrikes boost morale in the perimeter. As one man put it:

*One major feeling at Chipyong-ni was the tremendous lift I got from the air force making napalm bombing and strafing runs on the surrounding hillsides. Apparently their method was to have the jets drop the napalm to flush the enemy and then the following plane would be a propeller driven unit for strafing. The jets would merely get a couple of very short bursts off during a run whereas the prop planes could fire nearly continuously and actually chase fleeing enemy. The tremendous lift in spirit mentioned above came when they were finished. They would make a very low-level "barrel-roll" run through the valley. The speed, the noise, the barrel-roll victory symbol all added to waving and indeed there was spontaneous cheering by us in the perimeter.*

**3. The regimental situation is critical.**

- a. The Chinese have a partial break in the 23d perimeter.
- b. The regiment does not have enough small-arms and mortar ammunition to fight through another night of Chinese assaults.

**4. Nevertheless, morale in the 23<sup>rd</sup> RCT remains high.**

- a. At noon, Task Force Crombez, the relief force from the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, radioed their position near Koksuri, less than four miles away.
- b. The men of the 23d are confident the relief force will get there before dark.

**Virtual View:** IAW the discussion show the attack up the hill. Then shift to the west to show the tank attack along the road. Stop at the obstacle.

**5. Around 1500, LTC Edwards organized another counter-attack to reestablish the Company G line.**

- a. He directed the BN S-3 (Cpt Perry Sager) to organized a task force ( TF-S) using a tank platoon and a P&A squad to attack SCHMITT HILL from the south while Company B attacked from the north.

- b. At about 1530, TF-S attempted to break through the obstacles and mines west of SCHMITT HILL – however, Chinese small arms fire and bazooka fire stopped TF-S.

**Virtual View:** IAW the discussion show the tank attack along the road. Break through the obstacle and swing around behind the G Company Hill.

6. **LTC Edwards attached the Ranger Company to TF-S and another attempt was made at about 1610.**
  - a. With more infantry support the tanks were able to break through and get to the south side of the hill while Baker Company attacked from the north.
  - b. LTC Edwards recalled, *“The rifle fire of the Rangers and the P&A squad killed most of the Chinese bazooka men and forced the remainder to ... stay in their foxholes... The 4 tanks by themselves now raced about 150 yards south on the road and began firing their cannons and machineguns rapidly at hundreds of Chinese now clearly seen on the reverse slopes of CURTIS, McGEE, and SCHMITT HILLS, in MASAN and on the western slopes of HILL 397.”*
  - c. LTC Edwards stated the just before dusk there was a *“psychological moment about 1630”* and *The Chinese started to run...”*

**Virtual View:** IAW the discussion look to south to discuss the arrival of TF Crombez.

7. **The “psychological moment” was the arrival of the 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment (US).**
8. **The 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment (US) was the IX Corps Reserve when the siege of Chipyong-ni began.**
  - a. On 13 February it received orders to cross the Han River and proceed to Yoju to protect the IX Corps right flank.
  - b. Midafternoon on the same day, it was redirected north from Yoju to Koksuri, and from there northeast to Chipyong-ni.
  - c. The other potential relief force, the British 29<sup>th</sup> Brigade, was advancing on a more direct route, but was delayed by heavy enemy contact on their route.
9. **The 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment, organized as TF Crombez on 14 February (during the first attacks on the 23<sup>rd</sup> RCT).**
  - a. It was composed of 3 infantry battalions with a combat engineer company, 2 field artillery battalions, and a medium tank company.
  - b. At the end of the day, the Task Force was just short of Koksuri, forced to stop for the night because of a blown bridge. They are now 7 miles from Chipyong-ni.

- 10. On the morning of 15 FEB, the plan is to clear the ridges on either side of the road to Chipyong-ni to ensure safe passage for the tanks.**
  - a. One battalion is dedicated to each side of the road, and the third battalion is kept in reserve.
  - b. Stiff resistance from the Chinese slows TF Crombez' advance that morning.
  - c. There is enormous pressure on the 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry to reach the 23<sup>rd</sup> RCT before the end of the day (the 23d lacks the ammunition to fight off another night of attacks).
  - d. After an aerial reconnaissance, it is decided that only an "audacious dash by an armored column could reach Chipyong-ni that day."
- 11. The 23 tanks are ordered to dash up the road, supported by 160 infantrymen from 3-5 CAV's Love Company and 4 engineers.**
  - a. The engineers ride the second tank to clear any mines found on the road.
  - b. The infantry ride the tanks behind the engineers to defend against the Chinese on the ridges.
  - c. Neither the infantry nor the tankers have practiced this tactic.
  - d. A truck is dedicated to pick up stragglers if they get separated from the tanks.
- 12. The column is immediately engaged when it enters Koksuri.**
  - a. The infantry dismount (or are knocked off the tanks when the turrets rotated to engage targets).
  - b. When the firing subsides, the tanks are ordered forward without notifying the infantry. About 30 are left behind.
- 13. About a mile outside Koksuri they are engaged again, and the same mistake is made not notifying the infantry when the tanks resume the march.**
  - a. This time, between seventy and 100 men are left behind, including the company commander and a battalion commander.
  - b. Both are taken prisoner.
- 14. What remains on the tanks proceeds forward under constant fire from the Chinese.**
- 15. The most severe fighting occurs in the cut just south of Chipyong-ni, where the Chinese fail to disable the first three tanks but kill the turret crew of the fourth tank, but the driver gets it off the road to avoid blocking it.**
- 16. TF Crombez arrives just as Task Force -S breaks through to the south of Schmitt Hill.**

