


# **STAFF RIDE WALKBOOK**

## **Combat Action in Korea: The Lost Patrol (27-30 January 1951)**

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**Combat Studies Institute**  
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## **The Lost Patrol Staff Ride**

**Stand 1: Overview of the Korean War (June 1950 to Jan 1951)**

**Stand 2: The Lost Patrol**

**Stand 3: Initial Contact at the Twin Tunnels**

**Stand 4: Defending the Hill Top**

**Stand 5: The Relief Effort**

**Stand 6: After the Lost Patrol**

Yellow highlighted text refers to terrain movements on the virtual terrain.

Blue highlights refer to visual aids to be displayed from the PowerPoint visual aids package.

**Page not used- Walkbook formatted for printing on both sides.**

**STAND 1**  
**Overview of the Korean War**  
**June 1950 – January 1951**

**VISUALS**

| Visual                                   |
|--|
| Visual 1A : Korea                        |
| Visual 1B: June to September 1950        |
| Visual 1C: September to November 1950    |
| Visual 1D: November 1950 to January 1951 |
| Visual 1E: Operation Thunderbolt         |

**ORIENTATION**

**Virtual View: No virtual view for Stand 1.**

**Orientation: Not needed for Stand 1.**

**DESCRIPTION**

**VISUAL 1A: KOREA.** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is Excerpt from CMH Pub 19-6, *The Korean War – The Outbreak* (Center of Military History), 1-5  
**[The PPT builds on the Visual are IAW the discussion below.]**

**1. The Korean Peninsula**

- a. Korea is a mountainous peninsula jutting from the central Asian mainland with a shape that resembles the state of Florida.
  - (1) Korea varies between 90 and 200 miles in width and 525 to 600 miles in length.
  - (2) Water outlines most of this small country, which has more than 5,400 miles of coastline and thousands of small islands.

- b. The Yalu and Tumen Rivers define much of its northern boundary, while major bodies of water are located on its other sides: the Sea of Japan on the east, the Korea Strait on the south, and the Yellow Sea on the west.
  - c. China lies above the Yalu and Tumen Rivers for 500 miles of Korea's northern boundary as does the former Soviet Union for some eleven miles along the lower Tumen River.
  - d. High mountains drop down abruptly to deep water on the east where there are few harbors, but a heavily indented shoreline on the south and west provides many harbors.
  - e. Summers are hot and humid, with a monsoon season that lasts from June to September, but in the winter cold winds roar down from the Asian interior.
  - f. In 1950 the country's population totaled about 30 million: 21 million south of the 38th Parallel, with 70 percent of the people engaged in agriculture, and 9 million north
2. A rugged landscape, a lack of adequate roads and rail lines, and climatic extremes make large-scale modern military operations in Korea difficult.

**PHASES OF THE KOREAN WAR, JUNE –SEPTEMBER 1950.** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from CMH Pub 19-6, *The Korean War – The Outbreak* (Center of Military History), 5-25 **[The PPT builds on the Visual are IAW the discussion below.]**

- 1. **(Visual 1B: June to September 1950):** The invasion by North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) in June 1950 had driven the UN forces into a headlong retreat to the Pusan Perimeter.
  - a. 25 Jun: The Attack.
  - b. 27 Jun: Captured Seoul.
  - c. 5 Jul: Battle of Osan (TF Smith): Communist forces brushed aside a token force of US troops at Osan.
  - d. On 20 July they crushed a more determined stand at Taejon.
  - e. 1 Aug - 14 Sep: Pusan Perimeter.
    - (1) At Pusan US reinforcements arrived and, with ROK troops established a 200-mile defensive line in south-eastern Korea, around the port of Pusan.
    - (2) One of early reinforcements was the 2d Infantry Division which included the 23d Infantry Regiment.
      - (a) 5 Aug: The 23d Infantry disembarked at Pusan.

- (b) 19 Aug: Fought in the Battle of Taegu to stabilize the perimeter.
  - (c) 1- 14 Sept: Participated in the heavy fighting along Nakong River Line.
2. **(Visual 1C: September – November 1950):** In a spectacular reversal of fortune, the amphibious landing of UN forces at Inch'on in mid-September triggered a collapse of the North Korean People's Army.
- a. 15 Sep: US amphibious force from Japan stormed ashore at Inchon.
  - b. 16 Sep: Pusan Counter-Attack - UN forces broke out of the Pusan Perimeter and attacked to the north.
  - c. 26 Sep: Liberation of Seoul.
  - d. 19 Oct: Capture of Pyongyang.
    - (1) The UN, after some hesitation, mandated MacArthur to invade North Korea.
    - (2) On 19 October, UN troops captured the North Korean capital of P'yongyang.
  - e. 26 Oct: Chinese Border - ROK forces in the east pushed north to the Chinese border.
  - f. The 2d Infantry Division (and the 23d Infantry Regiment) played a major role in this phase of the Korean War.
    - (1) 16 – 31 Oct: The 2d Division (and the 23d Regiment) fought in the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter and the drive north.
    - (2) By 1 Nov, the 23d Regiment was on garrison duty at a port near Pyongyang and anxiously awaited the end of the war and being shipped home.
3. **(Visual 1D: November 1950 – January 1951):** The collapse of the North Korean People's Army was only stopped by the enormity of the Chinese intervention in October and November.
- a. **Chinese Intervention:**
    - (1) 14 Oct: Chinese Attack: The entry into the war of major Chinese military forces rocked the overextended UN troops and sent them reeling back into South Korea [note: U.S. 2d Infantry Division (and the 23d Regiment) sustained heavy casualties fighting as the Corps rearguard during the retreat].
    - (2) 24 Nov: UN Central Front collapsed and started a fighting retreat through horrible winter weather.

- (a) At Thanksgiving the 2d Division (and the 23d Regiment was about 60 miles south of the Yalu River.
  - (b) Initially the 2d Division tried to contain the Chinese attack, but soon joined the fighting retreat..
  - (c) The 23d Regiment served as the 2d Division rear guard and suffered significant losses in men and material.
- (3) By mid-December, the UN forces had organized a defensive line roughly on the 38th Parallel. There they braced for the expected offensive by Chinese and new North Korean divisions.
- (4) LTG Walton Walker killed in a vehicle accident
- (5) LTG Matthew Ridgeway assumes command of the 8<sup>th</sup> Army.
- (a) Inherits a defeated and dispirited Army.
  - (b) Instills a ***“Lead from the Front”*** attitude to rebuild the fighting spirit of the UNC forces.
    - (1) ***“I don’t want to hear your withdrawal plans – I want to hear your attack plans.”***
    - (2) ***“The job of the commander was to be up where the crisis of action was taking place. In time of battle, I wanted division commanders to be up with their forward battalion, and I wanted corps commanders up with the regiment that was in the hottest action. If they had paper work to do, they could do it at night. By day their place was up there where the shooting was going on. I held to the old-fashioned idea that it helped the spirits of the men to see the Old Man up there, in the snow and sleet and the mud, sharing the same cold, miserable existence they had to endure.”***
- (6) Ridgeway’s Guidance and ***“Meat Grinder Tactics”***<sup>1</sup>
- (a) Units off their vehicles and on the hills.
  - (b) Troops to construct tight defensive perimeters for night fighting, while expanding the perimeters during daylight.
  - (c) Use the UNC advantage in airpower, artillery, tanks, and flak wagons to grind down the communist forces.

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<sup>1</sup>Kenneth Hamburger’s “Leadership in the Crucible.”



- (d) Punish the Chinese by killing as many as possible –not concerned with fighting for real estate.
  - (e) No more **"bug outs."** Units would stay in position and fight surrounded if need be, holding out until a relief force could get to them the next day.
  - (f) At night, destroy the enemy with artillery and flak wagons, and using tanks to support the infantry, then call in air strikes during daylight hours.
  - (g) ***"A spirit that cannot be imposed from above but that must be cultivated in every heart, from private to general. It is rooted, I believe, in the individual's sense of security, of belonging to a unit that will stand by him, as units on both sides and in the rear stand by all other units too. Good training should help a soldier get rid of that awful sense of alone-ness that can some times overtake a man in battle, the feeling that nobody gives a damn about him, and that he has only his own resources to depend on. Americans, I think, are often more self-sufficient than soldiers of other nations. But still they need help in cultivating that assurance that they belong to a group that will return their loyalty no matter what danger threatens."***
- (7) The soldiers (tired of retreating) welcomed Ridgway's leadership.
- (a) He was a warrior. He carried a carbine and a grenade always taped to his right shoulder strap (a theatrical but soldierly gesture). The soldiers joked about the grenade and speculated as to whether the grenade had powder in it.
  - (b) Soldiers noted that Ridgway had tremendous reservoir of personal courage.
    - (1) Lieutenant Robert Curtis remembers seeing him drive through mortar fire to reach the 23d Regiment, then walk along the line of riflemen through mortar and small-arms fire, talking to individual soldiers.
    - (2) Captain Ansil Walker, the 1st Battalion's heavy weapons company commander, saw Ridgway striding erectly across a valley through a hail of small-arms fire, and was impressed that a general would take such risks.

## b. The 1951 Communist Offensive

### (1) 31 Dec: 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel Attack

- (a) Ridgeway had only a few days to influence the 8<sup>th</sup> Army before the North Koreans and Chinese attacked.
- (b) On the evening of December 31, 1950, the North Koreans and Chinese launched a massive attack against South Korean forces along the 38th parallel.

### (2) 3 Jan: Evacuation of Seoul: Ridgway interpreted the Sino-Korean attack on the central front as an attempt to surround the UN defenders at Seoul, and he immediately ordered the evacuation of Seoul on January 3.

### (3) On January 5, Ridgway ordered all UN forces to withdraw to the 37th parallel to set up a new defensive line, dubbed "Line D. "

### (4) 5 – 7 Jan: 1<sup>st</sup> Battle of Wonju (US 2d IN DIV)

- (a) Prior to the Communist Offensive, Ridgway had already ordered the US X Corps to reinforce the South Korean defenses near Wonju.
- (b) Most of the US X Corps was still assembling at Pusan, the only unit that was available in the Eighth Army's reserve was the US 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division, which was still recovering from its earlier losses in the retreat.
- (c) The Communist main effort was against Seoul. However, Ridgway declared that the village of Wonju was "only second to Seoul" in importance, and therefore must be defended at all cost.
- (d) In the First Battle of Wonju, the US 2d Infantry Division (and the 23d Regiment) was pushed south of Wonju.

### (5) 8 – 20 Jan: In the Second Battle of Wonju – US 2d Infantry Division battled to retake Wonju.

**VISUAL 1E: OPERATION THUNDERBOLT** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from *The Korean War – Restoring the Balance*, Center of Military History). **[The PPT builds IAW the narrative below]**

1. The defeat of the 1951 Communist Offensive enabled the UN forces to consolidate their positions along the Korean central and eastern front and set the conditions to resume offensive operations.

2. At the end of January, Ridgway ordered the US Eighth Army to resume offensive operations.
3. He directed I and IX Corps conduct a cautious and limited advance north toward the Han River.
4. Ridgway directed the X Corps to protect the IX Corps right flank.
5. Since the enemy situation was still unclear, the action, codenamed Operation THUNDERBOLT, was designed to discover enemy dispositions and intentions with a show of force.
  - a. The projected attacks did not represent a full-scale offensive.
  - b. Phase lines—lines drawn on maps with specific reporting and crossing instructions—would be used to control tightly the advance of the I and IX Corps.
  - c. The units were to avoid becoming heavily engaged.
  - d. To accomplish this, each corps would commit only a single U.S. division and ROK regiment.
  - e. This use of terrain-based phase lines and of limited advances with large forces in reserve was to become the standard procedure for UN offensive operations for the rest of the war.
6. Prior to Ridgway issuing guidance, General Almond had already made preparations for X Corps to conduct operations similar to THUNDERBOLT.
7. On 29 Jan 51, a joint motorized patrol from the 2d (X Corps) and the 24th Division (IX Corps) moved north out of the Yaju area on the east side of the Han to a pair of railroad tunnels about four miles south of Chip' yong-ni.

|                 |
|-----------------|
| <b>ANALYSIS</b> |
|-----------------|

1. How did LTG Ridgway rebuild the shattered morale of the US 8<sup>th</sup> Army?
2. What role did the junior leaders play in the rebuilding the morale of the US 8<sup>th</sup> Army?

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## **STAND 2: The Lost Patrol**

### **VISUALS**

| Visual                                    |
|---|
| <b>2A: The Mission of the Lost Patrol</b> |
| <b>2B: Troop Leading Procedures</b>       |
| <b>2C: The Road to Sinch' on</b>          |
| <b>2D: The Lost Patrol's Equipment</b>    |
| <b>2E: CCF Organization and Equipment</b> |
|   |
| <b>Troop Leading Procedures Handout</b>   |

### **ORIENTATION**

**Virtual View: No virtual view for Stand 2.**

#### **Orientation:**

1. By the end of January 1951, the Eighth Army occupied defensive positions along the 37th parallel.
2. The 23d Infantry occupied the left flank of the 2d Division line with its left resting against the Han River. (Green star on the visual).
3. The UN retreat had exceeded the pace of the CFF advance and the CCF limit of advance was unknown to the UN forces.

### **DESCRIPTION**

**VISUAL 2A: THE MISSION OF THE LOST PATROL** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from the “Combat Actions in Korea,” by Russell Gugeler. Pages 80-99, The Twin Tunnel Ambush). **[The PPT builds on the Visual are IAW the discussion below.]**

1. The 24th and 2d Infantry Divisions occupied adjoining positions near the center of Eighth Army's line.

2. In late January 1951, the Eighth Army sent feeler patrols northward to locate the enemy again and reestablish contact.
3. Late on the 27th of January, the commanding general of U.S. X Corps directed the 2d Division to send a reconnaissance patrol northward to the vicinity of two railroad tunnels a few miles south of Chipyong-ni.
  - a. It was to join forces at Iho-ri with a group from the 24th Division, after which the composite patrol would proceed to the objective.
  - b. 'Because the order reached the divisions so late, the 24th Division was unable to make arrangements for crossing the unbridged Han River in time to effect the meeting.
  - c. A patrol from the 23d Infantry (2d Division) reconnoitered the Twin Tunnels area, however, and returned to its base without incident.
4. At 2240 on the night of the 28th, X Corps directed the 2d Division to run the same patrol on the following day, again in conjunction with a patrol from the adjoining division.
  - a. This time the 2d Division was to furnish five additional jeeps to carry the men from the 24th Division, which was still unable to get its vehicles across the river.
  - b. First orders concerning the patrol reached the 23d Infantry at 2300.
  - c. Patrol assigned to Company C and Lt. James P. Mitchell (1<sup>st</sup> Platoon). He received his initial warning order the night before – soon after 2300 hrs. Directed to report for full order the next morning at 0600.

**VISUAL 2B: TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from the “Combat Actions in Korea,” by Russell Gugeler. Pages 80-99, The Twin Tunnel Ambush). **[The PPT builds on the Visual are IAW the discussion below.]**

- Show slide 2B for the initial discussion.
  - Also provide a copy of Slide 2B to the participants as a handout.
  - You may want to consider backing up to Slide 2A (the map) during the discussion.
1. Lt. Mitchell (1<sup>st</sup> Platoon) received his initial warning order the night before – soon after 2300 hrs., and directed to report for full order the next morning at 0600.
    - a. Orders at 0600:
      - (1) Jeep mounted reconnaissance of the Twin Tunnels area-by road, about thirty miles north of Company C's location (road distance).

- (2) Make contact with the enemy, if he could, but to avoid combat with any large enemy force.
  - (3) He was ordered to move out as soon as possible since he was scheduled to meet the 24th Division's patrol at 1030. Joint patrol – Lt. Mitchell is the senior Lt.
  - (4) Return before dark.
- b. His platoon consisted of approximately 44 men. However, 20 of those were new replacements.
    - (1) The 23d Infantry was still recovering from the difficult retreat from North Korea.
    - (2) To find the needed replacements, 8<sup>th</sup> Army directed units to move cooks, clerks, and other administrative personnel to the infantry platoons.
- 2. Battalion headquarters called three times between 0630 and 0800, each time adding men and weapons to the patrol.
    - a. Lt. Willaim Penrod and heavy weapons squad (HMGs, MMGs, Recoilless Rifles).
    - b. Capt. Melvin R. Stai (battalion assistant S3) to coordinate link-up with 24th Division.
    - c. Major Millard O. Engen with Liaison Plane to provide radio link back to BN/Regt (Infantry radios not compatible with aircraft radios).

**VISUAL 2C: THE ROAD TO SINCH' ON.** (Unless noted this portion of the narrative is from the “Combat Actions in Korea,” by Russell Gugeler. Pages 80-99, The Twin Tunnel Ambush). **[The PPT builds on the visual are IAW the discussion below.]**

- 1. After the BN orders brief (0600), BN directed Lt. Mitchell to move out as soon as possible since he was scheduled to meet the 24th Division's patrol at 1030.
- 2. It was a joint patrol – However, it was made clear that Lt. Mitchell was the senior Lt. and in command.
- 3. Capt. Melvin R. Stai (battalion assistant S3) went along only to be certain that Lieutenant Mitchell's patrol met the men from the 24th Division as planned. He was told to return to battalion headquarters after the composite patrol departed for the tunnels. (The 34 year-old Stai was a decorated veteran and had served earlier in the war as a company commander).
- 4. The final platoon order, collecting of vehicles and radios took time. One the significant delays was that the Artillery BN wanted to provide its own radio operators to care for its finicky radios. The radio operators did not report until sometime after 0830.
- 5. It was 0900 before the patrol was ready to get under way. They were about 1 hour behind schedule for meeting with the 21<sup>st</sup> IN Patrol in Iho-ri at 1030.

6. Movement to Ihori.
  - a. For Korea, the road was good but movement was slow because of heavy snow in shaded spots and patches of ice that covered some sections of the narrow road.
  - b. The liaison plane circled above the vehicular column as far as Ihori where it lost visual contact because of the haze in the valley.
7. At 1115 the column reached Ihori, a small village on the east bank of the Han River, where the patrol from the 24th Division was waiting.
8. The patrol now consisted of 60 men from three different companies. One of those companies was from a different divisional organization
9. The 23d Infantry element consisted of forty-five officers and men, most of whom were members of Lt. Mitchell's Company C rifle platoon.
  - a. Nine members of the patrol, including an officer, were from Company D;
  - b. The others were the artillery radio operators and the drivers from the 3d Battalion.
  - c. Vehicles consisted of two 3/4-ton weapons carriers and nine jeeps.
10. For 20 of the 44 members of the patrol, this was their first combat action since they had joined Company C only four days before. They were from specialist schools-listed as draftsmen, mechanics, and technicians-and had received little training as infantrymen.
  - a. One of the new men was Pvt. Richard C. Fockler (High Tide in the Korean War, iv-v).
  - b. Only in the Army for 3 months and with the platoon only the last 5 days. More on Pvt. Fockler later in the staff ride.
11. The 21<sup>st</sup> Infantry element consisted of one officer and 14 Men from the 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon, Company F.
12. The Patrol was completely motorized and heavily armed.
  - a. LT Mitchell's 45 men were heavily armed.
    - (1) They carried either rifles or carbines and two men were armed BARs.
    - (2) They also had a 75mm and a 57mm recoilless rifle.
    - (3) A 3.5-inch bazooka.
    - (4) A 60mm mortar.
    - (5) Two light machine guns with tripod mounts.
    - (6) Two caliber .50 and three caliber .30 machine guns mounted on the vehicles.,



- b. LT Mueller's 15 men lacked the heavy weapons.
    - (1) But six had BARs
    - (2) Additionally they had a light machine gun.
- 13. Mueller's men had reversible parkas which they wore with the white side out, including white hoods over their helmets, whereas the men from the 2d Division were dressed in fatigue clothing and field jackets.
- 14. Soon after the linkup, the patrol moved north toward Sinch' on.
- 15. Lieutenant Mitchell, with four men in a jeep mounting a caliber .50 machine gun, made up the advance party and led the patrol by about fifteen hundred yards. – **Critique Lt. Mitchell's decision to serve as the reconnaissance effort.**
- 16. Captain Stai, who decided at Ihori to accompany the patrol instead of returning to battalion headquarters.
- 17. It proceeded at once toward the objective, which was still approximately fifteen miles away.
- 18. A short time before noon the patrol approached the small village of Sincho.