17. **Baker Companies attack from the north and the arrival of TF Crombez are apparently too much for the Chinese.**
18. **The Chinese in the area break contact and run from the hills – the panic among the Chinese forces soon spreads**
19. **LTC Edwards recalled, “Thousands of Chinese on all the close and distant hills could now be seen running in long files away from the perimeter. Every available rifleman and weapon on and inside the perimeter began firing and there were more targets than weapons. Two Chinese Armies were in complete panic! The Chinese ran like terror-stricken deer and stumbled over their own dead and wounded in their wild desire to get away from the perimeter. At 1700 hours, Easy Company again trapped a large group of fleeing Chinese in the draw south of its third platoon area and killed most of them by fire. Air, artillery, tanks and AA had a field day hitting the more distant targets. The riflemen, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and mortars hit the close in targets. The din was terrific with all weapons firing. It was like shooting ducks on a pond.”**
20. **The Chinese had no fight left in them. Except for more flare activity as they searched for their wounded, there was no activity through the remainder of the night.**
  - a. All very fortunate – TF Crombez brought no ammunition through to the besieged regiment.
  - b. Crombez’s infantry and supply trucks would not arrive until the next morning (16 Feb).
21. **On 16 FEB, only a few rounds of artillery fire fell inside the perimeter, and patrols to reestablish contact with the Chinese found no enemy within a mile of Chipyong-ni.**
22. **On 20 FEB, General MacArthur flew in from Tokyo and presented a second Presidential Unit Citation to the 23<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Regiment and to the French Battalion.**

## ANALYSIS

1. **FM 3-0, Chapter 2, Capabilities and Training states the following:**
  - a. The *sustainment warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance.
  - b. The availability of supplies and materiel to sustain tactical unit operations becomes critical to extend operational reach as large-scale combat operations progress. Operational reach is reduced when supplies fail to keep up with the demand of tactical units. Slow or limited resupply may require commanders to use controlled supply rates for various classes of supply to reduce unit expenditures. When those controlled supply rates are not sufficient to continue operations, the force culminates.

2. In regards to the siege of Chip'yong-ni, evaluate the doctrinal statement, "When those controlled supply rates are not sufficient to continue operations, the force culminates." **Why and how did the 23d RCT extend reach and prolong endurance?**

## STAND 9

### UNC Resumes the Offense and Stalemate on the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel

#### VISUALS

##### Visual

**9: UNC Resumes the Offense and Stalemate on the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel**

#### ORIENTATION

**Virtual View: None**

No orientation

#### DESCRIPTION

**VISUAL 9A: FEBRUARY – APRIL 1951** [The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below.]

1. The 23<sup>rd</sup> Regiment's successful defense at Chipyong-ni along with the 2d Division's defense of the Wonju line broke the back of the Chinese offense.
2. All along the line UNC troops resumed offensive action.
3. On 14 March I Corps recaptured Seoul, and by mid-April Ridgway's forces had reached 'Line Utah', just inside North Korea.

**VISUAL 9B: COMMUNIST SPRING 1951 OFFENSES** [The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below.]

1. The Chinese attempted to resume offensive operations in the spring, but the UNC forces held firm.
2. The UNC forces also defeated a Chinese Second Spring Offensive in mid-May.
3. The UNC ceased large scale offensive operations and fortified Line Wyoming with trenches, wire, mines and artillery.

4. **In June the USSR announced that they believed the war in Korea could be settled by negotiations.**

**VISUAL 9C: STALEMATE [The PPT builds on Visual are IAW the discussion below.]**

1. **UNC, USSR, South and North Korea supported the negotiations. However, China believed the negotiations threaten their newly won image as a major world power.**
2. **In late August China broke off the negotiations.**
3. **Fighting resumed and included the battles of the Punchbowl, Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge.**
4. **At Heartbreak Ridge (13 Sept to 15 Oct):**
  - a. **The combat borne by the 9<sup>th</sup> and 23rd Infantry Regiments of the 2d Division, along with the attached French Battalion.**
  - b. **The division suffered 3,700 casualties.**
  - c. **Heartbreak Ridge was the UNC last major offense in the war and the last major combat action for the 23d Infantry in the Korean conflict.**
5. **China agreed to reopen negotiations on 25 Oct 1951.**
6. **Negotiations proceeded slowly with little progress. Most of the fighting limited patrols and outpost clashes.**
7. **Throughout January 1952, massive air and artillery strikes rained down on Chinese positions to inflict casualties and convince the Chinese to start serious negotiations.**
8. **Finally, on July 27 at 1000 in the city of Panmunjom all sides agreed to an armistice.**
9. **By the terms of the armistice, the line of demarcation between North and South Korea closely approximated the front line as it existed at the final hour and represented a relatively small adjustment of the prewar division.**
10. **Within three days of the signing of the armistice, each opposing force withdrew two kilometers from this line to establish a demilitarized zone.**

**ANALYSIS**

- A. **Why was the 23d Infantry able to successfully defend Chipyong-ni against overwhelming odds? (A follow-on integration question could focus on what insights can we take for today in regards to the successful defense of Chipyong-ni).**
- B. **What can we learn from the relationship between the 23d Regiment and the French Battalion at the Battle of the Twin Tunnels and the Battle of Chipyong-ni.**