**VISUAL 2D: THE LOST PATROL'S EQUIPMENT:** (This discussion is optional)

- 1. Additional information on the US weapons.
  - a. Lieutenant Mitchell had two SCR-300 radios, neither of which worked well, for communications within the patrol.
  - b. To help maintain communications between the patrol and its headquarters, the regiment had arranged for an L-5 liaison plane to circle above the patrol and act as a radio relay station.
    - (1) It was therefore necessary to have an SCR-619 radio to communicate with the plane.
    - (2) To be safe, the 1st Battalion borrowed two.
  - c. M1 "Garand," U.S. Rifle caliber .30: The basic shoulder weapon of the UN Forces. It was the first gas-operated, semi-automatic service rifle adopted by the U.S. Army.
    - (1) First fielded: 1935 (iconic American shoulder arm of WW2)
    - (2) Weight: 9.5 pounds.
    - (3) Effective range: 300 yards.
    - (4) Rate of Fire: 30 rounds per minute. (Fired an 8-round clip)
  - d. US Carbine Caliber .30: The M1 Carbine was developed as a "light rifle," chambered for .30 pistol weight ammunition. Principal arm for officers and senior NCOs.
    - (1) First fielded: 1941.
    - (2) Weight: 6 pounds.

- (3) Effective range: 200 yards.
- (4) Rate of Fire: 750 rounds per minute. (15 or 30 round detachable magazine)  
[Practicable rate of fire with 30 round magazine was far less]
- e. Pistol, Caliber .45 M-1911 A-1: the Colt .45 Automatic (M1911A1), was the primary service pistol of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marines by World War II. B
  - (1) First fielded: 1911
  - (2) Weight: Slightly less than 2 pounds.
  - (3) Effective range: 25 yards.
  - (4) Rate of Fire: 70-85 rounds per minute. (7 round detachable magazine)
- f. Browning Automatic Rifle, or BAR: The U.S. Army's squad level light machinegun in WWII and Korea. (limited use in WWI) Fired the same cartridge as the M-1 Garand.
  - (1) First fielded: 1918
  - (2) Weight: 15.98 pounds.
  - (3) Effective range: 1,500 yards.
  - (4) Rate of Fire: 500-650 rounds per minute. (20 round detachable magazine)  
[Practicable rate of fire with 20 round magazine was far less]
- g. US Machine Gun, Caliber .30, M-1919 A-4 (Light Machine Gun, or LMG): The standard U.S. Army Light Machine Gun. In Korean War the standard was 1 per platoon. Fired the same cartridge as the M-1 Garand
  - (1) First fielded: 1919
  - (2) Weight: 31 pounds.
  - (3) Effective range: 1,500 yards.
  - (4) Rate of Fire: 400-600 rounds per minute. (Belt fed)
- h. US Machine Gun, Caliber .30, M-1917 A-1 (Heavy/Medium Machine Gun): A heavy/water cooled version of the M1918 LMG. The Infantry Battalion Weapons Company had four of these guns. The mounted element of the patrol had three jeep-mounted 30. Cal machineguns and some of these may have been the M1917.
  - (1) First fielded: 1917
  - (2) Weight: 103 pounds.
  - (3) Effective range: 1,500 yards.
  - (4) Rate of Fire: 600 rounds per minute. (Belt fed)
- i. 50 Caliber Air Cooled MG M2HB: A large-caliber machine gun that was usually mounted of vehicles or positioned in fixed positions. The mounted element of the patrol had 2 mounted M2s, but not present in the defense of the hill top.
  - (1) First fielded: 1933
  - (2) Weight: 83.78 pounds.
  - (3) Effective range: 2,000 yards.
  - (4) Rate of Fire: 400 to 600 rpm.
- j. M20 3.5in Super Bazooka: A man portable rocket launchers, developed in WWI. The Super Bazooka replaced the WWI era 2.36 in Bazooka. A rifle platoon had one bazooka.

In the Lost Patrol action the mounted element of the patrol had a Supper Bazooka and it may have been present on the hill top.

- (1) First fielded: 1950
- (2) Weight: 15 pounds (each shell was additional 8.5 pounds)
- (3) Effective range: 75 yards.
- (4) Rate of Fire: 575 rounds per minute. (Belt fed)

- k. Recoilless Rifles: The 57mm, and 75mm recoilless rifles (RR) fire artillery or tank like shells along a flat trajectory – known as “Pocket Artillery.” The back-blast escapes from the rear of the weapon so that there is no recoil, as with howitzers or cannon. The 57mm RR could be shoulder fired. The 75mm RR was crew-served and mounted on a tripod. The RR’s were effective against infantry and fortifications such as bunkers.

- (1) Each infantry company had 3x 57mm M18 RRs. [Note: In the Lost Patrol action the mounted element of the patrol had a M18, but not present in the defense of the hill]
  - (a) First fielded: Early 1945
  - (b) Weight: 45 pounds. (Each shell was an additional 5.3 pounds)
  - (c) Effective Range: 500 yards (area targets out to 4,340 yards).
- (2) Each infantry battalion had 4x 75mm M20 RRs in the battalion weapons company. [Note: In the Lost Patrol action the mounted element of the patrol had a M20, but not present in the defense of the hill]
  - (a) First fielded: Late 1945
  - (b) Weight: 103 pounds. (each shell was an additional 5.3 pounds)
  - (c) Effective Range: 1000 yards (area targets out to 3.9 miles)

- l. Infantry mortars: The 60mm, 81mm and 4.2in. Mortars were the infantry’s organic artillery. They were primarily anti-personnel weapons. The mortar consisted of a sealed-breach tube with bipod and a base-plate. Mortars threw high explosive shells at high angles and were capable of reaching into trenches and other defilade positions that were impervious to direct fire weapons.

- (1) M2 60mm mortars (3 each in a rifle company) [Note: In the Lost Patrol action the mounted element of the patrol had a 60mm mortar, but not present in the defense of the hill]
  - (a) First fielded: 1940
  - (b) Weight: 42 pounds (each shell is an additional 3 pounds)
  - (c) Effective Range: 1.1 miles
- (2) M1 81 mm mortars (4 each in the battalion weapons company) [May have been with F Co. 1/23 Infantry in the Lost Patrol Action]
  - (a) First fielded: 1940
  - (b) Weight: 136 pounds (each shell is an additional 6 to 15 pounds)
  - (c) Effective Range: 1.9 miles
- (3) M2 4.2in mortars (12 in the regimental heavy mortar company) [the 4.2in mortar is similar today’s 120mm mortar]
  - (a) First fielded: 1928
  - (b) Weight: 333 pounds (each shell is an additional 24 to 28 pounds)
  - (c) Effective Range: 4.4 miles

- m. Artillery During Korean operations, the standard US artillery of WWII was employed: the 105mm, the 155mm, and the 8-in howitzers and rifles. Normally Allied forces enjoyed a significant advantage in artillery. After their retreat to the hill, the Lost Patrol has no means of calling for supporting artillery. The relief company did call for and use supporting artillery.

## **VISUAL 2E: CCF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT: (THIS discussion is optional)**

1. Lt. Mitchell's patrol would soon discover that there was a significant CCF presence in the Twin Tunnels area. The 23d Regiment estimated in their after-action report that the patrol and the relief effort fought against a 2 or 3 companies of CCF Infantry.
2. CCF organization was triangular like the US Army.
  - a. A CCF Regiment (in theory 3,242 men, but usually understrength) had three Infantry battalions, artillery battery, and guard, mortar, transport, signals, medical and stretcher companies..
  - b. Each Battalion had:
    - i. Small Headquarters
    - ii. 3 Light Infantry Companies armed with rifles, SMGs, and LMGs.
    - iii. The BN also had some support weapons – primarily MMGs and mortars.
    - iv. The 23d US Infantry Regiment estimate of the enemy situation is that the patrol and relief effort fought against a BN (-) because enemy mortars were present.
3. The Chinese infantry were very light, very robust, very aggressive, and very mobile.
4. As with the US, the majority of Russian equipment was WWII vintage. Although Chinese and Japanese equipment also saw extensive use.
5. Infantry rifles: Communist forces were equipped with a miscellany of shoulder weapons. Two of the most prominent were the Russian 7.62mm carbine and the Japanese 7.7mm Imperial Army Rifle (both WWII era weapons). In time, the CCF discarded the rifle in favor of the submachine gun. It was less accurate and had less killing power. However, it gave the peasant soldiers the ability to deliver a much higher volume of fire.
6. Shpagin PPSH41 submachine gun (burp gun): The Shpagin PPSH41 submachine gun (burp gun) was the most common submachine gun:
  - a. First fielded: 1941
  - b. Weight: 8 pounds without the magazine.
  - c. Effective range: 140 yards.
  - d. Rate of Fire: Up to 1000 rpm(35-round box magazine or 71-round drum)

7. Chinese hand grenades were significantly different in physical appearance to US grenades. The stick fragmentation grenade was less powerful, and their stick concussion grenade more powerful. In the attack, the CCF ordinarily employed one platoon armed only with grenades to lead the attack.
8. Machine Guns: The CCF fielded many Japanese and Russian Light Machineguns. One such LMG was the Degtyaryov Light Machine Gun (7.62mm).
  - a. First fielded: 1928
  - b. Weight: 25 pounds with the magazine.
  - c. Effective range: 879 yards.
  - d. Rate of Fire: 550 rpm (30 round overhead round-box magazine)
9. **Mortars**: The CCF used a variety of mortars – mostly of Russian. Because of its ease of transport, the mortar was the most common form of indirect fire-support.
  - a. Communist regiments had six 120mm mortars.
  - b. Each infantry battalion had had nine 82mms or sometimes the more portable 61mms.
  - c. Communist mortars could use US 81mm and 60mm ammunition. US 81mm and 60mm mortars could not use the communist ammunition.
  - d. The CCF forces in the combat action against the Lost Patrol did employ mortars – the size and numbers present are not known. This indicates that at least a BN (-) was employed against the Lost Patrol.

## ANALYSIS

1. For 20 of the 44 members of the patrol, this was their first combat action since they had joined Company C only four days before. They were from specialist schools-listed as draftsmen, mechanics, and technicians-and had received little training as infantrymen – What leadership challenge does this impose on Lt. Mitchell?
2. What advantages and disadvantages does the addition of Lt. Willaim Penrod and heavy weapons impose onto LT Mitchell?
  - Same issue applies with the addition of Capt. Melvin R.Stai (battalion assistant S3).
  - Same issue also applies to Major Millard O. Engen with Liaison Plane to provide radio link back to BN/Regt (Infantry radios not compatible with aircraft radios).


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### **STAND 3: Initial Contact at the Twin Tunnels**

#### **VISUALS**

| Visual   |
|--|
| <b>3A: Initial Contact at the Twin Tunnels</b> |
| <b>3B: Lost Patrol's Equipment</b>             |
| <b>3C: The Race for the Hill</b>               |

#### **ORIENTATION**



#### **Virtual View: Twin Tunnels Overview.**

- **This is a birds-eye view of the road leading north to the village of Sinch' on.**
  - Currently located about 1/2 mile south of the small village of Sinch' on (Green Star on Visual 3B).
  - The road to the north leads to the Twin Tunnels.
    - The tunnels are about 1.5 miles to the north.

- One of the tunnels passes below the large hill to the north (Hill 333)
  - To the west is Hill 453 and to the east is Hill 404.
  - The road will eventually take you to Chipyeong- ni, about 6 miles to the NW.
  - To the south is the road to Iho –ri. The UN front lines are about 15 miles to the south.
- **IAW the discussion move down to the road and then drive along the road to the road to the location of the next Green Star near Sinch' on.**

## DESCRIPTION

**VISUAL 3A (PART 1): INITIAL CONTACT AT THE TWIN TUNNELS.** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from the “Combat Actions in Korea,” by Russell Gugeler. Pages 80-99, The Twin Tunnel Ambush). ). **[The PPT builds on the visual are IAW the discussion below.]**

1. As Lieutenant Mitchell in the lead vehicle neared the objective, he passed a large hill that rose steeply on the left (west) side of the road, dominating the entire area. - This was Hill 453.
2. Skirting the base of the hill, the road crossed a ford in a shallow stream and then split at the base of another, smaller hill.
  - a. One fork of the road turned right to Sinch' on; the other fork went west for several hundred yards, then turned north.
  - b. Another two thousand yards where it crossed the railroad track between the two tunnels.
3. At the ford Lieutenant Mitchell stopped to wait for Lieutenant Mueller and Captain Stai.
  - a. The patrol was behind schedule and Lt. Mitchell was concerned that they would not be able to return to friendly lines before dark.
  - b. To save time, Captain Stai offered to go alone into Sinch' on while the rest of the patrol went on to investigate the tunnels, after which they would be ready to return.
  - c. Captain Stai moved out and stopped his vehicle just short of the village.



**Virtual View: Show Sinch' on off to the right.**

- **Currently at the Green Star near the village of Sinch' on.**
  - **The road to the right goes to Sinch' on.**
  - **The road to the left goes to Twin Tunnels and then onto Chipyeong-ni**
- d. Captain Stai left his driver and vehicle by the road, walked alone to-ward the cluster of drab houses in Sinch' on and disappeared – with him was the patrol's means of communicating with the Liaison Plan above them.
- e. After Captain Stai had walked off toward Sinch' on, his driver followed him in the jeep for a hundred or two hundred yards and had then stopped in the single-lane road to wait.
- f. At this point Cpt Stai disappears.
- (1) The driver was later found dead by his jeep.
- (2) Stai was reported as missing in action and assumed dead.
- (3) Many years after the war it was discovered that he was captured and then killed in a UN airstrike while performing forced labor at a railroad yard.



**Virtual View: Move forward along the road to the location of the next Green Star at the RR tracks. Describe the terrain and initial contact IAW the discussion below.** [note there are several jeeps parked along the road just prior to the railroad crossing]

- **Currently located at the Green Star at the railroad tracks.**


- **One of the tunnels can be seen to the west and the other to the east.**
  - **The small hamlet of Ch'owang-ni is to the NE.**
  - **There is also a significant spur to Hill 333 that blocks long range visibility to the north.**
4. Meanwhile, the two lieutenants and the men with them proceeded to the railroad tracks and stopped.
  5. The tunnels were not side by side, but were, instead, end to end, cutting under two steep ridges, one on each side of the road and narrow valley.
    - a. On the west side the ridge rose toward the south to the hill mass of which Hill 453 was a part; the ridge on the east side of the road sloped north to Hill 333.
    - b. Between these two ridges were a stream, terraced rice paddies, and scattered Lombardy poplars.
  6. Mitchell sent Lt. Mueller and the F Company element forward as a dismounted patrol forward. He wanted them to get visibility with the small village of Ch'owang-ni and the road leading north.
  7. The C and D Co personnel remained with the vehicles and turned the column around to prepare for the drive back, and then ate their lunch ration.
  8. The time was about 1215 – initial contact.
    - a. The dismounted patrol spotted 15 or 20 Chinese soldiers running from a small hill just north of the railroad crossing, and opened fire on them.
    - b. Soon after the first shots, ten or twelve scattered mortar rounds fell near the road, landing just south of the parked jeeps. The jeeps also started to receive scatter machinegun fire.
    - c. Corporal Leroy Gibbons (C. Co) provided supporting fire with his jeep's 50. Cal HMG as the dismounted patrol rushed back the vehicles.
  9. At same time, the liaison plane was overhead of the column. (Major Millard O. Engen, the battalion executive officer).
    - a. Major Engen saw the same enemy troops whom Lieutenant Mueller's men had taken under fire, as well as another company-sized group on Hill 453.
    - b. He immediately reported this over the SCR-69 radio together with instructions for Lieutenant Mitchell to turn his patrol around and get out of the area at once.
    - c. Lieutenant Mitchell did not receive this message because the working radio was with Cpt. Stai.

10. Lt. Penrod was worried the men would panic. Despite the mortar and MG fire moved about the column to reassure the men. Pvt Fockler recalled, *“Penrod was walking up and down our column as cool as he could be.”* (High Tide, ix).

**VISUAL 3A (PART II): LIEUTENANT MITCHELL’S DECISION.** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from the “Combat Actions in Korea,” by Russell Gugeler. Pages 80-99, The Twin Tunnel Ambush). **[The PPT builds are IAW the discussion below.]**

**Virtual View: Initially remain at the location of the Green Star at the RR tracks, but refocus toward Hill 453 to the south.**

1. Lt. Mitchell also saw enemy movement to the south on the lower slopes of Hill 453 and suspected that his patrol had been caught in a well-planned ambush. He realized that from the fingers of Hill 453, the Chinese might possibly block the route of retreat.
2. Lieutenant Mitchell decided to make a run. *“Let's get out of here!”* he shouted to the men, most of whom had dispersed to seek cover when the first mortar rounds fell.
3. In the plane overhead, Major Engen also watched the Chinese moving to cut off the patrol, and he radioed new instructions, this time directing Mitchell to head for the high ground east of the road.
  - a. He then left the area since it was necessary to refuel the plane.
  - b. No one received this message either.



**Virtual View: Move along the road to south until just past the second bridge to the right/west of the road. (IAW the visual).**

4. Once the dismounted element had rejoined the vehicles – the patrol moved out to the south along the road.
5. Pvt. Fockler remembered, *“Chinese machine gunners and riflemen were hammering the convoy hard.”* (High Tide, x). Very quickly the lead vehicle was hit and it stalled the column.
6. Private Billy Blizzard stated: *“We didn’t have any idea we were so close to the Gooks until they opened up on us. They waited until we got into their trap and then cut us off.”* (High Tide, 43).
7. The patrol took cover in the ditches along the side of the road and returned fire.
  - a. Some men remained with the vehicles to use the heavy weapons. They opened fire with their caliber .50 machine gun, but the gun was cold and had so much oil on it that it took two men to operate it, one to jack it back and another man to fire it. It had little effect.
  - b. The Chinese directed most of their fire at the vehicles to neutralize them and prevent the patrol from using them to escape.
  - c. Lieutenant Penrod got one of the 75mm recoilless rifle in position to fire to the south, but after a few rounds gave that up. The Chinese had already cut the road and that they were racing for the high ground on the east side of the road.

- d. He called back to Mitchell to say they couldn't get through.

**VISUAL 3A (PART 3): LIEUTENANT MUELLER'S DECISION.** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from the "Combat Actions in Korea," by Russell Gugeler. Pages 80-**[The PPT builds on the visual are IAW the discussion below.]**)

**Virtual View: IAW the discussion below look to the south toward Hill 453 and up Hill 333 to the east. [DO NOT MOVE UP THE HILL AT THIS TIME].**

1. When the firing commenced, Lieutenant Mueller looked at the hill on the east side of the road and realized they had no chance of breaking out of the ambush by following the road.
  - a. He made the decision to lead his men up the hill, and called for them to follow him.
  - b. The ridge was only about four hundred feet higher than the road, and both it and the ridge leading to it were covered with low brush and, on the northern slopes, a foot of wet snow.
2. Lieutenant Mueller studied the area through his binoculars.
  - a. To the south he saw the Chinese running from Hill 453 toward the same hill for which he was going to lead his men.
  - b. *"We're going to have to get to the top of that hill,"* he called back to Lieutenant Mitchell. *"The Chinese are coming up from the other side! This is our only chance!"*
  - c. Mitchell agreed and ordered the patrol to abandon the vehicles and move to the high ground.
  - d. From this time on it was a race for the high ground, with the Chinese climbing the south slope of the hill from which the snow had melted.

**VISUAL 3B: THE LOST PATROL'S EQUIPMENT.** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from the "Combat Actions in Korea," by Russell Gugeler. Pages 80-99, The Twin Tunnel Ambush). **[The PPT builds on the visual are IAW the discussion below.]**

1. The patrol, well equipped when mounted, was forced to abandon most of its heavy and crew-served weapons now that it was on foot.
2. Penrod and Mitchell loaded their men with as much ammunition as each man could carry, and with the tripod-mounted caliber .30 machine gun and the 3.5-inch bazooka.
3. Mueller's men had another light machine gun with them.

4. The two recoilless rifles, the 60mm mortar, the five machine guns mounted on the vehicles, and the ammunition that could not be carried, were all left on the vehicles which were abandoned on the road, their engines still running.

**VISUAL 3C: THE RACE FOR THE HILL.** (UNLESS noted this portion of the overview narrative is from the “Combat Actions in Korea,” by Russell Gugeler. Pages 80-99, The Twin Tunnel Ambush). [The PPT builds on the visual are IAW the discussion below.]

**Virtual View: IAW the discussion discuss the fighting near the vehicles and then move up the Hill, IAW the discussion below, to the location of the Green Star on Hill 333.**

- The hill top position is very nondescript and can be difficult to find. The position is below the observation plane.
- It has logs marking the south, west, and north perimeter. There is a MMG at the south perimeter log.

1. In the break for the high ground. Some Chinese soldiers got in among the American soldiers.
  - a. Fockler remembered that Private Allan G. Anderson *“engaged them in hand-to-hand combat until he was killed.”* The Army awarded Anderson a posthumous Silver Star.
  - b. Fockler also remembered, that before he left the ditch. A man in a pale white, quilted uniform stared down on him. He recalled that he looked like *“a bastardized version of the Michelin Man.”*
  - c. Fockler stated he was so scared that he emptied his entire clip into the Chinese soldier.
2. Pvt Blizzard remembered, *“We left our vehicles and ran up a hill... All we could carry with us were rifles, carbines, one automatic rifle and on 30-caliber machine gun.”* (High Tide, 43)
3. In the confusion of the break for the hill seven of Lieutenant Mitchell's men, all new replacements, did not hear the order to run for the high ground.
  - a. One of those was Pvt. Fockler, who realized *“There was no one there. We had been left behind.”*
  - b. At first the orphaned squad tried to hide in the ditch. Then they tried to infiltrate up the hill to join with the unit.
  - c. Unfortunately they were spotted and engaged by the Chinese. Most were killed. Fockler was wounded and captured along with one other soldier.

- d. The Chinese took Fockler back to the jeeps and then abandoned him. Fockler over the next two days was rocketed by UN planes, but then rescued when the 23d Regiment moved into the twin tunnels area.
4. It was after 1300. Including Captain Stai and his driver, nine of the original sixty men were out of action.
5. The remaining fifty-one men were climbing the steep northern side of the ridge.
- a. The climb was agonizingly slow. Cpl. John Hinkel stated, ***“There was about a foot of snow on the hill and it was pretty steep. We ran and crawled and climbed any way we could to get up there. There must have been hundreds of them firing at us. We had at least six men hit before we got to the top.”*** (High Tide, 44).
  - b. Since enemy soldiers were climbing the hill on the south side of the same ridge, Mitchell's men had to stay on the north, steep, snowy side.
  - c. Even so, they were under fire from several enemy riflemen and an enemy machine gun located to the north.
  - d. Men from the 23d Infantry were conspicuous targets since their dark clothing made them prominent against the bright snow.
  - e. Much of the way they moved on their hands and knees, pulling themselves from one scrub brush to another.
  - f. Enemy fire was so accurate they would often pretend that they had been hit, deliberately roll a short distance down the hill and lie quietly until the enemy rifleman shifted his fire to someone else.
  - g. They did this in spite of the extreme difficulties of carrying their heavy loads up the steep, slippery ridge.
  - h. Within a short time all of the men were wet, either from the snow or from perspiration, and several of them were injured on the way up.
    - (1) PFC Bobby G. Hensley, who was carrying the light machine gun and tripod on his back, stumbled and fell forward over a pointed stump, breaking several ribs.
    - (2) Sgt. Alfred Buchanan, who was with him, carrying four boxes of ammunition, rubbed snow in Hensley's face to revive him, and had him on his feet a few minutes later when Lieutenant Penrod came along and told Hensley to throw away the bolt and leave the machine gun.
    - (3) Hensley said he didn't think he could make it any farther.

(4) *"You've got to make it, son,"* said Penrod. *"Just keep climbing."*

(5) Sergeant Buchanan left the ammunition and helped Hensley part way up the hill.

**Virtual View: There is no definitive location for the event below. But stop about halfway up the hill IAW the discussion below.**

i. Lieutenant Mitchell also became a casualty before reaching the hill.

(1) During World War II he had received an injury to his spine, which left his back and legs weakened.

(2) Three fourths of the way up the hill one of his legs became weak and numb.

(3) Mitchell slid himself along the ground for a while but finally sat down in the snow to rest.

(4) While he was sitting by the trail a jeep driver (PFC William W. Stratton) stopped and urged Mitchell to go on.

(5) Stratton was one of the recent replacements and this was his first day in combat. When Lieutenant Mitchell explained that he couldn't move for a while, Stratton offered to stay with him.

(6) Just about this time, three Chinese riflemen appeared on top of the ridge and stopped about fifteen feet from where the two men were sitting.

(7) Mitchell was hidden partially by brush.

(8) Stratton saw them first and fired seven rounds from his rifle, missing each time.

(9) Mitchell fired one round and missed. His carbine jammed then and he had to take out his bayonet and pry the cartridge from the chamber.

(10) Meanwhile, a bullet from one of the Chinese guns hit the stock of Stratton's rifle and then his hand, tearing it badly.

(11) Then the enemy gun jammed.

(12) The other two Chinese had turned their backs and appeared to be listening to someone who was shouting to them from the opposite side of the hill.

(13) Lieutenant Mitchell finally got his carbine in operation and killed all three of the enemy.



- (14) The two men slid down the hill a short distance to a small gully that offered more cover from enemy fire.
- (15) Hensley (the machine gunner with the broken ribs) was already sitting in this gully, having been left there by Sergeant Buchanan. The three men sat there for about a half hour.
- j. One other soldier had trouble reaching the crest of the hill.
- (1) Sgt. John C. Gardella, loaded with machine-gun ammunition, slipped in the snow and fell down a steep part of the ridge.
- (2) Since he was unable to climb back at that point, he circled to the north looking for an easier route.
- (3) As it happened, he went too far north and suddenly came upon several enemy riflemen and a crew operating a machinegun.
- (4) He was within twenty feet of the group before he noticed it and although he was in heavy brush at the time and had not been seen, he was afraid to move back.
- (5) He lay there for the rest of the day and throughout the night.

## ANALYSIS


1. Evaluate the leadership's decision to abandon the vehicles and most of the heavy weapons.
2. LTG Ridgeway upon assuming command of the 8<sup>th</sup> Army was concerned that after the disastrous retreat from the Chinese Border that many of the UNC forces lack the will to fight – they seemed more concerned with retreating than with defending or attacking.
  - a. Ridgeway was not so much concerned with holding ground – but more interested in using the UNC advantages in heavy weapons, supplies, artillery and airpower to inflict punishing casualties upon the communist forces.
  - b. In his **“Meat Grinder Concept”**:
    - (1) UNC units should stand and fight on good ground even if isolated.
    - (2) Establish tight defensive perimeters and then destroy attacking communist forces with overwhelming firepower.
  - c. Does the leadership's decision to occupy a defensive position fit the Meat Grinder Concept?
    - (1) Maybe No – the patrol had no choice, it had to stand and fight.
    - (2) Maybe Yes:
      - (a) At first Lt Mitchell ordered: ***“Let's get out of here!”*** – A possible continuation of the ***“bug out”*** mentality of the disaster retreat from the north.
      - (b) However, Lt Mueller order his men to the top of the hill and was determined to ***“Stand and Fight.”*** LT Mitchell and his men then followed them to the top of the hill.
      - (c) Additionally, the patrol had several BARs per squad (only authorized one) and LT Penrod's squad from the heavy weapons platoon showed and increasing reliance on heavy weapons.

## STAND 4: Defending the Hill Top

### VISUALS

| Visual                     |
|----------------------------|
| 4A: Defending the Hill Top |
| 4B: The Last Stand         |

### ORIENTATION



### **Virtual View: Hill Top Perimeter at the location of the Green Star on Hill 333.**

- Currently located in the hilltop where the patrol's leaders elected to make their stand.
- The position is very nondescript and is marked with three logs marking the north, west, and south edge. There is a MMG behind the south log.

- **The west view of looking at abandon jeeps helps to provide prospective on the distance and height of the hill.**
- The ridge, which extended south from Hill 333, was made up of several pointed peaks connected by narrow saddles.
- The hill patrol occupied was approximately sixty feet lower than the top of Hill 333, nine hundred yards to the north, and a little lower than another hill not more than one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards to the south.
- The ground dropped off sharply on the east side of the hilltop.

## DESCRIPTION

**VISUAL 4A: DEFENDING THE HILL TOP.** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from the “Combat Actions in Korea,” by Russell Gugeler. Pages 80-99, The Twin Tunnel Ambush). **[The PPT builds IAW the discussion below.]**

1. The remaining forty-eight men left in the patrol reached the crest of the hill.
  - a. Lieutenant Mueller and his fourteen men were the first to reach the top of the hill.
  - b. Once there, they learned that it afforded little protection from the enemy guns, which both to the north and to the south were located on higher ground.

**Virtual View: Take up a position behind the south log (the location of the 30. Cal MMG) looking to the south.**

2. The Chinese reached the hill to the south about the same time Lieutenant Mueller occupied the center high ground.
  - a. In addition to the two narrow saddles that connected Mueller's position with the enemy held ground both to the north and to the south, there was another narrow saddle between his hill and a smaller mound of earth to the west, on the ridge that the patrol followed toward the high ground.
  - b. This mound of earth was within grenade-throwing distance. All three of these saddles were under enemy fire.
3. The useable area on top of the hill was so small it could have been covered by a squad tent.
  - a. It was tilted so that it sloped toward the east side of the hill, which was so steep that there was no danger of enemy attack from that direction.

- b. However, the hilltop was too small to accommodate all of the men, so Mueller and Penrod put some of the men along the saddle to-ward the north - Even then, it was crowded.
  - c. There were no holes and the ground was frozen too deep to allow digging.
4. Enemy activity commenced almost at once, with machine-gun and rifle fire coming from both the Chinese north and south positions.
5. The activity from the south was the more serious threat for two reasons.
- a. The enemy machine gun on the southern hill, being only slightly higher than the hilltop occupied by the American patrol, fired from a flat angle - Its beaten zone, therefore, was long and almost exactly covered the hilltop.
  - b. In addition, the saddle connecting the two hills was so deep that the Chinese would be able to move under the machine-gun or other supporting fire until they were within a few yards of the patrol before they would mask their own fire.
    - (1) This would place them within easy grenade range.
    - (2) Fortunately, this same path was so narrow that the Chinese would be limited to small groups for each assault.
6. Lieutenant Mueller, realizing that this was the critical part of his perimeter, placed his machine gun to guard this approach. (The machine gun was the only one left to the patrol by this time.
7. There were eight BARs and the 3.5-inch bazooka.
8. The first enemy assault was prepared by mortar fire while the Chinese moved under the machine-gun fire until they were within easy grenade range.
- a. Mueller's men stopped it just below the rim of the perimeter with the machine gun and a concentration of BAR fire.
  - b. The Chinese backed away and the enemy was comparatively inactive for about twenty minutes.
9. Meanwhile, the three injured men-Lieutenant Mitchell and Privates Hensley and Stratton-worked their way up on the hill to join the rest of the men in the perimeter.
- a. Pvt Stratton was pleased because he thought his shattered hand would be sufficient cause for returning home.

**Virtual View: From the south log turn back to the north IAW the discussion below (Stratton and Gibbons.**

- b. He crawled around the perimeter and showed it to some of the men. *"Give me your telephone number,"* he said to several of them, *"and I'll call your wife when I get back to California."*
10. Soon after the initial thrust from the south, the enemy gun to the north opened fire, wounding seven men at that end of the perimeter.
- a. The men lay as still as possible to avoid this fire, except for an eighteen-year-old squad leader (Cpl. LeRoy Gibbons) who already had been wounded six times during the Korean war.
  - b. Gibbons wanted to talk with Lieutenant Mitchell, who, by this time, had reached the small, flat part of the perimeter.
  - c. He stood up and walked erect through a string of tracers that went past him. Several of the men yelled at him to get down. *"Aw, hell,"* he said, *"they couldn't hit the broad side of a barn,"* and continued walking.

**Virtual View: Move to the north end of the perimeter - IAW the discussion below point out the CCF MG location on Hill 333.**

11. After this demonstration, Sgt. Everett Lee decided to take the enemy gun under fire.
- a. He crawled about fifteen feet farther north, saying to the other men nearby, *"I'm going to get that son of a bitch."*
  - b. He fired two rounds to zero in his rifle, then killed two of the men operating the machinegun.
  - c. Other men near him joined in the firing and the enemy gun went quiet and did not again fire.
  - d. Sergeant Lee stood up and walked back to his position on the line.

**Virtual View: Return to the south log (the MMG position) on the south side of the perimeter.**

12. Lee's actions relieved much of the pressure on the north end of the line and, from then on, the main enemy efforts came from the south and from the west.
13. Lieutenant Mueller's machine gun, the only one to reach the top of the hill, was the main strength of the defense.

**Virtual View: Use the virtual view IAW the discussion below.**

14. Five or six separate assaults were directed against the south side of the perimeter during the afternoon.
- a. Each time the men held their fire until the enemy soldiers were within close range and then directed all available fire at the narrow enemy approach route.
  - b. The machine gun was effective and Mueller's chief concern was keeping it and several BARs operating at the south end of the line.
  - c. Seven men firing these weapons were either killed or wounded during the after-noon, all hit in the head.
  - d. When one man was hit others would pull him back by his feet and another man would crawl forward to man the machine gun.
  - e. One of the machine gunners (Cpl. Billy B. Blizzard) raised his head not more than six inches from the ground and was struck by a bullet that went through his helmet, cutting into the top of his head.
- (1) Lieutenant Mitchell noticed Blizzard's head jerk and saw the hole suddenly appear in his helmet. He yelled to him, *"You aren't hurt, son. That was a ricochet."*
- (2) Corporal Blizzard turned so that his platoon leader could see the blood running across his forehead. *"Like hell it's a ricochet,"* he said.
- (3) Mueller put another man in Blizzard's place. *"For God's sake,"* he kept saying, *"we've got to keep this gun going."*
15. During one of the attacks, a Chinese crawled close to the perimeter, stood up and fired a continuous burst from his burp gun. He hit five men, including Mueller, before one of the Americans killed the enemy soldier.

**VISUAL 4B: THE LAST STAND.** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from the "Combat Actions in Korea," by Russell Gugeler. Pages 80-99, The Twin Tunnel Ambush). **[The PPT builds on Visual 2C are IAW the discussion below.]**

**Virtual View: Raise up in the air for a birds-eye view to the south. The 23d Regiment is more than 20 miles to the south**

**1. 23d Regiment Actions**

- a. When Major Engen (executive officer of the 1st Battalion) in the liaison plane left the Twin Tunnels area to refuel their plane, he immediately reported to the 23d Infantry that the Chinese had ambushed and surrounded Mitchell's patrol. – about 1245.

- b. The regimental commander (Col. Paul Freeman) immediately initiated action to send help – however it would take hours to get help to the surrounded patrol.

**Virtual View: Return to the MMG position at the south log.**

- 2. On the hilltop the situation was desperate.
  - a. The afternoon wore on with occasional lulls between enemy assaults.
  - b. Toward late afternoon ammunition was getting scarce and the officers kept cautioning their men to use it sparingly.
  - c. Medical supplies were exhausted.
  - d. More than a third of the men had become casualties, although many of the wounded men remained in the perimeter fighting.
- 3. Private Stratton (the jeep driver with the shattered hand) had taken over a BAR from another wounded man.
  - a. He fired it with his left hand.
  - b. During quiet periods he crawled around the perimeter telling the other men not to worry about their situation. *"We'll get out of this all right,"* he kept saying.
  - c. However, by evening few of the men there expected to get out alive.
- 4. Lieutenant Mitchell decision: he pulled his men back several feet to the rim of the hilltop.

**Virtual View: Move to the west side of the perimeter (the military crest). Then IAW the discussion move back slightly.**

- a. There were advantages to this move.
  - b. There, the Chinese could not spot American weapons so easily, and from the new position the Americans could not see an enemy soldier until his head appeared a few feet away.
  - c. This saved ammunition since the men could not fire until they could see a Chinese head.
- 5. All expected a major attack as soon as the darkness was complete.
  - 6. The first help for the surrounded patrol members came late in the afternoon.
    - a. A utility plane appeared above the patrol about 1730, just before sunset.



- b. The men watched as it circled above them and then screamed with delight when the first fighter planes appeared.
- c. Altogether they were two flights of four planes each.
- d. The first planes were jets, and they came in so low the men thought they could have touched them with the tips of their bayonets.
- e. Enemy activity stopped abruptly and, for the first time that afternoon, the men could raise their heads from the ground and move around freely in their crowded perimeter.
- f. The first planes fired machineguns and rockets.
- g. The second flight carried napalm bombs.
- h. It was excellent close support – that lasted about a half hour.

**Virtual View: Consider mimicking the actions of the Liaison plane to show how small of target the plane had for dropping supplies.**

- 7. Immediately following the air strike a liaison plane came over to drop supplies to the patrol.
  - a. It made four runs over the group of men, each time flying no higher than fifteen feet above their heads.
  - b. The pilot dropped thirty bandoleers of rifle ammunition, two cases of machine-gun ammunition and several belts of carbine cartridges and then, on the last run, an envelope to which was fastened a long, yellow streamer.
  - c. Except for one box of machine-gun ammunition, all of this fell beyond the tiny perimeter and, now that the air strike was over, in an area that was under enemy fire.
  - d. Nevertheless, several men dashed out to retrieve everything that was close.
  - e. The message said, "*Friendly column approaching from the south. Will be with you shortly.*"

**Virtual View: Take up a close-in birds eye view from the south of the perimeter for the discussion below.**

- f. Mitchell read it and then crawled around the perimeter to show it to the rest of the men.
  - g. About the same time, there was the sound of firing to the south – more about the relief effort in the next stand.
- 8. Mitchell and Mueller warned their men to expect an enemy assault just as soon as it got dark.

- a. Both Lieutenants crawled around the perimeter to check on the men and encourage them.
- b. They also told the men not to yell out if they were hit because they did not dare let the Chinese know how many of the group were wounded.
- c. The NCO's also moved around the perimeter checking on the men and encouraging them to stay in the fight.

**Virtual View: Return to the position the MMG behind the south log.**

- 9. Chinese attacked again and were supported by mortars, automatic weapons fire, and bugle calls.
  - a. The patrol defeated the attack.
  - b. Four men wounded – these included Sergeant Larson – who pointed to his head wound-his fifth for the day-as he crawled past Lieutenant Mitchell and said. *"That's enough for me,"* – he was having trouble focusing and remaining conscious.
  - c. Nonetheless he continued to load magazines and pass ammo to the men along the perimeter.
- 10. After the attack, the temperature dropped rapidly in the growing darkness.
- 11. The situation was grim and there was now no evidence of friendly troops were nearby (no more sounds of firing to the south.
  - a. The men lost hope of getting out of their perimeter.
  - b. Their wet clothing was freezing to the ground.
  - c. Several men were suffering from frostbite.

**Virtual View: From the MMG position look NE (you may need to rise-up slightly to show the area of the aide station.**

- d. More than half were casualties.
  - (1) Those with serious wounds had been dragged to the rear (east) part of the hilltop where they were laid on the frozen earth.
  - (2) The hill was so steep there that if grenades were dropped they would roll on down the hill away from the wounded men.

- (3) Those men who were less seriously wounded kept firing on the line or loading magazines for automatic rifles and carbines.
- (4) Lieutenant Mueller, who had been wounded earlier when a bullet struck his leg, was hit a second time-this time in the head-injuring his left eye (he began to see flashes of light and occasionally lost consciousness).

12. A second night attack hit Mitchell's patrol.

- a. It began with the usual mortar and machine-gun fire, worked up to grenade range, but again stopped a few feet from the edge of the perimeter when faced by the concentrated fire at the south end-fire from the machine gun and from several BARs.
- b. Private Stratton fired one of the automatic rifles with his left hand.
  - (1) When the Chinese were close, he stood on the rim of the perimeter, leveled his BAR at them and emptied the magazine.
  - (2) He was hit a second time, this time through the chest.
  - (3) Someone pulled him back toward the center of the perimeter.
  - (4) Soon afterwards a grenade exploded nearby and mauled his legs.
  - (5) Soon after this Stratton was wounded a fourth time, and died.
  - (6) Unfortunately, he was not able to cash-in on his first million-dollar wound.

13. The enemy made four separate assaults, all of them against the south end of the perimeter - Cpl. Jesus A. Sanchez defeated the first of these attacks with BAR fire.

**Virtual View: Move to the west of the perimeter and IAW the discussion below mimic the CCF attack. .**

14. There was respite for an hour before the enemy struck again - For this assault the Chinese shifted to the small mound just west of Mitchell's hill, and attacked from that direction.

- a. Ten or fifteen enemy soldiers crawled up under the mortar and machine-gun fire and attempted to overrun the American position.
- b. Since Lieutenant Mueller's machine gun was still guarding the south end of the line, five men with rifles and automatic carbines waited until the Chinese were at the rim of their perimeter, then fired at full rate for a minute or less.

15. There was another brief lull before the Chinese made two more assaults.

- a. In the last assault, three enemy soldiers succeeded in getting into the perimeter where they caused considerable confusion in the darkness. (High Tide, 57)
  - b. One of these Chinese soldiers emerged from the darkness and fired a **“burp gun”** [*A Chinese submachinegun*] at 1<sup>st</sup> Sgt Martinson. *The First Sergeant fired back with a pistol. Both were at point blank range, and both missed.*
  - c. PFC Thomas J. Mortimer (a D Co. Soldier) charged in and killed 1<sup>st</sup> Sgt Martinson’s attacker with a bayonet. A chased the other two Chinese away.
  - d. The 1<sup>st</sup> Sgt grabbed the bayoneted body of his assailant and tossed it out of the perimeter – and yelled to his men **“I don’t want them in here. Dead or alive.”**
  - e. PFC Mortimer was awarded the Silver Star for his one man counterattack. Citation: *The Silver Star is awarded to Private First Class Thomas J. Mortimer, RA17260475, Infantry, United States Army, a member of Company G, 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, who displayed gallantry in action against an armed enemy on 30 January 1951 in the vicinity of Sinch’ on, Korea. Private Mortimer was a member of a patrol which, attacked and surrounded by a numerically superior enemy, formed a perimeter defense on high ground. When the only machine gun with the patrol was threatened by a strong enemy assault, Private Mortimer left his position and, under intense hostile fire, went to the aid of the gunner. The enemy concentrated their efforts to destroy the machine gun, and the gunner soon exhausted his ammunition. With the enemy advancing toward the gun, Private Mortimer charged fearlessly into their midst with fixed bayonet, inflicting heavy losses upon them and singlehandedly causing them to withdraw. Largely as a result of his heroic action his patrol was able to break out of the enemy trap. The gallantry displayed by Private Mortimer reflects great credit upon himself and the military service. Entered the military service from Keokuk, Iowa.*
16. There was some talk of surrender, but SFC Odvin A. Martinson (Mueller's platoon sergeant) and other leaders put an end to the discussion.
  17. About 2300, the patrol observed two red flares to the west and thereafter it was quiet.

## ANALYSIS

1. Evaluate the efforts of the Lieutenants and the NCOs to move around in the perimeter and encourage the men.
2. There was some talk of surrender, but SFC Odvin A. Martinson (Mueller's platoon sergeant) and other leaders put an end to the discussion. – How does a leader confront this leadership challenge?

## **STAND 5: The Relief**

### **VISUALS**

| Visual                                       |
|--|
| <b>5A: The Relief</b>                        |
| <b>5B: The Casualties of the Lost Patrol</b> |

### **ORIENTATION**

**Virtual View: From the hilltop perimeter. Take up a birds-eye view looking to the south.**

### **DESCRIPTION**

**VISUAL 5A (PART I): THE RELIEF EFFORT.** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from the “Combat Actions in Korea,” by Russell Gugeler. Pages 80-99, The Twin Tunnel Ambush). **[PPT builds IAW the discussion below.]**

1. **2 Hours: Mission, Assembled, SP 1145 (Risk Guidance)**
  - a. After the report from the liaison plane (1245) that the patrol was in trouble, the regimental commander (Col. Paul Freeman) immediately requested an air strike, ordered the 2d Battalion to send relief to the patrol, and directed that a liaison pilot make a drop of ammunition to the patrol.
  - b. The 2d Battalion occupied a patrol base forward of the regimental line and was already about ten miles (road distance) nearer than the remainder of the regiment.
  - c. The order reached the 2d Battalion commander (Lt.Col.James W. Edwards) at 1300 – about the same time the patrol established a perimeter on the hill top.
  - d. Colonel Edwards immediately called Capt. Stanley C. Tyrrell (Company F) to relieve the patrol.
  - e. It required a little more than two hours to assemble the vehicles, weapons, and necessary supplies for the company, which consisted of 3 other officers’ and 142 enlisted men.

- f. Colonel Edwards added a section of 81mm mortars, a section of heavy machine guns from Company H, and included an artillery forward observation party because its radio was necessary for communications with the liaison plane.
- g. The total strength of the force amounted to 167 officers and men.
- h. Captain Tyrrell's mission was to rescue the ambushed patrol and to recover the bodies and the vehicles.
- i. Since darkness was not far off, Colonel Edwards instructed Tyrrell to form a defensive perimeter and proceed with the mission the following morning, if he could not gain contact with the ambushed patrol that night.
- j. Company F started north at 1445.
  - (1) 1245: Radio message from the liaison plane.
  - (2) 1320: Regimental estimate of the situation and warning order to 2d BN.
  - (3) 1415: Regimental order to 2d BN.
  - (4) 1445: F Co. moves out.

**Virtual View: Move to the vicinity of the Twin Tunnels Overview looking to the north.** (See screen shot with Stand 3)

- **Point out the Hill 333 to the north.**
  - **Point out Hill 453 to the NW.**
2. **Captain Tyrrell's 1<sup>st</sup> Decision:** : Company F had arrived in the Twin Tunnels area between 1720 and 1730—as the air strike was in progress and a few minutes before darkness.
- a. The vehicular column of eight 3/4-ton trucks and thirteen jeeps, with all of the trucks and some of the jeeps pulling trailers loaded with extra mortar and recoilless rifle ammunition, followed the same road used by the patrol.
  - b. While the column was en route, an observer in a liaison plane dropped a message giving the exact location of the ambushed patrol, its vehicles, and also several positions where he had observed groups of enemy soldiers in that vicinity.

**Virtual View: Move down to the road and then IAW the discussion below move up Hill 453.**

- c. Nothing important happened until the two jeeps that formed the point of the column were within one hundred or two hundred yards of the ford near which Captain Stai had disappeared earlier in the day.
- d. Two machine guns on Hill 453 opened fire on the jeeps, bringing them to a quick halt – the occupants scrambled into the ditch for protection.

- e. Captain Tyrrell, in the third jeep, soon appeared - he dismounted and walked back toward the rest of the column while his driver, already in the ditch, called after him, "**You'd better get in the ditch, Captain. The Chinks will get you.**" – Tyrrell replied, "**To hell with the Chinks,**"
  - f. CPT Tryell decided he could not proceed to the patrol with enemy machine gunners in his rear and riflemen on the highest hill in the area.
3. **Clearing of Hill 453:** He ordered his 2d Platoon to dismount and lay down a base of fire to support an attack by the other two platoons – the 2d Platoon was firing rifles at Hill 453 within three to five minutes after the Chinese began firing.
- a. In the haze of dusk, Tyrrell sent his other two platoons toward the top of the hill, attacking up two of three spur ridges which extended generally east from Hill 453 and ended abruptly at the road.
  - b. The heavy-machine-gun section was in action by the time the infantrymen started up the steep ridgeline, and before they had gone far the 81mm mortar section began firing.
  - c. 7Captain Tyrrell told the mortar crew to plaster the hill during the attack, moving the shell bursts up the ridgeline just in front of the advancing platoons.
  - d. All of this had taken place in no more than twenty minutes, and in the midst of brisk enemy fire.
  - e. The first sergeant of Company F, in the meantime, had all vehicles turned around and parked in a closed column near the mortar section so that the drivers and other men not actively engaged at the time could guard both the mortar section and the vehicles.
  - f. There was no fight for the top of Hill 453; the Chinese abandoned it and fell back in front of the mortar and machine-gun fire.
  - g. In fact, enemy fire fell off sharply after the first half hour, and thereafter there was negligible opposition.
  - h. Darkness, however, retarded the advance, which was already difficult and tedious because of the snow and the steepness of the ridge.

**Virtual View: IAW the discussion below move down to the road intersection west of Sinch' on.**

- 4. **Moving into position to continue the advance:** It took two hours or longer for the 1st Platoon—the one that attacked straight west—to gain the top of Hill 453. Once there, Captain Tyrrell told it to form a hasty perimeter for the defense of the hilltop and then send

one squad south to contact the other platoon, which was coming up along the southern of the three spur ridges, thus making certain that the top of the hill was free of enemy soldiers.

- a. At 2030 these two platoons made contact.
- b. Having secured Hill 453 and eliminated the threat from his rear, Tyrrell was ready to go ahead with his original mission – at the time From the hill to the north came the sounds of grenade explosions and heavy firing as another enemy attack fell against Lieutenant Mitchell’s patrol.
- c. His 2d Platoon, which had been in support so far, was on the road and ready to head straight north toward the surrounded patrol just as soon as the rest of the company could be maneuvered into place to support the attack.
- d. By radio Captain Tyrrell ordered one of the platoons on Hill 453 to return to the road by the most direct route, and told the other one to move northeast to a point approximately two thirds of the way down the northernmost of the three spur ridges from that hill mass.
- e. When this platoon reached a position from which it could support the 2d Platoon by fire, it was to hold in place.
- f. He also sent the heavy-machine-gun section up the northern ridgeline to join the platoon that was to form the base of fire.

**Virtual View: IAW the discussion below look to the east toward the “survivor contact #1)**

5. **Last Sound of Heavy Firing from the Lost Patrol.** This re-positioning of his force required time, and in the meanwhile Tyrrell went to the area of his 2d Platoon to work out the complete plans for its advance and to make certain that all men of the platoon knew of the movements of the other platoons so that units of his company would not get into a fire fight among themselves.
  - a. It was, by this time, 2100 or later. The enemy fire against the Lost Patrol ended abruptly after what seemed to Tyrrell like a half hour of heavy fighting.
  - b. Nevertheless, CPT Tyrell was determined to continue the advance.
  - c. As part of his effort to set the conditions to continue the advance, CPT Tyrell also look for a new positions east of the road for the heavy mortars, which he intended to displace forward.
6. **Survivor Contact 1 and the 2d Decisions:** While Tyrrell was thus engaged, he heard a voice coming from the direction of Sinch’ on: **“Hey, are you GIs?”** It sounded like an American voice.



- a. Captain Tyrrell called back, *“Who are you?”* and received an answer that they were three wounded Americans.
- b. Returning to the road, he alerted the platoon there to the possibility of some incident occurring on its right flank, moved a squad into position about a hundred yards east of the road and then, with his runner and radio operator, walked forward toward the direction from which the sound of the voice had come.
- c. They stopped at a ditch and Tyrrell called for one man to come forward to be recognized—someone answered, claiming they could not come forward separately since two of them were wounded—one seriously—and could not walk alone.
- d. Tyrrell, by this time reasonably certain that they were Americans, told them to come forward together.
- e. It was so dark that Tyrrell could distinguish objects only a few yards away and although he could see nothing, he could hear the three men stumbling through the crusted snow.
- f. He saw them first when they were only a few yards away, halted them, and asked who they were.
- g. The three men explained that they were members of Mitchell’s patrol.
- h. They had escaped from the perimeter and had made their way down the steep east side of the hill to the railroad tracks, which they had followed south.
- i. All of them appeared to be excited and suffering from exhaustion - one was bleeding badly.
- j. Tyrrell told them to get into the ditch with him and remain quiet while he listened for the sound of any enemy soldiers who, he thought, might have followed them.
- k. Everyone else in the patrol, according to the three men who reached Company F, was dead.
- l. They described the last attack which ended with Chinese swarming over their perimeter, shooting and throwing grenades.
- m. Only the three of them had escaped and there was nothing on the hill now, they claimed, but *“hundreds of Chinese.”*
- n. Although Captain Tyrrell questioned them in detail, they were emphatic in stating that the entire patrol had been overrun and all members had been killed.
- o. The 2 Decision:

(1) Tyrrell now decided to wait until morning before continuing, since his battalion commander had told him that if he could not make contact with the patrol before dark, to form a defensive perimeter until morning to prevent falling into an enemy trap or getting into a fire fight with friendly troops.

(2) He advised his platoon leaders of the change in plan.

**Virtual View: IAW the discussion below look to the west toward the “survivor contact #2)**

7. **Survivor Contact 2 and the 3d Decision:** Ten or fifteen minutes later the leader of the 1st Platoon (Lt. Leonard Napier), which was moving down the northern ridge from Hill 453 with the mission of establishing the base of fire for the next attack, called his company commander by radio. *“If you had talked with a man who just came into my position,”* he told Tyrrell, *“you wouldn’t believe the patrol was wiped out.”*

a. This was Lieutenant Mueller’s aid man who had run out of medical supplies during the afternoon and had left the perimeter after dark to try to get back to the vehicles where he hoped to find more supplies - for some unaccountable reason, he had gone too far south and there encountered Napier’s platoon.

b. Captain Tyrrell, questioning the medic over the radio, learned that the patrol was still holding at the time he left, even though three fourths of the men were casualties.

c. The 3d Decision:

(1) Tyrrell issued new orders for his 2d Platoon (Lt. Albert E. Jones) to head north up the end of the long ridge toward the ambushed patrol.

(2) In the path of this platoon were three high points on the same ridgeline.

**Virtual View: IAW the discussion below move from the Sinch’ on intersection up the spur to the patrols hill top position.**

8. **The Advance Continues:** Moving as quietly as possible, without preparatory or supporting fires, Lieutenant Jones and his platoon started forward, experiencing only the difficulties of moving and maintaining contact over steep terrain.

a. They could hear another fire fight starting at the perimeter.

b. They reached the first knob an hour later.

c. The next knob ahead was the one from which most of the Chinese attacks had originated -beyond that was the slightly lower knob where the patrol itself was located.

d. There was no firing going on at the time Jones’s 2d Platoon arrived at the southernmost knoll.

- e. Afraid that he might be walking into an ambush with his own platoon, he halted and then decided to go forward with one squad while the rest of his men formed a defensive perimeter.

**Virtual View: IAW the discussion stop slightly south the perimeter's MMG position and assume a low birds-eye view of the perimeter.**

9. **Link-UP:** In the Lost Patrol Perimeter:

- a. Several hours had passed since Company F had done any firing.
- b. To the surviving members of Mitchell's patrol there was no evidence of the promised rescue.
- c. Between Two red flares appeared toward the west and thereafter it was quiet.
- d. The patrol members waited for a half hour or longer while nothing happened.
- e. Then they heard footsteps again, the same sound of men approaching over frozen snow. This time the sound came from the south again.
- f. When the footsteps sounded close, Lieutenant Mitchell's men opened fire. ***"GIs!"*** someone below yelled. ***"Don't shoot! GIs!"***
- g. For several seconds no one spoke or moved. Finally Corporal Sanchez called down, ***"Who won the Rose Bowl game?"***
- h. There was silence again for a few seconds until someone below called, ***"Fox Company, 23d Infantry, by God!"***
- i. Lieutenant Jones and his squad from Company F moved on up, following the same snow-beaten path over which the Chinese attacked during the afternoon and evening.
- j. Sanchez, the BAR man, stood up.
- k. ***"We're relieved, fellows!"*** he yelled. ***"We're relieved!"***
- l. The others who could also stood up and, from then on, they disregarded the Chinese who had, apparently, moved back for the night.

10. **Evacuation:** A thin moon came up and furnished a little light, which made the evacuation of the wounded men easier.

- a. Nevertheless, it required more than three hours to move everyone off of the hill.

- b. Corporal Sanchez took charge of the top of the hill and supervised the evacuation from that end, searching the hill to be certain no living men were left behind, and emptying the pockets of the dead.
  - c. Some of the men whose wounds were not serious complained about the cold and the hardships of walking over the difficult terrain in the dark, but those men who were wounded seriously expressed only their gratitude, and tried to help themselves.
  - d. Sergeant Martinson, with five bullet wounds, left the litters for the other men and hobbled out with two other men.
  - e. Private Hensley, who broke several ribs while climbing the hill at the beginning of the action and had received help himself at that time, now helped carry another man down the hill.
11. **Return Journey:** It was 0330, 30 January, before Company F men had carried down all surviving members of the patrol.
- a. Captain Tyrrell gave the word to move out and the column started south with one platoon of Company F marching ahead of the column and another following on foot behind the trucks.
  - b. The sun came up as the column reached Iho-ri.

**PART 5B: THE LOST PATROL CASUALTIES.** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from the “Combat Actions in Korea,” by Russell Gugeler. Pages 80-99, The Twin Tunnel Ambush). **[PPT builds IAW the discussion below.]**

- 1. Of the 60 men in the patrol.
  - a. 13 KIA.
  - b. 30 WIA.
  - c. 5 MIA.
- 2. Only 12 remained physically unscathed.

## ANALYSIS

**Evaluate the conduct of the relief effort – consider the following:**

- 1. Colonel Edward’s guidance to form a defensive perimeter and proceed with the mission the following morning, if he could not gain contact with the ambushed patrol that night.

2. Captain Tyrrell's decision to clear Hill 453 before proceeding with the mission. The clearing of Hill 453 consumed approximately 3 hours.
3. Captain Tyrrell's evaluation of survivor contact #1's information and the decision to form a night time defensive perimeter and then proceed the next morning.
4. Captain Tyrrell's evaluation of survivor contact #2's information and the decision to push immediately forward to the lost patrol.

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## **STAND 6: After the Lost Patrol**

### **VISUALS**

| Visual                   |
|--------------------------|
| 6: After the Lost Patrol |

### **ORIENTATION**

**Virtual View: Return to Twin Tunnels Overview.** (See the screen shot with Stand 3)

1. Point out the area of the “Lost Patrol” fight.
2. Then IAW the discussion below show that the 23d Infantry Regiment returned to the area on 31 January with 2 Infantry Battalions.

### **DESCRIPTION**

**VISUAL 6: AFTER THE LOST PATROL** (Unless noted this portion of the overview narrative is from the “Leadership in the Crucible,” by Kenneth Hamburger. Pages 105-125). ). **[The PPT builds on Visual 3A are IAW the discussion below.]**

1. The 23d Infantry’s “Lost Patrol Fight” was the beginning of the last phase of the Korean War.
2. The Lost Patrol Fight led to the 23d Infantry’s return to the Twin Tunnels to clear the area of Communist forces.
3. Then the 23d Infantry advanced toward Chipyeong-ni to protect the flank of the X Corps in Operation Roundup – a general UNC advance.
4. A CCF counter-attack in early February isolated the entire 23d Regimental Combat Team at Chipyeong-ni.
5. The 23d Infantry successfully defended at Chipyeong-ni and their fights at the Twin Tunnels and Chipyeong-ni proved:
  - a. The CCF was not invincible.

- b. UNC units could and would fight.
  - c. Not only could they fight, but they could fight and win against overwhelming odds and inflict devastating losses on attacking CCF and North Korean units.
6. After Chipyeong-ni, a general UNC advance moved north into North Korea to the 38th Parallel.
7. Finally, on 27 July 1953, the long-awaited Armistice was signed and the Korean War came to an end. .

|                 |
|-----------------|
| <b>ANALYSIS</b> |
|-----------------|

1. The patrol to the Twin Tunnels area consisted of:
- a. Elements of two platoons from different rifle battalions – both of which were from different regiments.
  - b. Many of the vehicle drivers were from other battalions.
  - c. The radio operators were from an artillery battalion.
  - d. Personnel from the heavy weapons company were attached to the patrol.
  - e. How did the task organization of the patrol influence the action?
  - f. Did the patrol composition result in any significant leadership challenges for the three lieutenants?
2. How and why did the patrol survive the action?
- a. Unity of effort.
  - b. Courageous and good leadership of the officers and NCOs.
  - c. Good defensive ground and good use of the one remaining 30 cal. MMG.
  - d. Timely and skillfully executed relief effort.